The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Unfinished Business
The challenges of sustaining Peace and Transforming Sudan

“The National Islamic Front (NIF) is too deformed to be reformed” by Dr. John Garang

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1. Introduction:

I am extremely happy to have such opportunity to share with you my thoughts about the future of the continuing state of Sudan after the secession of South Sudan. I slightly changed the title of my presentation from the theme of this event to be more comprehensive. In fact the unfinished business in the Sudan is not only the Abyei and Southern Kordofan but also the unfinished business of transforming Sudan and building good relations between the North and South.

Given the fact that I participated in the negotiations of the CPA, constitutional making process in the Sudan, continuous engagement between the parties in the implementation of CPA, continuous negotiations for the post-secession arrangements and arbitration process for the delineation of Abyei Area as well as participating in the government of Southern Sudan and national government, I will be able to share with you with confidence the unfinished business of the CPA with the hope of providing options and insight for your ongoing and future engagement in Sudan and South Sudan.

I am currently the Executive Director of Kush, Inc. Kush is a not-for-profit organization designed to promote peace, stability and economic and infrastructure development in Africa with an emphasis on South Sudan and Abyei Area. After serving in government for six years, I decided to serve the people of South Sudan and Abyei area outside the government and I feel very fortunate to be part of the not-for-profit sector and to contribute towards building and ensuring the success of my new country not only in meeting the aspirations of its people but to forge good relations with its neighbours, particularly with its twin country the Sudan.

I would like from the outset of my presentation to share with you that I resigned from my position as a minister in the national government last May 2011 because of the barbaric invasion and the atrocities committed thereafter in my own area of Abyei. Prior to my resignation, I committed myself to building peace and promoting good relations between the North and South regardless of the outcome of referendum for the people of South Sudan. In some cases I even used to appreciate the political courage of the leadership of the National Congress Party in accepting peace as the choice of the people of Sudan who suffered a great deal during the prolonged conflict.

During the historic visit of President Bashir to Juba and during which he reiterated his commitment to the conduct of the referendum in South Sudan and that he will not only respect the choice of the people but he will be the first person to recognize the new state of South Sudan. Such commitment was received with great relief by the people of South Sudan and the world at large and renewed hope for building good relations and trust between the North and South and it provides as well an opportunity for Sudan to forge new relations with international community on pending issues of debt relief, sanctions and normalization of diplomatic relations. In some incidents I described President Bashir as man of peace and similar message was echoed by President Salva when describing President Bashir as “Peace Hero” in his statement on the day of the announcement of results of referendum in Juba in Feb 2011. All these hopes were dashed by the invasion
of Abyei area and the current war waged against the people of Southern Kordofan. These recent incidents clearly revealed to the world the true colour of President Bashir and his party, the National Congress Party. In fact Dr. John Garang was right when he described that National Islamic Front (NIF) is too deformed to be reformed.

For the purposes of my presentation, I would like first to provide you with a brief account of how the CPA provided political settlement to the conflict in the border areas of Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. Then I will discuss how the CPA is still unfinished business even after the secession of South Sudan and to discuss the current challenges facing peace and stability in the border areas. I will map the political landscape in the North after the secession of South Sudan and the new opportunities for engagement in the North. I will also briefly discuss the challenges of building new state in South Sudan and how a viable South Sudan could help in addressing the challenges of peace in the border areas. I will conclude with key policy options of engagement in building peace and stability in the Sudan and South Sudan.

2. CPA: A Framework for Transformation of Sudan

Although I will not attempt to inconvenience you with the full historical account of the genesis of the root causes of the Sudan recurrent conflict and civil wars, it is important to highlight that the marginalization of rural Sudan is central to understanding the conflict in Sudan. People of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile joined the struggle in the South after they became convinced the elites in Khartoum were less concerned about their welfare and the people of Darfur later took up arms after they discovered that they have been cheated, exploited and marginalized under the slogan of political Islam. Besides the marginalization of rural Sudan, the elites in the centre consistently used ethnicity and religion to suppress the rural Sudan and to dominate power in the centre. The liberation struggle that was waged by the SPLM in the South with political vision of New Sudan had not only appealed to the rural Sudan but awakened them to rise up to fight for their rights.

The success of the SPLM in bringing peace that is transforming Sudan rests with its vision of New Sudan that challenged the old Sudan agenda that defined Sudan around one religion and one ethnicity. The CPA has provided a golden opportunity for ending the violent conflict and a new basis for defining national identity and recognition of cultural and religious diversity as a virtue and a basis for peace building, citizenship and legal pluralism. Specifically, the CPA has redefined the nature of state in Sudan away from Arab-Islam paradigm and recognized the cultural, religious and ethnic diversity as a virtue and the foundation for national cohesion in the new post-conflict Sudan. Specifically, the post-CPA Sudan has been defined as multi-cultural, multi-lingual, multi-racial, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious country where such diversities co-exist and are sources of strength, harmony and inspiration for the Sudanese people and shall not be used for creating division.
One of the salient features of the CPA is that it has laid down a new basis for the relationship between all levels of government in the Sudan and their people through new constitutions at the national, Southern Sudan and states levels. The sovereign authority in the Sudan has been recognized to be vested in the people with all levels of government deriving their authority from the people. Among the basic principles adopted in the CPA is the devolution of governmental functions and powers to the people at appropriate levels where they can best manage and direct their own affairs.

Besides the recognition of sovereign authority of the people and devolution of powers, the Bill of Rights has also been recognized in the CPA and enshrined in the new Interim National Constitution and subsequently making it obligatory on all levels of government to respect, uphold and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Bill of Rights is a covenant between the people and their government at every level and the cornerstone of social justice, equality and democracy. By adopting the principle of devolution of powers and the Bill of Rights, the CPA has laid a basis for good governance, respect of rule of law and basic rights and freedoms which are the concerns of the rural Sudan. Two years after the signing the CPA, Sudan has witnessed a constitutional transformation with all states and Southern Sudan having their own constitutions, functioning legislative assemblies, governments and judiciary. As rightly stated by Dr. John, the icon of peace, that “Sudan will not be the same again with the signing of the CPA” Sudan is indeed changing everyday with the implementation of the CPA.

2.1 Two Areas: Self-Rule and Popular Consultation

As I mentioned in my testimony in 2007, the sustainable peace in the Sudan will primarily hinge on the stability in the transitional areas of Abyei, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, Eastern Sudan and Darfur as these areas represent the majority of the marginalized rural Sudanese. Indeed, the extent to which Khartoum can continue to commit and in fact build upon these CPA principles going forward will be a yardstick by which it will be able to measure the peace that it can secure internally. While the people of Nuba Mountains, Eastern Sudan, Abyei and Blue Nile initially joined the agenda of the SPLM to fight for freedom and rights symbolized in the New Sudan vision, the people of Darfur were later on dragged into civil war with similar underlying causes of marginalization, suppression and neglect from the central government.

As the conflict in Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile is a microcosm of other conflicts in the rural areas of northern Sudan, the CPA has provided a resolution for such conflict and a model framework for addressing the issues of governance, neglect and marginalization not only in the two states but also for the entire rural Sudan. The resolution of conflict in Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile in the CPA, through its respective principle, has accorded both states with something on the way to autonomous and decentralized self-rule with independent executive, legislative and judicial organs. According to the CPA, this arrangement was subject to popular consultation by the people of the two states through their respective democratically elected legislatures. While the CPA ended, the parties agreed recently in Addis Ababa to continue with their commitment to implement the
protocols and popular consultation. The implementation of the protocols for Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile will be a litmus test for the CPA as a framework for resolving other conflicts in other areas of the Sudan such as Darfur and Eastern Sudan.

In fact the decentralized self-rule did not adequately meet the aspirations of the people of Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile at the time of the conclusion of the CPA. What they were aspiring for was the right of self-determination that the people in Abyei secured – the right to a referendum. Despite their dissatisfaction, most people in these areas appreciated what has been achieved in the CPA as first step in their long search for ultimate self-determination. As I mentioned in my statement before this committee on 24th January 2007 that “In case the implementation of the CPA fails to provide a meaningful self-rule in Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, then the chance that war will erupt again is most likely in these transitional areas.” It seems what I said four and half years ago proved to be a reality today.

2.2 Abyei Area and CPA: Resolving the status of Abyei area by people’s choice

The problem of Abyei Area is one of the main causes that sparked the conflict again between the north and south after the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement in 1972. Since the British colonial authority arbitrary decided to annex Abyei area to Northern Sudan in 1905 without the consent of the Ngok people, the area has been gravely devastated by policies of ethnic cleansing and counterinsurgency. Despite the conflict in Abyei area was resolved in the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement; the provisions concerning Abyei Area were deliberately ignored until the entire Addis Ababa Agreement was later abrogated. The CPA has recognized this thorny conflict by according the people of Abyei dual citizenship in the South and North, special administrative status under the Presidency and a referendum to determine their future administrative status. The people of Abyei area overwhelmingly supported the CPA as their aspirations have been adequately met. As I mentioned in 2007 in my statement before the US Congressional Hearing that “Lack of implementation of Abyei Protocol makes it now the most contentious flashpoint and litmus test to stability and peace in the Sudan” is becoming a reality now. This poses a direct challenge to the USG’s unique and special contribution to the CPA as the current Abyei Protocol is based on the suggested draft text prepared by USG and it subsequently makes USG to have major stake in the implementation of this Protocol.

3. CPA: Unfinished Business and Still Work-in-Progress:

After six years of the interim period that ended on 9th July 2011 and during which all the provisions of the CPA should have been implemented, there are critical provisions of the CPA that have not been implemented. On the top of these provisions is the conduct of referendum in Abyei area and popular consultations for the people of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Unlike other provisions that have not been implemented, the referendum in Abyei area and popular consultations in the two area clearly addressed the root causes of conflict in these areas and are considered as major achievements in the CPA in meeting the political aspirations of the people of these transitional areas.
3.1. Popular Consultation: NCP betrayed the people of the two areas

The people of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states attached a lot of hope on popular consultations as a mechanism through which they could consolidate what they have achieved in the CPA and to provide a platform to negotiate with the central government mechanism to address shortcomings in the implementation of CPA in order to meet their political aspirations within a united Sudan. However, the NCP deliberately undermined the popular consultations and betrayed the people of the two areas through the following actions:

- NCP resisted the popular consultation legislation and it was forced to accept the law after serious pressure through peaceful demonstration in Khartoum led by the SPLM calling for the passing of bills related to referendum for people of South Sudan and Abyei area and popular consultations and that resulted in the imprisonment and torturing of some leaders of the SPLM.
- NCP deliberately rigged elections in the two areas, particularly in Southern Kordofan state with the aim of diluting the representation of the people in state legislatures that will exercise the popular consultations.
- NCP deliberately obstructed the process of popular consultation in Blue Nile that started well under the supervision of the governor of the state.
- NCP unilaterally dismissed the members of South Sudan in national legislature (National Assembly and Council of states) before the end of the interim period (9th July 2011) with clear intention of denying them to participate in the discussion of the results of popular consultations if no solution is found at state level.
- NCP unilaterally took a decision contrary to the provisions of the CPA to forcefully disarm the SPLA in the two areas before the end of the interim period on 9th July 2011 and waged a war against the people of South Kordofan on 5th June 2011.
- NCP rejected to implement the African Union mediated Addis Ababa Agreement that allowed for ceasefire, peaceful resolution of outstanding issues and free access of humanitarian assistance.
- NCP continues to commit massive human rights violations, including war crimes, ethnic cleansing and displacement of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians, children and women and denial of humanitarian access to aid the victims. Furthermore the NCP has not only refused to open camps for the internally displaced people (IDPs) but uses them as human shield in the ongoing aerial bombardment of their houses, hospitals and places of worship.

The atrocities that are now being committed by NCP in Nuba Mountains are extremely alarming and will require immediate action. If such atrocities continue they will mark the renewal of civil war in Southern Kordofan which may extend soon to Blue Nile state. We are witnessing mass atrocities once again in Sudan and we have only a limited time to prevent further escalation that will engulf Blue Nile as well.
3.2. Abyei Referendum: Ending with barbaric invasion by NCP

The way the NCP handled the issue of the protocol of Abyei shows not only a lack of commitment to the peace agreement but it clearly shows its ethnic agenda of dehumanizing the black Africans in the Sudan. This has been shown in the consistent pattern of ethnic cleansing in Darfur, Abyei and Nuba Mountains committed not by any other person but the President of the Republic and his aide the Governor of Southern Kordofan state. While the SPLM has shown flexibility in the implementation of Abyei Protocol and concession for the sake of peace, the NCP deliberately and consistently obstructed the implementation of Abyei Protocol through the following actions:

- NCP without a legitimate basis rejected the report of the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) despite a clear provision in the CPA that such report shall be final and binding.
- NCP invaded Abyei town in May 2008 that razed villages and resulted in massive displacement of thousands of people and loss of innocent lives and properties.
- While the SPLM, despite the loss of some areas of Dinka to the Arab Misseriyia, accepted the ruling of the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on the boundaries of Abyei area, the NCP officially accepted it but its actions showed a clear rejection of the final and binding ruling. The boundaries of Abyei area as per the ruling have not been demarcated as the NCP-supported Arab militia obstructed the demarcation. It is worth mentioning that it was the NCP that suggested to the SPLM to resort to international arbitration over the boundaries of Abyei area.
- NCP deliberately obstructed the conduct of Abyei Referendum on 9th of January 2011. While the two parties (SPLM and NCP) agreed that the SPLM would nominate the chair of Abyei Referendum Commission and NCP to nominate the chair of the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission, the NCP rejected the SPLM nomination while the SPLM accepted the NCP nomination.
- In an effort to dilute the choice of Ngok Dinka in a referendum, NCP argued to allow all to Arab nomads to vote in Abyei Referendum. While the Protocol of Abyei Area explicitly defines the eligibility of voters in Abyei Referendum to members of Ngok Dinka and other Sudanese residing in Abyei area and with no other reference at all to other specific communities but rather a requirement of residency, the NCP blindly and without any convincing argument (legal precedents or prior state practice) insisted that all Arab Misseriya should vote in the Abyei Referendum. In fact the Arab nomads that move seasonally to South Sudan did not vote in the Referendum of Southern Sudan.
- While the two parties have entrusted African Union High Level Implementation Panel under the auspice of President Thabo Mbaki, President Bashir after failing to mobilize Arab Misseriyia to attack Abyei town, order the premeditated invasion of Abyei area and used all military might of the state that resulted in massive displacement, loss of innocent lives and properties. The NCP has started now after the displacement of Ngok Dinka to settle Arab
nomads in the Dinka land thereby changing the ethnic composition of the area by force.

- The NCP has not taken any steps to implement the African Union mediated agreement on temporary arrangements for Abyei Area to deploy UN Forces (Ethiopian forces) to ensure the withdrawal of Sudan Armed Forces out of Abyei area and to allow return of displaced population to their home areas. They have dishonoured arrangements for nominating members of the Abyei Administration and have made no visible plan to redeploy their forces. Currently four Ethiopian soldiers lost their lives in explosions planted by the Sudan Armed Forces and the injured were denied evacuation by Sudan Armed Forces.

3.3 Post-Secession Arrangements: A commitment for two viable states

In order to strengthen and nurture the historical relations between the North and the South on the new basis and to mitigate the consequences of secession of the South and to ensure as well that the two states will not only be peaceful but equally viable, the AUHIP has been facilitating the negotiations between the parties with the hope of reaching a comprehensive agreement around issues of mutual benefits to the two states. Based on my personal knowledge during these negotiations, I came to a conclusion that NCP is not keen or capable to forge new good relations with the new state in the South as it is well reflected in the following positions:

- **Citizenship:** Given the unique history of Sudan and social relations developed over years, the SPLM supports the principle of option to choose and guarantee the freedom to reside, own, work and travel, the NCP on the other hand rejects such principle and is lukewarm in accepting the four freedoms with the South. With such position, the NCP intends to grant citizenship on the basis of their political choice rather than that of individual and it subsequently undermines the interest of large population of nomads and other transboundary population. Despite international law’s prohibition on creating statelessness and favouring the right of option and encouraging soft landings for citizens when sovereignty changes occur, Sudan has decided to automatically withdraw citizenship of all Southerners in the North and released ALL Southerners from public and private service in the North depriving them of livelihoods and making their continued stay in the North difficult, regardless of citizenship status.

- **Oil Sector:** While the South is committed to using oil facilities to build economic cooperation on the basis of international practices, the NCP opted to use its leverage over pipelines in the North to effect exorbitant fees USD 33.2 per barrel exported through the North and to wage economic war against the South. Indeed, during the month of July the North oversold Southern oil and retained the share of the South in the oil revenue.
• **Currency:** While the South opts to have its own currency and to use the redeemed Sudanese currency as part of its foreign reserve to promote trading activities with the North as recommended by International Monetary Fund, the NCP unilaterally issued in a disorderly manner its new currency in an effort not to take responsibility of its currency in the South as it liabilities. With this unilateral action and refusal to accept the redeemed currencies in the South as its liabilities, the NCP has not acted contrary to international practices but it left the South valueless old Sudanese currency estimated to be more than one billion US dollars. Actually what the North has done is contrary to international financial and banking standards in that the Central Bank of Sudan has not honoured its currency liability. Also they refused the redemption by trade which state practice showed would have benefitted both the North and South and while negotiating about the South’s currency and agreeing in principle that both should not issue a new currency without coordination, they unilaterally issued a new currency while depriving the South of SDG’s in July that were due under the CPA.

• **Soft-Borders:** While the parties agreed to the principle of soft border and free movement of goods, services, people and animals, the NCP decided unilaterally to close its borders with far reaching economic consequences on the people of South Sudan.

• **North-South Border and the Third Party:** While the South argues for the need for a third party (UN or AU) to supervise and monitor the border, particularly in the disputed areas, the NCP rejects any presence of the third party and opted instead to military occupy the disputed areas along the North – South border.

4. Sudan after Secession of the South: The Danger of Disintegration and Radicalism

While the secession of the South would certainly create serious economic shocks on the North, it would have equally provided new opportunities and space for serious reform in the North through the process of permanent constitution making. Contrary to the expectations, the continuing state of Sudan faces the following challenges but provides as well opportunities:

• The leadership of the NCP is not only getting weaker and without focus but it is more divided with more radical elements and army directing the affairs of the state.

• With the secession of the South, the Islamic extremists are advocating for establishing now a real Islamic state as the North has now been purified from non-Islamic elements. President Bashir even echoed this by stating in one of the public rally that with secession of the South Islam shall be the only religion of the state and Arabic shall be the official language of the Sudan.

• While the other political parties are rather weak, the SPLM North is the only credible political party that can provide strong opposition and be a key ally in pushing the agenda of democratic reform and change in the Sudan. But given the political development in Southern Kordofan state and atrocities being
committed in Darfur, the SPLM North may opt to adopt the path of regime change through armed struggle.

- Given the current political development in the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states, increased violence and atrocities in Darfur and disappointment in the East, Sudan runs the risk of disintegration as there are voices now calling for right of self-determination in these regions.

- It is apparent that after secession of the South, some opportunities are missed in the North by not building on the CPA reforms and seeing them as a way to resolve crisis, addressing the grievances of the periphery and avoiding further violence.

- As the political situation is deteriorating in the North and given the growing critical views about NCP, there is a real fear for the safety of leaders of SPLM North such as Malik Agar, Abdel Aziz and Yasir Saeed and even myself as shown by series of threats made by Khartoum on their lives and physical integrity and the recent Bashir rejection of the Addis Ababa agreement on Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile which at least recognized the legitimacy of the SPLM North as a political party in the Republic of Sudan.

5. South Sudan: The Challenges of Building a New State and New Relations

Certainly, the viability of the new state of South Sudan will largely depend on the stability in the North, the peace or violence found along its border with Sudan, and the type of relations that will be developed between the two states. The current political development and atrocities committed in Southern Kordofan will pose a real challenge to the new state of the South as people of Nuba Mountains are their comrades in struggle. Coupled with the deteriorating political situation in Southern Kordofan, the new South Sudan will face the following challenges and opportunities:

- Consolidating peace and security will be the top priority of the new state. The current efforts to address security sector reform, modernization and transformation of the SPLA, embarking on effective Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs and affecting the reconciliation commitment of President Salva will provide opportunity for building a secure and peaceful South Sudan.

- The political stability of the new State will rest on the leadership of the SPLM as the ruling party through democratic reform within itself and providing space and conducive environment for other political parties, civil society organizations and media. In the short term, democracy will require that the SPLM-dominant Government provide the legal framework and environment for a multi-party system, but all must recognize that in this short term, even with elections in the next few years, the foundation for the country’s democracy must first be seen and practiced internally by the SPLM itself as it will continue to be the majority and dominant party for a number of years yet to come.
• Economic challenges and symptoms of over reliance on oil, and scarcity of resources will be a real challenge for the new state. Effective fiscal discipline coupled with sound monetary policy and a strong and credible central bank will help in fighting mismanagement of public resources and ensuring transparency. Reforms in the oil sector, good faith negotiations with the Government of Sudan and foreign oil companies operating in the South, and responsible and professional review of existing oil contracts is crucial for effective management of oil resources. This will also require the need to review the current US sanctions to ensure that they will not adversely affect the economy of the new State, discourage cooperation between the North and South to promote economic viability and mutual security, or discourage the foreign direct investment in this sector which currently is monopolized by Asian companies that do not possess all the technology the South desires to increase oil reserve outputs and maximize environmental responsibility.

• Capacity will be the real constraint for the new State and this will require early investment in education and future generation as well as exploring creative options of encouraging the Diaspora to return to the South. Particularly in the private sector which would welcome some incentives such as waiving their school loans and cost of living adjustments.

6. Conclusion: Urgent Steps and Actions

• The international community must recognize that the way NCP is managing the affairs of state of Sudan is extremely alarming and will soon create a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions. The leadership of the NCP is becoming a real liability not only to its own people but a real threat to stability and peace in regional and continent. The pattern of ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity being committed by the leadership of NCP require collective international action. The world has discovered, if impunity is permitted, as evidenced by Darfur and what is now happening in the Southern Kordofan and Abyei area, we shall not have seen the last of such violence only its exportation to other areas and other victims. The international community must scale up their efforts to bring the leadership of NCP to justice and the efforts of International Criminal Court (ICC) of apprehending the culprits of these atrocities to be supported and expanded to include the recent atrocities committed in Abyei and Southern Kordofan. As part of scaling up pressure on the Sudan, the members of the UN to restraint diplomatic relations with Sudan until it stops such atrocities and to seriously work towards full implementation of the remaining provisions of the CPA and the current agreements signed in Addis Ababa.

• Given the terrain and denial of access to the affected areas, the humanitarian crisis will get even worse during the next few months. Therefore it is critical for the international community to increase humanitarian assistance and to explore creative options for getting aid to South Kordofan and Abyei either through indigenous organizations or to encourage safe-corridors and IDPs camps for the
affected communities, particularly in secured areas in South Sudan where the new State of the South needs to address challenges related to security, water, education, health, agriculture, and to encourage private direct investment.

- While working to apprehend the culprits in the atrocities committed in Sudan, the international community, particularly African Union must put more pressure on NCP to fully implement agreements signed by parties in Addis Ababa. In particular, the international community and in an effort to build confidence between the North and South to exert pressure on the government of Sudan to accept the return of Abyei area to South Sudan in return of a reasonable financial arrangement for the economic soft landing in the North and to mitigate the economic shocks created by the secession of the South and a secured access to pastures and water to the Arab Misseriyia nomads.

- The new Republic of South Sudan as a newest country, it has all enormous potentials and opportunities to be become a viable state and to forge good relations with the North. Certainly unstable North will derail the South to realize its potential and growth that is needed for the benefits of the people of the region. The success of South Sudan is central to the stability of the region and it should be seen in the context of strategic global security, given the emergence of Islamic radicalism in the North. What the South will be lacking most is the skilled human resource and capacity to build a new state and such capacity gap can easily be gradually resolved by assisting the return of Diaspora and increased investment in human resource, particularly in education and training. Given the available international experiences and knowledge, the world stands a chance of making its newest country a success and to avoid any option for failure.