

# Protracted displacement

## Uncertain paths to self-reliance in exile

Annexes 2 – 7

September 2015

Full report available at [odi.org/hpg/protracted-displacement](http://odi.org/hpg/protracted-displacement)



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## Annex 2: statistical analysis

### Data source selection criteria

The following criteria were taken into account in selecting data sources for the Level One typology.

- The underlying data should be publicly available with a clear published methodology. Ideally publicly available figures should be more reliable than internal figures as they are subject to public scrutiny. Public availability also means that the data would be reproducible – the typology could be extended to cover additional years without requiring access to confidential data. This version of Annex 2 makes no use of internal data sets, but only uses published data.
- The data had to cover a wide range of countries for a significant time-span.

There is no one perfect data source. An appendix at the end of this annex discusses the quality of the data available. All data sources involved some sort of compromise. The main data sources used are:

For numbers of displaced:

1. The UNHCR Population Statistics Database as published on 22 June 2015.<sup>1</sup> This major revision included the cleaning of null data. The database contains data about UNHCR's populations of concern from 1951 up to 2014, and includes details of various aspects of these populations: their general composition by location of residence or origin, their status (refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons, etc.), their evolution over time and other factors. This dataset represents a huge improvement on the previous version and UNHCR is to be congratulated on such an addition to the resource data on refugee displacement. However, this data-set is less useful for IDPs as it only includes 'conflict-generated IDPs to whom the Office extends protection and/or assistance'.<sup>2</sup> The UNHCR data-set omits some major caseloads of IDPs, particularly those living in protracted displacement such as in Turkey or India. The UNHCR figures for IDPs often reflect official state figures, which frequently understate or overstate the problem for internal political reasons.
2. IDMC data on IDPs displaced by conflict. IDMC gathers data on internal displacement from a variety of sources, including UNHCR. Due to the way this data is collected and aggregated, IDMC's annual country-level estimates do not distinguish between different groups of IDPs within a country. It may happen that one part of the total IDP national caseload is returning to their homes while another is in the process of being displaced. IDMC's estimates are based on an aggregation of: IDPs displaced in previous years (i.e., living in protracted displacement); IDPs newly displaced within that year; and, in some contexts, children born into displacement. When the data is available, the IDPs who have returned, integrated locally, settled elsewhere, fled across international borders or died during that year are subtracted from the total annual cumulative figure. IDMC reports IDPs in nearly twice as many countries as UNHCR. However, while new movements of IDPs are reported, returns of IDPs are less

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<sup>1</sup> [http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons\\_of\\_concern](http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern). The revised database (dating from 18 June) was first published on 20 June, but a revised (22 June) version, with about 15,000 additional records, was downloaded on 26 June 2015.

<sup>2</sup> <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview>

reported, while data on IDPs who have integrated locally or settled elsewhere is reported in only a few cases.


3. UNRWA reporting on the UNRWA caseload (various UNRWA reports at <http://www.unrwa.org/>). Since the end of 2011 UNRWA has split its caseload figures into registered refugees and other registered persons receiving UNRWA assistance (approx. 7% of the UNRWA caseload). The figures in the table are for all registered persons as the two categories were reported jointly for 2009 and 2010. UNRWA provides support in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the West Bank and Gaza. Estimates for years prior to 2009 were developed by applying the average population growth rate for the period for which numbers were available. UNRWA financial data was also used.

Financial data was abstracted from:

4. UNHCR country-level spending data for 2013. This data is from a new website launched by UNHCR in early March 2015 (<http://reporting.unhcr.org/financial>). Previously, this information was not available on any publicly accessible website.
5. WFP financial data from the Performance Report to the board.
6. UNICEF data from the UNICEF website and reports.
7. The financial summaries of humanitarian assistance produced by Development Initiatives in the Global Humanitarian Assistance report at <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/>. This data-rich report is the most comprehensive estimate of humanitarian funding.

Other important data sources were:

8. ReliefWeb posting data (at <http://reliefweb.int/updates>). ReliefWeb is the premier site for reports on humanitarian action. Since 2005 there have been over 36,000 posts a year on average in English, and the number of postings has been increasing by 2.2% a year over the last decade. Postings in English only were considered to avoid double counting translated postings. As discussed below, the number of ReliefWeb postings is a good proxy for the overall level of humanitarian funding for any given country.



9. The Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index (FSI) (methodology at <http://ffp.statesindex.org/methodology>). This is an index composed of 12 indicators with an average of 14 sub-indicators each. The Index is based on the Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool analytical platform. Millions of documents are analysed by this software every year. By applying highly specialised search

parameters, scores are apportioned for every country based on 12 key political, social and economic indicators.

10. World Bank data, especially on the classification of countries by income level (<http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups>) and the Size of the Economy indicators in the World Development Indicators (<http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/1.1>).
11. A series of tables published by UNHCR as part of the UNHCR Global Trends Report for 2014.<sup>3</sup>
12. Tables for the Human Development Index from the UNDP's Human Development report 2014.<sup>4</sup>
13. The CIA World Factbook table of land borders, for determining whether countries were neighbouring or not.<sup>5</sup>

Some of these sources contain large numbers of data points. The FSI is based on millions of documents. The UNHCR database and ReliefWeb contain approximately half a million data points each. The UNRWA data is the least dense in terms of underlying data. The World Bank data is generally based on national statistics. These ten main data sources were supplemented by reviewing data from the OECD's Development Statistics Database and the UN's Financial Tracking System.

### Who's counted?

One of the limitations of available data is that different groups are included in totals. UNHCR offers the following definitions of different groups<sup>6</sup>.

### Refugees

Refugees include individuals recognised under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; its 1967 Protocol; the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; those recognised in accordance with the UNHCR Statute; individuals granted complementary forms of protection; or those enjoying temporary protection. The refugee population also includes people in a refugee-like situation.

### Asylum-seekers

Asylum-seekers are individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined, irrespective of when they may have been lodged.

Some countries have a large proportion of their refugee and asylum-seeker caseload as asylum-seekers.<sup>7</sup> The ten countries of refuge that have at least 1,000 asylum-seekers and the highest proportion of their refugee and asylum-seeker caseload as asylum-seekers are shown on the following table.

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<sup>3</sup> [https://s3.amazonaws.com/unhcrsharedmedia/2015-06-18-global-trends/14-WRD-tab\\_v2\\_external.zip](https://s3.amazonaws.com/unhcrsharedmedia/2015-06-18-global-trends/14-WRD-tab_v2_external.zip)

<sup>4</sup> [http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14\\_statisticaltables.xls](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14_statisticaltables.xls)

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/fields/2096.html>

<sup>6</sup> [http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview#\\_ga=1.142422322.1838606709.1422528458](http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview#_ga=1.142422322.1838606709.1422528458)

<sup>7</sup> Mongolia and Sint Maarten (Dutch part) have asylum-seekers but no refugees.

	Country	Refugees	Asylum- seekers	Proportion of refugee and asylum-seeker caseload as asylum-seekers
1	Hong Kong SAR, China	130	2,183	94.4%
2	Hungary	2,819	15,629	84.7%
3	South Africa	112,112	463,875	80.5%
4	Japan	2,552	9,274	78.4%
5	Somalia	2,717	9,252	77.3%
6	Greece	10,262	31,881	75.6%
7	Republic of Korea	1,149	3,446	75.0%
8	Mozambique	4,524	13,311	74.6%
9	Malawi	5,871	14,489	71.2%
10	Angola	15,458	30,200	66.1%

South Africa hosts just over one-quarter (25.9%) of all UNHCR-registered asylum-seekers.

World Bank Income classification	Proportion of refugee and asylum-seeker caseload as asylum-seekers	Proportion of asylum-seekers from neighbouring countries
Low-income	8.5%	22.5%
Lower-middle-income	5.4%	6.7%
Upper-middle-income	21.8%	37.1%
High-income	0.5%	5.6%

Upper-middle-income countries have a higher proportion of their refugee and asylum-seeker caseloads as asylum-seekers. The reasons for this are not clear, but may include upper-middle-income countries being easier for asylum-seekers to access (over one-third are from neighbouring countries), not having a history of receiving refugees from non-neighbouring countries or lacking the bureaucracy to deal with asylum claims.


Proportion of caseload from:	Asylum-seekers	Refugees
Neighbouring countries	16%	86%
Non-neighbouring countries	84%	14%

Contrary to the pattern for refugees, where five-sixths are from neighbouring countries, only one-seventh of asylum-seekers are from countries bordering the country where they are seeking asylum.

There are over 100,000 asylum-seekers from Iraq: Afghanistan, Syria, DRC, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Myanmar and Somalia all have over 50,000 asylum-seekers in countries of refuge. These seven countries account for 37.6% of all asylum-seekers for whom UNHCR identifies a country of origin.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Just over 25% of the asylum-seekers caseload is recording with 'various' as their country of origin.

This study has not included numbers of asylum-seekers in the analysis of protracted displacement as asylum application should, in theory, be dealt with relatively quickly.<sup>9</sup> The number of refugees climbed steeply at the end of the 1970s with the start of the Afghan crisis, and peaked in 1992 during the Balkans crisis. 2014 saw the highest number of refugees since 1993.




### Internally Displaced Persons

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are people or groups of individuals who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of, armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border. For the purposes of UNHCR's statistics, this population only includes conflict-generated IDPs to whom the Office extends protection and/or assistance. IDMC provides data on conflict-displaced IDPs in 58 countries in 2014 compared with UNHCR's 24<sup>10</sup> in that year. The difference in totals is just under 6 million.

It should be noted that, with the sole exception of Cyprus, all countries for which IDMC reports IDPs are also the source of refugee movements.

### Stateless persons

Stateless persons are defined under international law as persons who are not considered as nationals by any state under the operation of its law. In other words, they do not possess the nationality of any state. UNHCR statistics refer to persons who fall under the agency's



<sup>9</sup> This is not always the case. A study of the Irish asylum processing system in 2014 found that some 59% had been awaiting processing for over three years, 31% for over three years and 9% for over seven years. Joyce, C., & Quinn, E. (2014). *The Organisation of Reception Facilities for Asylum-seekers in Ireland* (pp. 50). Dublin: Economic and Social Research Institute.

<sup>10</sup> The countries for which UNHCR provides no IDP data but IDMC does are Nigeria, Turkey, India, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Kenya, El Salvador, Mexico, State of Palestine, Guatemala, Cyprus, Peru, Indonesia, Chad, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Thailand, Uganda, Honduras, Russia, Senegal, Liberia, Lebanon, Niger, Eritrea, Togo, Armenia, Congo, Papua New Guinea, Laos, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Timor-Leste, and FYR Macedonia.

statelessness mandate because they are stateless according to this international definition, but data from some countries may also include persons with undetermined nationality. Others of concern refers to individuals who do not necessarily fall directly into any of the groups above, but to whom UNHCR extends its protection and/or assistance services, based on humanitarian or other special grounds.

Some stateless persons may have travelled from the country of their birth to gain refugee status. UNHCR registers these as having the country of origin of 'Stateless'. However, the bulk of stateless persons are not displaced and are therefore not included in the summary statistics for the displaced. UNHCR estimates that the number of stateless person is ten million, about three times high than the number recorded in UNHCR statistics.

UNHCR also records numbers of other persons of concern to whom it provides assistance. However, there are normally not displaced persons and are not included in the numbers here.


### UNRWA Palestinian refugees

These are persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict. Palestine refugees, and descendants of Palestine refugee males, including legally adopted children, are eligible to register for UNRWA services.<sup>11</sup>

UNRWA also registers other persons including the

Jerusalem Poor, non-refugee wives and others. Their numbers were included in the UNRWA totals until 2010, after which they were reported separately. The reported numbers of UNRWA registered persons for 2009 and 2010 have been reduced by an estimate of the non-refugee population based on extrapolating the growth rate in this population from 2011–13.

Distribution of registered UNRWA caseload of 5.2 million in 2014. Note: Syria registrations may overstate population as some had taken refuge outside of Syria.



The growth rate observed from 1997 to 2007 was used to extrapolate the Registered Refugee Population of West Bank and Gaza<sup>12</sup> to give a more accurate estimate for these populations. UNRWA has not published any summary numbers for the end of 2014 yet<sup>13</sup> but the annual report to the General Assembly contains the figures for December 2014 that were used in the calculations.<sup>14</sup> Estimates for 1989 to 2008 were generated by extrapolating the growth rate seen in 2009–13 backwards for UNRWA refugees in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. Jordan and the State of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza) are home to over 80% of UNRWA Registered Refugees.

### The challenges of estimating IDP numbers

<sup>11</sup> [http://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/cei\\_24\\_may\\_2006\\_final.pdf](http://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/cei_24_may_2006_final.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> Using the data from: UNRWA, & Ajluni, S. (2010). *West Bank and Gaza Strip Population Census of 2007 Briefing Paper* (pp. 35). Amman: UNRWA.

<sup>13</sup> By the end of June 2015.

<sup>14</sup> [http://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/report\\_of\\_the\\_commissioner-general\\_to\\_the\\_general\\_assembly\\_of\\_the\\_united\\_nations\\_2014\\_english.pdf](http://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/report_of_the_commissioner-general_to_the_general_assembly_of_the_united_nations_2014_english.pdf)



One of the main challenges in estimating the scale of global displacement is the lack of a common conceptual framework and accepted definition of an IDP at the operational and data collection level. Frameworks and definitions used for the purposes of data collection are inconsistent and usually narrower than the descriptive IDP definition in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Data collection exercises on the ground may, for example, exclude some causes of displacement altogether (e.g. large-scale development projects, gang violence, some forms of human rights violations) as well as certain groups – e.g. stateless persons, foreigners and other migrants. They may also exclude whole geographic areas. As a result, it is likely that a large number of IDPs are regularly excluded from the total count.

As well as limitations in capturing all people displaced in a comprehensive and systematic manner, methodological gaps are problematic for tracking what happens to people beyond their initial flight, i.e. displacement dynamics and trends over time. The implication is that, rather than painting a complete picture of displacement in a country, the estimates give a general indication of the scale of a number of situations at a given point in time.

Reported IDP figures usually represent multiple situations that have been aggregated into a national figure. For these reasons, it is difficult to make comparisons between countries, or even to compare different displacement situations within a country. In Syria, for example, different IDP definitions and data collection methods are used in different areas depending on which party to the conflict controls the territory at the time.

Moreover, internationally reported IDP figures do not necessarily reflect the true number of IDPs or the number of IDPs in need. IDPs may have difficulty registering or not wish to do so if they are in isolated, insecure or less visible areas, they lack the documents required to register, or they fear conscription, reprisals or social stigmatisation if they identify as IDPs. Some may also believe that registration could bring them more harm than benefits if their personal information is leaked. As such, the figures can be skewed in favour of one group while excluding another, rendering the figures inaccurate.

The result of all of these challenges around data collection is that comprehensive IDP data does not exist. It may be available for some but not all areas of a country, or it may be collected for some but not all of the factors that determine an overall caseload. Such factors include the number of IDPs who have returned, integrated locally or settled elsewhere, and the number of those born or who have died in displacement. IDP figures are also inherently conservative. People reported as having returned without knowing whether they have achieved durable solutions or not are subtracted, while IDPs living outside of camps, collective centres and camp-like settings are difficult to capture.

### **IDPs in protracted displacement – numbers and trends**

Calculating the number of IDPs in protracted displacement, whether displaced by conflict or disasters, is not possible with the data available. This study defines protracted displacement as having lasted at least three years. As the scale of internal displacement has on the whole increased over the past 15 years, one may be tempted to say that the cumulative global IDP figure at the end of 2011 can be taken as the number of IDPs living in protracted internal displacement at the end of 2014. That is, IDPs who were displaced at the end of 2011 are

likely still displaced since the global figure in 2014 is larger than it was in 2011. And since they have been displaced for at least three years, the 2011 cumulative IDP figure is the number of IDPs in protracted displacement at the end of 2014.

This would be erroneous since there is no evidence that the same IDPs are included in each country figure from year to year. Some drop off the list, including because of return, loss of IDP status, death or re-registration exercises, while others are added to the list because they are newly displaced, born to IDPs in displacement or they manage to get registered after some time in displacement.

In the absence of real-time data collection, IDP figures represent the number of IDPs who were on the register at a certain point in time. IDMC's cumulative IDP figure for the Philippines in December 2014, for example, was 'at least 77,700'.<sup>15</sup> During 2014, IDMC estimates that at least 123,800 people were newly displaced and 70,700 returned.<sup>16</sup> The cumulative IDP figure obscures the large flows that occurred throughout the year – flows that, taken together, are three times as large as the 'cumulative' IDP figure. Thus, without taking into account the new displacement, returns and the other factors that influence displacement figures, it is impossible to determine the duration of displacement from aggregated annual point-in-time estimates.

Plotting national IDP figures over time allows one to see the evolution of IDP figures in a country. This often says more about the reporting of internal displacement rather than an increase or decrease in displacement from year to year given the limitations of IDP data collection. In addition, producing a single national estimate usually involves aggregating displacement figures from various regions in a country, new displacement situations within a region or both. Combining various figures in this way makes it impossible to determine how long a given individual or group has been displaced. The data is not disaggregated by date of displacement, so it is not possible to have accurate figures for the length of displacement of the different IDPs included in the aggregate figure. As such, it is not possible to ascertain how many IDPs in a given country caseload are protractedly displaced.

IDP figures also obscure other important dynamics of internal displacement. Many people living in protracted displacement have been forced to flee more than once in their lives. IDMC's qualitative analysis has found that people already displaced by conflict and violence before 2014 were forced to uproot their lives again during the year in a third of the countries monitored. In more than 80% of cases, those affected are thought to have fled to escape further exposure to conflict or generalised violence in their places of refuge.<sup>17</sup> Also, new waves of IDPs join those previously displaced, many blend in with others displaced for different reasons and migrants in search of better opportunities. Displaced children grow up, elderly IDPs die and new generations are born into displacement. These changes in demographic composition are generally concealed in country and global IDP figures.

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<sup>15</sup> IDMC 2015 Global Overview 2015: People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence, p. 86.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 11.


## Total number of displaced in 2014

The analysis of the data yields the following:

Classification	Number	Source of data
Refugees	14,376,295	UNHCR Database update of 22 June 2015
Asylum-seekers	1,792,408	UNHCR Database update of 22 June 2015
UNRWA refugee caseload	5,149,748	Various UNRWA reports
IDPs	38,207,193	IDMC data from the 6-year IDMC dataset
<b>Total displaced</b>	<b>59,525,644</b>	
<b>Non-displaced reported numbers</b>		
Stateless Persons	3,492,250	UNHCR Database update of 22 June 2015
Other UNHCR Persons of Concern	1,052,666	UNHCR Database update of 22 June 2015
UNRWA non-refugee caseload	397,795	Extrapolation from end 2013 and mid 2014 UNRWA reports

There are now more persons forcibly displaced than at any time in history.<sup>18</sup>


## Displacement from 1989 to 2014



- While IDPs were just under 50% of the total displaced caseload in 1989 they have accounted for over 60% of all displaced since 2001.
- This increase in the proportion of IDPs in the caseload appears to be enduring.

<sup>18</sup> Although the figure is often given as being larger than at any time since the Second World War, forcible displacement in the wake of the Second World War has been estimated as being in the order of 11 to 20 million. <http://www.dpcamps.org/migration.html> gives the number as 12 million.


IDPs as a proportion of all displaced 1989 to 2014



### Where are the displaced from?

- Five countries account for over half of all 59.5 million displaced at the end of 2014.

Distribution of 59.5 million displaced (refugees including UNRWA, asylum seekers, and IDPs) at the end of 2014 by country of origin



- Syria alone was the origin for nearly one in 5 displaced in 2015.

The Syrian caseload was a mix between internal displacement (IDPs) and external displacement (refugees and asylum-seekers). As can be seen from the following table, IDPs make up the largest numbers of the displaced in seven of the ten largest displacement contexts. Somalia has approximately equal numbers in internal and external displacement.

In only two of the top ten cases is the displacement predominantly in the form of refugee displacement. These are Israel, the country of origin for the UNRWA caseload, and Afghanistan.

Top ten countries of displacement	Percentage of caseload internally displaced	Percentage of caseload externally displaced
Syria	66%	34%
Colombia	94%	6%
Israel	0%	100%
Sudan	82%	18%
Iraq	87%	13%
Afghanistan	23%	77%
DRC	83%	17%
Pakistan	83%	17%
Somalia	49%	51%
South Sudan	71%	29%


- In the case of Syria the total number of displaced in 2014 was nearly half the country's population in that year (World Bank population data).

Syria was the country with the largest proportion of its population in displacement both for refugees and IDPs.

Country	Displaced in 2014 per million of population	As IDPs	As Refugees
Syria	492,841	326,170	166,671
Somalia	204,779	102,423	102,356
Cyprus	184,206	184,206	-
Central African Republic	180,608	93,116	87,492
South Sudan	180,121	127,629	52,492
Colombia	130,890	123,527	7,363
Afghanistan	108,654	25,748	82,906
Eritrea	57,071	1,530	55,541

Refugee crises have shifted over time. In 1978 Sub-Saharan Africa was the source of the bulk of refugees. This quickly changed with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. This led to a large increase in refugees in South and Central Asia. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the subsequent Gulf Wars led to slowly growing refugee movements in the Middle East.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup> This analysis only includes refugees and asylum-seekers as good-quality data on IDPs prior to 2009 is not available and the data on the UNRWA caseload before 2009 has been extrapolated.




What this graphs tells us is that:

- The locus of refugee displacement crises has changed over time, and displacement is driven by the context.
- There is no one over-riding pattern for displacement.

### Where do the displaced go?

The study demonstrates that external displacement is not a simple country 'a' to country 'b' phenomena, but that the displaced from any one country go to many other countries. The first choice for refugees is an adjoining country. Less than one in seven refugees (13.5%) is in refuge in a country other than an adjoining one.

Average number of countries of refuge for refugee sending countries in the given region




- Displacement is not bilateral: it goes from one country of origin to many countries of refuge.

Refugees and asylum-seekers from Syria could be found in 92 countries of refuge and those from Pakistan could be found in 56 countries. Thus the nature of refugee displacement is fractured and widely distributed. In terms of countries hosting the conflict-displaced in 2014, two-thirds of all displaced people were displaced within the borders of their countries. IDPs are not reflected in this table.


Country of origin	Countries of refuge
Syria	92
Somalia	87
DRC	84
Iraq	80
Sudan	74
Afghanistan	72
Iran	65
Eritrea	63
State of Palestine	60
Pakistan	56

Distribution of 21.3 million refugees (including UNRWA and asylum seekers) at the end of 2014 by country of refuge




Seven countries account for over half the total number of refugees (including UNRWA and asylum-seekers). Jordan hosts over one in eight of all refugees between the UNRWA caseload from 1948 and the recent Syria crisis refugees.

Distribution of 38.2 million IDPs at the end of 2014 by country



For IDPs, the new IDPs in Syria outnumber those in the historic IDP crisis of Colombia. Just four countries (Syria, Colombia, Iraq and Sudan) account for over half of all IDPs listed in the IDMC data.


Distribution of 59.5 million displaced (refugees including UNRWA, asylum seekers, and IDPs) at the end of 2014 by country of refuge



Again, this illustrates one very significant problem with current displacement. Some of the largest caseloads are in countries with very limited humanitarian access (for example, Syria and Iraq), meaning assisting IDPs in those countries or planning for the return of refugees to those countries is difficult.

- For refugees and asylum-seekers, refugee-hosting countries in Europe have on average refugees from 70 other countries.






What is interesting here is that even countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have refugees from 23 countries of origin on average.

However, the countries with refugees and asylum-seekers for the largest number of countries of origin are Canada (with 163) and the United States (with 161). South Africa has refugees from 44 countries of origin. Brazil and Argentina have refugees from 49 and 45 countries respectively. Cameroon, Kenya, Angola, and Ghana all have refugees from 17 countries. Hosting refugees from diverse countries of origin is not a monopoly of the rich world.

Country of refuge	Countries of origin
Canada	163
United States	161
Germany	125
France	115
United Kingdom	112
Sweden	103
Switzerland	89
Italy	88
Netherlands	87
Belgium	83

In 2013 (for which more complete GNI data is available than for 2014), 77% of the refugee caseload for which GNI data was available was taking refuge in countries with a higher GNI (Atlas method) than the country of origin (\$12,634 higher on average). When comparing the World Bank income class of origin and refuge the impact of this can be seen, with over four million UNHCR refugees from lower middle-income countries taking refuge in upper-middle-income countries.



No refugees from high-income countries took refuge in low-income countries, but over half a million refugees from low-income countries took refuge in high-income countries.

- Refugees are more likely to take refuge in countries which are richer than their countries of origin.


Most large refugee movements are not predicated by choice but by the nearest border. Even so there are a number of potential mechanisms that might explain why countries of refuge are richer than countries of origin, including:

- The conflict that leads to displacement may also have a negative impact on the economy of the country of origin.
- Refugees may have a positive impact on the economy of their country of refuge.<sup>20</sup>
- Refugees, when moving to third countries from initial country of asylum, deliberately select richer countries.

<sup>20</sup> This is a much contested issue. Maystadt and Verwimp (2014) found that the economic impact was positive in aggregate, but that it could be positive or negative for different groups in the hosting population. Winners and Losers among a Refugee-Hosting Population. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 62(4), 769-809. doi: 10.1086/676458

However, it is not possible to say which, if any, of these possible mechanisms predominates. It may simply be a data artefact generated by a few specific cases such as Syria and Afghanistan, where the countries to which most Syrian and Afghan refugees have fled (Iran and Pakistan for Afghanistan, and Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq for Syria) being in a higher World Bank income class.

High-income countries are the only group which have a majority of their refugee caseload from non-adjointing countries.



### Protracted displacement

For the purpose of this study, protracted displacement is defined as a situation in which refugees or IDPs have been displaced for three years or more, and where the process for finding durable solutions, such as repatriation, integration into host communities or resettlement in a third location, has stalled.

The number of refugees in protracted displacement was estimated by looking at the refugee flows between 6,697 different country of origin and country of refuge pairs from 1978 to 2014. The calculation was based on two assumptions:

- First, it was assumed that no refugees were returning from a particular country of refuge to a particular country of origin in a particular year and being replaced by other refugees from that country of origin in that year. This meant that we assumed that there was zero churn for a particular country pair.
- Second, it was assumed that, when refugees returned, it was the most recently displaced refugees that returned rather than those that had been in displacement the longest. This is the first-in last-out assumption.

This assumption of zero churn for a country pair is a reasonable one, in that the level of churn in refugee crises tends to be small once the population has been displaced for a few years. Where there is churn it may happen that refugees are returning from one country of refuge while others are fleeing to another country of refuge due to political changes in the country of origin. Asylum-seekers were excluded from the analysis as they are the refugee group most subject to churn as their asylum applications are accepted or rejected.

The second assumption again is a reasonable one, in that longer-established refugees have children in school in the host country, and may also have livelihoods there. Newly arrived refugees have fewer such constraints, and

more livelihood links to the country of origin. This means that return has a lower opportunity cost for them than for longer-established refugees.

Of course, both of these assumptions do not hold true in the case of every single refugee, but we considered that any error introduced from using these assumptions was probably smaller than the precision of measurement of refugee caseloads.

The following calculation for refugees from Haiti illustrates the technique.


Country hosting Haitian refugees	2011	2012	2013	2014	In protracted displacement in 2014
Angola	1	2	2	0	0
Argentina	57	58	62	66	57
Belgium	6	4	2	0	0
Brazil	3	3	3	0	0
Canada	4,963	6,798	7,872	8,422	4,963
Chile	1	1	1	0	0
Colombia	1	1	1	0	0
Costa Rica	38	38	38	38	38
Cuba	1	1	1	0	0
Dominican Republic	595	750	716	603	595
Ecuador	24	27	25	22	22
France	3,619	3,710	3,741	3,523	3,523
Germany	47	45	15	15	15
Honduras	6	6	6	6	6
Italy	8	8	8	8	8
Jamaica	19	19	18	18	18
Mexico	191	173	175	175	173
Netherlands	2	2	2	0	0
Norway	2	2	2	0	0
Panama	13	17	17	16	13
Peru	15	16	19	24	15
Spain	18	20	21	21	18
Sweden	1	1	1	0	0
Switzerland	0	1	2	0	0
Trinidad and Tobago	2	0	2	0	0
United Kingdom	0	1	1	0	0
United States	24,013	26,849	25,891	24,170	24,013
Venezuela	15	15	15	15	15
<b>Total</b>	<b>33,661</b>	<b>38,568</b>	<b>38,659</b>	<b>37,142</b>	<b>33,492</b>

In the case of Haitian refugees in Mexico, the number dropped to 173 in 2012, so only this many out could be in protracted displacement in 2014. In the case of the United States, although the number of refugees increased to 26,849 in 2012 and then decreased, it was assumed that the departing refugees were the most recently arrived ones. The overall percentage of protracted displaced for refugees from Haiti in 2014 was 33,492/37,142 or 90%. The same calculation was repeated for all countries of origin and of refuge.

### Who is in protracted displacement?

- All of the UNRWA registered refugee caseload.
- Currently 54% of the non-UNRWA refugee caseload.
- A part of the global IDP caseload, but the data is not collected in a ways that permits one to estimate the total number of protracted IDPs.

The percentage of the refugee caseload in protracted displacement varies as new refugees are generated and old refugees return. Today's percentage of non-UNRWA refugees in protracted displacement is the lowest proportion in protracted displacement since 1982; and then, as now, that lower figure is due in part to the large number of new refugees within the previous three years. The percentage of the non-UNRWA refugee caseload in protracted displacement has been over 75% for 14 of the last 30 years. Refugee protracted displacement peaked in 2005 at 87%, as was at 83% in 2011, just before the start of the Syria Crisis. If we include the UNRWA refugee population (all in protracted displacement), the percentage of refugees in protracted displacement stood at 91% in 2005, 88% in 2010 and 2011 and 66% at the end of 2014, the lowest percentage of refugees in protracted displacement for 20 years.




What we can say is that:

- Protracted displacement is the norm for refugees.
- The proportion of the UNHCR refugee caseload in protracted displacement has not dropped below 50% for the last 30 years.
- Two-thirds of the UNHCR refugee caseload has been in protracted displacement for 21 of the last 40 years.

Although there are some long-standing IDP crises, as in Darfur or Colombia, with many millions of persons displaced, it is not possible due to the aggregation of multiple IDP caseloads within a country to estimate the

percentage of the IDP caseload that is in protracted displaced. Estimating the numbers of IDPs in protracted displacement is especially difficult for the reasons set out earlier.



There is a strong correlation<sup>21</sup> between the proportion of the population from any country in internal displacement and the proportion of the population in external displacement.

The proportion of population was used rather than overall numbers as this is a better measure of the scale of the problem and prevents the size of a country's population from biasing the correlation.<sup>22</sup> While internal displacement is different in many respects from external displacement we can say that:

- Countries experiencing large-scale internal displacement are likely also to experience large-scale refugee displacement.

The one exception to this is Cyprus, which has large numbers of displaced following the partition of the island but no refugees in exile.

<sup>21</sup> We have used the following table for describing correlations based on Pearson's  $r$ : less than 0.30 negligible; 0.30-0.49 weak; 0.50-0.69 moderate; 0.70-0.89 strong; 0.90+ very strong.

<sup>22</sup> When numbers rather than proportions are compared the Pearson  $r$  is 0.678 with  $p < .05$ .

Split between protracted and not-yet protracted refugees by region of origin  
(including UNRWA) at the end of 2014




- The proportion of the caseload in protracted displacement varies by region.

### Patterns of displacement: How long do refugee crises last?

Examining the patterns of displacement makes clear that most refugee crises last for decades not years. The following plot shows the pattern of refugee displacement for the 20 largest refugee crises from 1978 to 2014.

The evolution of the 20 Refugee Crises generating more than 400,000 refugees from 1978 to 2014. The width of each plot is proportional to the caseload from that country in that year.





These tell us several things:

- Most of these large refugee crises last for decades, not years. Of the 20 crises shown here, 13 still have significant numbers in displacement in 2014.
- The variety in the shapes of the plots shows that there is no single overriding pattern for refugee displacement. Some crises rise and then fall away, like Sierra Leone, others wax and wane over time, like Afghanistan.
- The onset of a refugee crisis can slowly build, as for Sudan, or rapidly explode, as for Syria.
- Crises that drag on for years may suddenly explode in scale, as for Iraq or Rwanda (albeit with different caseloads).
- Even where refugee crises are resolved, as in Mozambique, there can be a tail of refugee cases for several years.


The same patterns can be seen whatever the scale. The following charts plot 80 refugee crises over the last 37 years. To facilitate the comparison the crises have all been plotted as the percentage of their maximum displacement.






The intervals were selected for each graph to give 20 crises.

All refugee crises generating between 34,000 and 120,000 refugees or asylum seekers from 1978 to 2014. The width of the plot corresponds to the percentage of the peak number of displaced for that crisis.




All refugee crises generating between 9,500 and 34,000 refugees or asylum seekers from 1978 to 2014. The width of the plot corresponds to the percentage of the peak number of displaced for that crisis.



As can be seen:


- Small-scale crises can last for decades just as large-scale crises do.
- Smaller-scale crises are just as variable as larger-scale ones.
- The variability of refugee displacement crises are scale-invariant. The same phenomena can be seen for 5,000 or 5 million.
- The 1990s saw a jump in the number of refugee crises.

We can test this last observation by counting the number of refugee crises with over 1,000 displaced from 1978 to 2014.



It can be seen that, from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, the number of countries with refugee crises more than doubled (from 38 in 1988 to 81 in 1996). Part of the increase may be an artefact of the UNHCR database, in that UNHCR provided data on countries of origin for only 83% of the refugee caseload in 1988 and 90% in 1990.<sup>23</sup> 1978 was excluded as UNHCR only provided data on origin for 70% of the caseload in that year. However, the increase seen far outweighs any impact that this data artefact might have. Checking the countries involved reveals that many of the new caseloads were due to the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union.

It also appears from this graph that the number of origin/refuge pairs has increased more quickly than the number of countries of origin. We can confirm this by looking at the numbers.




The average number of countries of refuge with at least 1,000 refugees from a particular crisis has increased from approximately two in 1979 to approximately four and a half in 2014.

<sup>23</sup> See the appendix on data quality.


These charts led to the following conclusions:

- There was an explosion in the number of countries generating refugees between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s with a doubling of the number of countries of origin with more than 1,000 refugees in exile.
- The number of refugee crises continued to grow from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s but at a slower rate.
- The number of refugee crises has been stable since the mid-2000s.
- Refugee displacement has become more disperse with the average number of countries hosting at least 1,000 from any one country of refugee increasing from three in 1978 to four and a half in 2014.


In terms of protracted refugee displacement, similar increases can be seen as for overall refugee displacement (again for countries with caseloads of at least 1,000).



The orange line (for the number of country pairs) rises much faster than the blue bars (for the number of countries). This suggests that the average number of countries of refuge with refugees in protracted displacement per country of origin has grown. The following graph makes this explicit.



What is more interesting is that the proportion of refugee crises where a country of origin is generating at least 1,000 refugees in protracted displacement, or where a given origin/refugee pair has at least 1,000 refugees in protracted displacement has also grown since 1990. This can be seen from the following graph by the fact that both the red (country) line and the green (origin/refugee pairs) show a strong upward trend.



These graphs tell us that, since 1990, situations of protracted displacement are increasingly becoming the norm for refugee crises. The reasons for this are not clear.

- Since 1990, the likelihood that a refugee crisis would become protracted has increased.
- At the end of 2014, for countries of origin with at least 1,000 refugees in exile, more than nine out of ten such countries had refugees in protracted displacement.
- 96% of non-UNRWA refugee crises with at least 1,000 refugees in exile now have at least 1,000 refugees in protracted displacement.
- 82% of all non-UNRWA refugee/origin pairs with at least 1,000 refugees have at least 1,000 refugees in protracted displacement.

### How long do refugee crises last?

The crisis duration was measured for 213 countries and territories of origin from 1978 to 2014 using the UNCHR data. Each crisis was assumed to begin when the number of refugees generated reached 10% of the peak number. The crisis was assumed to end when the number of refugees dropped below 10%.


Obviously, if a different percentage is used for picking the start and end of crises, then the average duration of the crises will vary. Picking 5% of the peak displacement as the start and end point increases the average length of the crises, and picking 20% reduced the average length. Again, picking a large level of peak displacement gave lower average lengths.

Percentage of peak displacement at which the crisis is assumed to begin and end	Average length of the longest crisis in years for 213 countries and territories with this number of UNHCR refugees at peak				
	51-500	501-5,000	5,001-50,000	50,001-500,000	Over 500,000
5%	17.8	16.4	21.3	19.2	23.6
10%	14.9	14.2	17.8	16.1	22.1
20%	10.8	11.2	13.9	12.8	18.2

Although there is a tendency for larger crises to last longer, the difference is not statistically significant.

Several countries experience multiple crises by these definitions, as the refugee numbers may have dropped below 10% for a year or more at the beginning or the end of the crises. A visual example of the plots of the data showed that few refugee crises had more than one large-scale phase and to avoid crises being segmented artificially by this rule, the longest-lasting crisis between the limits was taken for each country.

The frequency distribution shows that only a tiny proportion of refugee crises are resolved quickly.



If we analyse the data for 1978 to 2014, excluding South Sudan and Syria (as they were less than four years old at the end of 2014), we can see that:

- Durations of over three years are the norm for refugee crises.
- Less than one-in-forty refugee crises are resolved<sup>24</sup> within three years. Of the 91 refugee crises displacing 5,000 or more from 1978 to 2014, only one (Togo in 1993) saw 90% of the peak displaced population return in less than four years.<sup>25</sup>
- More than four-fifths of refugee crises displacing 5,000 or more last for ten years or more.
- Two in five refugee crises displacing over 5,000 people lasted 20 years or more.

The following table presents an analysis of the duration of refugee crises for countries of origin. The length of a crisis was taken to be the maximum number of consecutive years for which the number of refugees was at least 10% of the peak level of displacement.


Refugee flows 1978-2014 with a peak displacement of at least	No. of countries of origin	Number of crises lasting less than 4 years	Percentage lasting 4 years or more	Percentage lasting 10 years or more	Percentage lasting 20 years or more
50	165	3	98.2%	81.2%	36.4%
500	132	3	97.7%	81.8%	37.9%

<sup>24</sup> Resolved is used here to indicate that the caseload was reduced to 10% of the peak caseload.


<sup>25</sup> Togo has continued to generate refugees since, but the numbers were small compared to the 1993 caseload.

5,000	91	1	98.9%	81.3%	41.8%
50,000	55	1	98.2%	80.0%	47.3%
500,000	15	0	100.0%	93.3%	60.0%

It can be noted from this table that the likelihood of a crisis lasting for 20 years or more is higher as the crisis grows in scale. The number of years was plotted against the case size to check the strength of this relationship. It was only weakly correlated.<sup>26</sup>



The correlation is negligible<sup>27</sup> but it is statistically significant. An analysis of the data shows that the correlation was being biased by the shorter duration of crises with less than 5,000 refugees.



The correlation is weaker if the comparison is limited to cases over 5,000 max displacement. The correlation for crises over 5,000 is not statistically significant.

<sup>26</sup> All correlations reported here exclude zero values to increase the accuracy of the calculation of Pearson's  $r$ .


<sup>27</sup> We earlier defined a correlation of 0-0.30 as negligible. Conventionally the proportion of variation in one variable accounted for by an association with another variable is  $r^2$  or 3.6% in this case.

- The length of refugee displacements is only negligibly correlated with the scale of displacement.

### Short term crises

There have been a small number of dramatic short-term refugee flows and returns. Examples are the flow of Burundian refugees to Tanzania in late 1993 and refugees from Kosovo in 1999. The bulk of Burundian refugees had returned to Burundi by early 1994. Their data is captured in the dataset as they were in exile at the end of December 1994.

The Kosovo crisis provides another example of an exceptionally short exile. Here refugees ebbed and flowed over a 38-week period in 1999. This event is not reflected in the plots shown above as it was all over before the end of the year. The 38 weeks of the peak of the crisis are plotted below on the same scale as the earlier plots. However, such examples are few and far between.



However, this was an exceptional event. The normal pattern is for refugee exile to last decades, as shown by the previous plots for the 20 largest refugee displacements from 1978 to 2014.

- Quickly resolved crises are few and far between. Refugee crises that persist until the end of the year tend to last for decades.

### Time in displacement

The duration of crises does not tell us how long the displaced have been in displacement. For this analysis, the caseload was again divided up into 6,967 pairs of countries of origin and of refuge for the analysis.

The time in displacement was calculated by using the same two assumptions, zero-churn and first-in, last out. The calculation consisted in estimating what part of the 2014 caseload dated from which year, and then using this data to estimate which part of the caseload had joined in which year.


The following table illustrates this calculation for Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia. Only part of the calculation is shown (it was done back to 1978).



Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Yearly total	90,451	73,927	66,980	35,493	25,913	23,516	25,238	45,286	27,175	33,582	35,447
Of which still in place in 2014	23,516	23,516	23,516	23,516	23,516	23,516	25,238	27,175	27,175	33,582	35,447
Number in 2014 dating from this year	23,516	0	0	0	0	0	1,722	1,937	0	6,407	1,865
Years ago	>10	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Percentage of 2014 caseload	97.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	7.1%	8.0%	0.0%	26.5%	7.7%


This calculation was carried out for refugees in place in 2014 and refugees in place in 2011 for all 6,967 country pairs.

The UNHCR caseload was considered first for 2014, and then for 2011. The reason for looking at 2011 is that, as already noted, the onset of the Syria crisis (and, to a lesser extent, South Sudan) has seen the proportion of refugees in protracted displacement fall to its lowest level in 20 years.



As already noted, 54% of the UNHCR refugee caseload were in protracted displacement (displaced over three years) at the end of 2014.


### How long has the UNHCR Refugee caseload at the end of 2011 (11.7mn) been in displacement?



Looking at the situation prior to the Syria and South Sudan crises, in 2011, shows that 83% of UNHCR refugees then were in protracted displacement.


UNHCR refugees are only part of the refugee caseload. The UNRWA caseload have been displaced for over 60 years.

### How long has the refugee caseload at the end of 2014 (19.5mn between UNHCR and UNRWA) been in displacement?



- When UNRWA figures are taken into account the proportion of refugees in protracted displacement at the end of 2014 rises to two-thirds of all refugees. Again, the situation before the Syria and South Sudan crises is more typical of the general picture.

### How long has the refugee caseload at the end of 2011 (15.2mn between UNHCR and UNRWA) been in displacement?




With the inclusion of the UNRWA caseload the proportion of refugees in protracted displacement at the end of 2011 rises to 88%.

We could only estimate the average (mean) length of displacement if we knew how long each and every refugee had been displaced. We don't have this because the earlier UNHCR data is of lower quality. The often quoted statistic that the average length of stay in a refugee camp<sup>28</sup> is 17 years cannot be confirmed or refuted by the available data. However, we can estimate the median length of displacement:

- At the end of 2014, half the UNHCR and UNRWA refugee caseload had been in exile for over ten years.
- At the end of 2011 (prior to the large Syrian and South Sudan displacements) half the UNHCR and UNRWA refugee caseload had been in exile for over 22 years.

### Livelihoods and refugee displacement

To what extent does poverty contribute to displacement? We are not able to answer this with the data available, as low incomes could be either a cause or a result of displacement, or could both be generated by the factors leading to displacement. We also tested the case as to whether low GNI per capita is associated with the number of displaced.



<sup>28</sup> <https://singularthings.wordpress.com/2015/07/04/17-years-in-a-refugee-camp-on-the-trail-of-a-dodgy-statistic/>


What this graph tell us is that:

- There is a negligible association between lower GNI per capita and the percentage of the population that is in external exile. Countries with lower GNI are slightly more likely to have a larger part of their population in exile.


Again we can only identify the association and cannot say anything about the direction of any causal relationship, or even whether both the GNI and the proportion in exile were being determined by another cause.

We examined a large number of factors, such as the Human Development Index (HDI) from UNDP, the inequality adjusted HDI, the UNDP Coefficient of inequality, and the Gini Coefficient for incomes, but found no correlation with the number of displaced generated by a particular country of origin.

However, we found that the proportion of the population in severe poverty (UNDP 2014 HDI report) was negligibly correlated with the proportion of the population in external exile.



Again this was a negligible but statistically significant correlation.



The correlation between the percentage in severe poverty and IDP numbers is effectively nil.


What we can say is that:

- It is likely that poverty, in itself, is not a major driver of displacement.

### Where are the displaced?

UNRWA notes that one-third of their registered refugee caseload is in camps. However, these camps are not the tented camps that might house recent influxes but towns built of bricks and mortar. Similarly the UNHCR category 'planned camps' can be thought of as 'once-planned' camps as many have grown far beyond their original layout.


### Where are UNHCR refugees staying?



Just over one-half of UNHCR refugees are staying in private accommodation, just under one-third are in camps and the accommodation type for the remaining one-sixth is not known. There are regional differences between


different types of accommodation. Given half of the UNHCR caseload lives in private accommodation and two-thirds of the UNRWA population lives in private accommodation we can say that:

- Just over half of all refugees (UNHCR and UNRWA) are in private accommodation.



- Refugee camps predominated in the Far East and Sub-Saharan Africa, but private accommodation predominates elsewhere.


If the UNRWA caseload were urbanised to the same extent as the host population of their countries of refuge 78% would be in urban settings. However, the percentage is likely to be much higher as refugees in the Middle East normally don't have access to land to pursue rural livelihoods. Thus it is likely that well over 90% of the UNRWA caseload is in an urban setting.



The bulk of UNHCR refugees are in urban settings. When we combine this with the very conservative assumption that UNRWA refugees are no more urbanised than their host populations we find that:

- At least 59% of all refugees (UNHCR and UNRWA) are living in urban settings.

Again there is a marked regional variation.



Only Sub-Saharan Africa has a clear majority of the caseload in rural settings. South and Central Asia has about equal numbers in urban and rural settings, but elsewhere urban settings predominate.

No correlations (other than trivial, statistically insignificant correlations) were found between the percentage of the caseload in protracted displacement and the proportion in either individual accommodation or in urban settings. The variation between contexts was too great.

### Estimating international focus

Humanitarian agencies post approximately 40,000 updates and reports to ReliefWeb every year. ReliefWeb provides a good indication of the focus of the international community on humanitarian crises. The attention of the international community was measured by the percentage of ReliefWeb postings referring to that country in 2014.

Percentage of postings re country	Classification	Number of countries
0.0% to 0.099%	Negligible focus	139
0.1% to 0.499%	Almost forgotten	47
0.5% to 0.999%	Some attention	13
1.0% to 2.999%	Significant focus	16
3.0% to 4.999%	Strong focus	6
5.0% to 100.000%	Main focus	4

The ten countries characterised as strong or main focus account for 48% of all postings in 2014. We also examined how the focus of the international community had changed from 2013 to 2014. Countries whose total number of posts for 2013 and 2014 was less than 0.01% of the number of posts in 2014 were excluded.

Condition	Descriptive term	Countries
Decreasing by more than 50%	Strongly decreasing	14
Decreasing by 10-50%	Decreasing	47
Less than 10% change	Little change in numbers	21
Increasing by 10-50%	Increasing	8
Increasing by more than 50%	Strongly increasing	25

#### Focus on IDPs and refugees in 2014

The focus on IDPs and refugees was defined for this study as the proportion of ReliefWeb postings for that country (as the primary country) that were tagged by ReliefWeb as referring to IDPs or refugees. Of course this is an imperfect measure as not all postings about IDPs or refugees may be tagged by ReliefWeb, especially if they make no use of refugee or IDP keywords.

% 2014 posts for tagged as referring to IDPs or refugees	Classification	Number of countries
0%	Nil	91
0.01–3.99%	Negligible	12
3–9.99%	Slight	30
10–24.99%	Weak	34
25–49.99%	Moderate	27
50–84.99%	Strong	21
85–100%	Very strong	10

The focus has changed over the years. The following table shows the ranking of countries by references to refugees and IDPs in ReliefWeb Postings from 2012–2015.

2012	2013	2014	2015 (to 14 July)
Syria	Syria	South Sudan	Iraq
South Sudan	Sudan	Iraq	Syria
Sudan	Lebanon	Syria	South Sudan
Somalia	South Sudan	Lebanon	Ukraine
DRC	Jordan	Sudan	Lebanon
Myanmar	Myanmar	CAR	Sudan
Mali	Philippines	Palestine	Yemen
Pakistan	Mali	Jordan	Myanmar
Jordan	CAR	Pakistan	Nepal
Lebanon	Somalia	Ukraine	Jordan



## The protection environment

Originally we planned to estimate the overall protection environment by using an indicator of state fragility such as the Fragile States Index. The refugee and IDP portion of the index was excluded to avoid double counting. The index was calculated both for the country of refuge and as a weighted average for countries of origin.

However, the indicator correlated poorly (very weak and statistically insignificant correlation) with the percentage in displacement, the scale of displacement, and the crisis duration. Testing with a variety of other indicators, including the difference between the fragile states index of the country of refuge and the country of origin, produced no significant correlations.


- Neither the level of the fragility index nor changes in the fragility index of countries of origin were a useful indicator of trends in displacement numbers.

## Estimating funding for displacement


### The level of financial support

Estimating the level of financial support has proved very difficult. The two biggest spenders in refugee operations are UNHCR and WFP. UNHCR began to publish expenditure by country in March 2015, and this data has been used. However, the other big spender, WFP, has operations which can include multiple beneficiaries.

While there is a specific OECD/DAC category for refugee support in donor countries, there is no broader category for refugee and IDP support. Searching the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) for project descriptions proved less useful than expected as the totals clearly reflected only part of the international spending on displacement.




Another approach was to use the fact that a small number of donors appear to account for the bulk of support.



However, this does not match the pattern of UNHCR and WFP overall funding, suggesting that the pattern seen is an artefact of the type of reporting. This is a common issue with OECD/DAC data, whose quality is dependent on the effort made by reporting donors.

Approaching the problem from the donor end also proved difficult. Donor reports examined did not normally provide detailed information on the assistance provided for protracted displaced. Similarly, UN appeals only cover some crises and it is not possible to identify which part of the assistance was for protracted displacement.


Another approach was to consider the UN appeals system. This represents a large slice of humanitarian funding and has been growing significantly in recent years (the funding level for 2014 was nearly double that for 2012).



However, the UN appeals system does not cover private or direct funding for NGOs and the Red Cross. Private humanitarian funding is estimated to be one-third of official humanitarian funding.<sup>29</sup> The system focuses more on new crises than on protracted refugee or IDP situations.

The best estimate of overall humanitarian assistance is the annual Global Humanitarian Assistance report by Development Initiatives. This combines OECD/DAC, UN and private agency data to provide an overall estimate of humanitarian spending by year.

The 2015 Global Humanitarian Assistance report estimated the global spend on Humanitarian Action at \$24.5 billion in 2014. The following graph illustrates the general trend in humanitarian funding. The detailed data for 2014 is not yet available<sup>30</sup> for inclusion here.



The team tested the correlation between funding by country (from the GHA Report, 2014) and the number of ReliefWeb postings for 2006 to 2013. It should be noted that the funding figures by country of destination include donor data from the OECD/DAC, and UN and NGO data from the OHCA Financial Tracking Service (FTS); they do not include all private funding. Nevertheless the distribution of funding correlates<sup>31</sup> strongly with the distribution of ReliefWeb postings.

Correlation between funding per country (as reported by GHA) and ReliefWeb postings (by primary country)		
Year	Pearson's R	r <sup>2</sup>
2006	0.90	0.80
2007	0.88	0.77

<sup>29</sup> The 2015 Global Humanitarian Assistance report estimates private funding for humanitarian action at \$5.8 billion compared with \$18.7 billion for official humanitarian assistance.

<sup>30</sup> The June 2015 update to the OECD/DAC data does not include full details for 2014.

<sup>31</sup> For this correlation zero values were included, as there was no null data in the set. Normally the correlations presented in this report exclude pairs from the correlation calculation where at least one member of the pair is zero. This is because null values have been replaced by zero in some of the datasets.

2008	0.79	0.62
2009	0.87	0.75
2010	0.92	0.84
2011	0.84	0.70
2012	0.87	0.76
2013	0.80	0.65

These strong and very strong correlations suggested that:

- The distribution of ReliefWeb posts can be used as an approximate proxy for the distribution of humanitarian expenditure.

The appeal of using ReliefWeb as a proxy is that there is a considerable time lag between expenditure and reporting for humanitarian expenditures. By contrast, the ReliefWeb data is available up to the minute. The percentage of ReliefWeb postings was used to estimate the distribution of humanitarian funding in 2014.

Estimating international spending on protracted displacement using agency reportingA number of approaches were tried to develop an estimate of spending on protracted displacement. The publication of UNHCR data by country in March 2015 finally allowed an estimate of spend for UNHCR. The estimates were developed by estimating:

- The total expenditure of the agency
- The proportion of expenditure for the displaced
- The proportion of expenditure on the displaced for the protracted displaced

However, it should be emphasised that the estimate is based on a large number of assumptions, including that:

- Non-country-specific expenditures can be distributed pro-rata with country-specific expenditures.
- Assumptions about the proportions for displacement and protracted displacement. These vary with each case.

Thus the expenditure estimates made here should be regarded with great caution.

## UNRWA


All UNRWA expenditure can be regarded as being for protracted displacement. Even though some spending is for recent displacement, these are in fact recently displaced people who were already in protracted displacement.

- Total expenditure for 2014: \$1,311 million.<sup>32</sup> This was split between the regular programme budget (about half of this total), and special appeals for the West Bank and Gaza and for the Syrian crisis.
- Proportion of expenditure for displacement: 100%: \$1,311 million.
- Proportion of expenditure on the displaced for protracted displacement: 100%: \$1,311 million.

<sup>32</sup> [http://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/report\\_of\\_the\\_commissioner-general\\_to\\_the\\_general\\_assembly\\_of\\_the\\_united\\_nations\\_2014\\_english.pdf](http://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/report_of_the_commissioner-general_to_the_general_assembly_of_the_united_nations_2014_english.pdf)

## UNHCR

The total UNHCR expenditure for 2013 was \$3,348.1 million.<sup>33</sup> However, of this, \$36 million was for stateless persons, so the full refugee expenditure was \$3,312.119 million. However, not all of this was for protracted displacement. One would imagine that new caseloads attract higher levels of UNHCR spending than do protracted caseloads. We tested this by comparing the correlation between overall UNHCR refugee displacement and UNHCR spending on refugees, and between non-protracted UNHCR refugee displacement and UNHCR spending on refugees.




There was a moderate correlation between the UNHCR caseload and the spending by UNHCR on the refugee pillar of their budget. In theory, recent refugee movement should be receiving more support per head, so we tested the correlation between funding and the non-protracted UNHCR refugee population.

<sup>33</sup> UNCHR expenditure reporting from <http://reporting.unhcr.org/financial>.

### Comparison of non-protracted Refugees and UNHCR percentage spend in 2014 (by country)

Pearson  $r = 0.7341$ . 1-tailed t-test:  $p = 0.0000$ . Statistically significant at the 5% level.




There was a stronger correlation between UNHCR funding and non-protracted refugees than there is between the full UNHCR refugee caseload and the UNHCR refugee funding. One of the confounding factors here is that UNHCR spending per refugee varies greatly with the size of the caseload and the support provided by host governments. Spending by UNHCR on the refugee pillar in 2014 varied from \$10 per refugee in Canada to \$9,788 per refugee in Sri Lanka.

When we compare the numbers of refugee in protracted displacement with UNHCR refugee spending we find that the correlation is negligible.

## Comparison of UNHCR refugees in protracted displacement and UNHCR percentage spend on refugees in 2014 (by country)

Pearson  $r = 0.1481$ . 1-tailed t-test:  $p = 0.0950$ . Not statistically significant at the 5% level.



When the strong correlation between numbers of non-protracted refugees and UNHCR's funding distribution is compared with the negligible correlation between the numbers of protracted refugees and UNHCR's funding distribution this suggests that:

- UNHCR's funding is focused more on new arrivals than on protracted refugees.


In order to estimate the UNHCR spend on protracted displacement, the percentage of the caseload in the country that was in protracted displacement was multiplied by the funding for that country and then summed. This was then divided by the total funding to give an estimate of the level of UNHCR funding for protracted displacement.

This calculation suggested that 43.5% of UNHCR funding in 2014 was for protracted displacement. This may be an overestimate as it implicitly assumes that funding per capita is the same in any given country for protracted and non-protracted refugees. However, without a good method for estimating the imbalance, we will use this estimate of 43.5%. It should be noted that this proportion of funding is less than the 54% of the UNHCR caseload that are in protracted displacement.

This percentage can be expected to rise by 2016 when, unless there are major improvements, most of the Syrian caseload will be in protracted displacement.

- Total expenditure for 2014: \$3,348.1 million
- Of which expenditure for displacement: \$3,312.1million.
- Proportion of expenditure on the displaced for protracted displacement: 43.5%: \$1,440.3 million.

Interestingly, UNHCR's overall expenditure correlates better with overall displacement than the protracted displacement expenditure correlates with UNHCR's refugee expenditure. The overall expenditure includes funding for stateless persons, IDPs and returnees.



## WFP

WFP's funding is reported at \$5.38 billion in 2014.<sup>34</sup> However, the report on direct expenditure gives a total of \$4,717.6 million excluding PSA (this is typically 7%). If a 7% PSA is applied this brings the total expenditure to \$5,072.7 million in 2014. WFP reports that 7.3% of direct expenditures went for development. Another 4.6% was for bilateral and trust fund projects, many of which are developmental in nature. Many of the special operations are in support of relief operations. This gives a total of \$4,470 million for humanitarian action.


Of WFP Relief Operations, 54% of expenditure was for emergency operations and 44% for protracted relief and recovery operations. Both of these types of projects may include refugees. In fact, the cost of food in protracted relief and recovery operations means that WFP's contribution may out-weight UNHCR's in protracted displacement.

The problem with estimating WFP expenditures is that while refugees and IDPs only represent 26% of WFP's total caseload in 2014. However, these types of beneficiaries typically cost much more per head to service than school feeding, or food for asset programmes for example.

<sup>34</sup> [http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/qcpr/pdf/wfp\\_annual\\_report\\_2013.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/qcpr/pdf/wfp_annual_report_2013.pdf)



WFP gives the total assisted in emergencies as 42 million. Emergency funding is given as 56% of all relief funding. Of the six crises that WFP responded to in 2014, four involved significant conflict-driven displacement (Iraq, Syria, South Sudan and the Central African Republic).



The distribution of WFP's relief expenditure correlates moderately well with the distribution of total UNHCR expenditure. The distribution of WFP's relief expenditure also correlates well with the distribution of all displaced ( $r = 0.65$ ). This correlation would suggest that WFP's spending on displacement is higher than the caseload proportion of 25%. An estimate of 35% may be realistic.

Assessing the distribution of WFP's relief expenditure by the level of protracted displacement in the countries with WFP funding suggests that 50% of WFP expenditure for displacement is for protracted displacement. This is higher than for UNHCR, but is not surprising as food assistance is often far larger than other types of assistance to the displaced after a few years.

- Total (other than development) expenditure for 2014: \$4,470 million.
- Proportion of expenditure for displacement: 35%: \$1,565 million.
- Proportion of expenditure on the displaced for protracted displacement: 50%: \$782 million.

## UNICEF

2014 expenditure by UNICEF was \$4,868 million.<sup>35</sup> We have been unable to locate any country breakdown. UNICEF presents all its spending as development spending, but reports that 30.5% of the \$5,169 million it raised in 2014 (\$1,579 million) was for humanitarian assistance. It can be assumed that all of this was spent as the report talks about humanitarian needs outstripping resources.

Year	UNICEF posts	Of which tagged as refugee or IDP	as %
2015 (to 10 March)	277	121	44%
2014	1,313	614	47%
2013	974	457	47%

Nearly half (47%) of all UNICEF posts on ReliefWeb refer to IDPs or refugees (\$742 million). Assuming that the distribution follows the UNHCR pattern, about 43.5% of the funding for displacement is for the protracted displaced (\$308 million).

- Total humanitarian funding in 2014: \$1,579 million
- Proportion of expenditure for displacement: 47%: \$743 million.
- Proportion of expenditure on the displaced for protracted displacement: 43.5%: \$323 million.

## Summary

Using the above data, and assuming that other humanitarian funding follows the pattern of UNICEF and WFP as these are not dedicated to displacement (with 38% of their expenditures for displacement and 18% for protracted displacement), we developed the following estimate.

Organisation	Humanitarian expenditure or funding in 2014 (\$ millions)	Of which for refugees or IDPs (\$ millions)	Of which for protracted displaced (\$ millions)
UNRWA	1,311	1,311	1,311
UNHCR	3,348	3,312	1,441
WFP	4,470	1,565	783
UNICEF	1,579	743	324
<b>Total for 2014</b>	<b>10,708</b>	<b>6,931</b>	<b>3,859</b>
<b>Other humanitarian funding</b>	<b>13,792</b>	<b>5,241</b>	<b>2,516</b>
<b>Overall funding</b>	<b>24,500</b>	<b>12,172</b>	<b>6,375</b>
<b>As percentage of total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>26%</b>

The figure for other humanitarian funding was obtained by subtracting the identified humanitarian funding from the GHA estimate of \$24.5 billion of humanitarian funding in 2014. Of this approximately 50% was estimated to be spent on displacement and roughly half of the total on protracted displacement.

<sup>35</sup> [http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/UNICEF\\_Annual\\_Report\\_2014\\_Web\\_07June15.pdf](http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/UNICEF_Annual_Report_2014_Web_07June15.pdf)

It should be clear that this estimate is based on a tower of assumptions, and is little better than an informed guess as to the extent of funding for protracted displacement.

### Description of fields in Annex 1

All of the columns have a filter function, allowing you to select a proportion of the overall data set such as only low-income or Sub-Saharan African countries or countries with a population over a particular size. The filters also allow sorting on any of the columns.

In most cases the total is the total for the current set. The percentage of the unfiltered total gives the percentage of the overall number represented by the current set. The average is an unweighted average for the current set. In some cases, the total is not a simple total, but a calculation of the appropriate value for the current set.

Factor	Source	Comments
<b>Filtered Row Count</b>	Generated	Allows the user to filter or a limited number of countries, e.g. the top ten countries for whatever the current sort order is. The total is the number of countries in the current set.
<b>Country Name</b>	Mostly used the standard UNHCR name of the state	The need to accommodate different forms of the names used in different databases and in different years meant that translation tables had to be developed. In some datasets names were not used consistently between years in some cases, requiring a significant effort to develop translation tables.
<b>Region</b>	Regions taken from the OECD/DAC classification of geographical regions	Any additional cases were classified geographically
<b>World Bank Income class</b>	Classification taken from the World Bank list for 2014	Some states and territories are not classified by the World Bank (due to their small size etc.). They were classified by the authors using the best available estimate of GDP
<b>Classified as a fragile state in 2014 by:</b>	Fragile states list from the OECD/DAC, World Bank and the FSI	The OECD/DAC Fragile States Report 2014 classifies 51 countries and territories as fragile states, against 37 states on the WB/AfDB/ADB harmonised list for 2014 and 34 states with a score of 90 or over on the FSI list for 2014

Factor	Source	Comments																										
Fragile States Index classification 2015	Fragile States Index	The 2015 values were used as they were based largely on 2014 data.																										
		<table><tr><th>Classification</th><th>No of countries</th></tr><tr><td>Unclassified</td><td>48</td></tr><tr><td>Very Sustainable</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Sustainable</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>More Stable</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>Stable</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>Less Stable</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>Low Warning</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>Warning</td><td>41</td></tr><tr><td>High Warning</td><td>28</td></tr><tr><td>Alert</td><td>21</td></tr><tr><td>High Alert</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>Very High Alert</td><td>4</td></tr></table>	Classification	No of countries	Unclassified	48	Very Sustainable	1	Sustainable	14	More Stable	11	Stable	15	Less Stable	12	Low Warning	18	Warning	41	High Warning	28	Alert	21	High Alert	12	Very High Alert	4
		Classification	No of countries																									
		Unclassified	48																									
		Very Sustainable	1																									
		Sustainable	14																									
		More Stable	11																									
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		Warning	41																									
		High Warning	28																									
		Alert	21																									
		High Alert	12																									
Very High Alert	4																											
World Bank Population (millions)	World Bank	De facto population at the end of 2014 as estimated by the World Bank. This figure is for the population regardless of status. Populations for sites not listed by the World Bank as the most recent population given on Wikipedia. There may be some minor double counting in the total population as the populations for some territories are included in the population for the controlling state e.g. French Overseas Territories.																										
IDPs	IDMC estimates of IDP numbers	Used the data for 2014 from the six-year (2009-2014) data set available on the IDMC website																										
Refugees (UNHCR and UNRWA) here	UNHCR and UNRWA	Uses data from the UNHCR online database as updated on 22 June 2015 for this country of refuge. Various UNRWA publications.																										
Asylum-seekers here	UNHCR	Uses data from the UNHCR online database as updated on 22 June 2015 for this country of refuge.																										
Total displaced in this country	UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC	Sum of the above data																										
Displaced here as % of total	UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC	The number of displaced in this country as a percentage of the total number of displaced.																										

Factor	Source	Comments																														
Scale of displacement in this country	UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC	<p>A one word descriptor for the scale of displacement in this country.</p> <table> <tr> <th>Displaced in 2014</th><th>Descriptor</th><th>Countries</th></tr> <tr> <td>0</td><td>Nil</td><td>60</td></tr> <tr> <td>1–1,000</td><td>Trivial</td><td>38</td></tr> <tr> <td>1,001–5,000</td><td>Minor</td><td>24</td></tr> <tr> <td>5,001–20,000</td><td>Small</td><td>17</td></tr> <tr> <td>20,001–50,000</td><td>Medium</td><td>16</td></tr> <tr> <td>50,001–200,000</td><td>Significant</td><td>29</td></tr> <tr> <td>200,001–500,000</td><td>Major</td><td>16</td></tr> <tr> <td>500,001–2,000,000</td><td>Large</td><td>16</td></tr> <tr> <td>2,000,001+</td><td>Huge</td><td>9</td></tr> </table>	Displaced in 2014	Descriptor	Countries	0	Nil	60	1–1,000	Trivial	38	1,001–5,000	Minor	24	5,001–20,000	Small	17	20,001–50,000	Medium	16	50,001–200,000	Significant	29	200,001–500,000	Major	16	500,001–2,000,000	Large	16	2,000,001+	Huge	9
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Total displaced here per million population	UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC and WB	Calculated using the de facto population for the World Bank . No adjustments were made to the population figure for refugees or IDPs. The total shown is not the column total but the displacement per million population for the current set.																														
Number of countries sending refugees here	UNHCR and UNRWA	A count of the numbers of countries of origin sending refugees here. The total shown is the range of values for the current set.																														
Proportion of caseload here as refugees or asylum-seekers	UNHCR, UNRWA, and IDMC	The refugee and asylum-seeker caseload as a proportion of the total caseload in country. The total shown is not a column total but a calculated proportion for the current set.																														
Proportion of refugee and asylum-seeker caseload here as asylum-seekers	UNHCR and UNRWA	The number of asylum-seekers divided by the sum of the refugee and asylum-seeker caseloads in this country																														
Number of refugees in protracted displacement here	UNHCR and UNRWA	Calculated for each pair of asylum/refuge countries. Protracted displacement taken to be those displaced for over three years. 100% of UNRWA caseload taken to be in protracted displacement (i.e. no adjustment for children under three).																														
Proportion of refugee caseload here in protracted displacement	UNHCR and UNRWA	By calculation from previous figures. The total shown is not a column total but a calculated proportion for the current set.																														

Factor	Source	Comments																														
Percentage of refugee caseload from neighbouring countries	UNHCR and UNRWA	Based on the percentage of the refugee caseload (UNHCR and UNRWA) from countries with an adjoining land border. The total shown is not a column total but a calculated proportion for the current set.																														
Refugees (UNHCR and UNRWA) from here	UNHCR and UNRWA	Uses data from the UNHCR online database as updated on 22 June 2015 for this country of origin. Various UNRWA publications. All UNRWA refugees taken to be from Israel.																														
Asylum-seekers from this country	UNHCR	Uses data from the UNHCR online database as updated on 22 June 2015 for this country of origin.																														
Total displaced by this country	UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC	Sum of the above data plus the IDP number previously given																														
Displaced from here as % of all displaced	UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC	The number of displaced from this country as a percentage of the total number of displaced.																														
Scale of displacement from this country	UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC	<p>A one-word descriptor for the scale of displacement from this country.</p> <table> <tr> <th>Displaced in 2014</th><th>Descriptor</th><th>Countries</th></tr> <tr> <td>0</td><td>Nil</td><td>34</td></tr> <tr> <td>1–1,000</td><td>Trivial</td><td>77</td></tr> <tr> <td>1,001–5,000</td><td>Minor</td><td>30</td></tr> <tr> <td>5,001–20,000</td><td>Small</td><td>17</td></tr> <tr> <td>20,001–50,000</td><td>Medium</td><td>17</td></tr> <tr> <td>50,001–200,000</td><td>Significant</td><td>14</td></tr> <tr> <td>200,001–500,000</td><td>Major</td><td>17</td></tr> <tr> <td>500,001–2,000,000</td><td>Large</td><td>9</td></tr> <tr> <td>2,000,001+</td><td>Huge</td><td>10</td></tr> </table>	Displaced in 2014	Descriptor	Countries	0	Nil	34	1–1,000	Trivial	77	1,001–5,000	Minor	30	5,001–20,000	Small	17	20,001–50,000	Medium	17	50,001–200,000	Significant	14	200,001–500,000	Major	17	500,001–2,000,000	Large	9	2,000,001+	Huge	10
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Number of countries to which this country sends refugees	UNHCR and UNRWA	A count of the numbers of countries of refuge with refugees from this country. The total shown is the range of values for the current set.																														
Proportion of caseload from here as refugees or asylum-seekers	UNHCR, UNRWA, and IDMC	The refugee and asylum-seeker caseload from this country as a proportion of the total caseload from this country. The total shown is not a column total but a calculated proportion for the current set.																														

Factor	Source	Comments
Proportion of refugee and asylum-seeker caseload from here as asylum-seekers	UNHCR and UNRWA	The number of asylum-seekers divided by the sum of the refugee and asylum-seeker caseloads from this country
Number of refugees from here in protracted displacement	UNHCR and UNRWA	Calculated for each pair of asylum/refuge countries. Protracted displacement taken to be those displaced for over three years. 100% of UNRWA caseload taken to be in protracted displacement (i.e. no adjustment for children under three).
Proportion of refugee caseload from here in protracted displacement	UNHCR and UNRWA	By calculation from previous figures. The total shown is not a column total but a calculated proportion for the current set.
Max duration of refugee crisis here from 1978–2014	UNHCR and UNRWA	This is based on the maximum period that the number of refugees from this country was above 10% of the peak refugee displacement. The total shown is the range of values for the current set.
Percentage of refugee caseload in neighbouring countries	UNHCR and UNRWA	Based on the percentage of the refugee caseload (UNHCR and UNRWA) in countries with an adjoining land border. The total shown is not a column total but a calculated proportion for the current set.
UNHCR refugee caseload in this country of refuge	UNHCR	Uses data from the UNHCR online database as updated on 22 June 2015 for this country of refuge.
Proportion of UNHCR refugee caseload here in camps	UNHCR	UNHCR Supplemental tables published in June 2014 as background data for the Global Trends Report ( <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/14-WRD-tab_v3_external.zip">http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/14-WRD-tab_v3_external.zip</a> ). Proportion based on the number in camps of all types. The total shown is not a column total but a calculated proportion for the current set.
Proportion of UNHCR refugee caseload here in individual accommodation	UNHCR	UNHCR Supplemental tables published in June 2014 as background data for the Global Trends Report ( <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/14-WRD-tab_v3_external.zip">http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/14-WRD-tab_v3_external.zip</a> ). The total shown is not a column total but a calculated proportion for the current set.

Factor	Source	Comments
Proportion of UNHCR refugee caseload here with unknown accommodation	UNHCR	UNHCR Supplemental tables published in June 2014 as background data for the Global Trends Report ( <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/14-WRD-tab_v3_external.zip">http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/14-WRD-tab_v3_external.zip</a> ). The total shown is not a column total but a calculated proportion for the current set.
Proportion of UNHCR refugee caseload here in urban settings	UNHCR	UNHCR Supplemental tables published in June 2014 as background data for the Global Trends Report ( <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/14-WRD-tab_v3_external.zip">http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/14-WRD-tab_v3_external.zip</a> ). The total shown is not a column total but a calculated proportion for the current set.
Proportion of UNHCR refugee caseload here in rural settings	UNHCR	UNHCR Supplemental tables published in June 2014 as background data for the Global Trends Report ( <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/14-WRD-tab_v3_external.zip">http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/14-WRD-tab_v3_external.zip</a> ). The total shown is not a column total but a calculated proportion for the current set.
Proportion of UNHCR refugee caseload here in unknown settings	UNHCR	UNHCR Supplemental tables published in June 2014 as background data for the Global Trends Report ( <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/14-WRD-tab_v3_external.zip">http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/14-WRD-tab_v3_external.zip</a> ). The total shown is not a column total but a calculated proportion for the current set.
Proportion of UNHCR country-specific spend for this country of refuge	UNHCR	Downloaded data from <a href="http://reporting.unhcr.org/financial">http://reporting.unhcr.org/financial</a>
Proportion of WFP country-specific spend for this country of refuge	WFP	Data abstracted from Annual Report to the Board from <a href="http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/eb/wfpdoc063825.pdf">http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/eb/wfpdoc063825.pdf</a>
Estimated proportion of global humanitarian spend in this country of refuge	ReliefWeb	Based on the proportion of ReliefWeb country-specific references referring to this country as the primary country in 2014. This is based on the observation of the high correlation between funding and ReliefWeb posts observed in 2011.




Factor	Source	Comments																											
Degree of focus of international community on this country of refuge	ReliefWeb	<p>This is a descriptive term based on the proportion of ReliefWeb country-specific references referring to this as the primary country in 2014.</p> <table> <tr> <th>% of posts</th><th>Descriptive term</th><th>Countries</th></tr> <tr> <td>0.0% to 0.099%</td><td>Negligible focus</td><td>139</td></tr> <tr> <td>0.1% to 0.499%</td><td>Almost forgotten</td><td>47</td></tr> <tr> <td>0.5% to 0.999%</td><td>Some attention</td><td>13</td></tr> <tr> <td>1.0% to 2.999%</td><td>Significant focus</td><td>16</td></tr> <tr> <td>3.0% to 4.999%</td><td>Strong focus</td><td>6</td></tr> <tr> <td>5.0% to 100%</td><td>Main focus</td><td>4</td></tr> </table>	% of posts	Descriptive term	Countries	0.0% to 0.099%	Negligible focus	139	0.1% to 0.499%	Almost forgotten	47	0.5% to 0.999%	Some attention	13	1.0% to 2.999%	Significant focus	16	3.0% to 4.999%	Strong focus	6	5.0% to 100%	Main focus	4						
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Trend in focus (2013–2014)	ReliefWeb	<p>This is a descriptive term reflecting the change in the percentage of country specific references on ReliefWeb posts between 2013 and 2014. It is only applied to countries where the combined number of posts for 2013 and 2014 was at least 0.1% of the number of posts in 2014.</p> <table> <tr> <th>Change</th><th>Descriptive term</th><th>Countries</th></tr> <tr> <td>50+% less</td><td>Strongly decreasing</td><td>14</td></tr> <tr> <td>10–50% less</td><td>Decreasing</td><td>47</td></tr> <tr> <td>10% less to 10% more</td><td>Little change in numbers</td><td>20</td></tr> <tr> <td>10–50% more</td><td>Increasing</td><td>8</td></tr> <tr> <td>50+% more</td><td>Strongly increasing</td><td>25</td></tr> </table>	Change	Descriptive term	Countries	50+% less	Strongly decreasing	14	10–50% less	Decreasing	47	10% less to 10% more	Little change in numbers	20	10–50% more	Increasing	8	50+% more	Strongly increasing	25									
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Degree of attention to refugees and IDPs in international focus	ReliefWeb	<p>This is a descriptive term referring to the proportion of ReliefWeb posts for a country that are tagged by ReliefWeb as referring to refugees or IDPs.</p> <table> <tr> <th colspan="3">% posts for 2014 tagged as referring to IDPs or refugees</th></tr> <tr> <th></th><th>Classification</th><th>Countries</th></tr> <tr> <td>0%</td><td>Nil</td><td>91</td></tr> <tr> <td>0.01–3.99%</td><td>Negligible</td><td>12</td></tr> <tr> <td>3–9.99%</td><td>Slight</td><td>30</td></tr> <tr> <td>10–24.99%</td><td>Weak</td><td>34</td></tr> <tr> <td>25–49.99%</td><td>Moderate</td><td>27</td></tr> <tr> <td>50–84.99%</td><td>Strong</td><td>21</td></tr> <tr> <td>85–100%</td><td>Very strong</td><td>10</td></tr> </table>	% posts for 2014 tagged as referring to IDPs or refugees				Classification	Countries	0%	Nil	91	0.01–3.99%	Negligible	12	3–9.99%	Slight	30	10–24.99%	Weak	34	25–49.99%	Moderate	27	50–84.99%	Strong	21	85–100%	Very strong	10
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## Appendix to Annex 2: Assessing the quality and availability of the data

Given the lack of ideal data for estimating the state of protracted displacement, the study team spent some time on analysis of the quality of the datasets that have been used to report on displacement and to estimate the frequency of situations of protracted displacement and the numbers of refugees who can be considered in a state of protracted displacement.


The different datasets were subject to Benford analysis<sup>36</sup> to assess the extent to which the data was synthetic, the findings of which confirmed the study team's conclusion that better and more exact estimates of protracted displacement would require improvements in the available global data sets. The Benford analysis suggested that UNHCR data, dating back to 1960, has improved over time, with improvements after 1979 and again from 1990 onwards. For IDP data, the Benford analysis suggested that figures for IDPs from both UNHCR and IDMC were subject to a higher degree of estimates and rounding than recent UNHCR data – a finding consistent with IDMC's own reporting on the challenges and limitations of current IDP data.<sup>37</sup>

The quality of UNHCR data has improved over time. The current UNHCR database only provides data on countries of origin from 1960 and only provides data on at least 80% of the total caseload from 1980.



These limits were why the study used data from 1978 only.

By contrast, UNHCR data on the caseloads in the countries of refuge was much more complete.



<sup>36</sup> This analysis makes use of the property that the frequency of the first significant digit varies by the digit in many naturally occurring countable numbers.

<sup>37</sup> IDMC 2015 Global Overview 2015: People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence, introduction.

## Annex 3: Review methodology

### Type of documents reviewed

The study reviewed both primary and secondary literature published between 2000 and 2014. Generally, grey literature did not feature in this review. It was only considered if recommended by one of the experts or if cited heavily. In total, 157 documents were consulted in total, 84 of which were peer-reviewed articles published in academic journals and (mostly) peer-reviewed research studies.

All documents were systematically compared using a spreadsheet matrix according to type of source, type of document, geographical scope and case studies covered. They were compared on their use of primary and secondary data, the inclusion of quantitative data and their sensitivity to gender dynamics. It was also noted whether documents discussed the effect of government policy frameworks and evaluated the effectiveness of food security and education initiatives or other specific self-reliance or livelihood interventions. The review also compared documents with regard to whether they drew on cost–benefit analyses of some sort, evaluating for example the value for money<sup>38</sup> of self-reliance and livelihood programmes and care and maintenance regimes. Finally, documents were also compared according to whether they discussed the appropriateness of funding for the interventions featured in the research.

### Sources of documents reviewed

Documents reviewed were identified from bibliographies in recent key publications. Experts identified by the study team were also contacted and asked to provide leads and bibliographies. To avoid potential selection biases, the majority of documents were identified through key word searches in search engines, library catalogues and the websites of academic journals, think tanks, policy institutes and intergovernmental agencies. The research team was advised to apply two search strings for the literature review:

- (1) *protracted displacement/refugees/IDPs AND livelihoods/ jobs/ employment/ self reliance/*
- (2) *protracted displacement/refugees/IDPs AND protection/rights/durable solutions/*

The search strings often failed to identify applicable literature, particularly case studies. Additional case study-specific key word searches proved more effective. Additional search terms included cash-based interventions, labour market access, refugee/IDP integration, refugee/IDP camp economies and food safety. It is important to note here that the terminology around livelihoods and self-reliance in the context of protracted displacement is vast and extremely diverse. Thus, while certain key word combinations worked extremely well in the case of one case study, they generated no hits in another.

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<sup>38</sup> Documents qualified for the 'value for money' category if programme evaluations included a general or specific discussion on the returns on investments. The majority of documents reviewed, however, did not specifically disclose actual programme costs. Instead they discussed positive or negative cost-to-benefit ratios in terms of programme efficiency and effectiveness, while monetary or material concerns were mostly expressed in relation to maintenance costs or funding constraints.

From the academic journals consulted, the following seven featured relevant literature most frequently: *Disasters*, *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, *Development Policy Review*, *Forced Migration Review*, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *Refuge (Canada)* and *International Migration Review*.

The researchers prioritised countries that appeared less frequently in the literature. They also aimed to achieve a balance between literature on theory and empirical evidence or accounts by distributing the search time evenly across academic and non-academic sources. No literature was excluded from the review process in order to achieve a balance between theoretical and empirical studies.

### Timeframe

The review focused on literature published between 2000 and 2014. Studies outside of this date range were omitted from the review.

### Geographic scope

Bearing in mind the need to put practical limits on the scope of the literature review, the study was limited to 12 case studies. The case studies chosen represent the top six refugee and IDP countries in the world.

Refugees	IDPs
Jordan	Colombia
Pakistan	Sudan
Iran	DRC
Kenya	Somalia
Chad	Iraq
Uganda	Azerbaijan

It is important to note that this separation between IDP and refugee contexts is somewhat arbitrary. Both populations of concern are found in most of the case studies, and much of the literature does not distinguish between IDPs and refugees in situations of protracted displacement, but addresses the issue of protracted displacement more holistically.

### Quality of the evidence

In order to ensure a rigorous literature review, all the documents consulted provided evidence with methodologies and/or peer review. Reviewed documents either constituted academic peer-reviewed research or research institution/policy/think-tank reports that provided evidence on populations in protracted displacement based on a sound methodology. Of the total number of 157 sources, 84 were peer reviewed (approximately 55%). Grey literature was only consulted if it was recommended by one of the experts or if it was highly cited.

The majority of the reviewed literature was qualitative in nature. Only approximately 20% of sources referred to or presented quantitative research. Many of the reviewed documents had a practitioner focus, while approximately 12% was produced by intergovernmental agencies, predominantly UNHCR.

## Challenges and limitations

Due to the limited timeframe of the literature review, documents published prior to 2000 fell outside the scope of this study and were omitted by the research team, although older publications that had been cross-referenced multiple times by the relevant literature were also consulted.

The uneven coverage of the case studies posed a significant challenge. While some, such as Kenya, Uganda and Somalia, were prominently represented, others, such as Azerbaijan and Chad, were not. In the case of Azerbaijan in particular relevant available literature is extremely scarce. While researchers aimed to prioritise case studies that appeared less frequently in the literature, a balanced representation of all 12 case studies could not be achieved.

The preset search strings often proved unsuccessful; although generating a large number of hits, most of the literature detected was not applicable to the case studies or the protracted displacement context. Thus, general key word searches as well as country specific ones were conducted for each country. Researchers searched websites of academic journals, think tanks, policy institutes and intergovernmental agencies directly, always applying the same key words.

Another methodological challenge lay in the analysis and comparison of documents in the spreadsheet matrix. A lack of conceptual clarity in existing guidance on the definition of value for money and self-reliance sometimes made it difficult to objectively assign documents to a certain Yes/No category in the spreadsheet matrix.

Some guidance is provided below on how researchers approached their answers to the following Yes/No questions covered by the spreadsheet matrix.

### *Sensitivity to gender dynamics? Yes/No*

Documents qualified as ‘gender sensitive’ if the presented data was gender disaggregated, or if women/gender was mentioned specifically as an issue. Gender did not have to be the main theme in the document for it to qualify for the ‘yes’ category; however, simply mentioning the issue would not suffice. If a document included at least one sub-section that discussed the findings through a gender-sensitive lens, researchers marked it as being sensitive to gender dynamics. It is therefore important to note that, while many documents have been identified as being gender sensitive in their analysis, not all of are so to the same degree.

### *Value for money of self-reliance and livelihoods? Yes/No*

### *Value for money of care and maintenance regimes? Yes/No*

For both of these questions, researchers generally selected ‘Yes’ if the issue was explicitly discussed *and* if it was implied in the overall findings/recommendations. Of course, it still remains difficult to measure. From our review we can say that there appears to be a gap in the literature as only a couple of documents qualified for the ‘Yes’ category.

*Evaluates specific self-reliance or livelihood intervention? Yes/No*


‘Yes’ was selected if a *specific intervention* was mentioned, whether it was cited as an example or in a box. Literature that included references to certain *types* of interventions, such as ‘food for work’ or cash vouchers, would be included in the ‘Yes’ category, but only when their effectiveness and outcomes were discussed. If interventions were mentioned without any evaluation of their appropriateness, effectiveness or outcomes, ‘No’ would be the selected answer.

*Appropriateness of funding architecture? Yes/No*

‘Yes’ was selected if the author mentioned whether the funding structure in place was appropriate/working/not working, or how funding structures could be changed for the better. For example, for agencies to be able to plan their projects with an eye towards durable solutions, they need access to multi-year funding, rather than one-year grants from donors. Another example could be that local staff of international agencies should have the opportunity to provide more input into how funds are used, as they possess local knowledge and know what is appropriate to the local context. Thus, in order to qualify for the ‘Yes’ category, some sort of commentary was required regarding whether the funding structure in place was appropriate for the desired outcomes (enabling self-sufficiency of refugees, long-term livelihood programming, etc.).

## Annex 4:

### Typology 2: Assessing the environment for successful self-reliance programming



#### Rationale

This typology draws on the findings of the literature review, covering hundreds of documents that draw attention not only to the factors that enable the displaced to achieve sustainable livelihoods, but also to the factors that hamper efforts by external aid actors to implement successful programmes.

These have been grouped into four themes:

#### *The legal framework and protection environment*

This typology recognises that several key rights form the foundation of and the limits to what displaced people may be able to achieve. Freedom of movement is crucial so that the displaced can get to places where they can match their skills with opportunity; property rights are important for everything from security of tenure to an incentive to invest; and the right to work opens up the possibility of formal employment. However, this section also recognises that, in the absence of these formal rights, the displaced often achieve de facto recognition of their right to earn a living in the (often far larger) informal economy, or respect for their control over land that has been purchased through customary procedures. Likewise, the existence of rights mean little if the host state is not able to ensure that they are upheld, or provide protection to the displaced.

#### *Access to markets and the private sector*

The ability of the displaced to access markets is fundamental to the scope they have to buy or sell goods, services and labour. In cases where access is limited, notwithstanding the economies that form in places like closed camps, it is highly unlikely that they will be able to achieve self-reliance. The displaced can also be economically isolated by language barriers and cultural

attributes, such as belonging to a clan which does not possess the ‘right’ affiliation. Lastly, the threat of abuse and violence limits and distorts the economic opportunities open to any community.

#### *The capacities, assets and resources of the displaced*

The displaced also arrive with – and develop – a set of characteristics that have a significant influence on their ability to find sustainable livelihoods. At a minimum, displaced people should not still be exhibiting emergency symptoms – injury, malnutrition – but they will also be at a disadvantage if their skills are not matched to the local economy. Within a given population, the degree of social capital and spread of information will also be crucial in linking the displaced with opportunities. The need for material inputs and credit is a recurring theme in the livelihoods literature. Lastly, access to basic services constitutes an important resource for any economic actor.

#### *The environment for external intervention*

The attitude of the government (or host state in the case of refugees) provides an overarching framework determining whether attempts by external aid actors succeed or fail. Even if the factors falling under the other three themes are largely positive, if the government is strictly opposed to greater economic integration of the displaced, or if dialogue between aid actors and the state is hostile or difficult, then programming encouraging self-reliance is likely to be opposed or denied. Likewise, if donors do not recognise the developmental needs of the displaced as important, or provide funds in such a way that long-term livelihoods work can be implemented, then the response will remain limited to emergency modalities.

The interplay of these four themes shapes the environment for any potential self-reliance programming.

#### **Purpose of this typology**

The purpose of the typology is to provide a system for grading and characterising situations with the greatest chance of successful livelihoods programming – this is an aid-centric typology. The typology could help to determine where political and material resources would be best spent to further self-reliance.

The process of answering the checklist can also be used to identify issues that reduce the likelihood of successful livelihoods programming in a particular context. For example, identifying which themes generate the lowest score should indicate where efforts could yield the biggest improvements in the environment for self-reliance.

#### **Caveats**

This typology makes an assessment about the likelihood that livelihoods work will be successful at scale, but it does not deal with highly disaggregated data. It involves generalising across large groups, which may contain a diverse range of livelihoods situations.



A low score does not preclude the possibility of small-scale or under-the-radar livelihoods projects. Neither does it suggest that livelihoods should not be an important element in the analysis and design of programmes – even in the most acute emergencies, the livelihoods strategies of the displaced should be taken into account from the start, even if only to ensure that these strategies are not undermined.

The typology is not prescriptive about the type of livelihoods programming that could be viable in a particular context, or how host government policies and programmes might accommodate self-reliance strategies for the displaced. Nor does it provide a detailed picture of the market in which the displaced pursue their livelihoods, or their capacities.

This typology does not require economic training in order to complete it, though it does require some familiarity with basic concepts related to livelihoods – market supply and demand, the role of social capital in facilitating employment etc. It should be completed by staff familiar with these terms, or a mixed team incorporating people with expertise in protection issues for displaced persons, livelihoods and familiarity with the context.

### Applying the typology

Go through the checklist of questions associated with each criterion in order to assign it a score, both for each theme and cumulatively for the typology as a whole. The questions are equally scored in all themes, bar theme 3. Here the scores for each question are doubled. The aggregate measure is composed of the addition of the scores for each theme.

These statements are written in a formulation that conveys a favourable condition for livelihoods work.

A score should be given to each of the key questions, grading them according to the following scale:

- **Not true in most cases = -1**
- **Sometimes true (or true for a significant minority) = +1**
- **Frequently true = +2**
- **True in almost all cases = +3**

Ideally several people with knowledge of the context should complete this exercise, with first-hand experience of the livelihoods activities and economic environment of the displaced. This could take the form of several people sitting down to fill out the checklist together, or the checklist could be sent to several different people to fill out alone, with the modal score for each question feeding into the final result.


The rubric – see annex 5

The total score for each theme will place the context on a spectrum in the rubric. Generic scenarios are described to give a sense of the ways in which each theme can constrain or facilitate livelihoods work. Do not expect your scenario to align perfectly with one of these descriptions.

When all four themes have been addressed then total up the score.

Theme	Score
Legal and protection	
Access to the market and private sector actors	
Capacities, assets and resources	
Environment for intervention	
<b>Total:</b>	

This final score places the context under examination on a scale from ‘Highly Constraining’ to ‘Highly Conducive’.



#### 0–21: ‘Social Protection Priorities’

In these scenarios it is likely that little is possible beyond care and maintenance or protection activities, probably because of acute obstacles with regard to the needs of the displaced, political constraints on livelihoods work, instability in the local environment and weak leverage or interest of the international community, or an interplay of these factors. This does not mean that livelihoods are unimportant and should not be analysed and factored into programming, but just that resources spent promoting ‘self-reliance’ are highly unlikely to achieve that result at scale and may detract from core emergency activities.

#### 22–30: ‘Precarious Providers’

This scenario also displays a range of harsh constraints on livelihoods work, though there may be space for small projects to exploit ‘grey areas’ in legal or political frameworks or engage in work that may reap benefits when conditions change. These scenarios may require humanitarian modalities in the present, though possible links to development programmes or the integration of development approaches should not be ignored where these do not compromise humanitarian space.

#### 31–39: ‘Hopeful Providers’

In these scenarios there is scope to do innovative programming, though perhaps not at scale. There is capacity and willingness in some parts of government to improve the self-reliance of the displaced, though this probably does not enjoy widespread political support. The scope may exist for integration into some development plans. The environment is probably enabling for spontaneous income generating activities and for some of the displaced to cover basic needs and still have surplus income.

#### 40–57: ‘Partners in Prosperity’


In this scenario there is scope for meaningful collaboration with host governments and an enabling environment for innovative approaches. Dialogue can be held on integrating the displaced into national and local development frameworks. The displaced are free to work or own businesses and property without extraordinary

discrimination. With some support, they could achieve economic integration and make investments in their future.

## Scorecard

Scorecards present the overall score and generic description of the possibilities in this context. They also include indicators – which are not calculated in the score – to help to contextualise the scale of need for livelihood approaches. These are the scale and duration of the crises and the scope for durable solutions.

### Example summary scorecard

Environment for successful self-reliance programming for Y Displaced Group in X Context	
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>28 Precarious Provider</b></p>  <p style="text-align: center;">Most Constraining <span style="float: right;">Most Conducive</span></p>	
<p>[TAILORED TO CONTEXT, and highlighting where the largest constraints to self-reliance programming lie]: This scenario displays a range of harsh constraints on livelihoods work, though there may be space for small projects to exploit ‘grey areas’ in legal or political frameworks or engage in work that may reap benefits when conditions change. These scenarios may require humanitarian modalities in the present, though possible links to development programmes or the integration of development approaches should not be ignored where these do not compromise humanitarian space.</p>	
<b>Scale and duration</b>	300,000 refugees, most of whom have been displaced for 10 ten years
<b>Durable solutions?</b> <b>Settlement options available, including combinations where they exist</b>	Return is unlikely as country/place of origin is still unstable Few resettlement places are open to these refugees Local integration has been ruled out by the host state.

## Annex 5: Typology 2 rubric

Characteristics of conducive and constraining environments for self-reliance programming				
Most constraining	– Most conducive			
	0–3	4–7	8–11	12–15
	Countries in this range typically exhibit these characteristics:			
<b>Legal framework and protection environment</b>	<p>The displaced have no or few recognized rights of residence, employment, property ownership and movement (and, in the case of IDPs, political rights). Their environment is characterised by acute threats to security and high volatility.</p> <p>Some evade restrictions, but legal constraints effectively suppress economic activity, or there is capricious and corrupt tolerance of economic activity which the displaced take advantage of with risk. Volatility and abuses are major setbacks. Organisations may be able to do limited advocacy/programming to redress abuses or reduce threats, but these can have little influence on the basic drivers of insecurity or the legal framework.</p>	<p>The displaced possess some but probably not all of the core rights that encourage self-reliance. Any existing livelihoods work with the displaced is likely to be unofficial or precarious. The government may tolerate only a narrow range of activities, or accept livelihoods work in principle but be unable to overcome obstacles to implementing it in practice.</p> <p>Abuses and instability jeopardise gains made towards self-reliance, and the government struggles to ensure rule of law.</p>	<p>The legal framework contains gaps in recognising the rights of the displaced or is not fully implemented, but there is a positive or tolerant attitude on the part of the authorities to livelihoods or self-reliance. While some protection threats exist these do not make the pursuit of livelihoods impossible. Rule of law more or less pertains and the displaced benefit from this stability. External organisations may be able to work with the state to improve legal frameworks or address threats to the displaced.</p>	<p>The displaced enjoy recognised rights of residence, employment, property ownership and movement (and, in the case of IDPs, political rights). If these rights are infringed they have means of redress. There is a positive attitude by the government to the self-reliance activities of the displaced. They do not face acute threats en masse and enjoy a degree of stability and security that makes livelihoods possible. The government maintains rule of law and the displaced benefit from this too.</p>
	0–4	4–6	7–15	15–18
<b>Access to markets and the private sector</b>	<p>The displaced are strictly confined or only have access to small or remote markets. The local population themselves only have very limited access to economic opportunities, which are not diverse. The displaced probably have few or weak connections to the local private sector, perhaps exacerbated by language or other cultural barriers. The displaced may regularly suffer discrimination in gaining access to markets and employment, or there may be acute threats to their safety in accessing livelihoods opportunities.</p>	<p>The displaced may be partially confined, or have access to markets but face severe difficulties accessing them, for example because of distance and transport expenses. The barriers to entry in the local economy are formidable, including periodic discrimination, but some of the displaced have established livelihoods. Language barriers or other cultural attributes may isolate the displaced to an extent from the local private sector. Only a few of the displaced have established relationships with customers/suppliers/contacts/mentors in the host community. Concerns about safety, discrimination or other threats constrain efforts to search for livelihoods.</p>	<p>The majority of the displaced have access to markets for labour, services and goods. The majority of the displaced have adequate if costly access to transport or proximity to markets, or are near enough to these locales to walk to them. They still face barriers to entry, but through their social networks, political capital or other means some are able to access opportunities within the host community. While there may be threats to their safety while engaging in livelihoods activities these do not preclude the majority from pursuing them.</p>	<p>The local economy is connected to district, regional and even international markets and the displaced have the right and the ability to access these markets. The displaced are integrated into the local economy and connected with local private sector actors. In general, they do not face significant protection threats in pursuing livelihoods</p>

	0–3	4–6	7–9	10–12
<b>Capacities, assets and resources of the displaced</b>	<p>Many of the displaced are destitute and have few avenues for support. They may be highly socially isolated. Few receive remittances, and inputs from e.g. external aid actors cannot form the basis of a sustainable livelihood. The skills that the displaced possess are inappropriate to the local economy. Cultural beliefs or ethnic differentiation militate strongly against them or certain groups within the population taking advantage of available work opportunities. The displaced have only poor, precarious or low-quality access to the basic services necessary for them to pursue stable and sustainable livelihoods.</p> <p>If the displaced are or wish to be reliant on land for agriculture, land is unavailable or in poor condition.</p>	<p>The displaced still exhibit emergency needs, and many may be unfit for work. They have access to financial or material support in emergencies but it is inadequate or counter-productive to self-reliance. The displaced show signs of adapting skills and livelihood approaches to the local economy, but may lack information, finance or other resources to put these to use. The displaced have only poor, precarious or low-quality access to basic services and it is difficult for the displaced to achieve access to health, housing, education in areas where they can pursue self-reliance.</p> <p>If the displaced are or wish to be reliant on agriculture, land is hard to access and/or is in poor condition.</p>	<p>The displaced are not or are no longer in need of an emergency response. Remittances and other forms of external support (potential sources include social networks as well as international assistance and the social welfare system) enable some members to set up income-generating businesses or be self-reliant. Some self-reliant members are able to provide opportunities for others in the displaced group. Some are able to put skills, education, qualification or livelihoods assets to use.</p> <p>The displaced have access to the basic services necessary to pursue stable and sustainable livelihoods. It is possible, if not guaranteed, for the displaced to access health, housing and education in areas where they can pursue self-reliance.</p> <p>If the displaced are or wish to be reliant on land for agriculture, it is possible to access viable land, though there may be difficulties in using the land in terms of location, safety and inputs.</p>	<p>The displaced have access to resources for establishing enterprises and to cover emergency needs should these arise. They may have strong social networks that facilitate trade and employment. They have appropriate skills for sustainable livelihoods and are able to educate their children. They do not suffer from extraordinary levels of discrimination in the local economy. The displaced have access to the services (basic, health, housing, education) necessary for them to pursue stable and sustainable livelihoods. If the displaced are or wish to be reliant on agriculture, they have access to viable plots of land.</p>

	0–3	4–6	7–9	10–12
<b>Environment for external intervention</b>	<p>In this scenario the government is likely to be both formally and informally opposed to livelihoods work by international organisations. There is a fractious or unstable relationship between external aid actors and the host state. The delivery of international assistance may be difficult because of ongoing widespread insecurity, sanctions or other blockages, and/or there is an absence of international attention (forgotten crises). Funding is most likely delivered for short, emergency-oriented cycles only. There is no or little collaboration between different actors to discuss the development needs of the displaced.</p>	<p>The host state attitude towards the displaced and/or their livelihoods is ambiguous or hostile, or inconsistent between national and local levels. The state may have low capacity or will to implement or support livelihood programmes itself, or high capacity but low political will to do so. There is an unstable relationship between external aid actors and the host state. External funding levels are precarious or decreasing, or funding is problematic because of limitations on its use. There is lip service paid to addressing the development needs of the displaced, but no concrete action is taken.</p>	<p>The host state has positive attitudes towards the self-reliance of the displaced, and/or is tolerant of de facto integration. International agencies and their local partners have a workable relationship with the host state. Funding levels are adequate or sustainable in the medium term, and/or funds may be used to support long-term livelihoods work. There may be dialogue and coordination between the appropriate actors to meet the developmental needs of the displaced.</p>	<p>There is an established partnership between external actors and the government. The government exhibits a willingness to find a solution to the livelihoods situation of the displaced. There are established protocols and policies and institutions for channelling external assistance to host government programmes for livelihoods for the displaced. There is international attention, goodwill and material commitment to solve the livelihood challenges of the displaced. Different actors collaborate to support self-reliance for the displaced.</p>

## Annex 6: Typology 2 – results of the pilot application

### Aim, approach and limitations

This typology was applied to the 12 contexts that were also the subject of the literature review.<sup>39</sup> The exercise was intended to provide a preliminary categorisation of the contexts and test the typology itself, refining the methodology where necessary.

The typology should ideally be applied with the combined expertise of several individuals familiar with the context. However, for the purpose of this exercise and working with available resources, the pilot was conducted drawing on one Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre country expert per country for the six IDP contexts, and one refugee expert for the six refugee contexts. Experts drew primarily on desk research.

Research was limited to desk-based information sources. The main sources were the UN, international NGOs, human rights NGOs, academic papers and think tanks. The number of sources used to answer the checklists varied. For the refugee contexts, 3–15 sources were used, while for IDP contexts 2–10 sources were used. Many respondents had to rely heavily on one or two reports which provided detailed information about the livelihoods of the displaced, reflecting the paucity of livelihoods-related research in some contexts. A small number of sources might mean that information sources were substituted with a reliance on relevant country experience to answer the checklist. Respondents may have answered conservatively on statements for which there were no clear answers in the literature or their country experience.

Comments on the checklist were received at the beginning and end of the process. The lead ODI and IDMC analysts then revised the checklists and the broader methodology. Final scores were calculated and the scorecards were completed, with some input from the IDMC country experts.


This approach allowed the exercise to be completed within the allotted time, though it is important to note that more ‘grounded’ responses to the questions would have been gained by including experts in-country, and by having the checklists completed by several respondents in order to introduce more rigour and replicability. In other circumstances, drawing on in-country expertise and triangulation between several respondents remains the standard guidance for using the typology.

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
<sup>39</sup> The checklist was applied to six refugee contexts (Chad, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Pakistan, Uganda) and six IDP contexts (Azerbaijan, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan).

## Results

This section of the annex presents the scorecards for each of the 12 countries analysed. The full checklists are available on request, and include justifications for each response as well as references where available. A full list of references drawn on for each checklist is included here.


Environment for successful self-reliance programming for urban IDPs in AZERBAIJAN	
<p>Hopeful Provider, Score: 33</p>  <p>Most Constraining <span style="float: right;">Most Conducive</span></p>	
<p>The state has implemented numerous positive discrimination measures to help IDPs gain access to employment and education and meet their basic needs over the course of 25 years of displacement. For the vast majority of IDPs in urban areas these measures have not led to self-reliance, but to dependency on state welfare benefits. The state has allowed external actors to carry out livelihoods programmes for IDPs, but these have mainly been implemented in rural areas.</p> <p>Self-reliance is possible in urban areas. Not all those of working age have realigned their skills with the urban environment, while youth are keenest and have the most appropriate skills and education. As an oil-rich state and a humanitarian donor, Azerbaijan has the financial resources required for self-reliance programming for IDPs in urban areas. The main constraining factor is the lack of political support. The state prioritises the return of IDPs to their place of origin and considers that any efforts that facilitate their local integration, especially on self-reliance, work against that priority.</p>	
Scale and duration	622,892 IDPs, most of whom have been displaced for 25 years
Settlement options available	<p><b>Return</b></p> <p>Unlikely as place of origin is occupied by Armenia and peace negotiations have not progressed for years.</p> <p><b>Settlement elsewhere in the country</b></p> <p>The state has been settling IDPs in new purpose-built settlements for many years.</p> <p><b>Local integration</b></p> <p>The state tolerates the presence of IDPs in urban areas, but does not facilitate their local integration.</p> <p><b>Combination</b></p> <p>Some IDP families in urban areas are combining local integration with settlement elsewhere, using residences at both locations.</p>



Environment for successful self-reliance programming for urban IDPs in COLOMBIA	
<p>Partner in Prosperity, Score: 40</p> 	
<p>The state is highly supportive of improving the self-reliance of IDPs. Colombia is an unprecedented example of external actors supporting a strong state in its efforts to protect and assist IDPs, including some collaboration between humanitarian and development organisations. However, most IDPs in urban areas took refuge in informal settlements where they have poor access to services and are at risk of further displacement due to eviction or urban violence. They find it difficult to insert themselves into local markets because of stigma against IDPs and a lack of valuable skills and education. Self-reliance for urban IDPs is possible and appropriate given the duration of stay in these areas and because most IDPs do not wish to return to their place of origin.</p>	
Scale and duration	5,700,000 IDPs have been displaced over the last 50 years
Settlement options available	<p><b>Return</b></p> <p>Unlikely as place of origin is often insecure, IDPs fear being displaced again after return and new families created in displacement generally do not wish to return. The 2011 law establishing the land restitution process is facilitating the return process.</p> <p><b>Settlement elsewhere in the country</b></p> <p>The state has settled IDPs in uninhabited areas.</p> <p><b>Local integration</b></p> <p>The state tolerates the presence of IDPs in urban areas, and in some cases facilitates their local integration.</p> <p><b>Combination</b></p> <p>Some IDPs who have been settled elsewhere or who have returned periodically go back to their area of displacement to access services, social contacts and markets.</p>

**Environment for successful self-reliance programming for IDPs in North Kivu in the DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO**

**Precarious Provider, Score: 23**




The DRC is characterised by poverty, weak governance and poor rule of law. Multiple waves of displacement have eroded IDPs' assets, increased their vulnerability and made them highly reliant on personal contacts and networks made over the course of displacement. External actors struggle to address acute humanitarian needs along with the long-term development needs of IDPs, especially in urban areas. While the state has signed several regional legal instruments for the protection and assistance of IDPs, the authorities lack the capacity and resources for self-reliance programming and prefer that IDPs return to their place of origin, thereby making long-term livelihoods initiatives unnecessary.

Scale and duration	863,000 IDPs in North Kivu, many of whom have been displaced more than once in the past 20 years
Settlement options	<p><b>Return</b></p> <p>The state prefers the return of IDPs. IDPs report access to land, property and employment is easier in place of origin than place of refuge. However, for many their land and property has been occupied or destroyed, complicating their return. Insecurity in the place of origin and fear of renewed displacement also prevent some IDPs from returning.</p> <p><b>Settlement elsewhere in the country</b></p> <p>The state is generally tolerant towards the integration of IDPs throughout the country, though the official position has not been indicated.</p> <p><b>Local integration</b></p> <p>The state is mostly tolerant of the integration of IDPs at their place of refuge, but would prefer they return.</p> <p><b>Combination</b></p> <p>Some IDPs move daily or weekly to check on their belongings and to cultivate their land in their place of origin, and also to neighboring towns to find daily work.</p>

**Environment for successful self-reliance programming for IDPs displaced in 2006–2008 in IRAQ**

**Precarious Provider, Score: 28**



The upsurge in conflict, violence, human rights violations and displacement, as well as ongoing religious tension, renders self-reliance for IDPs a low political priority at the national level, while municipalities can be more sympathetic to IDPs of a similar ethno-religious profile. The sectarian divide runs deep as the state is increasingly representative of only the Shiite majority, Sunnis have been disenfranchised and mixed neighbourhoods are now largely single-sect. The state supports IDP livelihoods and self-reliance, including initiatives by international actors, and these actors have leverage with the state. However, they exert little pressure or have been ineffective in persuading the state to resolve internal displacement. As most IDPs intend to integrate in their place of refuge, and cite access to work as their most pressing need, self-reliance programming is appropriate in these areas. Special thought in design and implementation is necessary to ensure sustainability given sectarian divisions and the weak economy.

**Scale and duration**

1.1 million IDPs, most of whom have been displaced for eight years

**Settlement options**

**Return**

The state prioritises return of IDPs and provides financial incentives to encourage returnee families to deregister as IDPs. The longer IDPs are displaced the less likely they are to state an intention to return. Barriers include insecurity, poor relations with communities of origin, lack of access to property, damaged homes and lack of employment.

**Settlement elsewhere in the country**


Tension and competition over land at all levels of governance complicate the search for areas IDPs could be settled. Residency can be restricted by administrative rules and practices.

**Local integration**

In 2012, the vast majority of IDPs intended to integrate at their current residence. Fifty per cent of registered IDPs live in informal settlements with limited access to services and are at risk of eviction.

## Environment for successful self-reliance programming for IDPs in Darfur in SUDAN

### Precarious Provider, Score: 20




The state has voiced its commitment to resolving displacement in Darfur and has adopted a national IDP policy that sets out a number of rights related to livelihoods. However, the state has done little for IDPs and has sometimes been counter-productive, though some authorities have supported IDP livelihoods programming. Violence between government forces and armed groups continues and the conflict and associated displacement have led to increased competition for resources and livelihoods. Successful self-reliance programming requires due diligence on land rights, vocational adjustments and assistance to recover from injuries and violations. Sustainability requires addressing insecurity, sometimes at the hand of government forces, which limits IDPs' freedom of movement and access to markets. In general, tense relations persist between the state and the international community, especially Western countries. Some Middle Eastern donor countries have more leverage. Donor fatigue has set in as Darfur has been overshadowed by crises elsewhere.

Scale and duration	3,400,000 IDPs in Sudan, around 2,500,000 of whom have been displaced in Darfur for up to 11 years
Settlement options	<p><b>Return</b></p> <p>The state prioritises return of IDPs. Forced return as well as secondary occupation and destruction of homes and crops reported. Armed groups have an interest in preventing returns and keeping the number of IDPs high to attract international attention to the situation.</p> <p><b>Settlement elsewhere in the country</b></p> <p>There is no information on the state's position on this settlement option, or on IDPs' preference for it.</p> <p><b>Local integration</b></p> <p>The state is not fully tolerant of integration of IDPs at their place of refuge. Young IDPs would prefer to stay in the urban areas where they have grown up.</p> <p><b>Combination</b></p> <p>Some IDPs divide their time between their places of refuge and origin in order to cultivate and keep control of their land, supplement their income and maintain relations with their communities.</p>


**Environment for successful self-reliance programming for IDPs in South Central Somalia and Puntland in SOMALIA**

**Precarious Provider, Score: 16**




Despite a new government being established in 2012 and the eradication of armed militias from some areas, governance is weak and there is potential for further instability. The state ratified a regional instrument on IDP protection in 2011 and adopted an IDP policy in 2014. Local authorities have undermined these steps by violating IDPs' rights. Constraints to self-reliance include gatekeeping, insecurity, forced relocations to remote areas, lack of appropriate clan affiliations, low level of education and skills and food insecurity. International actors are attempting to meet humanitarian needs and improve self-reliance, though a funding shortfall remains and access to areas in need is limited by insecurity and deliberate obstruction.

Scale and duration	1,100,000 IDPs, most displaced for some 20 years
Settlement options	<p><b>Return</b></p> <p>The state prioritises return of IDPs to their place of origin. Improvements in the security situation in some areas have led to increased interest in return.</p> <p><b>Settlement elsewhere in the country</b></p> <p>The state does not oppose settlement elsewhere, though this choice depends on living conditions, security and clan affiliations in that area.</p> <p><b>Local integration</b></p> <p>Authorities have supported the local integration projects of international agencies.</p>

Environment for successful self-reliance programming for Sudanese in CHAD	
<b>Social Protection Priorities, Score 20</b>  Most Constraining <span style="float: right;">Most Conducive</span>	
<p>Chad scores highly in terms of the government's tolerant or positive attitude to achieving self-reliance for the displaced, the rights they are accorded and the large degree of leverage external actors have to encourage and support government policies that encourage self-reliance. Its low score derives from the fact that displaced populations are largely in remote and destitute areas where the local population frequently exhibits alarming rates of malnutrition, and there levels of insecurity are a concern.</p>	
Scale and duration	368,290 refugees, many displaced since 2003
Settlement options	<p><b>Return</b></p> <p>Return is unlikely as country/place of origin is still unstable and communal clashes in Darfur are frequent.</p> <p><b>Resettlement</b></p> <p>Resettlement appears to be the only viable solution, but few resettlement places are open to refugees.</p> <p><b>Integration</b></p> <p>Local integration is unlikely given the limited capacity of the host country.</p>

## Environment for successful self-reliance programming for Afghans in IRAN


### Social Protection Priorities, Score 21




Iran has the potential to be a far more enabling place for self-reliance approaches. It scores highly on access to markets and the resources and capacities of the displaced. This is because the vast majority of Afghans live in urban areas and are largely integrated into Iranian society through cultural and language similarities. Transnational networks have existed for more than 30 years, making it easier for Afghans to find support. However, Iran scores poorly on external engagement, and low scores on legal frameworks and protection pull it into the Social Protection Priorities category. While the Iranian government already plays a large role in the refugee response there is very limited scope for external actors to support progressive policies, particularly as some of the largest threats to refugee livelihoods are related to human rights, a highly sensitive issue. The government is increasingly focused on return and on limiting de facto integration. This makes it difficult to resolve restrictions relating to movement, education, access to professional employment and property.


Scale and duration	950,000 refugees, most of whom have been displaced for ten years
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
Settlement options	<p><b>Return</b></p> <p>Return is unlikely as country/place of origin is still unstable. Living conditions in Afghanistan are dire and many refugees in Iran have never been to their home country.</p> <p><b>Resettlement</b></p> <p>Few resettlement places are open to these refugees.</p> <p><b>Integration</b></p> <p>Local integration has been ruled out by the host state.</p>
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Environment for successful self-reliance programming for Iraqi refugees in JORDAN	
<p><b>Precarious Provider, Score 22</b></p> 	
<p>The situation of Iraqi refugees in Jordan scores well in respect to access to markets, through Iraqis' location in urban centres with large and dynamic informal sectors and sophisticated formal markets, and their moderate integration through existing connections and language. It scores low to medium in respect of the capacities of the displaced and legal frameworks and protection; although Jordan provides a relatively safe and stable environment, Iraqis suffer due the limitations imposed by the irregular status of many refugees and limitations placed on women's mobility and employment. The most constraining factor, however, revolves around the environment for external intervention, with a very restrictive attitude on the part of the government towards livelihoods work with Iraqis.</p>	
Scale and Duration:	57,140 'refugees' (21,920 registered with UNHCR), most of whom have been displaced for nine years.
Settlement options	<p><b>Return</b></p> <p>While some Iraqi refugees are attempting to return many find it unsustainable.</p> <p><b>Resettlement</b></p> <p>This group continues to benefit from resettlement, though on a much smaller scale than previously, and this will not be the solution for the majority.</p> <p><b>Integration</b></p> <p>Local integration has been ruled out by the host state.</p>



Environment for successful self-reliance programming for urban refugees in KENYA	
<p><b>Precarious Provider, Score 25</b></p> 	
<p>Kenya's urban refugees present a complex picture. On the one hand the Kenyan government is engaged in refugee issues, while on the other wavering between tolerance of urban refugees and harsh crackdowns, particularly on Somalis following a spate of terrorists attacks for which the Somali community has been blamed. Many refugees in Nairobi are already achieving self-reliance, but many others lack crucial support to achieve this. While there is promising research and programming in Nairobi it is small-scale and overshadowed by the care and maintenance camps in northern Kenya.</p>	
Scale and duration	56,000 asylum-seekers and refugees were registered with UNHCR in Nairobi and other urban centres in Kenya, the majority from Somalia, Ethiopia and DRC.
Settlement options	<p><b>Return</b></p> <p>For refugees from Somalia, Ethiopia and DRC sustainable return is highly unlikely as insecurity remains high in Somalia and in eastern DRC, and many Ethiopians still fear political persecution if they return.</p> <p><b>Resettlement</b></p> <p>Few resettlement places are open to these refugees.</p> <p><b>Integration</b></p> <p>Local integration has been ruled out by the host state.</p>

Environment for successful self-reliance programming for Afghans in PAKISTAN	
<p><b>Precarious Provider, Score 25</b></p> 	
<p>Self-reliance programming for Afghans in Pakistan faces a range of obstacles, with low to medium scores in all categories. While most Afghans have access to public services and many are, after long spells in protracted displacement, integrated into local economies, with some well established in transport and other sectors, a self-reliance agenda faces serious obstacles in the persistent security threats that confront many residents of north-west Pakistan, the government's reluctance to support livelihoods work, mobility restrictions for women and a response from the international community that largely does not push for more developmental policies to be applied to this group.</p>	
Scale and duration	<p>Almost 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees. Length of displacement varies with some refugees displaced prior to the US invasion in 2001, and many displaced (or re-displaced) since then.</p>
Settlement options	<p><b>Return</b></p> <p>Return is unlikely as country/place of origin is still unstable and a large portion of Afghan refugees have never seen Afghanistan.</p> <p><b>Resettlement</b></p> <p>Few resettlement places are open to these refugees.</p> <p><b>Integration</b></p> <p>Local integration has been ruled out by the host state.</p>

Environment for successful self-reliance programming for Congolese refugees in UGANDA	
<p><b>Hopeful Provider, Score 39</b></p> 	
<p>Uganda scores highly in respect to its legal and protection environment (which accords refugees a range of important economic rights), refugees' access to markets and economic integration (through attempts to integrate rather than isolate the Settlements), and the environment for external intervention (with a promising dialogue and coordination between domestic and external actors to promote refugee self-reliance). Given language difficulties and the shorter duration of their displacement, Congolese refugees are in some respects less conducive to a self-reliance. If applied to the South Sudanese or Somali case load, a higher score may have been achieved.</p>	
Scale and duration	226,880 refugees, many of whom have been displaced since 2010
Settlement options	<p><b>Return</b></p> <p>While Eastern DRC has seen modest improvements, it remains highly volatile.</p> <p><b>Resettlement</b></p> <p>Few resettlement places are open to these refugees.</p> <p><b>Integration</b></p> <p>While the government is not strongly opposed to de facto integration, de jure integration has been ruled out.</p>

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## Annex 7: Protracted Displacement - Terms of Reference

*How can policy frameworks, institutional arrangements and international and government assistance be adjusted to improve livelihoods and enable greater self-reliance for people who are forcibly displaced for more than 3 years?*

### Background

The majority of the world's refugees and IDPs now live in situations of protracted exile where there is little or no prospect of achieving a durable solution.<sup>40</sup> This state of long-standing limbo has significant impact on peoples' human, economic, social and cultural rights. However, there is no single experience of protracted displacement. Displaced populations are sometimes confined to designated camps (predominantly in rural areas), but are also integrated into host communities (often in more urban areas), where they can be invisible to service providers. Indeed most displaced are today in urban settings. The policy framework and institutional arrangements set by host countries and the international community is an important determinant of where displaced people reside and the scope of opportunities that are available.

A significant proportion of refugees and IDPs living in protracted displacement are situated in developing countries, with many of the displaced hosted in fragile and conflict affected states. In August 2011, the largest protracted refugee situations (in terms of numbers) were reported in: Pakistan which hosted 1.8 million Afghans, and Kenya which hosted around 400,000 Somalis<sup>41</sup> (while in Somalia itself, more than 1.4 million people are internally displaced). There are currently more than 2 million Syrian refugees hosted in neighbouring countries, while more than 6million are estimated to be internally displaced in Syria. Similarly, a large proportion of protracted IDP situations are located in fragile states. In Afghanistan there are estimated to be more than 660,000 IDPs, while in DRC there are estimated to be at least 2.6 million IDPs<sup>42</sup>. There are also large displaced populations in Middle Income Countries: Columbia hosted at least 3.6 million protracted IDPs<sup>43</sup>.

In situations of protracted displacement, responses need to go beyond humanitarian assistance to address longer-term issues around land, housing and productive assets restitution, service delivery, livelihoods, self-reliance, voice and social cohesion – pending a durable solution. However there is typically disconnect between the policies and institutional settings established for refugees during the initial emergency period and those required to address protracted displacement. Moreover, a transition out of dependence on humanitarian support to longer term development approaches is frequently impeded by political obstacles. These may take the form of host country governments' insistence on maintaining parallel systems (humanitarian aid for refugees, development assistance for national citizens), of excluding refugees from social and economic opportunities, of bilateral cooperation agreements that focus development aid on host country nationals, or even the absence of

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<sup>40</sup> Zetter, R. 2011. "Unlocking the Protracted Displacement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: An Overview". *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 30 (4).

<sup>41</sup> Long, K. 2011. "Permanent crises? Unlocking the protracted displacement of refugees and internally displaced persons." Oxford: Refugees Study Centre. Available at: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/9C65376E1F9DBAAEC125793D003ADC24/\\$file/unlocking-protracted-displacement-policy-overview.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/9C65376E1F9DBAAEC125793D003ADC24/$file/unlocking-protracted-displacement-policy-overview.pdf) [Last accessed 17 February 2014].

<sup>42</sup> <http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures>

<sup>43</sup> IDMC/Brookings (2011) 'IDPs in protracted displacement: Is local integration a solution?' Report from the Second Expert Seminar on Protracted Internal Displacement, Geneva: [www.internal-displacement.org](http://www.internal-displacement.org).

development assistance programmes in Middle Income Countries where refugees are present. The same may apply to many IDPs who may be seen as ‘enemies of the state’. Protracted displacement therefore presents a significant challenge for host countries and the international community as well as national governments and its ability to address the interface between short-term humanitarian assistance and longer-term development opportunities.

### Developing a definition and typology of protracted displacement

The definition of protracted displacement has evolved and been redefined in line with the growing international commitment to understanding the scope and scale of protracted displacement. In 2009, the UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion provided a refined definition for Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS) as situations where refugees have been in exile “for 5 years or more after their initial displacement, without immediate prospects for implementation of durable solutions.”<sup>44</sup>

Using this UNHCR definition, by 2012, almost 7.1 million people had been living in exile for five years or more – accounting for almost 75% of the refugee population under UNHCR’s mandate<sup>45</sup>. Milner and Loescher identified 30 major PRS globally and found that the average length of displacement in these situations was almost 20 years in 2011, compared to 9 years in the early 1990s<sup>46</sup>. However, these estimates and definition remain somewhat limited, excluding: those displaced for less than 5 years; PRS in urban settings or smaller residual displaced populations; Palestinian refugees under the mandate of UNRWA; nor any of the millions of IDPs worldwide.

By the end of 2013, there was an estimated 33.3 million IDPs displaced by conflict and violence, marking a significant increase of 4.5 million from the previous year. 63% of the global figure came from just five countries: Syria, Colombia, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan<sup>47</sup>. These figures highlight both the scale of new crises and IDPs situations such as Syria, as well as the protracted nature of conflict and displacement in places such as DRC where the turmoil dates back to the 1990s.

IDMC defines internal displacement as a situation in which “persons or groups of persons [...] have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border.”<sup>48</sup>

For the purpose of this study, protracted displacement is defined more broadly as a situation in which refugees and/or IDPs have been in prolonged exile for 3 years or more, and where the process for finding durable solutions, such as repatriation, absorption in host communities, or resettlement in third countries, has stalled. This definition includes refugee and IDP populations forced to leave their homes to avoid armed conflict,

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<sup>44</sup> UNHCR, ExCom. 2009. “Conclusion on Protracted Refugee Situations”, No. 109, LXI.

<sup>45</sup> UNHCR. 2012. “Finding Durable Solutions”. *UNHCR Global report 2012*. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/51b1d61d0.html>

<sup>46</sup> Milner and Loescher. 2011. “Responding to protracted refugee situations: Lessons from a decade of discussion”. *Forced Migration Policy Briefing 6*. Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre.

<sup>47</sup> IDMC. 2014. *Global Overview 2014: People internally displaced by conflict and violence*. IDMC, NRC: Geneva.

<sup>48</sup> Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998), noted in [Comm. Hum. Rts. res. 1998/50](#).

violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters. It also includes those living in camp settings or dispersed among host populations.

### International response and evidence-base

In 2009, the UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion highlighted the scale of the problem of PRS and called for an urgent international response. The Conclusion emphasised the short-comings of ‘care and maintenance’ model of assistance for long-term displaced populations. While assistance under this model has provided asylum, protection and basic needs for millions of refugees, many refugees have remained in camps indefinitely often with restrictions placed on their rights and ability to establish a livelihood. The Conclusion argued there was a need for a fundamental shift towards approaches based on the promotion of livelihoods and self-reliance, pending a durable solution<sup>49</sup>. While the locus of this analysis was in relation to refugees (UNHCR’s key responsibility), the same could be said in relation to IDPs.

As UNHCR have highlighted elsewhere, “self-reliance is not in itself a durable solution but can be a precursor to any of the three durable solutions. Even in situations where local integration does not appear to be a viable solution for a refugee population, self-reliance should be vigorously pursued as it...facilitates sustainable reintegration.”<sup>50</sup> Similarly, Milner and Loescher highlight that an increased focus on self-reliance and livelihoods can improve short-medium term conditions and take place in parallel to work to reinforce durable solutions<sup>51</sup>.

However, evaluations and evidence on the effectiveness of interventions to promote livelihoods, self-reliance and social cohesion (pending a durable solution) remain limited. Humanitarian interventions are largely based on annual budgets and designed to maintain populations above emergency thresholds; at the same time developmental actors have only limited engagement with these populations. There is some evidence that the space in which interventions can promote livelihoods, self-reliance and social cohesion is largely shaped by the institutional framework set by the host country<sup>52</sup>. Within East Africa for example, the Uganda government allows refugees to undertake employment and other economic activities, whereas in Kenya refugees are largely constrained to camp settings and are not permitted to work.

Much of the literature on protracted displacement has focused on refugees in camp settings, rather than IDPs and those dispersed in host communities. In addition, the literature has tended to focus on the political challenges to durable solutions rather than how to overcome programmatic, policy and political challenges and utilise opportunities for promoting livelihoods, self-reliance and social cohesion.

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<sup>49</sup> Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998), noted in [Comm. Hum. Rts. res. 1998/50](#).

<sup>50</sup> UNHCR. 2005. “Local Integration and Self-Reliance”, 2 June 2005, EC/55/SC/CRP.15. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/478b3ce12.html> [accessed 28 January 2014]

<sup>51</sup> Milner and Loescher. 2011. “Responding to protracted refugee situations: Lessons from a decade of discussion”. *Forced Migration Policy Briefing 6*. Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre.

<sup>52</sup> Betts, A., (2013), *Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement*, Cornell University Press.

Where evidence is available it is generally small-scale, isolated, qualitative evaluations. There are a limited number of evaluations that focus specifically on self-sufficiency as an outcome of aid.<sup>53</sup> One useful example includes a joint UNHCR-WFP impact evaluation on food assistance, which has tested the intervention logic for programmes contributing to the attainment of durable solutions and self-reliance. It found that a shift from care and maintenance to self-reliance had not occurred due to a combination of external factors including donor funding policies, and factors within the control of the organisations. The impact evaluation highlights that WFP and UNHCR did not use or create opportunities to find durable solutions, tended to reinforce contextual barriers, and continued to conform to a care and maintenance model.

Research on protracted exile led by the Refugees Study Centre in partnership with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displaced Monitoring Centre, suggests a more multi-dimensional, experimental and innovative approach is needed to tackle the shifting and episodic nature of protracted displacement<sup>54</sup>. Suggested examples of such flexible approaches towards greater self-reliance (pending a durable solution) include developing more flexible legal regulation (temporary citizenship, more flexible work permits, internal freedom of movement) and more innovative regional policies and tools. In addition, Zetter calls for more people-centred approaches to protracted displacement that acknowledge and build on the capacities, informal initiatives and strategies already employed by refugees and IDPs. Also important will be to analyse the effectiveness of aid and financing and delivery models, and how they enable or hinder integration and return to self-sufficiency.

## Objective

In order for collaborations between humanitarian and development actors to promote impactful interventions that support protracted displaced populations, policy-makers need better evidence on the typology, scale and scope of protracted displacement and the effectiveness of interventions aimed at improving self-reliance and psycho-social well-being.

The objectives of this study are to:

- map and analyse evidence on the scale and typology of protracted displacement globally;
- assess the impact of national policy frameworks, institutional arrangements and international assistance to improve self-reliance and livelihoods in situations of protracted displacement;
- Identify innovative opportunities to promote people's livelihoods and self-reliance (taking into account the impact of psychosocial wellbeing on access to work and livelihoods). While it is important to note that self-reliance is not a substitute for a durable solution, the main focus of this study will be how to overcome programmatic and policy challenges and utilise opportunities *pending* a durable solution.

This study will aim to:

- **Map and analyse the scale, dynamics and typology of protracted displacement.** This will include: mapping the scale, trends and dynamics of protracted displacement; analysing the scale and breakdown and structure

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<sup>53</sup> McLoughlin, 2013. "Supporting self-sufficiency in situations of protracted population displacement". (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report no. 1028), Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

<sup>54</sup> Zetter, R. 2011. "Unlocking the Protracted Displacement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: An Overview". *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 30 (4).

of programmatic spend; and developing a comprehensive typology to capture the scope of protracted displacement. Important components of a comprehensive typology to consider include:

- Single country or multi-country (regional) displacement
- Trends and dynamics (active conflict, peace process underway, mixed population movements, previous repatriation)
- Duration/longevity
- Population numbers
- Demography (structure, first, second, third generation etc)
- Ethnic, political or confessional complexity
- Socio-economic profile of displaced
- Locations (rural, urban, camps, settlements)
- Policy environment (restrictive, enabling, disabling on government, assistance side)
- Institutional arrangements (centralised, counterpart(s) within security domain (ie. Ministry of Interior), political economy issues)
- Institutional capacities (assertive, weak, degree of external budget support). Security and development implications

- **Analysing the theory of change underpinning international interventions for populations who are displaced for more than three years.** Specifically: what are the interventions designed to achieve in terms of increasing self-reliance and improving livelihoods versus care and maintenance approaches? What are the core assumptions underpinning these interventions? How robust are these in practice? What evidence is there that these interventions work in practice? How do host country policies and institutional arrangements support or constrain interventions? This will include an exploration on how interventions contribute/constrain food security, skills training, social protection and education - with a particular focus on the graduation towards self-reliance and improved livelihoods. This should include and take into account how psycho-social wellbeing impacts livelihoods and self-reliance outcomes. Effectiveness of international assistance will be measured by: 1) success in meeting above-emergency thresholds, 2) the graduation of protractedly displaced populations towards self-reliance and improved livelihoods, and 3) value for money.

The ToR has been developed in close collaboration with DFID, UNHCR and the World Bank's Global Programme on Forced Displacement (GPDF). Protracted Displacement has been identified as a significant priority by all three actors, particularly given the scale of displacement in countries including Syria, South Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Mali, Ethiopia, DRC, Myanmar and Colombia, and the needs of host countries affected by displacement including Jordan and Lebanon.

The study will be used to inform and contribute to: DFID's practice, policy and advocacy position; the work of other humanitarian and development actors (including UNHCR and GPDF); and the wider policy debate on protracted displacement. It will do this by:

- **Providing the first comprehensive review of data on the scale, dynamics and typology of protracted displacement and the impact of international assistance.** The final study will appear in a peer-reviewed journal and will provide an important evidence base for a range of humanitarian and development actors.
- **Informing and shaping further research and innovative interventions.** The study will identify key evidence gaps and opportunities for innovation. Within DFID, it will help to inform the future direction of the Humanitarian Innovation and Evidence Strategy and will be used by country offices and policy teams.
- **Informing analysis of the cost-effectiveness of different international responses to protracted displacement.**
- **Influencing dialogue between key humanitarian and development partners.** The study will identify the strengths and constraints of humanitarian and development actors and identify examples and lessons learned from strong and early collaboration.

## Scope

The overarching research question for this study is: How can the impact of international and government assistance be improved for people who are forcibly displaced for more than 3 years, with a particular emphasis on whether and how such assistance can support livelihoods and enable greater self-reliance? The study should also seek to address the following areas and sub-questions:

### 1. Scale, dynamics and typology of protracted displacement

- What evidence is there regarding the scale of protracted displacement globally? Over the last twenty years, how many people (both IDPs and refugees) are displaced, how many years are they displaced for, and are they in receipt of international assistance?
- Is there an upwards trending curve for number of people in situations of protracted displacement (and does this differ between refugees and IDPs)? Is there an upward trending curve for average number of years that refugees/IDPs remained displaced for?
- What are the various typologies of protracted displacement? How do humanitarian and development needs differ between IDPs, refugees and the various typologies? (Please refer to p.4 and suggested components of the typology to consider)
- *Visualised data should be used here to illustrate the scale and trends of protracted displacement.*

### 2. Programmatic spend

- Over the last twenty years, how much government and international humanitarian and development assistance was spent per year on assistance to protracted refugees/IDP situations (both absolute and as a percentage of humanitarian and development ODA)?
- What is the funding architecture for protracted displacement? How does this architecture support/constrain government, humanitarian and development assistance?
- How is spend allocated between different countries and populations (e.g. refugees/IDPs,)? What is the programmatic breakdown of this spend (how much is allocated to food, watsan, protection, livelihoods etc)?

- Over the last twenty years, how much did host governments contribute to displaced populations in their care and what is the programmatic breakdown of this spend?<sup>55</sup>
- *Visualised data should be used here to illustrate the scale and breakdown of programmatic spend. A narrative should be provided documenting if/ where there are significant challenges in capturing this data – what are the constraints in data collection?*

### 3. Effectiveness of interventions to promote livelihoods and self-reliance

- What tested theories of change and systematic approaches have been used to define and measure the effectiveness of humanitarian and developmental responses designed to support greater self-reliance of populations who are displaced for long periods of time? Have innovative approaches to assistance to protracted refugee/IDP situations been developed and tested? If so, what were the results? What were the impacts on different social groups – women/men, refugee/IDP, camps/dispersed, rural/urban?
- What are the factors (both external and internal) that enable or constrain the transition from aid dependency to self-reliance and strengthened livelihoods among refugees and IDPs in protracted displacement? To what degree are these constraints the results of the external environment (violence, legal framework); to what extent are they the result of the way in which international assistance is currently organised? How do unmet mental health and psychosocial needs affect self-reliance and livelihood outcomes? What role do host governments play in enabling or constraining the transition to self-reliance, and what are their concerns?
- In what ways have interventions created or utilised opportunities to move from long-term care and maintenance approaches towards approaches that effectively promote livelihoods, self-reliance and social cohesion? To what extent have local factors and localised alternative strategies contributed towards durable solutions (e.g. labour mobility, temporary migration, alternative forms of legal stay) – even when existing political constraints remain?<sup>56</sup>
- What is the evidence base on value for money of care and maintenance approaches in situations of protracted displacement? What is the evidence base regarding value for money of interventions designed to support greater self-reliance?
- What evidence is there regarding the effectiveness of food security interventions for protracted refugee/IDP situations?
- What evidence is there regarding the effectiveness of educational interventions both in the short term and their long term effects on earning and social capacity?

### 4. Roles of and collaboration between humanitarian and development actors

- What have been the main roles/divisions of responsibility among different humanitarian and development actors in responding to protracted displacement?
- What are the main strengths and constraints of these actors (e.g. what are their comparative advantages)?

<sup>55</sup> Lessons may be learned from the World Bank's experience in Jordan: <http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P132097/5m-displaced-people-jordan-lebanon?lang=en>

<sup>56</sup> Here it would be beneficial to refer to a recent GPF funded study (implemented by the Danish Refugee Council) on livelihood programmes for displaced people.

- What examples are there of strong and early collaboration between humanitarian and development actors?
- What are the evidence gaps that could be addressed by DFID funded research?
- Based on the above analysis, the study should develop a theory of change relating to interventions that support self-reliance of populations displaced for more than three years?<sup>57</sup>

## Methodology

The literature review will provide an overview of the main evidence on protracted displacement. It will critically appraise evidence from academic institutions as well as reports and policy documents from multilateral agencies and NGOs. This will include the gathering and analysis of data on the scale and typology of protracted displacement. Research teams will be expected to develop a structured approach to its search of the literature and assess the relevance and quality of papers for the literature review. DFID strives to ensure that literature reviews are as robust, objective and credible as possible and researchers should refer to the DFID Assessing the Strength of Evidence How to Guide (enclosed) for full guidance. For a good example of a robust literature review that meets these standards, please refer to Schreter, L.; Harmer, A. (2013) Delivering aid in highly insecure environments. A critical review of the literature, 2007–2012. London: Humanitarian Outcomes Ltd. Available at: [http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/Hum\\_Response/60995-Delivering\\_aid\\_in\\_highly\\_insecure\\_environments\\_final\\_report.pdf](http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/Hum_Response/60995-Delivering_aid_in_highly_insecure_environments_final_report.pdf)

The case studies selected for the comparative analysis will be finalised during contract negotiations. We envisage that four of the following case studies will be selected:

1. Rohingya refugees and IDPs (in Myanmar and Bangladesh)<sup>58</sup>
2. Protracted refugee situations in Ethiopia
3. Protracted refugee situations in Uganda
4. IDPs in Colombia
5. IDPs in DRC
6. IDPs in Afghanistan
7. Iraq IDPs and refugees
8. Palestinian refugees under the mandate of UNRWA

These case studies will be chosen to represent examples from both refugee and IDP situations, cover a broad geographical remit and highlight differences in the typology of protracted displacement within each country. For example, the Uganda case study is identified as a potential example of a more enabling government policy environment where refugees are allowed to undertake employment and other economic activities. The analysis will be particularly valuable in highlighting potential differences and similarities and identifying context-specific barriers and opportunities to move from long-term care and maintenance approaches towards approaches that effectively promote livelihoods and self-reliance. This will be a predominantly desk-based study and might also

<sup>57</sup> Here it would also be beneficial to link up to the World Bank's work on livelihoods and displacement.

<sup>58</sup> Kiragu, E. et al. (2011). *States of denial: A review of UNHCR's response to the protracted situation of stateless Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh*. Geneva: UNHCR. <http://www.unhcr.org/4ee754c19.pdf>



include phone/skype-interviews with DFID, UNHCR and World Bank staff and partners where relevant and other interviews with experts to identify literature sources.

While the literature review will make up the main body of report, the findings should draw on the detailed case study analysis to provide more detailed examples. Gender analysis should be implemented throughout this study.

The final research output will appear in a peer reviewed journal.

## **Outputs**

The final study should deliver the following outputs:

1. An analytical literature review and case-study analysis of approximately 30 pages (single spaced, size 12) with an executive summary, covering the topic areas outlined above, bringing together the themes in the literature and case studies in an analytical form. A full reference bibliography should be included (not counted in the page limit). The literature review should include:
  - Visualised data (e.g. info-graphics and graphs) to: illustrate the scale, dynamics and trends in protracted displacement; highlight key differences between the typologies of protracted displacement; and detail programmatic spend.
  - A comprehensive typology of protracted displacement (see p.4).
  - A theory of change for existing interventions that are designed to promote greater self-reliance of populations displaced for long periods, drawing on the existing literature, and annotated to highlight the degree to which the assumptions and impacts are/are not substantiated by the evidence. (Drawing on this, the consultants may wish to propose an alternative theory of change)
2. An additional policy brief
3. A discussion of where there are notable thematic gaps in the evidence, or a paucity of research in a particular geographical area.
4. A record of any experts contacted or interviewed as part of the literature reviews, including contact points or websites where appropriate.
5. A meeting to discuss the literature review with DFID and its key partners.
6. Methodological annex detailing how the literature review and case study analysis were conducted

The process should include provision for peer review of the report.

## **Skills and personnel**

A multi-disciplinary team (one senior researcher and one researcher officer) will be required with expertise in the following specialisms:

- Forced migration
- Livelihoods
- Financial analysis
- Policy and programming approaches
- Political Analysis

DFID would encourage partnership between different organisations/institutions if it will help to deliver a strong project

### Inputs, Proposed Budget and Timeframe

A team of two researchers (one senior researcher and one research officer) will be required for a total of 98 days work.

#### Estimated level of Inputs:

- Data and financial analysis and mapping of the scope and typology of protracted displacement: 18 days researcher input (team of two researchers)
- Literature review and phone interviews for case study analysis: 65 days researcher input (team of two researchers) and communication costs for case study interviews
- Write up: 10 days researcher input
- Peer review, redrafting and presentation of results (5 days): inputs will include travel and subsistence costs for workshop at DFID HQ

**Total estimated budget: £80,000**

The timeframe for the research will be four months.

Deadline	
Tbc (approx. day 18)	Inception phase: analysis of scale of protracted displacement and programmatic spend (including visualised data) and comprehensive typology of protracted displacement developed.
Tbc (approx. day 80)	Draft report (literature review and case study analysis)
Tbc (approx. 5 days)	Peer review, redrafting and presentation of results
Tbc (approx. day 98)	Final report

### Contact Points

For any contractual or financial queries, the consultant should contact Dawn Wood at [Dawn-Wood@dfid.gov.uk](mailto:Dawn-Wood@dfid.gov.uk)

For queries relating to the content of the report, or for support in locating resources or experts, the consultant should contact Jessie Kirk at [jessie-kirk@dfid.gov.uk](mailto:jessie-kirk@dfid.gov.uk) or Joanna Macrae at [j-macrae@dfid.gov.uk](mailto:j-macrae@dfid.gov.uk);

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