Preventing Violent Conflict in Africa
Book Overview

London
12 December, 2013

Yoichi Mine
Visiting Fellow, JICA-RI
Professor, Doshisha University
Conflict Prevention and Development Cooperation in Africa

- Organized by JICA and UNDP, chaired by Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Robert Picciotto
- Development aid has not paid due attention to the structural conflict risk factors
- Many conflicts are ethnicity/identity-based
- Conflict may occur even when national economy is growing, etc...
Project at JICA Research Institute
“Preventing Violent Conflict in Africa”

- Violent ruptures after the end of the Cold War
  Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, DRC, etc.
- Lingering conflicts and fragile peace in the 2000s
  Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Zimbabwe, etc.
- Rapid economic growth (linkages with East Asia)
- Growth is given. The quality of development is in question
  (JICA’s Vision: “Inclusive and Dynamic Development”)
- JICA-RI established in 2008. Launching a new research project on Conflict Prevention in Africa (Advisors: Frances Stewart, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, and Thandika Mkandawire)
[1] Horizontal Inequalities (HIs)

- Dimensions of HIs:
  I. Economic HIs: assets, income, employment, etc.
  II. Social HIs: education, health, housing, etc.
  III. Political HIs: political opportunities and power
  IV. Cultural status HIs: customs, norms, languages, etc.

- Multi-dimensional inequalities between identity groups rather than individuals

- When those HIs occur in all dimensions simultaneously, violent conflict is likely

- Mainstreaming the perspective of HIs in development cooperation

- CRISE at Oxford (headed by Professor Stewart)
[2] Subjective Perceptions of HIs

• “People take actions not because of statistical data on inequalities, of which they might not be aware, but because of injustice they perceive.”

• Questions about perceptions on inequalities, identity, and hostilities toward other groups were asked in:

• Urban areas in Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and South Africa. 3,745 samples. About 100 questions per country
[3] Choice of Institutions

- Political HIs are conditioned by political institutions
- Formal & informal political institutions: Important determinants of stability and instability.
- Variables: Electoral system, party system, composition of the Executive, head of government, federalism, local elections, quota system, and recognition of group culture
- PD (Power-Dispersing) regime: characterised by power-sharing and decentralisation
- PC (Power-Concentrating) regime: characterised by majoritarian system and centralisation of power
...Inequalities → Perceptions → (Conflict →) Institutional choice → Inequalities...

Political Institutions and Policymaking → Socioeconomic HIs

Political Processes

(Conflict)

Stability/Instability

Structural Risk Factors

Historical Settings

Interactions between structure and processes
African countries chosen for qualitative case studies: 4 country pairs (combination of stable and unstable neighbours) and 2 single country studies (history of institution building)
Publication of Research Outcome

- Yoichi Mine, Frances Stewart, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, and Thandika Mkandawire eds., *Preventing Violent Conflict in Africa: Inequalities, Perceptions and Institutions*

- A volume of “Conflict, Inequality and Ethnicity” series (editor: Frances Stewart)
Contents of the book

• Chapter 1: Introduction, and horizontal inequalities
  – Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Arnim Langer, and Yoichi Mine
• Chapter 2: Classification of political institutions
  – Yoichi Mine, Mari Katayanagi, and Satoru Mikami
• Chapter 3: Country pair 1 (Rwanda and Burundi)
  – Shinichi Takeuchi
• Chapter 4: Country pair 2 (Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire)
  – Arnim Langer
• Chapter 5: Country pair 3 (South Africa and Zimbabwe)
  – Yoichi Mine
• Chapter 6: Country pair 4 (Tanzania and Uganda)
  – Yuichi Sasaoka and Julius Nyang’oro
• Chapter 7: Single country 1 (Kenya)
  – Mwangi Kimenyi
• Chapter 8: Single country 2 (Nigeria)
  – Ukoha Ukiwo
• Chapter 9: Significance of perceptions on horizontal inequalities
  – Arnim Langer and Satoru Mikami
• Chapter 10: Conclusion and policy recommendations
  – Frances Stewart, Thandika Mkandawire, and Mari Katayanagi
Chapter 1
Introduction: Disentangling the linkages between horizontal inequalities and political institutions by Fukuda-Parr, Langer and Mine

- Presentation of overall motivation of research
- Confirmation of research questions: horizontal inequalities, subjective perceptions, and the role of political institutions.
- Literature review on horizontal inequalities and violent conflict.
Chapter 2
Comparing political institutions: Institutional choice and conflict prevention in Africa
by Mine, Katayanagi and Mikami

1. Power-Dispersing institutions (Power-sharing and decentralisation of power)
2. Power-Concentrating institutions (Majoritarian rule and centralisation of power)

Hypothesis: Comparative advantage of Power-Dispersing institutions

i. Some countries have adopted ad hoc power-sharing to avoid the escalation of violence
ii. Relatively bad governance performance in countries with centralised power structures (analysis of 49 countries)

However, informal values and institutions should be taken into account (Case studies)
Chapter 3
‘Twin countries’ with contrasting institutions: post-conflict state-building in Rwanda and Burundi
by Takeuchi

• Commonality: Relatively rich minority Tutsi and relatively poor majority Hutu
• (a pre-colonial contrast between centralised Rwanda Kingdom and decentralised Burundi Kingdom)

A) Rwanda: Military victory of Tutsi-led forces after the genocide. Power-concentration. Ostensible stability and simmering grievances among Hutu

B) Burundi: Institutional power-sharing after the Tutsi minority rule. Check on bloodshed but unstable

Lesson: Institutional choice determined by the modalities of war-ending
Chapter 4
Horizontal Inequalities, Ethnic Politics, and Violent Conflict: The Contrasting Experiences of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire by Langer

• Commonality: Relatively rich South and relatively poor North
• (majority Christians in Ghana and rivalry between Southern Christians and Northern Muslims in Côte d’Ivoire)

A) Ghana: Legacy of Nkrumah. Equal attention to various ethnic groups. Informal power-sharing functions under majoritarian formal institutions. Stable.

B) Côte d’Ivoire: Spread of ethno-nationalism. Civil war situations from 2002 to 2011

Lesson: Significance of leadership quality and informal power-sharing
Chapter 5
Beyond Ad hoc Power-Sharing: Comparing South Africa and Zimbabwe by Mine

• Commonality: European settlements and the history of racism
• (polarisation of African politics in Zimbabwe: Political repression of minority Ndebele by the government)

A) South Africa: Ad hoc power-sharing and semi-federalism to avoid violence in 1994. Stable. Gradual shift toward two-party system?

B) Zimbabwe: From the authoritarian majoritarianism to ad hoc power-sharing in 2008. Unstable.

Lesson: Significance of electoral system and ad hoc power-sharing in avoiding the escalation of violence
Chapter 6
Is Ethnic Autonomy Compatible with a Unitary State?: The Case of Uganda and Tanzania
by Sasaoka and Nyang’oro

- Commonality: Experiences of African socialism. Influential minorities seeking for ethnic autonomy
- (relatively homogeneous ethnic configuration in mainland Tanzania. Several ethnic poles in Uganda)

A) Tanzania: Conflict contained through federal arrangement between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. Stable.
B) Uganda: Grievances of Northerners and Baganda caused by power concentration. In recent years, political manipulation of decentralisation

Lesson: Similar political institutions (e.g., decentralisation) may function differently in different political contexts
Chapter 7
The Politics of Identity, Horizontal Inequalities, and Conflict in Kenya
by Kimenyi

• After independence, giving way to single-party domination
• Presidents favoured their own ethnic groups. Alteration of presidents leading to the alteration of powerful groups
• Election-related violence, worst in 2007 → ad hoc power-sharing
• New constitution adopted with power-dispersing devices in 2010 (check on presidential power and decentralisation)

Lesson: Effectiveness of a democratic constitution
Chapter 8
Managing Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Conflicts in Nigeria
by Ukiwo

• North (Hausa Fulani) and South (West: Yoruba, East: Igbo)
• Asymmetric power relations: Political ascendancy and better social service in the Northern Muslim areas / relative economic prosperity in the Southern Christian areas
• After the Biafra Civil War (1967-70), an emergence of a federal nation combining elements of power dispersion and concentration. Prevention of a recurrence of major civil war successful.

Lesson: Prospect for the evolution of hybrid institutions
Chapter 9
Relationship between Objective and Subjective Horizontal Inequalities: Evidence from Five African Countries
by Langer and Mikami

• Polimetric analysis of ethnic perceptions in five countries (Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe)
• Presence of objective, material horizontal inequalities
• However, incongruity between objective inequalities and their subjective perceptions
• Tendency of economically inferior (superior) groups to feel less inferior (superior), when the same groups feel they are politically (dis-)empowered
Chapter 10
Findings and Implications: The Roles of Development Cooperation by Stewart, Mkandawire and Katayanagi

• Chapter summaries
• Relationships between socioeconomic and political horizontal inequalities → Confirmation of the significance of subjective perceptions of inequalities
• Stability/instability explained in a matrix of political institutions → Advantage of sustainable power-sharing (supplemented by informal PS)
• Political processes of conflict and the role of external actors
• Policy recommendations (JICA-RI Policy Brief No. 8)
Policy Brief

Preventing Violent Conflict in Africa

Policy Recommendations

1. Horizontal inequalities (HIs) can be a major root cause of violent conflict, especially when they encompass economic, political, social, and cultural spheres. HIs, therefore, should be fully investigated in any development assistance for Africa.

2. HIs when subjectively perceived do not necessarily coincide with objectively observable HIs, and people's behavior is often shaped by their subjective perceptions of the self and others. In this light, development practitioners need to avoid actions that could worsen the perceptions of HIs among local groups.

3. Inclusive political institutions, both formal and informal, can contribute to alleviating the sense of alienation and fostering conciliation among groups. Outside actors should respect local initiatives for building effective and long-lasting institutions for power-sharing and decentralization.