“THE MAJORITY OF CASES OF SUCCESSFUL STATE-BUILDING AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM HAVE OCCURRED WHEN A SOCIETY HAS GENERATED STRONG DOMESTIC DEMAND FOR INSTITUTIONS AND THEN CREATED THEM OUT OF WHOLE CLOTH”.

(Francis Fukuyama, 2004).
POLITICS, POWER AND THE DEVELOPMENT STATE

“POLITICAL POWER, LIKE WEALTH, HAS TO EXIST BEFORE IT CAN BE DISTRIBUTED” (Atul Kholi)
ARGUMENT (1)

- DEVELOPMENT: A POLITICAL PROCESS
- POLITICS ENABLE OR CONSTRAIN IT
- INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
- APPROPRIATE INSTITUTIONS DEPEND ON POLITICS
- WE KNOW TOO LITTLE
- WE CAN DO MORE
- DEVELOPMENT STATE
BRINGING POLITICS BACK IN

- POLITICS AND THE VICTORIAN PIANO LEGS – KNOWN BUT NOT ADMITTED

- INCREASING *EXPLICIT* AWARENESS


- TECHNOSPEAK TO DISGUISE AND IT – ‘POLITICAL ECONOMY CONSIDERATIONS’ OR ‘INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES’
RESISTANCE TO POLITICS

- SOVEREIGNTY AND DIPLOMATIC ISSUES
- WORLD BANK ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT
- SCEPTICISM ABOUT HOW TO OPERATIONALISE FINDINGS
- SPLIT BETWEEN DIPLOMATIC AND DEVELOPMENT AID FUNCTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY
CONCEPTUALISING POLITICS: TWO LEVELS (1)

- CONVENTIONAL VIEW IS THAT OF STRUGGLE FOR POWER OR ADVANTAGE OF COMPETING GROUPS

- PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, ETHNIC GROUPS, CONTENDING ELITES

- PLAYERS OF THE ‘GAME’

- AVOID GETTING INVOLVED
CONCEPTUALISING POLITICS: TWO LEVELS (2)

- RULES BY WHICH POLITICS IS ENACTED
- INSTITUTIONS
- NATIONAL OR MICRO POLITICS
- THE FUNDAMENTAL LEVEL OF POLITICS
- STABLE POLITIES HAVE ONE SET OR COMPLEMENTARY SETS
PROBLEMS

- OFTEN MORE THAN ONE SET OF RULES: MULTIPLE FORMS OF CONFLICT ENSUE

- COMPLEX INTERPLAY BETWEEN LEVELS: STRUCTURE/AGENCY ISSUES

- COMPLEX INTERPLAY OR TENSION BETWEEN SETS OF RULES:

  - E.G. PATRONAGE POLITICS OR WEBERIAN POLITICS
POWER

- DIFFICULT CONCEPT
- HARD TO MEASURE
- NOT A QUANTUM BUT A RELATIONSHIP
- FLUCTUATING AND CHANGING
- INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AGENTS
- OPERATES THROUGH FORMAL AND INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS
CLASSIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATES

- EAST ASIAN PROVENANCE
- CHALMERS JOHNSON’S WORK ON *MITI*
- MUCH SINCE THEN, ROBERT WADE, PETER EVANS
- ALSO OTHERS – BOTSWANA AND MAURITIUS
DEFINING FEATURES

- Politics have been developmentally driven
- Developmental objectives have been politically driven
- “Rich country, strong army” (Meiji).
CONDITIONS

- EXTERNAL THREAT

- INTERNAL ELITE POLITICAL COHERENCE (‘WILL’)  

- CONCENTRATION OF POWER – DEMOCRATIC OR NOT – KOREA, SINGAPORE, BOTSWANA

- IMPOSITION OF A SINGLE SET OF DEVELOPMENTALLY DRIVEN RULES GOVERNING ECONOMY AND POLITY
CHARACTERISTICS

- DETERMINED DEVELOPMENTAL ELITE
- RELATIVE STATE AUTONOMY
- INFRASTRUCTURAL POWER
- POWERFUL, COMPETENT INSULATED ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACY
- WEAK AND SUBORDINATED CIVIL SOCIETY
- CLOSE RELATIONS WITH PRIVATE ECONOMIC INTERESTS
- POOR HUMAN RIGHTS
- YET CONSIDERABLE INSTITUTIONAL VARIATION (HAGGARD)
- ‘VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM’
MODIFICATION

- INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLITICAL FORCES
- GLOBAL PRESSURES
- INTERNAL DEMANDS
- POLITICS AGAIN
POSSIBILITIES NOW?

• MUCH HARDER
• EXTERNAL THREAT NOW RARE
• EXTERNAL ENCOURAGEMENT RARE
• WILL DEPEND ON INTERNAL POLITICS
• INTERNAL DEMAND
• HOW CAN DONORS HELP THAT?
WHAT IS TO BE DONE? (1)

- BRING POLITICS BACK IN
- FOCUS ON *RULE FORMATION* NOT PARTIES OR PERSONS
- RETHINKING THE STATE – NOT SO MUCH ON WHAT IT SHOULD DO AS ON WHAT IT IS
- DEEPEN UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICAL DEMAND FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
(2)

- COUNTRY FOCUS
- UNDERSTAND FAR MORE ABOUT MACRO AND MICRO POLITICAL PROCESSES
- E.G. (I) POWER AND ‘SHADOW STATE’ OPERATIONS
- E.G (II) CHIEFS, POLITICIANS AND BUREAUCRATS – CHANGING RELATIONS