1. Introduction

For the past decades trade and financial globalization have been the focus of multilateral negotiations with the need to expand and strengthen the multilateral trade system and to prevent the recurrence of disruptive financial crises in emerging markets. However, unequal achievements and diverging policies between the North and the South have so far opposed policy makers, researchers and civil society from both zones. The multilateral trade rules are far from the fundamental principles of transparency and non-discrimination among the World Trade Organization (WTO) member states. While the last decades have geared developing countries toward trade liberalisation and the elimination of subsidies to their agricultural sectors, their vulnerable economies are now threatened by the multiform subsidies still provided by some WTO member states to their agriculture. In 2001, rich countries provided subsidies that represented six times the amount of their development aid. African countries, among the most competitive cotton producers in the world, lost export revenues as a consequence of other producer countries’ cotton subsidies. The failure of agriculture to provide farmers with liquidity for their consumption smoothing and investment need imposes off-farm diversification of
income sources as part of a survival strategy. Migration is the most important non agro-pastoral income source (half of all off-farm income sources in the Sahel).

However, the international labour market remains completely absent in the agenda of the international economic system. Meanwhile, restriction of the labour migration is increasingly gaining recognition as a direct impediment to trade, particularly in services. Removal of these restrictions could result in important benefits to the world as a whole and in particular to the suppliers of this labour. Hamilton and Whalley (1984) suggested that the liberalisation of world labour markets could double world income and imply proportionately even larger gains for the developing countries. Thus, allowing labour to move between countries would seem to be an important tool for growth and poverty reduction. International migration accounts for an important part of poor countries’ livelihoods and remittances alone represent each year 100 billion of US dollar, which corresponds to more than twice the total public aid to Development in 2000 (see table 1).

**Table 1: Importance of remittances flows**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Importance of Remittances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>13% of GDP or more than exports value (2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Total exports value (1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>60% of exports value (1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>&gt;30% exports value (1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>&gt;US$ 100 billion/year i.e. more than twice Public Aid to Development in 2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* >: superior operator

While in the nineteenth century migration flows played a key role in fostering income convergence between Europe and the United States (see Faini 2002), its role is scaled down at national and at best regional levels in the present globalisation context. One important achievement of the regional arrangements in West Africa (ECOWAS, CEAO, UMOA)\(^1\) has been to promote the free movement of persons. This policy results in important international migration flows in the region. Considering the period 1960-90,

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\(^1\) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of West Africa (CEAO), and West African Monetary Union (UMOA). ECOWAS extends UEMOA to the non francophone countries: Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.
nearly 12 percent of the total population of West Africa (excluding Nigeria) no more resides in their homeland.

Replacing CEAO, the commercial and monetary union in the Francophone West Africa (UEMOA\(^2\)) is the leader of regional integration process in Africa. Its objective is to change the relatively weak intra-regional trade\(^3\) and the strong disparities between countries. How to achieve the latter objective given the heterogeneous profiles of countries (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso)? The former country is the polar economy in the Union and the latter is a representative of the landlocked poor countries. The disparities between the two countries and their historical and economic linkages give a good case to study in order to evaluate trade and labour markets impacts.

Côte d’Ivoire is the most important exporter to the rest of the world and inside UEMOA. For example in 1995, the country’s share in regional export was 10 percent whereas its imports from the other members represented only 0.8 percent of the total. On the other hand, Burkina Faso presents a structural trade deficit. On average during the period 1989-1995, exports to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa represented only 0.9 percent of the intra-trade whereas it is the most important importer in UEMOA with 18 percent of the regional total import.

The study aims first to evaluate the potential gains of a representative landlocked small country (Burkina Faso) in the regional integration process, beyond the traditional trade benefits (supposed to be negative or negligible by several studies). The study addresses a research gap on the typology, scope, and driving forces of labour migration in the region, both at micro- and macroeconomic level. In the UEMOA, where the role of the state and market is still relatively limited, the survival of households through non local income diversification remains an essential strategy. The paper comprises two additional sections. Section 2 presents trade and migration background information and sets the confines of the research problem and questions while section 3 summarizes the empirical assessment of the migration role inside UEMOA. The latter uses household

\(^2\) West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) comprises eight countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.

\(^3\) The intra-regional trade represented only 5.7 percent of the Union’s total trade in 1995 (Yeats 1998).
models of migration between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire as well as countries level growth convergence analysis in the Union.

2. Trade and migration issues in UEMOA
Prior to UEMOA, the integration experience of the CEAO was a failure because of the import-substitution strategy. Therefore the new customs union removes all the barriers to the regional trade and sets a very low common external tariff on non-regional imports. The new tariff regime resulted in lower trade diversion costs even though difficult adjustments are required in the national fiscal policies because the reforms led to a decline in the average tax rate on total imports (Dissou 1998). The simplification of the trade environment fostered a free movement of products manufactured in the zone.

The preceding reforms are expected to lead to higher intra-regional trade flows. However, several studies show that the trade benefits mainly accrue to Côte d’Ivoire that has the capacity to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), assuming stable macroeconomic environment. Based on the Ivorian growth pattern during the 60’s and 70’s, it can then be expected higher demand for labour, which can induce optimal reallocation of regional labour force. Under this optimistic scenario economic integration between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire could be strengthened through the markets of goods as well as the markets of labour and capital.

On the trade side, the prevailing intra-UEMOA exports constitute less than 10 percent of total export and less than 1 percent in the case of a country like Niger (See table 2). Import flows are similarly weak except for landlocked countries like Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso (See table 3). Burkina Faso presents an extreme case of imbalances. It is even the most important importer in UEMOA with 18 percent of the regional total import. On the average during the period 1989-1995, Burkina Faso exports to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa represented only 0.9 percent of intra-trade whereas Côte d’Ivoire supplied 25 percent of all regional exports (Yeats 1998). In 1995, the share of

4 Before the regional reform, except of Côte d’Ivoire, the intra-region trade was more protected than the one with the rest of the world.

5 In 1998, the imports tariff earnings contributed for 40 percent the total budget revenue of the UEMOA.
Côte d’Ivoire in the UEMOA total export was 10 percent whereas its imports from the other members represented 0.8 percent of the total.

**Table 2: Destination of exports (percent of total value, 1996)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Exporter</th>
<th>Burkina Faso</th>
<th>Côte d’Ivoire</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Niger</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Benin</th>
<th>Togo</th>
<th>Union</th>
<th>Rest of the world</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>98.97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>9.19</td>
<td>90.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>98.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>99.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>7.04</td>
<td>92.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>97.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>97.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Decaluwé, Dumont, Mesplé-Somps, and Robichaud (2000)

**Table 3: Origin of imports (percent of total value, 1996)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Importer</th>
<th>Burkina Faso</th>
<th>Côte d’Ivoire</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Niger</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Benin</th>
<th>Togo</th>
<th>Union</th>
<th>Rest of the world</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.04</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>18.09</td>
<td>81.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>98.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>19.64</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>24.45</td>
<td>75.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>10.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>13.07</td>
<td>86.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>97.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>7.07</td>
<td>92.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.79</td>
<td>93.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Decaluwé, Dumont, Mesplé-Somps, and Robichaud (2000)

The past experiences of trade agreements between UEMOA countries and European Union show that a trade policy based solely on tariffs is not a sufficient condition to expand trade. The Lomé commercial cooperation proved that the non-reciprocal preferences\(^6\) were not efficient as a solution to help UEMOA to change its

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\(^6\) Jadot (2000) evaluated to 99 percent the amount of ACP export accepted to enter in European Union duty free.
production structure from primary production to manufacturing products. After twenty
five years of the Lomé preferences’ benefit, the primary products still represent more
than 80 percent of UEMOA export and 65 percent have a single destination that is
Europe, whereas UEMOA represents only 0.1 percent of world total export. Preferences
represented a competitive advantage vis-à-vis the excluded developing countries but their
effectiveness was constrained by the poor production and trade performance of the
beneficiary countries. More than some percentage points of non-reciprocal tariff
preferences; the supply conditions (rate of investment, infrastructure, technology, human
resources, financial services and market institutions) have proved their primary
importance for export competitiveness. Decaluwé, Dumont, Mesplé-Somps, and
Robichaud (2000) obtained a quite small total impact of the new common external tariff,
which is usual concerning the simulated effects of trade liberalization.

In Burkina Faso, compared to the agricultural and livestock sector that contributes
80 percent of the export, the non-competitive manufacturing industries (primary resource
transformation) remain stagnant at 10 percent of total export, that is, 4 percent of GDP.
Most of the manufacturing industries are handicapped by the burden of imported inputs
and are not prepared to compete with the partners countries inside UEMOA.

On the other hand, several authors find in regional migration flows the base and
the engine for the regional integration process (Coussy 1994; Lachaud 1999). While trade
in goods is outward-oriented, regional labour migration flows are higher than migrations
out of Africa. The Network of Surveys on Migration and Urbanisation in West Africa
(REMUAO 1993) emphasised the intensity of migration in West Africa. Between 1988
and 1992, more than 6.4 millions migratory movements were recorded between the seven
countries of the network (Bocquier and Traoré 2000). Among these migrations, 2.3
millions were international with 1.30 millions inside the network. The most important
flows were recorded between Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso (Bocquier and Traoré 1996). The exchange between Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso (508,000 movements)
represent about 40 percent of total migrations in the network. Far behind this

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7 Thereafter called the network, REMUAO or NESMUWA’s surveys are the most recent source of
regional data concerning eight countries: Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal.
8 See page 5 in Decaluwé, Dumont, Mesplé-Somps, and Robichaud (2000).
performance are the flows between Côte d’Ivoire and Mali (with 283,000) and between Côte d’Ivoire and Niger (114,000).

It is assumed that stable and competitive macroeconomic conditions may attract regional labour force and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Due to the weaknesses of the Sahelian economies (inputs and factors prices, natural resources, infrastructure), Côte d’Ivoire is effectively likely to be the recipient of future Foreign Direct Investment. However, the positive effects on production factors’ returns should result in further labour mobility and consequently an increase in migration flows. Markets interdependence suggest therefore that the expected benefits to Côte d’Ivoire will likely spill over to Burkina Faso because of the stake Burkina Faso has in Côte d’Ivoire\(^9\) via its migrant population.

Despite the above striking importance of migration and its socioeconomic implications, labour migration is the least studied demographic phenomenon in West Africa and most of the assessments of the UEMOA have been biased toward the trade in goods. The main objective of the next section is to evaluate the possible advantages Burkina Faso can gain in the regional integration of labour markets as a case study of the poorer landlocked UEMOA countries. Therefore, the interesting research issue is whether regional integration, which is not likely to benefit Burkina Faso directly in terms of traditional trade, could benefit it considerably through the migration channel. Accordingly, the particular research questions to be addressed can be formulated as:

1. To what extent does migration and seasonal migration in particular, make a difference in households’ livelihoods and how can this income strategy be explained in the context of the New Economics of Labour Migration?

2. What is the role of income diversification through migration in rural development and in particular the role of migration in technology adoption and food security?

3. How extensive is the brain drain inside UEMOA and what is its impact on the macroeconomic convergence of the countries?

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\(^9\) In 1998, 2,238,548 Burkinabe lived in Côte d’Ivoire and 1,152,189 are migrants. The presence of migrants makes Burkina Faso a “share-holder” in Côte d’Ivoire.
3. Micro and Macro-economics of migration

3.1. Methodology

The research relies on a detailed statistical and econometric analysis of the role of labour mobility inside UEMOA using modern economic theories of migration. A particular attention is paid to the aforementioned two countries that are representative of the differences in development levels in the region.

Obtaining systematic insights into the complexity of rationales for migration is absolutely necessary from the perspective of both households and policy makers in order to establish the right incentives for migration and optimize the benefits for the region as a whole. The empirical approach focuses on both micro and macroeconomic issues concerning migration. Emphasis is particularly placed on the linkage between economic theory and empirical evidence.

At micro level, the study used household level survey data collected on migration and natural resource management. The survey was conducted in forty eight villages (250 households) in the northeastern rural provinces of Burkina Faso (Seno and Oudalan) in summer 2002. The two provinces comprise four administrative regions that are Bani (58 sample households), Dori-west (53 households), Gorgadji (37 households) and finally Gorom-Gorom in the province of Oudalan with 102 households. In addition to the household data, two other village and institutional level surveys were conducted on the same sites in 2002. The data are complemented with the first round of the same surveys in 2000 and the data collected at migrant destinations (263 households) in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002.

Three main ethnic groups are living in the source regions: Rimaibe (31 percent) who constitute the agricultural group, Fulbe (23 percent) and Bella (20 percent) who are pastoralists. The descriptive statistics revealed that 46 percent of households receive remittances sent by a member migrant. Among these 115 migrant households, 90 percent choose Côte d’Ivoire as their favorite destination. In general, Burkinabe migration to Côte d’Ivoire concern rural populations who leave the sahelian dry lands for better perspectives either in the fertile agricultural lands to cultivate cocoa and coffee in South and West Côte d’Ivoire or to find temporary jobs in Ivorian cities. Considering the limit of 12 months to define seasonal migration, 78 percent of the households migrating to
Côte d’Ivoire are seasonal migrants. The migrant households have better endowments in agricultural plots. From the observations, it seems that nonmigrants are more likely to participate in the cereal market as sellers while both groups equally participate as buyers, the predominant market strategy in the Sahel. On average nonmigrant families rely more on the sale of livestock, which may support the argument that remittances sent by migrants not only shield parents from income loss in case of production negative shocks but also protect their drought sensitive assets. When the destination is restricted to Côte d’Ivoire, remittances reach 182,605 CFA francs, which is 4 times the annual burkinabe poverty line defined in 1996 and 44 percent of the beneficiaries’ total income.

At macroeconomic level, data were collected from different statistical sources and a new database on skilled migration and brain drain were constructed. The latter are used to examine the potential impact of the regional agreement on countries’ convergence, particularly the factor mobility contribution.

3.2. Seasonal migration: a survival strategy in the Sahel

Results show that special attention should be placed on seasonal migration. Seasonal migration does not cause significant labour shortage in the Sahel and can be explained by income expectation motives and risk management strategy. Econometric results supported that even under the pessimistic scenario where the direct benefits of the regional integration program would go exclusively to the polar economies like Côte d’Ivoire, households in the Sahel may still benefit from an increased economic attractiveness of this destination. It is shown that under the conditions of free movement of rural labour, an increased expected income of a magnitude of 10 percent of the Sahelian average income would induce a significant increase of 6.3 percentage points in seasonal migration. Because it is seasonal, the increased migration will translate into higher liquidity that enables households to overcome credit and insurance market failures and invest in their main agropastoral activities. At the same time, households are better able to smooth their consumption, which in the local context is subject to high uncertainty. The latter is shown in the results in two different ways. On the one hand, important income instability in the preceding period enhances the practice of seasonal migration. On the other hand, under low rainfall conditions, households preferably diversify incomes toward geographically distant migration. Results also indicated the
importance of safety in pastoral activities. An increase in the level of mistrust among households in delegating the security of their livestock during periods of absence (10 percentage points) would decrease the probability of migration by 3.2 percentage points. Because livestock is a widespread self-insurance mechanism in the region, it is important to develop policies that address security issues and policy makers can achieve this through institutions that develop rural labour market and enforceable rules regarding shepherd contracts called Halfinadi in the Sahel. These are contracts under which households confide their herd to another household who guards the cattle against money or in-kind remuneration.

However, other factors explain seasonal migration decision positively through the affiliation to the agriculturalist ethnic group (with a short-growing-season July-September), the availability of extra-labour force, education, population density and negatively through age. Under the assumption that a household adopts migration strategy, its income is positively affected by the availability of crop lands and lower rainfall. The latter factors push households to migrate and generate remittances that make agricultural investments possible. This finding makes it particularly relevant to examine next the relationship between migration and technological innovation.

3.3. Migration and food security
Food security is currently an important regional issue in West Africa (IFPRI’s 2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture and The Environment). The study examined the latter issue through the links between income diversification strategies, in particular migration and grain yield-enhancing technology adoption, namely stone bunds. Stone bunds are a traditional and cost-effective technology that is appropriate for the Sahel conditions. It is used for rainwater harvesting and soil erosion control. Impacts on grain yields have been measured as between 40 percent and 100 percent.

Here the capacity of migration to generate and efficiently allocate remittances toward technological adoption makes it an important household livelihood strategy for food security. The results showed that if Sahelian households have access to migration, this promotes a significant higher adoption rate that enable households to ensure their food security through the direct channel of food production and the indirect channel of food market where they may have better access and purchasing power. In most of the
developing world, expansion of crop area will be severely limited, so yield increases will have to account for most of the increases in production. Therefore, research on policies to boost smallholder productivity in developing countries remains critical for food security in the Sahel. Given the dependence of the poor on the cropping base, policies and development programs should focus on improving productivity and building more resistance to agroclimatic shocks into the Sahel agricultural system. The latter involves removing barriers to entry for the poor into nonfarm income activities by increasing their access to credit and human capital formation. The strategy of promoting nonfarm enterprises is complementary with promoting agriculture in these zones. Policy makers can reduce the incidence of market failures for specific households by the channel of infrastructure investments, increased competitiveness among local merchants, and the better circulation of information on prices.

The analysis revealed that factors, other than migration, play a significant role in stone bund adoption behavior. Participation in the food market as a buyer has a significant negative impact on a household’s adoption of the stone bunds technique. This means that in opposition to self-sufficiency or the seller regime, access to the market as a buyer may bring households to diversify their activities in less risky sectors that provide them with purchasing power (off-farm activities or livestock farming). Concerning the direct impact of rainfall, the households living in the driest zones of the Sahel have relatively lower incentives as well to adopt stone bunds and allocate their scarce resources in food production. Instability and insufficiency of rainfall in the Sahel make agriculture less profitable and therefore play a negative role in the adoption of stone bunds. As previously mentioned, households from regions of lower rainfall (province Oudalan and northern Seno) have relatively higher propensity to migrate and send back money that is partly used for innovation and directly increases their income. But these effects should be distinguished from the direct negative effects of low rainfall. Age of the household was also controlled since adoption behaviour may differ for an older generation following the Chayanovian life cycle. The latter stated that peasant households contained families with different age structures, and that those households also farmed different quantities of land. The propensity to adopt new technology may consequently depend on the labourer to consumer ratio in households. This declines as households get
Schooling capital of households appears to have no direct significant impact on their adoption behavior. Household-level education is important to the timing of adoption but less crucial to the question of whether a household has ever adopted fertilizer, i.e. early innovators tend to be educated and to be copied by those who adopt later. Finally the number of different quarters or neighborhoods per village was used as a proxy for the size of the community. The larger a community, the more difficult it is to organize collective action. The lack of cooperation and efficiency in natural resources management can hinder the construction of stone bunds which needs community labour participation.

The negative effect of number of quarters on adoption indicates that efficiency in resource use is obtained by cooperation, the latter becoming more difficult to achieve under big group size.

### 3.4. Migration and economic convergence in the UEMOA

Since the last decade an increasing of attention has been paid to the ambiguous relationship between international migration, brain drain, and economic growth, but few studies analyzed the growth impact of skilled migration. This study filled the research gap by building the first data set on brain drain concerning seven countries of the western African Union and highlighted the size of the brain drain toward Côte d’Ivoire and France.

Results indicated that sending countries should carefully monitor the skilled migration because its current intra-regional level does not seem optimal regarding the brain gains. Burkina Faso seems to lose a critical proportion of the meagre pool of skilled workers through migration to Côte d’Ivoire.

The migration of skilled personnel speeds up the process of growth convergence only when it is outward-oriented, that is, toward developed countries like France. There is no brain gain when the movement of skilled migrants is toward the polar economy, Côte d’Ivoire. The positive effect of the skilled migration from the UEMOA countries to France actually revealed the benefit of a well controlled policy of brain drain. The results confirm that for the level of welfare of the sending country to increase, the destination should be very attractive in terms of expected gains and the source country’s migration policy should be designed so that the probability of migration is not above a certain threshold estimated around 10 percent. Part of the education investment in the source
country actually acts through those who migrate to advanced countries, send back remittances and further incentives for investing in human capital in the sending country. Therefore, if the traditional receiving countries (USA and other OECD countries and Arab Gulf countries) care about the welfare of poor countries, they should collaborate in the design of carefully controlled immigration policies (monitoring thereby the size of brain drain) that matches the optimal welfare level and include the migratory policy in the globalization arena.

The positive message is the finding that there exists a convergence path inside UEMOA that leads to the conclusion that polar economies are not the only beneficiaries of the Union. Once the migration effects are included, the regional annual convergence speed is enhanced by 0.85 percentage points.

3.5. Conclusions and recommendations
From the detailed and comprehensive assessment, it becomes evident that migration phenomenon is complex but represents a desirable activity in the context of missing credit and insurance markets, high agroclimatic risks and low level of human capital.

Migration is an important engine in the process of regional integration and compensate for the weakness of the other channels that are trade and investment flows. Despite the sociopolitical crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, the development process of the sahelian countries is partly dependent on the remittances that national and international migrants supply to their home communities. The transfers from Burkinabè emigrants constitute an essential variable in the economy that enhances national demand (consumption and investment) and mitigates the effects of poverty during the slack season. Remittances represent an important source of foreign exchange that reduces the deficit of the balance of payments. The study recommended promoting the free movement of people while identifying alternative destinations for future migrations.

To make brain circulation a beneficial activity, more effort should be made also in coordinating sending and receiving countries policies to reach an optimal skilled migration level that is favorable to human capital formation in the poorer sending zones.

Finally, the study recommended enabling national statistical systems to record data on the economic contributions of labour migration. In particular, a deeper analysis of
the brain drain necessitates that the countries construct an appropriate database on the different types of migration by educational levels.

References