Paper presented at the African Studies Association annual meeting, San Diego, 19-21 Nov 2015

What next for political settlements theory and African development?

David Booth*

Comparative analysis of 'political settlements' has emerged as an attractive alternative to earlier institutions-and-development thinking, especially single-track conceptions of institutional advance. But political settlements theory remains under-specified and can be hard to apply in practice. Existing typologies are conceptually narrower than they need to be and suffer from internal consistencies. Comparing experience in four African countries, this paper argues that some of the salient factors are singled out by the analytical frameworks of Khan and Levy, but others are missed or insufficiently captured. An amended two-dimensional classification matrix that reflects more consistently the premises and aspirations of political settlements theory is proposed as a basis for future hypothesis formation and testing.

1 Introduction

In explaining divergent development outcomes, scholars increasingly find it necessary to go beyond both geography and institutions to uncover the underlying patterns power that determine how institutions work. Development performance often varies remarkably among states facing comparable structural constraints with broadly similar institutions. Basic policy options, such as the priority given to rural development, matter greatly, as confirmed by recent research (Henley, 2015). Yet outcomes sometimes differ when governments have been pursuing apparently identical policies. This observation was the starting-point of Mushtaq Khan's (1995) critique of new institutional economics which introduced the term 'political settlement' to students of development.

Khan's own work has been primarily concerned with the determinants of industrial policy outcomes in South and East Asia. However, the analytical space signalled by the language of political settlements is of equal interest in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, where researchers and development agencies are challenged by the diversity of trajectories of change among countries with apparently similar initial conditions. In the recent literature, the observation that African countries make progress at different speeds and in different ways is linked to the recognition that, in world history, remarkable progress has taken place in a great variety institutional contexts (Chang, 2007; Rodrik, 2007; Andrews, 2010; Rothstein, 2011; Sundaram and Chowdhury, 2012; Levy, 2014). The biggest success-stories in development exhibit common features at a certain level, but these are not a shared set of 'inclusive institutions' as maintained by influential accounts of 'why nations fail' (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).

* Politics and Governance Programme, Overseas Development Institute, London (d.booth@odi.org.uk). Generous comments on several previous versions of this paper by Patrick Barron, Diana Cammack, Hazel Gray, Matthias vom Hau, Sam Hickey, Seth Kaplan and especially Tim Kelsall are warmly acknowledged but its remaining limitations are solely the author's responsibility.

One of the challenges facing those dissatisfied with over-simplified claims about the role of institutions is to offer a coherent alternative method of identifying relevant explanatory variables and applying them to specific cases. Some headway has been made in this respect. Khan's (2010) paper includes a path-breaking attempt to construct a typology of political settlements, starting with a simple two-dimensional matrix. Taking a similar typological approach, Kelsall (2013) aims to make sense of the diversity of African development trajectories by distinguishing four types of rent-management regime. Levy's (2014) book offers an alternative classification matrix in order to explore alternative pathways of change towards a democratic capitalist end state.

The Khan and Levy typologies, in particular, have been key references for some of the best recent research in comparative African development, including the Copenhagen-led Elites, Production and Poverty project (Whitfield et al., 2015) and the Manchester-led Effective States and Inclusive Development programme (Hickey et al., 2015). This paper is a contribution to that body of work. It is the product of two concerns.

One is the desire to maintain and strengthen links between the use of political settlements analysis in comparative development studies and two wider bodies of work. Most obvious is the literature on war and peace. The raison d'être of political settlements theory is to make a link between the conditions shaping civil conflict and peace-building on the one hand and the factors shaping the prospects for economic and social development on the other. Fundamental to most definitions of political settlement (Parks and Cole, 2010; OECD/DAC, 2011a; Laws, 2012) is the idea of a tacit agreement among the most powerful members of a society about the conditions under which they are prepared to engage in some form of peaceful political competition, rather than resort to violence.[1] In post-conflict studies (Lindemann, 2008; OECD/DAC, 2011b; Call, 2012; Jones et al., 2012; Putzel and Di John, 2012; Berdal and Zaum, 2013), political settlements analysis concerns itself with whether the agreements underlying the peace are robust. In comparative development, the starting point is the observation that robust settlements come in several varieties.

The other important linkage is with comparative and historical studies that do not use the concept of political settlement but occupy the same analytical space: that of explaining divergent development pathways with reference to the deep structures

[1] Khan's (2010) definition of a political settlement as 'a consistent combination of institutions and a distribution of power such that the two are compatible and mutually supportive' is commendably concise but does not bring out clearly enough the way the concept functions as a bridge between conflict and development studies. Alternatively, a settlement may be defined as a (re-)arrangement of political and economic power relations and institutions, one that is viable in the sense of providing a (long-established or new) means of limiting violence. We will not go into the matter of what should count as limited violence in this context. We would only note that throughout history, settlements that have been a sufficient basis for the most powerful members of a nation to engage in non-violent political competition have often been accompanied by continuing and even intensified violence in peripheral regions as well as by violent criminality on some scale. For practical purposes, we follow the OECD/DAC paper that states 'every political regime that is not in the midst of an all-out civil war over its basic parameters is based on some kind of settlement' (2011a: 9, quoted by Laws).

underlying current institutional arrangements. This literature is extremely fertile and spans different historical periods and at least four continents (Mahoney, 2001; Lewis, 2007; North et al., 2009; Slater, 2010; Vu, 2010; Pritchett and Werker, 2012; North et al., 2013; Hough and Grier, 2015). It offers a number of pointers for enriching conceptually the comparative study of settlements.

The second concern motivating the paper is that, although stimulating and illuminating, the currently available typologies suffer from internal inconsistencies. For related reasons, they do a limited job of explaining some of the puzzles about development processes in in Africa that trouble country specialists and policy makers. Our belief is that by drawing on a wider range of concepts and addressing the inconsistencies, political settlements analysis can be made more powerful, both as a framework for research and as a tool for better development practice.

The paper approaches its task from two opposite ends. It begins, in inductive mode, with a four-country illustration, applying political settlements analysis to aspects of the experience of contemporary Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda. We show that although some of the salient factors are, or are close to, those singled out for attention in the Khan or Levy frameworks, others are missed or insufficiently captured.

The second half of the paper adopts a more deductive approach. It proposes a set of criteria that ought to be satisfied by a typology of political settlements. This suggests a modified two-dimensional classification matrix that, as well as capturing better the salient issues arising from the four country cases, appears more consistent with the premises and aspirations of political settlements theory. Our claim is that this will provide a more robust basis for diagnostic work and empirical studies of the development consequences of different settlements in the future.

2 The challenge: making sense of Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda

Political settlements analysis is, first and foremost, a diagnostic tool. It provides a set of concepts to help in answering otherwise puzzling questions about why things are the way they are, and more specifically why institutions and policies work in different ways in different places and times. It then serves to generate important further questions, about origins and about policy implications. This may seem obvious but it is not always fully appreciated when political settlements analysis is recommended as a research framework or an instrument for guiding policy action. We begin our illustration, therefore, with a few observations about what it means to put political settlements analysis to work.

2.1 Putting political settlements analysis to work: some principles

Doing political settlements analysis should never be a question of just pinning a label of the prevailing arrangements in a country. As a rule, we would argue, it should always be possible to answer the following four sets of questions:

- ***What's the puzzle?*** What are the institutional functionings or features of the policy process that are to be explained? What is the unexplained residue after the proximate factors, including broad policy priorities have been fully explored? Particular interest obviously attaches to the presence or absence of generally recommended qualities of development policy making, such as high-level political drive, coherence of policies and problem-solving learning.[2]

- ***What's the content of the settlement and how does it work?*** It should be clear that the central issue here is in what way the agreements or power deals that constitute the settlement serve to limit political violence and prevent civil war. The point is that there are different ways of doing this, which have different effects on other important matters, including those likely to influence development policy processes and outcomes.

- ***When and how did the settlement originate?*** Political settlements involve the phenomenon of path-dependency. In other words, once the tacit agreements and norms of behaviour that define them are established, it becomes progressively easier to continue observing them than to abrogate them and get agreement to a different set.[3] That does not mean they cannot change, but future possibilities cannot be assessed without some understanding of the origins of the persistent features.

- ***What are the implications for policy and practice?*** The answers to the previous questions are not just of academic interest. Political settlements analysis has been widely recommended as a guide to policy action, notably by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. Yet political settlements analysis has yet to be used effectively in operational contexts. We propose that questions about

[2] Emphasized by, among others, Booth and Cammack (2013: Ch 3) and Andrews (2013).

[3] The concern here is not with the very long-term path-dependencies hypothesized by some writers on Africa (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010; 2012; Akyeampong et al., 2014). It is with settlements or trajectories that have their origins in relatively recent history – in decisions of leading actors at particular watershed moments under the influence of specific concerns, preferences and beliefs. This thinking is supported by the rich, mainly non-Africanist, literature on critical junctures and path dependencies in institutional change (Mahoney, 2001; Pierson, 2004; Mahoney, 2005; Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; Slater, 2010; Vu, 2010; Pierson, 2015). Importantly, this means that analyzing a political settlement involves an important place for specifying not just the interests but the ideas in play; thus the thesis of the Effective States and Inclusive Development research team (Hickey et al., 2015) that the development effectiveness of states is determined by their settlements plus ideas should be qualified to recognize a greater role for ideas that are endogenous to them. As some of the country illustrations below will show, understanding the ideational content of different sorts of settlement becomes important when it comes to thinking about whether they can be influenced. In several if not all respects, these remarks bring us close to the founding ideas of the Developmental Leadership Programme (Leftwich, 2009; Laws and Leftwich, 2012).

implications will be more satisfactorily answered if they build on the answers to our three previous questions.

In the rest of this section and in Table 1, we illustrate the possible content of each of the diagnostic steps suggested above, with references to a sample of the relevant literature on each of four countries. We believe all of the claims can be substantiated, although they are stated here in a very summary form. However, they are intended to be illustrative, not definitive. In other words, the purpose is to show that these are the pertinent questions to be asking, even if there may be disagreement about the answers.

In this exercise, we make a few basic assumptions about the nature of political settlements analysis which should be spelt out to avoid misunderstanding. Thanks to the magisterial survey by Laws (2012), we may say that three features distinguish the best of current usage in this field.

First, settlements are ongoing arrangements and understandings of some duration, not one-off critical events such as a peace agreement or a new political pact, although they include and are often initiated by such events. Second, political settlement is an explanatory concept, not a normative one. It is not the 'social contract' of Enlightenment political philosophy. The inclusion or inclusion of different types of actors is fundamental to what a settlement is. However, this is distinct from questions about the inclusiveness or otherwise of the economic, political or social development processes that may be partly explained by the nature of the settlement.[4] Third, a political settlement is a 'two-level game'. It is about the relations and tacit agreements not only among key elites but also between them and their respective groups of followers. The proposition that settlements differ on both of these two dimensions has been accepted by most of the typological literature, and it was taken into account in selecting Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda for the present illustration.

2.2 The policy puzzles

In all of our four countries, there is a good deal about development policy, patterns of violence and outcomes that is not particularly surprising. Many things are quite easily explained in terms of broad factors of size, location, social structure, colonial and post-colonial history. Yet there remains an unexplained residue. The way formal and informal institutions function in the four countries is more varied than would be predicted on the basis of differences in starting points.

[4] The inclusiveness and other properties of the settlement may have a causal influence on the inclusiveness and other desirable qualities of development processes. But this is an empirical question to which the answers are not obvious. If the desired outcomes and the possible explanatory factors are not distinguished conceptually, the empirical question cannot even be posed. This has not always been clear in the practical guidance issued by agencies, for example DFID (2010). For further discussion of these distinctions, see Rocha Menocal (2015).

Table 1: Political settlements analysis in action

	What is to be explained	Settlement type and how this instance works	Origins, critical junctures, ideas	Policy implications (always assuming complexity and uncertainty)
Nigeria	Predatory, anti-poor policy making and implementation, even by standards of resource-rich states	Prebendal politics, horizontally and vertically, very entrenched; an appearance of mutuality created with old-fashioned (protectionist) policy ideas	The 1966-79 failures of the senior bureaucracy to establish a relatively autonomous state power to counteract prebendal tendencies	Initiatives that effectively undermine the ideological props of vested interests could work if pursued in smart and adaptive ways
Tanzania	Consistent inability to get sufficient policy coordination around rural transformation visions, with result that growth brings limited poverty reduction	Nation-building vision and rural priorities of political elite severely constrained by patronage-based relations with economic actors and local elites	1967 and 1985: continuity between manifestations of *ujamaa* control imperative and 'neoliberal' cronyism	The nation-building vision still provides a hook for challenges to the control orientation/cronyism, which could work to improve reform coordination if pursued in smart and adaptive ways
Uganda	Policy quality is inconsistent through time and across sectors; pro-poor in limited respects only	Rule through political barons and pay-offs coexists with a regularly renewed alliance between the President Museveni and pockets of bureaucratic effectiveness	1985 and 2005: continuities before and since multiparty elections	Initiatives, half-inside and half-outside the Museveni-bureaucrat alliance, could tip the balance in favour of consistently pro-poor outcomes if pursued in smart and adaptive ways
Rwanda	Policy-making has become consistent and quite adaptive despite weak capacities and ideologically driven early mistakes	Agreed/effectively compelled elite consensus around public goods and service provision and avoidance of clientelism	1990-94, 2000-2003: nation-building project since before the genocide, completed by constitutional process	Considerable scope for problem-driven, adaptive policy improvement within government system/settlement; little will succeed outside

In Nigeria, the puzzle is about how markedly anti-developmental and socially exclusive economic policies have been for so long. With due respect to the reforms carried out since the restoration of party politics in 1999 (Okonjo-Iweala, 2012; Lewis and Watts, 2015b), Nigerian policy remains stuck in a pattern of agricultural and industrial growth established in the 1970s which compares unfavourably on all counts with what has been achieved in comparable oil-producing and other countries in Africa and Asia (Bevan et al., 1999; Treichel, 2010; Fuady, 2012; Henley, 2015). The country's economic and social under-performance is matched only by its inability to deal with the sources of its rising tide of politico-religious violence (Campbell, 2013; Lewis and Watts, 2015a).

Tanzania is not a development success-story, yet the puzzle about Tanzania is different. The policy biases of the political elite of the country are not as dismissive of agriculture as those of Nigeria's rulers, and they were once famed as pro-rural. Yet real policy patterns have not been consistent with this, and agricultural productivity growth has lagged behind other sources of growth since the mid-1960s. A typical policy pattern in Tanzania is a grand transformation initiative followed by failure to deliver the necessary coordinated action. There is an enduring gap between formal and actual policy. Examples of this abound for both the 'socialist' years under Nyerere (Coulson, 1982; Lofchie, 1989; Schneider, 2014; Henley, 2015) and the putatively neoliberal years since the mid-1980s (Cooksey, 2003; Hyden and Mmuya, 2008; Therkildsen, 2012; Kelsall, 2013: Ch 2; Tilley, 2014).

Policy can be incoherent in Uganda too, but sometimes Uganda has seemed to be leading the developing world in development management. The quality of policy varies sharply through time and across sectors. Ugandan reforms in the 1990s were responsible for one of the more impressive periods of rural poverty reduction in recent African history. This rested in part on the establishment of a technically impressive system of public financial management and other islands of administrative effectiveness (Robinson, 2007; Kuteesa et al., 2010; Melo et al., 2012: Ch 2). There are signs that Uganda's proven ability to host pockets of bureaucratic effectiveness may permit it to establish a reasonably sound system for managing its future hydrocarbon wealth (ESID paper). In contrast, basic public service delivery in several fields remains no better than the African average and in several respects compares unfavourably with conditions in its much poorer neighbour, Rwanda (Booth and Cammack, 2013).

Rwanda's progress since the 1994 genocide has no doubt been over-hyped. Policy-making has some major flaws, including excessive voluntarism and the adoption of inappropriate international models. For some years after the consolidation of the RPF-led regime, the key question of how to develop agriculture was badly addressed, with quite serious consequences for nationwide food security in the middle years of the last decade. This has been corrected in most but not all important respects (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2014; Van Damme et al., 2014). On the other hand, policy in all areas now features both consistent carry-through to implementation and an ability to notice, learn from and correct mistakes that is unusual in the region. Outcomes today compare favourably with those in other landlocked, historically impoverished and recently

conflict-affected countries on the continent (Chambers and Booth, 2012; World Bank, 2013).

2.3 The settlements and their origins

Our claim in Table 1 is that our selected countries illustrates some, if not all, of the significant differences that are or ought to be of concern to students of political settlements. We are concerned with a specific period in each case, although a longer one than features in many conventional political periodizations. For Nigeria, we are addressing the whole era since the end of the Biafra war in 1970; for Tanzania, it makes sense to go back to the gestation of the 'socialist' model in the mid-1960s; the Uganda settlement we are dealing with is of more recent origin and begins with Museveni's accession to power in 1986; and the Rwandan settlement that concerns us is from 2000, the year of Kagame's assumption of the presidency, to the present.

Nigeria since Biafra

In Nigeria since 1970, what Richard Joseph (1987) calls prebendal politics has become entrenched, or subject to strong path-dependency, in both the way the rich and powerful share out the spoils of power, especially the revenues from oil, among themselves and the way they legitimize this state of affairs with their followers. As Joseph explains, prebendal politics plays on the potential for ethnic group loyalties and fears to come to the fore. It provides a sufficient sense of benefit, or at least of threat averted, for the mass followers of the big man in power for open rebellion to be averted. The current Boko Haram insurgency and previous rebellion in the Delta define the limits of the settlement in this respect.

Its origins lie back in the 1970s when, according to Joseph and especially Lewis (2007), the bureaucratic and military elite in power confronted the collective-action challenge of starting a state-building project and refused it. As emphasized by Henley (2015) and the other previously cited comparativists who have studied the period, the development ideas that contributed to this failure were grandiose and inward-looking at a time when the errors of the import-substitution strategy pioneered in Latin America were already acknowledged internationally. These ideas provided the justification for the entrenching of protectionist practices and the build-up of closely intertwined networks of economic and political power, both inside and outside the military. Both the vested interests in the resulting pattern of economic growth and its original intellectual-ideological rationale are alive and well in Nigeria today.

A salient feature of Nigeria's prebendal politics is that it includes an unrestrained competitive struggle within the elite for access to the spoils of oil. But the basic pattern persists under both military dictatorships and periods of multi-party electoral politics. As we shall argue later, what makes Nigeria's clientelism competitive is not that there are multi-party elections. Rather, the functioning of Nigeria's democracy is shaped by the underlying qualities of the power struggle.

Tanzania from ujamaa

Tanzania, we suggest, has had and continues to exemplify a different type of political economy. This is an interpretation that not all country specialists will share, although it is aligned with recent analysis by Hazel Gray (2015) that highlights the significant continuities between the present period and the 'socialist' past. For certain, the present period features a high level of factionalism within the dominant party, CCM. This is linked in part to high-level corruption, involving close-knit groups of African politicians and Asian or Arab business people, all operating under a cloak of neoliberal ideology. However, the elements of novelty and breakdown in this scenario can easily be exaggerated, and it is not necessary to dwell on them in explaining puzzles such as the failures of coordination that afflicted President Kikwete's irrigated rice initiative (Therkildsen, 2012).

CCM, and its predecessor TANU, was not a highly disciplined structure, but it was in a real sense a vehicle of collective action by an otherwise fragmented national elite around a nation-building vision. A strong element of this remains, despite the new level factionalism, and to a significant extent, the same vision – sometimes termed the Nyerere legacy – underlies the programmes of the opposition parties, at least on the mainland. Aspects of all of this were observable in the alignments and realignments that took place ahead of the 2015 elections (Branson, 2015), with the CCM leader with the strongest personal following being marginalized by the party and then accepted as the opposition figurehead. This illustrates something that will be important in our more formal analysis later: what distinguishes the intra-elite bargain in Tanzania is not reducible to the fact that a single party has been continuously in power since independence, or indeed dependent on whether CCM continues in power after future elections

What explains the puzzle about Tanzanian policy processes is more about the way the political leadership relates to the rest of society. And, again, the salient feature is not that CCM is not what it was, but that in an important respect it is still very much what it has been since the 1960s. The literature on the Nyerere period tended to portray the strategy of the political elite as cooptation and control of independent economic actors, such as Asian business communities and the rural cooperatives. Analyzing recent failures of reform coordination, Therkildsen and others have stressed the veto power of CCM allies in business (e.g. rice importers) and the national leadership's loss of control over district government (to which key implementation responsibilities have been devolved). However, there is an important element of continuity between these phases.

As Gray reminds us (see also Aminzade, 2013), Asian business was never outside the CCM system and there always was cronyism. At the critical juncture in the late 1980s, when Mwinyi took over the presidency, rules were relaxed so that political leaders could get into business, and Asian businesspeople who had been running parastatals could go private. But this did not change the character of the relationships as much as might be expected. Similarly, the relationship between the CCM elite and the cooperative unions has changed relatively little in substance since Nyerere destroyed

their autonomy in the mid-1960s. Whether the ideological rationale was state-socialist or neoliberal, the key relationships involved the type of reciprocity that characterizes patron-client relationships. Relationships of this character are intrinsically unsuited to the kind of arm's length regulation of private activity by the state (or of local government by central government) that coordinated planning assumes and requires. That, rather than any medium-term shifts in relative power, explains the Tanzanian conundrum. As we shall say later, modalities of power matter as much or more than relative quantities.

Uganda under Museveni

The Ugandan settlement under the presidency of Yoweri Museveni inverts the Tanzanian pattern in an important sense. Although in theory a single political party, the National Resistance Movement, has been in power since 1986, this is much more of a personal vehicle than CCM. Museveni maintains himself in power with judicious personal relationship-building to deliver the continuing support of different parts of the country through its elites. A large element of sharing of spoils and of bilateral deals is involved in this, as we have stressed in explaining the puzzling lack of support for self-evidently important reforms such as those affecting the maintenance of the national road network (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2009). At the same time, Museveni's ascendancy since 1986 has permitted the establishment of pockets of effectiveness in parts of government which are afforded protection from what would otherwise be the predations of the political barons. In recent years, these protected islands have extended from the central bank and the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, to the Uganda Revenue Authority and the Kampala City Council.

Of course, President Museveni is a master of clientelistic appeals to the masses, including direct vote-buying, at election times. Bilateral deals between the big man and big business are considered commonplace. But all of this exists alongside a basically sound management of the macro-economy, which has enabled economic growth to be vigorous, diversified and relatively inclusive. In short, a highly personalistic, deal-based hegemony at the top is not only consistent with, but actually enables an impersonally rule-based management of at least sectors of the national political economy. This illustrates the importance of treating political settlements as, in Laws' phrase, a two-level game. It also adds to the reasons for not being overly concerned with formalities (e.g. has the same party of leader been in power for a long time?) and for paying attention to the system of rule that underlies any such 'dominance'.

Rwanda in the new millennium

Situating Rwanda in a typology of political settlements is bound to be controversial because of the pressure to make simple judgements for or against the RPF-led regime. However, characterizing the settlement since 2000 is not the same as taking a position on the rights and wrongs, or the proper interpretation, of the country's bloody history before and since the 1994 slaughter (e.g. Mamdani, 2001; cf. Lugan, 2014). We do not even need to say whether we agree Rwanda should be more of a liberal-democracy than

it is (Reyntjens, 2013) or whether we accept or not that the country's progress depends on Kagame's continuing to act as its 'CEO' (Crisafulli and Redmond, 2013). We limit ourselves to claiming a) that there is a tacit bargain among the elites in power around a state-building project based on three principles, and b) that, as a result, the prevailing mode of legitimation gives a central place to the enforcement of impersonal (ethnically neutral) rules and providing public, rather than private or 'club', goods.

The three elements of the settlement, as we have argued previously (Golooba-Mutebi and Booth, 2013), are a commitment to power-sharing among parties that reject ethnic politics; a shared belief in the achievement of ethnic reconciliation through development rather than by negotiation; and the search for an alternative to clientelistic politics. Although, like Tanzania and Uganda, Rwanda has a dominant party, it is the consensus around these issues, which extends to the minor parties, that is salient feature. This combination has the effect of freeing policy-making from the constraints that are important elsewhere (e.g. the veto power of political barons in Uganda, or the business cronies and uncontrolled district councils in Tanzania). It also helps to explain the drive and determination, and willingness to learn, that we have suggested elsewhere (Booth and Cammack, 2013) distinguishes implementation of government programmes in the country.[5]Nothing guarantees that policy outcomes will be consistently good, and it is important that our characterization of the settlement is logically independent of outcomes. However, a plausible empirical hypothesis would be that, other things being equal, a settlement with these elements will be good for development.

The Rwandan settlement has its roots in political realignments in the diaspora ahead of the 1990 invasion by the RPF forces and was consolidated during the constitution-making process 2000-2003. The superficially attractive thesis that it was primarily a response to the shock of the genocide is probably wrong. Nevertheless, the decisive military victory of the RPF in 1994 and the subsequent concentration of the means of violence in the hands of the RPF leadership were undoubtedly decisive in sealing the deal.

This last aspect would be a problem for any theory that portrayed political settlements as purely voluntary agreements to conduct the affairs of the elite in a particular way. Some definitions of the concept may have given that impression. However, the historical evidence follows Olson (1993) in suggesting that fragmented elites seldom, if ever, engage in collective action around a common state-building or similar project without an element of compulsion by those controlling the main means of violence. Hough and Grier (2015) support this view with a rich array of experience from early-independence USA and Spain as well as medieval England and Spain.

[5] Nothing guarantees that policy outcomes will be consistently good, and it is important that our characterization of the settlement is logically independent of outcomes. However, a plausible empirical hypothesis would be that, other things being equal, a settlement with these elements will be good for development.

2.4 Policy implications

The final column of Table 1, we make the assumption that is getting new attention in the literature (Andrews et al., 2013; Booth and Unsworth, 2014) that effective development action is problem-driven, adaptive and, as far as possible, locally led. From this starting point, political settlements analysis cannot tell us what action needs to be taken or how it should be taken. But it perhaps can help to indicate *where*, in relation to current policy processes in the country, it should expect to take a difference.

The Nigerian settlement often seems peculiarly intractable, to both domestic reformers and international development agencies. The fact that some reforms have been successful is encouraging but only up to a point. If the political settlements analysis offered here adds anything to the general advice to take a piecemeal trial-and-error approach, searching out tractable issues, it is an invitation to consider initiatives that dent the still-prevailing economic ideology which has been part of the cement of the prebendal regime. This might include efforts to demonstrate the feasibility and benefits, potentially to both the rich and the poor, of more outward-looking and employment-intensive investment projects. Of necessity, this would need to be done behind the backs (or in areas of no interest to) the fat cats sitting on the big protected niches of the day, but that may not be completely unrealistic.

In Tanzania, it would seem that the residual elements of consensus around the ideological principles of nation-building and rural development provide an authorizing environment for efforts to address the chronic weaknesses of the rural economy. The enduring force of the other dimension of the settlement – the control-oriented yet troublesome clientelism linking the political elite and major economic players – provides an additional reason for ensuring that interventions are politically informed and smart as well as technically well judged.

Extending Uganda's president-bureaucrat alliance into new fields would appear to have some potential as a developmental reform strategy in Uganda, but the settlements analysis also underlines the risk that any advances will be overwhelmed by the more 'feudal' dimensions of Museveni's system of rule. Therefore, a wise approach would pay close, politically smart, attention to both types of influence on a given reform process. The answers may be different in different sectors and at different levels. We have tried to apply this idea to the national roads reform in a recent revisiting of the state of play in that sector (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2015). The growing body of theory about pockets of effectiveness within dysfunctional public services (Roll, 2014) will be particularly pertinent.

Our analysis of the Rwandan settlement encourages a belief in improving development outcomes by working largely inside government. For international agencies and NGOs, the idea of working outside the system for policy changes that may appear desirable but go against the grain of the settlement are very unlikely to work. As most donor agencies recognize most of the time, it is more productive to exploit to the full the enabling features of the prevailing regime.

3 Towards a revised typology

The argument so far has been that putting political settlements analysis to work on contemporary Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda brings to the fore certain kinds of distinctiveness and relegates others to the background. Now we attempt to formalize the implications of some of these observations. This section returns to the basic premise of the political settlements approach (institutional functionings depend on the exercise of power) and sets out a case for amending the approaches of Khan (2010) and, to a lesser extent, Levy (2014) to defining a basic typology of political settlements. The contention is that these previous contributions are not fully consistent with their own account of the theoretical function of political settlements analysis

We proceed in three steps. Section 3.1 re-states the basic premises that analysts in this field tend to share, even if they are reluctant to admit it, ending with a reminder of the way Khan and Levy move from these assumptions to building a typology. We then, in 3.2, put forward our view on dimensions of variation that should be considered relevant to characterizing a settlement, given the theoretical function of the concept. This generates a two-dimensional matrix which contrasts with Khan's basic typology and, to a lesser extent, with Levy's. The final sub-section, 3.3, reviews how these adjustments affect the definition and relevance of the four basic types, referring back to the earlier country examples.

3.1 Theoretical orientations

The starting-point of political settlements thinking is a strong sense of history, especially on two points. First it is recognized that elites and societies in developing societies today, as in most of the world in the past, are typically fragmented along ethnic, regional and other lines, from which it follows that the conditions for avoiding a perpetual state of civil war cannot be taken for granted. Second, controlling violence tends to cost money, because compulsion invariably needs to be accompanied by the ability to buy off recalcitrant forces. This gives a central role to the generation and allocation of economic rents.[6] Since, by definition, developing economies lack a substantial capitalist sector and the state has a narrow conventional tax base, settlements invariably involve means of capturing and channeling a variety of other kinds of rent-based finance.

The concept of political settlement, used in this way, has strong affinities with the thesis of North et al. (2009) about historical types of 'access order'. This also begins with the problem of violence and ends with the way institutions enable or block processes of economic development. To the extent that there are significant differences between the political settlements perspective and the contributions of North et al., our view is that this has to do less with any fundamental theoretical divergence than with scope and

[6] An economic rent is defined technically as a payment for the services of an economic resource above what is necessary for it to remain in its current use (Black et al., 2012). It can arise from, among other things, monopoly power in a market or administrative context, occurring naturally or created by policy, and ownership of an unimproved natural resource, such as land or minerals under the ground.

focus.[7] North et al. focus most of their analytical attention on the trajectories of change associated with the rise of Western capitalism, particularly in its Anglo-American variant since the watershed of the Glorious Revolution of 1688. However, they explicitly warn against the temptation of trying to export an 'open access order' to societies that lack the necessary preconditions (2009: Ch 7).

It is certainly the case that the 2009 book does not provide much guidance on the alternative trajectories that may be open to poor developing countries. This neglect is corrected somewhat in their later edited collection (North et al., 2013). Yet although this includes case studies of currently developing countries, it still concentrates on the later stages of the transition from a 'limited' to an 'open' access order. The most significant leap forward in this line of thinking is the previously mentioned work of Hough and Grier (2015), which concentrates on early state-building and pre-industrial capitalism in Europe (England and Spain) and the Americas (the USA and Mexico). Putting historical flesh on Mancur Olson's thesis about early state-building, this book is suggestive of better ways of capturing the variety of contexts in which development challenges are being confronted in today's world.[8]

Despite varying greatly in empirical scope, these similarly motivated contributions converge on two fundamental points. First, the central issue in understanding varieties of historic social order is the different ways power and rents are used to limit violence. Second, the way this is done has major implications for the pace and form of social and economic progress.

Khan and Levy take this generic argument forward in initially similar ways. Both adopt the familiar technique of the two-dimensional matrix, and we shall continue to do so. Ideally, one would recognize three dimensions, beginning with the fundamental question of whether the settlement is sufficiently inclusive of power-groups with the ability re-ignite civil war. However, three dimensions are harder to manage.[9]

The two dimensions respond to the observation by Laws cited earlier that settlements are a two-level game, and the four categories defined in this way are offered as ideal-

---

7 For a different view, see Gray (2014).

8 In contrast, Acemoglu and Robinson's influential book (2012) takes a step backwards in this respect, by placing even stronger emphasis on the merits of the English settlement and its colonial offshoots, arguing against the evidence that there is not much other historical experience that is relevant to present-day low-income countries and fragile states. Acemoglu and Robinson's account of 'why nations fail' relies on a one-dimensional conceptual distinction between 'extractive' and 'inclusive' institutional patterns. This does not begin to capture the actual diversity of institutional-change trajectories that have led to successful development in history. It also mixes up two distinct questions: whether the tacit agreement among the main fragments of a country's elite is sufficiently inclusive to limit violence, and whether this settlement is of a kind to sustain inclusive economic and political development. Lastly, the book's thesis that present-day extractive regimes are the product of path dependences established many centuries ago is sustained at the price of an unjustifiable 'compression of history' (Jerven, 2015: Ch 2). The effect is to distract attention from the more relevant, medium-term path dependencies that are the focus of political settlements and similar analysis.

9 Forthcoming work by my ODI colleague Tim Kelsall addresses this weakness.

types, not empirical descriptions of real-world cases. In the 'horizontal' dimension – where the focus is on the relationship between elite factions that are included in the settlement and those that are not included – the approaches of Khan and Levy are close, if not quite identical. The distinction is between settlements that involve is a dominant party or ruler and those that do not, in which there is more competition. In our illustrative discussion, we have shed some doubt on whether the variable 'dominance' should be handled in this simple way and whether 'competition' is to be identified with multi-party elections. In these respects, we take issue with both typologies.

In the vertical dimension, however, the approaches of Khan and Levy diverge. For Khan the relevant distinction rests, as in the other dimension, on the 'holding power' of the subordinate groups or 'lower level factions' relative to that of the ruling coalition. Levy, on the other hand, takes a step in what seems to us the right direction. Rather than focusing on a simple arithmetic of exclusion, as measured by the holding power of the subordinate groups, he concerns himself with the modalities governing this relationship. He joins North et al. (and Hough and Grier, and ultimately the tradition of Max Weber) in contrasting impersonal with personalistic rules and rule-enforcement. We agree with this broad approach.

3.2 Key dimensions of difference

In this section, we follow the two-dimensional approach to typology building but join it with six further concerns, two of them about the logical requirements of a rigorous typology, and four about the substantive content of a typology of settlements. In the interests of rigour,

1. The typology should be ***parsimonious***, with as few dimensions as needed to capture the range of variation and without adding criteria beyond what is needed to distinguish each type from the others.

2. If the typology is meant to define a set of independent variables whose causal significance is to be explored empirically, as is the case here, the ***hypothesized effects should not be built into the definition of the types***.

More substantively,

3. The essential rationale of the political settlement concept is that 'merely' institutional frameworks of explanation do not work. Therefore, ***types of settlement should not be defined, or even casually labelled, with reference to configurations of formal institutions (elections, authoritarianism, party systems, etc.).*** A new settlement may be expressed in, and underpinned by, particular institutional arrangements such as a new constitution or political party organization, but it is not to be identified with them.

4. Much of the literature on political settlements has followed Khan in emphasizing bargaining relationships, rather than assuming agreement and consensus (e.g., Di

John and Putzel, 2009; Putzel and Di John, 2012). However, this has unduly restricted the type of power relations entering the picture. We propose to open the door to ***a broader concept of power, one that embraces both 'power over' (zero-sum) and 'power to' (positive sum)***.[10]

5. The power of elites to achieve more or less shared objectives depends on, among other things, the extent to which they are able or obliged (with selective incentives) to overcome challenging collective action problems. As shown by Olson (1993; 2000) and elaborated by Hough and Grier (2015), a key step in the early stages of state-building and capitalist development is when centralization of control of the means of violence begins to interact constructively with the generation of economic rents. Raising this to a more generic level, ***a fundamental issue is to what extent the relevant elites are able to engage in coordinated use of rents around some joint project such as state- or nation-building.***

6. If, in the above respect, the 'horizontal' differences among settlements hinge on the *kind* of relations established among elite factions, not the power of the excluded elements or the amount of exclusion, the same should apply to the elite-follower relationship. In this dimension, ***one variant or another of the distinction between impersonal and personalistic rules, or programmatic versus non-programmatic provision, seems necessary***.[11]

Taking these concerns seriously points to a typology that differs significantly in content, if not in form, from Khan's, including the 'elaborated' version proposed by Whitfield et al. (2015). In one of the dimensions, though not in the other, it calls for amendments to the Levy variant. Table 2 presents a provisional illustration.

Those familiar with the equivalent diagram in the Khan paper (2010: Figure 17), the Whitfield version and the Levy matrix will immediately notice a) the absence of claims about outcomes (even 'potential' ones) and b) the lack of reference to regime type or party system. Less obvious and more important is the attention given to modalities rather than amounts of inclusion or exclusion. This applies not just to the vertical dimension, on which we do not differ from Levy, but also to the horizontal relationships. There, giving attention to the exercise of positive-sum as well as zero-sum power implies a concern with the elite collective action problems of early capitalism and state-building.

[10] We are grateful for this formulation to Goran Hyden.

[11] In different drafts of this paper, we have suggested the enforcement of rules and the provision of public goods as the basis of this distinction. But this is problematic. Stokes et al. (2013) point out that the fundamental distinction between programmatic and non-programmatic distribution does not equate exactly to distinction between public, club and private goods. And Levy is persuasive on the point that personalistic distribution also involves rules, but of a different, more informal, type. There may also be an argument for taking this a step further and making use of the concept of 'impartiality' in public administration, shown by Bo Rothstein (2011) to be the basis of universally recognised norms of good government and a good predictor of other desirable outcomes.

Table2: A basic typology of political settlements

		Primary mode of inclusion (of elite interests in the settlement)	
		Purposively coordinated rent utilization (state- or nation-building project)	**Uncoordinated rent utilization** (Sharing of spoils/bilateral 'deals')
Primary mode of legitimation (of the settlement vis à vis other elites and non-elites)	**Impersonal provision and rule-enforcement**	***Coordinated impersonal*** Elites are motivated/compelled to overcome their collective action dilemmas and engage in some degree of purposive action in pursuit of a unifying vision. ***And*** compliance with the settlement is secured in part by impersonal public provision and rule-enforcement.	***Uncoordinated impersonal*** Elites are not motivated/compelled to overcome their collective action dilemmas, so the settlement relies on sharing the spoils of power among elite fragments, simultaneously or sequentially. ***But*** compliance with the settlement is secured in part by impersonal public provision and rule-enforcement.
	Personalistic provision and rule-enforcement	***Coordinated personalistic*** Elites are motivated/compelled to overcome their collective action dilemmas and engage in some degree of purposive action in pursuit of unifying vision. ***But*** compliance with the settlement is principally secured by personalistic provision and rule-enforcement.	***Uncoordinated personalistic*** Elites are not motivated/compelled to overcome their collective action dilemmas, so the settlement relies on sharing the spoils of power among elite fragments, simultaneously or sequentially. ***And*** compliance with the settlement is principally secured by personalistic provision and rule-enforcement.

Our approach draws inspiration from, among other sources, Mahoney's (2001; 2005) account of the origins of distinct 'national political regimes' in Central America, Lewis' (2007) comparison of Nigeria and Indonesia, and Slater's (2010) treatment of 'provision pacts' and 'protection pacts' in the comparative politics of Southeast Asia. At the same time, our argument extends and refines some themes developed in the Africa Power and Politics Programme (2007-12). It provides a more nuanced treatment of what we there called developmental patrimonialism (Kelsall et al., 2010; Kelsall, 2013). It situates more precisely the variety of solutions and non-solutions to the challenges of elite collective action highlighted in the APPP synthesis (Booth, 2012; Booth and Cammack, 2013). In turn, this promises productive connections with scholars approaching comparative development trajectories from the angle of formal collective-action theory (Corduneanu-Huci et al., 2013; Ferguson, 2013; 2015).

Our claim is that this approach provides a conceptually enriched account of what is unique about each of four settlement types. Giving a central place to the presence or absence of the 'power to' achieve an elite's collective goals, such as the building of a state and gaining the required support of other elites and non-elites, helps to clarify the causal mechanisms by which accommodations are reached and peace is maintained. Taking us away from a dry arithmetic of inclusion, exclusion and zero-sum power, these mechanisms are, in turn, a rich source of research questions, both about origins (what does it take to impel national elites to address their collective action problems?). In turn, understanding origins is the key to wise thinking about potential pathways of change.

3.3 The four types discussed

In this section, we discuss the political settlement types defined by Table 1 one by one, suggesting some of the ways each relates to the range of actual instances in the world and to previous treatments of certain cases, including our four African countries. An important health-warning here is that in emphasizing power modalities, rather than power balances, we are not at all dismissing the peace-building concern, that settlements should be inclusive enough in both dimensions to provide an alternative to political violence. The issue here is not what it takes for a settlement to be robust, but the different ways of achieving robustness.

Uncoordinated personalistic

Khan's (2010) characterization of the equivalent cell in his matrix as 'competitive clientelism' has been widely adopted and has descriptive appeal. However, it has some disadvantages which we seek to address in our revision of his two-dimensional definition.

First, it may well be that, as in Nigeria, politics is typically very competitive in settlements that are uncoordinated in the horizontal dimension and personalistic in the vertical one. However, it is the nature rather than the intensity of the competition that sets this type apart as a solution to the problem of violence. The competition focuses on

spoils and deals. It is also this aspect that generates the feature that is potentially relevant to differences in economic performance, namely policy processes based on short time-horizons and extreme informality.

Second, it seems a mistake to allow this type to be defined by the presence of credible mechanisms for allowing different elite factions to occupy power in cycles, in other words regular elections with parties alternating in government. In our approach, the quality and typical outcomes of elections belongs to the realm of formal arrangements that do not by themselves define a settlement. Clientelism can be competitive without alternation in power and vice-versa, as our African cases have illustrated.

The way electoral systems work and the types of party systems they help to generate are in fact among the less stable and predictable features of political systems in developing countries, as illustrated by recent shifts in political patterns in Bangladesh (reduced expectation of alternation in power since 2008) and Sri Lanka (no more dominant party since 2015). Included in the distinguishing features of this cell should be a certain fluidity in the formal features of politics. The tacit consensus among the players in the horizontal and vertical dimensions that defines the type is about an acceptable sharing of spoils, not about the legal form this takes (credible elections, non-credible elections, no elections, etc.)

Linked to this point, we propose not to use Khan's term 'ruling coalition'. This is a source of ambiguity. On the one hand, settlements in general are defined by the structure of *the* ruling coalition (singular); on the other hand, in otherwise lucid analyses of Bangladesh (Khan, 2013) and Ghana (Whitfield, 2011), authors find themselves to move back and forth between this usage and one in which ruling coalitions (plural) are identified with major political parties and their traditions. To avoid this ambiguity – comparable to the problems that Marxists had at one stage with capitalism's 'ruling class' – it would be preferable to distinguish between governing coalitions and the more fundamental alignments underpinning settlements (about which, in addition, 'coalition' may be the wrong word, at least in connection with this cell of the matrix).

Coordinated personalistic

What we have said about the uncoordinated personalistic type of settlement implies that in that category we will include some instances where there has been no recent alternation in power and one party or leader regularly wins national elections, for example because of the much discussed phenomenon of incumbency advantage. We would maintain that this kind of party 'dominance' needs to be distinguished from the situation where the most prominent political organisation is the expression of a purposive coordination of otherwise fragmented elite interests, around some form of unifying vision, a state- or nation-building project. Even though this line may be difficult

to draw in practice, it seems to us to be a fundamental one if political settlements analysis is to provide a consistent alternative to mere institutional theory.[12]

Purposive coordination around a vision is a feature of both of the cells on the left-hand side of our matrix. In the real world, of course, the degree to which the collective action problems entailed in pursuing a collective state- or nation-building project are solved is not a black-and-white issue. We are probably dealing with 'fuzzy sets' rather than crisp categorical variables (Ragin, 2000; Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). But, more important, there is a distinction to be made among cases of purposive elite coordination. It is arguable, of course, that a consistent state-building project necessarily entails a strong movement in the direction of impersonal, rather than discretionary, resource allocation. However, settlements are not necessarily consistent in this respect, and the point is to make sense of variations in the real world, not to set up a normative model.

As elsewhere in the matrix, we make the distinction on the basis of modalities rather than amounts of inclusion or the balance of power. It does not seem justified to assume, as Khan does, that persistent clientelism is necessarily a reflection of the dominant elite's weak bargaining position vis-à-vis its lower-level supporters. The more generally relevant issue will be the nature of the relationship, not the current power balance. As we suggested earlier, our approach – which agrees in this respect with Levy – allows for a more coherent interpretation of instances like that of Tanzania under CCM, about which those who follow Khan closely seem to be unable to agree (see Whitfield et al., 2015: 208-209).

Uncoordinated impersonal

If we cross Table 2 diagonally to the top-right cell, we find the inverse state of affairs. Here the elite does not achieve purposive coordination around a common project and cannot overcome, but only manage, its fragmentation. The settlement relies on a sharing out of the spoils of power among the fragments. However, this does not necessarily entail a fully clientelistic approach to ruling the country and obtaining the adherence of non-elites. Rather, there are serious efforts to provide goods and enforce rules without distinction across national populations.

This type of settlement is not common. It calls for a distinct ability to impose a formally rule-based and service-oriented style of governance in a context where intra-elite relations are all about allocating rents, patronage-style. In Khan's analysis, the equivalent cell is associated with authoritarianism, but if taken literally this poses a difficulty for two reasons. First, authoritarian principles and practices are compatible with most, if not all, of the other types, and are found in particular instances to a greater or lesser degree. Second, a high degree of authoritarianism, as conventionally

[12] This argument is relevant across the board to the way 'dominant' is used in recent comparative settlements work, including Levy (2014), where it is associated with concentration of power and is unashamedly quite normative, seeing this dimension as roughly equivalent to the traditional distinction between authoritarian and democratic regimes.

understood, does not seem to be a necessary feature of the type we are considering. Uganda is a current case in point.

Khan was originally concerned to understand the strengths and limitations of Pakistan's long period of military rule in the 1960s, as compared with the equivalent period in South Korea. For us, this type is illustrated best on the African continent by Malawi, Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire under their first post-independence leaders, Kamuzu Banda, Jomo Kenyatta and Houphouët-Boigny. All three were relatively authoritarian in style but what is salient is the way they used their personal dominance both to build a stable, ethnically inclusive, patronage system at the apex of the polity while also protecting the civil service and the management of public agencies from the corrosive effects usually associated with neopatrimonial rule. It was the distinctive development outcomes associated with these regimes that led Tim Kelsall and his research stream in the Africa Power and Politics Programme to coin the phrase 'developmental patrimonialism'.

Coordinated impersonal

One of the problems we encountered with developmental patrimonialism as a category was that it bundled together regime types unified only by relatively long planning horizons and commitment to public goods' provision. In the end, we had difficulty in using the concept to make sense of the current regime in Rwanda (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012). The typology of settlements now proposed disposes of this problem.

The type that occupies the top-left cell is distinguished by a purposive coordination of elite fractions that is translated into a mode of legitimation based on impersonal provision and rule-enforcement. For the general reasons explained earlier, we are reluctant to call this a 'developmental' type, even 'potentially' (Khan's qualifier), but it seems at least a plausible hypothesis, worthy of testing, that settlements of this sort provide a more enabling context for national development than any of the other types.[13]

Once again, it is important to say that actual instances of political settlements will often lie at the boundary between two or more types, or will have elements of several. Also, at the risk of undue repetition, there is more to a characterizing and understanding a settlement than allocating it to a type within a deliberately parsimonious scheme of classification.

With those caveats, the type is no doubt best exemplified by the periods of development breakthrough in South Korea and Taiwan. We would add Malaysia up to the crisis of 1997 on the basis of Slater's (2010) theory of elite 'protection pacts'.

Mention of the Asian cases naturally raises two large issues that have preoccupied Asian comparativists as well as students of state formation in Europe and the Americas. One is whether these kinds of solutions to elite collective action problems are invariably associated with existential threats, of external or domestic origin. In our discussion of

[13] As we have argued elsewhere in proposing a theoretical concept of 'developmental regime' for application to contemporary Africa (Booth, 2015).

the Rwandan case, we rejected the idea that the settlement was prompted by the genocide, although a different application of the threat thesis may apply. The other is whether such elite agreements are typically compelled by forces enjoying overwhelming means of violence as well as access to economic rents, rather than resulting from voluntary deliberations. Again, the Rwanda case lends support to that interpretation.

4 Conclusion

This paper has sought to take forward the thinking about political settlements analysis, treating it as a broad effort to capture conceptually the elements that, along with institutions and policies, shape countries' development trajectories. We have argued that this broad field of work needs to do two things better. We need to be able to show how allocating a particular instance to a basic type can be part of a diagnostic procedure which begins with under-explained facts about the functioning of institutions the conduct of policy and associated outcomes, and ends with policy implications. And we need a better basic typology, one that is fully consistent with the specific contribution of political-settlement and allied concepts.

Beginning inductively, we have argued that there is more to analysis and assessment of a given political settlement than labelling it. Practitioners needs to be capable of putting flesh on the bones of any classification, showing what it explains, and when and how the settlement arose, including the kind of ideas that cemented it and are bound up in its longevity. We have taken the risk of trying to show how this can be done, using relevant knowledge about four African countries whose current settlements seem to illustrate well each of four basic types. Readers will be convinced or not by the particular interpretations offered, but the hope is that they will agree that the questions posed are the right sort of questions.

In the more formal part of the paper, we have proposed adjustments to Khan's two-dimensional matrix. Our alternative follows Levy and then goes further in emphasizing ways of exercising power and modalities of inclusion, rather than limiting itself to the power balance between included and non-included actors. We have tried to clear away characterizations of particular settlements that rely on the formal institutions or organisations (elections, dominant parties etc.), arguing that the *raison d'être* of settlements analysis is to dig beneath these relatively superficial and changeable phenomena. One effect is that our basic typology is comparatively abstract, making use of theoretically weighty terms such as collective action problems and solutions.

The hope is that policy-makers and practitioners in countries and in the international community will find both the illustration and the typology useful. Almost by definition, political settlements are *not* easy to change. Moreover, the universal properties of developmental change – complexity and uncertainty – mean that policy and policy-influencing should be problem-driven, adaptive and locally led. But a good analysis of

the prevailing settlement can tell us important things about where and how to attempt politically smart initiatives for change.

References

Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2010) 'Why Is Africa Poor?', *Economic History of Developing Regions* 25(1)**:** 21-50.

Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2012) *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty.* London: Profile Books.

Akyeampong, Emmanuel, Robert H. Bates, Nathan Nunn and James A. Robinson (eds.) (2014) *Africa's Development in Historical Perspective.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Aminzade, Ronald (2013) *Race, Nation and Citizenship in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania.* Cambridge: Cambridhe University Press.

Andrews, Matt (2010) 'Good Government Means Different Things in Different Countries', *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions* 23(1)**:** 7-35.

Andrews, Matt (2013) *The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Andrews, Matt, Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock (2013) 'Escaping Capability Traps Through Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)', *World Development* 51**:** 234-244.

Berdal, Mats and Dominik Zaum (eds.) (2013) *Political Economy of Statebuilding: Power after Peace.* London: Routledge.

Bevan, David L., Paul Collier and Jan Willem Gunning (1999) *Nigeria and Indonesia: The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth.* New York: Oxford University Press for World Bank.

Black, John, Nigar Hasimzade and Gareth Myles (2012) *Oxford Dictionary of Economics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Booth, David (2012) *Development as a Collective Action Problem: Addressing the Real Challenges of African Governance.* London: ODI/Africa Power and Politics.

Booth, David and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi (2009) *Aiding Economic Growth in Africa: The Political Economy of Roads Reform in Uganda*. Working Paper 307. London: Overseas Development Institute.

Booth, David and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi (2012) 'Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda', *African Affairs* 111(444)**:** 379-403.

Booth, David and Diana Cammack (2013) *Governance for Development in Africa: Solving Collective Action Problems.* London: Zed Books.

Booth, David and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi (2014) 'Policy for Agriculture and Horticulture in Rwanda: A Different Political Economy?', *Development Policy Review* 32(s2)**:** 259-272.

Booth, David and Sue Unsworth (2014) *Politically Smart, Locally Led Development*. Discussion Paper. London: Overseas Development Institute.

Booth, David and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi (2015) *Reforming the Roads Sector in Uganda: A Six-year Retrospective*. Working Paper 424. London: Overseas Development Institute.

Booth, David (ed.) (2015) *Developmental Regimes in Africa: Synthesis Report.* London: Overseas Development Institute.

Branson, Nick (2015) *What's in it for me? Personalities, Enticements and Party Loyalties in Tanzania's 2015 Elections*. Briefing Note 1503. London: Africa Research Institute.
Call, Charles T. (2012) *Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence.* Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Campbell, John (2013) *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink.* Plymouth, UK: Rowman and Littlefield/Council on Foreign Relations.
Capoccia, Giovanni and R. Daniel Kelemen (2007) 'The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism', *World Politics* 59**:** 341-369.
Chambers, Vikki and David Booth (2012) *Delivering Maternal Health: Why is Rwanda Doing Better than Malawi, Niger and Uganda?* Briefing Paper 74. London: Overseas Development Institute.
Chang, Ha-Joon (2007) 'Understanding the Relationship Between Institutions and Economic Development: Some Key Theoretical Issues' in H.-J. Chang (ed.) *Institutional Change and Economic Development*. London: Anthem Press/UN University Press: 17-33.
Cooksey, Brian (2003) 'Marketing Reform? The Rise and Fall of Agricultural Liberalisation in Tanzania', *Development Policy Review* 21(1)**:** 67-91.
Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina, Alexander Hamilton and Issel Masses Ferrer (2013) *Understanding Policy Change: How to Apply Political Economy Concepts in Practice.* Washington, DC: World Bank.
Coulson, Andrew (1982) *Tanzania: A Political Economy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crisafulli, Patricia and Andrea Redmond (2013) *Rwanda Inc.: How a Devastated Nation Became an Economic Model for the Developing World.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
DFID (2010) 'Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper'. London: Department for International Development.
Di John, Jonathan and James Putzel (2009) *Political Settlements: Issues Paper*. Birmingham: Governance and Social Development Resource Cente.
Ferguson, William D. (2013) *Collective Action and Exchange: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Contemporary Political Economy.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Ferguson, William D. (2015) 'Collective Action, Inequality, and Development: Prelude to a Comprehensive Theoretical Framework', paper presented at the 27th Annual Meeting of SASE, London School of Economics (2-4 July).
Fuady, Ahmad Helmy (2012) *Elites and Economic Policies in Indonesia and Nigeria, 1966-1998.* Amseterdam: University of Amsterdam (PhD thesis).
Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick and David Booth (2013) *Bilateral Cooperation and Local Power Dynamics: The Case of Rwanda.* London: Overseas Development Institute.
Gray, Hazel (2014) 'Limited Access Orders and the "New" New Institutional Economics of Development'. London School of Economics, Department of International Development: processed.
Gray, Hazel (2015) 'The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Tanzania', *African Affairs* 114(456)**:** 382-403.
Henley, David (2015) *Asia-Africa Development Divergence: A Question of Intent.* London: Zed Books.
Hickey, Sam, Kunal Sen and Badru Bukenya (eds.) (2015) *The Politics of Inclusive Development: Interrogating the Evidence.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hough, Jerry F. and Robin Grier (2015) *The Long Process of Development: Building Markets and States in Pre-industrial England, Spain, and Their Colonies.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Hyden, Göran and Max Mmuya (2008) *Power and Policy Slippage in Tanzania: Discussing National Ownership of Development.* Sida Studies. Stockholm: Sida.
Jerven, Morten (2015) *Africa: Why Economists Get it Wrong.* London: Zed Books.
Jones, Bruce, Molly Elgin-Cossart and Jane Esberg (2012) 'Pathways Out of Fragility: The Case for a Research Agenda on Inclusive Political Settlments in Fragile States'. New York: Center on International Cooperation.
Joseph, Richard (1987) *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Kelsall, Tim (2013) *Business, Politics, and the State in Africa: Challenging the Orthodoxies on Growth and Transformation.* London: Zed Books.
Kelsall, Tim, and David Booth, with Diana Cammack and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi (2010) *Developmental Patrimonialism? Questioning the Orthodoxy on Political Governance and Economic Progress in Africa*. Working Paper 9. London: Africa Power and Politics Programme.
Khan, Mushtaq (1995) 'State Failure in Weak States: A Critique of New Institutionalist Explanations' in J. Harriss, J. Hunter and C.M. Lewis (eds.) *The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development*. London: Routledge: 71-86.
Khan, Mushtaq (2013) 'Bangladesh: Economic Growth in a Vulnerable LAO' in D.C. North, J.J. Wallis, S.B. Webb and B.R. Weingast (eds.) *In the Shadow of Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 24-69.
Khan, Mushtaq H. (2010) *Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions.* London: Economics Department, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
Kuteesa, Florence, Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile, Alan Whitworth and Tim Williamson (eds.) (2010) *Uganda's Economic Reforms: Insider Accounts.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Laws, Edward (2012) *Political Settlements, Elite Pacts, and Governments of National Unity: A Conceptual Study*. Background Paper 10. Canberra: Developmental Leadership Program.
Laws, Edward and Adrian Leftwich (2012) *Bringing History Back in: Three Big Books*. Background Paper 09. York, UK: Developmental Leadership Program.
Leftwich, Adrian (2009) *Bringing Agency Back In: Politics and Human Agency in Building Institutions and States: Synthesis and Overview Report*. Research Paper 06. York, UK: Developmental Leadership Programe.
Levy, Brian (2014) *Working With The Grain: Integrating Governance and Growth in Development Strategies.* New York: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, Peter and Michael Watts (2015a) *Nigeria: The Political Economy of Governance*. DDD Discussion Paper. Abuja: World Bank.
Lewis, Peter and Michael Watts (2015b) *The Politics of Policy Reform in Nigeria*. DDD Discussion Paper. Abuja: World Bank.
Lewis, Peter M. (2007) *Growing Apart: Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria.* Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Lindemann, Stefan (2008) *Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter? A Research Framework for Understanding the Causes of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Discussion Paper 15. London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics.

Lofchie, Michael F. (1989) *The Policy Factor: Agricultural Performance in Kenya and Tanzania.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Lugan, Bernard (2014) *Rwanda: Un génocide en questions.* Paris: Editions du Rocher.
Mahoney, James (2001) *The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America.* Baltomore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Mahoney, James (2005) 'Combining Institutionalisms: Liberal Choices and Political Trajectories in Central America' in I. Kaznelson and B.R. Weingast (eds.) *Preferences and Situations*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation: 313-333.
Mamdani, Mahmood (2001) *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda.* Princeton, NJ and Kampala: Princeton University Press/Fountain Books.
Melo, Macus Andre, Njuguna Ng'ethe and James Manor (2012) *Against the Odds: Politicians, Institutions and the Struggle against Poverty.* London: Hurst.
North, Douglass C., John J. Wallis and Barry R. Weingast (2009) *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C., John J. Wallis, Steven B. Webb and Barry R. Weingast (eds.) (2013) *In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
OECD/DAC (2011a) *From Power Struggles to Sustainable Peace: Understanding Political Settlements.* Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
OECD/DAC (2011b) *Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance.* Paris: OECD Publishing.
Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi (2012) *Reforming the Unreformable: Lessons from Nigeria.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Olson, Mancur (1993) 'Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development', *American Political Science Review* 87(3)**:** 567-576.
Olson, Mancur (2000) *Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships.* New York: Basic Books.
Parks, Thomas and William Cole (2010) *Political Settlements: Implications for International Development Policy and Practice*. Occasional Paper 2. Bangkok: The Asia Foundation.
Pierson, Paul (2004) *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Pierson, Paul (2015) 'Power and Path Dependence' in J. Mahoney and K. Thelen (eds.) *Advanced in Comparative-Historical Analysis*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press: 123-146.
Pritchett, Lant and Eric Werker (2012) *Developing the Guts of a GUT (Grand Unified Theory): Elite Commitment and Inclusive Growth*. Working Paper 16/12. Manchester: ESID.
Putzel, James and Jonathan Di John (2012) *Meeting the Challenges of Crisis States.* London: London School of Economics/Crisis States.
Ragin, Charles C. (2000) *Fuzzy-Set Social Science.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Reyntjens, Filip (2013) *Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda.* New York: Cambridge University Press.
Rihoux, Benoît and Charles Ragin (eds.) (2009) *Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Robinson, Mark (2007) 'The Political Economy of Governance Reforms in Uganda', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 45**:** 452-474.
Rocha Menocal, Alina (2015) *Inclusive Political Settlements: Evidence, Gaps, and Challenges of Institutional Transformation*. University of Birmingham: International Development Department.
Rodrik, Dani (2007) *One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Roll, Michael (ed.) (2014) *The Politics of Public Sector Performance: Pockets of Effectiveness in Developing Countries.* London: Routledge.
Rothstein, Bo (2011) *The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Schneider, Leander (2014) *Government of Development: Peasants and Politicians in Postcolonial Tanzania.* Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press.
Slater, Dan (2010) *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno and Valeria Brusco (2013) *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics.* New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sundaram, Jomo Kwame and Anis Chowdhury (eds.) (2012) *Is Good Governance Good for Development?* London: Bloomsbury Academic/United Nations.
Therkildsen, Ole (2012) *Policy Making and Implementation in Agriculture: Tanzania's Push for Irrigated Rice*. DIIS/EPP Working Paper 2011:26. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.
Tilley, Helen (2014) *The Political Economy of Aid and Accountability: The Rise and Fall of Budget Support in Tanzania.* Farnham, UK: Ashgate.
Treichel, Volker (ed.) (2010) *Putting Nigeria to Work: A Strategy for Employment and Growth.* Washington, DC: World Bank.
Van Damme, Julie, An Ansoms and Philippe V. Baret (2014) 'Agricultural Innovation from Above and from Below: Confrontation and Integration on Rwanda's Hills', *African Affairs* 113(450)**:** 108-127.
Vu, Tuong (2010) *Paths to Development in Asia: South Korea, Vietnam, China, and Indonesia.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Whitfield, Lindsay (2011) *Competitive Clientelism, Easy Financing and Weak Capitalists: The Contemporary Political Settlement in Ghana*. DIIS/EPP Working Paper 2011:27. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.
Whitfield, Lindsay, Ole Therkildsen, Lars Buur and Anne Mette Kjær (2015) *The Politics of African Industrial Policy: A Comparative Perspective.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
World Bank (2013) *Rwanda Economic Update: Maintaining Momentum.* Kigali: World Bank.