

# City limits: urbanisation and vulnerability in Sudan

## Juba case study

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January 2011



**UKaid**  
from the Department for  
International Development



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## Acknowledgements

ODI would like to thank the wide range of individuals and organisations that assisted and supported this study. First and foremost our thanks extend to the many people who gave generously of their time to participate in focus group discussions in Juba. We would also like to thank all the key informants who gave their time to be interviewed. Special thanks are due to NRC, Monica Sanchez Bermudez (UNDP) and UNHCR for supporting the study through seconding staff members. We are particularly grateful to UNDP for the logistical support provided to the study.

ODI would also like to extend its thanks to the many people who contributed in numerous ways to the study including through research support, the provision of documents and materials and comments on earlier drafts. Particular thanks are due to SORCHA O'Callaghan (British Red Cross), Cherry Leonardi (Durham University) and Mireille Girard (UNHCR). Finally, thanks to colleagues in the Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI who provided comments and support to the study, and particularly Matthew Foley for his expert editing of the paper.

ODI gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) to this study. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect DFID's official policies.



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# Contents

<b>Acronyms/abbreviations</b>	iii
<b>Chapter 1 Introduction</b>	1
1.1 Study details and methodology	1
<b>Chapter 2 History, drivers and patterns of urbanisation</b>	3
2.1 Context and history	3
2.2 Drivers of urbanisation	4
2.3 Settlement patterns	5
<b>Chapter 3 Policy context</b>	7
3.1 'Taking towns to the people'	7
3.2 Priority spending areas and financing trends	7
3.3 The South Sudan Growth Strategy	8
3.4 The Local Government Act	9
3.5 Pre-referendum priorities	9
<b>Chapter 4 Governance and leadership in Juba</b>	11
4.1 Local leadership	11
<b>Chapter 5 The urban economy and livelihoods</b>	13
5.1 Promoting pro-poor growth within the context of rapid urbanisation	13
5.2 Private sector investment in Juba	13
5.3 Urban livelihoods	14
5.4 Wage rates and living costs	15
5.5 Strategies to support livelihoods and employment	16
<b>Chapter 6 Land and housing</b>	17
6.1 Policy environment	17
6.2 Urban planning	17
6.3 Planning for returnees	19
6.4 Access to land	19
<b>Chapter 7 Infrastructure, services and the environment</b>	23
7.1 The link between land, infrastructure and services	23
7.2 Education	24
7.3 Health services	25
7.4 Water and sanitation	26
7.5 Deforestation	27
<b>Chapter 8 The social consequences of urbanisation and urban vulnerability</b>	29
8.1 Integration	29
8.2 Culture, gender roles and social norms	29
8.3 Protection and insecurity	30
8.4 Security provision	30
8.5 'Gangs'	30
<b>Chapter 9 Conclusions and recommendations</b>	33
9.1 Recommendations	33
<b>References</b>	35

Figure 1: Map of Juba



# Acronyms/abbreviations

<b>BRAC</b>	Bangladesh Rural Cooperative
<b>BSF</b>	Basic Services Fund
<b>CES</b>	Central Equatoria State
<b>CHF</b>	Cooperative Housing Foundation
<b>CPA</b>	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
<b>CPPG</b>	Cholera Prevention and Preparedness Group
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration
<b>DFID</b>	Department for International Development
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organisation
<b>GoS</b>	Government of Sudan
<b>GoSS</b>	Government of Southern Sudan
<b>ICSS</b>	Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan
<b>IDP</b>	internally displaced person
<b>IOM</b>	International Organisation for Migration
<b>IRC</b>	International Rescue Committee
<b>JICA</b>	Japan International Cooperation Agency
<b>JIU</b>	Joint Integrated Units
<b>LGA</b>	Local Government Act
<b>LRA</b>	Lord's Resistance Army
<b>LSE</b>	London School of Economics and Political Science
<b>MDTF</b>	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
<b>MHLPU</b>	Ministry of Housing, Land and Physical Infrastructure
<b>MoFEP</b>	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
<b>MoH</b>	Ministry of Health
<b>MoPI</b>	Ministry of Physical Infrastructure
<b>MSF</b>	Médecins Sans Frontières
<b>MSI</b>	Marie Stopes International
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organisation
<b>NISS</b>	National Intelligence and Security Service
<b>NPA</b>	Norwegian People's Aid
<b>NRC</b>	Norwegian Refugee Council
<b>OCHA</b>	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>OHCHR</b>	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
<b>PADCO</b>	Planning and Development Collaborative International
<b>PSDN</b>	Peace and Security Development Network
<b>PHCC</b>	Primary Health Care Centre

<b>PHCU</b>	Primary Health Care Unit
<b>PSDP</b>	Private Sector Development Programme
<b>PSI</b>	Population Services International
<b>SETIDP</b>	Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Development Programme
<b>SPLA/M</b>	Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement
<b>SRRC</b>	South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
<b>SUMI</b>	Sudan Microfinance Institution
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNEP</b>	United Nations Environment Programme
<b>UN-Habitat</b>	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
<b>UNHCR</b>	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UNMIS</b>	United Nations Mission in Sudan
<b>USAID</b>	US Agency for International Development
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

This case study of urbanisation in Juba is part of a wider study on urbanisation in Sudan, commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID). The study aims to explore the growing phenomenon of urbanisation in the country, focusing in particular on Nyala, Khartoum, Port Sudan and Juba. The overall aims of the study are as follows:

- To deepen understanding of the drivers of urbanisation in different parts of the country, in relation to the broader economic, political and security context.
- To analyse the consequences of rapid urbanisation, socially, economically (paying particular attention to urban livelihoods) and environmentally, and in terms of urban infrastructure and the provision of services.
- To assess the implications of rapid urbanisation in terms of the vulnerability of urban populations to future hazards and shocks, as well as development opportunities.
- To identify how the international aid community can best engage with changing settlement patterns in Sudan, and the implications for humanitarian and development programming in the future.

Although both humanitarian and development actors are paying greater attention to urban centres, significant gaps still exist in understanding drivers of vulnerability in these areas, and the needs of the urban poor, including in Juba. Risk factors associated with urbanisation – overcrowded living conditions in informal or slum settlements, unemployment, insecure tenure, food insecurity, poor access to services, health risks associated with pollution and poor sanitation, the proliferation of small arms and high levels of crime and displacement – are all areas of concern.

As well as challenges, urbanisation presents significant opportunities. Towns and cities are the engines of national and regional development, even in predominantly agricultural economies with large rural populations. Urban areas are the centres of government at the national, state and county levels. They are the source of economic services – markets, trade and commerce; banking, insurance and credit; communications, technical support and agricultural and other rural extension services. They are centres of national and regional social infrastructure – hospitals and other health referral facilities; secondary and higher education and technical training establishments and welfare facilities for the disabled, infirm and elderly. They are also sources of cultural change, modernisation and social development. If towns do not function effectively and efficiently, the rural areas that they support will not function or develop effectively and efficiently either. There is as yet limited understanding of this fundamental relationship

in current government and international engagement with urbanisation in Southern Sudan.

### 1.1 Study details and methodology

The methodology underpinning this study is the Adapted Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (see Annex 1 of the Synthesis Report). This puts people at the centre of analysis, while also looking at the ways in which institutions, processes and policies impact on assets and general wellbeing.

Field work in Juba was carried out by a team of two international researchers and five Sudanese researchers, over a period of six weeks. Four additional Sudanese researchers joined the team for shorter periods. Sudanese colleagues came from a variety of backgrounds, including Juba University, the South Sudan Law Society, the Access to Justice Programme, the State Ministry of Gender and Social Welfare and international agencies including UNDP and UNHCR and the NGO Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). A two-day workshop held in April introduced the partners to the research methodology, including an initial mapping exercise of formal and informal stakeholders.

A profiling exercise was carried out to ascertain the specific urban status of different parts of Juba, including economic profiles, main population groups and any other specific characteristics, such as security threats or environmental concerns. After the initial profiling, a total of nine locations from a cross-section of urban and peri-urban locations within Greater Juba was selected, with an emphasis on obtaining a representative sample of Juba's diverse neighbourhood profiles, settlement patterns and population groups. The nine selected *bomas* were Gurei, Gudele, Atlabara, Lologo, Gabat, Tong Ping, Nyokuron, Gumbo and Tokimaan.

Primary data was collected mainly through focus group discussions with different population groups (local authorities, elders, youth, women and men – separately where possible) in those locations. The team spent three days in each location, divided into two groups, and conducted on average of six focus group discussions per day. Over 50 key informant interviews were also carried out with government authorities at various levels, representatives of international and local organisations, donor representatives, academics, lawyers, traders and representatives of the private sector, the police and the Church.

Most of the data collected was qualitative, though some quantitative data was also retrieved. Secondary data was also collected from government institutions and international and local agencies.





# Chapter 2

## History, drivers and patterns of urbanisation

### 2.1 Context and history

Juba is the seat of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) as well as the capital of Central Equatoria State (CES). It comprises three of the 16 *payams* of Juba County: Juba, Kator and Munuki. The border of the municipality is however not clearly defined, and as the city has expanded it has incorporated surrounding rural *payams*, namely Northern Bari and Rajaf. The urbanised area of Juba was estimated at around 52km<sup>2</sup> in 2009 (JICA, 2009), though Greater Juba, including sparsely-built areas, takes up some 336km<sup>2</sup> (OCHA, 2007). Since 2005, Juba has mainly expanded westwards (west of Munuki *payam* towards Gudele, Gurei and Northern Bari) and southwards, towards Rajaf *payam*, including Tokimaan on the Yei road. Population density tends to be much higher in undemarcated areas than in the demarcated areas in Juba and Kator *payams* in the centre of town.

Forced displacement and return have been a key characteristic of the development of Juba town. Although fluctuating significantly at times, Juba's population has increased steadily over the years.

When Juba became the capital of the Southern Sudan regional government in 1956, it had a population of about 10,600 people. During the first civil war (1955–72), Juba's population

increased to around 56,737, making it the largest settlement in the South ahead of Wau and Malakal (Mills, 1985). The (relative) peace that followed the end of the civil war saw the town expand again to 83,787 inhabitants by 1983, a growth rate of 47% (USAID, 2005). It was estimated at the time that well over 80% of this growth was accounted for by migrants to the town (Mills, 1985). Expansion was marked by the uncontrolled growth of informal settlements and non-permanent housing. Less than 15% of all housing could be considered permanent: of the roughly 22,000 buildings in Juba in 1979, at least 18,000 were traditional mud-walled *tukuls* with grass-thatched roofs. Only a small number of buildings were erected on plots officially allocated by the authorities. For example, over 2,000 new plots were created between 1972 and 1975, but only 170 were officially allotted (Mills, 1985: 321). Demolitions of informal settlements, to build services or simply upgrade an area, were common in the 1970s, forcing those who could not afford to stay to move to the outskirts of what was by then Juba town. The policy of re-division of the South (called 'Kokora'), enacted in the 1980s, divided Southern Sudan into three regions: Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal, and called upon all Southerners to return to their home areas, forcing many non-Equatorians out of Juba.

During the second civil war (1983–2005), Juba, which by then included Mangalla, Rajaf, Gondokoro and Wangar *payams*, was a garrison town under the Government of Sudan (GoS), while the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) controlled the surrounding areas of Katigiri and Lobonok *payam* in Juba County. As during the first civil war, Juba experienced repeated large fluctuations in its population. A major attack on Juba by the SPLM/A in 1992, for example, forced many of its inhabitants to flee to Khartoum, while persistent insecurity from the late 1990s resulted in the displacement of large numbers of people from Juba County to Juba town. Civilians escaping attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda and fighting between the GoS and the SPLM/A over Torit, Kapoeta and Lafon came to Juba in search of protection. Reports suggest that, in 2002, camps in Juba town and its environs were hosting

**Table 1: Estimates of Juba's population**

Year	Population	Growth rate
1956	10,600	
1973	56,737	435%
1983	83,787	47%
1993	114,980	37%
2005 (estimated)	250,000	117%
2010 (estimated)	500,000	100%

Sources: USAID, 2005; HPG interviews, 2010.

**Table 2: Population distribution per *payam* in 2005 and 2009**

<i>Payam</i>	Juba	Kator	Munuki	Rajaf	Gudele	Total
Population in 2005	103,000	69,000	78,000	0	0	250,000
Population in 2009	117,000	79,000	117,000	31,000	62,000	406,000

Source: JICA, 2009: 3–5.

over 45,000 IDPs (WFP, 2003). When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005, Juba town was home to approximately 250,000 people, including 163,000 residents and 87,000 IDPs, a growth rate of 450% since 1973 (equivalent to 14% per year (UNEP, 2007)). By this time, over 30,000 plots of land were formally occupied in Greater Juba, alongside an estimated 86,000 squatter shelters (USAID, 2005).

Juba's expansion has accelerated in the post-CPA period. More than 2 million IDPs are said to have returned to Southern Sudan, together with over 330,000 returning refugees from neighbouring countries, many of whom have decided to stay in Juba rather than return to their home areas (HPG interviews, 2010). There are no exact population figures for Juba, and those figures that do exist vary significantly: some news reports in 2007 and 2008 put the population as high as 1m. In 2009 census results estimated a figure of 230,195, though this is widely seen as a gross underestimate and has been refuted by the GoSS. A study by JICA in 2009 based on a land use survey put the population at 406,000, with an annual growth rate of 12.5% since 2005 (JICA, 2009: 3–7). Other estimates are around 500,000 (Deng, 2010: 7); the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure is working on the basis of a population figure of between 500,000 and 600,000 for 2010 (HPG interviews, 2010).

## 2.2 Drivers of urbanisation

During the second civil war Juba was considered to be the only secure town within Central Equatoria State (known then as Bahr-el-Jebel State), making it a refuge for IDPs from other parts of Southern Sudan as well as people fleeing neighbouring countries (El Bushra and Sahl, 2005: 33). IDPs were organised into camps according to ethnicity and allowed to settle temporarily on the land of people who had fled Juba, with the understanding that they would have to leave once the original owners came back.

After the signing of the CPA, Juba has continued to attract huge numbers of people – returning residents, previous IDPs as well as many newcomers, including foreigners – in search of security, better livelihoods and business opportunities. Many people have been IDPs, refugees and/or economic migrants at various points in their lives. Some have attempted to settle several times in Juba, but were displaced in and out of the town due to insecurity. Yet others came in the 1970s to work in the regional government, but continue to be defined as IDPs even after 30 years of residence, mainly because they lack land ownership. Many returnees view Juba as a transit point on their way to their home village – a stop-over which often lasts longer than expected. In such a dynamic context, labels such as 'IDP', 'returning refugee' or 'economic migrant' are largely meaningless and do not adequately reflect the diversity of many people's life experience, or their reasons for moving to Juba.

People rarely come to Juba for a single reason: typically a variety of push and pull factors are at work. Most people

interviewed for this study cited a combination of improved economic and employment opportunities and (perceived) better services as their prime reasons for coming to Juba. Whether services are in fact better in Juba is unclear. Data suggests that the existing population is largely underserved, facilities are overcrowded and staff numbers are being cut. However, some respondents suggested that the presence of a few high-quality facilities like the Juba Teaching Hospital was enough to convince them that services were better in the city than in rural areas. Some respondents also mentioned that, even when facilities and infrastructure were better in rural areas, the lack of qualified personnel meant they were often not functioning. This suggests that people are no longer satisfied with services in rural areas, and that the prospect of better services and a better quality of life is enough to convince them to leave.

One emerging trend seems to be that of young, unskilled or semi-skilled males coming to Juba in search of better jobs and an urban lifestyle, as many are having difficulty (re)adapting to rural life after years of displacement in urban areas or after having fought during the war. While figures are hard to come by, several international aid agencies, as well as the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SRRC), have noted an increase in female-headed households in rural areas as well as a tendency for young male refugees and IDPs to leave their home areas relatively quickly (IOM, 2009; HPG interviews, 2010).

The presence of international organisations, the establishment of the regional government as well as an increasing number of private businesses lure many young people into town in search of employment. Many hope to find unskilled work, for example as drivers or office attendants. Others aspire to establish their own small business, work as motorcycle taxi drivers (*boda bodas*) or join friends in their small-scale enterprises. While many of these young men move permanently to Juba, others go back and forth between their home village and the town, returning to assist in thatching the *tukul* or to help during the cultivation season. For those who cannot leave the very young or the elderly behind, moving to Juba may mean bringing the entire family along.

The opening of regional roads and the resulting boost in trade has meant that many foreigners, mainly but not exclusively from neighbouring countries, are also moving to Juba to take advantage of the more promising business environment. Whereas jobs in home countries are often difficult to get and remuneration is low, in Juba many are able to find work in the expanding hospitality sector or in small-scale trade and retail businesses, especially agricultural products.

The presence of relatives within the town is another key factor encouraging people to come to Juba. Most recent arrivals interviewed for this study initially settled with family members until they could sustain their own households.

International Rescue Committee (IRC) Monitoring Reports of returnees also found that the presence of relatives was one of the main reasons behind people's decision to return to Juba, together with peace and security and improved livelihood opportunities (IRC, 2007a: 3). Many residents pointed out that they are having to cater for their relatives from rural areas for extended periods of time, as employment opportunities and land are increasingly difficult to obtain in town.

For returnees on their way to their original home area, Juba has also increasingly become a stop-over or transit point from which to assess the situation in the home village and reunite with relatives before deciding where to settle permanently. After spending some time in Juba, many decide to stay. Only about 10% of returnees originate from Juba town (IRC, 2009), and the presence of relatives as well as the existence of support structures within the town has meant that it is often easier to remain than to establish a new life back in the village.

Another key pull factor, and one which has been underplayed, is the establishment of the SPLA headquarters in Juba. Originally meant to be divided between three different locations across the South, the choice of Juba has led to the arrival of a large number of soldiers, often with their relatives in tow. The presence of their families has meant that many soldiers chose not to stay in the barracks, but to settle among communities in town, for example in Lologo, Tong Ping and Gumbo. This in turn has led to additional demand for already scarce plots of land, often resulting in conflicts with local communities as well as an increase in land grabbing. Apart from official SPLA soldiers, the establishment of the GoSS in Juba has also brought with it many individual commanders acting as bodyguards or security personnel for senior officials. These soldiers are not integrated within the barracks and report to separate commanders.

Insecurity and drought in many rural areas of Southern Sudan remain major push factors. Even in the immediate surroundings of Juba insecurity continues to cause displacement. For example, in *Rajaf payam*, across the river on the eastern bank of the Nile, attacks by the LRA in 2006 and 2007, cattle raiding, child abductions and the presence of unidentified gunmen are forcing people to flee to Juba town as well as to Gondokoro island, the traditional refuge of the Bari community. On the western side of Juba, cattle raiding and clashes between the Bari and Mundari communities in 2009 displaced a large number of people from Northern Bari *payam* to Gondokoro island and Juba town.

## 2.3 Settlement patterns

During the war people tended to move closer to the centre of town. Since the CPA, there has been movement both inside and outside of the city, as well as circular displacement around the outskirts, for example from Northern Bari or *Rajaf payam* to Gondokoro island.

### Box 1: Settlement patterns in Gumbo

*Rajaf payam* on the eastern bank of the Nile has been populated since colonial times, when the British transferred the administration from Gondokoro island to *Rajaf*. Gumbo, a *boma* under *Rajaf* just across the bridge from Juba, was once a village, but is now slowly taking on the characteristics of a town. People came to settle in the area as early as the 1950s, but were soon displaced into Juba town because of insecurity during the first civil war. Gumbo received large numbers of people fleeing from insecurity in Eastern Equatoria in the 1970s, such as the Latuko and Lopit communities. Others, such as the Bari from Lobonok, also arrived around that time, driven out of their home villages by drought. Many of those who settled in Juba town were pushed back to Gumbo and Lologo in the mid-1970s, when demolitions due to the upgrading of the area around Usratuna forced many poorer people to relocate. During the second civil war, the same people were once more forced to seek security and shelter within the confines of Juba town as fighting intensified. After the CPA, they were again obliged to move as plot owners returned and reclaimed their land. Those who were lucky enough to have found an unoccupied space were often subsequently affected by government-ordered demolitions in 2009, forcing them to relocate again. Currently the original Bari owners of the land in Gumbo are planning to demarcate their area informally, to give out land and secure tenure to some of those people who have repeatedly sought refuge in the area and to prevent others from grabbing land.

### Box 2: Settlement patterns in Lologo

Lologo is an undemarcated area partly under the administration of Kator and partly under *Rajaf payam*. It began life in the 1970s predominantly as a settlement for soldiers, who were subsequently joined by their relatives and other civilians. People then came to Lologo in four different waves: during demolitions in the area around Usratuna and Al Sabbah Children's Hospital in 1974, after the start of the second civil war, following LRA disturbances in Gumbo between 2002 and 2006 and after the signing of the CPA. Demolitions in Juba in 2008 and 2009 brought further new inhabitants to the area, mainly people joining relatives on their plots or cramming into the few empty spaces left. Lologo is now a large settlement area. Although it has been integrated into the town, it remains non-demarcated and without services 30 years after its establishment.

Most of those moving outwards are poor, landless people who have lost access to land due to demolitions, the return of the owners of the land they were staying on or due to increasingly unaffordable rent and housing prices. These include many long-term residents who came to Juba in the 1970s, who have had to vacate the plots they had been occupying during the war and now need to apply for land like any other newly arrived returnee.

People owning land, or who are able to obtain land through money, connections or force, are moving inwards towards the well-serviced centre of the town, as are large numbers of international aid workers and foreign business people.

Most areas of Juba are now inhabited by a mix of different tribes, encompassing residents and returnees as well as other

migrants. The old IDP camps have been dismantled and their populations have integrated within the town. Neighbourhoods now tend to reflect the socio-economic status of their inhabitants according to the pattern laid out by the old colonial land classification system, with the better-off concentrated in large, demarcated plots in the centre of town, and poorer people in the more densely populated areas on the outskirts.

# Chapter 3

## Policy context

After decades of conflict, the GoSS faces a massive task in leading recovery and development efforts, and the challenges of policy-making and implementation in Southern Sudan cannot be overstated. This chapter examines the key policy frameworks guiding government efforts to support long-term recovery and development, focusing on the over-arching vision of ‘taking towns to the people’, expenditure priorities and strategies for economic growth and governance.

These policy areas are relevant to urbanisation in Juba for a number of reasons. First, policies on governance envisage a decentralised Southern Sudan in which Juba is treated equally with all state capitals in policy terms. However, implementation of the Local Government Act is already clashing with a parallel move towards the centralisation of key powers within the GoSS. Juba’s dual status as capital of South Sudan and of Central Equatoria State also raises particular challenges in relation to urban management. Second, the GoSS strategy for economic growth identifies agriculture as a key area for investment. So far, however, the growth in private sector activity has taken place in Juba and surrounding areas within Central Equatoria State, driven by the influx of government ministries, civil servants and aid agencies. Finally, the upcoming referendum on the future of Southern Sudan, due in January 2011, will have an important impact on policy processes.

### 3.1 ‘Taking towns to the people’

In 2004, a policy of ‘taking towns to the people’ was developed by the SPLM/A to reflect its focus on rural transformation and investment in rural areas. However, as the newly elected President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, acknowledged in his inaugural address in May, ‘regrettably, for the last five years our achievement in this regard was, if at all, minimal’, and recognised that this lack of progress had contributed to increasing rates of urbanisation (GoSS, May 2010).

‘Taking towns to the people’ is to be given renewed priority and will therefore remain as the underlying vision informing policy-making. It will be based on a decentralised model that supports access to basic services and livelihood opportunities in rural areas and smaller urban centres, to be funded through oil revenues. It is also intended to help counteract the flows of rural-to-urban migration, as well as ease the pressure on services, housing, land and infrastructure in Juba.

### 3.2 Priority spending areas and financing trends

In 2008, the government acknowledged that a medium-term plan for Southern Sudan was lacking, and has now

adopted a budget planning approach strongly supported by the international community (GoSS, 2008). The medium-term priorities for 2008–2011 are:

- Security: develop efficient and effective armed forces, to safeguard security and implement the CPA.
- Roads: rehabilitate road infrastructure to promote socio-economic and private sector development.
- Health: provide primary health care.
- Education: promote equitable access to primary education.
- Rural Water: increase access to safe water and sanitation.
- Production: improve rural livelihoods and incomes.


In addition, the government is preparing a development plan with the aim of ensuring a more strategic medium-term focus within budget planning, based on an assessment of income levels and the economy, as well as an overview of the government’s development priorities.

Planned expenditure figures for 2010 show that, out of a total of SDG 4.5 billion (\$1.64bn), the security sector will receive 26%, infrastructure and public administration 13% each, education 7% and health 4%, the latter two seeing an increase compared to 2009 of 11% and 7% respectively (GoSS, 2010a), see Figure 2, page 8. The six priority objectives are unlikely to change under the 2011–2013 budget sector plans (HPG interviews, 2010).


Of particular concern is the significant gap between planned and actual allocations by donor governments for 2010. Figure 3 (page 8) shows a decline of 85% in the levels of planned future funding for the period 2009–2012 (GoSS, 2010b). There is also a large shortfall in recorded expenditure. The expenditure report for the first six months of 2009 showed that only 38% of planned expenditure for the year had been spent (*ibid.*). The need to encourage economic growth and ensure the predictability of government revenues is therefore a priority.

While donor funding is expected to account for 40% of the GoSS budget for 2010, future levels are uncertain. Only USAID has so far committed resources towards longer-term programmes beyond 2011. In the words of one donor representative, ‘many are asking themselves “where do we stand with South Sudan?”’ (HPG interviews, 2010). Issues contributing to this lack of clarity include financial pressures in donor countries and concerns over the mismanagement of funds within the GoSS (a framework for mutual accountability, the Juba Compact, was signed in 2009). The upcoming referendum is a further source of uncertainty.



**Figure 2: Planned GoSS expenditure for 2010**

Source: GoSS, 2010a.

**Figure 3: Donor commitments, 2009–2012 (US\$m)**

Source: GoSS, 2010b.

### 3.3 The South Sudan Growth Strategy

Over 90% of the GOSS' budget (excluding donor contributions) comes from oil revenues (GoSS, 2009a), and reducing this dependence is an important concern for the government. The drop in oil prices caused by the global downturn had a significant impact on the economy, leading to demonstrations and blockades in March 2009 in Yei, Nimule and Kapoeta (UNHCR, 2009: 8).

To support moves away from oil, the South Sudan Growth Strategy, developed in 2009, focuses on private sector development. The strategy is based on the premise that the government's role should be limited to providing an enabling environment for investment and private sector growth (GoSS, 2009a). A dedicated department has been set up within the Ministry of Commerce focused on four main activities grouped

under the Private Sector Development Project (PSDP), funded by the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) and the GoSS: policy and regulation, access to finance, market development and capacity-building within the government. The MDTF and GoSS have contributed \$12.8m and \$7.4m respectively over five years. However, while progress has been made numerous laws and regulations are still under development.

At the local level, microfinance programming has been adopted as a key means of supporting livelihoods and income levels through the creation of small businesses, in turn stimulating local markets. Microcredit is financed under the PSDP and by USAID, which has committed \$12.6m over the period 2009–2011 (GoSS, 2010b).

While investment in agriculture and infrastructure development in rural areas has been identified as the overarching priority,

the growth strategy has particular relevance to Juba's economy because of the town's capacity to generate tax revenue and its role as a hub for regional trade. The majority of private sector investment in Southern Sudan has so far been concentrated in Central Equatoria State.

### 3.4 The Local Government Act

Underpinning the policy of 'bringing towns to the people' is the GoSS's stated commitment to devolution and decentralisation. For the SPLM the rationale was that devolution of political authority would contribute to strengthening its legitimacy, ease administrative burdens in the post-CPA period and help align statutory and traditional modes of governance (Washburn, 2010). To this end, the government passed the Local Government Act in 2009, establishing local government structures at the county, *payam* and *boma* levels (GoSS, 2009b).

In practice little progress has been made, particularly at the *payam* and *boma* levels. Financial allocations to state ministries were to facilitate implementation of the Act, but transfers have been irregular and most have been spent on staff salaries rather than the policy priorities outlined above (Washburn, 2010; HPG interviews, 2010). Given this, the extent of the government's commitment has been questioned (Washburn, 2010). Decision-making power has been retained at the centre, and a situation has emerged whereby 'decentralization, while theoretically the best way to govern Southern Sudan, has in reality often become an instrument to entrench "tribal lines" over competition for resources ... it currently mimics and reinforces damaging arrangements at the national level, rather than providing an alternative to them' (LSE, 2010: 9).

Recent efforts to trim the public sector are also having an important impact in Juba. The governor of Central Equatoria State recently issued an order for the workforce to be reduced from 19,000 to 10,000, including 1,000 new recruits (HPG interviews, 2010). The GoSS is proposing to fund approximately 35% of total salary costs, while the state government is supposed to raise the rest from taxes. While transparency and accountability in the public sector are real problems, the larger difficulty concerns the capacity of the state authorities, and their lack of skilled personnel.

### 3.5 Pre-referendum priorities

According to one UN representative, as the end of the interim CPA period draws closer the GoSS is increasingly focused on 'surviving until the referendum' by 'keeping everyone happy' (HPG interviews, 2010). The result is that 'there are policies everywhere but nothing is happening on the ground'. The referendum and the uncertainty around what possible secession will entail for the GoSS, as well as the risk of renewed conflict, is also a key preoccupation among international donors. In the words of one representative: 'at the moment there is a lot of attention to keeping our heads above water, and for South Sudan not to re-enter into conflict' (HPG interviews, 2010).

Elections were held in Southern Sudan in April 2010, and Kiir was re-elected as President with a majority of the vote. However, the GoSS is facing challenges to its authority and legitimacy on several fronts, in response to which it has sought to accommodate powerful interests and exclude others. While the SPLM is the main party within the GoSS, it does not have a coherent vision for the future of Southern Sudan. Tensions are also emerging within the SPLA. Although the GoSS regards security as the core priority, it cannot afford to pay salaries at current levels. A massive disarmament programme will be needed after the referendum, but this will have to be very carefully designed so as to avoid generating potential sources of discontent within the South.

There is little evidence to suggest that policy development has engaged with the reality of urbanisation in CES and the rapid increase in the numbers of urban poor. With the massive tasks facing the GoSS since the start of the CPA period, urbanisation and its consequences were never likely to be a strategic priority. Current policies suggest that development and growth can be achieved through focusing solely on rural areas, without considering the important part that urban growth can play in driving regional and national change. The assumption that all IDPs will return to their home villages in rural areas does not reflect the reality, and also ignores the skills that many IDPs can offer, and the role that urban migrants can play in strengthening urban-rural linkages. Greater appreciation is needed of the potential benefits of a more balanced policy which takes into account both rural and urban areas, and the linkages between them.





# Chapter 4

## Governance and leadership in Juba

Juba was chosen as the new capital of Southern Sudan following the death of First Vice President John Garang in 2006. Several factors led to this decision. Juba is located in the heartland of the Bari people, so selecting it as the new capital was seen as a gesture of inclusiveness by the predominantly Dinka-led SPLM/A – an earnest of its desire to represent the whole of the South (HPG interviews, 2010; Deng, 2010). Ram Chiel, which lies a few miles east of the town of Yirol, at a point where the homelands of a large number of different tribes intersect, had originally been the favoured option, but this would have meant building the capital from scratch. Juba already had an airport, had access to water and was closer to neighbouring countries. Juba was also chosen as a symbol of the GoSS's right to govern. During the civil war, the Khartoum government controlled urban centres, including Juba, while the SPLM/A held the countryside. Allies of the SPLM/A, including Uganda and Nigeria, indicated that, if the SPLM/A could capture Juba, it should have the right to be recognised as an official political body (HPG interviews, 2010; Deng, 2010).

The fact that Juba doubles as the capital of Southern Sudan and Central Equatoria State has resulted in multiple, and often confusing and overlapping, layers of administration. In theory, the responsibility for urban management lies with the Ministry of Housing, Lands and Public Utilities (MHLPU) at the GoSS level, and the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure (MPI) at state level. While the MHLPU is supposed to be driving policy and providing guidance to the state, it is also involved in the management of major infrastructure development contracts under the Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Development Programme (SETIDP). The MPI is responsible for a wide range of public works throughout Central Equatoria State, including the construction and maintenance of public buildings, water supplies, electricity, roads and drainage, the development of new areas and land management and allocation (UNDP-UN Habitat, 2009). Juba County, under the authority of the Juba County Commissioner, also carries out tasks in a number of these fields, and is acting as overall administrator of the town in the absence of a mayor (one was appointed by the President in 2008, but was rejected by the state government). Power struggles between these various layers of government have played out over a number of issues, including land allocation, garbage collection, business and vehicle licensing and tax collection. According to one observer, the situation has 'degenerated into a dysfunctional situation of deadlock' (Deng, 2010: 9).

### 4.1 Local leadership

During the civil war, Juba was administered by the GoS, alongside traditional leadership structures among IDP and

refugee communities. Local leaders were often directly appointed by the GoS, raising questions about how 'genuine' traditional authorities in urban and peri-urban areas really are (see Pantuliano et al., 2008: 27). The new local government system stipulates that chiefs and traditional authorities do not have an official role to play at the municipal council level, but that their administrative and customary functions should be exercised within the quarter council/*boma* administration. Similarly, customary bench courts are no longer authorised to function at municipal level (GoSS, 2009b). In the town C Courts are supposed to resolve local disputes, though certain issues may be referred back to the B Court and tried by customary law. Quarter councils are presided over by a chairman or *sheikh-al-hilla*, who is elected by the community every four years and performs his work voluntarily. In rural councils, executive chiefs remain in charge of the *boma* administration, and A Courts (at *boma* level) and B Courts (at *payam* level) resolve most local disputes. Chiefs in rural areas report to the Office of Traditional Authorities under the Ministry of Local Government, and receive salaries according to the government grading system (HPG interviews, 2010).

In practice, distinctions between rural and urban structures are not as clear-cut and many of the provisions envisaged by the Local Government Act are not yet in place. Customary law continues to be applied to certain matters within the town, such as inheritance for wives, even though chiefs do not retain the same powers with regard to land within the town as they do in areas surrounding Juba (Deng, 2010: 25). Although the CES government ordered all IDP chiefs to return to their original home areas in 2006, some continue to exercise their functions within the town, reportedly mainly in connection with the affairs of their particular community and in an unofficial manner. Similarly, the B-Court in Kator run by the Paramount Chief of the Bari continues to function as one of the oldest and most active courts in the town. At the local level, many more unofficial and often overlapping structures for resolving local disputes exist than are officially acknowledged. In several areas visited several *shuyukh-al-hilla* and local chiefs claimed to represent the same communities. It was often unclear whether these were the remnants of the old GoS administration, or part of newly created, separate local arrangements made by communities themselves.

In most areas local leaders and chiefs were reportedly elected and answerable to local communities. Similar improvements in accountability have not however been made in higher-level traditional structures. High-ranking chiefs, particularly in the surrounding rural *payams*, as well as the paramount chief, are reportedly increasingly co-opted into corrupt urban

governmental structures, and as a result are increasingly removed from local communities. People interviewed in areas on the outskirts of Juba commented that chiefs had become too powerful following the CPA because of their influence over land use and allocation, were ‘increasingly acting like politicians’ and were not trusted by their communities. Communities are reportedly afraid to challenge the chiefs or individuals close to them for fear of retribution.

Confusion regarding the division between GoSS and state-level roles and responsibilities, together with the integration of traditional leadership with local official administrative structures, has led to a proliferation of different, often contradictory policies and laws with regard to the Juba administration. Ambiguous policies and laws in turn are interpreted in different ways, or even sidelined within the

emerging competition for influence and resources between the local, state and central levels of government. Traditional structures have been subsumed into this confusing system of town administration, and in the process often become part of corrupt networks, further removing them from the people they are meant to represent. This has significant impacts for the urban poor, including their livelihoods, land, services, infrastructure and security provision. It leaves them vulnerable to exploitation and unable to demand better leadership. The lack of coordination amongst international actors exacerbates the problem, as different authorities benefit from an aid architecture that is not cohesive and is not engaged at the local level. As a matter of priority, there needs to be greater support in order to create clearer structures of authority and implement the Local Government Act in a way that meets the particular needs of Juba as a capital city.

# Chapter 5

## The urban economy and livelihoods

Urbanisation has been accompanied by a rapid expansion in economic activity. Prior to the signing of the CPA, Juba's economy was stagnant. Access to the town by river or road was severely restricted. Physical infrastructure had been left untouched for many years and was badly in need of repair, and many residents survived on subsistence agriculture and petty business. Since then the economic landscape has changed dramatically as oil revenues, goods and financial capital have flooded in. However, while the town and its economy are often described as booming, rapid and unregulated expansion has also attracted – as well as created – a growing number of urban poor. Poor newcomers and the existing urban poor are affected by rising living costs accompanied by a lack of employment opportunities and declining wages. As a result, not one but several urban economies are in the making.

### 5.1 Promoting pro-poor growth within the context of rapid urbanisation

Southern Sudan's private sector development strategy is based on the assumption that indigenous informal and micro-enterprises will be the first private sector actors to emerge. However, economy activity is mainly catering to the influx of government officials and aid actors, and shortfalls in goods and services are being met by regional entrepreneurs with access to the specific types of goods and services required, such as housing, electronic goods and vehicles. Meanwhile, the majority of the urban poor still operate within the same economy that existed prior to the CPA, dominated by small-scale activities including firewood collection, charcoal making, petty trade and brewing (El Bushra and Sahl, 2005). While goods are in plentiful supply and trade is no longer dominated by Sudanese from the North, the majority of residents are still involved in semi-skilled and unskilled work, in pursuit of which they face growing competition as Juba's population expands. The key factor mentioned by many as the most difficult aspect of urban livelihoods was the introduction of financial capital and the need to access cash. As one woman commented: 'everything is there, but we need money in order to access anything from land and school fees to food' (HPG interviews, 2010).

Thus it could be argued that there are effectively two urban economies. The first is international, and is thriving as Juba opens up to the regional and global economy and the aid industry. It is characterised by a growing number of regional businesses, as well as by the growth in national and local NGOs. While data is most likely incomplete, the business registry shows that almost 700 NGOs have been established since 2006, as well as over 8,000 businesses in manufacturing, transport, construction, wholesale and retail, financing and insurance,

real estate, catering, hotel management and private health clinics (GoSS, 2010c). The other urban economy is informal and small-scale, generating goods and services which become less profitable as competition increases. Trade opportunities in this economy are constrained, there is a lack of financial capital and there are few opportunities for skills development.

### 5.2 Private sector investment in Juba

Both the GoSS and CES governments are trying to encourage investment. The CES government, for example, has created the CES Investment Authority, which is seeking to attract more strategic and long-term investment through tax exemptions and tax holidays, as well as providing profit repatriation guarantees to investors. Moving from a situation where 'investors thought there were no laws and could do what they want' (HPG interviews, 2010) to one where regulation is enforced and longer-term investment encouraged will however be a challenge. Competition between the GoSS and CES in attracting investment reduces the incentive to enforce regulations, and is encouraging procurement practices governed by patronage networks.

Formal private sector activity has to a large extent been driven by the influx of government actors and aid agencies (PSDN, 2009). Longer-term investment in industries and infrastructure is largely absent, mainly due to uncertainty about the political situation, a corrupt and non-transparent business environment, a lack of clear policies and guidance for investors and difficulties in accessing land and supporting infrastructure. This means that most of the profit generated by the international private sector does not serve the Southern Sudanese economy, bypasses its banking system and is relocated to neighbouring countries rather than invested locally (HPG interviews, 2010).

The retail, trade and construction industries are perhaps the most visible indicators of economic activity in Juba. In the case of the latter, the main focus has been on the rehabilitation and construction of government ministries and homes, as well as offices and residential houses for the international aid community (PSDN, 2009). Over 500 construction companies are registered as operating in Central Equatoria State alone. The majority originate from other countries in the region, including Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Somalia. While Northern Sudanese businesses used to have a large presence, many left following the signing of the CPA. Very few businesses at the medium enterprise scale are owned by Southern Sudanese (GoSS, 2010c).

While the private sector development strategy focuses on promoting inter-state trade within Southern Sudan, particularly

in food commodities, there has been little progress. Despite the substantial growth in the number of businesses operating in Juba, very little is produced *in situ*. The lack of domestic agricultural production around Juba, very poor regional trade infrastructure and the absence of local manufacturing companies have meant that Juba's market relies almost entirely on imports (HPG interviews, 2010; World Bank, 2009). Fresh produce originates mainly from Uganda, for which Southern Sudan has become a major export destination, accounting for 12% of Uganda's total exports (NewVision, 24 February 2010). Juba has also become a market for Ugandan re-exporters of electronic materials, such as computers and refrigerators, as well as vehicles and pharmaceutical drugs (The East African, 21 September 2009). Ethiopian traders have a significant presence in the import of building materials, whilst Northern Sudanese traders have a niche area in the import of vehicle parts and electronic products. Few Kenyans are engaged in trading, but many work in the service sectors, including hotel management and catering, private health clinics and banking (HPG interviews, 2010).

### 5.3 Urban livelihoods

In the past, agrarian livelihoods, including pastoralism and subsistence farming, constituted by far the most important source of livelihoods. During the war, many of Juba's poorer residents engaged in agriculture on the outskirts of the town to supplement their livelihoods and ensure basic subsistence. This is now changing: as surrounding areas of Juba are swallowed up by new settlements, space for agriculture has become largely unavailable. At the same time, insecurity in peri-urban areas has increased significantly compared to during the war, when the Sudanese armed forces were in firm control. As a result, the majority of Juba's residents, whether semi-skilled or unskilled, tend to work in the informal sector as casual labourers or in petty trading.

Employment opportunities within state structures in Juba are increasingly difficult to find. As we have seen, there are plans to reduce the size of the public sector significantly, and demobilisation is meant to remove 90,000 soldiers, though whether the political will exists for reductions on this scale is doubtful. So far, some 20,000 have gone through the demobilisation process (HPG interviews, 2010). Few employment opportunities have been generated by the new businesses that have sprung up in Juba, though some private companies are making a conscious effort to employ local Sudanese. The South African Beer Brewing Factory, for example, employs just under 300 local Sudanese. Overall, the proportion of Sudanese in formal employment is estimated at around 10% of the total economically active population of Southern Sudan (PeaceDividend, 2010), and according to the GoSS Ministry of Labour incentives to hire cheaper and often more skilled workers from East Africa remain high (HPG interviews, 2010).

There is little difference between residents, returnees and long-term IDPs in terms of the type of work they do. The most

common types of casual labour for Juba's residents include charcoal making, firewood collection, stone breaking, alcohol brewing, mudding houses, making bricks and petty trading. Women are involved in small-scale business activities in the market, such as brewing tea, making cakes/chapattis, selling mangoes, brewing local alcohol and collecting firewood. Men usually engage in charcoal making, construction, digging pit latrines, mudding houses or motorcycle taxi driving (*boda boda*).

The majority of people engage in two or more of these activities. Grass cutting and firewood collection are seasonal, while others, such as mudding houses or brick-laying, depend on fluctuating demand. The steadiest source of year-round income is charcoal-making or selling. With the exception of the Bari landowners, most people within the town as well as on the outskirts engage in charcoal making. Some, such as the residents of Lologo, walk up to 15 miles every day, there and back, to bring charcoal from the forest.

Juba's growth and commercial vibrancy have presented some new opportunities for its residents. Respondents commented positively, for example, on the increasing numbers of Southern Sudanese engaged in regional trading. Retailers sell foodstuffs such as maize, flour, sugar, rice, beans and salt as well as beer and sodas bought from wholesalers either in Sudan (including Khartoum) or in neighbouring countries. Other small-scale businesses trade in hardware, household and cooking utensils, electronic equipment, motorcycles and spare parts, as well as mobile top-up cards and telephones. Profits vary widely according to the location and size of the business, and can range from SDG 100 (\$35) per day for a small drinks retailing concern in Nyokuron to about SDG 150–200 (\$55–\$70) per week profit from goods worth SDG 3,000 (\$1,050) for a shop in Gumbo. Some traders, especially those from neighbouring countries, reported higher profits of up to SDG 1,000 (\$350) per week (HPG interviews, 2010).

Increasing numbers of women are now engaged in petty trade in the market as well as in other informal livelihood activities, and many women have small businesses in the market. This was cited by both men and women as a positive development, and an example of attitudinal changes in Sudanese society as a result of urbanisation. A number of women doing business Lologo market, Tong Ping and Atlabara also reported having benefited from access to micro-finance loans in order to get help in setting up. In the market women sell tea, chapattis, bread, beans and alcohol. Others buy vegetables or fruit from wholesalers from the surrounding *payams* of Northern Bari, Rajaf and Gondokoro island, and sell them on in the Juba markets. On a good day they can earn up to SDG 30 (\$11). Women are increasingly responsible for providing for their family as their husbands are unemployed, out-competed, have been laid off or are receiving very irregular salaries as civil servants or soldiers.

**Table 3: Main livelihood activities and average wage rates**

Livelihood activity	Wage rate/profit
Firewood collection	Small bundle: SDG 5–7 (\$2–2.50) Big bundle: SDG 20–25 (\$7–9)
Charcoal-burning	Gumbo: SDG 35 (\$13) per bag Lologo: SDG 30 (\$11) per bag
Stone breaking	Gudele: SDG 450 (\$165) per truck load Tokimaan: SDG 350 (\$130) per truck load (One truck load is equivalent to approximately seven tonnes or one to two weeks of labour depending on the number of workers.)
Making bricks	SDG 30 (\$11) for 500 bricks
Smearing houses	SDG 20 (\$7) per day (or approximately SDG 200 for 2 rooms)
Washing clothes	SDG 1 per piece (or approximately SDG 50 (\$18) for 3 days' work)
Washing dishes	SDG 10 (\$3.50) per day
Charcoal retail (bags bought from charcoal-burners and sold at markets)	SDG 10 to 20 SDG (\$3.50–7) per bag
Food retail	Tea-making and baking: SDG 10–30 (\$3.50–\$11) per day Vegetables: SDG 5–10 (\$2–3.50) per day
Alcohol brewing	SDG 10–15 (\$3.50–\$5.50) per day
<i>Boda boda</i>	SDG 30–60 (\$11–\$22) per day (after fuel and motorbike rental costs)

Source: Focus group discussions.

## 5.4 Wage rates and living costs

Wage rates in casual labour are extremely low, considering the amount of labour demanded: young people reported receiving only SDG 30 (\$11) for laying 500 bricks; mudding two rooms will bring in SDG 200 (\$70), but involves hard physical labour and takes time. Ugandans and Kenyans are generally more skilled and cheaper, as they have access to less costly materials and are better connected with both suppliers and employers. In the words of one young man, they 'are very willing to do anything at a cheaper price, they work faster and work more. People employ them because they don't complain' (HPG interviews, 2010). Sudanese traders are another group facing stronger competition, from Ugandan traders in particular. Ugandan traders have a number of advantages, including access to cheaper goods and more advantageous business connections in their home country. Net profits from petty trading have also declined compared to 2006 and 2007 as the growing number of traders is leading to increased competition. A trader in Rajaf reported that his profits had gone down from SDG 800–1,000 (\$290–\$350) a month to about SDG 600 since 2005/6. Another trader in Gumbo explained the decline in demand due to increased competition in this way: 'Whereas before three cups of sugar and one cup of milk could finish in three days, now one cup of sugar can stay for seven days' (HPG interviews, 2010).

Large numbers of people are unemployed, particularly youth and men. Even the semi-skilled are finding it increasingly difficult to find work, as competition for jobs has become increasingly fierce and ever-higher qualifications are demanded. Youth interviewed in Nyokuron East pointed out that many of their peers have dropped out of school or training and have thus ended up 'somewhere in the middle' – with some skills but no proper certificates. When competing against those who completed courses at high-level technical schools or universities – especially in neighbouring countries – they usually lose out.

As wages decline, living costs appear to be rising. The main expenditures reported for most families interviewed were food, school fees and medicine. School fees and medical costs are also reported to have risen. Food prices are also rising thanks to multiple taxes and illegal levies along the routes from the Ugandan border. Traders report being taxed at illegal checkpoints up to 15 times. One trader reported having to pay nine different taxes before proceeding. He reported that for goods worth \$2,000 he might end up paying up to \$1,500 in taxes (HPG interviews, 2010). Authorities at all levels – boma, payam, county and state – all levy taxes. The resulting rises in food prices are marked. For example, the price of a 50kg bag of flour has risen from SDG 50 (\$18) in 2005/6 to SDG 100 (\$35) today; sugar used to cost just over SDG 100 (\$35) a bag, but has now increased to just over SDG 160 (\$58). A bucket of beans



that used to be sold for SDG 25 (\$9) now sells at SDG 40 (\$15). While most people acknowledge that there is much more food in the market than previously, in the words of one family in Lologo: 'even if you have SDG 100 you can now not sustain the family in the house with foodstuff for one week' (HPG interviews, 2010).

Large numbers of the urban poor are subsisting on very little. In slum areas many respondents reported eating only once a day. This is confirmed by Solidarités, which found that a majority of people in poor areas regularly went without food (Solidarités, 2010). The lack of livelihood opportunities has also forced people to take on risky jobs, including prostitution. An increasing number of street children survive on washing agency or government cars or collecting plastic bottles for recycling.

### 5.5 Strategies to support livelihoods and employment

Lack of access to financial capital was identified by a majority of respondents as a key constraint, alongside lack of access to education and skills.

Regarding access to financial capital, micro-finance has been identified as a key strategy for supporting the livelihoods of poor people within the PSDP, supported by the MDTF and USAID. The four key objectives of this strategy are to encourage employment, increase assets and wealth, reduce the vulnerability of households to economic shocks and other risks and increase their capacity to invest in education and health and, finally, to promote the economic empowerment of women (GoSS, 2007a). Emphasis on the fourth objective has meant that, across all locations visited during the research, no men or male youth reported receiving micro-loans. This approach to micro-finance as the principal livelihoods strategy evidently does not acknowledge the diversity of needs and skills of both genders in relation to livelihoods. There are also problems with scale: in 2005 the World Bank estimated the number of potential micro-finance clients to be 350,000–400,000. The micro-finance industry, however, is only reaching 1–3% of this group (PSDN, 2009).

Women respondents mentioned three micro-finance institutions that provided loans: Bangladesh Rural Cooperative (BRAC),

Finance Sudan Ltd. and the Sudan Microfinance Institution (SUMI). BRAC is the largest, with 17 branches in Central Equatoria State and over 14,000 members across Southern Sudan. Micro-credit loans are made available exclusively to women. Finance Sudan Ltd. is also operational in Juba, and 75% of its loans are reserved for women (HPG interviews, 2010). Similarly, SUMI states that it also makes 'special efforts' to provide loans for women (SUMI, 2007).

In a context of declining incomes and rising living costs, micro-finance may well not be appropriate. While a number of women respondents noted that they had benefited from start-up loans from micro-finance institutions, they were facing growing difficulties in complying with loan conditions. Women interviewed in Nyokuron West, for example, stated that several had withdrawn from the programme as they found it difficult to repay their first instalment of SDG 450 (\$165) (SDG 596 (\$216) with interest). It is noteworthy that these women had succeeded in starting businesses, lived in better-off areas closer to the centre and owned land. Women living in precarious conditions in the slums in urban and peri-urban areas of Juba cannot access micro-finance loans at all due to the stringent conditions imposed. Most institutions demand that the women must have their own plot with the associated legal papers to prove it, or are registered if they are renting. Only a minority of Juba residents stated that they would be able to produce either of these papers. In addition, a nationality certificate and two photos are often demanded, which most non-working women do not possess.

In relation to building the skills and capacity of Sudanese workers, employers are expected to check the jobseekers database at the Labour Office for suitable Sudanese candidates before recruiting for a job; in practice however only a few NGOs comply, with most of the private sector still largely ignoring this provision. A new Labour Act remains stuck in parliament, while the new Investment Promotion Act, though praised by officials in the Chamber of Commerce for its flexibility and openness to foreign technical knowhow, does not impose any regulations. Although it recommends a discretionary 75%/25% ratio for Southern Sudanese versus foreign employment in any given enterprise, this is not a legally binding condition (GoSS, 2009c).

# Chapter 6

## Land and housing

Squatting and land-grabbing have become major issues in post-CPA Juba. The lack of a clear policy and legal framework on land issues, under-resourced institutions and the lack of a systematic, transparent process for plot allocation have meant that ordinary citizens find it increasingly difficult to access land within the town. Corruption is rife and in practice only those with money or connections can obtain land. The majority of Juba's people live without secure land tenure and are hence under constant threat of eviction. Many have experienced repeated demolitions of their homes, and have in the process been relocated to the outskirts of the city.

### 6.1 Policy environment

During the war, land in Southern Sudan was subject to a number of different colonial and post-colonial laws and regulations, all of which stipulated that all land is owned by the central government.<sup>1</sup> With the establishment of the GoSS it was initially unclear which national laws would apply in Southern Sudan, as most were viewed as exploitative and designed to enable the Khartoum government to access land and resources in the South. The SPLM frequently used the slogan 'the land belongs to the people', although this principle was never actually enshrined in the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (ICSS) or in the CPA.

In February 2009 the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly finally passed a new Land Act, which revoked all existing national land laws. However, while cancelling all previous provisions the new Act does not lay out in any detail the new processes to be used regarding land administration, as these are currently under review by the Ministry of Legal Affairs. Nor does the Act spell out clearly enough the roles and responsibilities of the various levels of government in relation to land administration.<sup>2</sup> As such, it fails to recognise the extent to which many of the key institutions concerned with land, such as the CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure and the Southern Sudan Judiciary, still use procedures based on pre-CPA laws (Deng, 2010: 15). Land administration in Juba consequently remains largely without a clear statutory basis; the process is not transparent and there is ample room for the exercise of discretionary powers (*ibid.*: 23). In the meantime, land allocation has been suspended since February 2009 as the GoSS and CES are in dispute over the proposed relocation

of the land registry from the Judiciary (HPG interviews, 2010). With regard to land in rural areas, while stopping short of vesting full ownership of customary land in the hands of communities the new Act does explicitly recognise customary land tenure, though within limits.<sup>3</sup> Considerable confusion remains around institutional arrangements both for customary land tenure and in relation to statutory mechanisms (Odhiambo, 2009).

In the absence of a clear legal and policy framework for land administration it has been difficult for the MHLPU to engage in effective urban planning and policy-making. Work has however restarted on a new low-cost housing policy (a previous attempt to draft a housing policy in 2008 ended inconclusively). Tied closely to the concept of 'taking the towns to the people', this new policy aims at decongesting the towns and controlling the growth of informal settlements by building satellite towns near Juba and other cities, with fully serviced low-cost housing estates. In conjunction with private investors, the government hopes to provide subsidised housing through this \$10 billion project, rather than encouraging urban sprawl by continuing to give out land to people who cannot afford to build permanent structures.

'Rhino City' is a new city in the shape of a rhinoceros 15km from Juba on the Yei road, with around 10,000 houses planned, half of them low-cost. A second project, 'Liberty City', is meant to provide 2,000 suburban-style houses. Private investors, including Abu Malek Companies and Agencies Ltd., have agreed to implement the 'Rhino City' project, with government guarantees. Individuals are expected to come into possession of government-subsidised housing by taking out loans from financial institutions. While providing decentralised services and access to housing for the poor seems reasonable, it is not clear how attractive and affordable this would be for people without the regular income to pay back the government loan. CES officials point out that, if such an expensive project were ever carried out, it would take years to complete. In the meantime, concrete, feasible solutions need to be found for the increasing number of squatters in Juba. More research also needs to be done into how relocated poor people might cope with the loss of family and support networks, and loss of access to the large informal market within Juba.

### 6.2 Urban planning

As there is no proper framework in place, the expansion of Juba town is largely unmanaged and unplanned. Town

<sup>1</sup> These include the Land and Settlement Ordinance (1925); the Village Lands Scheme 1948, revised in 1950; the Disposal of Government Lands for Building Purposes Regulation (1974); and the Town Planning Act of 1985 (USAID, 2005).

<sup>2</sup> The Southern Sudan Land Commission is developing a land policy with the support of the Land Coordination Forum, comprising FAO, NPA, NRC, UNHCR, UNDP and the consultancy group Associates in Rural Development (ARD).

<sup>3</sup> For example the GoSS retains authority over all subterranean natural resources; investment land and allocation of land above 250 *feddans* (10,500 hectares) needs to be approved by the ministry concerned at state level (GoSS, 2009d).

planning has centred around simple processes such as land allocation, subdivision and determination of land use type and densities, rather than following comprehensive and more proactive management strategies. The situation has not been helped by the absence of a comprehensive land register and a systematic process for allocating residential plots (DeWit, 2004: 32). The limited capacity of the government institutions dealing with land administration is another key concern. This lack of planning may be a reflection of the SPLM's heavy investment in its rural base (USAID 2007: 7).

Like other Sudanese towns, Juba has inherited the colonial administration's system of dividing residential areas into four classes, according to the socio-economic status of its inhabitants. Land is classified according to plot size, land fees and taxes, and the quality of the building materials. Classes 1–3 are generally reserved for more formal and permanent housing, whereas Class 4 is used to designate areas with temporary shelters, though Class 4 areas are being upgraded to Class 3 to encourage the building of permanent structures (USAID, 2005: 9). Land transfers are managed through leaseholds which can last between 20 and 50 years, with tenure security increasing according to plot classification. Most Class 1 plots are concentrated in the centre of town, in Juba *payam*. Kator and Munuki *payams* have recently been upgraded to Class 3, though they still host a number of undemarcated areas as well. Munuki is the most populous and fastest growing of the three *payams*, and is home to most of the town's urban poor as well as returning refugees and IDPs.

Replanning and service expansion are mainly achieved by upgrading areas and displacing those inhabitants who do not have the financial means to comply with the new requirements (i.e. building more permanent structures on the plot). In the 1960s, for example, when Hai Malakal was upgraded to a Class 2 area, those who could not afford to stay were relocated to a new zone, which they soon named 'Atlabara' – literally 'get out' in Arabic. Today, Atlabara is one of the more planned and settled neighbourhoods for the middle classes. Upgrading parts of the town in this way often leaves the poorest people without access to land, and encourages the creation of squatter areas and slums. This system also fails to tackle the complexity of urban problems in Juba.

In 2005 the GoSS launched a major urban infrastructure development programme to rehabilitate key infrastructure such as offices and houses, water, electricity and sanitation. Consultants Gibb-Kwezi V3 Joint Venture/PADCO were contracted to develop the first masterplan, funded by GoSS with MDTF support, and JICA was engaged for the second and most recent plan, funded by the Japanese government. While the government and local administrators are stressing the importance of having a formal town plan, a number of UN agencies and NGOs have raised concerns about the top-down approach being adopted and the lack of participatory planning.

The current plan, developed by JICA, maintains the plot zoning system and proposes the relocation of people in overcrowded settlements to the periphery (USAID, 2007: 35). However, the plan was drawn up without taking into account current settlement patterns and without consulting the communities concerned. The CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure indicates that implementing the JICA masterplan would entail relocating or compensating half of the population of Juba (Pantuliano et al., 2008: 32). There have been problems during the first pilot of the masterplan as areas through which the new ring road is supposed to pass have been occupied by squatters (HPG interviews, 2010). By maintaining traditional practices for classifying land (commercial, residential etc.), the plan also ignores the reality that land is often put to mixed uses. Larger, lower-density plots tend to be concentrated in the centre, whereas high-density, smaller plots are located in the periphery away from services. This is in direct opposition to the more sustainable trend of having a compact town with higher densities in the centre, allowing for lower service delivery costs (UNDP/UN-Habitat, 2009: 7). UN-Habitat and UNDP are recommending more participatory approaches to urban planning, emphasising community participation and engaging a wide variety of stakeholders (UNDP, 2005: 6). Through their Support to the States programme, the two agencies are engaged in a pilot slum upgrading initiative in Hai Zandya, working with affected communities to achieve more secure land tenure and assisting the state government to find viable compensation models in cases where people have been relocated.

Not enough attention is currently being paid to the pro-poor dimension of urban planning, and neither the government nor the international community has properly addressed the needs of the poor and disadvantaged. Technical advice to the government, such as the SETIDP project, has focused on standards geared to wealthier countries, and may as a result make many services unaffordable for the majority of households in Juba (UNDP-UN Habitat, 2009). USAID is promoting a lower-technology, lower-cost approach to urban planning that focuses on public health. UNDP and UN-HABITAT also emphasise that, in the current context, addressing the basic needs of the majority of urban households should be the priority, rather than aspiring to unrealistic notions of modern urban development (HPG interviews, 2010).

The problems of urban planning in Juba are compounded by disagreements between the GoSS and CES. While the MHLPU is promoting a policy of providing low-cost housing to the poor on the outskirts of the town as a way to decongest and replan, the CES MPI continues to allow official and unofficial land allocation in the peri-urban areas of Juba. GoSS officials accuse the CES MPI of short-sightedness and suspect that its interests lie mainly in generating revenue through land allocation. The GoSS is blocking grants for CES projects which it perceives as contradictory to its policy. The CES, for its part, is concerned about the practicality and intent of many GoSS



projects. CES officials made it clear that, in the wake of the large influx of people into Juba, there is no time for unrealistic projects like Rhino City. CES accuses the GoSS of wanting to block development in CES, and is pursuing ideas to transfer the capital to a different location.

### 6.3 Planning for returnees

The land administration in Juba was utterly unprepared to absorb large numbers of returnees after the CPA. While most returnees were expecting to be provided with land and services upon their arrival, the local authorities underestimated the range of land and property challenges they would confront. Local administrators also seem to have assumed that most would return to their places of origin (DeWit, 2004: 45).

According to the Director-General of the State MPI, the original plan was to expand the town in all directions – Rajaf *payam* on the eastern bank of the Nile, Gondokoro island, Tokimaan *boma* on the Yei road and Northern Bari *payam* on the Maridi road. Fifteen thousand plots were supposed to be ready and demarcated for the new arrivals, including a Class 1 area near the Jebel to attract well-educated and trained people from the diaspora. In the end, insecurity and heavy mining prevented expansion across the Nile, despite the demarcation of many new plots there. The land in northern areas proved to be too swampy. The main obstacle, however, was an impasse over new land allocation between the GoSS, the CES and the Bari, who resented the large-scale in-migration onto their land as well as the lack of consultation and transparency on the part of the GoSS when approaching them for land (see Pantuliano et al., 2008: 29ff). This effectively stalled town expansion between 2006 and 2008, just as the influx of returnees and in-migrants reached its peak. By the time the deadlock had been resolved, people had started to settle on any free spaces available within the town. The CES MPI complains that, ever since, it has been impossible to allocate newly demarcated land.

Another neglected aspect was planning for the accommodation of military personnel and their families. While initially supposed to be distributed across three sites in Southern Sudan, it was later decided to establish the SPLA Headquarters in Juba. State officials claim that over 80% of the land grabbing within Juba is done by soldiers, who are staying outside the barracks to be with their families. Many soldiers believe that they were promised compensation for their efforts during the war and are entitled to land in Juba. If denied access, some take the land by force. Communities and local authorities alike judged the problem of land grabbing by soldiers to be much more serious than illegal squatter settlements, as compromise is rare and most people end up having to give up their plot.

Those whose land has been occupied by others during their absence have had difficulty regaining access to their property. While the new Land Act establishes a process and

framework for addressing restitution claims for land lost as a result of involuntary displacement, few people are aware of these provisions and current institutions lack the capacity to implement them. It is also concerning that the Land Act provides for a period of three years from the entry into force of the Act for returnees to claim their land. This will have the effect of curtailing the land rights of returnees beyond this period.

### 6.4 Access to land

#### 6.4.1 Official land allocation processes

Land in the municipality is normally acquired through the principles of statutory law, either through individual transfer of the lease title between two people, or through the official land allocation system of the MPI. Land in the communities surrounding Juba is still governed by customary law, and a plot may be acquired through discussions with the traditional authorities and the local community.

In practice, the capacity for land administration in Juba is low, and waiting times of three years for the official surveyor to come and inspect plots and transfer ownership between individuals are common (Deng, 2010: 25). Trained personnel to survey and gazette land in urban areas are scarce (*ibid.*). The process is further complicated by a lack of information on which to base new land allocations and transfers, as there are no public maps showing plot distribution and ownership within the city (PSDN, 2009).

Commercial land prices have soared, and few individuals can afford them. In Gudele Block 9, for example, a plot costing SDG 3,000 (\$1,090) in 2004 now goes for SDG 25,000 (\$9,090). In Nyokuron West residents recounted having bought their plots for SDG 2, or just under \$1 in the 1980s; now a plot of land in the undemarcated area costs between SDG 10,000 and SDG 15,000 (\$3,600 to \$5,500). In demarcated areas with secure land tenure, like Atlabara, a plot of land can cost up to SDG 35,000 (\$12,700). In the Class 1 area of Tong Ping one plot was recently sold for SDG 110,000 (\$40,000).

The procedure for acquiring land through the official governmental allocation process is expensive and lengthy. CES officials reported having a list of 20,000 applications for land; new demarcation of land is however proceeding slowly and the process is currently suspended because squatters are occupying the newly demarcated areas, and because of the dispute between the GoSS and CES over the location of the land registry. Officially, those who have waited for land for a long time, those whose homes have been recently demolished and those with proven long-term residence in an area which has been officially demarcated are to be given priority. In practice, however, the process is highly untransparent and corruption is rampant; most of those with priority status never gain access to land. Instead, new land is allegedly given to the highest bidder or to the well-connected and powerful. For example, the newly demarcated area of Durupi, with around

3,000 plots, was initially meant as an area for people whose houses had been recently demolished. However, most of these plots have reportedly been given to government ministers and MPs. Even if ordinary citizens could get access to new land, official prices would be unaffordable for many, with a Class 1 plot currently costing SDG 8,000 (\$2,900), a Class 2 plot SDG 6,000 (\$2,200) and a Class 3 plot SDG 3,000 (\$1,100).

Land allocation procedures tend to favour men over women (Odhiambo, 2009: 24). Women are reportedly facing particular difficulties in accessing plots in the towns – both on the commercial market and through the official allocation process. Proof of the death of the husband in the case of widows or a marriage certificate are often demanded to determine whether a woman can acquire land. This is coupled with customary practices that do not allow women to own or inherit land.

People who are renting also facing rising prices, especially in the centre of town. Rent prices vary significantly according to location and type of structure. In Tong Ping, for example, one of the Class 1 areas in the town, a zinc-roofed house goes for SDG 200 (\$70) per month, and a *tukul* for SDG 150 (\$55). In areas towards the outskirts of town, such as Jebel, rents are much cheaper, with a house with a zinc roof costing SDG 50 (\$18) and a *tukul* SDG 30 (\$11). In some areas, such as Nyokuron, rents are said to have come down significantly since 2005, due to increased availability of houses and *tukuls* on the market as well as decongestion of the area due to demolitions. The price of a *tukul* is reported to have halved, from SDG 150 (\$55) in 2005 to SDG 70 (\$20) this year.

In other areas on the outskirts of town, such as Gumbo, where many people whose homes have been demolished have now moved, prices have gone up from SDG 60 to SDG 100 (\$22–\$35) for a zinc-roofed house. There are wide disparities in the rents that NGOs and business people pay. For example, houses in Tong Ping start from SDG 5,300 (\$1,930) per month; in other areas, NGOs are paying up to \$7,000 to rent a concrete house (HPG interviews, 2010).

#### 6.4.2 Corruption

The legal vacuum and lack of transparency surrounding land administration and allocation in Juba have encouraged and entrenched corruption. Many people interviewed pointed to corrupt networks increasingly controlling access to land in the peri-urban perimeter of Juba.

Communities cite many examples of chiefs selling land to foreign investors or rich locals without their knowledge. Many interviewees commented on the growing gulf between communities and chiefs in peri-urban areas around Juba; chiefs are reported to have become extremely powerful because of their authority over customary land and are now working solely in their own interest. Their authority is reportedly becoming increasingly difficult to challenge because of their connections with individuals in the government.

Northern Bari *payam* reported receiving many more applications for land from individuals in the GoSS and the military than from genuine private investors. These applications often purport to demand land for agricultural activities, but afterwards turn out to be for the benefit of one individual only. Repeated cases of this sort have made communities more suspicious and careful in negotiating access to land. In Rajaf *payam* people complained that powerful individuals often negotiate access to large pieces of land directly with the chiefs. For their part, chiefs point out that communities that witness their land being occupied or swallowed up by the expanding town immediately suspect their involvement. They point out that community members themselves, as well as other unknown individuals from the town, sell land in empty areas, pretending to be the rightful owners. In this way plots of land are sold on four or five times with forged land titles. The study also heard reports of official corruption.

Land grabbing has become an increasingly well-organised and institutionalised activity in high-value Class 1 areas such as Tong Ping. In response, people resort to a variety of methods to defend their land: one family in Tong Ping reported ensuring that someone was constantly present on the plot to defend it against opportunists. Generally, these attempts to defend land are not successful.

#### 6.4.3 Insecure land tenure and informal settlements

Unable to afford or gain access to land, an increasing number of people are without secure land tenure. These are often already marginalised and poor people living in constant fear of being evicted. Many have had their homes demolished several times, and have been forced to move towards the outskirts of the town. This has increased their vulnerability and poses a serious threat to their already very precarious livelihoods.

Informal slum settlements do not exclusively comprise recent arrivals to the city: a significant number of residents who settled in Juba over 30 years ago are still living in undemarcated areas such as Lologo or Gumbo. Whereas many of these long-term squatters have often succeeded in entering into informal agreements with the owners of the land and are thus at less risk of immediate eviction than more recent arrivals, they have nevertheless lived in insecure land tenure for decades. That said, recent arrivals often live in much more precarious conditions: they squat on empty spaces demarcated for roads or public services, settle in swampy areas which become flooded during the rainy season and even live in cemeteries. Others move out to the periphery of Juba in search of an empty plot. Most of these squatters live in very insecure conditions, face significant protection concerns and are under constant threat of eviction. Residents of an area called Hai Miskin [also spelled Mashakin] ('poor' in Arabic) near Jebel Kujur, who have stayed in the area since 2005, recounted how they were informed overnight that the land they were staying on had been sold and that they would have to vacate the area. When they refused they were

assaulted by the police and threatened with further violence if they did not quit the area immediately. In desperation, several widows who had already been forcefully relocated a number of times decided to undress and throw themselves in front of the police to stop the eviction.

Poor urban dwellers are making significant contributions to the urban economy as casual labourers, consumers and small-scale entrepreneurs. Constant fears of relocation preclude engagement in more permanent livelihood strategies as well as the establishment of more stable living arrangements. Many people interviewed reported having some money ready for investment in more permanent housing or a small-scale business within or near their homestead. Others, such as the community in Hai Miskin, had collected enough money to build a concrete building for a community school. However, they ultimately abandoned their plan for fear of demolition.

Many people become vulnerable to exploitation in the search for tenure security. In Gurei, for example, local chiefs and community representatives claiming to be in charge of the area have started to informally demarcate the land. Potential applicants reported paying between SDG 250 and SDG 1,500 (\$90–\$550) in exchange for a plot number and registration of their names. These are large sums of money in return for a plot that may be unusable.

The government's initial response to dealing with informal settlements was to demolish them and forcefully relocate their inhabitants to other areas. On 16 January 2009 the Governor of CES issued State Order No. 5/ 2009 ordering the demolition of a large number of informal settlements, markets and shops falling on roads and public spaces. The order gave residents a notice period of seven days to vacate their plots. Officially justified as necessary for the reorganisation of the town, the restitution of property and for reasons of public order, the demolitions had a devastating effect on large numbers of already vulnerable people. While the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) estimated that, between January and May, 27,800 people were affected by demolitions (UN Demolition Taskforce Meeting, 2009), UN officials suggest that an additional 30,000–40,000 people were displaced between March and June 2009 (Deng, 2010: 35). It is safe to say that the majority of those affected were poor and landless.

IRC Monitoring Reports found that a surprisingly large number of people understood and supported the objectives of the demolitions, such as opening roads for police patrols or ambulances to be able to pass (IRC, 2009: 3). However, the way that the demolitions were organised and carried out alienated many. Interviewees complained that they were given late or incorrect information about which area was to be demolished, making it impossible for them to save their belongings from the bulldozer. There was also a general lack of planning for the relocation and compensation of those affected. Residents interviewed by IRC felt that they were given insufficient support from the government prior to, during and after the demolitions (IRC, 2009: 1). The deployment of heavy security contingents meant that people were reluctant to question or challenge the operation (Deng, 2010: 35). People affected by demolitions usually move to the outskirts of the city, where services are either expensive or unavailable and access to casual labour and markets may be difficult.

There are indications that government officials are beginning to encourage communities to demarcate informal areas themselves, leaving them to decide who has to leave and who can stay (HPG interviews, 2010). Focus group discussions also revealed that communities in areas around Juba are starting to demarcate and register their land, allowing them to decide how much to keep and distribute among their own members, and how many plots to give out, for example to long-term residents. This represents an important step towards individual land ownership on the outskirts of Juba. Some of the income raised from the sale of plots is to be given to the *payam*, and some is to go to the community to augment services. Some communities have been more successful than others in defending their traditional lifestyle, while ensuring some income from selling community resources. For example, Bari landowners living in Kor Rumula (the Tokimaan community) have built a school, a health centre, a store and a church using income from selling sand for construction. Community structures (including a village development committee and a land committee) are particularly well-organised, and local leaders are an integrated part of the community. Other communities, however, especially those with corrupt or disintegrated leadership and community structures, have found themselves unable to cope with the increasing occupation of their traditional land.



# Chapter 7

## Infrastructure, services and the environment

Infrastructure and service provision are failing to keep pace with the expanding town; existing structures are under growing pressure and in many areas they are deteriorating. State authorities have been reluctant to expand infrastructure and the provision of public services in the belief that doing so might encourage an even greater influx of people into Juba. In fact, the factors influencing migrants' decision to come to Juba are more complex. While improvements in access to services in rural areas and in smaller state capitals might one day have the effect of reducing the number of people coming to Juba, this is unlikely to be a major incentive for existing residents to leave.

There is a general view that services in Juba are better than in the rest of Southern Sudan. Certainly, compared to many other states, basic services are overall more readily available, and most investment in the South has focused in and around the town. Several government-run primary health clinics have been built, private health centres and pharmacies are burgeoning, the government has supported the expansion of the Juba Day secondary school and the town hosts a university. However, the benefits of these improvements are not shared equally among Juba's inhabitants. In addition, the quality of existing services has deteriorated. Water points are not being maintained, health clinics are short of staff, equipment and medicines and government schools are overcrowded and lack trained teachers. Private service provision is growing, but few can afford to pay for school fees or drug treatments.

### 7.1 The link between land, infrastructure and services

There has been little investment in Juba's infrastructure beyond works designed to rehabilitate existing infrastructure in order to enable the government to function. Funded by the government with the support of the World Bank, the

Emergency Rehabilitation Works project was initiated in 2006, and resulted in the restoration of government offices and residential houses and the Juba Teaching Hospital, as well as the creation of a water plant, tarmac roads, a power supply system and generator network, a waste disposal site and a water treatment plant (HPG interviews, 2010). These interventions were largely aimed at 'keeping things running', in the words of one donor representative, and are coming under increased pressure as the town expands.

Some non-demarcated areas have lacked services for three decades. Neither the government nor aid agencies wish to invest in services that might later be destroyed due to replanning. Public services are dependent on roads being opened, which in turn is subject to land allocation procedures. The absence of roads in non-demarcated areas makes them very difficult to access, particularly in the rainy season. Access to services is therefore to a large extent determined by location, the ability to pay for transport to the town centre or the ability to pay for private services. The demand for land also means that areas that have been demarcated for services and roads are being occupied, creating further obstacles to service expansion.

A consistent finding across all areas where roads have been opened up is that this has contributed to improving the security situation by allowing greater mobility for police patrols, and reducing congestion in settlement areas. The availability of electricity was also found to have a bearing on the security situation. In Atlabara, for example, residents noted that, since electricity had been extended to some parts, it was no longer as dangerous to walk around in the evenings. Public electricity is mainly provided to Class 1 areas around the centre of the town, even though some efforts are currently under way to expand the network. While areas such as Atlabara and Kator

**Table 4: Basic services in Juba in 2003, 2007 and 2009<sup>4</sup>**

Service	2003	2007	2009
Water	567 (371 functional)	620 (412 functional)	385 (358 functional of which 308 need improvement)
Health	67 PHCUs	69 PHCUs	49 PHCUs 17 non-functional PHCUs
	19 PHCCs	20 PHCCs	22 PHCCs
Education	115 primary schools	122 primary schools	139 primary schools
		16 secondary schools	16 secondary schools

<sup>4</sup> Figures for 2003 and 2007 are drawn from Pantuliano et al. (2008). Figures for 2009 are provided by the GoSS Ministry of Health and the CES Ministry of Education.



are connected to the line, they only have electricity for one or two days a week. In most other areas there are privately operated generators, which charge around SDG 30 (\$11) for one lightbulb per month. In Tokimaan, residents said that the lamps of the nearby factory provided lighting in the area. The factory is reportedly willing to extend the power supply to the community, but only once the land where they live has been demarcated.

## 7.2 Education

While Central Equatoria State is better served than the rest of Southern Sudan in terms of the number of schools and teachers (GoSS, 2010d), the difficulties of attending school, and particularly pursuing secondary education, were consistent across all study locations. While there is no data on the number of residents in Juba that are of school-going age, in addition to potential numbers of over-age students, data from the CES Ministry of Education shows very low rates of school enrolment, particularly with regard to secondary education.

Many young people reported starting to attend classes but then dropping out because they were unable to pay school fees and transport costs. According to the South Sudan Interim Constitution (SSIC) and government policy, primary education is supposed to be free, though most people have to pay fees of around SDG 10–15 (\$3.50–\$5.50) for stationery and school maintenance. Fees for private primary schools range from SDG 100–150 (\$35–\$55) per year (HPG interviews, 2010). Government-run secondary schools are few and cost around SDG 40 (\$14) per year. Classrooms are often very overcrowded. There are examples of over 120 students per classroom in some schools, while the average class–pupil ratio in the state as a whole stands at just under 80 (HPG interviews, 2010; GoSS, 2010d).

Private schools generally tend to provide better services. Most are run by the Catholic Church. Private secondary fees can reach SDG 400 or SDG 500 (\$140–\$180) per year (HPG interviews, 2010). As such they are unaffordable for most parents. There are indications of large increases in fees for private schools over the past year. For example, a private school in Kator reportedly increased fees from SDG 200

(\$70) to SDG 400 (\$140). During the war many state-funded teachers were made redundant because all teaching had to be in Arabic, and went to work in the private sector. Earlier this year the GoSS recalled these teachers to government-run schools, forcing the Church to recruit and train new teachers, pushing up fees and eroding teaching quality. In Nyokuron, for example, it was reported that the head teacher had to do all the teaching. In Munuki, the primary school run by the Church was closed due to a lack of staff (HPG interviews, 2010).

While increasing the number of schools is a priority for the CES Education Ministry, the quality of teaching in government-run schools is problematic. Although 40% of teachers in Juba are trained, compared to 28% in CES as a whole (the highest rate in Southern Sudan), and there has been an increase in the number of primary school teachers, this increase has mainly been accounted for by untrained teachers. The number of trained teachers has in fact declined from 767 in 2005/06 to 738 in 2009/10 (see Table 5). Furthermore, teachers' allowances in government-run schools are lower than in privately-run schools, which could also be affecting the quality of teaching. One headmaster reportedly asked the Kor Rumula community in Gumbo to pay SDG 65–75 (\$24–\$27) in annual fees, much higher than the SDG 10 (\$3.50) fee put in place by the government.

In non-demarcated areas such as Lologo and Hai Miskin, parents rely on community self-help initiatives to provide their children with access to education. In Lologo, for example, the community collected money to start a community school; parents contribute SDG 150 (\$55) a year to support the staff. In Hai Miskin, parents started a self-help school under a tree after they abandoned their plan to build a permanent school for their children because they were concerned that it would be demolished. While parents paid SDG 120 (\$45) in school fees in Hai Miskin in 2008 and 2009, the contribution has been set at SDG 60 (\$22) this year because community members cannot afford to pay more.

Many parents stressed the importance of school for their children. In Gabat, a group of households living under a temporary shelter next to an office building, and earning around SDG 2 (under \$1) each a day, invest almost all their income in school fees and stationery and pens so that their

**Table 5: Education statistics for Juba County**

Year	No. schools	No. male pupils	No. female pupils	No. trained teachers	No. untrained teachers
<b>Primary</b>					
05/06	120	22,785	17,712	685	1,081
09/10	139	29,375	25,124	632	558
<b>Secondary</b>					
05/06	18	2,008	860	82	66
09/10	16	3,160	1,600	106	87

Source: CES Ministry of Education.

children can attend school. As one mother remarked, ‘we have to send them because they get fed at school, and they can’t stay here in these living conditions and the risks from loitering around in the area’ (HPG interviews, 2010). The large (and in some areas, like Tokimaan, growing) numbers of young people who are neither in school nor employed was mentioned by some as ‘a risk to other people in school because they can be encouraged to drop out’ (*ibid.*). Drop-out rates amongst secondary school students were also a worry. According to the CES Ministry of Education, 22 out of 35 female students in senior 3 reportedly left in 2009/2010, and 72 out of 842 male students (HPG interviews, 2010). In Gabat, one teacher said that fees were the main factor driving this trend. Some students have no parents to support them, and some female students married and left school due to pregnancy. For those attending school, the learning environment is affected as a number of students had to go without food in the morning after WFP stopped school feeding interventions (HPG interviews, 2010).

Very few respondents had received any form of assistance for education. In Atlabara, UNICEF provided schools with stationery. In Gumbo, the Roman Catholic mission of the Salesian brothers is working with young people who have left school. With funding from the Spanish government for the next five years, the brothers are planning to open a secondary school, a vocational training centre and a youth centre (HPG interviews, 2010). Eight primary schools in Juba are being rehabilitated or constructed by the CES Ministry of Education, with funding from actors including JICA, UNICEF, the Church, community initiatives and the military. However, capacity-building efforts are progressing less well. Teacher training is implemented by the CES Ministry of Education, which is in turn funded by the GoSS through the MDTF. However, the six-month teacher-training course in Yei is only organised every three years due to a lack of funds caused by procurement delays and inefficiencies within the Ministry (HPG interviews, 2010).

### 7.3 Health services

The main health concerns in Juba are malaria, waterborne and respiratory diseases, acute watery diarrhoea and neonatal and infant mortality (HPG interviews, 2010). While CES has better rates of neonatal and infant survival than other states in Southern Sudan, mortality rates are still very high. The 2006 household health survey showed infant mortality rates of 107 per 1,000 live births and under-5 rates at 141.4 per 1,000. Maternal mortality rates stood at 1,867 per 100,000. The prevalence of stunting from malnutrition in CES is approximately 30% (GoSS, 2007b).

HIV/AIDS is another problem. Health centres reported an increase in the number of people testing HIV-positive, as well as other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). One health unit in Nyokuron said that it received around 15 HIV-positive results per month, a third of them pregnant women (HPG interviews, 2010).

Due to the lack of data, it is not clear how significant the increase in infection rates is, what factors might be driving this and whether it is affecting all residents equally. Nor is it clear how far the increased availability of antiretroviral drugs is encouraging more people to take the test (HPG interviews, 2010).

Another pressing problem is psychological trauma. A 2007 study by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in Juba showed that 36% of participants were suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, and 50% had symptoms of depression, with forcibly displaced people and women worst affected (Roberts et al., 2007). Interviewees for this study told us that people were still traumatised from the war: ‘The trauma of war is deep, it affects our culture, and there are rifts within families’ (HPG interviews, 2010).

Health facilities are overcrowded as patient numbers have doubled or tripled since the CPA. Despite government efforts to rehabilitate local health centres, many still rely on the Juba Teaching Hospital, which is too small for the growing number of patients it attracts from all over the state. According to one health official, the situation with regard to human resources, particularly nursing and midwifery, is worse today than in the early post-CPA years across Southern Sudan as a whole. As patient numbers increase, health service personnel are being cut. In Nyokuron Primary Health Care Centre (PHCC), for example, patient numbers have tripled from fewer than 50 to an average of 120–150 a day, yet seven staff out of 30 were recently made redundant, including the driver of the newly equipped ambulance (HPG interviews, 2010).

The state government pays staff salaries, as well as approximately SDG 1,000 (\$360) every four or five months towards fuel for generators and other running costs. However, because the transfer is often delayed and is not in any case sufficient to purchase even the most basic items, such as soap, medicines, disinfectant and surgical gloves, many health centres have resorted to collecting a small fee of SDG 2 from each patient. While the government has forbidden this practice, and some health personnel buy these supplies themselves, only three PHCCs were reported to be providing services entirely for free. Even the Juba Teaching Hospital was said to be charging SDG 20 (\$7) for laboratory tests (HPG interviews, 2010). Health facilities have also been affected by rising crime. When the clinic in Nyokuron opened in 2007 it operated 24 hours a day. However, in April 2009 the midwife was attacked by a group of thieves. The PHCC in Kator has also been attacked. Both clinics now shut at night (HPG interviews, 2010).

In peri-urban areas of Juba there are often no government health services at all and patients need to be transported over long distances to the Juba Teaching Hospital for treatment. This can mean that, in case of an emergency in Hai Miskin for example, a car needs to be hired to transport the sick person to the centre of town, at a cost of around SDG 150 (\$55). In other non-demarcated areas roads are reportedly obstructed by squatter settlements,

and as a result ambulances cannot get through. In Lologo, for instance, residents reported that, in the absence of a midwife, if a woman is close to delivery and needs emergency care she has to be carried to the hospital on a makeshift stretcher.

Private clinics, often run by Ugandan or Kenyan staff, are unaffordable for most. In Atlabara, a private clinic run by a Kenyan doctor charges SDG 75 (\$27) for a consultation, and SDG 250 (\$91) for a two-day admission (HPG interviews, 2010). One private clinic in Gumbo charges SDG 5 (under \$2) for a malaria test and around SDG 50 (\$18) for treatment.

There are very few health interventions in Juba, and what interventions there are tend to be ad hoc. The Basic Services Fund (BSF) has supported a handful of clinics, and the French government funded the establishment of a clinic in Gudele (HPG interviews, 2010). Problems in the sector are compounded by poor financial management within the CES Ministry of Health, which has four times more staff than the salary budget allows, and has not paid some of its health workers for seven months. The GoSS has not yet decided whether it will continue to provide public health services, or whether it will sub-contract health care on a permanent basis.

As in the education sector, some communities have taken the initiative and opened clinics themselves, but lack of staff makes some of these efforts fruitless. In Gumbo, for instance, local people built a clinic in 2006, but it quickly closed because the state government was unable to provide staff and no medicines were available. On Gondokoro island the community pays two community health workers a salary of SDG 80 (\$29) a month. The Church is currently the only institution that has capacity-building amongst health workers as a key priority, but it reports that interest in funding its activities is declining (HPG interviews, 2010).

## 7.4 Water and sanitation

Most of Juba's residents rely on two sources of water: tankers and boreholes (JICA, 2009). Only the central areas and Kator are covered by the town's old water pipe network, which was recently rehabilitated by the MDTF. However, a lack of coordination between the road companies and the Urban Water Corporation mean that many of the newly restored pipes were recently destroyed when the roads were rehabilitated (HPG interviews, 2010).

Access to water in areas on the outskirts of Juba is particularly problematic. Residents often have to rely on rainwater, which is difficult to store and quickly becomes infected. Although there are boreholes across the town, many no longer work due to lack of maintenance. In the 1980s Gumbo had 14 boreholes, but only three are still functioning. In Lologo only one of four boreholes is still operational. There is a water tap in the military barracks which relatives of soldiers can use, but most people rely on mobile water trucks. In Gudele West, people queue for up to

eight hours at one of the two boreholes to collect two or three jerricans. In Tokimaan, residents have access to clean water from the factory. However, others rely on purchasing water from trucks. The water is sold untreated, and a barrel of water, or 200 litres, generally costs SDG 5 if it is purchased in the town centre. In Gurei, on Juba's outskirts, this can increase to SDG 10, or the equivalent of \$4 to \$5 for 200 litres of untreated Nile water, and approximately \$20 per cubic metre. In most countries in Europe, the average cost of a cubic metre of treated water is around \$5 (HPG interviews, 2010).

Few people own or have access to latrines and most resort to using open fields. In non-demarcated areas, most people hesitate to construct a latrine because of the fear of demolition. Only in areas such as Atlabara, which were demarcated some time ago, did people frequently report having proper latrines. Across the river, residents on Gondokoro island reported that latrine slabs were quickly destroyed due to the sandy soil.

In some areas in the town centre, trucks collect garbage for a fee, albeit irregularly. However, 95% of Juba's residents have no access to waste management services (Losio and Tomor, 2009). Waste is burned, dumped in streams or in open areas or buried. In Lologo the soil has been affected, making cultivation difficult. The same problem was noted in Kator. As the town expands, water and soil contamination will also have consequences for communities residing on the island, and those who rely on agriculture as their main source of livelihood. Another aspect of urbanisation that is having an increasingly significant environmental impact on Nile water is liquid waste from factories and hotels. The Southern Sudan Brewery in Tokimaan, for example, regularly spreads liquid waste over part of the area, channelled through a stream flowing down the hill. The *sheik-al-hilla* of Tokimaan complained to the factory on behalf of the community, and the factory is now in the process of digging a canal. However, this means that liquid waste will now be channelled to the Nile instead, and may become a source of contamination unless it is treated first. Local leaders in Gondokoro *payam* accused hotels of polluting the Nile with sewage waste; apparently 'people don't know it is unsafe'.

Water contamination means that people in flood-prone areas such as Lologo are vulnerable to waterborne diseases, including cholera. Cholera outbreaks were recorded in 2006, 2007 and 2008, with 7,496, 3,256 and 1,256 cases in each respective year. There were 80 deaths in 2007 and 32 in 2008. The worst affected areas were the *payams* of Kator and Munuki. It was reported that, during the rainy season, the river water passes over open fields that have been used as latrines. Water collection points along the riverbank risk becoming sources of contamination. The disease is also spread through water tankers (CPPG, 2007; HPG interviews, 2010).

There have been some targeted interventions by international actors. Medair constructed a water treatment plant in Gabat, which is being managed by the local community. Norwegian



Church Aid constructed a borehole in Tong Ping West, and MSF is planning an intervention in Gudele as part of efforts to prevent further cholera outbreaks. CHF International, funded by the Louis Berger group through USAID, chlorinated the water sold by tanker trucks during 2009 (HPG interviews, 2010). Funding has since stopped.

Starting in 2008, DFID has invested \$1m in a project to support sustainable waste management systems, and JICA has recruited a community waste management expert to open up a new landfill field. Twelve compactor trucks will be provided for waste collection, to enable *payams* to assume responsibility for organising waste collection again. While this is a positive step, it will be of no benefit to those residents who live in areas where there are no roads. In addition, linkages have to be made between waste management, service provision and infrastructure projects, especially in the areas of health and water provision. While JICA has now completed its plan for urban water rehabilitation, this will not meet the needs of all Juba's residents. In the medium term, a chlorination programme has been initiated by Marie Stopes International (MSI), and such projects should be scaled up as a matter of priority.

PSI Sudan and the Sudanese Red Crescent Society carried out a public awareness campaign on health and hygiene in four *payams* and in the SPLA barracks during September and October 2009, advocating for the use of water treatment systems which PSI Sudan sells at a subsidised price (HPG interviews, 2010). However, these campaigns are far more difficult in informal settlements, not least because investing in latrines is risky for residents (HPG interviews, 2010). Interventions for rehabilitating boreholes often do not help informal settlements, as criteria for intervention include long-term settlement (*ibid.*).

It is unclear who has overall responsibility for ensuring the maintenance of boreholes. No maintenance is being carried out by the GoSS Ministry for Water Resources and Irrigation, while the Urban Water Cooperation reportedly considers that boreholes lie outside its mandate (HPG interviews, 2010). JICA has undertaken a water network assessment with a view to increasing the capacity of the pipeline network to 14,000 cubic metres by 2012. By 2025, the objective is to increase capacity to 237,000 cubic metres. The total cost of the project is estimated at \$467m. However, the project has not yet generated the \$40m needed to implement the first stage (HPG interviews, 2010).

## 7.5 Deforestation

Rapid urbanisation is also having profound effects on the forest environment around Juba. While no exact figures are available, the UNEP Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment estimates that on average 40% of Southern Sudan's forest resources had been depleted by 2006 (UNEP, 2007). The rate of deforestation has been at its greatest around urban areas, in particular outside Juba, Wau and Malakal (*ibid.*). During the war, tree felling as a commercial activity was practiced by both sides, and timber was transported to Khartoum (UNEP, 2007; HPG interviews, 2010). Today, the dependence of many urban poor on firewood collection and charcoal burning as a source of livelihoods as well as energy is a key factor driving deforestation around Juba town, together with the clearing of forests due to the demand for land as the town expands. Soldiers in Gumbo are reported to be cutting down trees in order to support themselves and their families. While UNEP has received funding from Italy for a forestry project which expects to plant a million tree seedlings by 2011, without access to alternative employment and livelihood opportunities people will be forced to cut down the new trees before they have time to grow.



# Chapter 8

## The social consequences of urbanisation and urban vulnerability

The beginnings of peace in 2005 and the rapid pace of urbanisation that followed have led to significant social changes. As one UN representative remarked: ‘in 2005 Juba was like an overgrown village within a time capsule where not much had changed since 1993, since then everything has accelerated’ (HPG interviews, 2010). Juba has attracted significant numbers of people, both returning Sudanese and foreigners, all with a diversity of backgrounds and life experiences. This, together with the advent of modern technologies such as mobile phones and the internet, has brought about changes in many areas, including cultural norms, social networks and people’s relations to and perceptions of leadership, governance and peace.

### 8.1 Integration

As highlighted in Chapter 2, settlement patterns have changed rapidly and markedly. Whilst people used to settle according to whether they were returning refugees or IDPs or from a particular homeland, in many areas these distinctions are no longer apparent. In 2008, HPG research into return and reintegration in Sudan found that returnees from rural areas in Uganda and Kenya tended to be viewed as unsophisticated or uncivilised, and ‘non-Sudanese’ (Pantuliano et al., 2008: 13). A 2007 study by IRC found antagonism between people who had lived in areas controlled by the GoS and those who had lived in areas controlled by the SPLA or who had left for Uganda (IRC, 2007). Today there is much greater diversity. Respondents also mentioned that there was now much greater understanding and acceptance of different backgrounds.

Neighbourhoods increasingly reflect the socio-economic status of their residents, with the urban poor being progressively pushed towards the outskirts, and well-off residents concentrated in the centre. This shift is important from the perspective of social integration as well as political dynamics within Juba. As economic equalities increase, so the feeling grows amongst many urban poor that they are not benefiting from peace and economic growth. One boy commented that the ‘CPA has created discrimination, disunity, tribalism, and nepotism’ (HPG interviews, 2010). There is a perception that little has improved. In the words of one woman: ‘the only positive thing is the freedom of movement and ability to meet again with relatives’. Soldiers interviewed stated that they had had high hopes for the country during the war, but that they had become disillusioned and marginalised by the government (*ibid.*). A recent study led by the London School

of Economics and Political Science (LSE) found a similar trend across communities in other states in Southern Sudan, in that many people felt that the benefits of peace had been unfairly distributed (LSE, 2010).

Residents also expressed resentment against foreigners, particularly Ugandans and Kenyans, for taking jobs and outcompeting Sudanese traders. They were also accused of causing a growth in the number of drinking lodges and the emergence of commercial sex within them. While this might be true in some cases, it should be noted that commercial sex work makes an easy target for resentment. In Gabat for instance, one group of respondents stated that the neighbouring residential area was rented by Ugandan prostitutes, a claim which turned out to be false. Some areas have dealt with the problem by demolishing the lodges, and a public order prohibits any lodges in the market. However, they remain visible in Tong Ping, for example, and fully eradicating the trade has been difficult.

### 8.2 Culture, gender roles and social norms

Amongst older residents, changes in cultural and social norms were particularly emphasised. Many spoke of ‘cultural disintegration’ and ‘family life going down’ (HPG interviews, 2010). One elder in Gurei regretted the fact that young people no longer knew traditional songs and rites associated with weddings or funerals, and in some instances did not know how to speak the language of their families’ original homes.

The diversity of Juba’s population has meant, in the words of one woman, that there is now greater ‘social freedom’ and acceptance of different traditions and cultural norms, and opportunities for learning from each other. This is not restricted to women’s involvement in the economy. One nurse, for example, noted that many more people, particularly women, were now testing themselves for HIV/AIDS (HPG interviews, 2010). Furthermore, since Juba has become the new capital of Southern Sudan, women are playing a much more visible role in politics. Some women who previously were very active within the SPLM/A or civil society groups now hold ministerial posts, and campaign and work within the town. At the grassroots level, the Archdiocese of Juba is a strong advocate of women’s rights. It reports that women are playing a more prominent role in development and peace-building activities, and are demanding that they be treated equally, in terms of education opportunities for example (HPG interviews, 2010).

Men and male youth have not been able to find viable alternative ways of making a living. Men without any occupation and skills find it particularly difficult to cope with the demands of town life, particularly as they cannot fulfil the responsibilities traditionally associated with being the head of the family. In Tokimaan, one man described the extent of this change by stating that ‘men are even doing domestic work while women collect firewood’ (HPG interviews, 2010). One group of young men explained that they could not easily entertain the idea of doing certain activities that Ugandan men were making a living from, such as plaiting hair and carrying water, were it not for the fact that it brings in a bit of money. Even then one respondent stated that they could only do such business where no one could recognise them, as such activities are perceived to be ‘womanly’. The expectation that men marry and provide for their families is adding to feelings of frustration and stress. Confronted with high expectations from relatives and friends and an inability to deliver, in the words of a young man in Gumbo ‘life becomes difficult at every step – you are expected to work, to get married and to have a family, these are too many expectations’ (HPG interviews, 2010).

On the one hand, the break with tradition that has seen an increase in the number of single women, women earning an income and having a say in how they spend it, and more broadly having a greater say in household matters, could be viewed as a process of empowerment. On the other hand, women are shouldering greater burdens and face greater economic pressures, in addition to caring for their children. One local government official pointed to a trend for men, both husbands and older children, to ‘slip outside’ and leave the family due to the effects of unemployment (HPG interviews, 2010).

### 8.3 Protection and insecurity

For many respondents levels of insecurity within Juba were a key concern. Whilst Juba remained relatively peaceful during the war, with the end of the fighting insecurity within and on the outskirts of the town has worsened considerably. The irony is not lost on people. As one young man in Lologo commented, ‘before the CPA there was security within. Now there is no security; is this the meaning of freedom?’ (HPG interviews, 2010). Another man residing in Tong Ping stated that: ‘Before the peace the enemy was definite. Now, in comparison the enemies are many and unknown’ (*ibid.*).

Alcohol is reportedly significantly exacerbating problems such as domestic violence, harassment by soldiers and fighting amongst youth. One group of women remarked that there were many positive changes for women, but ‘women are drinking a lot ... both husband and wife drink and then start fighting’ (HPG interviews, 2010). Drinking amongst youth and soldiers is also widespread. Soldiers were mentioned as greatly contributing to insecurity after spending afternoons in drinking lodges, refusing to pay for goods at the market, sexual harassment and stealing from people’s homes under the pretext of carrying

out disarmament campaigns. Gun ownership was also seen as contributing to violence, with residents in some areas reporting gunshots at night and people being killed in gunfights. Residents in some areas report being ambushed and attacked at night, with some areas having self-imposed curfews for fear of being attacked by armed individuals or gangs.

For residents on the periphery of Juba, armed cattle rustlers are a significant problem. While conflict over water and grazing land is often believed to lie behind cattle rustling, it is in fact a symptom of the inability of young men to acquire bridal wealth in the form of cattle. Following the CPA, cattle ownership has become concentrated in the hands of high-ranking SPLM and government officials, whose rush to invest in livestock drove up prices to levels affordable to few. One of the few ways to fulfil this role at present is therefore through cattle rustling (HPG interviews, 2010). Women and girls are being forced to marry against their will to older, but rich and influential, men. They become important assets due to the dowry settlements that their families receive.

### 8.4 Security provision

The South Sudan Police Service has officially been in charge of public order within Juba since 2008, when responsibilities were handed over from the SPLA. Both police officers and residents report that crime is on the rise. Cases are most frequently related to conflict over land, although murder, theft and forgery also feature prominently (HPG interviews, 2010). The majority of areas in Juba have no police presence. Security provision was defined by one man as a strategy of ‘managing things at your own risk’.

In Nyokuron soldiers and police officers are perceived to be contributing to insecurity by harassing residents. However, in Gumbo the presence of soldiers residing there was seen as positive, and a deterrent to problems such as theft. One Bari community in Rajaf explained how, when 30 of their cattle were stolen, they approached the governor for help. He sent a group of soldiers to accompany them to where they had seen their cattle being taken, and they were able to reclaim them (HPG interviews, 2010).

The GoSS has tried to disarm and demobilise troops, with support from UNMIS and UNDP, as well as private contractors, donors and NGOs. Some 5,000 ex-combatants had been demobilised by June 2010 (HPG interviews, 2010). Regarding the police sector, there are plans to increase the number of stations, and to replace current staff with a younger workforce (HPG interviews, 2010).

### 8.5 ‘Gangs’

Youth gangs are an international phenomenon in developed, transitional and developing contexts, including Chicago, Los Angeles, Rio de Janeiro, Belfast, Kingston, Lagos and

Mogadishu (UN-Habitat, 2007). In Juba, little effort has been made to engage with these groups. A few years ago they were much more visible, and would even hold parties at one of Juba's main hotels. However, it seems many have now taken to the outskirts of town following GoSS efforts to crack down on crime (HPG interviews, 2010).

Disenfranchised and economically and socially excluded urban youth may engage in violent activities, whether 'criminal' or 'political'. In Central America and the Caribbean, governments have often responded through military- and police-led campaigns (Muggah, 2010). Where the impacts of rapid urbanisation and poverty have been particularly severe, many young men from marginalised communities join gangs as a form of extended family and as a mechanism to provide economic and social values not found in mainstream society (UN-Habitat, 2007). Furthermore, in urban areas where young men have lost touch with their families and rural support networks, gangs or armed groups may offer camaraderie and support as an alternative to a family unit (Stavrou et al., 2000). The emergence of gangs therefore cannot simply be explained in resource terms, nor as a manifestation of anti-social behaviour and a security threat. In Nyokuron and Lologo in particular, residents described a far more nuanced and complex picture. As one group of men in Lologo explained: 'Some join just for fun and the music, and adopt just the culture and style of dressing, others also become thieves' (HPG interviews, 2010). The determining factor was whether parents were able to support their children, or whether young people had families to turn to for support. In some cases, parents encourage their children to join because they can help support the family. As one woman in Lologo explained: 'children who have joined [gangs] are now wearing good clothes, and some have even bought vehicles. So it's becoming difficult to argue they should drop out, as they can earn a living. And in some cases, families also benefit from the income' (HPG interviews, 2010). Gangs have formed after seeing how members in other groups benefit. Some include 'clusters of rich boys who have vehicles, weapons and connections. The clusters of poor youth

use pangas and razor blades. Their families are poor. They feel social injustice when seeing such big differences, and also want their share' (HPG interviews, 2010).

Two groups, the Niggaz and the Outlaws, operate across several areas in Southern Sudan, including Wau (LSE, 2010). The Niggaz and the Outlaws were formed in 2009 by a group of young Sudanese refugees in Cairo. The Egyptian authorities expelled them and sent them back to Southern Sudan. Other groups based in Juba include Black Cross, Donkey Star, Kashami, 2Pac and 50 Cents. All these groups are influenced by the music and dress adopted by stars such as 2Pac and 50 Cents (HPG interviews, 2010). Both women and men join. As one woman in Lologo explained: 'during the day, you cannot know who is who, but at night they dress according to which group they belong to' (HPG interviews, 2010). Gang groups are alleged to have links with influential individuals within the military and police force and lie behind much of the organised crime in Juba (HPG interviews, 2010; LSE, 2010). The business community is particularly vulnerable as both their shops and homes are targeted, as are *boda boda* drivers. This makes the price of doing business very high, which could be a contributing factor to inhibiting longer-term investment.

Some groups are highly structured in terms of membership and leadership. If someone decides that they want to join, they register with the leader who will assign them to one of several sub-groups, where they will be taught the 'gang rules', including what proportion of stolen goods have to be passed on to the leader, and how much can be kept. During the day, members are sent out to scout businesses and find out how they store their daily cash income, with robberies taking place at night. On one occasion, it was reported that some members of the group had tried to cheat the leader out of the commission from a robbery, resulting in them being pointed out to the police and subsequently arrested. Respondents reported that the leader also had the power to take someone out of prison if he so wished.



# Chapter 9

## Conclusions and recommendations

In common with other urban centres in Sudan, rapid population growth confronts Juba with significant challenges, as well as important opportunities in terms of the growth and development of Southern Sudan as a whole. Policy-making within the various levels of government with responsibility for Juba has not kept pace with the town's expansion, and international engagement with the many and varied problems of urbanisation has been ad hoc and limited. Planning initiatives such as those produced by JICA, UNDP and UN-Habitat have become entangled with the politics of urban management, resulting in contradictory approaches that fail to reflect the priority concerns of the urban poor.

Despite signs of growing attention to urbanisation, driven in large part by the referendum and the possibility of further large-scale returns in its wake, significant programming initiatives have yet to materialise, and the focus of international effort remains on rural areas. The urban poor face very high levels of vulnerability with regard to livelihoods, services and infrastructure, exposure to environmental hazards and protection threats. This highlights the urgent need for greater and more strategic engagement with urbanisation and its consequences, including capitalising on the opportunities that urbanisation presents, and the desire of residents to make a positive contribution to the future development and economic growth of Juba, and Southern Sudan as a whole.

### 9.1 Recommendations

#### *Government of Southern Sudan*

- As a matter of priority, roles and responsibilities with regard to urban governance should be clarified, and the Local Government Act implemented in a manner that is suited to the particular needs of Juba as a capital city. This applies particularly to land administration.
- The JICA master plan should be reconsidered as an urban planning strategy and urban planning should take into consideration pro-poor housing needs through greater consultation at local level.
- The renewed emphasis on 'bringing towns to the people' should include greater appreciation of Juba's growth and its links with rural areas, and should identify ways in which Juba can support South Sudan's future development and economic growth. Price and tax regulations are important aspects of a more predictable urban economic strategy.
- Supporting men, women and young people to gain skills and access to employment is key, and should be reflected in the private sector development strategy as well as in the GoSS's growth strategy. Greater investment is needed to support access to loan facilities for people seeking to establish viable

businesses. Loan conditions must be realistic and flexible, and the exclusive focus on micro-enterprises needs to be rethought. The growth in the numbers of Sudanese traders clearly demonstrates that business skills are available, and could be capitalised upon.

- While it is clearly difficult to strike a balance between employing foreign technical know-how and investment and building the capacity of the local labour force, proper labour legislation is urgently needed to encourage and support Southern Sudanese workers.
- These efforts should be linked to public sector reform, to ensure that the GoSS can fulfill its commitment to recruiting young, bright graduates within its ministries. Provisions for pensions, and alternative livelihoods options for those who have been made redundant, will also be important, particularly in relation to demobilised soldiers in view of the significant DDR exercise planned for the post-referendum period.
- The GoSS should support the expansion of service provision. While the hope of better services is not the sole reason why people move to Juba it is an important one, and there is a general expectation that services will improve. The link between land, roads and access to services needs to be prioritised within urban planning.
- The constraints to education, particularly secondary education, need to be urgently addressed if young people are to have a chance of improving their livelihoods opportunities and living standards. The trend for more students to drop out of school, and for others never to attend, is concerning. School and transport fees are the most important constraints to access.

#### *Humanitarian and development organisations*

- The international community must abandon the assumption that the urban poor are better off than poor people in other areas of Southern Sudan.
- As a priority, programmes should avoid targeting on the basis of particular population sub-groups, such as IDPs, refugees, women and children. While planning for an eventual increase in insecurity and conflict is critical, it is equally important to demonstrate support for the needs of the people of Southern Sudan as a whole.
- Greater effort should be made to engage with and understand the dynamics of violence and insecurity in Juba. These issues remain largely invisible to the international community.
- For a comprehensive programming strategy to be developed, Juba's infrastructure and basic service needs should be included in overall basic service programming and in strategies related to economic growth and market development, as



well as land allocation and urban planning. Actors currently providing support in Juba in the areas of food insecurity, protection, livelihoods, land and services should seek to engage other partners in strategic discussions regarding programming interventions. Lessons from other urban contexts with high levels of violence should be drawn on.

- In the short term, coordination between agencies as well as clarity regarding roles and responsibilities within government structures will be important. In the long term sustained support towards strengthening the capacity of the GoSS and CES will be key.
- The situation with regard to water and sanitation is a good example of the added costs incurred by the urban poor. Recurrent cholera outbreaks reinforce the need for a comprehensive infrastructure intervention. There is an urgent need for support for access to clean water, including through chlorination programmes.
- There are several examples of communities setting up schools and health centres on their own initiative and with their own funds. However, human resource capacity and running costs remain a major constraint. These initiatives merit attention and support, particularly while efforts are ongoing to strengthen public and, where appropriate, private service provision.

- Helping people gain skills and access to employment in all sectors of the economy is key, and should be supported by greater investment in programming initiatives in this area. Within this efforts being undertaken within the GoSS Ministry of Labour are worthy of support.

#### *International donors*

- As a priority, donors need to devise a clear strategy governing their support and their financial commitments over the coming year and beyond. The unpredictability and inconsistency of approaches to both urbanisation policy and support to GoSS more generally is doing little to enhance the GoSS's own limited approach to urbanisation. It is also important to reiterate the significant impact that a lack of predictable commitments is having on the capacity to address not just the needs of the urban poor, but those facing the country as a whole. Donor governments should restate their support for development and growth regardless of the outcome of the referendum.
- Greater and more strategic coordination amongst donor governments on Juba's growth and future development is essential. It is crucial to consider the protection and insecurity concerns that run through many sections of this report.



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