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## Acronyms and abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>NAO</td>
<td>National Audit Office</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance (aid to developing countries)</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<td>PSA</td>
<td>Public Service Agreement</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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Executive Summary

In 2001, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair described Africa as a “scar on the conscience of the world”. This speech set in motion a sustained effort on the part of the British Government to work harder, and to spend more, on reducing poverty in Africa. In 2004/05, the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), spent £883 million on aid to Africa. By 2007/08, DFID spending on programmes in Africa will have risen to £1265 million. Aid to Africa – from the UK, and from other G8 countries – is on an upward trajectory.

With its colonial history, the UK has long been involved in Africa, and began providing aid to Africa in 1929. Since then, aid has been provided for a variety of reasons; indeed, at any one time aid is motivated by multiple reasons. These reasons have included the promotion of British commercial interests, foreign policy and security concerns, and the reduction of poverty in developing countries. Since the coming to power of a Labour Government in 1997 in the UK, the stated reason for providing aid to Africa and developing countries elsewhere has been one of poverty reduction. There is no doubt that aid flows are motivated by security concerns too, but aid – perhaps particularly aid to Africa – is spent to reduce poverty.

The British Government assesses and reviews its spending priorities every two years in an exercise called the Spending Review. Once the Government has made its plans, these plans must be approved by Parliament. Since 1997, DFID has been the lead Department in the Government’s contribution to the fight against global poverty. In addition to administering the UK’s programme of aid, DFID is also responsible for promoting international development across Government, in an effort to ensure that other Departments’ policies do not undermine DFID’s work. A Public Service Agreement – agreed between the Finance Ministry and DFID – sets out DFID’s objectives, along with a series of targets and indicators against which its performance is measured.

The Public Service Agreement identifies 16 countries in Africa, where DFID’s effort is focused. These countries – Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Lesotho – receive 89% of DFID’s bilateral aid spending in Africa. Within Africa, British aid is focused on those countries where a) poverty is a major problem, and b) the government is committed to poverty reduction. Sectorally, much UK aid has in recent years been spent on the health and education sectors, along with governance. The productive sectors, including economic infrastructure, have been relatively neglected. In terms of aid modalities – the ways in which aid is delivered – the UK is delivering more of its aid to Africa as Poverty Reduction Budget Support. In this modality, aid is delivered direct to the budgets of governments which have in place effective systems for financial management, and are seriously committed to poverty reduction. Delivering aid in this way raises challenges in terms of tracking its impact, but it is also expected to deliver benefits in terms of predictability of aid flows, local ownership and
Domestic accountability is hugely important, both in developing countries and in the developed world. In the UK, the British Government is accountable to the British public – the taxpayers who pay for the aid programme, and the voters who elect the Government – in a range of ways. In terms of formal accountability: the International Development Act sets the legal limits of the aid programme - aid must be spent on poverty reduction; elections provide a blunt instrument of accountability; and Parliament and the National Audit Office play key roles. Despite the UK’s long history of aid, and the range of mechanisms, formal accountability remains patchy. In addition to mechanisms of formal accountability, the UK Government engages informally with a range of organisations – NGOs, faith-based groups, trade unions, academics, the media, think-tanks – both to get their input into policy discussions, and to build a constituency for international development and aid. As DFID moves further in the direction of providing aid through Budget Support, with all its attendant risks, maintaining public support will remain an important challenge.

DFID’s performance, and that of the programme of aid to Africa, is assessed against the Public Service Agreement. Target 1 of the Public Service Agreement is about “progress towards the Millennium Development Goals in 16 key countries in Africa”. DFID reports twice a year on progress towards its Public Service Agreement targets. The most recent report reveals a mixed picture with some progress in terms of reducing poverty, getting more children into school, and reducing child mortality, but with little or no progress on getting girls as well as boys into school, and on tackling maternal mortality. In terms of the British public’s attitudes towards the UK’s programme of aid, there are major concerns about corruption and the possibility of aid being used ineffectively, but nevertheless the public remains largely supportive of the aid programme. It would seem that the British public’s level of concern about poverty in developing countries – a concern and understanding which is nurtured by a very active NGO sector – is greater than its level of concern about the potential wastage of aid.

The UK is at the forefront of international development thinking and practice, with the Department for International Development leading the Government’s efforts. Since 1997, UK aid to Africa – focused on poverty reduction – has played an important role in helping African countries to make progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. Many challenges remain, but if donors such as Japan are able to make their programmes of aid to Africa as effective as DFID’s seem to be, then – subject to the commitments of African governments – faster progress will certainly be achieved.

Disclaimer: This report has been produced by Dr. Alan Hudson of the Overseas Development Institute for the UFJ Institute. It does not represent a corporate view taken by the Overseas Development Institute.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Background

1. Japanese aid flows to developing countries are set to rise from $8.859 billion in 2004 to $11.859 billion by 2010, with aid to Africa set to double over the next three years.¹ This report aims to inform Japanese thinking on aid, by providing information about the UK Government’s programme of aid to Africa.

2. The UK Government is committed to international development, poverty reduction and contributing to progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Since the election of a Labour Government in 1997, aid has been on an upward trajectory. In 2004/05, UK development assistance totaled $7.836 billion, or 0.36% of the UK’s Gross National Income. By 2010, UK development assistance will amount to $14.525 billion, or 0.59% of GNI. The UK is set to reach the UN target of providing 0.7% of GNI as aid to developing countries by 2013. Africa has been and will continue to be a particular focus of the UK’s aid effort. Aid to Africa – from the UK, and from other G8 countries – is on an upward trajectory.

3. In this context, the UFJ Institute decided to fund a study on “the philosophy, processes, achievements and national interests of major donors” in relation to aid to Africa. The purpose of the study is to inform Japanese thinking on aid, and, as the UFJ Institute put it, “to construct the basis for a conceptual framework of Japanese ODA [Official Development Assistance] to Africa by drawing a comparison to aid trends and aid policies by the UK and France”. The UK component of this study has been conducted by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

Methodology

4. The project has proceeded in three stages (see figure 1). The first stage involved a literature review. Nearly thirty key documents were identified and reviewed, leading to the production of an annotated bibliography (see Annex 1). In the second stage, a series of expert interviews were conducted with key informants from across the UK aid and development field, exploring issues around aid to Africa and – as agreed with the UFJ Institute – giving particular attention to the question of how the UK Government is accountable to the British public for aid to Africa (see figure 2 and Annex 2 for details). A generic topic guide (see Annex 3) was produced to provide potential interviewees with information about the project. Specific topic guides were produced to guide each interview (see Annex 4 for an example). The final stage of the research process has involved analyzing the expert interviews, and synthesizing the results of the literature review and the expert interviews, along with other secondary data, to produce this final report. The budget provided for 10 days

of the consultant’s time.

Figure 1: Stages and timing of the project process

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Figure 2: Expert interviews, by sector

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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Think tanks</td>
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<td>Business</td>
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Structure

5. Chapter two of this report explores why the UK provides aid to Africa. Chapter three outlines the ways in which the UK’s aid programme is organized. Chapter four examines which African countries receive UK aid. Chapter five explores the ways in which the UK Government is accountable to the British public for its aid and development programme. Chapter six outlines first the ways in which DFID assesses its own performance, and second the attitudes of the British public to the British aid programme. In conclusion, chapter seven draws out some lessons and implications for other donors, such as Japan.
Chapter 2: Why does the UK provide aid to Africa?

6. In 2005, Africa was headline news in the UK, as campaigners and politicians including the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer argued the case for more and better aid, more debt relief, and trade justice. This chapter addresses the question of why the UK provides aid to Africa, first by exploring the motivations for the provision of aid to Africa prior to 1997, and second by examining the reasons why the Blair Government, in power since 1997, has provided aid to Africa.

**Historical motivations for the provision of UK aid**

7. The British aid programme is firmly rooted in Britain’s colonial history. For this reason, the majority of UK aid is spent in Commonwealth countries, including in Africa. In 1929, Parliament passed the Colonial Development Act, the purpose of which was to promote agriculture and industry in the colonies, in order to boost industry and employment in the UK by encouraging trade with the colonies. By 1940, the limitations of the Colonial Development Act were clear; the Government decided to expand the scope of aid to the colonies so that it could be used to enhance the welfare of people in the colonies as well as to boost employment in the UK. This move was enshrined in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940.

8. In the years following the Second World War and the election of a Labour Government, the objective of aid was to foster development for the benefit of people in developing countries. This was the motivation for UK assistance to colonies, former-colonies and other developing countries through the 1950s and 1960s. A separate Ministry of Overseas Development was established in 1964, and in 1965 a White Paper made the case for aid on the grounds both of moral duty and in terms of the long-term interest of the UK. The Ministry was re-absorbed into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1970, and in 1975 a White Paper was published making clear that aid was to be allocated in such a way as to have the most effect in alleviating the worst poverty over the long term. In practice however, UK aid was driven also by UK business interests, particularly following the introduction of the Aid and Trade Provision of 1977 which ensured that a portion of British aid was spent on British goods and services.

9. With the election of a Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher in 1979, UK aid flows began to decline, a decline which would continue almost uninterrupted throughout the Conservatives’ eighteen consecutive years in power (see figure 3). In addition to the reduction in aid volumes, there was

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also a marked shift in emphasis with British political, industrial and commercial objectives given greater weight in thinking about aid flows. During the 1980s nearly half the British aid programme was restricted, or tied, to goods and services provided by the UK. Gradually, through the early 1990s, the practice of tying aid in this way came under increasing pressure until a landmark 1994 High Court ruling (“The Pergau dam affair”) established that there was no legal basis for using development funds for primarily commercial purposes.

Figure 3: Net ODA/GNI Ratios for the UK 1970-2004

Post-1997: Eliminating poverty?

10. In the run-up to the 1997 General Election, the Labour Party made a manifesto commitment to “strengthen and restructure the British aid programme and bring development issues back into the mainstream of government decision-making”, and to focus aid resources on helping the poorest people in the poorest countries. Following the election of the Labour Government, a separate Department for International Development was established, to be led by a new Secretary of State, Clare Short, with a seat at the Cabinet table. A new White Paper was published, with the ambitious title of “Eliminating world poverty”\(^4\), and DFID - under Clare Short’s determined and effective leadership - pushed ahead with its efforts focused very much on poverty reduction.\(^5\) Significantly, DFID’s remit was to extend beyond aid, to include championing international development across the board. This approach continues to be developed, and will likely be reflected in the 2006 White Paper and the approach it sets out to ensuring that the UK’s policies are made more coherent as regards their impact on developing countries. As far as aid was concerned, the practice of tying aid to the purchase of British


\(^5\) OECD (1997) UK Development Co-operation Review: Summary and Conclusions
goods and services was phased out, and abolished by the 2000 White Paper.\textsuperscript{6}

11. In the nine years since it was established, DFID has maintained and strengthened its focus on poverty reduction. Its aim is “to eliminate poverty in poorer countries, in particular through achievement by 2015 of the Millennium Development Goals.”\textsuperscript{7} The UK Government has been a strong supporter of using the Millennium Development Goals as a framework to guide its contribution to the international development effort, and has established itself as one of, and perhaps the, leading donor in terms of development policy, and efforts to enhance the effectiveness of aid.\textsuperscript{8} In 2002, the International Development Act made clear that aid must be focused on poverty reduction.\textsuperscript{9}

12. As Secretary of State for International Development from 1997 to 2003, Clare Short emphasized that aid was not about charity, but was about investing in poverty reduction. This theme has continued after her departure, with the UK’s interest in reducing poverty in developing countries expressed by the current Secretary of State Hilary Benn in terms of a “common band of humanity”, a “fight against poverty and injustice”,\textsuperscript{10} and in terms of enlightened self-interest. As DFID puts it: “in a world of growing wealth, such levels of human suffering and wasted potential are not only morally wrong, they are also against our own interests ... many of the problems which affect us, war and conflict, international crime, refugees, the trade in illegal drug and the spread of diseases like HIV and AIDS, are caused or made worse by poverty in developing countries. Getting rid of poverty will make for a better world for everybody.”\textsuperscript{11}

13. There are of course those who would question whether the UK’s aid programme and development policies are truly and exclusively focused on poverty reduction in developing countries. For some commentators – particularly some of the more radical NGOs – the UK’s policies and practices on aid and development must be seen as part of a wider foreign policy agenda. The diversion of DFID funds from Latin America to finance the costs of reconstruction in post-war Iraq, and the shift in status of Pakistan from unfavoured military dictatorship to favoured ally and aid recipient post-September 11\textsuperscript{th}, are seen by such commentators as evidence that poverty reduction motives may be compromised when other foreign policy objectives are deemed more important.\textsuperscript{12} More broadly, many NGOs are concerned that the UK’s development programme may be becoming tied too closely to security objectives.

\textsuperscript{7} DFID (2005) Departmental Report, p.xi
\textsuperscript{8} Center for Global Development (2005) Reforming development assistance: Lessons from the UK experience, Working Paper Number 70, p.3.
\textsuperscript{10} DFID (2005) Departmental Report, p.viii
\textsuperscript{11} DFID Web-site - http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/
\textsuperscript{12} ODI-Conway (2003) Changing aid policies of the major donors: UK case study, p.76.
14. Another strand of skepticism is the suggestion that when UK aid is provided to developing countries, it often comes with conditions attached which promote economic liberalization and/or the privatization of services. The implication is that such policies might not otherwise have been chosen by developing countries, and that they might be being promoted for the benefit of companies in the developed world, rather than poor people in developing countries. To some extent the UK Government has addressed these concerns with the publication of a new policy paper which sets out a new approach to conditionality, limiting the sorts of conditions which can be attached to UK aid, and emphasizing the importance of more balanced partnerships which support local ownership of development strategies.\textsuperscript{13} But with much UK aid provided through multilaterals such as the World Bank, which have not changed their approach to conditionality as much, the criticism retains some force.

\textit{A changing blend of motivations}

15. The UK’s aid programme has always been driven by a range of interests and motivations (see figure 4). At times the key driver has been British commercial interests. At other times, the prime mover has been foreign policy. And at other times still, the key motive has been one of poverty reduction. In 2006, whilst it is true that aid and development is increasingly driven by security concerns, it remains the case that the UK’s aid and development programme – and particularly the work of DFID – is driven by the goal of reducing or eliminating poverty in developing countries. This goal is seen as important for reasons of enlightened self-interest, but it also reflects a genuine desire to contribute to the fight against global poverty because it is morally right. This sentiment was perhaps expressed most clearly by Prime Minister Tony Blair at the Labour Party Conference in 2001, where he said that the state of Africa was a “scar on the conscience of the world”, which the world needed to work hard to heal.\textsuperscript{14}

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\textbf{● History, especially colonialism:} This helps explain the priority given to Africa in Britain’s aid policy. \\
\textbf{● Moral arguments or enlightened self-interest:} The promotion of social and economic development has always been a consideration in the policy priorities of successive administrations. To a substantial extent, then, UK policy changes have been a response to conditions in Africa and the slow progress of much of the continent. This driver seems currently powerful. \\
\textbf{● Britain’s national interest:} The extent of foreign policy considerations have fluctuated with the party in government (and independence of the UK’s aid agency or not), but are currently less direct or powerful. Of increasing relevance in recent years has been security issues linked to the US war on terror. \\
\textbf{● Britain’s domestic economic situation:} Although a small part of total state spending, the domestic economic situation does affect ODA policy. The recent... \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{The key drivers of UK aid to Africa\textsuperscript{15}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{14} Expert interview
\textsuperscript{15} From ODI-Court (2005) \textit{Aid to Africa and the UK’s 2005 Agenda: Perspectives of European donors and implications for Japan.}
robust growth and healthy fiscal position has been the basis for expansion of ODA.

*Party politics*: Although not deep, there have been differences in the past that have affected policy to Africa (scale of budget and extent of national interest). Currently, both major parties have committed to achieving the UN target of an aid programme equivalent to 0.7% of GDP by 2013.

*Executive autonomy*: This is high and explains the degree of current emphasis on development in general and Africa in particular.

*Implementation agency’s position and capacity*: Whereas capacity has remained strong, issues that fluctuate include the degree of autonomy and the strength of leadership. The latest DAC peer review notes DFID’s breadth of knowledge and depth of expertise.

*Commercial objectives*: These two have fluctuated according to the party in government and are currently of low importance (untying).

*Public support*: Development has always enjoyed considerable public support, and the UK policy is influenced by increasingly sophisticated groups of civil society organisations.

*Intellectual climate*: This has fed the redesign of aid policies – from economistic to broader views of development and regarding modalities for effectiveness.

*Other donors*: British policies have also been shaped by other agencies working in the aid field, especially the International Financial Institutions.

**Further reading:**


ODI - Conway (2005) 'Changing aid policies of the major donors: UK case study'.

ODI - Killick (2005) 'Understanding British aid to Africa: An historical perspective'.

Chapter 3: The UK Aid Programme and the Role of DFID

16. This chapter sets out how the UK provides aid to Africa, providing information about the institutional framework for UK aid. It starts by explaining the role of the Spending Review, before outlining the role which DFID plays in the Government’s programme of aid and development, and explaining the role played by DFID’s Public Service Agreement in driving DFID’s work and providing a framework for assessment and accountability.

The Spending Review

17. Spending reviews, coordinated by Her Majesty’s Treasury, assess and review priorities and spending plans across the whole of government. They set firm and fixed three year spending limits for each Government Department, and – through Public Service Agreements – define what Departments are expected to achieve by spending the funds to be provided. The 2002 Spending Review set spending plans for 2003-04 to 2005-06. The 2004 Spending Review set spending plans for 2006-07 and 2007-08, and announced that the volume of official development assistance would increase to nearly £6.5 billion by 2007-08.

18. On the basis of the Spending Review, the Government makes a request to Parliament for funds from general taxation to cover its spending plans, a request which Parliament votes on. In its request to Parliament, the Government provides detailed information about what the money will be spent on and who will be responsible for ensuring that it will be spent properly. In theory, this is an important entry-point for parliamentary accountability, but in practice the Government’s requests are usually approved with little debate.

DFID: Leading the British Government’s fight against world poverty

19. The Department for International Development is the lead department on international development. In 2004, nearly 80% of the UK’s Gross Public Expenditure on Development was channeled through DFID. The remainder is spent by and through other Government Departments and agencies. So, financially, DFID is the key department for the delivery of UK development assistance. For aid to Africa, DFID is far and away the key Government department. In 2004/05 DFID’s total programme expenditure was £3.838 billion, with 56% of this spent through bilateral assistance. Thirty-nine percent was channeled through multilateral organisations such as the European Community, the World Bank, the United Nations, and as debt relief to the Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), with the remaining 5% spent on administration.

20. The British government’s policy on international development is set out in two White Papers. The 1997 White paper, “Eliminating world poverty: A challenge for the 21st Century”, committed the government to working towards the achievement of the International Development Targets – the precursors to the Millennium Development Goals – by 2015. The second White Paper, published in 2000, reaffirmed this commitment to working towards the MDGs, and explained how DFID would work to help developing countries to take advantage of the opportunities offered by globalisation. A third White Paper, due for publication in 2006, will focus on issues of policy coherence, aid architecture, and politics and governance. In each of the White Papers, DFID has emphasized the importance it places on working in partnership with other organisations, including other Government Departments and multilateral agencies.

21. In addition to the White Papers, the International Development Act was passed by Parliament in 2002, establishing the legal basis for UK development Assistance. The Act makes clear that the purpose of development assistance must be poverty reduction, or more precisely, that the Secretary of State for International Development must be satisfied that development assistance is likely to contribute to poverty reduction. The Act makes clear that aid cannot be “tied” to the purchase of British goods and services, a move which is designed to ensure that aid is spent effectively on poverty reduction, rather than made ineffective by restricting its use.

**DFID’s Public Service Agreements**

22. DFID’s key aims and objectives are set out in its Public Service Agreement (PSA). DFID’s progress is currently assessed against its 2003-06 PSA, with a 2005-08 PSA in place to guide DFID’s future work (see figure 5). DFID’s overall aim is “the elimination of poverty in particular through achievement of the Millennium Development Goals”. In order to track progress and monitor DFID’s contribution towards meeting the MDGs, the PSA sets out a series of medium-term targets, each of which has associated indicators. The Secretary of State for International Development is accountable to Parliament for ensuring that DFID meets its Public Service Agreement. Within DFID, the Management Board has collective responsibility for delivery, with individual directors responsible for particular sets of objectives and targets. In this way, the focus on the MDGs cascades down through the PSA, and through DFID to the delivery plans of individual Directors, and the workplans of individuals within DFID. In short, the PSA plays a central role, linking DFID’s work to the wider global effort to meet the MDGs, as well as providing a framework for guiding and assessing DFID’s activities.

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Figure 5: DFID’s Public Service Agreement for 2005-08

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<th>AIM: Eliminate poverty in poorer countries in particular through achievement by 2015 of the Millennium Development Goals</th>
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<td><strong>OBJECTIVE I:</strong> Reduce poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<td><strong>TARGET 1:</strong> Progress towards the MDGs in 16 key countries in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>OBJECTIVE II:</strong> Reduce poverty in Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TARGET 2:</strong> Progress towards the MDGs in 9 key countries in Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OBJECTIVE III:</strong> Reduce poverty in Europe, Central Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OBJECTIVE IV:</strong> Increase the impact of the international system in reducing poverty, preventing conflict and responding effectively to conflict and humanitarian crises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TARGET 3:</strong> Improved effectiveness of the multilateral system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TARGET 4:</strong> Ensure that the EU secures significant reductions in EU and world trade barriers by 2008 leading to Improved opportunities for developing countries And a more competitive Europe. [Joint target with the Department for Trade and Industry]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TARGET 5:</strong> By 2007/08, improved effectiveness of UK and International support for conflict prevention, through addressing long-term structural causes of conflict, managing regional and national tension and violence, and supporting post-conflict reconstruction, where the UK can make a significant contribution, in particular Africa, Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East. [Joint target with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Ministry of Defence]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OBJECTIVE V:</strong> Develop, support and promote policy that assists poverty reduction and the achievement of the MDGs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OBJECTIVE VI:</strong> Improve the impact and effectiveness of DFID’s bilateral programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TARGET 6:</strong> Ensure that the proportion of DFID’s bilateral Programme going to low-income countries is at least 90% and achieve a sustained increase in the index of DFID’s bilateral projects evaluated as successful.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further reading:


http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmintdev/964/964.pdf
Figure 6: DFID in sub-Saharan Africa, 2004-05 (Source: DFID Departmental Report, 2005)
Chapter 4: Which African countries receive UK aid?

23. This chapter outlines which African countries receive UK aid. It begins by setting out which African countries receive UK aid, before examining the sectoral distribution of UK aid, and the aid modalities through which aid is delivered.

Which African countries receive UK Aid?

24. The UK Government, primarily through DFID, provides aid to developing countries across the world, in Africa, in Asia, in Europe and Central Asia, in Latin America and the Caribbean, and in the Middle East and North Africa. The distribution of UK development assistance reflects two things: first the historical pattern of aid distribution which is shaped by the UK’s colonial history; and second, the UK’s decision to focus its efforts on poverty reduction. In terms of poverty reduction, DFID's approach is to provide support to those countries where poverty is a big problem, and where the government is committed to poverty reduction. This stance is informed by DFID’s view – supported by the World Bank – that aid is most effective when it is spent in poor countries with governments that are committed to poverty reduction. Africa, and especially sub-Saharan Africa, is a particular focus of UK aid. In 2004/05, 48% of DFID’s bilateral assistance was spent in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2005/06, this will rise to over 52%, or more than £1 billion.

25. Whilst the purpose of UK aid is poverty reduction, the delivery of aid to a specific developing country – its volume, and the ways in which it is provided – is very contingent upon the stance of the developing country. Countries which are committed to poverty reduction, and which have in place policies which are deemed sensible by the UK government and other key players such as the International Monetary Fund, will – all other things being equal – receive more aid. In the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative for instance, debt relief will only be provided to those countries which have in place a Poverty Reduction Strategy which has been approved by the IMF and World Bank. Conversely, as seen recently in the case of Ethiopia, if the behaviour of a country – in particular as regards governance – diverges from expectations, the UK retains the right to stop the flow of aid. In the recent Ethiopia case, to try to prevent the poor of Ethiopia suffering as a result of their government’s actions, the decision was taken to channel aid via NGOs rather than through the government of Ethiopia. DFID, in its decision-making, uses similar standards as the International Financial Institutions although no specific criteria are made public.

26. DFID’s Public Service Agreement (PSA) sets out a range of targets against which DFID’s work will be assessed. For Asia, these countries are India, China, Pakistan and Bangladesh. For Africa, there are 16 PSA countries: Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of

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Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Lesotho (see figure 6). The responsibility for managing bilateral development assistance programmes is largely devolved to country teams, which are located in country, or in some cases regional, offices. The 16 PSA countries receive 89% of DFID’s funds for Africa.

Figure 7: DFID Allocation by programme to Africa (£ thousand)²⁴

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<td>East and Central Africa</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>3,096</td>
<td>5,558</td>
<td>12,933</td>
<td>13,157</td>
<td>30,300</td>
<td>46,350</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>15,445</td>
<td>11,390</td>
<td>40,341</td>
<td>40,995</td>
<td>59,500</td>
<td>90,050</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>47,359</td>
<td>24,925</td>
<td>42,390</td>
<td>26,001</td>
<td>37,300</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>32,764</td>
<td>26,891</td>
<td>35,263</td>
<td>28,134</td>
<td>45,734</td>
<td>46,100</td>
<td>46,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>67,042</td>
<td>63,254</td>
<td>75,497</td>
<td>79,819</td>
<td>88,614</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>63,345</td>
<td>66,665</td>
<td>53,206</td>
<td>54,493</td>
<td>62,637</td>
<td>71,670</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Eastern Africa Other¹</td>
<td>3,103</td>
<td>7,226</td>
<td>26,810</td>
<td>22,690</td>
<td>34,200</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>44,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>258,154</td>
<td>205,919</td>
<td>286,345</td>
<td>264,692</td>
<td>357,185</td>
<td>458,370</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>56,010</td>
<td>42,058</td>
<td>51,728</td>
<td>53,107</td>
<td>54,500</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>29,902</td>
<td>38,567</td>
<td>30,563</td>
<td>36,608</td>
<td>45,673</td>
<td>55,000</td>
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<td>60,000</td>
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<td>South Africa¹</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho¹</td>
<td>2,139</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>2,759</td>
<td>3,311</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>52,101</td>
<td>39,113</td>
<td>37,710</td>
<td>24,664</td>
<td>28,548</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>10,678</td>
<td>16,699</td>
<td>26,776</td>
<td>23,149</td>
<td>27,600</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa Regional (inc. Lesotho¹)</td>
<td>36,905</td>
<td>29,619</td>
<td>81,014</td>
<td>58,637</td>
<td>54,545</td>
<td>18,590</td>
<td>18,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>166,956</td>
<td>234,556</td>
<td>209,475</td>
<td>210,766</td>
<td>223,590</td>
<td>226,000</td>
<td>248,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>69,550</td>
<td>51,615</td>
<td>52,371</td>
<td>58,022</td>
<td>66,442</td>
<td>70,100</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>4,587</td>
<td>5,268</td>
<td>19,956</td>
<td>14,655</td>
<td>89,100</td>
<td>104,250</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>15,815</td>
<td>19,725</td>
<td>29,237</td>
<td>31,875</td>
<td>44,908</td>
<td>70,470</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>35,059</td>
<td>34,608</td>
<td>33,004</td>
<td>35,160</td>
<td>30,200</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other West Africa¹</td>
<td>6,555</td>
<td>5,713</td>
<td>4,296</td>
<td>11,020</td>
<td>7,510</td>
<td>17,810</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>131,566</td>
<td>116,747</td>
<td>138,458</td>
<td>150,733</td>
<td>238,160</td>
<td>302,630</td>
<td>309,000</td>
<td>299,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Africa Non-Country Programmes</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Africa Policy</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union/Regional</td>
<td>3,940</td>
<td>4,665</td>
<td>2,671</td>
<td>7,014</td>
<td>10,756</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>69,000</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Assistance¹</td>
<td>2,255</td>
<td>2,597</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3,815</td>
<td>16,200</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa – AFD²</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1,103</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other²</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3,245</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,376</td>
<td>7,238</td>
<td>3,774</td>
<td>14,074</td>
<td>26,956</td>
<td>115,410</td>
<td>153,000</td>
<td>188,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICA Total</td>
<td>583,371</td>
<td>496,860</td>
<td>663,217</td>
<td>638,974</td>
<td>833,067</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>1,147,000</td>
<td>1,265,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27. DFID’s programme of aid to Africa is on a steep upward trajectory, rising from £583 million in 2000/01 to a planned expenditure of £1265 million in 2007/08 (see figure 7). In 2004/05, the top five recipients of UK aid to sub-Saharan Africa are: Sudan (£89 million); Tanzania (£89 million); Ghana (£66 million); Uganda (£63 million); and, Ethiopia (£60 million). In 2004/05 India and Bangladesh, were the only two countries receiving more UK aid than Sudan and Tanzania, receiving £237 million and £122 million respectively. In addition to bilateral programmes, assistance is also provided to the African Union, for humanitarian assistance programmes in particular countries as needs arise, and through multilateral institutions such as the World Bank.

28. DFID’s strong and increasing focus on sub-Saharan Africa is explained, both by history, but perhaps more importantly because of the challenges facing many of the countries in Africa. DFID’s goal is poverty reduction; with such a goal, Africa has to be an important focus. The poverty reduction goal, and the focus on poor countries that this goal requires, is set out in one of DFID’s PSA targets, which is to ensure that the proportion of DFID’s bilateral programme going to low-income countries is at least 90%. In 2003/04, the level of “poverty focus” achieved was 74%. In 2004/05 a “poverty focus” of 83% was achieved, with the 90% target likely to be reached in 2005/06. Having such a target has ensured that DFID’s focus has been kept firmly on poverty reduction, an orientation which has guided DFID’s growing programme in Africa.

**What sectors is aid targeted at?**

![Figure 8: DFID Bilateral Aid to Africa by Sector, 2004/05](image)

29. DFID’s aid to Africa is spent across a range of sectors, with the economic sector, education, health and governance being the most important (see figure 8). This sectoral distribution of DFID spending in Africa largely mirrors the pattern seen for DFID’s bilateral programmes across the world. Whilst the “economic” sector appears the largest, it remains the case that over the last several years DFID has shifted the balance of its focus away from productive

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25 By low-income, DFID refers to countries with a per capita GNP of $746 or below in 1998.
activities, towards the social sectors of health, education and governance. However, with the Commission for Africa, and the World Bank, putting renewed emphasis on the importance of economic infrastructure, there may well be a shift towards the productive sectors in the coming years.

### Figure 9: Distribution of UK Aid to DFID’s 16 African PSA Countries, 2004 (US$ mn.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Social Infrastr-ucture and Services</th>
<th>Economic Infrastr-ucture</th>
<th>Production Sectors</th>
<th>Multi- Sector</th>
<th>Emergency Assistance and Reconstruction</th>
<th>Commodity Aid/ General Programme Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congo (DR)</td>
<td>23479</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>1156</td>
<td>36088</td>
<td>3848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>30793</td>
<td>2466</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>7787</td>
<td>8558</td>
<td>36747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>7841</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>12318</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>25001</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1289</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1008</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>23038</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>7794</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>28960</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>147123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>300441</td>
<td>22700</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>6042</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>112647</td>
<td>1231</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1596</td>
<td>27483</td>
</tr>
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<td>South Africa</td>
<td>23625</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>9161</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>89369</td>
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</tr>
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<td>58357</td>
<td>1283</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5497</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>41224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>13154</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>14055</td>
<td>265665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>28061</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>13008</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>44856</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3029</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30. Working out the sectoral distribution of spending in individual countries is a challenge, because DFID does not include such disaggregated data in its Departmental Report or in its key statistical report “Statistics on International Development”. However, some information can be found through the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System. As figure 9 shows, in all but one of the 16 countries which DFID’s PSA is focused on in Africa, spending on social infrastructure and services, a category which includes health and education, is significantly greater than that on economic infrastructure or the productive sectors. It is also noteworthy that Countries facing major humanitarian crises – the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Sudan – are in receipt of a great deal of humanitarian assistance. In addition, several countries including Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda receive a lot of assistance which falls under the OECD’s category of “Commodity Aid/General Programme Assistance”. This reflects the UK’s increasing use of Budget Support - or as DFID terms it, Poverty Reduction Budget Support - as a mode of delivering aid to a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

30 The source for information on the sectoral distribution of aid is the OECD DAC’s Creditor Reporting System – see [www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline](http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline)
**How is it delivered?**

31. Nearly 40% of DFID’s aid programme is channeled through multilateral organisations. Of the remaining bilateral programme, in 2004/05 20% was provided through Poverty Reduction Budget Support, and 15% through Other Financial Aid. Technical Cooperation accounted for 24% of bilateral spending, with the rest made up of Grants and Other Aid in Kind (24%), Humanitarian Assistance (16%), and debt relief provided by DFID (1%). The distribution of DFID aid has remained fairly constant across these types of aid over the last few years, although it is noticeable that an increasing proportion of aid is being channeled through Poverty Reduction Budget Support (see figure 10).

![Figure 10: DFID Bilateral Programme 2001/02-2004/05 by Aid Type](image)

32. The move to Budget Support is less pronounced than DFID’s advocacy for this modality of aid provision would suggest, but it is certainly the case that DFID is – subject to the developing country concerned having in place good systems for financial monitoring and management – moving in the direction of providing more aid through Budget Support. In 2004, this policy was set out in a paper on Budget Support, which argued that providing partner governments with resources to use in support of their poverty reduction strategies is more effective and sustainable than funding projects implemented by donors, promotes local ownership, and is more likely to strengthen the accountability

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of governments to their citizens.\textsuperscript{32}

33. In 2003/04 £336 million or 21\% of DFID’s bilateral aid was provided in the form of Poverty Reduction Budget Support. In 2005/06, this will rise to over £600 million or 30\% of bilateral aid. In 2004/05, DFID provided Poverty Reduction Budget Support to 17 countries, with Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia being major recipients in Africa. In all of these countries, Poverty Reduction Budget Support makes up a significant portion – often more than half - of DFID’s country programme. DFID sees itself as a “cautious enthusiast” for Budget Support. As such, DFID continues to evaluate the effectiveness of Poverty Reduction Budget Support, to ensure that decisions about whether and how fast to move in the direction of providing aid in this manner, are informed by the best-available evidence.\textsuperscript{33}

Further reading:


\textsuperscript{33} Expert interview
Chapter 5: How is the UK Government accountable to the British public for its aid to Africa?

34. Accountability to the British public for the UK’s programme of aid to Africa is extremely important, as was recognized in all of the expert interviews conducted as part of this research. To be accountable, the Government needs to be transparent (to tell the public what it is doing), to be answerable (to be able to respond to questions and justify what it is doing), and to be controllable (to have its plans subject to approval or otherwise by the public).

35. Aid to Africa is paid for by the taxpayer. As with any other form of public spending, the taxpayer has a right to expect and demand that his or her taxes are being spent effectively. As one expert interviewee noted, this is particularly important as regards the British aid programme, because whereas the public might see domestic spending on education or health services as being essential to Britain’s national interest, overseas aid is seen by many people as “discretionary”. The implication is that if public support for the aid programme fell, then the aid programme would be cut. It is essential therefore that the Government demonstrate the effectiveness of its aid programme, making itself accountable for the ways in which it spends taxpayers’ money, as well as engaging more informally with its citizens to explain its approach to providing aid to Africa. It may also be the case, as one interviewee noted, that the Government’s performance and effectiveness on aid will be improved if people are keeping a close eye on it. Accountability in this regard provides an incentive or driver for effectiveness. This chapter outlines the formal and informal mechanisms through which the Government makes itself accountable for aid to Africa.

**Formal accountability: Legal, electoral, parliamentary, financial**

36. The International Development Act provides the legal basis and sets the boundaries for DFID’s aid programme, including its programme of aid to Africa, making clear that aid must be for poverty reduction. This is the basis for legal accountability. Were DFID to spend public funds on things other than poverty reduction, then it could be subject to a legal challenge.

37. The clearest form of accountability is of course electoral accountability. If the public is dissatisfied with the performance of a Member of Parliament, or of the Government, they can be voted out of office. Electoral accountability is however a very blunt instrument for holding the government to account. Voters decide how to vote on the basis of a range of reasons, with international development or aid to Africa rarely being the decisive issue. And, with an apparent cross-party consensus on the importance of aid to Africa, and on increasing the volume of aid to Africa, voters who object to the provision of aid

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34 Expert interview
35 Expert interview
to Africa have few candidates who they could support on this basis.

38. The Secretary of State for International Development, as the Minister with responsibility for the Government Department with the lead role on the UK’s programme of aid to Africa, is formally accountable to Parliament, and through Parliament to the British public. When asked about how the Government makes itself accountable for its programme of aid to Africa, “Parliament” was the first response given by almost all of the expert interviews consulted as part of this research. Parliament, formally, has the role of agreeing to, or denying, the Government’s requests for funds to finance its aid programme, although as mentioned previously, in practice such requests are always granted. There are however, other aspects to parliamentary accountability. DFID produces two reports a year outlining its progress in relation to its Public Service Agreement, the Departmental Report, and the Autumn Performance Report. The purpose of the Departmental Report is “to provide Parliament, members of the public, and others with a comprehensive account of how DFID has been spending, and plans to spend, public funds.”

39. In Parliament, MPs can hold DFID accountable, through its Ministers, by asking oral and written questions which DFID is required to respond to. Beyond the role of individual MPs, Select Committees can do much to bring issues to the attention of DFID and the Government, to raise awareness, and to make policy proposals. The Select Committee on International Development is the key select committee, tasked with monitoring and scrutinising the policy, practice and spending of DFID. The Select Committee operates by conducting perhaps 7 or 8 inquiries a year, on topics of its own choosing. To complete its inquiries, the Select Committee will ask questions of DFID, take evidence from other expert witnesses, and produce a report which the Government is required to respond to.

40. In recent years the Select Committee has produced influential reports on topics including trade and development, migration and development, Darfur and the responsibility to protect, as well as looking in detail at the approach taken by the UK Government to aid and development, in Africa in particular. The Select Committee can also make overseas visits to examine how the UK aid programme is implemented on the ground. Recent visits to African countries have included South Africa, Malawi, Kenya, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sudan; all countries which have significant UK aid programmes. In the British Parliament, in addition to the Select Committee on International Development, there are a number of All-Party Parliamentary Groups – on Overseas Development, on Africa, and on Aid, Debt and Trade – which bring together MPs with a particular interest in aid, development and Africa and enable MPs to work together to keep an eye on the issues.

41. The National Audit Office has the task of auditing DFID’s financial accounts. Its role is not to comment on Government policy, but to assess how effectively

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the Government is spending taxpayers' funds to achieve its policies.\(^\text{38}\) The NAO reports to Parliament, and its findings can be used as the basis for an inquiry by the Public Accounts Committee, a parliamentary committee made up of MPs from the range of political parties. The reports of the NAO and the Public Accounts Committee are widely respected and can play an important role in holding the Government, and DFID, to account for its aid to Africa. In practice, whilst the NAO has looked at specific parts of DFID’s aid programme – for instance, on HIV/AIDS – and also produced an influential report about the effectiveness of DFID’s performance management\(^\text{39}\), it has not taken a comprehensive look at the UK’s programme of aid to Africa.

42. Transparency is crucial for accountability. Whilst several of the experts interviewed in relation to this project felt that DFID is very keen to make itself accountable – because it has a good story to tell about its effectiveness – several also suggested that DFID is not as transparent as it should be. For instance, there is a perceived lack of transparency about how the funds which DFID channels through the multilaterals are spent, about the positions which the UK takes on the Board of the World Bank, and about DFID’s spending on technical assistance.\(^\text{40}\) In terms of the multilaterals, DFID’s spending via the European Community was felt to be particularly opaque, with a huge accountability gap as regards how, and how effectively, such funds are spent. It was also suggested that a shift to providing a greater proportion of UK aid as Budget Support will reduce the transparency of the UK aid effort and make it harder to hold the Government to account.

43. In sum, parliamentary accountability was seen as being good, but rather patchy, with one knowledgeable interviewee suggesting that parliamentary accountability is – given the power of the Executive – largely symbolic.\(^\text{41}\) One interview emphasized that DFID is much more accountable as a separate department of government focused on poverty reduction than it would be were it part of the Foreign Office.\(^\text{42}\) However, other interviewees stressed that holding DFID to account is insufficient and that attention must also be given to those other government departments – the Department for Trade and Industry, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, the Ministry of Defence etc. – whose policies also have an impact on developing countries in Africa.

**Informal accountability or engagement**

44. Perhaps as significant as formal accountability through Parliament and the National Audit Office, is the informal accountability – or engagement – of the Government with a wide range of sectors with an interest in international development, including aid to Africa. The largest and certainly the most vocal sector is the civil society or NGO sector, a sector which includes organisations

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\(^{38}\) Expert interview
\(^{40}\) Expert interview
\(^{41}\) Expert interview
\(^{42}\) Expert interview
such as Oxfam, Christian Aid, ActionAid, the World Development Movement and CAFOD, as well as hundreds of smaller organisations with an interest in international development. Backed up by perhaps 5 million supporters, many of these organisations have developed effective lobbying skills and work hard to engage with the Government, with many NGOs and other civil society organizations coming together in 2005 to build a high profile campaign around the theme of “Make Poverty History”.

45. Many of these NGOs are supported by, and often work together with, church groups; so, for instance, campaigns on debt relief were driven very much by the churches, working alongside many of the NGOs. In addition to the Christian church groups, other faith-based organisations are becoming more active in engaging the Government on international development-related issues. Other sectors which the UK Government engages with on international development include: academics, who help to shape the intellectual climate for aid; the media, which plays a fundamental role in communicating the issues to the general public; business; and, increasingly, diaspora organisations with expert knowledge of their countries of origin.

46. DFID’s engagement with this diverse set of actors is structured to varying degrees. When DFID is producing a policy paper, or a White Paper, it will seek to engage with a range of actors, explaining what it is doing and seeking the input of various organisations. In many cases, this will involve public and parliamentary meetings, organized on many occasions by a body such as ODI, or one of the All-Party Parliamentary Groups. But, on other occasions – the preparation for the 2006 White Paper, for instance – the timetable for production may mean that there is little time for public consultation.

47. On particular themes, there will be established points of contact between DFID and the wider development community. So, for instance, the Bretton Woods Project is a key link organization as regards consultation on the International Financial Institutions. However, whilst there are some formal public consultations, the nature of DFID’s engagement is quite chaotic. This is perhaps inevitable given the complexity of the policy processes which DFID is involved in, and the wide range of interest groups seeking to engage with DFID on a myriad of issues. At the more structured end of the spectrum, some NGOs, along with think tanks including ODI, are now seen by DFID as “partners” and receive a limited amount of core funding through arrangements known as “Partnership Programme Agreements”. This ensures that these organizations engage with DFID on a longer-term basis, rather than solely on specific issues.

48. Partnership Programme Agreements are agreements between DFID and a range of influential civil society organisations in the UK. They set out how the two partners will work together to contribute to meeting the Millennium

43 Expert interview
44 Further information about DFID’s Partnership Programme Agreements can be found at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/dfidwork/ppas/partnerprogagreements.asp
Development Goals, and run from between 3 and 7 years. Organisations have to apply for a PPA in a competitive process; 2006 will see more organisations signing PPAs with DFID. PPAs can be renewed, but there is no automatic renewal. Organisations with a PPA will be provided with strategic funding to deliver jointly-agreed outcomes. Currently fifteen organisations have PPAs with DFID. These are: Action Aid; Action on Disability and Development; CAFOD; CARE International; Christian Aid, the Catholic Institute for International Relations; HelpAge International; International Service; the Intermediate Technology Development Group; Oxfam, the PANOS Institute; Save the Children UK, Skillshare International; VSO; WaterAid and WWF. The Overseas Development Institute has a PPA with DFID, the purpose of which is to build stronger relations with civil society organisations in developing countries.

49. The various interest groups which seek to engage with DFID and other government departments in relation to development policy and development-related policies, are active at all stages of the policy process. Organisations may raise issues of concern to the government, identifying problems and proposing solutions. Or they may be involved through formal or informal consultations once the government has decided to design a policy. Or they may engage with the government to point out how the policy is working once it has been implemented. Through their involvement at various stages in the policy process, interest group engagement – rather than being a formality – plays an important role in the design of policy.

50. DFID’s engagement with the British public and groups interested in development is about explaining the Government’s approach as well as hearing from others. To this end, DFID has worked closely with the Department for Education and Skills to ensure that the global dimension is central to the education curriculum. This approach would appear to have been very successful, with one expert interviewee suggesting that environment and development were now the core values amongst school children and students in the UK. Another recent and successful initiative, timed to coincide with the focus on Africa in 2005, was the production of the “Rough Guide to a better world”, a user-friendly introduction to international development issues, which has been distributed very widely across the UK.

51. In terms of influencing DFID and DFID’s programme of aid to Africa, NGOs are the most influential interest group in the UK. They have the support of millions of people, are well-organised, and widely respected. Some of the expert interviewees consulted even went so far as to suggest that the NGOs are too influential. Business, on the other hand, is not very engaged with the Government on aid to Africa. One interviewee explained that it has been hard to find synergies between the business agenda and the international

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45 Expert interview; ODI-Conway
46 Expert interview
47 Expert interview
48 Expert interview
development agenda\textsuperscript{49}, whilst others felt that business was keen to engage, but that the development and business communities often failed to understand one another’s interests.\textsuperscript{50} Another suggested that British business does not see aid as a “good hunting ground” for contracts.\textsuperscript{51}

52. Prior to 2000, when aid was tied to the purchase of British goods and services, the construction business was an important sector in terms of lobbying on UK aid, but since aid was untied this is no longer the case. That said, on a range of policy issues which impact on developing countries – for instance, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, corruption and arms exports – business remains an important interest group. In this way, the influence of business is felt by DFID through DFID’s relationships with other Departments such as the Department for Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Defence. By engaging with these departments and others, business can and does indirectly shape the nature of the UK’s programme of development assistance to Africa. From the Government’s side, there has been an increased effort – for instance during the Commission for Africa – to get the business community on board.\textsuperscript{52} Finally, beyond the UK, DFID’s programme of aid to Africa is shaped very much by the thinking and practice of other donors and multilateral organizations, with the World Bank being most influential.

**Making the case for aid**

53. DFID’s accountability to Parliament, and its less formal consultations with NGOs and others, is essential to the sustainability of the British programme of aid to Africa. Public support will only be maintained if the public understands the issues, and believes that the UK’s aid programme is effective. Chapter six will explore UK public attitudes to international development in more detail, but the remainder of this chapter highlights an issue which was raised in interviews with several experts, the shift to Budget Support.

54. Budget Support, or Poverty Reduction Budget Support, is a different way of providing aid to Africa, which relies on direct government-to-government transfers. DFID only uses this approach when it is convinced that a partner government is seriously committed to poverty reduction, and will use the funds accordingly. But as recent events in Uganda and in Ethiopia illustrate, even those governments which have been favoured by DFID and have received Budget Support can engage in behaviours – locking up election rivals and shooting demonstrators – which run counter to the UK’s expectations. Whilst the provision of aid through Budget Support has advantages – it promotes local ownership and accountability, and can reduce the transactions costs of aid – it also carries risks. Many expert interviewees noted the likelihood of some scandal coming to light in relation to Budget Support, with the risk that this would discredit the aid programme. Scandals are highly visible, whereas the successes of Budget Support are perhaps harder to identify and

\textsuperscript{49} Expert interview
\textsuperscript{50} Expert interview
\textsuperscript{51} Expert interview
\textsuperscript{52} Expert interview
communicate.\footnote{Expert interview}

55. The risks of Budget Support require that DFID work with developing countries to ensure that they have adequate financial management systems in place, but it also raises an important issue as regards the UK Government’s engagement with the British public. In an earlier project by ODI, Debbie Warrener suggested that “there is a fundamental tension … between the aim to boost government ownership of the development process and its accountability to national stakeholders, and the need for donors to be accountable to their own taxpayers on how the aid budget is spent”.\footnote{ODI-Warrener (2004) Synthesis Paper 4: Current thinking in the UK on General Budget Support – available at \url{http://www.odi.org.uk/RAPID/UK_Japan/docs/Synth_4.pdf}} In the view of this author, there may not be a fundamental tension. But, the Government must certainly work hard to retain public support for aid, particularly when aid is delivered in a form which, whilst being more effective, also carries more risks. This is tricky, but is not an impossible task. Indeed, DFID is now embarking on a public awareness campaign focused on the message that “aid works” and that “aid effectiveness matters”.\footnote{Expert interview} And, as many interviewees noted, it is the role of politicians to act as leaders, to inform and to explain their policies to the public whose support is essential.\footnote{Expert interview}

\textbf{Further reading:}


Chapter 6: Assessing aid – DFID and the British public

**DFID’s monitoring, evaluation and learning**

56. DFID evaluates its aid programme, to Africa and to other developing countries, in a variety of ways. The Public Service Agreement (PSA) provides the starting point, clearly setting out a set of targets and indicators against which progress towards explicit objectives will be assessed. Target 1 of the PSA relates to “progress towards the Millennium Development Goals in 16 key countries in Africa”. DFID uses a “traffic light” system of reporting on progress. Green indicates that progress is good. Amber indicates that DFID does not feel confident about progress. Red means that there has been slippage in progress. And grey means that progress cannot be assessed because of a lack of data.

57. DFID reports on progress against its PSA targets, twice a year – in the Departmental Report, and in the Autumn Performance Report. Figure 11 shows DFID’s most recent assessment of progress towards its PSA target for Africa; this is the best available information about the impact of DFID’s aid and development programme on progress towards the MDGs in Africa. The Departmental Report provides further information and case studies about the impact of DFID’s programme of aid to Africa. To monitor progress towards its PSA targets in the sixteen PSA countries, DFID makes use of recognized international data sources – from the World Bank and the UN – alongside additional data from countries which have been able to collect and collate more up-to-date and comparable data.

58. In addition to reporting on progress against the PSA targets, DFID monitors and evaluates its performance at many levels, in order to learn from its experience and enhance its performance. First, quarterly Management Reports enable DFID to keep track of its performance, by reporting on issues including expenditure, human resources, risk management, and project and programme performance. Second, the Country and Regional Assistance Plans and the Institutional Strategy Papers which DFID produce include indicators so that performance can be measured against the plans. And third, at project and programme level, there are annual reviews of performance against objectives. Within DFID there is an Evaluation Department, which plays the role of helping DFID to learn lessons in order to improve its performance. DFID, in its Departmental Report, notes that such evaluation also helps DFID to improve its accountability to Parliament, the public and stakeholders in developing countries.

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60 Expert interview
Figure 11: Progress against 2005-08 Public Service Agreement Target 1

The absolute number of people living in poverty across Africa has fallen over the last three years and the pace of growth quickened. The rates of primary school enrolment and under-five child mortality have also improved, leading us to forecast that we are likely to meet these targets. New UN data for HIV and AIDS are currently unavailable but local data suggest that overall HIV prevalence is stabilising in Africa. Prevalence rates vary across the region however. Off track targets include the ratio of girls to boys in primary school and the number of births attended by skilled birth attendants. Greater levels of commitment by African governments will be required to meet these, and DFID will continue to encourage partner governments to prioritise these issues and intensify action. The Gleneagles Summit in July led to a series of commitments from the leaders of the G8 to a comprehensive plan of action for Africa. This was followed by an African Partners Forum in London at which it was agreed to formulate a Joint Action Plan to monitor the commitments of G8 and African governments. Whilst much remains to be done, such commitments offer the continent an opportunity for real progress.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-target</th>
<th>Progress</th>
<th>Current Position</th>
<th>Anticipated Progress by 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  a reduction of 4 percentage points in the proportion of people living in poverty across the entire region.</td>
<td>Too early to say. Data from 2001 show that poverty in sub-Saharan Africa is at 46.4%, unchanged from 2000. The pace of sub-Saharan economic growth has quickened since the 1999-2001 period though, and is expected to continue to deliver positive GDP per capita growth in 2005-2008. This should lead to further modest reductions in the proportion of people living in poverty. Despite this progress, external factors such as unexpected high oil prices mean that it is too early to say whether the target will be achieved.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2  an increase in primary school enrolment by 18 percentage points.</td>
<td>Too early to say. Latest figures on primary school enrolment rates are 77%, which is an improvement over a rate of 70% in 2000. Data cover 11 PSA countries; valid data are unavailable for DRC, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Sudan. The trend for enrolment rates is upwards; however, should data become available from countries with large populations (DRC, Nigeria and Sudan) this could have an impact on the baseline and overall enrolment rate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3  an increase in the ratio of girls to boys enrolled in primary school by 5 percentage points.</td>
<td>Off track. Data are available for 15 PSA countries; DRC is excluded because accurate baseline data are not available for conflict-affected areas. The ratio remains unchanged from 2000 at 91% and, based on the current trend, is likely to remain the same until the end of this PSA period. Lesotho, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe have all reached gender parity rates of at least 98%, Progress since 1998 has been greatest in Ethiopia, Mozambique and Uganda, but ratios in Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania declined between 1998 and 2002.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  a reduction in under-five mortality rates for girls and boys by 8 per 1000 live births.</td>
<td>Too early to say. Data are available for all 16 PSA countries and show a current rate of 153, an improvement over last year’s figure of 161 and the 2000 figure of 157. Based on the current trend, it is predicted that the rate will have decreased to 147 by 2008. Mozambique, Tanzania, Malawi and Nigeria have seen the fastest rates of progress. Despite these positive signs, DRC, Nigeria, Rwanda and Sierra Leone still have mortality rates of around 200 per 1000.</td>
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61 DFID Autumn Performance Report 2005, pp.8-9
59. In recent years, DFID has been criticized, in OECD Peer Reviews and in an influential report by the National Audit Office, in relation to its evaluation activities.\(^{62}\) Many of the challenges faced by DFID in evaluating its aid programme – particularly the impossibility of stating clearly what action caused what result in a global collective effort (the problem of attribution) – are common challenges faced by all organisations involved in international development and other complex issues. But some criticisms have been of DFID’s approach in particular. Some commentators have noted that it might be better to have the evaluations conducted by a body outside of DFID’s control, with others suggesting that DFID doesn’t take evaluation sufficiently seriously, and that this is reflected in the workings of its evaluation unit. Acknowledging these criticisms, DFID has sought to strengthen its evaluation function, providing it with additional resources, and ensuring that it is focused on lesson-learning.

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**Public knowledge and attitudes**

60. Aid to Africa will only be provided if the British public remains content for its taxes to be spent in this way. As such, the Government is keen to monitor and to nurture public support for aid and development. To this end, the British Government has conducted a survey into public knowledge and attitudes towards poverty in developing countries each year since the Labour Government was elected, and the Department for International Development was established, in 1997. This survey provides a huge amount of data about public attitudes towards international development. The most recently published survey was conducted in July 2004. In early 2006, the results of a survey conducted during 2005 will be published, but according to sources within DFID, despite the attention focused on poverty reduction in 2005, the public’s knowledge and attitudes have not shifted substantially. This data set, combined with the results of other opinion polls reveals that the British public is concerned about poverty in developing countries and supportive of the Government’s efforts to fight poverty, but that the public’s knowledge of the UK’s aid programme is rather limited. As an expert interviewee from DFID put it, the public thinks that aid is hugely important, thinks that aid is wasted due to corruption, thinks that aid doesn’t reach the right people, sees NGOs as more important players than the British Government in the fight against poverty, and doesn’t even realise that there is a Government Department with the responsibility for global poverty reduction.

61. In 2004, over two thirds of respondents to the Office for National Statistics survey were either very, or fairly, concerned about poverty in developing countries, a level of concern that has remained constant since 1999 (see figure 12). Notably, the vast proportion of respondents took the view that poverty in developing countries is a moral issue, a finding which resonates well with the language used by the Government, the Secretary of State, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Prime Minister in talking about international development. Looking at Africa in particular, the public sees the most important causes of Africa’s problems as being corrupt and incompetent African governments, followed by HIV/AIDS, followed by civil wars and fighting amongst African states. As regards the possibility of tackling poverty and related problems in Africa, whilst 30% take the view that Africans have it within their power to solve their own problems, 52% believe that Africa needs the support of rich countries, in terms of aid and other forms of assistance, if it is to solve its problems. A further 9% take the view that Africa’s problems cannot be solved.

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64 Expert interview
66 YouGov Survey on Africa and political institutions, June 2005 – see [www.yougov.co.uk](http://www.yougov.co.uk)
67 YouGov Survey on Africa and political institutions, June 2005.
62. Despite the role played by the Government and DFID, the public’s perception is that it is international charities – Oxfam, Christian Aid etc. – that have the most impact on poverty in developing countries. The Office for National Statistics Survey revealed that more than two-fifths (43%) of the public believe that the UK Government’s contribution to poverty reduction in developing countries is at about the right level. Twenty-eight percent felt that the Government was doing too little, with 16% thinking it was doing too much (see figure 13). These figures have remained constant since 1999.

63. As regards aid in particular, there is much confusion, with the public seriously over-estimating the proportion of national income spent on aid. For the UK, more than 85% of the population over-estimate the amount spent on aid, with in excess of 70% believing that aid accounts for in excess of 1% of national income. The reality is that UK aid spending amounts to some 0.36% of national income. Then, when asked about whether the level of aid is sufficient, 37% of the public say it is about right, with 36% saying it is too little, and 18% saying it is too much. To compare, across the EU, 30% of respondents to a survey stated that their government spent about the right amount on aid, with 33% saying spending was too low, and 11% saying it was too high. Interestingly, whilst 36% of the British public think aid is too low, and 50% would like to see the 0.7% target met by 2010, only 16% say that they would be prepared to pay higher taxes to fund aid increases. It is also worth noting that there is deep skepticism about the uses to which aid will be put, with fully 83% of respondents taking the view that aid will be ineffective as a result of

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68 Office for National Statistics (2004) Public attitudes towards development, figure 1.1
corruption and poor governance.\textsuperscript{74} This raises concerns about what would happen to public support for aid to Africa in the event of a major scandal, the likelihood of which may be increased by a shift to providing aid as Budget Support.

\textbf{Figure 13: Respondents’ perception of the level of commitment of the UK Government to poverty reduction in developing countries}\textsuperscript{75}

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure13.png}
\caption{Respondents’ perception of the level of commitment of the UK Government to poverty reduction in developing countries.}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Assessments, performance and accountability}

64. As many of the expert interviewees noted, public support is crucial for the sustainability of the British programme of aid to Africa and other developing countries. If such support were to decrease, levels of aid could fall in the face of competing priorities. A shift towards providing more aid in the form of budget support brings new challenges in terms of maintaining the British public’s support. DFID, as with all donors, needs to work hard to ensure that its assessments of its own performance deliver multiple goals: to enhance learning and performance; and to enhance DFID’s accountability to stakeholders including the British public by providing the evidence-base upon which politicians and the public can make an informed contribution to debates about the future of UK aid to Africa. As the OECD’s Development Centre put it recently: “If political leaders from donor countries … are genuinely committed to poverty reduction and long-term development, it is in their interest to shift from dependency on passive, uninformed public support for aid to a more critically aware constituency at home.”\textsuperscript{76}

\textbf{Further reading:}


\textsuperscript{74} YouGov Survey on Africa and political institutions, June 2005.
\textsuperscript{75} Office for National Statistics (2004) \textit{Public attitudes towards development}, figure 7.1
\textsuperscript{76} OECD/Development Centre (2005) “MDGs, taxpayers and aid effectiveness”, \textit{Policy Insights}, number 13, p.1.


OECD/Development Centre (2005) ‘MDGs, taxpayers and aid effectiveness’,
Policy Insights number 13.
Chapter 7: Conclusions

65. In this concluding chapter, the findings of the project are summarized, with particular attention given to issues which may be of interest to those considering how best to organize and present Japan’s programme of aid to Africa.

66. In 2001, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair described Africa as a “scar on the conscience of the world”. This speech set in motion a sustained effort on the part of the British Government to work harder, and to spend more, on reducing poverty in Africa. In 2004/05, the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), spent £883 million on aid to Africa. By 2007/08, DFID spending on programmes in Africa will have risen to £1265 million. Aid to Africa – from the UK, and from other G8 countries – is on an upward trajectory.

67. The UK has provided aid to Africa for a variety of reasons, with the mix of reasons changing over time. At any one time, aid is motivated by multiple reasons. At times, aid has been primarily about British economic interests, at other times it has been about foreign policy including security, and at other times it has been about poverty reduction. Since the coming to power of a Labour Government in 1997 in the UK, the stated reason for providing aid to Africa and developing countries elsewhere has been one of poverty reduction. There is no doubt that aid flows are motivated by security concerns too, but in 2006, aid – particularly aid to Africa – is spent to reduce poverty.

68. The UK’s recent experience demonstrates the importance of high-level political leadership – from the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and from successive Secretaries of State – in delivering a growing aid programme. It is also worth noting the important role played by DFID. The UK is something of an exception in having a separate Department for International Development. That the UK, with an exceptionally independent department focused on international development, has a reputation as a leader in international development, is surely not a coincidence.

69. Within the UK Government, DFID plays a key role in seeking to ensure that other departments take international development fully into account. This drive for policy coherence is arguably one of the next big things in international development. Beyond the UK, DFID sees itself as a partner working alongside other organisations – governments, donors, NGOs, poor people – in the fight against global poverty. This fits well with DFID’s emphasis on country ownership of development, something which – recognizing that development cannot be imposed by the donors – is essential.

70. The distribution of UK aid to Africa reflects the UK’s historical relationships, but it is also and increasingly driven by DFID’s focus on supporting governments which are committed to reducing poverty. This would seem
to be a sensible approach to maximizing the effectiveness of aid. Indeed, there may be a case for increasing the extent to which aid is used to reward good performance. However, as DFID recognizes, careful thought needs to be given to those countries whose people live in poverty, but whose governments are not committed to poverty reduction. Whatever approach the Japanese take to the provision of aid to Africa, they must ensure that their activities complement the activities of existing donors, and, where possible, harmonise and coordinate their aid efforts in line with recommendations coming out of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD.

71. Sectorally, in recent years much UK aid has been spent on the health and education sectors, along with governance. The productive sectors, including economic infrastructure, have been relatively neglected. In terms of aid modalities – the ways in which aid is delivered – the UK is delivering more of its aid to Africa as Poverty Reduction Budget Support. In this modality, aid is delivered direct to the budgets of governments which have in place effective systems for financial management, and are seriously committed to poverty reduction. Delivering aid in this way raises challenges in terms of tracking its impact, but it is also expected to deliver benefits in terms of predictability of aid flows, local ownership and domestic accountability.

72. Domestic accountability is hugely important, both in developing countries and in the developed world. Taxpayers have a right to know about, and to shape, the purposes to which their monies are put. And, accountability can play an important role in driving improvements in performance, and – as long as aid is effective – in maintaining public support. Accountability must not be an afterthought. In the UK, the British Government is accountable to the British public in a range of ways. In terms of formal accountability, the International Development Act sets the legal limits of the aid programme (aid must be spent on poverty reduction), elections provide a blunt instrument of accountability, and Parliament and the National Audit Office play key roles. Despite the UK’s long history of aid, and the range of mechanisms, formal accountability remains patchy. In addition to mechanisms of formal accountability, the UK Government engages informally with a range of organisations – NGOs, faith-based groups, trade unions, academics, the media, think-tanks – both to get their input into policy discussions, and perhaps more so, to build a constituency for international development and aid.

73. As DFID’s regular surveys indicate, the British public is supportive of aid and development, but not very knowledgeable. Therefore, continued efforts to build public support and awareness – including through ensuring that the global dimension is central to the educational curriculum - are essential to the long-term sustainability of the UK’s programme of aid and development to Africa.

74. In 2005, Africa was headline news in the UK. It is however debatable whether the “Africa fever” had much impact on DFID’s aid policies towards Africa. UK aid was already on a rapid upward trajectory and DFID’s policies had already been put in place. Nevertheless, 2005 was important. The campaigns around
the G8 Summit probably delivered more commitments in terms of aid and debt relief from other G8 countries than would otherwise have been forthcoming. In terms of the UK’s policies, the Make Poverty History and Live 8 campaigns demonstrated the widespread public support for action to tackle poverty in Africa, with one result being that the main opposition party, the Conservatives – with a realistic chance of winning the next General Election – are now much more supportive of efforts to reduce poverty in developing countries than they were a few years ago. The UK’s enthusiasm for tackling poverty in Africa is likely to remain high, although it will have to compete with other concerns such as addressing the threat of global terrorism.

75. The UK is at the forefront of international development thinking and practice, with the Department for International Development leading the Government’s efforts. Since 1997, UK aid to Africa – focused on poverty reduction – has played an important role in helping African countries to make progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. Many challenges remain, but if donors such as Japan are able to make their programmes of aid to Africa as effective as DFID’s seem to be, then – subject to the commitments of African governments – faster progress will certainly be achieved.
Annexes

Annex 1: Annotated bibliography


The establishment of the UK Department for International Development in 1997, and the evolution of the UK's foreign aid policies, has provoked international interest as a possible model for other countries to follow. The UK now combines in a single government department not only the delivery of all overseas aid, but also responsibility for analyzing the impact on developing countries of other government policies, such as trade, environment and prevention of conflict. The department is led by a Cabinet-level minister. It has a remit to articulate the UK’s long-term security, economic and political interests in helping to build a more stable and prosperous world, and to ensure that this long-term goal is considered alongside the more immediately pressing concerns of political, security and commercial interests. It has benefited from a sharp focus on its long-term mission to reduce poverty overseas. Within a few years, the new Department has established a reputation for itself, and for the UK Government, as a leader in development thinking and practice. This paper describes the institutional changes in more detail, and considers how they came about. It also considers the steps that will be needed to consolidate DFID’s early success.


This, the first of the current Government's White Papers on International Development, set out the approach to be taken to international development and poverty reduction.


This, the second of the current Government's White Papers on International Development explained the Government's strategy for eliminating world poverty. Issues addressed include: the challenge of globalization; promoting effective governments and efficient markets; investing in people, sharing skills and knowledge; harnessing private finance; capturing gains from trade; tackling global environmental problems; using development assistance more effectively; and strengthening the international system.


This study makes available to a wider audience the early results of a new effort within DFID to answer the crucial question of how best to deploy our resources in the international struggle to eliminate world poverty. Issues addressed include: the ways in which DFID and other donors currently allocate aid; the ways in which DFID could improve its aid allocation priorities; allocations of aid to multilateral institutions; and investment in international public goods.


The Departmental Report is intended to provide Parliament, members of the public, our development partners and others interested in development issues with a comprehensive
account of how we have been spending, and plan to spend, public funds. The report focuses primarily on DFID's work and key developments from April 2004 to March 2005. It explains our approach to working as part of a wider international effort to tackle poverty in poor countries, collaborating with many organisations, including other UK government departments, other donors, multilateral development agencies, the governments of developing and transition countries, civil society, business and academia. It does not contain information about policy that is already set out in other DFID publications.

The report is structured around DFID's Public Service Agreement (PSA) for the period 2003-2006. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to DFID's work to reduce poverty in developing countries, outlines the significance of the year 2005 to the international effort to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and describes the efforts we are making to enhance the understanding of development within the UK. Chapters 2 to 6 focus on DFID's five PSA objectives: our work to reduce poverty in Africa, in Asia, and in Europe, the Middle East and the Americas (Chapters 2, 3 and 4 respectively); our efforts to improve the effectiveness of the multilateral system (including our work with the European Union, the World Bank and United Nations agencies), our involvement with civil society, and how we address debt relief, international trade, conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian crises (Chapter 5); and the development of policy (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 explains how DFID is organised and structured to deliver its objectives efficiently. The annexes provide detailed information about DFID's financing, targets and achievements.


This annual report shows the deployment of official UK financial resources to support international development and how this funding is broken down by destination country or organisation, type of assistance and purpose. The report is structured as follows:

1. Understanding Aid Statistics - provides vital background information for users of the report, describing what counts as development assistance – or aid - and explaining key distinctions in the report, such as the difference between the DFID programme, Gross Public Expenditure on Development and UK Official Development Assistance (ODA).

2. How much is the UK Expenditure on International Development? - shows total aid volumes and summarises spend according to the type of aid. Figures for both the UK and DFID are presented. Progress towards the target of spending 0.7% of gross national income as ODA is shown and international comparisons are made.

3. Where does the UK Expenditure on International Development Go? - shows how DFID's bilateral programme is divided among countries and regions and how DFID's multilateral programme is divided among different institutions. Data are also presented on the destination of UK ODA. This section also shows disbursements via civil society organisations.

4. What is the purpose of UK Expenditure on International Development? - reports on the sectors to which the DFID bilateral aid programme is directed and how this aid is expected to impact on the Millennium Development Goals.

5. Debt Relief explains UK debt relief and the amounts reported.


The aim of this report, the first of its type for DFID, is to provide a concise, independent assessment of DFID's overall effectiveness. It is largely based on a desk review of performance assessment and evaluation reports produced since 1997, supported by interviews with some DFID staff. It is a test of what can be said about DFID's effectiveness.
based on existing performance assessment material. It follows, therefore, that it is also a test of DFID's current performance assessment systems.

DFID/UK Government (2005) 'Public Service Agreements and Technical Note'.
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/publicserviceagreement03-06.pdf
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/servicedeliveryagree03-06.pdf

DFID's key aims and objectives are set out in its Public Service Agreement 2005-2008 (PSA). DFID is currently working towards its 2003-2006 PSA, however they have now agreed how they will progress their work over the period beyond this, in a new PSA covering 2005-2008. The overall aim of the Public Service Agreement is the elimination of poverty in particular through achievement by 2015 of the Millennium Development Goals. The Public Service Agreement sets out targets that DFID needs to reach by 2008, this will help them to assess whether they are on track to meet the Millennium Development Goals.

Associated with DFID's new PSA is a Service Delivery Agreement and a Technical Note, which describes how progress against each of DFID's PSA targets will be assessed and measured. Where appropriate, it includes the statistical methodologies to be applied, sources of data and baselines.

Eurobarometer (2005) 'Attitudes toward development aid'.

This reports the findings of a survey of public opinion about development aid, conducted across EU member states, in November and December 2004. The underlying objective of this survey on attitudes to development aid is to assess awareness levels and perceptions of the Millennium Development Goals. This survey also aims at examining citizens' views on governmental aid at the national and European levels. Finally, the objective is to assess the perceived form and consequences of development aid and identify priorities for the EU. It provides a fascinating source of data on attitudes to aid and development.

Available from: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/ida.asp

The International Development Act, which came into force on 17 June 2002, is the central piece of legislation governing when the UK can give development or humanitarian assistance, what forms it can be given in, and on what terms. The Act replaces and repeals the outdated Overseas Development and Co-operation Act (1980), reflecting in law for the first time the centrality of poverty elimination in DFID's work and ensuring future governments will not be able to use development assistance for other purposes. Other purposes include the policy of 'tying' aid to procurement contracts for UK companies. The UK will now be one of the only countries in the world where this practice is unlawful. The Act also clarifies the purposes for which assistance can be given to UK Overseas Territories, gives clearer legal authority than before for DFID's development awareness work, and increases the forms of financial assistance available.

Available from: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmintdev/964/964.pdf

This report from the International Development Committee of the House of Commons [and
drafted by Dr. Alan Hudson] examines DFID's Departmental Report for 2002, commenting both on the picture it paints of DFID's activities, and suggesting ways in which it - and the activities which it reports on - might be improved in subsequent years. Taking its lead from DFID's Departmental Report, this report focuses on DFID's translation of policy into action through the injection and allocation of resources. The Committee's report argues that DFID needs to make its strategy - the ways in which it integrates the cycle of development policy and practice - more explicit, and suggests that by being both strategic and explicit, DFID will become a more accountable and more effective development agency.

Summary: http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/01-02/0102739es.pdf

This report outlines the use which DFID makes of performance management, outlining the frameworks and targets which DFID uses to guide its activities, and assessing how well they work. The report looks in particular at: DFID's performance against their key measures and targets and the methodology which underpins their performance framework; how DFID have translated their objectives and Public Service Agreement targets into planning activity at the country level; and how DFID monitors performance in deciding where they allocate their resources and which approaches to development assistance they employ.

The three key messages are: i) DFID are on track to meet most key targets but their contribution to global poverty reduction is hard to quantify; ii) performance measurement should feature more explicitly in DFID country programme management; and iii) performance monitoring and review are well established but need better integration into corporate management systems.

ODI - Conway (2005) 'Changing aid policies of the major donors: UK case study'.
Available from: http://www.odi.org.uk/RAPID/Projects/UK_Japan/docs/Conway_JBIC.pdf

This is the second of two studies commissioned from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). While the first report maps general changes in the policies of bilateral donors since the mid-1990s, this second study focuses specifically on key changes in UK development policy over recent years, focusing in particular on changes since 1997. The aim of the study is to provide both a concise description of the most important shifts in British development policy, but also and as importantly to explain how and why specific policy changes have taken place. It examines the actors and circumstances that have prompted new policies, and analyses the intellectual and political underpinnings of the processes through which these policies have emerged.


This paper presents a synthesis of ODI work, funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), to address the "2005 agenda" and the role of the UK. The paper outlines the UK's "2005 Agenda" on Africa: the key issues that will inform the UK's dual presidency in 2005 of the G8 and the EU. It assesses the perspectives of France, Germany and the EU on these
issues, along with areas of agreement and momentum versus areas of divergence. It concludes with the implications for Japan: the key decisions for 2005 and the implications for reform in the longer term.


A team of four from ODI visited Tokyo during the week of June 6 2005 as part of ODI's JICA-funded work on UK-Japan aid issues and the implications for Japan of the UK's focus on African development in 2005. These documents provide a record of the visit and the key issues discussed.

ODI - Killick (2005) 'Understanding British aid to Africa: An historical perspective'.

The purpose of this note is to utilise historical information to throw light on the forces shaping British aid policies towards Africa, in the hope that JICA will be able to compare these forces with the influences and constraints determining their own policies. Section 1 summarises some of the key long-term developments in British aid policies towards Africa; Section 2 attempts to summarise the influences shaping these policies; Section 3 comments briefly, in the light of the foregoing, on the present juncture of UK policies towards aiding Africa.

ODI - Piron (2005) 'Human rights and poverty reduction: The role of human rights in promoting donor accountability'.

The aid industry is characterised by a serious deficit of effective accountability mechanisms, in particular to individuals and communities in countries that receive assistance. Power relations between recipient governments and donor agencies are highly unequal. There is often a lack of transparency with regards to how aid agencies allocate financial resources, set priorities, and assess performance, and little information about the kinds of actions they take to hold individual agency staff to account and provide redress for failed projects or wider negative impacts. This background paper examines the extent to which human rights can be used to hold aid agencies to account in a meaningful way, and includes some discussion of domestic accountability to taxpayers in donor countries.

ODI - Sunderland (2005) 'The UK’s policies towards Africa: A snapshot of current positions, debates, with suggestions and implications for Japan'.

This study is part of a wider report on UK Aid Policies for African Development in the run-up to the 2005 G8 summit and their implications for Japan. It considers current UK policies towards Africa for the following issues (listing suggestions and implications for Japan in each case):

- General international development policy
- Governance
- Health
- Investment Climate
- Trade
- Aid
- Debt

This report describes and analyses the challenges posed by the monitoring and evaluation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and budget support programmes. It draws on recent studies and surveys, and on the experience of selected donor organisations and countries, making use of documents and interviews. There are four chapters that give an overall perspective on the issues, a Conclusion and an Annex containing details of arrangements and processes of change in five countries (Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda).


This review provides an assessment of the UK's development co-operation shortly after the coming to power of the Labour Government in 1997. As such it provides a snapshot of a rapidly-changing situation.


This review outlines the UK's programme of development cooperation, outlining changes since the previous OECD/DAC review, outlining a series of challenges and making recommendations as to how UK development cooperation could be further improved.


This short policy paper suggests that MDGs and new aid-effectiveness targets are an opportunity for donors to explain what they do before growing skepticism erodes taxpayer support for aid.


This report is based on data collected in Great Britain on behalf of the Department for International Development (DFID). A random sample of 1,698 people aged 16 years and over answered a range of questions concerning their knowledge and attitudes about poverty in developing countries.
**Annex 2: Expert interviewees**

76. Tony Baldry, Conservative M.P., Former Chair of the International Development Committee

77. Hugh Bayley, Labour M.P., Member of International Development Committee and Chair of All-Party Parliamentary Group on Africa

78. Frances Burns, Head of Communication Unit, Information and Civil Society Department, DFID

79. Richard Dowden, Director, Royal African Society

80. Lord Holme of Cheltenham, Liberal Democrat Member of the House of Lords, Chairman of Lead International, and former Executive Director of Rio Tinto

81. Sarah Kline, Policy Advisor, Oxfam and key strategist in Make Poverty History campaign

82. Simon Maxwell, Director, Overseas Development Institute

83. Sam Sharpe, Head of Development Effectiveness, Policy Division, DFID

84. Nick Sloan, Head of International Development section, National Audit Office

85. Eliot Whittington, Parliamentary Officer, Christian Aid and key strategist in Make Poverty History campaign
Annex 3: Generic topic guide

Background
ODI has been contracted by the UFJ Institute of Japan to conduct a short study into UK aid to Africa. The study is to include a review of key documents, and interviews with representatives of organisations which play important roles in the UK aid and development system. A parallel study is being conducted in France. The purpose of these studies is to provide the UFJ Institute with information about the practices of other major donor countries, to situation their thinking about Japanese aid.

ODI’s study of UK aid is exploring five questions:

- Why does the UK provide aid to Africa;
- How does the UK provide aid to Africa;
- Which African countries receive UK aid;
- How is the UK Government accountable to, and how does it engage with, British citizens in relation to aid to Africa and development-related policies; and
- What do British citizens think of UK development policy and practice and aid to Africa?

Many of these questions can be addressed through a review of the literature, and of key reports produced by DFID, the OECD/DAC and others. Therefore, the research interviews component of the project will primarily cover issues of domestic accountability and the UK Government’s engagement with its citizens in relation to aid and development policy. This document provides a “topic guide”, outlining the sorts of issues which research interviews will cover.

Topic Guide

1. Why does the UK provide aid to Africa?

   1.1. In your opinion, why does the UK provide aid to Africa? Do you think that UK aid to Africa is motivated solely by the goal of poverty reduction? If you think that there are additional/other reasons, what are they?

   1.2. Do you think that the pattern of UK aid flows to Africa and other developing countries has been motivated by goals other than poverty reduction in the past? If there has been a shift in motivation, when did it happen and why?

2. How is the UK Government accountable to, and how does it engage with, British citizens on aid and development?
2.1. Do you think that UK aid and development policy is effective in delivering poverty reduction? What evidence is your view based on?

2.2. Who is the UK Government accountable to domestically for its aid/development policy, and how? Do you think that domestic accountability mechanisms work?

2.3. Which groups does the Government engage with in discussions about UK aid and development policy? (Parliamentarians, NGOs, business, think-tanks/academics, trade unions, diaspora groups, faith-based groups etc.)

2.4. Which groups would you say are most engaged with the Government on aid and development issues? Which groups do you think the Government listens to most and why? Are any groups marginalised or excluded? If so, why?

2.5. What is your organisation’s experience of engaging with the UK Government on aid and development?
   - What has been your best, and worst, experience of effective/ineffective engagement with the UK Government on aid and development?
   - How does the UK Government engage with your organisation in relation to aid and development? Is the engagement of sufficient quality and quantity?
   - Is the UK Government transparent in its activities and decision-making processes relating to aid and development? Are you able to access sufficient information to know what the Government is doing and to engage effectively?
   - To what extent does the UK Government evaluate performance, policies and practice in consultation with key stakeholders? Does the UK Government involve your organisation in its evaluations?

3. Domestic accountability and the international aid system

3.1. To what extent is UK aid/development policy to Africa shaped by the Government’s engagement with domestic interest groups?

3.2. To what extent and why does domestic accountability matter?

3.3. Is there any tension between the need for donors to make themselves accountable to domestic taxpayers and the electorate, and the need for donors to provide enough aid, in the right way – possibly through budget support – to the right countries? If there is a tension, what can be done to manage or reduce the tension?

3.4. Does the shift of emphasis to providing aid through General Budget Support have any implications for domestic accountability, and for what the UK Government can tell its domestic audiences about the impacts of aid?
Annex 4: Specific topic guide – an example

ODI has been contracted by the UFJ Institute of Japan to conduct a short study into the UK’s development assistance to Africa. As part of this study, expert interviews are being conducted with representatives of organisations with whom the British Government engages in relation to its development programme. The purpose of the interviews is to explore issues around domestic accountability and engagement. This document outlines the issues to be explored in this particular research interview.

1) Why has aid and development risen up the political agenda in the UK in recent years? Why, in particular, has Africa become more prominent? Why, in your view, does the UK provide aid to Africa?

2) To what extent and why is UK domestic accountability for British development assistance to Africa and elsewhere important?

3) How does the UK Government make itself accountable domestically for its development assistance to Africa? What are the key mechanisms, and how well do they work?

4) What is your assessment of the effectiveness of parliamentary accountability as regards the UK’s aid and development programme? What role does Parliament play in the policy process?

5) Which constituencies does the Government engage with in discussions about the UK’s aid and development programme? What mechanisms are there for such engagement? What influence do you think such constituencies/groups have on policy?

6) How active is the business community as regards aid and development issues? What difference did the abolition of tied aid make to the level of engagement by the business community?

7) Are there any tensions between the need for aid to build structures of accountability within developing countries (perhaps through Budget Support), and the need for the British Government to retain public support for aid by telling persuasive stories about aid effectiveness?

8) Are there other issues you would like to raise in relation to the UK Government’s domestic accountability for its aid/development programme?