Urbanisation, land and property rights

The need to refocus attention

Anna Locke and Giles Henley

- Urbanisation is moving up the agenda of many donor agencies, with a recognition that it is inevitable and gaining pace; Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries are among those with most rapid rates of urbanisation.
- Peri-urban areas are often the front line of urban transformation and transition, particularly in terms of land tenure arrangements, administration and governance.
- Robust, transparent and pro-poor land use planning lies at the heart of ensuring that this process of transformation and transition promotes growth, poverty reduction and sustainable, resilient urban landscapes.
- Such planning needs to take into account the presence of different land governance and administration systems, particularly transitioning between customary systems and more formal, state-run systems.
- Approaches that emphasise adapting to existing systems of governing land markets are particularly relevant in peri-urban areas beyond municipal borders where city administrations are weak.
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Urbanisation, land and property rights 2
Executive summary

The prevalence of urban poverty

Around one in seven of the world’s population lives in poor quality, usually overcrowded, housing in urban areas (Satterthwaite and Mitlin 2014). Most of these areas lack provision for safe, sufficient water, sanitation and other needs, and include large numbers of urban dwellers who are malnourished and suffer preventable premature death and disease. However, a significant number of these are not defined as being poor according to standard poverty line measurements.

The opportunities and challenges of urbanisation

If well managed, the interactions between towns and countryside can be the basis for a balanced regional development which is economically, socially and environmentally sustainable (DANIDA 2000). Over the last decade, many influential global development organisations and national governments have moved from seeing urbanisation as an economic and social ill towards advocating the view that urbanisation can drive growth and development and should be encouraged. Underpinning this view is the theory and empirical literature that posits that agglomeration boosts productivity as concentration of capital, business services and relatively skilled labour leads to innovation; shared infrastructure and service providers generate economies of scale; and there is the opportunity for information and knowledge spill-overs (Page 2012; Miller 2014). Successfully assimilating new urban residents can provide an ‘urban dividend’ for countries, the payoff of which could be massive (Manuel and Calderon 2015).

The existence of agglomeration economies does not mean that urbanisation will necessarily cause economic output to increase. The benefits of concentration can be offset by negative externalities such as rising congestion, overcrowding, overloaded infrastructure, pressure on ecosystems (such as water courses and air quality), higher costs of living, and higher labour and property costs in cities. These increase business costs, reduce productivity and deter private investment.

There are also challenges that limit the transmission of benefits of high growth to the poorest, causing severe environmental and health costs and minimising the potential for social transformation. The rapid qualitative shift from a subsistence to a cash-oriented economy that urbanisation triggers can lead to a destabilisation of livelihoods and heighten risks for poor and vulnerable people. Unplanned urbanisation has resulted in cities becoming more of an environmental and health hazard with significant implications for the poor and vulnerable who migrate to cities in search of jobs. The lack of basic amenities and significant shortage of housing in unplanned and under-resourced urbanisation make urban problems acute, leading to more pronounced impacts on health and safety, particularly for the poor and, within that group, women. Over one billion urban residents today live in such poor quality and overcrowded housing that they can be considered to be slum dwellers (Revi and Rosenzweig 2013).

The importance of land issues

Within this process, the management of land can play an important role in providing conditions for maximising the potential for a beneficial process of urbanisation and minimising the negative impacts on the poor and vulnerable. If managed poorly, processes of administrative reconfiguration and settlement of incoming urban migrants can heighten tension, leading to violence and destabilisation. On the other hand, where good management exists, this can facilitate efficient urbanisation as land can be made available at affordable costs, facilitating low cost housing and minimising displacement of households and economic activities (UN HABITAT

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1 The recent attempt by Ethiopia’s federal government to incorporate land in the surrounding Oromo region into Addis Ababa in accordance with a new city Master plan, provides an example of how badly-managed processes can fuel resistance and violence.
Additionally, effective stewardship of land is necessary to provide the formal utilities, infrastructure and public bulk services (Manuel and Calderon 2015) that underpin inclusive and growth-enhancing urbanisations.

The literature reviewed for this study highlighted three main land issues as being particularly important for facilitating good outcomes from urbanisation:

- **Sound land use planning**, particularly when combined with gender-sensitive transportation planning to provide affordable access, appropriate densities, mix of land-uses, and safety for vulnerable populations and connect people to jobs, markets, essential services and political representation.

- **Smoothly functioning land and housing markets** and local authorities that are responsive to market failures, so that people and firms can easily relocate and can access suitable land and infrastructure for residential and economic purposes.

- **Capable and responsive land market and urban management institutions** that can ensure that formal sector housing and land markets can respond with adequate supply in the short-medium term and will plan on the basis of population projections to ensure the inclusion of the poorest urban dwellers.

At the same time, it is critical to recognise that the parallel existence of formal and informal markets is an incontrovertible reality of urban land markets in fast-developing cities, and government housing agencies are unable to satisfy the burgeoning demand from lower income groups that cannot afford formal housing (Bertaud, 2010). Finding ways to facilitate the functioning of markets that poor people can afford to access — and expand these — is a critical function of urban land policy (Bertaud, 2010; Napier et al., 2013).

Underpinning this is the need for clear and secure tenure to reduce the risk of eviction and provide a basis for sustainable livelihoods. However, no focus on land issues will succeed in resolving the challenges facing pro-poor urbanisation if governments are not supportive of urbanisation, and therefore adopt a strategic policy choice to disfavour informal settlements (Henderson 2010).

**The challenges of land in peri-urban areas**

In peri-urban areas (PUAs) — the interface between urban and rural areas — common and interlinked characteristics in land tenure, administration/planning and governance can make it hard to provide these conditions. PUAs tend to be areas of rapid transition, characterised by multiple land uses and tenure arrangements, with overlapping or fragmented land administration and governance systems.

This transition leads to land markets expanding and land becoming increasingly commoditised. As a result, land transactions in peri-urban areas become more frequent, and pressure increases to sub-divide land into smaller parcels in order to increase supply and financial returns.

Land and property rights regimes can differ significantly between rural and urban areas, often moving from customary tenure in more remote rural areas to more individualised forms of tenure in urban areas (Naab et al 2013). As populations in PUAs rise and municipality borders are extended, PUAs may bring municipal authorities into contact with areas under customary tenure systems, which municipal administrators’ tools are ill-suited for.

Customary systems may not be able to evolve to the extent that they can cope with the speed, volume, diversity and complexity of contemporary land management issues (Arko-Adjei 2011). This can manifest itself in increased land-related conflicts and disputes, haphazard and unregulated land development from land use change, illegal land transactions and proliferation of informal settlements, all of which contribute to heightened land tenure insecurity (ibid; van Veenhuizen undated).

This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the physical boundaries of urban areas often do not coincide with their administrative boundaries, and urban and peri-urban areas often fall under separate administrative jurisdictions with different resources, capacities and political leanings (DANIDA 2000; Simon et al 2004).
Authorities in peri-urban areas tend to be thinly spread and unable to carry out land governance and administration functions effectively in line with the transitional nature of those areas (Siechiping et al. 2015, Wehrmann and Antonio 2015). This undermines the capacity of the land administration to record tenure rights, undertake land use planning and enforce its results, or sustain land administration through land and property taxes.

Multiple land tenure systems make overcoming these land governance weaknesses more difficult because roles and responsibilities are unclear or subject to competition. This may also thwart attempts to plan and deliver the infrastructure and services conducive to economic growth and poverty reduction, including the adequate supply of roads, water and sanitation infrastructure, and housing.

Conclusions and recommendations

The report’s findings suggest that policies and programmes of governments and the development partners could include a stronger focus on the development of peri-urban areas and smaller cities and towns. The rapid pace of change in peri-urban areas throws into relief any underlying issues in land tenure arrangements, land administration/planning and governance, such as overlapping mandates, conflicts in tenure systems, weak land administration/planning capacity and wider political economy issues that can block positive reforms.

Governments and funders could support activities to strengthen tenure arrangements, increasing capacity at municipal level to: recognise and manage different tenure systems and to manage the transition along the land rights continuum, protecting rights while allowing access to land to new entrants; and improve capacity at municipal level to undertake sound land use planning, including through more community-based practices, and better data use and management.

Land governance

Policymakers should aim to minimise the scope for struggles over land governance to pose barriers to effective land planning and administration. As part of this, it is important that they:

- Clarify mandates and decision-making powers of different ministries, agencies and local government to ensure roles and responsibilities in drawing up and approving plans are clear. This will help ensure that overarching planning documents for cities and their surroundings can become operational, and avoid a situation where multiple plans generated by different levels of government compete for backing. At a minimum, governance arrangements should ensure that disagreements over planning authority do not act as long-term barriers to local level planning and land administration.

- Ensure that changes in the authority over planning are carefully managed such that new arrangements respect existing planning choices. Changes in planning authority should be managed to ensure village or officials or customary authorities who were previously held planning responsibilities are not completely disempowered in the new urban land administration, leading them to resist changes. Similarly, when the government changes the status of land, existing landholders’ rights over this land should not be weakened: the perception that land rights will be weakened because of changes can lead to resistance and further conflict.

- Where governments need to buy land through compulsory acquisition, they should ensure that rules for valuation and compensation are applied transparently in peri-urban areas to guarantee that landholders do not either lose out materially, or decline to participate in the formal sector out of fears they will.

As Ghana’s experience demonstrates, growing demand for land – mostly from the non-agricultural sector – results in land scarcity, higher land values and greater demand for planning of customary land. Customary systems often struggle to deal with these new demands and in some cases “disintegrate” (Naab et al., 2013), exposing several weaknesses within the customary land governance system. Any programme or intervention to support transitions in peri-urban areas needs to take into account and resolve power relations in customary systems and contested authority with chieftaincy systems, lack of information or records on land tenure and lack of planning.
Peri-urban planning

The need for planning
The literature and case studies explored in this study flag robust and sustained land use planning as a primary need to ensure adequate service provision and connectivity for both poverty reduction and growth. The literature places increasing emphasis on the need for planning to avoid locking in patterns of urbanisation that constrain growth, are anti-poor and are unsustainable environmentally.

Land use planning clearly plays a role in determining the severity of congestion: ensuring enough land is made available for transport infrastructure — especially for public transport — is one part of the picture. Also important for peri-urban areas will be the connectivity of areas more likely to be attractive to commuting middle income groups to reduce incentives for commuting using private vehicles.

This may call for proactive planning of suburban areas in the peri-urban areas for middle-income residential areas. A common co-benefit of planned housing areas for middle-income groups is to reduce competition for low-cost housing (downwards raiding).

Uncoordinated spatial expansion can undermine sustained growth, e.g., in the case of Ghana (World Bank 2015). Planning may need to make more efforts to coordinate spatial expansion including through better connections between large urban settlements, and between urban areas and their surroundings where much of the manufacturing activity will continue to move to (ibid).

Factors to consider in the planning process
The literature consulted for this review on peri-urban areas does not shed light specifically on how interventions can be designed to ensure efficient spatial planning as cities expand into peri-urban areas. Although there are efforts underway in Ghana to build capacity of chieftaincies to provide better planning in their jurisdictions, lessons from these have not been well documented in the literature. The experience in Tanzania is likely to be representative of other areas, where the lack of a clear and socially-accepted approach to compensating loss of land acts as a drag on efforts to reconfigure informal residential areas in order to build road infrastructure and other public infrastructure.

Ensuring transparent and robust valuation and compensation processes is likely to be the first-best option to ensure infrastructure programmes can get underway. However, where other options appear viable and do not lead to social exclusion, these should be explored. For example, communities that benefit from shared improved infrastructure may be willing to reconfigure residential land patterns to accommodate households that lose land or have to be displaced.

In general, where governments seek to use master plans, planners should consult closely with communities from the start to understand what the main current local land uses are and how important these are to livelihoods. Plans that are drawn up should avoid requiring large and fast changes in the landscape that will disrupt livelihoods and raise opposition.

In order to produce plans that are acceptable to current landholders, planners should factor in existing land uses — including agriculture — and ensure that plans respond to needs of poor households. As planning is likely to be biased towards providing plots and amenities that suit middle and high income households, it is important to ensure that provisions for poor households are not left out of planning exercises. A minimum step planners can take is to acknowledge the areas of high-density settlements that exist on the ground, and factor these into any new plans that are drawn up.

A major blockage to implementing planning in countries lies in the lack of resources to compensate landholders. Finding ways to move around this obstacle is important to ensuring that land registration efforts can go ahead. In Tanzania, recent experiences of changing the process so that land needed for roads is provided by landholders through a land readjustment process offers some promise (Lugoe 2015). New approaches have seen all landholders in a community pool their land and redistribute it to avoid any one landholder losing land disproportionately, which has offered some important successes.
Overall, donor-supported government-led programmes should recognise there is a need to adjust expectations of stakeholders around planning processes, particularly when these are seen to be major solutions. There is much emphasis at present on narratives better planning (for smarter cities, climate change adaptation etc), yet better plans are unlikely to be implementable when insufficient attentions is given to the existing patterns of landholding and the power of different stakeholders to implement, or conversely resist attempts to convert existing land use to alternatives.

**Land administration**

**Mandates and capacity**
The literature explored and the case studies discussed in this review point to the capacity of land administration and overlapping systems as two main issues that need to be tackled to improve the regulation/administration of peri-urban areas.

While problems of overlapping systems can be resolved by clarifying mandates and bringing land under municipalities to facilitate coherent planning, municipalities often do not have the capacity to oversee and administer larger areas. This implies the need for local governments to adopt a phased approach that acknowledged capacity constraints, combined with a focus for donor efforts to support capacity building at municipality level.

Municipal control is often extended by re-designating land but re-designating land is often controversial. Those whose land is being re-designated may resist attempts at upgrading the area’s classification to a municipality for fear of losing control. However, the vacuum resulting from the resistance to re-designation of rural land can create a situation where land governance caters to wealthier groups (Owens 2014).

**Working with different land administration systems**
As private registration of informal land is likely to be the main channel for households to register land, the land administration system may need to cater primarily to this channel, making it quick and easy to do so.

The literature provides support for recognising and working with local and informal land markets as a means to improve outcomes for poorer households. In countries/areas where traditional authorities are present (and whose legitimacy is accepted), local governments, with additional support from donors, can engage these to consider planning requirements and possibly strengthening customary land institutions to carry out land administration (Lund (2009) cited in Arko Adjei 2011).

There is often a need to improve the ways in which customary authorities manage their land to reduce the incidence of arbitrary and unfair decisions that can lead to eviction of households from especially farming land in peri-urban areas. The Community Land Secretariats being established in Ghana provide the clearest examples of efforts to design interventions that support positive change in the way customary systems work, to support better administration, planning capacity and reduce the potential for unilateral decision-making that often undermines tenure security. Experiences from these may provide useful guidance for other settings where customary authorities retain important decision-making powers.

Elsewhere, where other forms of recognition of occupancy exist — such as occupant or household lists that enjoy social legitimacy — embarking on processes to incrementally recognise these at higher levels are more promising way to strengthen tenure rights, rather than to rely on governments and households to engage in more formal but costlier titling exercises.

Overall, a sensible approach may be to opt for a secure but simpler registration processes in peri-urban areas, placing the emphasis on moving gradually from current forms of tenure to more appropriate and secure forms of tenure, while not being fixated on private land titling in contexts where it may not work as an immediate solution (Napier et al., 2013).

Local governments can help to confer tenure security by recognising a multitude of administrative or legal mechanisms that local administrations use. Forms of administrative recognition include occupancy registers, plot or shack enumerations, provision of infrastructure or services that register households. Similarly, mass legal recognition by recognising areas in zoning plans as areas for informal settlements, or declaring an area as a settlement area all provide additional tenure security to inhabitants in these areas.
Although these actions by themselves are rarely admissible as evidence of occupation rights, they can serve as a basis on which to add more information that confers greater legitimacy. These efforts appear to be more successful in many circumstances than attempting systematic titling efforts, as engaging households to apply for or even collect registration documents is often challenging. Both donors and CSOs can support local governments or communities directly to engage in such activities.

However, focusing on technical and capacity-building measures may not resolve the problem entirely if incentives exist for governments to implicitly seek to constrain migration to cities. Work can be done by development partners and CSOs to encourage governments to adopt a more positive and supportive approach to migration and urbanisation, including the provision of land, upgrading shelter and services, and help with building sustainable livelihoods (Turok and McGanahan 2013).

**Aim of study**

This study aims to analyse the interactions between the process of urbanisation and land tenure arrangements, land governance and tenure security in peri-urban areas, particularly in smaller urban centres, looking particularly at recent experience in Ghana and Tanzania.

The study does not take a position on whether urbanisation should be encouraged or not, focusing instead on how to support the process.

The results of this study will provide inputs for donors and African governments to understand the implications of rapid urbanisation on tenure security and access to land in peri-urban areas. This can feed into possible changes needed in policy and programming to ensure that the transition is managed so as to maximise the opportunities and minimise the risks for poor and vulnerable people’s livelihoods.

**Structure of study**

The study begins by identifying how and where urbanisation is projected to take place in the next 25 years in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is followed by a brief recap of the debate on links between urbanisation and growth, poverty and well-being, delving into the main challenges to doing urbanisation well in order to achieve pro-poor/inclusive growth, and the role that land can play in this process.

Chapter 4 of the study looks in more detail at the land issues in peri-urban areas urbanisation that pose challenges for creating conditions for urbanisation to have a positive impact on poor and vulnerable people. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss findings from the literature on land governance issues and poverty from peri-urban areas in Ghana and Tanzania.

We finish by drawing out the implications of these issues for national governments, donors and CSOs in thinking about how to manage or support the management of urbanisation.
1 Introduction

Urbanisation or urban growth² in low income countries often conjures up images of unplanned sprawl, normally dominated by slums with terrible housing and sanitation conditions, and lack of sustainable access to basic infrastructure, safe drinking water and services. Almost 1 billion people currently live in slums, and this number is expected to grow by nearly 500 million by 2020 (Revi and Rosenzweig 2013).

More recently, there has been greater attention focused on the potential that urbanisation has for promoting growth, with concentrated population and infrastructure providing opportunities for raising productivity through economies of scale, innovation and knowledge spill-overs (Miller 2014; Page 2012; Walton 2012; Turok and McGranahan 2013). Urbanisation can also be a platform for social transformation and greater inclusion through investment in human development, addressing asymmetries of gender, race, age and ethnicity and the participation of citizens in governance (Revi and Rosenzweig 2013). However, in sub-Saharan Africa, the population (including the poor) has become more urban with little reduction in aggregate poverty (Ravallion et al. 2008). While some countries such as Ghana have seen urbanisation initially coincide with periods of fast, stable growth and falling unemployment, slow structural transformation has meant most jobs have been created in the non-tradeable service sector which has limited potential for contributing to sustained growth compared to the manufacturing sector, which has grown slowly or stagnated (World Bank, 2015).

Statistics demonstrate that urbanisation is inevitable and taking place at an increasing rate. There are high projected rates of urbanisation in certain parts of Africa and, between 2010 and 2050, the number of Africa’s urban dwellers is expected to increase from 400 million to 1.26 billion (UN HABITAT 2014). Most people live in urban settlements which house fewer than 500,000 people; the next largest group live in cities of between one and five million people (UNDP 2014) compared to mega-cities, such as Lagos, which house more than 10 million people.

In most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), urban growth is driven more by natural increase within urban areas than by rural-urban migration, where rates have slowed (Miller 2014). However, most literature looks at urbanisation through a migration lens, which influences the focus of our analysis; many of the features of urbanisation are common to both processes (ibid).

Peri-urban areas are often the front line of urban transformation and transition, characterised by multiple and shifting land use, rapid population densification, frequent land transactions and incipient rises in land values. Peri-urban areas are usually beyond the territorial jurisdiction of city authorities or are split between jurisdictions, and are sites with competing governance claims (state vs. customary vs. other informal) and light formal regulation (Wehrmann 2015).

The changes that these peri-urban areas go through as they urbanise are often enormous and within this process, changes in land tenure arrangements, administration and governance can strongly influence how urbanisation impacts on poor and vulnerable people.

Despite peri-urban areas being the focus of rapid transition, land issues in peri-urban areas receive relatively little direct attention in the literature on urbanisation and development: although the urbanisation and growth literature issues highlights the importance of mobility and connectivity, there is little discussion of how land issues challenge or can facilitate this. Land issues also play a role in a poverty reduction/rights-based approach that aims to

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² We use the definition of **urbanisation** as a demographic process whereby the urban share of a country’s population is increasing over time (Potts 2009), with an increasing ratio of urban: rural population in a country or region. This differs from the concept of **urban growth**, which refers to a rise in the absolute level of urban population.
minimise the risk and negative effects of urbanisation to poor and vulnerable people through land tenure security and access to services.

This study focuses its attention on literature documenting transitions in peri-urban areas in SSA countries to understand what land issues arise in this process. It investigates what role land policy, planning and governance can play to facilitate a beneficial process of urbanisation for low-income groups in peri-urban areas to ensure that no one is left behind in the future development agenda. The target groups for the analysis are those already in the areas affected by urbanisation, such as small and marginal farmers or residents of informal settlements, and those moving in in search of a better life. Where possible in the literature, we focus on smaller cities and towns, which house the majority of SSA’s urban population and where future growth is predicted to be concentrated.

The study does not look at other strands in the wide debate on urban issues, such as urban regeneration, slum improvements, promoting industrialisation.

To illustrate the challenges and opportunities arising from land issues in peri-urban areas, the study presents two case studies, looking at the cases of Accra and Kumasi in Ghana, and of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. Ghana is one of the countries projected to have the most urban land cover in SSA by 2030 while Tanzania is projected to have the largest increase in urban population and a high proportion of its urban population living in slums. The multiple tenure systems in both countries highlight the impact of changes in land tenure arrangements, governance and administration in areas of rapid urbanisation.
2 Trends in Sub-Saharan African urbanisation

2.1 Current patterns of urbanisation

2.1.1 Urbanisation or urban growth?
African cities are growing at a faster pace than cities in most other parts of the world. However, the current growth rate is neither unprecedented nor does it necessarily indicate rapid urbanisation.

Urban populations in SSA are growing at 4%. While tempting to assume that this is driven by rural to urban migration, in fact most of this growth results from a high population growth rate. The annual rate of urbanisation in SSA in the current decade is 1.3%, which is well below the overall population growth rate of 2.6%. (McGranahan & Satterthwaite, 2014; Miller, 2014).

Data for individual countries confirms shows that net in-migration to urban areas was low across most of SSA (see Table 1). Although many people moved into cities, many moved out as well. For example, Tanzanian data shows that the net contribution of migration to urban growth in 2001-2002 was 44,000 people, which is less than 1% of the urban population (UN HABITAT 2014).

Table 1: Trends in urbanisation in selected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Counter-urbanisation (urban share falling)</th>
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Source: UN HABITAT (2014)

2.1.2 The growth of secondary cities...

Figure 1 shows that most people in SSA live in urban settlements which house fewer than 300,000 people while the next largest group lives in cities of between one and five million people. The majority of urban Africans are therefore not absorbed into the continent’s largest cities; most will continue to reside in smaller cities (UN HABITAT, 2014). In addition, most migrants go to smaller towns and cities — only 25% of migrants go to major cities, with the remainder going to smaller settlements (UN HABITAT, 2014). However, the growth in small urban centres is neither universal nor constant, with many migrants moving in and out of urban areas (so-called ‘circular migration’) and urban centres themselves growing and shrinking (Satterthwaite, 2006).
Although sub-Saharan Africa hosts few cities that are large by global standards, many countries are characterised by a single large (or ‘primate’) city that are much bigger than other cities and host a large portion of the national urban population (UN HABITAT, 2014; World Bank 2013). Examples exist in all regions of Africa, including Nairobi, Kenya; Nouakchott, Mauritania; Lomé, Togo and Dar es Salaam (UN HABITAT 2014). One important reason for this in many cases is that capital cities are perceived to offer better prospects for employment and potentially better services — major cities have received more attention and spending (World Bank 2013). Figure 2 presents data on access to sanitation for different sized cities in 12 African countries showing that in most cases, conditions are better in larger cities.
Figure 3: Growth of different sized cities in SSA, 1950-2030

Source: UNPD (2014)

Figure 4: Urban land cover in SSA cities, 2000-2030

Source: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (2012)

Figure 4 presents the current area of urban land cover and projections to 2030 for the 15 African countries with the most urban land cover. The five countries with the most urban land cover are South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Two estimates are given for the area of urban land in 2030, with the crucial difference between the two being if cities stay at the current levels of density or if they follow other global cities and become less dense as they grow larger. Under both scenarios, Nigeria is set to have the largest urban land area by 2030, with between 1.25 and 2.25 million hectares under urban land, up from 464,000 hectares in 2000. If urban density declines at a rate of 2% per year, South Africa will have around 1.36 million hectares under urban land, around the same amount in the United Kingdom in 2000. All cities shown in the figure will see their urban land areas cover expand by 2030.
2.1.3 .... and the rise of slums

Figure 5 displays the proportion of urban populations that are slum dwellers in Africa in 2005 following the UN-HABITAT definition of a slum household. As described in the following section, slum development has resulted from poor approaches to planning and the inability of land administration and governance institutions to keep up with the rapid pace of transition.

Figure 5: Slum population in urban Africa

Where are the urban poor concentrated?

Research by Coulombe and Lanjouw (2013) suggests that just as large cities are home to most of Sub-Saharan Africa’s urban population, they also host the lion’s share of the urban poor. This is in contrast to the situation of other developing regions where smaller cities and towns host the larger share of the urban poor.

This is not to say that smaller towns are richer than large cities – on the contrary, Table 2 shows that the share of the population in small towns that is poor is higher than in large towns – but simply reflects the fact that large cities are home to the lion’s share of most countries’ total urban poor. However, differing rates of regional growth shift this pattern over time: the Ghana case study shows how while the capital Accra saw the fastest rates of urbanisation in the 1980s and 1990s, in the 2000s population growth rates in other cities, especially smaller settlements, have exceeded Accra’s.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Reference Year</th>
<th>Incidence of Poverty (%)</th>
<th>Share of small town in urban population (%)</th>
<th>Share of small town poor in urban poor (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Smallest town category</td>
<td>Largest city size category</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lanjouw (2013)

This pattern suggests two things: more investment in public services is needed in smaller settlements in order to improve living conditions, especially as these are set to house more poor people in the future. But there is also a need to improve conditions in peri-urban areas of large cities where the majority of the urban poor currently reside, and where large numbers of people will continue to move to unless jobs and opportunities appear elsewhere.

2.2 Future patterns of urbanisation

Although the current rates of urbanisation in SSA are lower than sometimes suggested, the region is expected to urbanise at a higher rate than other parts of the world. Between 2010 and 2050, the number of Africa’s urban dwellers is expected to increase from 400 million to 1.26 billion (UN HABITAT 2014). Africa-wide, the proportion of people living in urban areas is projected to reach 50% by around 2035, and almost 58% by 2050 under a moderate growth-rate projection (ibid).

East Africa (which includes South Sudan) was the world’s least urbanised region and is expected to see rapid urban population growth of 5.35% in the coming decade, by far the world’s highest (UN HABITAT, 2014). While there were 20.8 million new urban dwellers in East Africa between 2000 and 2010, at current growth rates there are expected to be 50% more by 2020, and five times the 2010 figure in 2040. Although these numbers deserve cautious interpretation, the scale of urban growth is likely to be very large.
Globally, the largest urban expansion rates over the coming decades are expected to be observed in sub-Saharan Africa, with a predicted 12-fold increase in urban land cover surface between 2000 and 2050 according to some current projections (Angel, Parent, Civco, & Blei, 2010). The biggest absolute growth is expected to occur in countries with large populations and relatively low urban population: Tanzania’s urban population is expected to grow by 61.5 million people between 2010 and 2050; and Ethiopia’s is expected to grow by 41.9 million.

Most of this growth will continue to be in intermediate-sized and smaller cities. The ability of these cities to cope will be in question, given their weak institutional and infrastructure capacity, often below that of major cities. As such, the establishment of informal settlements/slums in new cities will be a constant possibility. Once established, a pattern of urban development can be locked in and very difficult/expensive to change, creating a large incentive for prior planning and managed development.
3 Urbanisation and land

3.1 A framework for exploring urbanisation and land

In the debate on the benefits and challenges of urbanisation in developing countries, a vital question is whether rapid urban population growth can help to raise living standards and reduce poverty without degrading the environment (Turok and McGanahan 2013; 1).

Figure 6 provides an overview of the three main areas of discussion in the literature on the impacts of urbanisation, namely: its potential for maximising growth; prospects for reducing poverty or at least, minimising the possible harm from urbanisation; and the need to minimise the environmental damage that can arise from urbanisation/urban growth and to improve resilience of urban communities to environmental shocks and stresses.

Figure 6: What is the end game of urbanisation?

3.1.1 The prevalence of urban poverty

Around one in seven of the world’s population lives in poor quality, usually overcrowded, housing in urban areas. Most of these areas lack provision for safe, sufficient water, sanitation and other needs, and include large numbers of urban dwellers who are malnourished and suffer preventable premature death and disease. A significant number of these are not defined as being poor according to standard poverty line measurements (Satterthwaite and Mitlin 2014). Even using the US$1/day line, between 1993 and 2002, while the number of people below the line fell by 150 million in rural areas, this rose by 50 million in urban areas (Ravaillon et al 2008).

3.1.2 The potential of urbanisation to drive economic growth

Over the last decade, many influential global development organisations and national governments have moved from seeing urbanisation as an economic and social ill towards advocating the view that urbanisation can drive growth and development and should be encouraged. Underpinning this view is the theory and empirical literature that posits that agglomeration boosts productivity as concentration of capital, business services and relatively skilled labour leads to innovation; shared infrastructure and service providers generate economies of scale; and there is the opportunity for information and knowledge spill-overs (Page 2012; Miller 2014).
However, the evidence to support a causal link between urbanisation and growth is thin, indicating a correlation rather than causation (Miller 2014; Turok and McGanahan 2013; Walton 2012). There is a positive link between agglomeration and productivity and employment when urbanisation and growth result from industrialisation, rather than being resource-led (Miller 2014). However, this does not appear to be the characteristic of urbanisation in sub-Saharan Africa where the population (including the poor) has become more urban with little reduction in aggregate poverty (Ravaillon et al 2008).

While urbanisation in Sub-Saharan African cities has contributed to growth in some countries like Ghana (World Bank, 2015), this experience has not been universal, and many cities do not see substantial agglomeration benefits resulting from urbanisation (Lall forthcoming). Rather, many cities that have low levels of manufacturing (lower than 10% of GDP) see little benefit from urbanisation as they do not see high levels of investment in densely populated areas. Part of the reason for this is that policies to guide residential capital, commercial capital and infrastructure are not coordinated (World Bank 2013). More attention needs to be paid to the dynamics of urbanisation and the nature of growth, including the different ways in which cities can support growth and the varied forms or composition of that growth (Turok and McGanahan 2013).

3.1.3 Main challenges to pro-poor urbanisation

The existence of agglomeration economies does not mean that urbanisation will necessarily cause economic output to increase. The benefits of concentration can be offset by negative externalities such as rising congestion, overcrowding, overloaded infrastructure, pressure on ecosystems (such as water courses and air quality), higher costs of living, and higher labour and property costs in cities. By dispersing factors of production, sprawling urbanisation increase business costs, reduce productivity and deter private investment (UN HABITAT 2015).

There are also challenges that limit the transmission of benefits of high growth to the poorest, causing severe environmental and health costs and minimising the potential for social transformation. Unplanned urbanisation has resulted in cities becoming more of an environmental and health hazard with significant implications for the poor and vulnerable who migrate to cities in search of jobs. The lack of basic amenities and significant shortage of housing in unplanned and under-resourced urbanisation make urban problems acute, leading to more pronounced impacts on health and safety, particularly for the poor and, within that group, women. Over one billion urban residents today live in such poor quality and overcrowded housing that they can be considered to be slum dwellers (Revi and Rosenzweig 2013).

Several factors make things worse, including: ineffective municipal governance and broader political economy issues; lack of revenue of these governments; and weak urban institutions (see section 4.2). Small secondary towns especially are afflicted by challenges as their poor management and lack of communication with other towns and cities mean that struggle to manage urbanisation, attract and retain investment, and therefore meet the demands for infrastructure and basic services (UN HABITAT 2015). While municipalities are often expected to rely on the taxes they raise, including land taxes, there are often serious constraints to their ability to do this. For example, in Ghana, disputes between chiefs and the government over what types of payments should go towards maintaining the offices of chiefs and what should go to accounts of district committees has meant that districts have very low funds at their disposal and have been overly reliant on payments by central government.

Disputed authority over land can also spill over and undermine governance of municipalities. In Tanzania, jurisdictional disputes between the Ministry of Lands and city municipalities over planning authority in different areas has stifled efforts to plan peri-urban areas. A clear example of this has been the attempts to set up new satellite cities in peri-urban outskirts of Dar es Salaam, where disputes over planning authority have increased tenure security and stifled development.

We explore these issues in more detail in the case studies on Ghana and Tanzania.

3.2 The role of land in promoting pro-poor urbanisation

Land tenure, administration/planning and governance influence some of the conditions necessary to maximise the pro-poor growth potential of urbanisation/urban growth and minimise its potential negative impacts.
3.2.1 Urbanisation, growth and land

In the literature linking growth to urbanisation, mobility or connectivity is a critical factor that is influenced by land:

- The agglomeration literature has tended to assume that land and housing markets function smoothly and local authorities are responsive to market failures, so that people and firms can easily relocate and suitable land and infrastructure will be provided to accommodate them. However, this is rarely the case in developing countries. Potential benefits will be much larger with supportive policies, markets and infrastructure investments to address other factors that affect productivity and development, such as the industrial and occupational structure, level of technology and skills, available land supply, and removing barriers to rural–urban and intra-urban mobility to facilitate matching, sharing and learning (Turok and McGanahan 2013).

- Another aspect is the need for sound land use planning integrated with gender-sensitive transportation planning to provide affordable access, appropriate densities, mix of land-uses, and safety for vulnerable populations and connect people to jobs, markets, essential services and political representation. However, access to mobility is unequal: “The poor make fewer trips and spend a greater proportion of their time and income getting to where they want to go” (World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2007 in Revi and Rosenzweig 2013). Gender-blind transport planning often assumes male labour patterns, prioritising travel from peri-urban areas to city centres during “peak hours”. This ignores women’s dominance in domestic, informal and part-time work in non-centralised zones, non-peak journeys and disproportionate household and care burdens (Chant 2013).

3.2.2 Urbanisation, poverty reduction and land

The literature focusing on poverty reduction in urban areas highlights the role of access to basic services, infrastructure and housing in improving people’s livelihoods and allowing them to go for job opportunities. Land can affect the provision and access to these basic services again through the functioning of land and housing markets, and urban land use planning and management capacity. Land governance and political economy issues also play their part.

**Land and housing markets**

For some authors, the rush of migrants into cities can **overburden existing and not fully developed land market institutions and urban management and capabilities**, so that formal sector housing and land markets cannot respond with adequate supply in the short-medium term (Henderson 2010). The result is the development and acceptance of a large informal sector, with lack of public facility servicing and public services.

**Land use planning**

Urban expansion into the peri-urban areas of towns and cities can lead to sub-optimal configurations of land use in the absence of pro-poor land use planning. Symptoms of sub-optimal land use include large areas of land sitting unused and which are inaccessible for other land uses, low density residential areas, and large distances between residential areas and sites of employment. According to Turok and McGanahan (2013) failing to plan on the basis of population projections is most detrimental to the prospects of the poorest urban dwellers. When located on the urban outskirts far from economic opportunities, informal settlements may not only lack basic water and sanitation services, but also trap communities in places where the prospects of upward mobility are remote. “Urban overcrowding and congestion are not merely economic constraints, drags on productivity and deterrents to private investment. They also worsen living conditions, spread disease, undermine people’s life chances and fuel dissatisfaction and social unrest.”

These ingredients raise the costs of urban life for poorer residents:

- **Rents are high**: land scarcity (created by either restrictive regulation or developers powerful enough to resist pressures to deliver building/housing) pushes up rents for poorer residents. When the options for housing are limited to illegal settlements, this can force people to settle in areas that either lack services or may be more vulnerable to disasters. High rents clearly disposable income for poor residents, reducing what they can spend on other services, amenities or remit home.
• **Transport costs are high:** Dislocation from places of income generation makes commuting costly in terms of time and money. Poor households regularly spend half of their income on commuting. High costs of commuting are driven by factors other than distance including the efficiency of public transport and congestion on roads.

• **Other service costs are high:** In addition, this type of development is inefficient because the costs associated with servicing this low-dense housing are high so governments do not prioritise them for services or infrastructure. Informal provision of basic services including water and cooking fuel are often more expensive in informal areas.

Land use planning clearly plays a role in determining the severity of congestion: ensuring enough land is made available for transport infrastructure — especially for public transport — is one part of the picture. Also important for peri-urban areas will be the connectivity of areas more likely to be attractive to commuting middle income groups to reduce incentives for commuting using private vehicles.

This may call for proactive planning of suburban areas in the peri-urban areas for middle-income residential areas. A common co-benefit of planned housing areas for middle-income groups is to reduce competition for low-cost housing (downwards raiding).

**Land governance and political economy issues**

**However, focusing on technical and capacity-building measures may not resolve the problem entirely.** Henderson (2010) points out that lack of servicing may be in part intentional or a strategic policy choice on the part of governments. Residents of favoured cities do not want to see the benefits of favouritism dissipated through migrants crowding into the city. Governments can make entry conditions much more difficult through indifference or hostility to informal settlements or they can pursue a more positive and supportive approach, including the provision of land, upgrading shelter and services, and help with building sustainable livelihoods (Turok and McGahan 2013).

### 3.3 Features of land use and governance in peri-urban areas

In peri-urban areas (PUAs), common and interlinked characteristics in land tenure, administration/planning and governance can make it hard to provide the conditions for a beneficial, pro-poor urbanisation process.

PUAs, at the interface of rural areas and growing cities, tend to be areas of rapid transition, characterised by multiple land uses and tenure arrangements, with overlapping or fragmented land administration and governance systems. They are often land tenure hotspots: land markets are subject to competitive pressure as urban centres expand, speculation is frequent, property relations are subject to intense contestation, and access to wealth and authority is undergoing rapid change (Ubink, 2008a and b in Arko-Adjei 2011; Simon et al. 2004; DANIDA 2000).

#### 3.3.1 Multiple demands on land from different land uses

Peri-urban areas see frequent changes in land use, underpinned by competition for land from different sectors, often reflected in sharp rises in land values:

Land is important for agricultural livelihoods. Much land remains used for agriculture, and is important for peri-urban agricultural producers who respond to demand from cities. Given the proximity to cities, production of commercial high value and perishable crops is common, including horticulture and dairying. However, some households also use peri-urban land for small-scale crop production.

At the same time, a major source of demand for peri-urban land is for residential housing. This demand comes from both middle-income earners seeking land for larger houses than would be possible in city centres, and low-income households unable to afford housing in city centres amid rising land prices, and frequent evictions.

Manufacturers also seek land for industrial activities, either because resources are present (quarries, water), because land is cheaper than in urban centres, or because there is more scope to discharge waste from industrial processes.
This transition leads to land markets expanding and land becoming increasingly commoditised: this rising demand raises the value of land in peri-urban areas, which leads to a change in perceptions away from seeing land primarily as a resource with little financial value towards seeing it as a commodity that can be managed for financial gain (Mends and De Meijere, 2006). In areas where customary practices have traditionally made land available to households for free or at very low costs, proximity to an expanding city often spurs traditional authorities to either evict current users in order to lease it out at higher rates to developers, or charge higher rates. For example, in Tamale, Northern Ghana rising land values have led customary authorities to repossess land from farmers and lease this for residential areas. As a result, land transactions in peri-urban areas become more frequent, and pressure increases to sub-divide land into smaller parcels in order to increase supply and financial returns.

3.4 Reasons why land administration in peri-urban areas is weak

At the same time, state resources are spread thinly and unable to provide effective land administration. Land administration in PUAs tends to be characterised by weak statutory land administration institutions and unclear or shifting systems of authority, which can lead to disputes between authorities, a breakdown in systems of customary authority or a vacuum in administrative mandates.

3.4.1 Weak statutory land administration functions

Authorities in peri-urban areas tend to be overstretched and unable to carry out land governance and administration functions effectively in line with the transitional nature of peri-urban areas (Siechiping 2015, Wehrmann 2015). Weaknesses in governance and administration are common to authorities in rural areas but are also likely to be true of urban municipalities incorporating rural areas. Specific areas of weakness include:

- **Recording tenure rights**: efforts to record rights may not be sufficient in peri-urban areas. Similarly, systems to record, store and update land rights may be ill-suited to the reality of the area.

- **Land use planning**: governments may not prioritise land use planning in peri-urban areas, or lack knowledge and expertise to do so;

- **Land use enforcement**: authorities regularly lack the power to prevent encroachment or illegal conversion of land from permitted uses, or levy fines in response to illegal practices.

- **Land valuation**: Authorities lack the expertise to correctly assess values of land and to project land value increases into the future in order to support planning.

- **Land taxation**: Authorities frequently lack the authority or power to raise land and property taxes.

3.4.2 Shifting governance systems

As populations in PUAs rise and municipality borders are extended, PUAs may bring municipal authorities into contact with areas under customary tenure systems. This process of urbanisation tends to lead to increasingly complex land markets and can weaken social ties that underpin the customary ties that have governed land tenure in rural areas, raising challenges for land governance and tenure security.

Confusion over authority can be exacerbated by the fact that the physical boundaries of urban areas often do not coincide with their administrative boundaries, and urban and peri-urban areas often fall under separate administrative jurisdictions with different resources, capacities and political leanings (DANIDA 2000; Simon et al. 2004). When an area reaches a specific threshold of population density, national laws mandate that the area is reclassified as an urban settlement and that municipal authorities be granted powers to regulate land transactions and land use. However, if those with mandates to make decisions over land are not present (e.g. absentee landlords) or lack influence within a community (as is often the case of state planners), nascent authorities and governance channels may emerge and grow (e.g. leaders in residential communities). This process of blending customary and state authorities is often not smooth: in Ghana’s case, the superimposition of state land management authorities on customary authorities has made the latter’s operations less efficient in peri-urban than in rural areas (Arko-Adjei 2011).
The change in statutory authorities can also create disputes over authority, creating a situation where there is no effective oversight over planning. In Tanzania, this has occurred when districts are upgraded to municipalities and village authorities lose their powers.

In the absence of institutions with a mandate to administer land, this may be taken up by those with other important functions or high standing within a community. Where land authority is vested in traditional leaders, these may employ more agents, or change their behaviour in response to growing demand (Pottier 2006 in Arko Adjei 2011).

3.4.3 Breakdown of systems of customary authority

Existing customary systems in peri-urban areas may not be able to evolve to the extent that they can cope with the speed, volume, diversity and complexity of contemporary land management issues (Arko-Adjei 2011). In some cases, this results in a ‘breakdown’ in customary systems, as seen around Accra, Ghana in the early 2000s, where 19 of the 25 chieftaincy positions were unoccupied (Burns et al. 2007). Customary governance may break down because of disputes within customary systems due to disagreements over authority and succession, or between different chieftaincies of historical land borders and allocations in areas where land values have recently risen. However, the literature does not indicate that complete breakdowns in customary systems are common, instead suggesting that a shift in the balance of power and authority is more common.

3.5 How poor land governance creates anti-poor outcomes

The challenges above can create widespread insecurity of tenure. Uncoordinated land governance can lead to double allocation of land to different parties, usually with outcomes that disfavour the poor. In some cases, this can be purposeful if traditional authorities chose to reallocate land away from longer-term occupiers for financial gain (see examples from Ghana case study).

Those whose claims derive from long-term residence or occupation of land may see their claim overlooked if it is not known to, or acknowledged by, relevant authorities. Landholders may not be aware of relevant requirements to register claims to land, and that their claim is at risk if they do not do so. Rising land values and associated opportunities for financial gain may convince either customary or state authorities to ignore claims of poor or vulnerable residents in favour of those willing to pay more for access to land, without compensating those who lose their residence either through alternative land, or through other means. In cases where customary systems have become less accountable, this has resulted in growing levels of landlessness, evictions and inequality (Arko-Adjei 2011).

However, in many contexts, the relationship between informal governance and tenure security is not necessarily a negative one, as communities and local institutions establish their own mechanisms to govern land markets. Recent research into the features that define informal markets in peri-urban areas in South Africa, Mozambique, Angola and Malawi found that informal land markets are very much alive in areas of informal settlements in both urban and peri-urban areas, and landholders did not perceive they had weak tenure security. These markets were characterised by the following factors:

- The importance of social relationships as a means to broker access to land — many households rely on friends and families to find reliable partners with whom to transact land. Across the study sites in the four countries, research identified the strong role of both traditional chiefs, but also friends and family in making introductions between sellers and buyers.

- These social relationships lend or confer legitimacy to transactions, and are often viewed as a more important means of affirming rights to land than formal registration documents. In other areas where customary authorities continue to have strong recognised decision-making authority over land allocation — as is common in peri-urban areas of Ghana — landholders frequently seen it as unnecessary to attempt to gain access to formal documentation where this is available because it adds little extra value (Sewornu and Barry 2015). This is confirmed by research from Malawi, Angola and Mozambique, particularly where households have paid for their access to land.

- Traditional authorities and local level institutions are also the first, and often only, port of call for land disputes between households, although some variation is observed between countries studied in
Southern Africa. One in three households living in informal peri-urban areas of Luanda referred disputes to local and provincial governments, but this exceptionally high for most countries in the region; in sites in South Africa, Mozambique and Malawi, the low number of disputes that arose under these customary tenure systems were referred to, and dealt with, by local committees or chiefs where the latter existed (Royston 2013).

**Land and spatial coordination and delivery of infrastructure for the poor**

Multiple land tenure systems may also constrain planning for infrastructure, for example leading to an undersupply of roads which is a common feature of African cities.

Weak or multiple tenure systems may also thwart attempts to plan and deliver infrastructure and services conducive to economic growth and poverty reduction (Mboup 2013; Simon et al. 2004). This includes the adequate supply of roads, water and sanitation infrastructure, and housing. Weak authorities may be ill-equipped to plan for long-term developments in areas under their control, lacking either information on future trends and challenges, or the knowledge to deal with these. Responsibility for provision and maintenance of infrastructure and services may lie with different government departments or agencies at central, regional and local government levels which makes it hard to coordinate supply and access to services in peri-urban areas (Simon et al. 2004). Multiple land tenure systems may prevent land planning taking place in peri-urban areas, as there is no clear mandate as to whose authority planning falls under.

A major blockage to implementing planning in countries lies in the lack of resources to compensate landholders. Although processes often call for land to be transferred from private individuals to government as a step in the land formalisation process, governments rarely have compensation funds or other budgets that can be used to compensate landholders for their loss of rights to access land. Conditions attached to loans and grants made by development banks or donors mean that their funds cannot be used to pay compensation for resettlement either.

The lack of resources can prevent programmes from going ahead. Finding ways to move around this obstacle is important to ensuring that land registration efforts can go ahead. In Tanzania, recent experiences of changing the process so that land needed for roads is provided by landholders through a land readjustment process offers some promise (Lugoe 2015). New approaches have seen all landholders in a community pool their land and redistribute it to avoid any one landholder losing land disproportionately, which has offered some important successes.
4 Ghana case study

Ghana’s urbanisation process has taken place in a context of customary and statutory tenure systems working side by side. In contrast to Tanzania, (see next chapter) where the land tenure system has been shaped by the decisions of the socialist government to abolish chiefs, in Ghana the political settlement has left important decision-making power in the hands of chiefs and traditional authorities who have important influence on land allocation and transactions on most of the land in the country. This raises a number of challenges that are characteristic of other countries in which authority over land is shared between statutory and customary authorities.

4.1 Ghana’s urbanisation trajectory

Since the 1980s, population growth in urban areas has exceeded that in rural areas: between 1984 and 2013, the number of urban residents grew from four million to 14 million and now around 51% of all Ghanaians live in urban areas. By 2030, this is expected to rise to 62% (World Bank, 2015).

For most of the period from the 1980s up until the early 2000s, the capital Accra attracted and housed by far the largest portion of Ghana’s urban population although Kumasi, Ghana’s second city, grew faster. In the year 2000, Accra (1.7m people) was home to 20% of Ghana’s urban population and, together with Kumasi (1.2m), accounted for 34% of the urban population. The three next largest cities of Tema, Seko/Takrodi and Tamale all had fewer than 500,000 people. By 2010, although the overall ranking of city classes remained changed, high growth in Kumasi and slower growth in Accra meant both cities grew to their present equal size of around two million. This period also saw growth in smaller settlements exceed that in large ones (apart from Kumasi) — see Table 3. The number of settlements with 20,000-50,000 people quadrupled, and those with 50,000-100,000 people quadrupled from nine in 2000 to 36 in 2010 (World Bank, 2015).

Table 3: Ghana’s city classes ranked by growth rate, 2000-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City class</th>
<th>Total urban population</th>
<th>Annual growth rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumasi</td>
<td>1,170,270</td>
<td>2,035,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3,401,619</td>
<td>5,462,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekondi/Takoradi</td>
<td>369,166</td>
<td>583,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 7 towns</td>
<td>473,445</td>
<td>727,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tema</td>
<td>447,472</td>
<td>633,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamale</td>
<td>197,178</td>
<td>274,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 6 towns</td>
<td>554,805</td>
<td>752,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accra</td>
<td>1,658,937</td>
<td>2,076,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,272,892</td>
<td>12,545,229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, the slow growth in Accra city shown in Table 3 masks faster growth of its outer lying peri-urban districts and small towns that have seen very high rates of population growth (Government of Ghana, 2015). Similarly, the peri-urban areas around Kumasi have seem high growth as migrants and residents have relocated to these areas. As Figure 7 shows, most of Ghana’s urban settlements are clustered in the south of the country, especially in the 200 km triangle between Accra, Kumasi and Secondi/Takoradi. The northern regions have fewer cities of all classes, and those that exist are further away from each other (Government of Ghana, 2015).

### Links with economic growth

The World Bank Urbanization Review for Ghana (World Bank 2015) points out that the recent period of rapid urbanisation in Ghana coincided with a period of fast, stable growth and job creation. Statistics suggest unemployment fell even during a period of steady rural-urban migration, as migrants were able to find work. Employment in the industry and services sector grew from 38 to 59% between 1992 and 2010, contributing significantly to economic growth and enabling many households to escape poverty. This process demonstrates the importance of economies of scale and network effects associated with urbanisation, and their impact on economic development (World Bank 2015).

However, this extra employment has not been in those sectors that provide the best conditions for sustained future growth. Manufacturing employment during the 2000s remained steady or even fell slightly, while most new jobs were in non-tradable services, such as commerce and hospitality. Sustained growth in Ghana risks being undermined by the lack of a vibrant industrial sector and the lack of efficiency associated with uncoordinated spatial expansion (World Bank 2015).

In order for urbanisation to sustain its contribution to economic growth, the World Bank suggests that more efforts are needed to coordinate spatial expansion including through better connections between large urban settlements, and between urban areas and their surroundings where much of the manufacturing activity will continue to move to (World Bank 2015).

### Figure 7: Geographical spread of Ghana’s urbanisation

![Figure 7: Geographical spread of Ghana’s urbanisation](source: World Bank, 2015)
4.2 Land tenure and governance

Ghana’s land tenure system, particularly that governing customary land in and around the cities, has become the “focal point of urban expansion and housing development” (World Bank 2015). How land markets, administration and governance work in the peri-urban areas surrounding larger towns and smaller settlements is critical to both the form urban expansion takes, and how benefits from urban expansion are distributed (World Bank, 2015).

4.2.1 The land tenure system in Ghana

Ghana has a dual land tenure system. Most land (around 80%) is customary land, vested in lineages represented by chiefs and or other traditional authorities including earth priests and clan heads. The government controls the remaining 20% which it manages through its Lands Commission (Bugri, 2014). The two main forms of customary-held land held by chiefs are stool land (in southern regions) and skin land (in the north). A third smaller category of Family land refers to customary lands owned by clans with a common ancestor (Arko-Adjei, 2011).

Responsibilities of the government

The 20% of public (state) lands are managed by the new Lands Commission’s public and vested land management division and the 10 regional commissions and secretariats. District Assemblies, which have the highest level of authority over legislating, budgeting and planning at the local level, are also involved in the management of customary land (ILGS, 2010). Their physical planning departments are responsible for spatial planning and controlling physical development on both public and customary land. Their responsibilities also include preparing and approving planning schemes and granting any subsequent building permits, enforcing regulations and sanctioning non-compliance. The Lands Commission is also meant to give final consent to transactions on stool land (Mahama & Baffour, 2009). The Office of Administration of Stool Lands is responsible for collecting revenue from taxes on land transactions, and distributing these to the local government and customary authorities according to a constitutional formula (see box on next page).

Responsibilities of customary authorities

On stool and skin lands, management responsibilities of chiefs include custody of land, dispute settlement, codification of customary law, as well as organisation of rituals, ceremonies and festivals organisation of communal labour, and promotion of socio-economic development. When carrying out these tasks, chiefs are meant to promote the wellbeing of the present and future community members, protect sacred sites and respect familial rights of land-owning families. Chiefs are assisted in their duties by elders and indigenous courts who help with decisions on how to allocate land to community outsiders and settle disputes (Arko-Adjei, 2011). Most decisions are made by chiefs in consultation with their councils, but there is rarely further consultation with the broader community (Pernes, 2014, Sewornu pers. comm.).

Although Ghana’s land laws provide clear definitions and divisions between the roles of different customary authorities and government agencies, in practice this division is often not upheld. For example, in the area of planning, planning departments lack the staff and resources to carry out their responsibilities and district assemblies lack powers to enforce plans. On the other hand, traditional authorities commission planning schemes in their jurisdiction without going through stipulated formal government channels. Although community members are meant to enjoy easy access to land through customary systems, the increasingly common practices of chiefs arbitrarily using of powers has eroded security of tenure for households (see discussion below).

To improve this situation, in recent years some traditional authorities have introduced Customary Land Secretariats (CLS) to assist land administration, governance and planning activities. Responsibilities of the CLS include assisting with dispute resolution, adopt simple land-use planning procedures, develop landholding rules, and establish simple registries to record land allocations and fees and charges associated with land grants (Arko-Adjei, 2011). As of 2013, 39 CLS had been established, almost all of which were established at the request of customary authorities (Biitir, Nara, & Ameyaw, 2015). The long-term aim of the government-led Land

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3 The small category of vested land is also managed by the public agencies. This land was previously taken from customary lands for public use.

4 As provided in the Lands Commission Act, 2008 (Act 767).
Administration Project is to establish through the CLS’s a unified, decentralised public record of land availability, use and transactions (Ubink, 2008). These are discussed in more detail below.

4.2.2 How households access land in these two systems

The ways these two categories of public and customary land are managed affect who can gain rights of occupation and under what conditions. While all citizens can theoretically gain access to public land, in practice, access depends on social connections or making informal payments – making them inaccessible to poorer segments of society (Sewornu pers. comm.).

Access to customary land is regulated by norms that apply under customary law. Several types of rights exist that offer different types of access that prioritise access of community members over outsiders. Through customary freehold title, male descendants of first settlers have assured rights to use land if they cultivate it. As long as they recognise the superior authority of the stool or skin, community members with these rights can also sell, lease or mortgage their rights (USAID 2013). These permanent use rights holders can also use the recognised sharecropping arrangements to lease land to outsiders, who usually cannot access to land on the same terms as community members.

Community members historically accessed customary land by giving chiefs gifts of alcohol or other small tokenistic payments. However, rising demand for land in urban and peri-urban areas5 has led to a situation where chiefs often request cash payments of much higher monetary value. The high cost of accessing customary land puts it beyond the means of many poor households.

Civil society organisations are not prominent in assisting poor households to access land and housing in Ghana as they are in other countries. The Land Administration Project (discussed below) is currently attempting to support more civil society activities working on land issues, particularly on public education activities to raise awareness on land issues.

Contested responsibility and funding for development activities

Ghana’s land laws mandate that rents, royalties, dues and any other form of income or capital that are raised from stool land are meant to be paid into stool land account for redistribution, according to the following formula:

- 10% for the administrator;
- 25% to the landholding stool through the traditional authority for the maintenance of the stool;
- 20% to the traditional council; and
- 55% to the District Assembly which has jurisdiction over the area where the stool is located.

Although the legal framework provides a clear division of responsibilities for land management, more contested is the question of if district assemblies or chiefs should be responsible for carrying out social and economic development activities within communities. Because taxes on land transactions are a major source of funding for development projects, there are conflicting opinions and practices over how land sales are organised and how much tax needs to be paid on transactions.

The core mandate of district assemblies includes a responsibility for community development. While they receive some funding from central government, much comes from taxes levied on property transactions on customary lands. These are meant to be funded primarily through revenue from land transactions, which are collected by the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL).

However, this disbursement formula has been unpopular with chiefs, partly because the district assemblies are not always perceived to use their budgets to deliver tangible benefits, and spend too much on recurring expenses and salaries and invest too little in works and infrastructure programmes. As the constitution also prescribes that chiefs have a responsibility to use land revenues for the benefit of their communities, some chiefs argue they should receive a greater portion of the funding in order to fulfil this obligation.

At the same time, because the funds that go to the district assembly are meant to be used for development, chiefs refute calls that they spend the 20% they receive on development projects. Some chiefs also maintain

5 In Accra and Kumasi, land prices increased between 460% and 1,300% between 1995 and 2005 (World Bank 2015).
that because their ancestors owned the land they have no obligation to share these proceeds with other members of the community.

Partly because of this disagreement, some chiefs have bypassed the formal system and structured land sales in a way that reduces the amount that goes to the district assembly while increasing what they receive. They have done this by declaring low official values for sales and other transactions, but requiring buyers to pay high amounts for what were formerly tokenistic payments to the chiefs: so-called “drink money”. Research suggests that the sums for drink money now reflect market prices for land, and dwarf the small sums coming from ground rent that chiefs agree to pay (Blocher 2006).

The issue of the definition of stool land revenue is particularly pertinent in peri-urban areas where much revenue is raised from the rise in land value as agricultural land is converted to residential land. Although this lacuna is widely acknowledged, few efforts to address this have been made due to fears that a case brought against the system would be met by broad backlash by the chiefs, with important political consequences (Ubink and Quan 2008).

4.3 Customary governance in fast-changing peri-urban areas

The effects of population growth and urbanisation place strains on customary land systems and this is most evident in peri-urban areas (Kaiser Hughes, Knox, & Jones-Casey, 2011). Growing demand for land – mostly from the non-agricultural sector – results in land scarcity, higher land values and greater demand for planning of customary land. Customary systems often struggle to deal with these new demands and in some cases “disintegrate” (Naab et al. 2013), exposing several weaknesses within the customary land governance system:

- Disputes over historical land claims emerge and take a long time and substantial resources to resolve because jurisdictions and decision-making powers are contestable. As land values rise in peri-urban areas, disputes over jurisdictional boundaries between neighbouring chiefdoms have become more frequent. These disputes are often over historical boundaries, but also over land that earlier generations of chiefs have loaned to outsiders and whether these loans were temporary or permanent (Paaga 2013).

- Disputes within land-owning families are also increasingly common as individual family members sell off parcels of land without the consent of other members. These decisions can then later be nullified or contested, especially when the same parcel is resold to another buyer. This type of situation is common on land under the authority of family heads and chiefs (Mends and De Meijere, 2006, Sewornu and Barry, 2015). Disputes over land allocation are sometimes tied to broader questions of authority and succession within customary systems, which are often contested. For example, struggles over succession may lead to the appointment of interim caretaker chiefs, who may withhold endorsement of land sales or allocate land in a way that is perceived as illegitimate by others in the community.

The dispute resolution system is ill-equipped to deal with the increasing numbers of disputes that result from contested land governance decisions. Despite the frequency of disputes within families, traditional dispute resolution mechanisms are not perceived to be fit to solve these disputes. Even though statutory courts are slow and cases are expensive to resolve, plaintiffs often turn to these as they expect a more favourable hearing (Crook 2004). Settling disputes can involve large litigation fees that encourage chiefs to sell further lands in their jurisdictions in order to pay legal fees. These conflicts at the jurisdictional level lead to tenure insecurity to households occupying lands that are subject to disputes (discussed below).

- Chiefs have the right to evict community members from land they occupy without consultation. Customary authorities can use their allodial (ultimate) rights over land to take and reallocate land to newcomers that both community members and outsiders use. The rising value of land provides incentives to reallocate land that previously did not exist. While chiefs consult with councils of elders,
these do not always act in the interest of community members, especially when it comes to the sale of communal land (Yaro, 2009; Ubink, 2008).

• **Chiefs are not obliged to share proceeds from sales with community members.** When chiefs choose to reallocate the land that community members use, there is no requirement for them to share proceeds from new leases with members. Although the government or private investors may provide compensation payments, district assemblies have limited means to stipulate how chiefs use the proceeds (Oduro et al., 2015) and where chiefs decide to pay compensation, they use their discretion rather than formal guidelines or formulae to guide how much they pay. Therefore, the amount of compensation households receive is often well below market rates. (Oduro et al., 2015). Where farmers lose land in peri-urban areas, studies have found they are often compensated only for lost crops or provided single dwellings in return for the loss of large areas of land (Alden Wiley and Hammond 2001, Pernes 2014).

• Traditional authorities usually do not have systems of record keeping that enable them to keep pace with accelerating rate of land transactions. In customary jurisdictions, neither customary authorities nor landholders keep records of land transactions, relying instead on trust and collective recollection to legitimise land holding (Paaga 2013). This has resulted in complex disputes when multiple allocation of land occurs (Ubink, 2008).

• **Planning of settlements on customary land does not take place.** Customary authorities have often been unwilling or unable to collaborate with planning authorities in order to plan settlements in areas of their jurisdiction. Chiefs frequently prepare their own planning schemes for areas, in some cases through surveyors, without consulting either district assemblies or any existing plans or maps. To confuse matters further, sometimes officials from state agencies carry out unofficial planning on behalf of chiefs (Pagaa 2013). In other areas, chiefs do not survey land boundaries but rather require land purchasers to do so, leading to a situation where survey information is not held in a central registry but in the hands of individual owners (Pagaa 2013).

The blame for a lack of formal planning does not lie entirely with traditional authorities as District Assemblies often lack the resources to carry out planning on the scale needed, or the capacity to enforce plans. Despite having important functions for overseeing the development of land in line with zoning stipulations, the District Assemblies’ Town and Country Planning Department lacks adequate personnel, resources and political backing to carry out its functions (Arko-Adjei, 2011).

In addition, acrimonious relationship between chiefs and district assemblies have prevented cooperation in land planning and administration. Reasons for poor relationships are often related to how local government has previously demarcated administrative boundaries without consulting chiefs. This has led to situations where administrative boundaries cut across traditional boundaries, or where public buildings (e.g. colleges and stadia) built on land claimed by one traditional authority are given names that associate them with an adjacent traditional authority6 (Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 2012).

4.3.1 Impacts on access to land

These issues of weak land governance, administration and planning brought into relief by the greater urbanisation of rural land markets produce a series of negative outcomes on households living in peri-urban areas. Contested authority within the chieftaincy system creates tenure insecurity, as occupied land may be sold off, and in many cases, those households losing land do not receive compensation. For example, Sewornu (*in lit*) and Danso and Barry (2015) note how disputes between family members in the chieftaincy in the Oyibi and Bortisanor areas of peri-urban Accra over rights to allocate land created long-term tenure insecurity for households occupying these lands. Similarly, Naab et al. (2013) note that the increasing demand for peri-urban land around Tamale creates

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6 As an example, MLGRD (2012) cites an example where Chiefs of the Akwapen Traditional Area complained that a polytechnic and stadium built on land in their area was named the Koforidua Polytechnic and Koforidua Stadium; Koforidua being the name of the neighbouring traditional authority. They complained because using the name of the neighbouring traditional authority undermined the Akwapen claim to land, and meant the Akwapen North District Assembly did not receive royalties from the project.
competition between traditional land-owning families, chiefs and elders and leads to dispossession of land by existing users.

The weak status of landholders’ claims means they cannot effectively protest and protect themselves against the loss of major livelihood assets. Although croplands are important for local livelihoods in most peri-urban areas, chiefs nonetheless regularly lease land to developers whose ambitions for using the land does not provide any benefit to local communities (Chingbu et al, 2015). Wetlands and natural waterways are often developed without regard to the consequences to the wider ecosystems and agricultural activities that depend on them (Ubink, 2007).

Studies from around Accra and Tamale show that poor, agriculture-dependent households are often in the weakest position to protest, and experience the greatest loss in living standards as result of losing land, as they have few alternative livelihood options (Oduro et al., 2015; Naab et al. 2013). Landholders whose land is reallocated to developers often attempt to move to villages further away to farm, but have increasing trouble finding affordable land and capital to develop it. The changes in customary systems can also disadvantage women and youths in within communities, who unlike men, do not have rights to land that allow them to lease land to developers and enjoy the benefits of the income.

From the limited studies looking at differences between indigenes and outsiders, identity does not seem to be more important than ability to pay. Oduwu (2008) finds that while more indigenes could access land more easily than migrants in peri-urban Accra, the opposite situation existed in Kumasi, where migrants were more successful in acquiring land for housing than indigenes because they could afford the higher land costs. Whereas previously it used to be possible for indigenes to acquire land using tokenistic payments, by the 2000s rising land costs in some cities like Kumasi were attracting higher payments that priced out poorer households (Oduwu 2008).

4.4 Current reforms and lessons learned

The sections above have discussed the challenges associated with poor land governance overall and weak land administration over peri-urban areas. Although the above discussion highlights some of the weaknesses inherent in the practices of customary institutions, government and donor response has focused on supporting their better functioning rather than seeking to diminish and replace them with statutory bodies is that they are able to “reach deep into rural society and operate more effectively at community levels” (Bruce 2013 cited in Biitir et al. 2015).

This rationale underpinned the 1999 National Land Policy and subsequent efforts to implement the contents of the policy through activities under the Land Administration Project. This has tried to harmonise the land policy and regulatory framework, reform and develop the public sector and customary land administration agencies, improve titling registration and valuation systems, and develop capacity in human resources, management and evaluation. The activities that had the most direct impact on changing land tenure security on customary lands in peri-urban areas include the establishment of Customary Land Secretariats (discussed above), and supporting the titling and registration of land claims.

Experience to date from activities suggests success has been mixed, and much more time is needed to change practices than the Land Administration Project first anticipated (Pernes 2014). A recent study of how well CLSs were performing their functions (Biitir et al., 2015) found that they had been successful in resolving disputes in their areas. However, progress in other areas was more challenging. Only a small number had attempted to demarcate chieftaincy boundaries, and none had built strong links with planning departments of local district assemblies to to carry out land use planning or allocate plots. In addition, they have faced significant challenges in documenting transactions of land in their jurisdictions. Information on transactions has not been collected for all years, and there has been little coordination in sharing information with the public land agencies. One of the main issues encountered with the CLS has been hiring and retaining long-term, professional staff. In some areas, chiefs have attempted to gain control over CLS by appointing family members to top positions only for the next chief to appoint someone else. Efforts to improve the land record keeping and dispute resolution in the next stage of developing CLS is critical to their success (Biitir et al., 2015; Bugri, 2014).

The Land Administration Project also aimed to strengthen tenure security by issuing permits to landowners and requiring individuals to register their land. According to Sewornu and Barry (2015), the project’s first phase attempted to title 300,000 land parcels in urban and peri-urban areas. Upon completion, fewer than 11,000 land parcels had been surveyed, of which about 5,760 parcels were approved for titling.
Progress has been slow because households are unaware of the project’s existence, but also because most households do not feel that registering their land strengthens their claims within the customary system. Instead, they take other actions, including constructing buildings or hiring land guards to ensure others did not encroach on land. In peri-urban Tamale, Naab et al (2013) found that only farmers growing commercial crops acquired titles for their land, perceive a strong need to register their claims. Expensive and slow procedures stop households from registering titles. In areas of peri-urban Accra distrust of the government was also an important reason. Households were suspicious of the offer of low cost registration by the government, fearing this could lead to expropriation or contestation at some future point (Sewornu and Barry 2015).

Beyond these specific examples, a major criticism of the current approach to reform formal land administration and registering land is that it is based on a technocratic approach that does not include provisions to ensure access, and thereby tenure security, of poor and vulnerable groups (Arko-Adjei, 2011). The processes to register deeds or title are relatively expensive and require a high level of education to navigate, which deter poorer households. The second phase of the Land Administration Project (LAP) is attempting to address these issues through improving information on the benefits of registration and making more use of CLS and civil society, which has traditionally been absent from working on land issues.

4.5 Conclusions and recommendations

Since 2000, Ghana’s urbanisation has been characterised by faster growth in smaller towns and cities, and around the outskirts of larger cities. Peri-urban areas surrounding larger towns and smaller settlements will see the highest population growth in the future.

As elsewhere, peri-urban areas are the sites of rapid change, not least because they often experience the largest changes in land values, which drives speculation and conversion of land use from farmlands to residential and commercial use.

This is accompanied by changes in land governance arrangements and tenure security: peri-urban areas in Ghana have experienced important shifts in land tenure systems as land values have risen and powerful groups, including chiefs and land-owning families, have taken more control over land allocation, often for private gain.

Customary systems may not be able to evolve to the extent that they can cope with the speed, volume, diversity and complexity of contemporary land management issues (Arko-Adjei 2011). As a result, access to land traditionally provided by customary authorities cannot always be relied on to continue under conditions of rapidly rising land prices, especially in the interests of the poor. However, the state’s ability to oversee transactions and provide administrative services that are accessible to the poor are similarly limited, and working to strengthen, rather than weaken, customary systems appears to be the most feasible way of strengthening land tenure for households living in these areas.

To assist the customary authorities in modernising their administrative procedures and offering better tenure security and land governance, the government has started establishing Customary Land Secretariats to support traditional systems. The CLS that have established are working well in some respects providing alternative dispute resolution to the courts systems, and information to communities on land rights. However, their ability to keep records of land transactions is mixed, and long-term support is needed in order for these to function as effective administrative bodies.
5 Tanzania case study

5.1 Overview of urbanisation in Tanzania

5.1.1 Tanzania’s urbanisation trajectory
Tanzania is urbanising rapidly (Figure 8). From 2002–2012, the growth rate of the urban population at 5.3% was almost twice that of the total population (2.7%) (Figure 9). During the same period, the urban population grew by around 8.7 million people, increasing the urban share of the total population from 22% to 29%.

Figure 8: Tanzania’s urban and total population growth, 1957-2012

![Figure 8: Tanzania's urban and total population growth, 1957-2012](source: Tanzania census data reported in Wenban-Smith (2015))

Figure 9: Growth rates of different-sized settlements, 1967-2012

![Figure 9: Growth rates of different-sized settlements, 1967-2012](source: Tanzania census data reported in Wenban-Smith (2015))

This period has seen Dar es Salaam maintain its position as Tanzania’s largest city (Figure 10). With 4.4 million residents, it houses over a third of all urban Tanzanians – a share that has remained more or less constant for the last 30 years (Christiansen et al 2015). While Tanzania’s other regional capitals’ collectively accounted for the

7 These all have populations of over 200,000 inhabitants
largest share of the population from the 1950s onwards, smaller towns grew rapidly over this period and, by 2012, more people lived in smaller towns (4.3 million) than in regional capitals (4.0 million).

**Figure 10: Distribution of Tanzania's urban population, 1957-2012**

The contribution of rural-urban migration to urban population growth differs by city and has changed over time. In general, the natural population growth of existing urban residents accounted for most of the growth within cities. However, in-migration to Dar in the period from 2002-2012 accounted for 65% of growth there. This is attributed to this period experiencing higher economic growth and better job prospects in comparison to rural areas (Wenban-Smith 2015).

Trends and events in Tanzania’s economic and institutional history also provide suggestions for the differences in urban population growth across different settlement types observed in Figure 9. Although in the 1970s, the government adopted anti-urban, pro-rural policies (discussed below), economic hardship in rural areas conversely encouraged greater migration to large cities, which still offered better options (Wenban-Smith, 2015). However, the following period from 1979 till the late 1980s which saw significant government budgets cuts, a decline in the manufacturing sector and the collapse of the state-run crop marketing encouraged farmers to shift from growing export and non-food crops to food crops for their own subsistence and slowed urban migration. It was only in the 2000s when the economy and formal employment grew again that rural-urban migration accelerated once again, explaining the faster growth rates especially in Dar es Salaam (ibid).

Given the high population growth rate, Tanzania’s urban population is expected to increase by 61.5 million between 2010 and 2050. While it is very hard to predict patterns of future urban growth across different types of cities, studies exploring patterns of out-migration suggest that many more poor households in rural areas prefer migrate to nearby smaller towns, suggesting these towns will continue experience high growth (Christiansen et al. 2015).

**Trends in urban policies**

At the same time that cities were growing, the dismantling of local government and attempts to direct urban planning through central government organs led to an under-supply of well-planned areas and formal housing. Although local government was re-introduced in the late 1980s, urban authorities were seriously limited in their capacity to tax and spend, and struggled to provide services to deal with the influx of migrants (Owens, 2014). When established, urban municipalities had large jurisdictions but lacked the capacity to govern properly. Lupala (2015) notes that there was no clear rationale for the establishment of such large jurisdictions, and urban local authorities have since struggled to provide needed services and contain urban sprawl.

At the same time, local authorities have lacked powers while the role of central government agencies has remained strong, even after economic liberalisation in the 1990s. For much of Tanzania’s recent history, urban planning was characterised by central control, modernisation aspirations and high development standards, with very little control placed in the hands of local government organs (Owens 2014).

Efforts to provide housing for the growing population were unsuccessful: from the 1960s onwards, the policy for housing made the National Housing Corporation (NHC) responsible for providing housing for all households in
urban areas, which it was unable to do. Even though it became clear that the only way most households could access housing was through self-construction on land they acquired through non-formal channels, government strategies for urbanisation did not recognise this, instead suggesting a key role in all land transactions and planning decisions for central government ministries and agencies. It was only with the passing of land laws in the 1990s that the government recognised the role of individuals and organised private sector in meeting housing targets (Owens, 2014). However, this has not been prioritised in government programmes, which have not provided clearly defined roles and adequate support to facilitate participation by private surveyors (Lugoe 2015).

For civil society organisations, the cost of land registration processes has prevented engagement on a major scale, although this is an important entry point for CSO engagement.

In general, the organisation of the land bureaucracy within government has meant that land governance and administration have struggled to perform well. The underlying reasons for the low provision of serviced land in Dar es Salaam are complicated and varied, and not explored in detail here. Important factors include unclear institutional mandates for planning between different levels of government, lack of resourcing for projects to regularise land (especially when projects have attempted to purchase and compensate landholders), slow land administration procedures, and unrealistically high standards for planned settlements such as large minimum areas for plots, which have made it difficult to introduce these (Kironde, 2006; Midheme, 2007).

Implications for access to land housing and services
As a result, all local governments have fallen well short of creating enough planned areas and plots. Figure 11 shows that the gap between the demand and supply of plots in Tanzania has grown quickly over time.

Figure 11: Demand and supply of plots between 1972/73 and 2005/06

With a shortage of planned development areas, between 40-80% of all built up areas are informal (Kironde, 2006; Lupala, 2015) and most urban households in all major cities live in unplanned areas (Kyessi & Sekiete, 2014). Due to the high cost and administrative challenges of servicing unplanned areas, services only reach small portions of the population: water and drainage systems cover only 3.3% of built-up areas and fewer than 40% of urban households are connected to water supplies (Lupala, 2015).

Implications for spatial development of cities
The legacy of this policy environment is that most cities in Tanzania are characterised by large areas of low population density. Many of the municipalities continue to have in their jurisdictions large areas of land that remain

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8 Annex 2 of Lugoe (2008) provides a comprehensive overview of some of the issues facing the land administration system that led to this undersupply.
undeveloped: across Tanzania’s eight largest municipal centres population density in urban areas is less than 80 persons per hectare and only 2% of built up areas included multi-storey properties (Lupala, 2015).

**Figure 12: Percentage of the land under the jurisdiction of urban centres that is built up in Tanzania, 2007-2012**

Source: Lupala (2015). Note: the last three lighter bars are municipalities of Dar es Salaam

Implications for peri-urban areas

The lack of attention to peri-urban areas in the policies for urban development and spatial planning meant that most of the effects have been experienced indirectly (Kombe, 2005).

This has manifested itself through several channels:

- The decisions the government made on how far out to place municipal boundaries into rural areas, and when to re-designate rural areas to urban impacts upon how peri-urban land is governed, and what resources exist to support land administration and planning;

- Peri-urban areas have been affected by the low availability of ‘serviced’ (i.e. planned and registered) land in urban areas. The resulting high cost of urban land has led to high demand for more affordable peri-urban land;

- Incentives within the land planning and registration system have led peri-urban areas to be first ignored and then latterly targeted. By prioritising land regularisation as the main strategy for tackling informal settlements, the major land policy statements\(^9\) effectively diverted focus from peri-urban areas that – because they were not substantially built up – were not selected for regularisation exercises (Kombe, 2005). However, the land planning system also incentivised the government to purchase land from landholders before planning and delivering it as plots, thereby encouraging programmes to seek cheaper land in peri-urban areas.

The next sections in this chapter discuss these issues further using specific examples from Dar es Salaam (which has been the focus of most research) and other smaller cities, illustrating both land governance and administration challenges and their impacts on the peri-urban poor.

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5.2 The particular case of Dar es Salaam

5.2.1 Dar es Salaam’s expansion
Dar es Salaam encompasses three municipalities of Kinondoni, Ilala and Temeke, which together cover an area of 1,393 km². These municipalities cover areas where population density varies greatly – around 12.5% of the total city area is densely built up and accommodates over 90% of its population. On the other hand, around 51% of Ilala and 81% of Temeke is still not built up (see Figure 12), despite a rapid expansion of the built-up area in recent decades (Lupala, 2015; Midheme, 2007).

Urban expansion out of central Dar es Salaam is often described as ‘finger-like’ as it historically followed the four main roads out of the city (Lugoe, 2008; Owens, 2014). As the city’s population has grown, the median resident has shifted further from the centre: the share of the city’s population living three kilometres from the city centre fell from 14% in 1988 to 7% in 2002, and the area with the highest population density is now around five kilometres from the city centre (Figure 13) (Owens, 2014). Across the whole city jurisdiction, population and housing density is generally low: Temeke has only 21 persons per hectare, while only 2% of the city’s buildings are multi-storey, reflecting the decisions of earlier governments to place large areas of surrounding rural land under the control of municipalities (Lupala, 2015).

Government authorities have struggled to provide formal land plots in numbers anywhere near the level of demand over the last 25 years (Kironde, 2006; Lugoe, 2008; Owens, 2014). Kironde (2006) notes that from 1990-2001, only 8,209 plots were surveyed and allocated in Dar es Salaam, well short of the 243,473 applications, meaning that 97% of demand was unfulfilled. Numerous projects in the 2000s that aimed to reduce this gap met with limited success (Midheme, 2007).

Initiatives to encourage settlement outside of central Dar es Salaam like Kigamboni City (discussed below) have targeted less densely populated peri-urban areas, but to date have not had a significant influence on the pattern of settlement.

Figure 13 presents the distribution across the city of households living in planned and informal settlements. The outer circles clearly show the ‘long tail’ of sparsely populated areas outside of the main city.

As shown in Figure 14, only a small share of Dar es Salaam’s expansion has been done through the channel of formal land administration that follow statutory procedures for planning, transacting land and development. Most of this spatial expansion has been in informal and unplanned settlements. As a result, most of Dar’s population live in informal housing in areas that bear little resemblance to official planning maps and schemes. While the low level of resourcing is often cited as an important reason for the lack of land administration services, Lugoe (2008) notes that the large areas of land that have been subsumed into Dar es Salaam’s urban municipalities have accentuated this shortage as there are too few land officials to manage what is a large area.

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10 Hill and Lindner (2010) estimate that 80% of buildings in Dar es Salaam are located in unplanned areas.
5.2.2 Impact of Dar es Salaam's informal expansion

The fact that Dar's expansion has been driven by the informal sector has produced a set of challenges. In the worst cases, informal settlements have been built on land that is unsuitable for housing such as areas alongside rivers prone to seasonal flooding. Often a result of their informal status, informal areas with high populations often lack water and sanitation infrastructure, leading to elevated health risks (Kyessi & Sekiete 2014; Lugoe 2008).

More often, the minimal role of government oversight in Dar’s expansion has led to the under-provision of land for roads, which in turn has led to long travel times for residents to cross the city and high costs of transportation. Roads cover only between 2.5-10% of the city, which is well below the recommended 15-20% in national planning standards (Kiunsi, 2013; UN Habitat, 2013). Traffic jams in the city are calculated to have reduced profits of small businesses by around 20% or US$2.5 million per day (Makoye 2014). Informal areas regularly suffer from poor road connectivity as it is more profitable for individual landowners to rent out land for housing rather contributing it areas for roads (Habitat, 2013).

The longstanding undersupply of regularised land has led to very high land values. As informal land houses such a large share of the population, this includes many middle-income households and the cost of land is generally higher than low income households can afford (Midheme, 2007). According to Owens (2014) between 2002 and 2010, rents for middle-income residents in Dar es Salaam increased by 270% compared to 9% nationally. House sale prices increased five-fold in central during the same period. Rising housing costs for middle-income households also push up housing costs for poor households, who often compete for the same areas of land.

The high cost of land also has a knock-on effect of raising the costs of improving urban infrastructure through projects that require the displacement and compensation of landholders, which in turn slows delivery of infrastructure. Efforts to improve urban infrastructure such as the ongoing Bus Rapid Transportation system face delays as landholders hold out in the face of perceived low compensation offers.

5.2.3 Impacts in peri-urban areas

The issues discussed above have had important implications for the pace of development in peri-urban areas and its effects on households who have either lived there for a long time or recently moved. Unplanned urban sprawl
has expanded at a rapid pace. For example, a recent study (Lupala, 2015) found that Temeke municipality lost 78% of the land zoned for agriculture between 2007 and 2011, much of it due to unplanned expansion. This is also true of Kinondoni and Illala (Muzzini & Lindeboom, 2008; Ricci, 2012).

This loss of agricultural land has often had adverse effects on poor agricultural-dependent households have often been displaced from their land. As many of the original landholders or incoming migrants to peri-urban areas are unskilled and poor, alternative livelihood opportunities to agriculture are limited (Magembe-Mushi & Lupala, 2015). Thus, when households are forced to sell land or are relocated, they are usually unable to maintain their same standard of living. In many cases, their land is often compensated at less than its full value (Kironde, 2006; Msangi, 2011). Research into the livelihoods of poorer peri-urban households illustrates how when displaced households resort to less lucrative activities, including begging, hawking or returning to their villages (Msangi, 2011).

While peri-urban areas have traditionally lacked attention from government land registration programmes, one of the consequences of the slow progress made in delivering land in urban areas has been for officials to attempt to implement planning schemes and deliver plots in peri-urban areas around the outskirts of Dar es Salaam where population pressure is lower and land is cheaper. For example, Owens (2014) notes that the recent programme to deliver 20,000 plots targeted peri-urban areas in order to meet targets for plot delivery which would not have been possible nearer the city centre due to high land values.

The literature suggests that many of the same issues that stand in the way of delivery of urban planning in central areas of Dar es Salaam also exist in its peri-urban areas (Fagerlund, 2010; Kombe, 2005). Major initiatives attempting to deliver planned settlements at scale have run into problems because of conflicts over authority of planning and decision-making and questions of how to deal with existing claims to land, including paying compensation to land owners for when land needs to be acquired. Box 1 discusses how the government’s vision of developing a satellite city in the peri-urban area of Kigamboni has faced severe difficulties related to both land governance and land administration, resulting in a need to revise downwards its ambition in recent years.

Initiatives that target smaller areas of peri-urban land for planning or formalisation (than the Kigamboni example) do not appear any more successful. Communities and households in peri-urban areas of Dar es Salaam have generally not interacted with formal processes to plan and register claims and transactions in land that involve central government (Briggs, 2011). As the relatively low cost of land in most peri-urban areas attracts poorer migrants from other parts of the country, or Dar es Salaam residents who move out when land and rent costs rise, most residents cannot afford the high costs need to engage with the formal processes (Kombe, 2005). Landholders also fear that interacting with official channels may require them to pay costs for penalties or bribes (Briggs, 2011). Instead, the governance of land transactions and land development remains informal: transactions between landholders and private buyers are witnessed by local village leaders or officials from the ruling party, but not authenticated by Ministry of Land officials (Kombe, 2005). Where local government units exist and function at community level, communities have relied instead on the coordinating role and authority of these to establish land use rules and register transactions.

The experience of government initiatives to deliver planning schemes in peri-urban areas suggests that these have largely been unsuccessful altogether, or where they have been implemented, have catered to wealthier groups and either side-lined or negatively impacted poorer landholders. In several cases, planning in peri-urban areas has produced plots that are unnecessarily large for the purported beneficiary groups of poor residents. In the example of the Kinyerezi area on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam, Kironde (2006) reports that planning exercises produced plot sizes of 1,800m² that were well above what was needed for residential purposes, and affordable only to middle and high-income households. Ten years after the plan was drawn up, most of these large plots in planned areas had remained vacant. The same experience has been common across multiple peri-urban planning projects (Kombe, 2005). Prospects for poorer households fare no better when private sector developers take on the role of

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11 The 20,000 plot programme that ran between 2002 and 2010 was a citywide initiative to make available plots for private development.
12 i.e. ward or subward government units.
planning for planned areas from public planning agencies, as these naturally attempt to achieve higher profits by deliver housing for wealthier groups (Owens, 2014).

**Land governance issues role in preventing development of Kigamboni New City**

Recent efforts to establish peri-urban satellite cities outside Dar es Salaam illustrate challenges associated with centrally planned efforts to provide modern and well-planned peri-urban extensions in the context of competing mandates between government bodies (unclear land governance), ambiguous tenure rights and a lack of finance.

Kigamboni is one of the six satellite cities planned for the peri-urban areas surrounding Dar es Salaam, which are a major part of the government's aim to relieve pressure in the downtown areas. The area encompasses five wards in the Temeke Municipality on the southern side of Dar es Salaam. According to Owens (2014) the area facilitates large-scale planning because there are few entrenched power brokers who blocked development. In 2008, the Ministry of Lands announced its intention to develop a modern satellite town in the area that would include mixed land use, including construction of around 83,000 new housing units to meet a six-fold increase in population by 2030. Original plans saw the creation of a new entity (the Kigamboni Development Agency - KDA) that would take over from Temeke Municipality planning, land acquisition and sale, compensation and resettlement and land development over 50,934 hectares (Haonga 2013). This would control a budget of TZS 11.6 trillion (US$5.4 billion) covering three phases from 2012-2032. In 2012, a budget of TZS 102 billion—amounting to 59% of the Ministry’s budget for that year was allocated, of which TZS 30 billion (US$14 million) went to setting up the agency and recurrent expenditure (Kimboy 2012).

However, unclear urban land governance coupled with a lack of funds has meant that implementing the visionary planning is for the satellite city appears unviable. Overlapping mandates for planning approval between the three government agencies (the Ministry of Land Housing and Human Settlements Division (MLHHSD), the Dar es Salaam City Council and the Temeke Municipality) meant that plans for the development of the area were disputed. Although the Temeke municipality can initiate development and zoning plans, these needed be approved by the Dar es Salaam City Council and MLHHSD, which provided their own plans.

Although announcements by city and land authorities suggested the planned city was going ahead up until 2014, recent months have seen a considerable contraction of the Ministry of Land’s role in the project as it became clear that political and financial obstacles proved insurmountable. In March 2015, the ambition for the city and KDA was substantially revised. The planned city area was shrunk to 12% percent of its original size to 6,494 has, and government announced that the KDA would no longer acquire and develop land, but rather limit its role to designing the master plan and provide social infrastructure including roads (Daily News 2015). Residents would retain their land rights and negotiate with investors directly, and had more scope to develop land as long as this fitted within the vision of the Kigamboni Master Plan.

A major obstacle the government would have faced in fulfilling the role it originally proposed for itself is overcoming the substantial shortfall in funding. The Ministry of Lands noted its intention to raise finances from international investors, pension funds and municipal bonds yet none of these had been used previously to raise municipal capital. Owens (2014) estimates the cost of compensating landholders for land acquisitions could easily surpass US$400 million, almost all of which would need to be paid upfront.

In addition, the plans were met with considerable resistance from local landholders who feared that initiatives to plan and develop the area would result in losing their land and not receiving fair compensation.

Housing development to date also suggest that despite ambitions to develop mixed-income housing, most housing development has been targeted at middle and upper income households (Owens 2014).

### 5.3 Land governance challenges in other expanding cities and towns

Experiences from peri-urban areas surrounding other cities highlight the broader relevance of the lessons from the section above discussing the peri-urban areas around Dar es Salaam. Peri-urban areas around smaller cities and towns see the same situation whereby land transactions and development on the urban periphery occurs without any input or oversight from city planners, and landholders do not perceive it in their interests to interact with formal land registration processes (Kombe, 2005).

As in Dar es Salaam, urban municipalities elsewhere have expanded to cover a much larger area of land than they are able to plan and service effectively. Lugoe (2015) notes that during the late 1990s and early 2000s, secondary
urban centres including Tabora and Sumbawanga extended their municipal borders to areas far larger than what their land administration departments could effectively plan for or oversee. In Tabora, this led to a situation where land conflicts arose that the land administration offices had to attend to, further limiting their ability to deliver other services (Lugoe 2008).

Experiences from smaller cities also highlight the additional challenge arising from attempts to establish municipalities in previously rural land, by means of changing the status of land — from Village Land to General Land — and land governance arrangements. As this process carries implications for who makes land allocation decisions and is perceived to increase the risk of land expropriation, it can lead to an institutional stand-off that creates uncertainty and dissuades planning and efficient development of land.

5.3.1 Re-designation of Rural to Urban Land

Another challenge that has yet to face Dar es Salaam (which has large areas of rural land within its jurisdiction) but has affected other urban settlements is the process of changing the status of the designation of rural districts to urban ones. This process relies on two criteria: the population for the area has to surpass 100,000 people, of whom fewer than 70% should be employed in agriculture (Urban Planning Act 2007). Re-designating rural districts that meet this threshold is an important underlying cause of expansion of the area statistically categorised as urban (Magigi & Drescher, 2010).

However, re-designating land is often controversial. The re-designation of Village Land particularly affects control over land that is seen to be vacant or undeveloped, as decisions on how to allocate this land transfers from individual landholders or — where they exist — village land councils to the Ministry of Lands. Owens (2015) describes the case of Usa River district, Northern Tanzania where, in order to retain decision-making control over land use, the village authorities blocked attempts aimed at upgrading the area’s classification to a municipality. They did this by failing to produce the master plan needed to complete the transition (as called for by the 2007 Urban Planning Act). Similar efforts to introduce an updated planning scheme for the township that extended to nearby villages failed as villagers refused to participate in the process. The reason for resistance by the village council was that its leadership, whose members are elected by the village assembly, would have much less influence over land allocation decisions on the new town council, whose members are mainly appointed by the district council.

In a similar situation to accounts above, Magigi and Drescher (2010) describe a process of attempting to incorporate a peri-urban settlement of Himo into Moshi, in Northern Tanzania. Registered villages that were incorporated into the planning area for the Himo township unit lost local control over land as a result of the re-designation, with no explanation given for if and how well land would be compensated. As a result, villagers have continued to subdivide and parcel their land informally in contravention to instructions from the district council.

Landholders who previously relied on customary laws to legitimise their rights faced a situation where they fear unused land will be taken over by the Ministry of Lands, and as result erect buildings in order to strengthen their claims (Magigi & Drescher, 2010). Villagers have also legally appealed against the change in zoning of their land from agricultural to residential areas, fearing this change will weaken their rights. Although villagers were not in principle against the conversion of their farmland to urban land, the poor compensation they stood to receive under the formal system led to widespread resistance.

This resistance results from previous experience of imbalanced and legally questionable expropriation of unused land by central governments, which has been commonplace in Tanzania’s peri-urban areas (Kironde, 2006). When requested to relinquish land in return for alternative plots and compensation, landholders in Himo did not receive information on either where or how large the plots they would receive as compensation would be (Magigi & Drescher, 2010). Nor did they receive any compensation despite reported promises by government officials. In some documented cases, landholders were promised priority allocation of new serviced plots on the land they had given up for planning schemes, only to find they had been assigned plots in a different area. As many relied on

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13 In the late 1990s, the cities of Tabora and Sumbawanga extended their municipal area to include 8 and 30 registered villages respectively. In both cases, these areas were not included in master plans and resource shortages prevented efforts to deliver affordable land administration services to residents in these areas.

14 Tanzania has three categories of land Village Land, Reserve Land and General Land. The majority of government powers over Village land rest with the village governments. Most powers over General land, which is mostly found in urban areas, lie with district and central government.
farming as an important source of household income, the prospect of receiving worse quality land and insufficient payment resulted in them being materially worse off.

The vacuum resulting from the resistance to re-designation of rural land can create a situation where land governance caters to wealthier groups. Owens (2014) cites the example of areas of private land development in the area surrounding Usa River where ambiguity over which authority has the power to plan and implement plans led to a situation in which public agencies and private developers have been able to establish their own plans with no regard to the contents of town and district planning initiatives. This has led to the establishment of private, high-end holiday complexes that do not appear in the district plans. In contrast, areas for high-density low-income housing were not created. As with experience of government-led planning elsewhere, the outcome of this process was the side-lining of the peri-urban poor (Owens, 2014).

5.4 Conclusions and recommendations

5.4.1 Conclusions
Tanzania’s rapid urban expansion raises a host of questions for how to manage land issues in peri-urban areas, which touch on changing spheres of influence/governance, land administration and planning:

While changing the designation of wards and districts from rural to urban should lead to better planning and administration capacity commensurate with the needs of a more densely populated area, in many cases village officials try to avoid this change. This is because incumbent leaders’ authority to make decisions over land is diluted as a new town council becomes the mandated body.

Equally importantly, the change also means that village land becomes reclassified as general land, and the Ministry of Lands is able to make decisions on the use of currently unused land, without consulting at a local level. This arrangement incentivises resistance to land re-designation, which creates a deadlock.

Huge demand for land in Dar es Salaam means there is strong demand to construct middle-income housing in peri-urban areas. Although satisfying this demand by building housing aimed at middle income earners may free up land in less attractive areas for poorer households, there is little documented evidence of this happening in Tanzania’s cities so far, and there are also concerns that land development occurring in peri-urban areas is overwhelmingly targeting middle income groups and fails to cater to needs of poor people.

5.4.2 Recommendations

Division of responsibilities
The discussion in this chapter suggests that the government plays an important role in designing appropriate standards for areas at different densities that local government authorities can adopt and refer to, but these must be practicable and realistic if they are to be useful.

While it may be tempting for the Ministry of Land to try to monopolise the process of peri-urban development through constructing satellite cities, the experience suggests that this is unlikely to succeed given the high costs of compensating land owners, and scope for creating conflicts of interest between government bodies mandated with land planning.

Overall, the literature from Tanzania suggests that although local government units may not be able to deal with all land planning and administration matters, they stand a better chance of being able to do this than central government, because of their ability to respond quickly and cheaply. Thus, the land administration system should devolve land administration processes to local government offices wherever possible, and improve efficiency in central approval processes to ensure slow land administration does not prevent landholders participating registering land.

To the extent that non-governmental organisations can assist groups of residents access official guidance and help communities organise themselves in order to plan settlements, such interventions are likely to be useful.
6 Conclusions and recommendations

This study looked at the opportunities and challenges of urbanisation and the role that land tenure, administration and governance can play in maximising a beneficial process of urbanisation for poor and vulnerable people.

The report’s findings suggest that policies and programmes of governments and the development partners could include a stronger focus on the development of peri-urban areas and smaller cities and towns. The rapid pace of change in peri-urban areas throws into relief any underlying issues in land tenure arrangements, land administration/planning and governance, such as overlapping mandates, conflicts in tenure systems, weak land administration/planning capacity and wider political economy issues that can block positive reforms.

Such issues often prejudice poorer and more vulnerable people, either those who already live in areas that are becoming urbanised and more densely populated, or those trying to find a place to live in those areas. This has contributed to the rise of slums and the continued high proportion of urban populations in Africa who are slum dwellers, constraining progress on poverty reduction and healthy growth.

This section outlines some ways that donors and African governments could respond to the issues raised, namely the need for secure and clear tenure, sound land use planning, well-functioning land and housing markets underpinned by capable and well-prepared land market and management institutions in urban and peri-urban areas.

6.1 Land governance

Policymakers should aim to minimise the scope for struggles over land governance to pose barriers to effective land planning and administration. As part of this, it is important that they:

- Clarify mandates and decision-making powers of different ministries, agencies and local government to ensure roles and responsibilities in drawing up and approving plans are clear. This will help ensure that overarching planning documents for cities and their surroundings can become operational, and avoid a situation where multiple plans generated by different levels of government compete for backing. At a minimum, governance arrangements should ensure that disagreements over planning authority do not act as long-term barriers to local level planning and land administration.

- Ensure that changes in the authority over planning are carefully managed such that new arrangements respect existing planning choices. Changes in planning authority should be managed to ensure village or officials or customary authorities who were previously held planning responsibilities are not completely disempowered in the new urban land administration, leading them to resist changes. Similarly, when the government changes the status of land, existing landholders’ rights over this land should not be weakened: the perception that land rights will be weakened because of changes can lead to resistance and further conflict.

- Where governments need to buy land through compulsory acquisition, they should ensure that rules for valuation and compensation are applied transparently in peri-urban areas to guarantee that landholders to do not either lose out materially, or decline to participate in the formal sector out of fears they will.
As Ghana’s experience demonstrates, growing demand for land – mostly from the non-agricultural sector – results in land scarcity, higher land values and greater demand for planning of customary land. Customary systems often struggle to deal with these new demands and in some cases “disintegrate” (Naab et al. 2013), exposing several weaknesses within the customary land governance system. Any programme or intervention to support transitions in peri-urban areas needs to take into account and resolve: power relations in customary systems and contested authority with chieftaincy systems; lack of information or records on land tenure; and lack of planning.

6.2 Peri-urban planning

6.2.1 The need for planning

The literature and case studies explored in this study flag robust and sustained land use planning as a primary need to ensure adequate service provision and connectivity for both poverty reduction and growth. The literature places increasing emphasis on the need for planning to avoid locking in patterns of urbanisation that constrain growth, are anti-poor and are unsustainable environmentally.

Land use planning clearly plays a role in determining the severity of congestion: ensuring enough land is made available for transport infrastructure — especially for public transport — is one part of the picture. Also important for peri-urban areas will be the connectivity of areas more likely to be attractive to commuting middle income groups to reduce incentives for commuting using private vehicles.

This may call for proactive planning of suburban areas in the peri-urban areas for middle-income residential areas. A common co-benefit of planned housing areas for middle-income groups is to reduce competition for low-cost housing (downwards raiding).

Uncoordinated spatial expansion can undermine sustained growth, e.g., in the case of Ghana (World Bank 2015). Planning may need to make more efforts to coordinate spatial expansion including through better connections between large urban settlements, and between urban areas and their surroundings where much of the manufacturing activity will continue to move to (ibid).

6.2.2 Factors to consider in the planning process

The literature consulted for this review on peri-urban areas does not shed light specifically on how interventions can be designed to ensure efficient spatial planning as cities expand into peri-urban areas. Although there are efforts underway in Ghana to build capacity of chieftaincies to provide better planning in their jurisdictions, lessons from these have not been well documented in the literature. The experience in Tanzania is likely representative of other areas, where the lack of a clear and socially-accepted approach to compensating loss of land acts as a drag on efforts to reconfigure informal residential areas in order to build road infrastructure and other public infrastructure.

Ensuring transparent and robust valuation and compensation processes is likely to be the first-best option to ensure infrastructure programmes can get underway. However, where other options appear viable and do not lead to social exclusion, these should be explored. For example, communities that benefit from shared improved infrastructure may be willing to reconfigure residential land patterns to accommodate households that lose land or have to be displaced.

In general, where governments seek to use master plans, planners should consult closely with communities from the start to understand what the main current local land uses are and how important these are to livelihoods. Plans that are drawn up should avoid requiring large and fast changes in the landscape that will disrupt livelihoods and raise opposition.

In order to produce plans that are acceptable to current landholders, planners should factor in existing land uses – including agriculture – and ensure plans respond to needs of poor households. As planning is likely to be biased towards providing plots and amenities that suit middle and high income households, it is important to ensure that provisions for poor households are not left out of planning exercises. A minimum step planners can take is to acknowledge the areas of high-density settlements that exist on the ground, and factor these into any new plans that are drawn up.
A major blockage to implementing planning in countries lies in the lack of resources to compensate landholders. Finding ways to move around this obstacle is important to ensuring that land registration efforts can go ahead. In Tanzania, recent experiences of changing the process so that land needed for roads is provided by landholders through a land readjustment process offers some promise (Lugoe 2015). New approaches have seen all landholders in a community pool their land and redistribute it to avoid any one landholder losing land disproportionately, which has offered some important successes.

Overall, donor-supported government-led programmes should recognise there is a need to adjust expectations of stakeholders around planning processes, particularly when these are seen to be major solutions. There is much emphasis at present on narratives better planning (for smarter cities, climate change adaptation etc), yet better plans are unlikely to be implementable when insufficient attentions is given to the existing patterns of landholding and the power of different stakeholders to implement, or conversely resist attempts to convert existing land use to alternatives.

6.3 Land administration

6.3.1 Mandates and capacity
The literature explored and the case studies discussed point to the capacity of land administration and overlapping systems as two main issues that need to be tackled to improve the regulation/administration of peri-urban areas.

While problems of overlapping systems can be resolved by clarifying mandates and bringing land under municipalities to facilitate coherent planning, municipalities often do not have the capacity to oversee and administer larger areas. This implies the need for local governments to adopt a phased approach that acknowledged capacity constraints, combined with a focus for donor efforts to support capacity building at municipality level.

Municipal control is often extended by re-designating land but re-designating land is often controversial. In Tanzania, the re-designation of Village Land particularly affects control over land that is seen to be vacant or undeveloped, as decisions on how to allocate this land transfers from individual landholders or — where they exist — village land councils to the Ministry of Lands. Those whose land is being re-designated may resist attempts at upgrading the area’s classification to a municipality for fear of losing control. However, the vacuum resulting from the resistance to re-designation of rural land can create a situation where land governance caters to wealthier groups (Owens 2014).

6.3.2 Working with different land administration systems
As private registration of informal land is likely to be the main channel for households to register land, the land administration system may need to cater primarily to this channel, making it quick and easy to do so.

The literature provides support for recognising and working with local and informal land markets as a means to improve outcomes for poorer households. In countries/areas where traditional authorities are present (and whose legitimacy is accepted), local governments, with additional support from donors, can engage these to consider planning requirements and possibly strengthening customary land institutions to carry out land administration (Lund (2009) cited in Arko Adjei 2011).

There is often a need to improve the ways in which customary authorities manage their land to reduce the incidence of arbitrary and unfair decisions that can lead to eviction of households from especially farming land in peri-urban areas. The Community Land Secretariats being established in Ghana provide the clearest examples of efforts to design interventions that support positive change in the way customary systems work, to support better administration, planning capacity and reduce the potential for unilateral decision-making that often undermines tenure security. Experiences from these may provide useful guidance for other settings where customary authorities retain important decision-making powers.

Elsewhere, where other forms of recognition of occupancy exist — such as occupant or household lists that enjoy social legitimacy — embarking on processes to incrementally recognise these at higher levels are more promising way to strengthen tenure rights, rather than to rely on governments and households to engage in more formal but costlier titling exercises.
Overall, a sensible approach may be to opt for a secure but simpler registration processes in peri-urban areas, placing the emphasis on moving gradually from current forms of tenure to more appropriate and secure forms of tenure, while not being fixated on private land titling in contexts where it may not work as an immediate solution (Napier et al., 2013). Our analysis of the role that land can play in peri-urban areas indicates that a combination of different approaches would be needed that allow the formal system to meet local practice “somewhere in the middle, and a new social contract brokered around land access in cities. The currently parallel systems of informal and formal land management have to reconcile with one another in very practical ways.” (Napier et al., 2013).

Local governments can help to confer tenure security by recognising a multitude of administrative or legal mechanisms that local administrations use. Forms of administrative recognition include occupancy registers, plot or shack enumerations, provision of infrastructure or services that register households. Similarly, mass legal recognition by recognising areas in zoning plans as areas for informal settlements, or declaring an area as a settlement area all provide additional tenure security to inhabitants in these areas. Although these actions by themselves are rarely admissible as evidence of occupation rights, they can serve as a basis on which to add more information that confers greater legitimacy. These efforts appear to be more successful in many circumstances than attempting systematic titling efforts, as engaging households to apply for or even collect registration documents is often challenging. Both donors and CSOs can support local governments or communities directly to engage in such activities.

However, focusing on technical and capacity-building measures may not resolve the problem entirely. Work can be done by development partners and CSOs to encourage governments to adopt a more positive and supportive approach to migration and urbanisation, including the provision of land, upgrading shelter and services, and help with building sustainable livelihoods (Turok and McGanahan 2013).

The need to recognise how informal urban and peri-urban land markets work

Research findings in recent years has emphasised the existence of operational land markets in poor urban and peri-urban across sub-Saharan Africa. Despite their existence, these were often ignored in earlier policy discourse on land markets (e.g. the 1996 Habitat Agenda) which explicitly recognised and made recommendations only for the formal land markets (Napier et al., 2013). Rather than emphasising the need to work with different actors to improve the functioning of existing markets, some of the earlier discourse blamed governments for failing to regulate dysfunctional land markets and provide credit to enable poorer households to participate in the formal market. Recognising the existence of the customary and neo-customary (or blended) markets and understanding their workings is critical to understanding opportunities and limitations of improving their functioning and the protection they can provide (Royston, 2013).
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