Pastoralists’ vulnerability in the Horn of Africa

Exploring political marginalisation, donors’ policies and cross-border issues – Literature review

Sara Pavanello

Humanitarian Policy Group
Overseas Development Institute, London

November 2009
About the author

Sara Pavanello is a Research Officer in the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

About the Humanitarian Policy Group

The Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI is one of the world's leading teams of independent researchers and information professionals working on humanitarian issues. It is dedicated to improving humanitarian policy and practice through a combination of high-quality analysis, dialogue and debate.
Contents

Abbreviations and acronyms ...........................................................................................................................................2

Section 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................3
  1.1 Aim and structure of the literature review ........................................................................................................3
  1.2 Scope and limitations of the review ....................................................................................................................3
  1.3 Sources and search methodology ......................................................................................................................3

Section 2: Pastoralists' vulnerability and political marginalisation ..............................................................................5
  2.1 Understanding the livelihoods, vulnerability and political marginalisation of pastoral communities in the Horn of Africa ........................................................................................................5
  2.2 Why do pastoralists continue to be politically marginalised? ...........................................................................7
  2.3 The impact of political marginalisation on pastoralist societies .......................................................................9
  2.4 Addressing pastoralists' political marginalisation: lessons for NGOs ............................................................11

Section 3: Cross-border issues and approaches ........................................................................................................17
  3.1 Cross-border conflict ...........................................................................................................................................17
  3.2 Cross-border livestock trade .............................................................................................................................19
  3.3 Addressing cross-border issues: lessons for NGOs .........................................................................................20

Section 4: Donor policies and funding approaches ..................................................................................................23
  4.1 Drought management and response ................................................................................................................23
  4.2 Funding approaches and mechanisms ..............................................................................................................26
  4.3 Promising initiatives .........................................................................................................................................27
  4.4 Policy engagement: lessons for NGOs ............................................................................................................28

Section 5: Key lessons ..................................................................................................................................................29
  5.1 Addressing pastoralists' political marginalisation ............................................................................................29
  5.2 Addressing cross-border issues .........................................................................................................................29
  5.3 Policy engagement ...........................................................................................................................................30

References .................................................................................................................................................................31

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1: The sustainable livelihood framework .....................................................................................................5
Figure 2: Key elements of the CBfE approach ............................................................................................................14
Figure 3: Horn of Africa: pastoralist conflict areas ...............................................................................................18
Figure 4: The Drought Cycle Management model ................................................................................................24
Figure 5: Funding appeals and contributions ........................................................................................................26

Table 1: Land under crop production in pastoral areas in Ethiopia ........................................................................10
## Abbreviations and acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASAL</td>
<td>Arid and semi-arid lands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBfE</td>
<td>Capacity Building for Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCM</td>
<td>Drought Cycle Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMI</td>
<td>Drought Management Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIC</td>
<td>Feinstein International Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HoA</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSNP</td>
<td>Hunger Safety Net Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIED</td>
<td>International Institute for Environment and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPF</td>
<td>Livestock Policy Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU-IBAR</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASC</td>
<td>Pastoral Affairs Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCI</td>
<td>Pastoralist Communication Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIPs</td>
<td>Policies, institutions and processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLI</td>
<td>Pastoral Livelihoods Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPGs</td>
<td>Pastoral Parliamentary Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPPG</td>
<td>Kenya Pastoral Parliamentary Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 1: Introduction

1.1 Aim and structure of the literature review

The Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) was commissioned by CARE International (CARE) to provide a review of the literature on the nature of pastoralists' vulnerability in the Horn of Africa (focusing specifically on Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia) and chart ways in which agencies have responded and identifying best practice. This literature review is part of a broader project that HPG is undertaking to provide learning support to CARE and document and strengthen best practices around drought cycle management in the Horn of Africa (HoA).

The learning support and the literature review focus on three key areas:

1. Pastoralists’ political marginalisation
2. International donors’ policies and approaches to drought management and response

The literature review is structured as follows:

- **Section 1** describes the aim, scope and limits of the review and outlines the search methodology.
- **Section 2** discusses the relationship between pastoralists’ vulnerability and their political marginalisation and points to key lessons and practical recommendations to address pastoralists’ political marginalisation in the HoA.
- **Section 3** reviews opportunities and challenges of adopting cross-border approaches to pastoralists’ livelihoods interventions.
- **Section 4** discusses the relationship between pastoralists’ vulnerability and international donors’ policies and approaches to drought management.

1.2 Scope and limitations of the review

This review recognises that addressing pastoralists’ political marginalisation, adopting appropriate cross-border approaches and improving donors’ policies to drought management is only part of broader efforts to address pastoralists’ vulnerability in the HoA, which may include efforts to improve access to markets, support viable economic alternatives, enable sustainable resource management to arrest or limit environmental degradation, and so on. However, for the purpose of this analysis, this review is limited to the literature that discusses the above three key focus areas in relation to pastoralists’ vulnerability. In addition, this review recognises that pastoralists are a highly diversified group with widely different needs, backgrounds and levels of vulnerability. While there are pastoralists who are relatively wealthy and still able to engage profitably in pastoralism, in recent years an increasing number of pastoralist groups across the HoA have been confronted with a series of livelihoods shocks and have suffered from the progressive weakening of their livelihood systems and increased levels of vulnerability and food insecurity. Many have been forced to drop out of pastoralism altogether. However, for the purpose of this analysis, the discussion in the following sections mainly refers to pastoralist groups in the HoA who have faced and continue to face significant levels of hardship and increasing levels of vulnerability.

The review has three main limitations. First, by its nature it does not offer policy prescriptions, but simply outlines the approaches and recommendations that have emerged from the review of the literature without seeking to judge their validity and appropriateness. Second, neither the published nor grey literature studied pointed to CARE's specific responses and therefore it has not been possible at this stage to shed light on areas of best practice and areas for learning in CARE's programme policy and practice. It is envisaged that best practices and areas for learning will emerge during the subsequent phase of this project (see Output 2 of the ToR in Annex 1). Third, this review does not examine in-depth country case studies, but points to brief examples of interventions or components of programmes in the three countries of focus – Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia.

1.3 Sources and search methodology

The documents for this literature review were collected from the following English-language sources:

**Published literature.** Papers were identified through Internet searches and a systematic search
in the websites of organisations and international forums concerned with pastoralist issues in the Horn of Africa, such as WISP, PARIMA, PCI, IIED and ALRMP. The websites of UN agencies and NGOs, such as UN OCHA, UNDP, Oxfam GB and CARE, were also searched. Keywords used in the search include: pastoralists, pastoralism, pastoral, vulnerability, political marginalisation, pastoralists’ voice, cross-border, trans-border, donor policy, donor approaches, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia and Horn of Africa. In addition, experts in pastoralist issues were contacted via e-mail to request documents on pastoralists in the HoA focused on the three focus areas.

**Grey literature.** Documents provided by CARE were reviewed and (where appropriate) included.
Section 2: Pastoralists’ vulnerability and political marginalisation

2.1 Understanding the livelihoods, vulnerability and political marginalisation of pastoral communities in the Horn of Africa

A livelihood is defined as ‘the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living; a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with, and recover from, stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihoods opportunities for the next generation’ (Chambers and Conway, 1992). The livelihoods approach provides a dynamic and holistic framework for understanding the interaction between the bundle of assets – human, natural, financial, social, physical,¹ that people own, control or have access to, and broader systems of governance, to determine if and how people are able to use these assets to pursue their livelihood strategies to achieve positive livelihood outcomes (as illustrated in Figure 1 below, positive outcomes include more income, increased wellbeing and reduced vulnerability). A livelihoods analysis helps us to understand the livelihood options that people have over time by exploring the linkages between people’s livelihood assets and strategies, and how these strategies are influenced by formal and informal institutions and processes (PIPs) within the ‘vulnerability context’ in which people operate.

According to Chambers (1989): ‘Vulnerability of households or population groups to particular disasters has two aspects. The first is the external shock and the second is people’s capacity to cope with the shock. Vulnerability may be related to particular livelihood systems, to wealth status, or people’s social or political status’. Vulnerability is often seen as the other face of resilience: a group of people is vulnerable when it lacks the resilience to resist an external shock.

Figure 1: The sustainable livelihood framework

![Figure 1: The sustainable livelihood framework](image)

Key
H = Human capital; N = Natural capital; F = Financial capital; S = Social capital; P = Physical capital

Source: DFID Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets: www.livelihoods.org/info/guidance_sheets_rtf/Sect2.rtf

¹ Some adaptations of the livelihoods framework add a sixth asset to the capital assets pentagon, political capital, seen as the ability to use power to further political or economic positions (see for example Concern Worldwide at http://www.concern.net/docs/LivelihoodSecurityPolicy.pdf).
For pastoralist communities five livelihood assets can be identified:

1. Human: education, health, nutrition
2. Natural: grazing land, water sources
3. Financial: livestock, credit
4. Social: livestock, community social support

To attain positive livelihoods outcomes pastoralists rely on specific strategies to manage their livestock effectively. Their livelihoods strategies have evolved over centuries in response to the local environment and the hot and dry climate in which they live, with low and erratic rainfall typical of the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL). Key strategies include accessing and managing natural resources, mainly grazing land and water sources, and maintaining high levels of mobility across large tracts of land to make the most effective use of scarce resources and in response to environmental conditions (Desta et al., 2008; Markakis, 2004). These sophisticated and dynamic strategies have allowed pastoralists to cope with the threats and risks that characterise their environment and to maintain a viable production and livelihoods system. Drought is a major external shock and a primary trigger of livelihoods crises in the HoA. Cyclical droughts are a defining feature of pastoralists' way of life in this region, and 'local livelihoods are sensitively adapted to the certainty that drought will come and can be overcome' (UN OCHA, 2006).

In recent decades however, it has become increasingly clear that pastoralists' strategies have been significantly strained and pastoralists' adaptive capacity to resist or recover from drought-related shocks has been progressively undermined. There is a general consensus in the literature that the chronic vulnerability that characterises many pastoral groups in the HoA today is not merely related to environmental stresses but is the result of complex and multi-dimensional political, economic and social processes (WISP, 2008; Morton, 2008; HPG, 2006; UN OCHA, 2006; Oxfam, 2008; Markakis, 2004; Kandagor, 2005). In particular, the long-standing political marginalisation of pastoralist communities in the HoA is widely recognised to be a primary factor in their chronic vulnerability (Oxfam, 2008/7; Morton, 2008; Makakis, 2004; HPG, 2006). The PIP element of the livelihoods framework is especially relevant here. As highlighted above, the relationship between the PIPs and people's assets is mutually reinforcing. The assets that pastoralists own, access and control determine their ability to influence the PIPs; in turn, the nature of the PIPs – both formal and informal – influences the way pastoralist groups access and govern their livelihoods assets and the strategies that they adopt to pursue their livelihoods. Adverse policies and practices, unresponsive formal institutions and persistent negative perceptions of pastoralism have progressively weakened pastoralists' livelihoods strategies. Their mobility and access to key natural resources has been severely restricted, and their ability to manage their livestock effectively has been repeatedly undermined. As a result, their livelihoods system is increasingly vulnerable to external shocks.

Pastoralists are the most politically marginalised group in the HoA and East Africa (Oxfam, 2008). According to Morton, ‘there is an increasing acceptance that the major issues in pastoral development are related to policy and governance: issues such as conflicts and insecurity, livestock marketing, land rights, inadequate provision of services and infrastructure, drought and dependence on food aid’ (2005: 1). In this analysis pastoralists' political marginalisation is understood as the result of an imbalanced power relation between the state and pastoral civil society – understood here as community-based organisations, local associations, and pastoral groups. On the one hand, the political marginalisation of pastoralists’ communities is the result of long-standing governance failures, non-responsive and unaccountable institutions and politicians and policy-makers lacking the will and incentives to include pastoralists’ interests in national policy debates. On the other hand, pastoralists often lack the ability to organise themselves and sustain the collective action required to exert political leverage in policy circles. In addition, the members of the pastoralist civil society groups who should represent the needs and interests of pastoralists and support their rights and voices in modern governance institutions have in some cases become detached from pastoral lives and systems. An increasingly common phenomenon in the HoA is the emergence of ‘pastoral elites’: while they can be a

---

2 Livestock is a key asset for pastoralists, and is both a financial asset, as a source of food, income and storage of wealth, and a social asset, as it forms the basis of social relationships through gifts, exchanges, fines etc. (Watson and Catley, 2008).

3 Other important shocks include recurrent closures of Gulf markets to livestock from East Africa, crackdowns on informal trade, animal diseases, banditry and conflict (Morton, 2008; UNOCHA, 2006).
force for good as those pastoralist representatives have gained a formal education and have easier access to decision-making circles, at the same time they have lived in urban centres for a number of years; some have become alienated from pastoral settings and ‘may not have the interests of pastoralists at heart’ (McGahey and Davies, 2007: 18).

Policy-making is a highly political process which involves dealing with and attempting to reconcile the interests of different parties. Interests are often conflictual and issues of power are of crucial importance. Those who are backed by political and/or economic power will succeed in pushing forward their interests, while the poor and marginalised will struggle to make their voices heard and have their interests and priorities addressed in decision-making circles.

2.2 Why do pastoralists continue to be politically marginalised?

The exclusion of pastoralists from national political, economic and social life dates back to the colonial era. The colonial enterprise interfered with the pastoralist system and led to the progressive deterioration of pastoralist livelihoods and social fabric. Pastoralists’ mobility became constrained within newly created states boundaries, and their internal movement within new states became increasingly restricted by district, and sometimes location, boundaries, nature reserves, tribal grazing zones etc. Their land and water resources were confiscated to pave the way for agricultural expansion and eco-tourism projects. Virtually no investments in technological innovations, infrastructure or social services were made in pastoralist areas (Markakis, 2004). With independence and African self-rule, already strained pastoralist livelihood systems were further undermined by national economic development strategies that closely followed colonial blueprints and priorities (Ibid.). In the post-independence years, recurrent civil conflicts, forced displacement and progressive impoverishment have further eroded the social and material base of pastoralism.

With the fall of authoritarian regimes and the widening of the political space in many African countries during the early 1990s, pastoral civil society groups started to proliferate. A more recent step forward is the establishment of Pastoral Parliamentary Groups (PPGs) in a number of countries, including Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia. The Pastoral Affairs Standing Committee (PASC) was founded in 2002 within the Ethiopian Parliament to promote sustainable pastoral development and represent the interests of pastoralists. The members of the PASC are drawn from different ethnic groups and states. The PASC has three main roles (Morton, 2005):

- Legislative – Assessing issues that require policy decisions and ensuring that policy reflects the interests of pastoral communities
- Oversight – Supervising activities such as various aspects of governance, infrastructure development, food security and early warning systems
- Representation – Focusing on advocacy activities to promote pastoralist skills and improve attitudes towards pastoralists.

The Kenya Pastoral Parliamentary Group (KPPG) is open to any member of the Kenyan Parliament with an interest in pastoral development (Wario, 2004; Livingstone, 2005). The KPPG’s main policy objectives for pastoral areas are: advocating for community-based property rights; lobbying for the right to food, education and health; and advocating for pastoralists’ inclusion in national poverty alleviation policies (Wario, 2004).

While the creation of PPGs and other pastoral civil society groups, such as the Kenya Pastoralists Forum and the Pastoralist Forum in Ethiopia, have the potential to bring pastoralist issues closer to national policy-making circles, and may amplify pastoralists’ voice, the literature points to a number of shortcomings. The PPGs are generally weak and often co-opted by powerful urban elites, and so far they have had a limited impact on pro-pastoralist policy-making and implementation (Morton, 2005; Oxfam, 2008; Grahn, 2008; UN OCHA, 2008; Wario, 2004). According to Markakis, to date none of these organisations has ‘been able to initiate a single piece of legislation of significant benefit to their constituencies’ (2004: 24). The disappointing track record of these groups and their limited success in bringing about significant change can be understood in relation to issues of representation, internal capacity and broader processes of democratisation at the national level.

Despite the PPGs’ stated objective of promoting the interests of pastoralist communities, questions can be raised about the effectiveness of their representation. For example, several members of PPGs belong to the so-called ‘pastoralist elite’: people of pastoralist origin who, for various reasons, have been detached from the
realities of pastoral life (McGahey and Davies, 2007; Oxfam, 2008). Within the KPPG, well-educated parliamentarians are called ‘the Nairobians’, who ‘have not lived the pastoralist life and hardly ever go back home’ (Livingstone, 2005: 29). As such, ‘their effectiveness as representatives of the pastoralist communities is minimal’ (ibid.). In addition, the PPGs, like many other civil society groups, often have limited financial resources and poor management and technical skills (Oxfam, 2008). For instance, despite the fact that some members of the KPPG are well-educated, others ‘are illiterate and sign [documents] with their thumbs’ (Livingstone, 2005: 29). Similarly, some members of the PASC have only elementary or secondary school education and as a whole the committee ‘lacks technical know-how to challenge the policy-makers and influence policy in favour of pastoralists’ (Mussa, 2004: 24).

The PPGs operate within the national political context and a discussion of their failures and successes needs to take into account the national political landscape, existing balances of power and various hidden agendas (Morton, 2005). The establishment of the PPGs and other civil society organisations has coincided with broader decentralisation trends in the South in recent decades. By bringing decision-making closer to the people, decentralisation is widely perceived to have the potential to better meet local needs while enhancing the voice of poor and marginalised communities. As such, it may ensure better inclusion of pastoralists’ interests in local decision-making and allow pastoral customary institutions to work more closely with the government (WISP, 2008). But it is also important to consider the problems that may arise with decentralisation processes. The issue of elite capture at the lower level represents a threat to meaningful decentralisation and may significantly hamper the ability of minority groups to defend their interests within their own communities (UN OCHA, 2008). In addition, decentralisation becomes effective only if it is accompanied by the transfer of resources from the central to the local level. But this is not always the case and central governments often show little willingness to cede control of land and natural resources to local institutions. Situations where ‘local government bodies have little independent revenue raising capacity, and are heavily dependent on fiscal transfers from the centre’ are not unusual in the HoA or in other contexts in the South (Markakis, 2004: 24; see also Hesse and Odhiambo, 2006; UN OCHA, 2008).

A review of the literature points to a number of reasons for the ongoing political marginalisation of pastoralists in the HoA.

**Geographical remoteness.** The pastoralist system and way of life requires high levels of mobility over large tracts of land, and pastoralist communities in the HoA have always been highly mobile. Pastoralist groups live far away from the national capitals where economic activities are concentrated (Morton, 2008). Their lands are generally perceived by national governments as ‘marginal … with little economic potential’ (Oxfam, 2008: 14). The fact that pastoralist groups usually represent a low proportion of the national population and are dispersed across different parts of the country means that politicians often consider pastoralists a ‘minority vote’ and consequently have little interest in including pastoral areas in their electoral campaigns (Hesse and Odhiambo, 2006). In addition, the isolation and dispersal of pastoralist communities across vast areas of the country, and the poor infrastructures of pastoral areas, make collective action problematic and social organisational capacity difficult to build (Grahn, 2008). This significantly hampers the ability of pastoralists to formulate coherent and collective demands and transmit their requests and preferences in a convincing manner to policy-makers. Ultimately, the weak civic capacity of pastoral communities in the HoA means that these groups ‘lack the means to hold the powerful to account, and too often their rights are not addressed relative to the rest of the population’ (Oxfam, 2008/7: 1).

**Cross-border identities.** The ethnicity of many pastoralist groups spans national borders. For example, the Afar group are found across Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti; Somalis in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somaliland, Somalia and Kenya; Borana in Ethiopia and Kenya; and the Karamoja in Kenya, Uganda and Sudan (Morton, 2005). For centuries pastoralists have ignored national borders and have engaged in activities, such as transhumance, characterised by high levels of trans-border movement. The cross-border identities of many pastoralist groups and their cross-border political and economic activities are seen in the literature as contributing to their marginal and politically vulnerable status (Morton, 2005; Oxfam, 2008; Markakis, 2004) For example, pastoralists are often accused of having divided loyalties, especially when such accusations can be used to suit other political interests. In addition, their disregard for state borders, their long-standing struggle to make their voices heard and their
negative experience with unresponsive and unaccountable formal institutions have not helped in developing ‘a robust sense of nationality and citizenship’ among those groups (Markakis, 2004: 23).

Pastoralism misunderstood. The protracted isolation and lack of representation of pastoralists within the national political arena is also due to deeply rooted misconceptions of pastoralism among national decision-makers. The chronic vulnerability of pastoralists in the HoA has often been perceived as an indicator that pastoralist systems and livelihoods are ultimately unsustainable. Pastoralism is often seen as an outdated way of living and a form of land use which is unviable and even irrational (HPG, 2006; Oxfam, 2008). Decades of inappropriate and biased national policies have contributed to pastoralists’ increased vulnerability: governments have often encouraged pastoralist groups to settle and engage in agriculture, promoted private land ownership over communal land ownership in pastoral zones, or assigned fixed grazing lands (Oxfam, 2008). Over the past two decades there has been a profound change in thinking around pastoralist issues within international policy circles, academia and national and international NGOs (Morton, 2008). Rather than viewing pastoralism as an outdated and unsustainable livelihoods system, there is now consensus that pastoralism is viable and sustainable. Numerous initiatives on the ground, studies and advocacy activities stress the importance of supporting the adaptive skills of pastoralists and point to the need to implement flexible dryland management strategies (WISP, 2008). However, this shift in thinking has yet to fully reach national governments and the negative image of pastoralism has yet to be fully dispelled among national policy-makers (Morton, 2008; WISP, 2008).

2.3 The impact of political marginalisation on pastoralist societies

The main effects that centuries of marginalisation have had on pastoral livelihoods and social systems are outlined below:

Access to productive assets. The access and use of an extensive area of land coupled with high levels of mobility are ‘the double imperative of pastoralists mode of production’ (Markakis, 2004: 5). Pastoralists need seasonally varied grazing lands and water sources for their different livestock species. Freedom of movement over large areas is a crucial element of the pastoralists’ resource management system in the drylands. Land issues, including use, access and property rights, are a well-known determinant of pastoralists’ vulnerability, and in the literature they are widely discussed in relation to their political marginalisation (Markakis, 2004; Morton, 2008; Helland, 2006). As discussed above, formal institutions have systematically failed to recognise pastoralists’ rights to land. For example in Kenya ‘land tenure is based on English property law, which does not recognise the communal system as understood and practiced by pastoralists’ (Markakis, 2004: 22). Similarly, customary tenure arrangements in Ethiopia have been increasingly ‘subordinated to unitary national land legislation … on the basis of issues relevant primarily to the arable agriculture in the highlands. The … pastoral areas [are] either ignored or very superficially treated’ (Helland, 2006: 2). The ongoing appropriation of land for commercial, tourist, environmental and conservation projects, in many cases without consultation or even communication with pastoralists living in the area, has deprived these groups of a key productive asset and has often rendered pastoralism unsustainable. Many pastoralist groups have been unable to defend their land rights, and as a result many have dropped out of pastoralism or have been forced to migrate.

In addition to difficulties in accessing productive assets, access to markets – a precondition for the growth and efficiency of livestock production – is another challenge for pastoral communities in the HoA. For example, cross-border livestock trade has been a vital market for pastoral communities for centuries. However, as discussed in section 3, adverse policy decisions and a lack of government support and regulation are among the key factors that significantly restrict pastoralists’ ability to engage effectively in cross-border trade.

Access to basic services. Pastoral areas have long been neglected by central governments in the provision of basic services such as health and education. In the HoA education participation rates among pastoralists are lower than national averages (Trench et al., 2007). In Kenya, primary school enrolment in Central province is above 90%, while in Northern Eastern province, where the majority of pastoralist communities live, the rate is just 20% (Markakis, 2004). In Ethiopia, while the national average gross enrolment at primary level is 64%, in the Afar and Somali pastoral regions the figure drops to 14% and 15% respectively (Ibid). A similar disparity can be
observed in relation to health statistics. Lack of education among pastoralist communities is a key determinant of political marginalisation as it significantly reduces their ability to engage in advocacy activities and ‘to understand and speak out for their rights’ (Oxfam 2008: 15).

Dependence on aid. In the last few decades, droughts in the HoA have triggered widespread and severe livelihoods crises affecting millions of pastoralists. For example, the increased frequency and severity of droughts in Kenya is leaving pastoralists increasingly exposed to shocks as the time needed to rebuild herds (15–20 years) is longer than the intervals between the occurrence of drought (Longley and Wekesa, 2008). Unable to recover, pastoralists become trapped in a downward spiral of vulnerability and destitution and are increasingly dependent on international aid. Their dependency on relief assistance however can also be seen as related to ‘years of neglect and misunderstanding by central governments’ (Grahn, 2008: 2). Rather than addressing pastoralists’ vulnerabilities with social protection mechanisms such as safety nets or compensatory protection, national governments can ‘get away with the neglect [of pastoralists areas] in the knowledge that the international community will step in as a guarantor of last resort of the lives of the very poorest’ (Ibid).

Food crises. Food insecurity and high levels of malnutrition plague pastoral areas in the HoA. The Neo-Malthusian arguments that dominated theory until the early 1980s, and which understood food crises as the inevitable result of over-population or natural calamities, have long been challenged. The seminal work of a number of scholars has pointed to the need to understand food crises as long-drawn-out political processes (de Waal, 1989; Rangasami, 1985; Sen, 1989; Keen, 1994). A focus on the process that leads to malnutrition and culminates in starvation is especially useful as it helps to focus analysis on the reasons why these crises happen. There is ample evidence that food crises occur even in times of plenty, and that people starve because they lack the political power to secure access to an adequate amount of food. Sen famously argued that ‘[s]tarvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough to eat. It is not the characteristic of there not being enough to eat’ (Sen, 1981: 1). The political, social and economic marginalisation of pastoralist groups is a primary cause of the food crises that recurrently engulf pastoral areas in the HoA.

Conflict. Competition for scarce natural resources is widely understood to be a primary cause of conflict in the region and is in part related to the inability of pastoralists to assert their land rights. In addition to loss of grazing land to irrigation schemes, conservation projects, natural reserves and so on, trends in land use also indicate a shift towards converting rangelands to croplands. In some regions these trends are alarming. As shown in Figure 2 below, the land under crop production in the pastoral areas of Ethiopia amounts to an estimated total of 2,030,172 hectares.

Table 1: Land under crop production in pastoral areas in Ethiopia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Hectares</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>178,000</td>
<td>CEDEP (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali region</td>
<td>390,000</td>
<td>Regional BoA (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borana</td>
<td>1,332,900</td>
<td>Zonal DoAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Omo</td>
<td>58,103</td>
<td>SNNPR (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambela</td>
<td>32,452</td>
<td>Socio-economic study (1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benishangul</td>
<td>38,717</td>
<td>WARDIS (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,030,172</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Loss of communal grazing land to farming or environmental degradation has fuelled conflicts in a number pastoral area across the HoA. For example in the Awash Valley in Ethiopia, home of the Afar pastoralists for centuries, the irrigation potential of the Awash river has been attracting the attention of the Ethiopian state since the 1950s. The gradual appropriation of large areas along the river for cultivation by the state has led to the progressive exclusion of Afar pastoralists from some of the valley’s most important resources (Helland, 2006). Having lost access to key livelihoods resources, the Afar started to utilise larger tracts of open rangeland. The competition for scarce resources with the neighbouring clan, the Somali Issa, has led to conflict between the two, with raids and counter-raids a regular feature. Ultimately, ‘the lack of attention to the needs of pastoral producers has created a highly volatile security situation and a
continued need for food security emergency interventions in the area’ (Ibid: 15).

2.4 Addressing pastoralists’ political marginalisation: lessons for NGOs

The discussion so far has pointed to the fact that the chronic vulnerability of pastoralists in the HoA is strictly related to the imbalance of political power between pastoralists and their governments. Addressing pastoralists’ political marginalisation therefore needs to be seen as a two-way process which entails strengthening the capacity and representativeness of pastoral civil society organisations on the one hand, and addressing the accountability and responsiveness of formal institutions on the other.

This section outlines a number of lessons and recommendations that have emerged from the literature review that relate to addressing pastoralists’ political marginalisation in the HoA.

**Strengthening pastoralists’ resilience.** An essential prerequisite of pastoralists’ engagement and assertiveness in the political life of their countries is their ability to attain a minimum level of food and personal security (Hesse and Odhiambo, 2006). As discussed above, recurrent conflicts and famines, chronic underdevelopment and environmental degradation in pastoralist areas have weakened pastoralists’ resilience and undermined their livelihoods systems. Pastoral areas have increasingly become places of poverty and political unrest, and pastoralist groups suffer from high levels of malnutrition, persistent morbidity and massive livestock losses. These factors ‘severely limit the capacities of pastoral communities to invest time and resources on what are perceived by them often to be long-term and intangible processes of empowerment’ (Ibid: 8). A first step for NGOs wanting to address pastoralists’ political marginalisation is therefore to support their livelihoods systems with timely and appropriate interventions aimed at protecting and strengthening livelihood assets and strategies. Initiatives designed to ‘save lives through livelihoods’ are fundamentally important in their own right as they can enhance pastoralists’ well-being and contribute to building resilience for the next, inevitable shock. In addition, by freeing individuals from severe deprivation, livelihoods interventions can open up opportunities for a more substantive engagement in political life.

**Supporting education services in pastoral areas.** In order to make their voices heard and exert political leverage, pastoralists need to be able to articulate the rationale of their livelihoods systems and land use, identify and understand a specific policy failing and use the language of policy-makers to influence decision-making (Hesse and Odhiambo, 2006; Grahn, 2008). Access to education services is first and foremost a basic human right, but it is also of fundamental importance for developing the skills that citizens need to participate in the political processes of their nations. In addition, education is key to livelihood diversification as it equips pastoralists with the skills and knowledge required to engage in alternative livelihoods. Some communities may be left with little option but to drop out of pastoralism altogether, in which case literacy and education may enhance their possibilities to pursue different livelihoods and attain alternative sources of income when pastoralism is no longer viable (Morton, 2008; Trench et al, 2007). The provision of education services to pastoral areas in the HoA is notably inadequate and often not tailored to the specific needs of these communities (Ibid.; see also Morton, 2008; and Wario, 2004). As Morton argues (2008), both primary and secondary education should be promoted and initiatives should be devised to address the educational needs of pastoralists’ children as well as adults. Most attempts to provide education and especially secondary education to pastoralists’ children have involved boarding schools. Like other schools, boarding schools may offer a curriculum which is irrelevant to nomadic pastoral life, and worse, teaching material and teachers may be highly critical of the system and lifestyle of pastoralists. Mobile schools can also be a way to provide education especially primary education to pastoral communities. In Iran, for example, teachers from a nomadic pastoral background, trained and equipped with a school tent and school equipment, join and move with groups of nomads. Attempts have also been made to incorporate formal education into mobile Quranic schools, which are common among Muslim pastoral groups in Africa, for example in Somalia (Bishop and Catley, 2008). Quranic teachers may however lack the skills and desire to teach secular subjects (Kandagor, 2005). When deciding how to best support pastoralists’ education, agencies should keep in mind that ‘perhaps the most important feature for successful schooling for nomadic pastoralists is the school culture and the way

4 This review recognises that education is only one dimension facilitating the participation of citizens in the social, economic and political life of their nation. However, given the focus of this analysis, only education services are discussed here.

**Strengthening pastoral civil society groups.** Initiatives to strengthen PPGs and other pastoral civil society groups should be aimed at building the capacity of these groups to lobby for pro-pastoralist policy change. In turn, capacity-building efforts can positively impact on the legitimacy and overall representation of these groups. As discussed above, despite the mixed levels of education among PPG members, they lack the technical know-how and the skills required to influence policy as a group. Support of education and training on pastoralism and policy can be an important intervention here. For example, the IIED and the Resources Conflict Institute (RECONCILE) have promoted an initiative in East Africa aimed at strengthening the capacity of pastoral civil society leaders and senior policymakers, including members of parliament (Hesse and Odhiambo, 2008). As part of this initiative, a training course has been developed 'to equip pastoral leaders with skills to engage with policy processes in an informed and confident manner' (ibid.: 3). The interactive and highly participatory training course consists of two modules: Module 1 challenges the negative image of pastoralism and provides evidences to support the viability and rationality of this livelihoods system; Module 2 analyses policy challenges and options for supporting pastoralism in East Africa.

Morton 2005 has pointed to three key areas where NGOs can play an important role in strengthening the capacity of the PPGs:

1. Building and strengthening the linkages between PPGs and broader civil society including pastoralists themselves, community-based organisations, local NGOs and the media.
2. Supporting access to and use of detailed, comprehensive and timely technical support and information (rather than information delivered in isolation) to aid the development of policy positions, for example crucial information for PPGs relating to water resources, land tenure and livestock marketing.
3. Supporting PPGs to link and communicate regularly with their constituencies. Given the geographical remoteness of pastoral communities this is clearly a challenge, and

NGOs working with local communities can help in bridging this gap.

**Strengthening local institutions and organisations.** For centuries, pastoralist communities have relied on customary institutions to regulate their day-to-day affairs, patterns of mobility and manage natural resources and conflicts (WISP, 2008). National governments have however often failed to recognise the legitimacy of those institutions. The literature points to the importance of building upon customary institutions to strengthen the relationship between pastoralists and formal institutions (UN OCHA, 2008). In particular, a mix of formal and informal or customary institutions and rules is widely seen as an effective way of strengthening the social contract between the state and pastoralist civil society (UNDP, 2003; UN OCHA, 2008). NGOs can play a key role in this regard, and their initiatives should be designed so as to engage with customary institutions and mechanisms. For example, existing social protection mechanisms like indigenous safety nets could be integrated with modern insurance schemes. The indigenous welfare system of the Borana pastoralists of Ethiopia protects pastoralists from becoming stockless and destitute (Qolle). This customary system allows the very poor to build up their livestock on the basis of community support mechanisms and reciprocal labour contributions. Even if this system is coming increasingly under strain due to the progressive impoverishment of the community, a stockless person appealing for restocking would rarely be turned away (Desta et al., 2008). Similarly, pastoralist communities in Somalia have relied for centuries on indigenous mechanisms, such as free gifts (xologoyo) and loans (maalsin), to ensure the social protection of poor families (Bishop and Catley, 2008). One way of supporting those customary institutions could be for example the introduction a formal insurance mechanism for livestock deaths during drought (Desta et al., 2008). This would also ease the burden on indigenous safety net mechanisms (UN OCHA, 2008). In discussing strategies to increase food security among pastoralists in Somalia, Bishop and Catley (2008: 145) argue that interventions will succeed ‘only if they include rebuilding local institutions and traditional support networks, reinforcing local knowledge, and building on people’s ability to adapt and reorganise’.

In addition, it is important that international NGOs engage and partner with indigenous NGOs or community-based organisations. In insecure environments engaging with those organisations

---

5 For a more in-depth discussion of the training, see Hesse and Odhiambo, 2008.
may be especially valuable as local NGOs can ‘operate at higher levels of insecurity and [have] a more thorough understanding of local conflict and politics’ (Ibid.). In the case of Somalia, for example, working with Islamic NGOs may be useful, given their success in providing access to vital services and the fact that they represent ‘a popular vision of a political alternative to Somali clannism, violence and state collapse’ (Ibid.: 46).

A final remark here relates to the need to develop a thorough understanding of the functioning and dynamics of customary institutions and mechanisms. For example, ‘poorly informed consultation with an unrepresentative group can have a particularly distorting effect on the way these institutions function … overt consultation with elders and neglect of the rights of women can lead to a shift in internal power relations and could damage the very functions that the engagement seeks to develop’ (WISP, 2008: 18).

Engaging in advocacy activities. Addressing pastoralists’ political marginalisation requires systematic efforts to influence decision-makers to adopt appropriate policies, strategies, legislation and other actions to reduce pastoralists’ vulnerability. Pointing to gaps in current policies and approaches, using evidence and action research to promote beliefs and practices that work well and changing those that do not are among the main goals of advocacy activities. NGOs can play a crucial role in this regard. Working to change negative perceptions of pastoralism among government institutions is one way to positively influence decision-makers. Targeted media campaigns through documentaries and the presentation of evidence on the importance and viability of pastoralism in brochures, pamphlets and other easy-to-read material are all important advocacy strategies.

Stimulating greater appreciation of pastoralists and dispelling their negative image is one of the objectives of the ‘Influencing Policy and Practice to Support Pastoral Livelihoods’ (REGLAP) project, funded by ECHO and currently implemented jointly by ODI and Oxfam GB. In addition, activities that advocate for the rights of pastoralists need to be supported by a sound analysis and evidence base to inform good practice. In this regard, the ‘Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards’ (LEGS) is a useful tool. LEGS is founded on a rights-based approach and links two key human rights: the right to food and the right to an adequate standard of living (Watson and Catley, 2008). In addition, LEGS provides standards and guidelines for best practice and assistance in decision-making for livestock interventions on the basis of experience and best practice from around the world in responding to emergencies (Ibid.).

Linking civil society and state. It is important that NGO programmes are designed from the outset to simultaneously strengthen and build the capacity of civil society groups while also working with state institutions to change the dominant paradigm driving national policies. For example, Oxfam GB’s Capacity Building for Empowerment (CBfE) approach is a two-way complementary process involving civil society as well as formal institutions. It aims to (Oxfam, 2008/7):

- Support pastoralists in building or developing their own organisations through which they can represent themselves and their values and come to understand and articulate their rights.
- Work to influence decision-makers to become more responsive to pastoralists’ needs and concerns.
The Kotido Pastoral Development Programme implemented by Oxfam GB in the Karamoja region of Uganda is based on the CBfE and follows a twin-track approach. ‘On the one hand, fostering strong, representative organisations through which pastoralists can better understand, articulate, and claim their rights; on the other, influencing institutions (such as government) to become more responsive to pastoralists’ interests and concerns’ (Oxfam). Oxfam GB works closely with the district government in Kotido to strengthen the district planning structures that have been set up through the national decentralisation process. Oxfam provides capacity-building to government staff at different levels (from district down to parish) to strengthen participatory planning. Through this collaboration, Oxfam facilitates the production of Community Action Plans (CAPs), drawn up by community groups and their parish administrators. This highly participative planning process involves identifying local resources and capacities, including those of the government, and using these to address the prioritised needs of the community. Pastoral communities are assisted in setting up management committees, which oversee the development interventions arising from the CAP process, and which ensure that all partners to individual development projects (government, community and NGOs) fulfil their obligations.

These management committees are further trained to manage resources after their construction, such as through the collection of user fees and the organisation of maintenance work and repairs. In addition, the project supports a number of community-based organisations and civil society organisations.

A study commissioned by the Pastoralist Livelihoods Initiative (PLI) to identify how NGOs can support customary institutions and bridge gaps between customary and government systems in the pastoral lands of Borana and Gujii in Ethiopia has pointed to the need to work across three areas (Muir, 2007):

1. Constituency and representation (including gender): providing training and support to customary institutions to develop effective consultation structures and mechanisms. Support should focus especially on strengthening existing structures and mechanisms of women engagement in local institutions.

2. Enhancing engagement with government structures: capacity-building of customary institutions should be carried out through the adoption of an ‘action learning approach’, where capacity is built by a process of
learning-by-doing in which stakeholders are helped by facilitators to examine their experiences and to jointly work out ways of improving practices in governance.

3. **Legal recognition for customary institutions as natural resource management bodies** is seen as key for preventing further degradation of the rangelands. A first step for legitimising customary institutions is to identify the boundaries of natural resource management units and identify and map the actual responsible management units. This identification and mapping exercise should be premised on norms of inclusion and participation so that the interests of all social and ethnic groups are taken into account.

The study concludes that achieving legal recognition of customary institutions in pastoral lands of Ethiopia ‘requires a collective approach on the part of a range of development agencies, the Ministry of Federal Affairs, pastoral development departments ... local NGOs and donors and international NGOs’ (Ibid.).

To ensure governments’ support of livelihoods-based interventions to enhance pastoralists’ resilience it is important that significant efforts are directed to develop close partnerships between state institutions and operational agencies. The PLI is implemented by a consortium of NGOs, managed by CARE Ethiopia, in partnership with the government of Ethiopia. The PLI covers a variety of interventions including early market purchase of stock before severe drought; restocking with improved breeds of small ruminants (sheep and goats) while improving productivity of existing breeding stock; and exploiting immediate opportunities for long-term livestock market development (including policy reform and public/private partnerships for systems improvement). As part of this initiative, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Ethiopia has established a Livestock Policy Forum (LPF) with technical support from the Feinstein International Center (FIC) at Tufts University. The LPF represents an important avenue to discuss and influence policy change with the government. In addition, FIC is working with IIED and others to develop a Pastoralism and Policy course for key decision-makers (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008).

---

Section 3: Cross-border issues and approaches

The pastoralist zone in the HoA spans the boundaries of nation-states. Pastoral communities are found in the lowlands of Ethiopia, in the whole of Somalia, in the Northern and Eastern part of Kenya and on the borders of Tanzania and Uganda (Abdulrahman, 2006). The ethnicities, idioms, and livelihood activities of pastoral groups are also often transboundary. Whether to follow the changing availability of the scarce natural resources of the region, to trade livestock, or to access better services, cross-border movement represents a key livelihood strategy for pastoralists groups. There is growing recognition that the traditional cross-border livestock movement and trade should be supported and that forging regional cooperation and implementing cross-border initiatives are of key importance for reducing pastoralists’ vulnerability in the HoA (Abdulrahman, 2006; Pastoralist Voices, 9). Indeed, ‘[d]roughts, livestock diseases, peace initiatives, marketing and trade transcend national boundaries so regional perspectives need to be developed’ (Akilu and Wekesa, 2002: 33).

The two main cross-border issues that have emerged from the review of the literature relate to conflict and trade. These two dimensions are discussed below.

3.1 Cross-border conflict

Tensions and violent conflict have long affected pastoral areas in the HoA. Pastoralists are involved in violent conflict at different levels, ranging from cattle raiding, conflicts over natural resources and political rebellion and secessionist movements (Markakis, 2004). For example, droughts often spark or escalate conflicts over natural resources. Pastoral groups move over larger tracts of land in search of available grazing and water sources. This movement often leads to fierce competition over scarce resources, and in many cases it becomes a source of tension or overt conflict between different communities, both nomadic and settled. For example, in normal times the Pokot only use about three-quarters of their territory to avoid clashing with the neighboring Karamajong groups. However, during drought periods they are forced to take the risk and rely quite heavily on the contested areas (Abdulrahman, 2006).

Cattle raiding have been another source of conflict for centuries, but in recent years the intensity and frequency of cattle raiding have intensified. In the past, cattle raiding ‘was a communal venture, organised and sanctioned by community leaders whose goal was to ensure optimal size of the group’ (Markakis, 2004: 26). However, this customary ‘communal venture’, traditionally carried out with spears and bows, has increasingly been replaced by a new form of gang raiding, carried out with modern weapons and as a lucrative source of income (Markakis, 2004; Abdulrahman, 2006). In December 2008, the media in Kenya reported an increase in the number of pastoralists killed in cross-border cattle raids in the Kenya/Uganda, Kenya/Sudan and Kenya/Ethiopia borders (Pastoralists Voices, 12).

Since the second half of the last century pastoralists have also been involved in larger conflicts in the region and many have joined armed opposition groups. For example, the presence of the Oromo Liberation Front in northern Kenya has provoked several Ethiopian military incursions into Kenya. Ethiopian incursions into Somalia have also been brought about by the presence of the Ogaden National Liberation Front and the Itihad el Islami groups on both sides of the Ethiopia–Somalia border (Markakis, 2004).

Recurrent tensions and violent strife in pastoral areas negatively affect the well-being of pastoral communities, destroy the social fabric and cause death and much suffering. In addition, widespread conflicts in the region further contribute to pastoralists’ vulnerability. The discussion so far has pointed to the importance of mobility as a key livelihood strategy. The movement of livestock and herders often transcends national borders and pastoralist groups across the region depend on the same communal pool of natural resources. Endemic conflict represents one major obstacle to the free movement of pastoralists and their livestock, and therefore greatly contributes to pastoralists’ chronic vulnerability in the region.
As shown in Figure 3, conflicts and tension in the HoA are mainly concentrated across borders. There is growing consensus that conflict-resolution and peace-building efforts are urgently needed, and that, in order to be effective and lasting, these efforts need to have a regional focus (Pastoral Voices, 9; Adan and Pkalya, 2006). For example, the disarmament of pastoral communities has been the primary response of some governments to the growing problem of violent conflict in pastoral zones. As noted by Dr. Abdulahi Wako, chair of the Kenya Pastoralist Week, ‘[d]isarmament cannot be implemented in one country alone; it has to be a regional initiative to be effective’ (Pastoral Voices, 9). The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) promoted by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has a regional focus. Through Field Monitors located in different areas, CEWARN observes cross-border and internal pastoral conflicts, and provides information related to potentially violent conflicts, their outbreak and escalation (specifically in the three Clusters: Karamoja, Somali and Afar-Issa). In addition to their reporting tasks, Field Monitors coordinate their efforts, liaise with local administrations and communities within and across borders to avert an impending crisis and promote and participate in peace initiatives. For example in January 2007, the CEWARN Field Monitor was notified by an International Rescue Committee Officer from Moroto district in Uganda of an impending raid from the Matheniko warriors. The CEWARN Field Monitor passed the information onto the Pokot local leaders who organised and prepared themselves for the attack. When the Matheniko warriors came and realised that the Pokot warriors had organised themselves they decided not to go ahead with the raid.

In January 2006, the Turkana warriors of Kenya approached the CEWARN Field Monitor in the area because they were experiencing a serious drought and had no water and pasture for their animals. They wanted to reconcile with the Dodoth group in Uganda, to share water and pasture. After reaching a peace agreement, the Turkana and the Dodoth started to engage in cross-border trade, mainly exchanging

---


livestock for cereals, which greatly benefited the Turkana.9

3.2 Cross-border livestock trade

For centuries, pastoralists have traded their livestock across borders, and many cross-border markets were flourishing even before colonial times (Little, 2007). Cross-border livestock trade10 follows the logic of the region’s natural economy and pastoralists’ traditional migratory routes. Even in very insecure environments, the specific characteristics of livestock – a mobile and high-value commodity that can be transported overland rather than on roads – make it especially amenable to cross-border trade (Little, 2005). For centuries, pastoralists have relied on cross-border trade, which has always been remarkably important for the economies and societies of the region (PARIMA/ENABLE, 2007; Little, 2005).

Kenya is currently the main destination of cross-border trade in the HoA: ‘[t]he markets at Mandera and Moyale are supplied from the Somali and Borana regions in Ethiopia, and the Garissa market from Lower Juba in Somalia. Animals are also trekked from Monduli and Ngorongoro in Tanzania ... to Nairobi’ (Markakis, 2004: 17). Today, cross-border livestock trade is still a vibrant, albeit unofficial, activity. According to Little (2007), more than 95% of the regional trade in eastern Africa is carried out via unofficial channels. Approximately 26% of Kenya’s meat consumption comes from cross-border trade (Markakis, 2004: 17). A recent study conducted by the PCI estimates that ‘informal cross-border exports from the Northern Somali Region alone exceed by a factor of 3.2 to 6.5 the Ethiopian Customs Authority’s statistics for the number of live animals exported from the whole of Ethiopia’ (Umar and Baulch, 2007: 7; see also Little, 2006). Little estimates that cross-border trade with Somalia alone encompasses an estimated 16% of beef consumed in Nairobi (Little, 2003; in Little and Mahmoud, 2005).

While cross-border trade carries huge potential for meeting national, regional and even international demands for livestock and contributing to food security in the region, governments in the HoA have often adopted a hostile and punitive attitude towards this specific trade. Cross-border activities in the HoA are widely considered informal and illegal. The government of Ethiopia, for example, considers trade across the border as illegal and the term used to describe it is ‘contraband’ (Umar and Baulch, 2007). Most governments in the HoA ‘rely on official exports of primary commodities to earn foreign exchange’ (Little, 2006:1), and therefore see unofficial cross-border trade as lost public revenue. In addition, governments’ concern with tax evasion means that transboundary trade is seen as undermining national and regional revenue-raising efforts (Umar and Baulch, 2007).

A review of the literature has pointed to the following challenges that pastoralists and traders are confronted with when engaging in cross-border livestock trade:

- Adverse national policies: Adverse policy decisions and governmental crack-downs on cross-border trade seriously impact on prices and pastoralists’ livelihoods, and some see them as devastating as the impact of recurrent droughts in the region (Umar and Baulch, 2007). The lack of governments’ support and regulation of cross-border trade means that traders are forced to operate without formal finance and credit, or official legal mechanisms. For example, trade across the Ethiopia/Somalia border has become increasingly difficult since mid-2006 where border trade restrictions have been intensified and closures enforced with unpredictable frequency and strictness. Because cross-border trade is illegal, the goods and livestock that are traded are often liable to confiscation (Ibid.). Indeed, ‘legal constraints are stifling trade rather than maximising the potential of ... cross-border trade to generate household incomes and government revenue’ (UNOCHA, 2006: 2).

- Insecurity: As discussed above, recurrent conflicts and tensions in pastoral border areas seriously restrict the movement of pastoralists and their livestock. Insecurity on trekking routes, livestock theft, violence and banditry represent major threats to those engaged in cross-border trade (Little and Mahmoud, 2005; Abdurahman, 2006). In addition, the absence of security often leads to significant market distortion and livelihood disruption, and greatly impedes much-needed investment in communication facilities, infrastructure and veterinary services (Little, 2005).

- Poor market information: Updated and reliable information on supply and demand in the nearest livestock market, prices and weather forecasts are crucial for guiding pastoralists’ marketing

9 Ibid.
10 Cross-border trade in the HoA involves many more commodities than livestock. However for the purpose and scope of this analysis, this study primarily focuses on cross-border livestock trade.
decisions. However, this information is very difficult to obtain in pastoral areas, especially in remote border areas, and pastoralists and traders often rely on informal means such as local market brokers (dilaaal) to obtain market information (Little, 2006; PARIMA/ENABLE, 2007).

**Poor infrastructures**: The lack of or very poor infrastructure and communication facilities in border areas and in the region in general significantly increase transaction costs, leading to market inefficiencies and poor dissemination of market information (Little, 2005).

**Unregulated trade**: In the absence of formal recognition of cross-border livestock trade, local institutions, practices and informal traders' networks allow the trade to exist and function (Little, 2006). However, ‘while these networks facilitate the trade, they also can be highly exclusive and distort supply and price conditions’ (Little, 2007: 10; see also Devereux, 2006). The marketing system for cross-border trade is a network of personal and clan-based relationships, which includes pastoralists, brokers, middlemen, trekkers and loaders. Especially during periods of violent conflict, these clan-controlled networks protect their trade and favour market and financial transactions with members of the same clan or with trusted individuals (Little, 2007). The unregulated livestock trade also leads to distorted prices, such as overpriced forage and water along trekking routes. While acknowledging the importance of customary institutions and informal traders’ networks (Little, 2006), it is also important to keep in mind that cross-border trade is also ‘marked by monopolistic characteristics, high barriers to entry, and excessive gains for merchant and transporters with only minimal benefits to producers. In fact in most [cross-border trade] herders receive less than 50% of the final price’ (Little, 2007: 19; see also Abdulrahman, 2006). However, given the very limited market alternatives, pastoralists have few options but to engage in the unpredictable and dangerous cross-border trade, in many cases with low income levels and small profit margins (Umar and Baulch, 2007).

### 3.3 Addressing cross-border issues: lessons for NGOs

There is growing recognition that traditional cross-border livestock movement and trade should be supported and that forging regional cooperation and implementing cross-border initiatives are key in reducing pastoralists’ vulnerability in the HoA (Abdulrahman, 2006). When thinking of cross-border approaches for supporting pastoral livelihood systems, it is important to keep in mind that many of the challenges that pastoralists face, such as poor infrastructure, lack of access to services, the hazards of illegality and conflict in pastoral areas, are closely linked to their political marginalisation. A conflict prevention agenda therefore should be seen as intimately linked to a governance agenda, since political marginalisation and lack of access to key natural resources are important contributors to some of the conflicts in which pastoralists are involved in the region (Morton, 2008).

**Promoting peace and reconciliation initiatives**. Peace and security make cross-border movement and interaction possible and allow pastoral communities to access vital natural resources and engage in trading activities. The promotion of peace-building initiatives in conflict-affected communities in the HoA should therefore be prioritised in interventions aimed at strengthening pastoralists’ resilience.

In 2001 the Organisation of African Unity Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (OAU-IBAR) implemented a cross-border peace initiative in north-east Uganda, south-east Sudan, south-west Ethiopia and north-west Kenya. The intervention used animal health services to facilitate peace and reconciliation meetings between antagonistic pastoral groups, decrease cattle raiding and banditry and make resources more accessible (Akilu and Wekesa, 2002). Under this initiative five border meetings among influential elders from different tribes were organised, and transport, food and accommodation provided for those attending the meetings. The initiative succeeded in improving relations, reduced tensions at borders and consequently helped to restore mobility and access to water and pastures. Greater freedom of movement also made it easier to carry out cattle vaccination on either side of the borders. The lessons learnt from this initiative point to the importance of improving relationships and implementing reconciliation initiatives as a way to improve pastoralists’ resilience. The fact that the elders were able to meet without external interference was seen as a key strength of the meetings. Thanks to the peace initiative and the ability of pastoralists to move freely across the border, at the height of the 1999–2001 drought, around 100,000 cattle were migrated to Uganda. It has been estimated that, without this timely migration, 20,000 cattle could have died (Akilu and Wekesa, 2002).
The website of the PCI (www.pastoralists.org) lists and describes a number of meetings11 that have been attended in recent months by different clan elders and representatives in different regions of the HoA to decrease tensions and reduce violence in their areas. A recent peace meeting mediated by the Oromiya Pastoralists Association was attended by the elders of two different clans and was based on the use of traditional peace methods. As in the OAU-IBAR initiative described above, government officials did not take part in the negotiations. ‘Ten local government officials opened the meeting and were present when the results were announced, but did not take part in the peace process. The meeting opened with a traditional ritual in which both sides pledged to accept the facts of any claims made by the other group.’

This example points to the importance of linking peace meetings with government authorities and structures. While direct participation of government officials in peace meetings is seen as counterproductive as it may interfere with negotiation processes, it is important to ensure that these initiatives are linked with local systems of governance, so that the outcome of negotiations is taken into account by local authorities. Fostering these linkages can also lay the basis for the collaboration and integration of customary institutions and mechanisms into formal systems of governance.

District Peace Committees have been established in a number of districts in the ASALs in Kenya and play an important role in early warning and conflict-prevention. These Committees are community-driven conflict-management structures which have been created following the model of the successful Wajir Peace Committee. The Wajir Committee was established in the aftermath of bloody clashes in pastoral areas between Kenya and Ethiopia during the 1990s. Local professional women took the initiative to form a peace committee, which later enlisted elders, traders and youth from different ethnic communities. In addition, the members of the committee reached up to the District Commissioner for support and extended their activities across the border in Ethiopia (Markakis, 2004; see also http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp/4/4_women.htm). District Peace Committees function with a highly decentralised structure and have representatives responsible for preventing conflicts in every location. When conflict occurs, customary methods of conflict resolution and dialogue are used to reconcile the warring parties and to encourage the equitable sharing of scarce resources. Crucially, Peace Committees ‘integrate both traditional and modern conflict intervention mechanisms to prevent, manage or transform ... conflicts’ (Adan and Pkalya, 2006: vii). Despite the instrumental role that Peace Committees have played and continue to play in peace-building activities, a recent study has identified a number of challenges that these organisations are faced with, such as poor support from government agencies, limited financial resources and logistical constraints (Ibid.). The study provides several recommendations for strengthening the work of these organisations, including NGO support with regular funding and capacity-building activities such as training. Training can provide Peace Committee members with the necessary skills to promote transboundary natural resource management. In addition, by incorporating basic elements of human rights, criminal and civil law in these training efforts, members can be better equipped to deal with government officials and structures (Ibid.).

Engaging in advocacy activities. Advocacy activities that focus on improving the policy environment are essential, and in particular efforts that advocate for the support of pastoralist livelihoods, facilitate conflict resolution, lift livestock bans, enable internal and cross-border movement and support trade of livestock and other goods (Hedlund, 2007). In relation to cross-border issues, advocacy activities should specifically focus on the need to support and understand cross-border livestock mobility and trade. Improved understanding of cross-border trade and acknowledgement of its positive dimensions is a first important step for the development of a more predictive and supportive regulatory system to address many of the challenges that livestock traders and pastoralists currently face.

New legislation in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Mauritania has recognised the rights of


\[13\] Ibid.
pastoralists to move their animals within and across national borders. Advocacy efforts could draw on the West African experience to prompt governments in the HoA to learn from these countries and adopt policies and regulatory frameworks that enable pastoralists to engage in cross-border activities. While the slow and uneven implementation of this legislation means that pastoralists are still faced with considerable difficulties in moving their livestock across borders, it nonetheless represents a good step forward in the recognition and facilitation of pastoralists’ freedom of movement as a key livelihood strategy. Similarly, advocacy efforts could point to the benefits that cross-border trade could attain from the establishment of a ‘tax free’ trade zone between Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia, for example through the regional Common Markets of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

Agencies may also significantly contribute to convincing national policy- and decision-makers of the positive role that cross-border trade plays in meeting national and regional food demands, in raising incomes and business activities, and as a form of international commerce that brings added value to exporting countries (Little and Mahmoud, 2005; Little, 2005). According to Little (2005: 19):

Policies that ... encourage regional trade across borders-rather than discourage it-would capitalise on comparative advantage for different local and national economies; strengthen local food security; increase collection of state revenues and investments in key market and transport infrastructure; and reduce price volatility and market imperfections.

In particular, Little (2006) suggests that policy discussions of cross-border trade and its importance should be encouraged at three institutional levels:

1. **At border sites:** among customs and local government officials, given the key role that local officials on the ground play in encouraging or discouraging policies.

2. **At national level:** involving national officials and diplomats, given the international agreements and dialogue that need to be undertaken with other states and because domestic policies directly impact on cross-border trade.

3. **At regional level:** involving regional bodies such as IGAD, given their regional involvement and cross-border mandate.

**Supporting pastoralists-led cooperatives:** A PARIMA/ENABLE (2007) study in the Oromia region in Ethiopia, recommended the support of pastoralist cooperatives to improve livestock marketing efficiency in the region and in particular to address the problem of poor market access. These cooperatives might be especially helpful in reducing transaction costs, in dealing with information asymmetries and in improving the dissemination of market information. Through collective action and resource pooling, pastoralist cooperatives may be able to overcome some of the challenges that pastoralists face when engaging in cross-border livestock trade, and attain a competitive edge and better prices for pastoralists.

---

Section 4: Donor policies and funding approaches

The discussion so far has pointed to the huge impact that policy and practice has on pastoralists’ livelihoods systems and strategies. Persistent negative perceptions of pastoralism and unfavourable national policies, often ill-informed of the importance, viability and economic value of pastoralism, significantly contribute to the chronic vulnerability of pastoralists in the HoA. Given the central role that policy plays in informing pastoral development practice and in mobilising funding and resources for pastoral areas, this final section investigates international donor policies and funding approaches to drought management and response and discusses the relationship between these policies and pastoralists’ vulnerability.

4.1 Drought management and response

Natural disasters, and in particular droughts of increasing intensity and frequency, have long been the focus of debates on pastoralists’ vulnerability and food insecurity in the HoA. Arguments that saw adverse climate changes as the primary cause of pastoralists’ vulnerability have long been challenged. Today, droughts are increasingly seen as a trigger of livelihoods and food crises in the region, but the underlying causes of pastoralists’ vulnerability are perceived to be social and political, and not natural (UNOCHA, 2006; Devereux, 2006; Morton, 2008; HPG, 2006). For example, as discussed in Section 1, political marginalisation is widely seen as a key determinant of pastoralists’ inability to recover before another drought hits and is thus central to the analysis of pastoralists’ chronic vulnerability in the region.

The idea that drought in the HoA is a major disaster of exceptional nature has also long been challenged. This thinking has widely informed drought management and response, which, in many cases, has been ad hoc, relief-based and disconnected from development activities. The Drought Cycle Management (DCM) model was developed during the 1980s following the realisation that, rather than an exceptional and exogenous event, drought is a cyclical and recurrent phenomenon in the HoA. The DCM points to the importance of a disaster management approach to drought. As shown in Figure 4, this model has been designed to identify appropriate activities for each phase of the drought cycle, normal, alert, emergency and recovery, given the situation on the ground (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008). Crucially, the DCM model identifies four stages of drought cycle management – preparedness, mitigation, relief assistance and reconstruction – and recognises that these stages may occur simultaneously. In turn, DCM, which has become increasingly accepted as the dominant drought management model in the HoA, points to the importance of ensuring that the response to drought is flexible and that it integrates relief and development activities in a holistic way (Ibid.).

---

15 This review recognises that drought management and response is only one area of donors’ engagement and efforts aimed at strengthening pastoralists’ resilience in the HoA. However, given the focus and scope of this analysis (see Annex 1, point 2), only donor policies and approaches in relation to drought management and response are discussed here.
A holistic and multidimensional approach to drought is increasingly perceived to be of crucial importance in addressing pastoralists’ vulnerability in the HoA. Lessons learned from evaluations of relief and recovery responses to past slow-onset disasters, particularly drought, food and livelihoods insecurity, clearly indicate that the most effective way of saving lives in such situations is through protecting people’s livelihoods (Hedlund, 2007). It is increasingly clear that there is a need to complement emergency responses that merely aim to save lives with strategic interventions that support livelihoods and promote the resilience of local populations (Longley and Wekesa, 2008; HPG, 2006; Lind, 2005; Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008; Akilu and Wekesa, 2002). Strategic livelihoods interventions (see Box 1 below) ‘can equip communities and vulnerable households with the means to manage the oncoming shock before they collapse into crisis’ so that ‘massive deliveries of food aid are often unnecessary’ (Barrett, 2006, in Longley and Wekesa, 2008).

The concept of ‘saving lives and saving livelihoods’ has challenged the provision of emergency aid, in particular food aid, as the predominant response to drought-affected areas in the HoA. While food aid represents an appropriate response in terms of meeting basic food needs and saving lives in the face of deteriorating food security and rising vulnerability, food aid is simply not designed to support pastoralists’ livelihoods and is not geared to increase pastoralists’ resilience. In their review of the response to the 1999–2001 drought in Kenya, Akilu and Wekesa (2002: 33) state that ‘rather than being the first response, food aid should be seen as a last resort … when all else has failed, or when nothing else was done to address the emerging crisis’. They conclude that, when food aid is used when livelihoods assets have been depleted, or because of a failure to implement timely and effective livelihoods interventions, then ‘it becomes counterproductive, creating dependency and eroding local initiative and coping capacity’ (Ibid.). The idea that the provision of food aid alone cannot protect and support livelihoods so as to strengthen the resilience of crisis-affected communities has long been recognised. More than 20 years ago, a study investigating the large food aid relief operation that took place in Turkana, Kenya, in 1984 highlighted that outside relief interventions contributed to the sedentarisation of the Turkana pastoralists in camps, which made them dependent on food aid and even more vulnerable to drought (Hogg, 1985, in Lind, 2005). More
In recent years, major international donors have signed up to the 23 Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship, which clearly emphasise the need to support livelihoods, and not only lives. The third Principle states that humanitarian action should ‘facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods’, and the ninth clearly indicates that humanitarian assistance should be delivered ‘in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods’.

Despite a widespread consensus and growing emphasis on the importance of investing more resources in protecting and supporting the livelihoods of chronically vulnerable populations, donors appear to have not yet fully embraced the idea of ‘saving lives and livelihoods’. Donors also continue to see drought as an exogenous event, rather than a defining feature of the African dryland ecological system and a largely predictable occurrence for which it is possible to plan (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008). Rather than regarding drought as primarily a development problem, in many cases donors continue to see it as a relief problem and the preferred response remains food aid. A review of the emergency livelihood responses to the crisis in the Horn concluded that ‘in the face of a well-understood, analysed and accepted food system and widely available food assistance, donors were simply not convinced that livelihoods interventions stood a better chance of saving lives’ (HPG, 2006: 4). More recently, an analysis of the 2005–6 drought in Kenya concluded that the response was dominated by food aid (Longley and Wekesa, 2008). A review of the drought response in the pastoral lowlands of Ethiopia during the 2005–6 drought also found that ‘[t]he default emergency intervention was food relief, and livelihoods protection and emergency livelihoods interventions were limited’ (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008: 12). ‘The preference for food aid appeared to be determined by pre-existing earmarking and a preference for the “safe option”, with its well-understood mechanisms and expected results’ (Ibid: 29).

There is no doubt that designing and implementing livelihoods interventions is more complex and requires greater capacity than the provision of food aid (HPG, 2006). For example, Catley (2007) argues that successful livelihoods

Livelihoods interventions could include:

- Destocking: early off-take when terms of trade for livestock are still favourable.
- Supplementary livestock feeding, which is more cost-effective than restocking or buying fresh animals after a drought (supplementary feeding should be done only for reproductive animals).
- Emergency veterinary programmes, which can prolong the life of vulnerable animals for several months, even where pasture and other conditions remain unchanged.
- Transport subsidies to support the off-take of large numbers of animals from drought-stricken areas to markets.
- Restocking, with a focus on those who have not dropped out of the pastoral system.
interventions often involve a ‘combined package’ of different activities, which makes them more difficult to plan and implement than interventions that focus on food aid only. Furthermore, designing and planning effective emergency livelihoods interventions requires a thorough understanding of pastoral livelihoods systems, which is not an easy task, especially in emergency contexts. For example, a restocking project implemented in north-east Kenya in 2002/03 was found counterproductive because the implementing agency failed to understand the nature of social structures (Longley and Wekesa, 2008). Nonetheless, if the aim is to strengthen long-term pastoralists’ resilience to external shocks, the need to move away from a predominant food aid response to include protection and support to livelihoods is imperative. Indeed, ‘saving livelihoods needs to be recognised as being as important as saving human lives in emergencies’ (Lautze, 2003, in Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008: 15).

4.2 Funding approaches and mechanisms

An effective and timely response to drought needs to be supported by appropriate funding mechanisms that allow agencies to implement both relief and development interventions. As shown in Figure 5, the response to the crisis in the HoA in 2005/06 was characterised by a much higher level of funding for food assistance than for livelihoods interventions. The main reason related to the quality of livelihoods assessments, which were perceived by donors as ‘generic and lacking the hard data that food assessments were able to provide to demonstrate potential life-saving impact’ (HPG, 2006: 4). Similarly, Longley and Wekesa (2008) argue that donors are familiar with food aid and have the confidence that lives will be saved through food distributions. Food aid is generally regarded as straightforward, relatively effective, efficient and accountable.

Figure 5: Funding appeals and contributions

Effective contingency plans and funding are crucial for the mobilisation of resources at the early stages of a crisis and for ensuring the planning and implementation of timely livelihoods interventions. Contingency planning for humanitarians can be defined as ‘[a] process, in anticipation of potential crises, of developing strategies, arrangements and procedures to address the humanitarian needs of those adversely affected by crises’ (Choularton, 2007: 3). In other words, contingency planning means making a plan to respond to a crisis so as to ensure that, when ‘the next crisis breaks, everyone and everything is ready’ (Ibid.). For contingency plans to be implemented in a timely and effective way, contingency funding must be available both at central and local level. Donors’ contributions to contingency funding are therefore of vital importance.

Timely and appropriate livelihoods interventions need to be supported by flexible funding mechanisms. For example, implementing agencies need to be able to quickly reallocate and spend funds so as to respond to a crisis in a timely fashion. An innovative aspect of the PLI initiative
(see Section 2.4 above) is that ‘it allows implementing agencies to identify new types of response and reallocate up to 10% of their total budgets without permission from USAID’ (Catley, 2007: 2). This is encouraging as it signals an important recognition of the need for flexible programming and funding grounded in ‘developmental relief’ thinking and practice (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008). Longley and Wekesa (2008) state that, during the 2005–06 Kenya drought, the agencies that were best able to respond were those that were able to divert longer-term funding for emergency needs, and those with access to contingency funding. To be sure, ‘the effectiveness of donor funding for drought response is ... reduced by rigid procedures and inflexibility in an environment where the situation on the ground is often rapidly evolving’ (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008: 30). A timely response also requires that donors disburse emergency funding swiftly, without delays or sluggish procedures. For example, during the 2005–06 drought response, funds which were originally intended for destocking were received after the rains had started, when pastoralists no longer needed to sell their livestock (Ibid.). Similarly, it has been observed that, during the 2005–06 Ethiopia drought, ‘interventions aimed at saving livelihoods arrived late’ (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008: 12). Among the constraints to quick action were some rigid procedures and donors’ restrictions, such as ‘sourcing drugs and vaccines only from companies with certain specifications (e.g. nationality) [which] delayed interventions’ (Ibid.: 26).

Finally, if building the resilience of pastoralists’ communities is the ultimate goal of donor-sponsored interventions, a long-term approach is imperative and resources need to be made available, with a long-term perspective. Indeed, ‘[d]rought resilience can only be enhanced through long-term development interventions’ (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008: 29). In addition, a long-term approach also contributes to keeping the issue of pastoral areas and pastoralist communities high on the national political agenda (Oxfam, 2006). This is of crucial importance for addressing political marginalisation and strengthening pastoralists’ institutions in the HoA. Donors’ funding schemes, however, are still not geared to take into account the complexities of working in pastoral environments. With few exceptions, current funding cycles do not usually allow a long-term and meaningful engagement, often because they have a short-time frame. For example, the PLI two-year cycle has been defined as ‘woefully inadequate’ (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008: 30) for building pastoralists’ resilience to drought.

4.3 Promising initiatives

Within the last year or so, a number of new donor-funded programmes have either just started or have been announced. Though it is still too soon for impacts to be assessed, these programmes are particularly encouraging as they promote longer-term approaches to drought response, attempt to address the underlying causes of risk and vulnerability in drought-prone areas and provide contingency funds for more timely drought responses (Longley and Wekesa, 2008). These initiatives are briefly described below.

The EC Drought Management Initiative (DMI) provides additional money for Kenya’s Drought Contingency fund. In addition it provides coordination, policy support and institutional strengthening to drought management structures in Kenya. This initiative consists of four components. For the purpose of this analysis, Component 1 and 4 are especially relevant. Component 1 is a Drought Contingency Fund of €8.5 million, and Component 4 has been created to specifically link relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) between the DMI and ECHO’s Regional Drought Preparedness Fund, thus providing an effective link between relief and development within EC/ECHO programming.

At the regional level, ECHO’s innovative Regional Drought Preparedness Decision aims to reduce the risks associated with drought by strengthening the resilience of local people. The programme complements other ECHO emergency operations, and provides a basis for subsequent development projects. This programme, which has been designed according to the DCM model, therefore puts the principles of LRRD into practice.

The USAID-funded RELPA Project – Regional Enhanced Livelihoods in Pastoral Areas – aims to provide a bridge between emergency relief and activities to promote sustainable economic development in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. The overall programme objectives are to: (i) increase household incomes and economic resilience of the populations living in pastoral regions; (ii) reduce the requirements for emergency assistance; (iii) set the conditions by which the pastoral areas of the Horn of Africa can participate in a broader process of social and economic development; and (iv) support COMESA in managing a policy and investment process in the
region, with an emphasis on vulnerable pastoral areas (USAID, 2007, in Longley and Wekesa, 2008).

DFID’s Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) will be implemented in four districts of Kenya to provide a regular, predictable and guaranteed amount of cash to chronically food-insecure households. It is intended to reduce food aid dependency, protect assets and promote more resilient livelihoods in the long term. Phase 1 (2008–2012) will provide cash transfers to 300,000 beneficiaries, and Phase 2 (2012–2018) will roll out the HSNP under a national social protection system delivering long-term, guaranteed cash transfers to extremely poor and vulnerable people.

As discussed above, a significant constraint to a timely and adequate support of livelihoods interventions relates to the difficulties that donors face in understanding the technical assessments of livelihoods-based proposals. The LEGS initiative discussed in Section 2.4, fills an important gap and represents an important step forward as it provides a standard point of reference and guidance to donors when assessing proposals to respond to emergencies in pastoral areas (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008).

4.4 Policy engagement: lessons for NGOs

Improving the quality of livelihood assessments. If timely and effective livelihood interventions are to become more prominent in drought responses and management, there is a need to invest in the preparation and development of accurate and detailed livelihoods assessments. As highlighted above, a major issue that hindered support to swift livelihood interventions during the 2005/06 crisis in the HoA related to the quality of livelihood assessments. Donors were more familiar with food aid mechanisms and results and saw livelihoods assessment as too generic and not backed by the hard data provided by food assessments (HPG, 2006). One way to improve livelihood assessments could be to follow the example of the food sector, where plans and templates are developed before a crisis so that putting together proposals and appeals during an emergency becomes easier and faster (Longley and Wekesa, 2008). In addition, to demonstrate the effectiveness and appropriateness of non-food interventions, it is important that proposals are backed by a robust evidence base ‘to allow for the identification of the specific interventions that are most appropriate in specific contexts and stages of drought cycle management’ (Longley and Wekesa, 2008: 47). Furthermore, highlighting best practice lessons as part of the development of the evidence base can also serve to convince donors of the beneficial impacts and lifesaving potential of livelihood interventions.

Working collaboratively for policy engagement. This review has highlighted a number of shortcomings in donors’ policies and approaches to drought management and response in the HoA. Operational agencies on the ground are uniquely placed to influence donors’ policies in the region, and working collaboratively can enhance the effectiveness of their advocacy activities. Advocacy aimed at improving donors’ approaches and policies can focus on a number of areas such as funding – contingency funds and more flexible, long-term funding; improving understanding of drought and the need for a response that incorporates relief and development frameworks. The REGLAP project is especially relevant in this regard as one of its objectives relates to the support of a regional advocacy strategy and the development of a strategy for evidence-based policy engagement. Agencies are also well-positioned to lobby donors to engage in high-level policy dialogues with national authorities on pastoralist-related issues. For example, one of the recommendations of the drought response in Ethiopia in 2005–06 points to the need to influence donor representatives ‘to take up policy dialogue with the government on areas of the [Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty] which demonstrate a bias against pastoralism’ (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008: 34), and specifically in relation to pastoralists’ settlement (Ibid.).
Section 5: Key lessons

In relation to the three focus areas of this review – pastoralists’ political marginalisation, cross-border issues and policy engagement – the following approaches and recommendations have emerged from a review of the literature:

5.1 Addressing pastoralists’ political marginalisation

Support pastoral livelihood systems with timely and appropriate interventions:
- ‘Saving lives through livelihoods’ to protect and strengthen pastoralists’ livelihood assets and strategies, enhance pastoralists’ well-being and contribute to building their resilience.
- Livelihoods interventions have the potential to free individuals from severe deprivation and open up opportunities for more substantive engagement in political life.

Support education services in pastoral areas to help communities to develop crucial skills and knowledge to participate in national political processes and engage in alternative livelihoods:
- Promote primary and secondary education as well as adult literacy.
- Support mobile and/or boarding schools as appropriate, especially for primary education.

Strengthen pastoral civil society groups to enable them to effectively lobby for pro-pastoralist policy changes and policies implementation:
- Promote capacity-building activities (e.g. technical know-how and skills to influence policy).
- Build and strengthen the linkages between PPGs and broader civil society (including pastoralists themselves, community-based organisations, local NGOs) by facilitating access to detailed, comprehensive and timely technical support and information and helping PPGs to link and communicate regularly with their constituencies.

Support local institutions and organisations to strengthen the relationship between pastoralists and formal institutions:
- Understand the dynamics and the working of customary institutions and mechanisms.
- Build upon those institutions and mechanisms with initiatives designed to integrate customary institutions and mechanisms within formal systems.
- Partner with and strengthen indigenous NGOs and community-based organisations.

Engage in advocacy activities to stimulate greater appreciation of pastoral communities and dispel their negative image; and to lobby decision-makers to adopt appropriate policies, strategies, legislation and other actions to reduce pastoralists’ vulnerability:
- Support advocacy activities with a sound analysis and evidence-base to inform good practice.

Link civil society and state. Plan and design initiatives aiming to support a two-way process: strengthen and build the capacity of civil society groups, while working with state institutions to change the dominant paradigm driving national policies that keeps pastoral communities on the margin.

5.2 Addressing cross-border issues

Promote peace and reconciliation initiatives to enable cross-border movement, access to vital natural resources and trade:
- Support peace meetings where local decision-makers (e.g. elders, clan leaders) can meet without the interference of government officials, but ensure that initiatives are linked with local systems of governance to ensure that the outcome of negotiations is taken into account by local authorities.
- Where possible, support and strengthen District Peace Committees with regular funding and capacity-building activities.

Engage in advocacy activities at the local, national and regional level to foster understanding and acknowledgement of the positive dimensions of cross-border trade and to stimulate support of pastoralist livelihoods, facilitate conflict resolution, lift livestock bans and enable internal and cross-border movement.

Engage with initiatives with a regional focus, such as CEWARN and COMESA.

Support pastoralist-led cooperatives to improve livestock marketing efficiency in the region and to address poor market access of pastoralists.
5.3 Policy engagement

*Improve the quality of livelihood assessments* to ensure that timely and effective livelihood interventions are more prominent in drought responses and management:

- Draw on the positive aspects of the food system, for example develop plans and templates before a crisis so that putting together proposals and appeals during an emergency is easier and faster.

- Create assessment methodologies which can build a robust evidence base to back up assessments and convince donors of the beneficial impacts and the lifesaving potential of livelihood interventions.

*Work collaboratively for policy engagement* to enhance the effectiveness of advocacy activities to influence donors’ policies in the region.

*Identify like-minded donors* to build strategic alliances for pro-pastoralist support.
Published literature


Devereux S. (2006) Vulnerable Livelihoods in Somali Region, Ethiopia. IDS.


HPG (2006) ‘Saving lives through livelihoods: critical gaps in the response to the drought in the Greater Horn of Africa’. HPG Briefing Note. ODI.


Grey literature


