VOLUNTARY INTERNAL MIGRATION

AN UPDATE

PRIYA DESHINGKAR
and
SVEN GRIMM

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE

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Executive Summary

In this overview paper, basic questions related to voluntary internal migration are revisited with a view to adding some of the substantial new field evidence that has emerged in recent years and setting out the policy implications of these findings. The paper addresses internal voluntary migration for paid work. It includes both permanent and temporary migration as well as rural-rural, rural-urban, urban-rural and urban-urban migration. However it does not include forced removal and relocation of people under development and social engineering programmes, trafficking and slavery or displacement by war and civil unrest. It does not discuss nomadic livelihood systems, transhuman graziers or migratory fishing communities although some of the generic arguments will apply to them too.

With a few exceptions, the evidence suggests that internal population movements are growing. Probably the three most significant recent changes in the pattern of internal population movement in recent years are:

- the feminisation of migration;
- the emergence of more accumulative kinds of migration which can contribute to the reduction of poverty;
- The increase in temporary migration, especially commuting.

Evidence suggests that internal migration can play an important role in poverty reduction and economic development; internal migration should therefore not be controlled or actively discouraged. Policy should instead concern itself with ways of maximising the potential benefits of migration to the individual concerned and society at large. While there have been few formal efforts to estimate the economic contribution of migrant labour, it is evident that many developing countries would probably not have had the roads, buildings, manufacturing and trade centres that they have today had it not been for migration. By not acknowledging the vast role played by migrant labour in driving agricultural and industrial growth, governments escape the responsibility of providing basic services to millions of poor people who are currently bearing the costs of moving labour to locations where it is needed most.

The paper has paid special attention to a number of village studies that have used multidisciplinary approaches as these are better at capturing temporary movements that seem to characterise much of the migration of today. A fresh review of the literature on internal migration is also timely because of the rapidly changing economic, social and natural resource context faced by the world’s poor as economic opportunities expand in some areas, especially through urbanisation, manufacturing and commercial farming and increasing rural-urban wage differentials, and shrink in others, especially in overpopulated drought prone areas where environmental, technical, land size and investment limits have been reached. Globalisation is an important force in both the expansion and contraction of economic opportunities that drive migration.

Migration is an important livelihood strategy for poor groups across the world and not just a response to shocks. Despite overwhelming evidence that internal migration can lead to the accumulation of household wealth as well as positive changes in both sending and receiving areas, it continues to be viewed as an economically, socially and politically destabilising process by policy makers, bureaucrats, academics and even NGOs. One reason is that migration is an administrative and legislative nightmare: it crosses physical and departmental boundaries confusing rigid institutions that are not used to cooperating with each other. Another reason is that many researchers and NGOs continue to take an old
fashioned position that migration through intermediaries for work in the informal sector cannot be anything but exploitative and impoverishing; they are thereby further perpetuating myths about the causes and effects of migration.

A linked **problem is the inability of official statistics to fully capture migratory patterns.** National censuses and other occupational surveys tend to be concerned with full-time and legal occupations. Very few record part-time and seasonal occupations especially those that are in the **informal sector.** A large and growing number of multidisciplinary micro-studies demonstrate that temporary migration and commuting are increasing and that most of the work is outside the formal sector.

Negative government attitudes combined with ignorance created by inadequate data sets has led to the widespread neglect of migration as an important force in economic development. Not only that; several countries have actively **discouraged** migration through restrictions on population movement and employment. Consequently, **migrants often have no access to civic amenities or government poverty reduction programmes en route or in their destinations, and they become vulnerable to harassment.** A particularly vulnerable group of migrants – whose lives already more often than not are characterised by difficult and unsafe conditions – are girls and women who are exposed to the danger of sexual harassment. While legislation does exist in some countries to protect migrant workers rights, it is routinely disregarded due to the lack of political interest. In addition, the occupations pursued by migrant workers in the informal economy are declared illegal; this fuels rent-seeking and corruption and also curtails economic activity.

**Urgent policy attention is needed in the areas of:**

- Improving our understanding of migration patterns through more appropriate methods of **data collection**
- Better **support for migrants** in accessing services especially those related to adequate shelter, health, education, water, food, insurance and wages
- Developing ways of maintaining **social and financial links** with sending areas
Introduction

Poverty and physical mobility have always been inter-related. While international migration has received more attention in recent debates on migration, internal migration is far more significant in terms of the numbers of people involved and perhaps even the quantum of remittances and poverty reduction potential of these.

Migration has become an important livelihood strategy for many poor groups across the world. While it is no panacea for the poor it can bring many benefits and this is being recognised in some policy and research circles. For example, a recent Club du Sahel report states unequivocally; “Population mobility is a necessary condition of sustainable development and poverty alleviation in West Africa. Any policy, program or action which tend to restrain mobility or to provide incentives for people to stay on their land would, in the long run, lead to unmanageable situations.” Similarly for Asia, based on secondary data from Bangladesh, China, Vietnam and Philippines, Anh (2003) concludes that migration is a driver of growth and an important route out of poverty with significant positive impacts on people’s livelihoods and wellbeing. Anh argues that attempts to control mobility will be counterproductive. Afsar (2003) also argues that migration has reduced poverty directly and indirectly in Bangladesh as remittances have expanded the area under cultivation and rural labour markets by making land available for tenancy. Ping (2003) draws attention to the huge contribution of migrant labour to overall development in China and says “without migrants there would be no Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou or Shenzhen”. The potential of migration is also attracting attention in Latin America: Andersson (2002) argues that rural-urban migration can bring many benefits to Bolivia where the low population density, poverty and mountainous terrain make it expensive and difficult to provide services in rural areas.

With a few exceptions, the evidence suggests that internal population movements are increasing. The classic push and pull forces that resulted in people from poor regions migrating to richer rural and urban locations still exist and may even be accentuated with rising population pressure and deteriorating land and water availability. But many new patterns have also emerged including urbanisation and manufacturing in Asia; increased occupational diversification and mobility in response to macro-economic reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa and more circulation within urban areas in Latin America. But a qualifying note is in order here: the notion of ‘internal’ migration is not always a fitting concept for migratory movement. The borders of today’s countries often cut across original abodes and paths traversed by ethnic groups. This is particularly true of Africa (the Fulani in West Africa, the Sotho in South Africa, Ewe between Ghana and Togo, Mandingo throughout West Africa etc.) but also South Asia (Punjabis, Bengalis) and Europe (ethnic Hungarians spread across Slovakia and Romania) where there have been subdivisions in the last century.

Equally problematic is the term ‘voluntary’. It is doubtful whether migrants who move from areas which do not guarantee their livelihood consider their departure as being ‘voluntary’. The same applies to migration for sex work: the exploitation inherent in it suggests that labelling it as voluntary underplays the suffering and negative aspects of it.

The overall message of this paper is that internal migration can play an important role in poverty reduction and it should not be controlled. We stress that even when migration is accumulative the costs of migration remain high. By underplaying or ignoring the vast contribution that migrant labour makes to the economy, governments escape the responsibility of providing them with adequate living conditions, minimum wages and freedom from exploitation and harassment.
The paper starts with Part 1 which contains a discussion of the broad patterns of migration by region, direction of movement, duration and demographic characteristics. Part 2 discusses the inadequacy of official data sets in understanding migration. This is followed by Part 3 which analyses the causes of migration, including a discussion of the more recent developments. Urbanisation and the role of the urban informal sector are discussed in detail. A distinction is made between accumulative and distress migration. Part 4 presents an assessment of the impacts of migration on the sending areas and receiving areas by different social group. The effects of migration on individuals and their families as well as overall development and poverty reduction are discussed. Part 5 shows how government and elite perceptions have remained negative and have led to policies to discourage migration. Part 6 contains a description of the hardships faced by migrants and finally Part 7 lists the areas where urgent policy attention is needed such as data collection, migrant support programmes, and improving financial and social links with sending areas.

1 Broad Patterns of Migration

1.1 More people migrate internally in many countries

Internal migration is important almost everywhere and in some countries is far greater than international migration. Close to 120 million people were estimated to migrate internally in China in 2001 against a mere 458,000 people migrating internationally for work (Ping 2003). In Vietnam roughly 4.3 million people migrated internally in the five years before the 1999 census whereas the number of international migrants was fewer than 300,000 (Anh et al 2003). In India too, internal migration numbers run into millions while international migration is only a fraction of this (Srivastava and Sasikumar 2003). There are references to the importance of internal labour migration and remittances in many other countries, including Bangladesh (Afsar 2003); Pakistan (Gazdar 2003); Cambodia (ADB 2001), Vietnam (Anh et al 2003, Government of Vietnam 2003), Lao PDR (Acharya 2003), Mongolia (Tsogtsaikhan 2003), Ethiopia (RESAL 1999), Sub-Saharan Africa (Bryceson et al 2003), Lesotho, Maldives and Papua New Guinea (Jerve 2001).

1.2 How broad patterns differ by region

Mobility seems to have increased almost everywhere but much of this is unrecognised by policy mainly due to the inadequacy of official statistics as we show in a later section. Migrants and commuters remain invisible and therefore unreached by policy. Migration patterns vary tremendously even within a small area but some broad patterns can be distinguished. To a large extent these depend on regional development trajectories. Some of the main drivers of migration are mentioned here briefly but explored in more detail in later sections.

1.2.1 South East and East Asia

In Southeast and East Asia, urbanisation and an expansion of manufacturing, especially for export, have led to enormous increases in both short and long-term migration. Sheng (1986) for instance maintains that the population of some cities grows by 10% during the dry season owing to temporary migration. Numerous studies conducted by Hugo in Indonesia from the 1970s onwards show an increase in circular migration and commuting from rural to urban
areas (Hugo 2003). A longitudinal study of 37 villages in Java carried out over the period 1967-91 (Collier et al. 1993) concluded that most of the landless rural families in Java have at least one person who is working outside of the village, and in a factory or service job.

China is a special case where a number of changes have occurred simultaneously, all creating more movement of people. These include market liberalisation and the spread of export-oriented manufacturing and the lifting of employment and movement controls (Ping 2003, Zhao 2003). This has been greatly aided by relatively good road networks, communication technology and export market links that have emerged as many countries have opened up their economies. In Vietnam for example temporary migration of labourers, traders and carpenters from rural areas to urban areas such as Ha Giang and Hanoi has increased perceptibly (Government of Vietnam 2003, IIED 2004). There is also much rural-rural migration from low agricultural productivity areas to high value cropping areas (Winkels 2004). Cambodia has also witnessed a sharp increase in migration recently as more young girls and women migrate to urban areas to work in garment factories, as domestic helpers, beer girls and sex workers (ADB 2001, Acharya 2003).

**Box 1: Mobility patterns by region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southeast and East Asia</td>
<td>Marked increase in short and long distance migration including commuting driven by an increase in manufacturing; urbanisation and relaxing of movement restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>Very mixed pattern with continuing high levels of rural-rural migration where agriculturally poor areas send workers to irrigated areas. Rural-urban migration is increasing. Agro-processing and manufacturing have become more important recently in attracting migrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Increases in mobility due to occupational diversification post-SAPs and return to rural areas with urban decline and post conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>Public sector downsizing and resulting occupational diversification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Removal of population movement restrictions and good transport networks creating suburban commuters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>Urban deconcentration movements from urban centres to the periphery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.2.2 South Asia

In India where rural-rural movements from poor areas to rich areas have been the dominant form of migration, there has been a sharp increase in rural-urban migration in recent years (Dev and Evenson 2003, Srivastava and Bhattacharyya 2003) as more young men travel to work in *construction and urban services* in the expanding informal sector. For example studies in areas of Bihar that have experienced a doubling of outmigration rates since the 1970s show that migration is now mainly to urban areas and not to the traditional destinations in irrigated Punjab where work availability has declined (Karan 2003).

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1. It needs to be borne in mind that many of the garment manufacturing jobs may be lost to competition from other countries (e.g. China) when the favourable conditions created by the Multifibre Arrangement come to an end in the near future. Governments need to think of alternative routes to diversification for such workers.
At the same time worsening population pressure and environmental limits have also created a new exodus of people (often entire families) from drought-prone and environmentally fragile areas that form nearly two-thirds of the country (see for instance Mamgain 2003 on Uttarakhand and Wandschneider and Mishra 2003 on Orissa). Falling agricultural commodity prices has been a recent trigger (Deshingkar 2004a), a subject that we explore more fully in part 4.1.5. In Pakistan recent increases in internal migration are associated with urbanisation (Gazdar 2003). The country already has a history of agricultural migration from arid areas to irrigated regions, particularly in the province of Sindh and in southern Punjab. In Bangladesh, migration to urban areas has been increasing for a while, first to the urban informal sector and more recently to garment manufacturing units (Afsar 2003).

While official statistics may even suggest a decline in migration rates (see part 3) a number of village studies show that mobility has increased tremendously, especially short-term migration and commuting. For example Rogaly et al (2002) observe that in excess of 500,000 tribals, muslims and lower caste people migrate seasonally from five districts in West Bengal to the rice-growing areas of the State. Another study of Bolangir in Orissa estimates that nearly 60,000 people migrated during the drought of 2001 from that district alone (Wandschneider and Mishra 2003). Deshingkar and Start (2003) found that more than half the households in four out of six study villages in Madhya Pradesh had migrating members. The proportion was as high as 75% in the most remote and hilly village with infertile soils. In Andhra Pradesh, while average migration rates were lower, the most remote and unirrigated village had 78% of the households with migrating members. Yet policy remains curiously ill-informed and ill-equipped to help people take advantage of more diverse livelihoods.

1.2.3 Sub-Saharan Africa

An estimated 50-80% of rural households have at least one migrant member (DFID 2004). While making generalizations about levels of internal migration is difficult on the basis of a handful of case studies there are indications that structural adjustment programmes have increased mobility as people have diversified occupational portfolios, many of which involve travelling to nearby trade centres (see synthesis by Bryceson 1999 of various country studies conducted under the Deagrarianisation and Rural Employment project (DARE) and also the Sustainable Livelihoods, Access and Mobility project (SLAM) Bryceson et al 2003) In the SLAM study sample only 18% of household heads in Uganda and 24% in Zimbabwe were born in the location where they lived. However it must also be borne in mind that many SSA countries had pronounced circular migration systems during the colonial period (pers comm. Bryceson). A Ghana participatory poverty assessment (PPA) also found that 52% of the respondents were migrants, having previously lived somewhere else. It is probable that internal migration increased in the 1980s (Bryceson 1999).

But there are exceptions: A case study of Zimbabwe conducted by Bryceson and Mbara (2003) showed that rural-urban mobility has declined for two reasons: 1) men's and women's fears of spreading AIDS making many prefer that reproductive couples live together

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3 Unless otherwise indicated all the PPAs referred to are contained in the World Bank series entitled “Voices of the Poor”

4 But also that net migration to towns has often fallen because of increased return migration flows (Potts 1995). The growing incidence of return migration has been noted in many recent writings and we cover this phenomenon in some detail in part 1.3.3.
rather than in split rural-urban families, and 2) the drastic increases in oil prices which made it financially impossible for people to carry on with their same levels of mobility. Zimbabwe had circular rural-urban migration embedded in its history since the early colonial period.

Increases in mobility have been noted in South Africa following the lifting of restrictive legislation (‘pass-laws’) at the end of Apartheid. In 1993, 32.6% of rural African households in SA contained (labour) migrant household members; in 1999, the figure had risen to 35.8% (Posel 2003). The region with the highest share of migrants was Gauteng: 40% of its population were born outside the province, 35% in other regions of South Africa. One fifth of Gauteng’s population had moved within the last five years, most of them coming from other provinces (SAMP 2004). Recent survey data from the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) suggest that migration, in the sense of population movement away from communities of origin and into new localities, has become the rule and not the exception for most of the rural population of South Africa’s coastal provinces. Infrastructure delivery appears to be driving migration processes to a considerable extent, and migration needs to be seen against this background (Cross 2001). In Ethiopia, too, mobility has increased as population movement controls have been relaxed or removed. Movements are to a few in-migrating areas which have large, often irrigated, farms (RESAL 1999).

1.2.4 Middle East and North Africa
In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region migration has increased with public sector downsizing (Al-Ali 2004) and the resulting occupational diversification (see also part 4.1.5 for more on this topic); this causality is also seen in a number of sub-Saharan countries as discussed above. It is very likely that the trend towards public sector downsizing will continue in many countries and this raises important questions on how efforts of households to diversify can be supported through say an employment policy that is not focused on one sector alone.

1.2.5 Latin America
Latin American countries that had witnessed high levels of rural-urban migration with rapid urbanisation before the 1970s are now undergoing a different process of economic and social change with new patterns of mobility. Migration between urban centres, especially intra-metropolitan migration has become an important form of internal population movement with effects on the role of cities and the process of urban de-concentration. The impacts of this are not yet fully understood (Cerruti and Bertoncello 2003) and require further study.

1.3 Spatial patterns
There are broadly four kinds of migration streams: rural-urban rural-rural, urban-rural and urban-urban. Often all are present in a country – and some times even within the same village – at any one time (see Appendix 1 for examples from India). But the wealth status and overall asset base of migrants can differ substantially between different kinds of streams necessitating different kinds of interventions.

1.3.1 Rural-Rural migration
In many poor countries rural-rural migration still dominates with labourers from poorer regions travelling to the agriculturally prosperous, often irrigated, areas which have more work. In India for instance rural-rural migration accounted for roughly 62% of all movements in 1999-00 according to National Sample Survey data (Srivastava and Bhattacharyya 2003). Workers from backward states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa and Rajasthan routinely travel to the developed green revolution states of Maharashtra, Punjab and Gujarat for the transplant
and harvesting season. Likewise in Nepal rural-rural migration from poor mountain areas to the agriculturally prosperous plains accounts for 68% of the total population movement and rural-urban for only 25% (Bal Kumar 2003) despite the country’s image of being an exporter of Ghurkha workers where mountain dwellers go to the plains to work as drivers, security guards and so on. In Vietnam, 37% of the population movement captured by the 1999 census was rural-rural and 26% was urban-urban (Skeldon 2003a). Work on coffee plantations was until recently an important destination for the poor from the uplands (Winkels 2004).

Migration for groundnut cultivation in Senegal is one example of rural-rural migration in sub-Saharan Africa. This case also illustrates the limits of the notion ‘internal migration’; the sub-region has to be seen as a unit in this case, with migrant workers (‘navétanes’) also coming from the sub-region, along the Senegal River including workers from Mali. Malian migrants, Burkinabé and Northern Ivorians are also a major labour force for plantation agriculture (cacao and coffee) in the Ivory Coast. A study of the Amhara region of the Ethiopian Highlands also found that rural-rural migration was more common than rural-urban migration but it had a generational pattern, with the young preferring to go to urban areas (Devereux N.d).

Rural-rural migration is typically undertaken by poorer groups with little education and other assets as it requires lower investments. Due to the scattered nature of the destinations and remoteness of sending areas, this is the least regulated of all kinds of migration. It is also the least visible because such migration is usually missed by official surveys. Even in India where a multitude of laws exist to protect migrant workers against underpayment and other kinds of exploitation, many do not apply to rural-rural migration and even those that do are difficult to implement. There is a strong case for devising support programmes that cater especially to the needs of rural-rural migrants.

1.3.2 Rural-Urban migration
Although still not the main form of migration in many developing countries, rural-urban migration is rapidly gaining in importance especially in the urbanising economies of Asia as rural-urban wage differentials grow and the returns from migration increase. For example, in Bangladesh two-thirds of all migration from rural areas is to urban areas and is increasing very rapidly (Afsar 2003). In China too rural-urban migration has overtaken other kinds of movements and has increased massively in recent years for reasons mentioned previously (Zhao 2003). In Thailand, as in other countries in Southeast Asia, rural-rural migration has been decreasing, while the share of rural-urban migration has been increasing (Guest 2003). Even in poorer Southeast Asian countries such as the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Cambodia rural-urban migration of labour has been on the increase in recent years due to urbanization and industrialisation (Acharya 2003).

Much of this migration is long-distance to the larger cities and manufacturing centres (e.g. Guangdong). But there are also smaller moves, typically undertaken by poorer people, to smaller towns and conglomerations of non-farm activity. For example the Ha Giang PPA (Government of Vietnam 2003) notes that several thousand temporary migrants come from nearby rural provinces to work as freelance labourers (construction, building), small trades, and carpenters.

It is with respect to rural-urban migration that positive impacts are potentially the greatest especially where urban incomes are higher. In Cambodia for instance the wage difference between agricultural work and unskilled work in Phnom Penh is very large: workers in paddy fields earn 4,000 riels (roughly $1) per day while the prevailing wage rate for unskilled/semi-skilled workers in the city is 6,000-10,000 riels (Pon and Acharya, 2001). Garment factories,
pay at least $45 a month; with overtime payments, most such workers are able to net $60-75 per month (Sok et al., 2001). Even where urban incomes are not much higher than rural areas, urban work may be available more regularly compared to rural work which is often tied to the crop season.

But the current policy climate in several countries continues to curtail this important route to poverty reduction and economic development especially through regulations on population movements and limitations on informal sector activities, subjects that we return to in Part 6.

1.3.3 Urban-Rural migration
Urban-rural movement can occur when people retire back to their villages or as in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s and 1990s with retrenchment under structural adjustment programmes especially in the case of Uganda and Zambia (cf. Potts 1995; Tacoli 2001). A crucial factor for this movement seems to have been access to land in both the city and rural areas.

A majority of urban-rural migrants are returnees. This trend has been noted especially in recent writings on Africa: in a study of Mambwe villages of Zambia (Pottier 1988) it was seen that former migrants were returning to their villages in the late 1970s as the copperbelt economy went into decline. Figures from the Ghana Statistical Service (2000) indicate that about 35% of migratory moves were urban-rural, 32% were rural-rural and almost a quarter (23%) was urban-urban (Ghana Living Standards Survey 2000). In Nigeria retrenchment of workers in both the public and private sectors in the 1980s is thought to have increased return migration. In the Nigeria country study under the DARE project 20% of the Osumenyi households sampled had male return migrants and 15% had female return migrants. Bigsten and Kayizzi-Magerwa (1992 in Potts 1995) note return migration from Kampala, Uganda as urban living standards dropped in the 1970s and 80s. In Tanzania also return migration was documented from large urban centres due to the impacts of structural adjustment (Mbonile 1995 in Potts 1995). In Ethiopia, over half a million men were demobilised from the army in the early 1990s after the end of the civil war. Many had been taken from their villages as youth, and a proportion of them gained skills useful for non-agrarian pursuits. It is estimated that about half of them returned to rural areas (Bryceson 1999). In both Zimbabwe and Mozambique there was significant outmigration from cities in post-war periods (Potts forthcoming). Post-conflict return migration in Mozambique in the early 1990s was considerably slowed down by unsafe access to farming land due to land mines. However Bryceson argues that return migration may not be that important outside Southern Africa where the circular migration system was historically strongest. This is because second generation migrants rarely have the option of 'returning'. Certainly this is the case in East Africa's large cities. Return migration patterns of the 1970s and 1980s may be entirely different to what prevails at present, due to the generational factor (pers. comm. Bryceson).

Return migration has also been documented in other countries and the reasons are rather different in each (see Box 2). For instance according to one estimate a third of Chinese migrants go back to their native homes (Murphy 1999) because they rarely find permanent white collar jobs on which they can retire. Using recent household survey data in China Zhao (2001) shows that an average returnee is older, more educated, more likely to be married with a spouse who is never a migrant, indicating that both push and pull factors affect the return decision. Return migration was marked in Thailand and Indonesia after the financial crisis (Guest 2003). In a study of Bangladeshi migrants Kuhn (2003 in Garrett and Shyamali 2004) found that at the end of a 12-year period, 62% of those who had migrated from one village in 1982-84 had returned, generally because they had “ended” their time of remitting income or to care for elderly parents.
Box 2: Why people return to their villages

- In South East Asia the effects of the financial crisis created return migration flows.
- In Bangladesh migrants return from the city after they have “ended” their time of remitting income or to care for elderly parents.
- A third of Chinese migrants go back to their native homes.
- Retrenched public and private sector workers in Nigeria went back to rural areas.
- Nearly half a million men who were demobilised from the Ethiopian army returned to rural areas.

Returning migrants may bring back a range of skills which can benefit their home areas enormously. A few unsuccessful attempts have been made to create conducive conditions for return migrants. This is an area for further policy attention.

1.3.4 Urban-Urban migration

Urban-urban migration is the predominant form of spatial movement in Latin America which has increased steadily since the 1980s. In México, for example, between 1987 and 1992, 50% of interstate movements (excluding intra-metropolitan movements) had urban areas as origin and destination and between 1995 and 2000, 70% of all municipal movements took place between urban areas. In Brazil, 61% of all the inter-municipal movements occurred between 1981 and 1991 were between cities (all figures from Cerruti and Bertoncello 2003). Due to the size of metropolitan agglomerations in Latin America, a large fraction of migration takes place between small administrative divisions within the same metropolises such as Mexico City metropolitan area, Santiago and Lima. This type of migration flow usually takes place from the centre to the periphery and has implications for urban de-concentration which require further study.

1.4 The duration of migration

Much of the literature on internal migration has focused on permanent migration primarily because official statistics focus on permanent relocation. Micro-studies or village level studies are better at capturing a wide range of possibilities in the spectrum between commuting, very short term migration, seasonal migration, long term migration and permanent migration. In general, poorer people move shorter distances because of their limited resources, skills, networks and market intelligence. For example the SLAM project (Bryceson et al 2003) showed that mobility patterns are highly differentiated according to levels of income and the size and type of settlement in which they reside.

There is plenty of evidence of increasing temporary movements (see Box 3). In China temporary migrants, many of who comprise the ‘floating population’ outnumber registered migrants by approximately 4 to 1 (Guest 2003). Liu and Chan 2001 note that non-Hukou migration has greatly increased in the post reform period. These migrants tend to concentrate in coastal regions and cities, peripheries of cities and construction sites and factories.

In South East Asia temporary migration is increasingly important particularly in movement to large cities (Guest 2003). In Thailand, temporary moves, which include both seasonal movement and other forms of short-term moves, have been estimated to account for one-third of all migration with durations of one month or more (Guest 2003). Similar trends have been noted in Indonesia in various studies by Hugo. An IIED study in the Red River Delta region of Vietnam while noting an increase in long distance migration also notes the high levels of short distance temporary migration to nearby destinations and Hanoi. Most migrants covered
in the study preferred long-term leave permits rather than registering as permanent migrants at the destination. This allows their families to continue to cultivate their land on their behalf (IIED 2004).

In India although temporary migration is of enormous proportions, official data barely capture it (see also part 1.2.2). Srivastava and Sasikumar (2003) argue that at least an additional 10.87 million people in 1999-2000 could be classified as short term migrants but were not captured by the census. The latest informal estimate among migration researchers is that roughly 20 million people migrate seasonally each year in India.

In Sub-Saharan Africa temporary migration from smallholder farming areas has been an important means of supplementing incomes and raising the productivity of subsistence agriculture through investments in capital, seeds and irrigation. Circulation is in fact part of a household strategy to maintain or improve the traditional livelihood base such as farming. Town dwellers will often retain ‘ancestral land’ in their region of origin (Potts 2000, e.g. for Southern and Northern Tanzania). In West Africa there are well established patterns of seasonal migration from the northern regions of counties such as Ghana, Togo, Mali and Burkina Faso to destinations in the south such as cocoa farms (Devereux N.d.). The incidence of migration both short and longer term seems to have increased in some contexts because of the non-agricultural income diversification precipitated by structural adjustment programmes. The DARE case studies show increased mobility facilitated quite often by improved roads and vehicles that have been put in place by market liberalisation and donor assistance. But market liberalisation has tended to increase the transport service gap between on-road and off-road villages as the private traders and transporters that replaced parastatal operations restrict their services to the bigger settlements on the road which have bigger markets and lower wear-and-tear costs for their vehicles.

**Box 3: Increasing temporary movements.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>temporary migrants, many of who comprise the ‘floating population’, outnumber registered migrants by approximately 4 to 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East Asia</td>
<td>temporary migration is increasingly important particularly in movement to large cities; in Thailand, temporary moves account for one-third of all migration. Similar trends have been noted in Indonesia and Vietnam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>a growing number of village studies show that temporary migration is of enormous proportions and increasing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Temporary migration from smallholder farming areas is an important means of supplementing incomes and raising the productivity of subsistence agriculture. Short term migration has also increased because of the need to diversify income sources after structural adjustment programmes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.5 Commuting

Commuting has become a feature in many peri-urban areas and villages near cities and metropolises and the phenomenon is growing. For example, in a study on migration and mobility in India, Dyson and Visaria 2004 state that there has been a marked increase in commuting but they provide no numbers. Train commuter figures are available for Mumbai but even these are somewhat outdated. Data collected by the two main railways plying to
the city show that nearly five million people travel in and out of the city every day. Mumbai is a special case because of its small and geographically limited area combined with numerous work opportunities which has led to large-scale long distance commuting. But there is a serious shortage of data on commuting. A good proxy indicator for commuting is urbanisation and the emergence of large cities where commuting seems to be the greatest. In Asia, between 1972 and 1992, the number of cities with more than 5 million inhabitants grew from 3 to 14, in Latin America from 1 to 5, while in Africa from none to 2. Asia currently has 11 of the 19 megacities in the world. Much of the added, predominantly poor, population in these cities have settled in the outskirts of cities (UNEP, Nd.). Reducing travel time has become a real challenge for transport planners of rapidly growing mega-cities such as Mexico, where, according to the UN-Habitat commuters spend 83 minutes on average to reach their workplace. Travel times in Asia-Pacific appear to be longer than in other regions.

In many parts of SSA, mobility continues to be severely constrained because it is arduous and/or expensive. The SLAM study noted that such constraints gave peri-urban areas in Uganda a distinct advantage because of shorter work/home distances tended to be minimized. Several rural areas in South Africa are served by daily minibus connections to the nearest town, such that it is possible to become a suburban commuter working in a nearby urban area and residing in the village. The mobility of South African rural dwellers has been dramatically enhanced by the expansion of privately owned, fiercely competitive minibus services during the 1980s (Bank 1990 in Bryceson et al. 2003).

2 Who Migrates?

2.1 Female migration

Several studies indicate that until recently, migration was dominated by single men (de Haan, 2000). But more and more women are migrating for work now and not just as accompanying spouses. This so-called “autonomous female migration” has increased because of a greater demand for female labour in certain services and industries and also because of growing social acceptance of women’s economic independence and mobility. In fact the feminisation of migration is one of the principal recent changes of population movement. The reasons for women’s migration are complex and may include both economic and non-economic factors. Migration can be an option to escape social control or gender discrimination (Posel, 2003) as well as prejudice in their home community if they pursue socially stigmatised work (ranging from certain manual wage labour to sexual services; cf. Tacoli, 2001).

Regional comparisons show that women’s migration is very high in South America and Southeast Asia (Guest, 2003). For example a study of the cities of Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh estimates that 40-45% of migrants are female (Grace, 2002). There is micro-evidence from several countries in Southeast Asia that the level of female migration has increased over recent decades. Using a mix of key informant interviews, statistics and other qualitative methods Clausen (2002) produces compelling evidence of the feminisation of migration in Thailand. The employment of women is greatest in the five major export-oriented, labour-intensive industries, which are electrical machinery, electronics and computer parts; textiles and ready-made garments; chilled, frozen and canned food; precious stones and jewellery; and

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5 Of the total of 2212 million passengers that travelled on the Indian Railway network’s 60,000 km, 35% travelled on the two main suburban lines to Greater Bombay. In 1994-95 the number of daily suburban commuters in Mumbai totalled 2.45 million on the Central railway which runs 95 trains in the morning and 88 trains in the evening peak hours and 2.49 million on the Western Railway which runs 98 and 102 trains respectively (Kosambi, 2000).
footwear. The majority of female rural-urban migrants in East and Southeast Asia are young and unmarried and the concentration of this group in urban areas is particularly pronounced in the ‘mega cities’ (Guest 2003).

There are indications of this in Africa, too: in South Africa, female migration has accounted for most of the increase in migratory movements and the figures for female migration have risen from 30% to 34% through the 1990s (Posel 2003). A study of Addis Ababa’s migrant population in the year 2000 cited in Devereux et al found that women migrants to Addis Ababa outnumber males; women migrants are, on average, younger than their male counterparts, and an unusually high proportion of these women migrants are divorced or unmarried. However migration in Ethiopia has been female dominated for a while (Potts pers. comm.)

Box 4: The feminisation of migration

- Women’s migration is greatest in Southeast Asia and South America
- The majority of female migrants in East and Southeast Asia are young and unmarried and the concentration of this group is greatest in the mega cities
- Female migration is increasing elsewhere: In South Africa increases in female migration accounted for most of the increase in migratory movements; In the Ethiopian capital women migrants have long outnumbered men. They are younger and tend to be unmarried or divorced
- Socio-religious seclusion and other cultural restriction on women’s mobility continue to constrain mobility but are gradually breaking down as the gains from migration become evident
- Societal norms and gender stereotyping may exclude women from higher return work

The pattern in China is still largely male-dominated as a number of studies have established (Zhao 2001, 2003) both due to cultural reasons restricting female mobility and the nature of the demand for manual workers in urban areas. But more women are migrating to labour intensive industries in areas such as Guangdong. Internal migration in Mongolia is also mainly by men (by Tsogtsaikhan 2003).

Although the migration of women has increased rapidly in South Asia, it is still not on the scale of South America and Southeast Asia. Here cultural factors may be responsible; the Bangladesh PPA shows how the practice of plurdab (socio-religious seclusion of women) reduces women’s freedom of movement. However, women’s migration to the urban garment manufacturing industry is huge. In India, regional differences in women’s mobility have been noted by Singh (1984 cited in de Haan 2000) where migration among women in South India is higher than their northern sisters who live in a cultural milieu that is similar to West Asian and North African Arab countries. Women in a PPA in Kajima, Ethiopia said that because their physical mobility is more limited than that of men, they are more dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods and hence are more insecure. Societal norms and gender-based stereotypes may also exclude women from higher return work and result in lower payment of women for the same work. Breman (1996) observed that migrant women in Gujarat, India, carrying out equivalent tasks to migrant men earned lower wages.

In some areas cultural barriers are breaking down because of the huge opportunities offered by migratory work. The PPA conducted in Mali showed that although men continued to view women’s migration (to rice fields and towns for working as maids) negatively, it had grown (Mali 1993). The PPA conducted by ADB in Cambodian (2001) notes that young girls and women were migrating to urban areas to work in garment factories, as domestic helpers, beer girls and sex workers even though their culture discourages them from moving out of the
village. Migration thus offers many prospects for helping women to exit from poverty but
given the greater vulnerability of women and children, they will need support of a different
kind.

2.2 Segmentation of migrant labour markets

That migrant labour markets are strongly segmented along ethnic and gender lines emerges
clearly from PPAs and other holistic assessments of poverty and diversification. For
migrating women in Africa working as domestic maids seems to be a widely available option.
There are many examples: in Senegal young women and girls particularly from the Sereer
community migrate into cities, as farm labour needs decline, in search of (low-paid) work as
maids or laundresses (41% of all domestics are under age 18) (Senegal PPA1995). Working
as domestic maids is also common in Niger (PPA 1996) and Pakistan (PPA 1993). A study of
Ethiopia by Devereux et al also found that many women from Wollo work as domestic maids.
In Mali’s urban centres, demand for women workers has grown in the service sector, for
example to work as waitresses in bars and restaurants. These jobs are attractive to women as
their access to land is traditionally restricted and they are expected to work as unpaid labour
on family land. Migration has become a socially acceptable way for unmarried women to
support the family. The movement of women in Northern Tanzania is directed towards the
coastal areas where the tourism industry has developed and this involves more long-distance
and long-term female migration (Tacoli 2002).

Box 5: Jobs commonly undertaken by female migrant workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Type</th>
<th>Regional Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic work</td>
<td>(common throughout Africa, South Asia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural labour</td>
<td>(e.g. India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction labour</td>
<td>(e.g. India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex work</td>
<td>(evidence from Armenia, Macedonia, Georgia, Ethiopia, Senegal, Uganda, Thailand, Cambodia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work in labour-intensive manufacturing</td>
<td>(China, Bangladesh, Cambodia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work in agro-processing</td>
<td>(e.g. prawn processing in India)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many of the PPAs (Armenia conducted in 1995, Macedonia 1998, Georgia 1997) note that
increased worker mobility is often related to sex work. In fact migration allows such socially
stigmatised work to be undertaken at a safe distance. The Uganda PPA (Government of
Uganda 2000) noted for instance that men from Kalangala, Kapchorwa, Kisoro, Kabarole and
Busheyeni migrate in search of casual labour; whereas women migrated in search of work in
bars and in the sex industry. Another example is of the Teklehaimanot in Ethiopia. Women
participants in a PPA mentioned the increase in prostitution since 1993 among women
previously employed as maids, driven by the arrival of more female migrants from rural areas
(Ethiopia 1998).

2.3 Segmentation by ethnic group

Segmentation along ethnic lines has also been noted by many authors. This is mainly to do
with traditional skills and social networks: if one person from a certain caste/tribe/region
establishes good connections and finds work in an area then his/her relations and friends soon
follow⁶. The study of Ethiopia (Devereux et al Nd) notes that the Amhara were the largest
single ethnic group among recent migrants to Addis followed by the Gurage and the Oromo.
Gazdar (2003) notes that in Sindh, Pakistan, a large proportion of the arid-area migrants are

⁶ This is also known as chain migration.
people from socially marginalised non-Muslim groups such as the Bheels and the Kohlis. Similar observations have been made by other authors (e.g. Skeldon 2003) where there is a strong association between caste, tribe etc and the kind of work found in the migratory labour market. Segmentation along ethnic lines can also determine the direction of movement – for example in Fiji rural-urban migration is the most significant type of migration for Fijians, compared with urban-urban migration for Indo-Fijians (Chandra 2002). A greater understanding of segmentation in migrant labour markets is essential for the development of support systems that can reach different groups of people with different needs.

2.4 Age profile of migrants

Internal migration is an activity undertaken primarily by young adults all over the world. For example Hare (1999) finds that the age groups of 16-25 and 26-35 are most likely to migrate in China. A study in Ethiopia also found that migrants are mostly male under the age of 30 (RESAL 1999). Recent country studies for Pakistan (Gazdar 2003) and Vietnam (Anh et al. 2003) all note a similar pattern. In Africa also, labour migration, particularly over greater distances tends to be dominated by young men (de Haan 2000).

Leaving one’s group of origin at a certain moment in the personal life-cycle might also be seen as a ‘rite of passage’ by certain ethnic groups. Young people who do not migrate at a certain time in their life can be exposed to ridicule by their community (Tacoli 2001). What is perhaps under-recognised in the literature based on hard statistics is the incidence of child migration (see Box 6).

Box 6: Migrating children

This PPAs powerfully demonstrate that working children are not unique to any society or culture: A common strategy for poor families is to take children out of school during periods of economic hardship and send them to work in neighbouring villages or towns as servants and apprentices. Child labour and child migration are widespread in South Asia: the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh has the highest number of child labourers in the country, many of whom work in seed cotton fields and travel there from long distances. Child migration is also widespread in Karnataka where young teenagers (usually boys) travel to work in restaurants in Bangalore and Mumbai. Child migration was mentioned in the Bangladesh PPA (Narayan et al. 2002) especially to Dhaka. A striking feature of the country’s workforce is that it includes 6.3 million children under the age of 14. Unmarried girls are employed as domestic servants throughout South Asia.

Similar patterns are noted in Africa. For example in Ghana children work in the informal sector in Kumasi and Accra, particularly in lorry parks. Not only is child migration an economic necessity, it is increasingly being viewed as a positive option by parents for their children’s future. The DARE project shows how, in the space of a decade, Tanzanian parents’ attitudes towards the migration of their children has switched from taunting their offspring for craving city life to goading them to seek their fortune there. Twenty-three per cent of households had male children who had migrated out, and 17% had female children who migrated.

2.5 Do the poorest migrate?

The literature on migration suggests that poorer villages (usually unirrigated and/or remote) tend to be the “sending” areas and urbanised locations or richer villages (irrigated and/or well connected) tend to be the “receiving” areas (Dev and Evenson 2003, Kundu 2003). However,
In the 1970s Indian Village Studies project of the Institute of Development Studies (Connel et al. 1977, Lipton 1980) found that *unequal, and not the poorest, villages* had the highest rates of out-migration. On the other hand, Yao’s (2001) study of the relationship between land and migration in China suggests that egalitarian land distribution promotes labour migration.

Overall, the evidence to date suggests that those with limited access to land and other assets are more likely to migrate. For example Zhao Zhu (2002) find land size has significant negative effect on migration in China. Each additional *mu* (a measure unit in China) of land reduces the probability of migration by 4.4% if the decision model is individual-based and by 2.8% if the decision model is household-based (Zhao, 1999b). The poorest usually cannot migrate because they do not have enough labour or the resources required for start-up investments on tools and other assets, transport, food and shelter. The move often involves bribes that have to be paid.

**Box 7: The role of labour contractors**

| Poorer people with surplus labour in the household but few other assets often migrate through labour contractors and intermediaries Labour contractors provide labourers with cash advances which are used to purchase the essentials for migration. For example, in drought-prone areas of North-western Andhra Pradesh, potential migrants are given a substantial cash advance (roughly Rs 5000 or $110) by contractors or employers, six months before the migration season begins, to buy bulls or repair their bullock carts. These are needed for the sugar-cane cutting work that migrants undertake in the irrigated areas of the state. The advance is cut from their wages and is usually paid off in a month. Labour contractors provide other kinds of assistance to migrants and their families and in the absence of other more organised and accessible forms of personal insurance and credit have become a major support system in South and Southeast Asia. But as a number of researchers have shown, contractors can also be very exploitative (Olsen and Ramanamurthy 2000) and migrant workers need access to a fairer system of migrant support. |

### 2.6 Do educated people migrate more?

Early studies of migration found that relatively better educated males aged between 15-30 years with relatively more contacts or capital required for the initial transport and establishment costs had the highest propensity to migrate. Several studies from India show that migration is high among the most and least educated with a tendency for the illiterate to engage in seasonal migration and the better educated to travel for regular white collar jobs or business enterprise. In China, earlier studies found that migrants had a higher level of education (de Haan 2000) but new evidence suggests that the best educated are avoiding migrating if they can (GHK/IIED 2004).

The demographic characteristics of temporary migrants may be different from longer term migrants. Asian country studies reviewed by Guest (2003) indicate that compared to permanent migrants, temporary migrants are more likely to be older, male, have lower levels of education, married (but who leave their families behind in the area of origin), living in poor conditions and remitting more of their income.

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7 The availability of labour within the household is a strong determinant of the likelihood to migrate. Having one extra member in the household increases the relative likelihood of that household migrating by 17% in AP and 19% in MP. And an increase in the ratio of working to non-working members in the household also increases the relative likelihood of migration by nearly 75% in AP and 221% in MP. Focus group discussions and participatory wealth ranking of migrating households corroborate these findings: labour-scarce households do not migrate (Deshingkar and Start 2003).
3 The inadequacy of quantitative surveys

Data on migration are notoriously inadequate. Several problems plague censuses and other national surveys including: the inability to capture seasonal and part-time occupations; covering only registered migrants and, not being able to capture rural-rural moves.

3.1 Inability to capture part-time occupations and unregistered migrants

The Chinese data typify the first two problems. Official data do not cover the huge number of unrecorded “floating” migrants who are often involved in short term work. Estimates vary between 50 m to 120 m showing how inaccurate the assessments are (Ping 2003). Liu and Chan (2001) further note that the six major data sets on national migration\(^8\) are not comparable because they use different categories of reasons for migration. There are several differences between the hukou statistics (only covers Hukou or *de jure* migration) and the census surveys (covers *de facto* migration) which hinder comparisons.

Similarly, official data in Egypt show a decrease in rural-urban migration between the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s and an increase in urban-rural migration. But Zohry (2002) questions these data on the basis of his knowledge of long-distance rural–urban migration to Cairo from Upper Egypt where many workers are not *officially registered* as migrants and *hide their origins* as they are still *de jure* residents of rural areas.

In Pakistan too rural-urban migration and urbanisation remain underemphasised because of definitions of “urban” and “rural” and also the way that surveys collect information (Gazdar, 2003). The Population Census is the main source of data and this can only capture permanent relocations. Other datasets such as the Labour Force Survey and the Integrated Household Surveys provide more detailed information on place of origin (rural or urban) but they also use the census to define their sampling frames.

Hugo (2003) notes that the examination of rural-urban migration in Indonesia is made difficult by the fact that national census migration data do not differentiate between urban and rural origins of migrants; census data do not detect migration within provinces and a great deal of rural to urban migration occurs within provinces. Some indication of the importance of intra-provincial rural-urban migration is evident in the results from the 1995 intercensal survey. Although this survey suffers from the problems associated with small clustered samples for identifying migration patterns (Hugo 1982), it gives some interesting insights into migration within provinces. However, the survey does not detect inter-provincial movement since it only counts movement within *kabupaten* boundaries.

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8 The 1986 Urban Migration Survey, the 1987 One Percent National Population Survey, the 1988 Two Per Thousand Fertility Survey, the 1990 Census, the 1995 One Percent National Population Survey and the household (hukou) registration migration statistics.
Box 8: Africa – incomplete and poor quality data sets

Data on migration in Africa appear to be especially problematic: data for many regions, particularly for Eastern Africa, are very patchy and the quality varies among countries and regions. Due to its population size, Nigeria is important but has one of the most limited data bases. Household surveys are available for a number of countries, but these (a) provide a partial view on the situation and are prone to misrepresentations and incomplete data (Van Dijk et al. 2001) and (b) touch on migration only on the margins. In the case of South Africa, for instance, the data basis with regard to migration has deteriorated; its household surveys increasingly do not capture internal migratory movements (Posel 2003). Researchers have found several limitations in the data for South Africa derived from the 1993 Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD) and the 1995, 1997 and 1999 October Household surveys (Posel and Casale 1993). Not surprisingly, data are particularly scarce in countries caught in or emerging from civil war.

3.2 Serious underestimation of mobility

Even where data are better as in India, the inability to capture part-time occupations and unregistered migrants can lead to completely flawed conclusions. The major sources of migration data in India namely the National Sample Survey and Census show that overall migration has actually decreased recently (Kundu 2003) because they do not cover temporary migration sufficiently. But as mentioned previously micro-studies show very high levels of migration. Similarly in Vietnam, official data suggested that there was very little movement to the cities in the mid 1990s. Between 1996 and 2001, the number of recorded rural migrants in Ha Noi was 156,344, and 500,000 for Ho Chi Minh City, however it is widely acknowledged that the real figures are much higher. Ho Chi Minh City experiences a massive seasonal influx of people to its outskirts when the Mekong River floods. Regional cities such as Da Nang, Ba Rai-Vung Tau and Can Tho are also destinations for rural migrants (Grace 2002).

3.3 Missing rural-rural migration

Probably the most serious problem from the poverty viewpoint is that official statistics on rural-rural migration are very scarce and inaccurate owing to scattered locations of sending and receiving areas and the difficulty in enumerating all the streams. In general, the finer details of mobility are best captured through multidisciplinary methods. For example Deshingkar and Start 2003 note six different migration streams for the State of Andhra Pradesh and nine for Madhya Pradesh, all distinct from each other in a variety of ways as the table in Annex 1 shows.

Inadequate data sets not only underestimate and underplay the importance of migration; they also lead to erroneous conclusions about people’s livelihood strategies and their scope for poverty reduction. In the Maldives, for instance, seasonal migration may be the primary source of income for many families left behind, explaining the discrepancy between the incidence of poverty and of malnutrition (Jerve 2001). Despite the huge amounts of research on migration better estimates are required especially in understanding shorter distance and short duration migratory moves including commuting.
4 The Causes of Migration

4.1 The ‘push’: mostly declining opportunities in agriculture

Situations of surplus labour arising from scarcity of cultivated land, inequitable land distribution, low agricultural productivity, high population density and the concentration of the rural economy almost exclusively on agriculture frequently lead to an increase in outmigration. This combination of factors creates a “push” that is encountered more often in fragile environments, examples of which are cited below.

4.1.1 Drought
Drought is the classic “push” affecting millions of people especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. In Africa the movement of people in a fragile and challenging environment can be seen as one of the main characteristics and drivers of history (Iliffe 1995). Drought-prone Sahelian and Sudanese rural economies have strong traditions of trade and labour migration (Bryceson 1999). It is estimated that the population of Nouakchott in Mauritania rose fortyfold between 1965 and the end of the 1980s because of prolonged drought and loss of livelihoods (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989 in Potts 1995). It is likely that migration will become even more important: a European Food Security Network study of employment and labour mobility in Ethiopia (RESAL 1999) notes that migratory labour is likely to play an increasingly important role as a coping mechanism for food insecure rural households.

Box 9: Drought-induced migration in India
Every summer India’s newspapers carry stories from all over the country of the growing tide of people who have been driven out of their homes by drought. Bolangir is a striking example. This is a very poor and drought-prone district in Orissa, where approximately 60,000 people migrated out during the 2001 drought (Wandshcneider and Mishra 2003). Nearly all the villages in the dry areas stretching across eastern Maharashtra, eastern Karnataka and western Andhra Pradesh have very high rates of migration. Mahbubnagar district in Andhra Pradesh is known for the legendary Palamur labourers who work in construction all over India.

The situation in most of the backward and dry areas of India (nearly two-thirds of the country) is increasingly resembling this because of the low levels of diversification and deteriorating access to common property resources. Seasonal migration is often linked to debt cycles and the need of money for repaying debts, covering deficits created by losses in agriculture, or meeting expenditures of large magnitude on account of marriages, festivals, ceremonies etc.

4.1.2 Water-logging
Water-logging can also be a trigger for migration – In parts of Pakistan (PPA1995), the uncontrolled use of irrigation water has resulted in the waterlogging and salination of lands. This has led to falling crop yields, which in turn has led to migration by poor families.

4.1.3 Population pressure and land fragmentation
Having little access to land in a predominantly agrarian society leaves the landless with few alternatives to migration. In some Latin American countries access to land is so limited that nearly all poor young people view migration as their main and perhaps only livelihood option. The PPA in Ecuador tellingly states “The voices of poor people in Ecuador are voices of people on the move, travelling to new places in hope of improving their circumstances”. Many young people in the study sites of Asociacion 10 de Agosto, Voluntad de Dios, La Calera, and Tumbatu and Tablas possessed no land at all and a majority migrated temporarily or permanently to work in factories, farms, as domestics, or selling handicrafts. The situation
in parts of Cambodia is the same where there are reports of “a new and growing breed of landless workers which has led to increased migration from rural areas to cities and other countries” (Acharya 2003).

4.1.4 River-bank erosion
In Bangladesh several districts are affected by river bank erosion which has been an important driver of migration. According to a study conducted in the late 1980s the number of people affected annually by river bank erosion in the delta areas was one million (Rahman 1991). The study found that roughly 11% of the squatters in Dhaka came from Barisal district and a further 31% from Faridpur (both districts are very prone to river bank erosion). A further 19% of the rickshaw pullers were from Barisal and 32% from Faridpur. Recent studies also show that such areas have high outmigration rates (PPA in Ulipur, reported in Narayan et al 2002).

4.1.5 Poor mountain and forest economies
In the poor mountainous areas of South Asia low agricultural productivity, poor access to credit or other pre-requisites for diversification and high population densities create the conditions for outmigration. A recent increase in migration has been reported from Uttarakhand by Mamgain (2003) as the fragile mountain ecosystem cannot support increasing populations. The poor mountainous districts of Nepal also have high rates of outmigration (Bal Kumar 2003). More or less the same factors create a push from many forested areas where population pressure has increased and CPR based livelihoods have become unsustainable. The very high rates seen from forested tribal areas of Madhya Pradesh in India are an example of this.

4.1.6 Other push factors
Apart from environmental push factors is the downsizing of public sector jobs and overall stagnation in formal sector job creation. In MENA countries migration has been triggered by a rapid growth of their labour forces, high rates of unemployment, and a heavy reliance on the public sector for job creation9 (which is now being downsized under structural adjustment). Roughly 70% of the poor in the MENA region live in rural areas. Since the 1970s, the share of employment in agriculture has declined rapidly but manufacturing and other industries have not increased proportionally creating a stream of rural-urban migration in all MENA countries, leading to rapid urbanization and, in turn, to the transformation of urban spaces into clusters of unemployed people10.

Box 10: Recent pushes created by globalisation
The most recent push factor appears to be a fall in agricultural commodity prices brought about by macroeconomic reforms linked with liberalisation and globalisation policies. New evidence is emerging from India of falling agricultural commodity prices due to macroeconomic reforms, creating a strong push from the countryside. Recent research by Ghosh and Harriss-White (2002) in Birbhum and Bardhaman districts of West Bengal suggests that paddy producers are facing heavy losses as prices fell sharply by over 50% since 1999. This situation was created by the reduction of subsidies as well as the de-restriction of inter-State transport which has allowed cheaper paddy to come in from Bihar, as well as from Jharkhand.

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9 Until recently, the proportion of public sector jobs was 60% in Algeria and 30% in Egypt and Tunisia (Al-Ali 2004).
10 Unemployment rates in MENA countries which average at 20% range from 10% in Egypt to 50% in Iraq. In a number of other countries in the region, such as Iran, Algeria, Libya, and Yemen, as much as a third of the potential workforce is unemployed. Unemployment is higher in the cities, among the educated youth, particularly women.
and Orissa where distress sales were occurring. But there are few other academic studies in this area because it has emerged very recently. Press coverage however, has been extensive\textsuperscript{11}. More research is urgently needed in this area.

4.2 The ‘pull’: often new opportunities in urban-based industry and services

In the 1950s, development economists viewed the demand for labour created by “growing modern industrial complexes” and the gap in rural and urban wages as the main “pull” factor. There have since been many models and debates on what motivates people to migrate including theories of “expected” as opposed to actual wage differentials. Other pull factors include the desire to acquire skills or gain new experiences. In the case of voluntary migration of the poor for economic reasons, the wage gap is probably the most important pull and the most important recent determinants of this appear to be urbanisation and the spread of manufacturing.

4.2.1 Urbanisation

Urbanisation has been a major driver of internal migration in many countries and has overtaken other factors in many Asian locations (see for example Gazdar 2003 on Pakistan, Afsar 2003 on Bangladesh). Rates of urbanisation influence rural-urban wage differences: an increase in the demand for labour in urban areas can push up urban wages and increase migration. Rural-urban differences in average incomes increased in many South and East Asian countries during the 1990s, especially in China and fell in most African countries (IFAD 2001, Eastwood and Lipton 2000). Current ESCAP projections are that urbanisation rates in South and Southwest Asia will soon exceed other regions in Asia (Guest 2003). Urbanisation is progressing throughout Africa albeit more slowly: in 1960, 18% of the population lived in urban centres (i.e. in settlements with more than 2,000 people). In 1990, the figure had increased to 34% for Africa as a whole\textsuperscript{12}.

Box 11: Urban and peri-urban economies in Southeast Nigeria

Densely populated Southeast Nigeria provides a good illustration of both positive and negative effects of urban growth, and the links with push and pull migratory movements. Commuting into urban centres (such as Aba and Port Hartcourt) is made possible for many by a well-functioning and relatively cheap (subsidised) transport system. This has led to considerable occupational diversification. Women work as housemaids or gardeners; men have work opportunities in construction and in the oil industry. Peri-urban settlements have become centres for small and medium-sized industries such as paper mills, creating additional labour possibilities. Outmigrants are investing in building homes for retirement, adding to

\textsuperscript{11} Several articles have been published in The Hindu a respected English newspaper in India, particularly by P. Sainath, an internationally recognised journalist writing on drought, poverty and migration who is known for his book “Everybody Loves a Good Drought”. Examples of commodities whose prices have crashed recently resulting in large scale loss of livelihood include rubber in Kerala, sericulture in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu and Darjeeling Tea in West Bengal.

\textsuperscript{12} The available evidence suggests [Stevens et al 2004] that all countries are converging towards a situation in which the majority of their populations are based in urban areas. In Asia the proportion of the population living in urban areas has doubled in the last 50 years from 17.1% of the total population in 1950 to 34.9% in 2000 (United Nations 2001). Projections estimate that more than half the African population (54%) will live in cities by 2015 (Tacoli 2001) At present levels of urbanisation are greatest in the DRC South Africa, Mauritania, Gabon, Zambia, Liberia, Mauritius, Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Senegal and North Africa (Egypt, Morocco, Algeria) but slow in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger, Eritrea, Burkina Faso and Lesotho (UN 1995). In general the higher the level of urbanization, the lower the rate of urban growth. Smaller urban centres in Africa are growing at a faster rate than the metropolitan areas. Zambia is actually de-urbanizing and has been for 20 odd years (Potts pers.comm.).
employment in the construction sector. This development, however, also brings negative effects such as increased water pollution by industrial activities (particularly by the paper mills), and a reduction in arable land. Some traditional non-farm activities have suffered from the social and economic change, e.g. women’s cloth-weaving which has faced increasing competition from imported goods (Tacoli 2002).

Contrary to conventional wisdom on urbanisation and migration, high rates of migration (permanent and temporary) into urbanised areas have continued despite rising levels of (formal) unemployment and persistent urban poverty. The explanation lies in the expanding urban informal sector which represents a significant pull. In addition, urban areas offer many economic opportunities to rural people for changing jobs rapidly and becoming upwardly mobile with a very low asset-base and skills. Even if urban wages are not higher, work is available more regularly than in subsistence agriculture. As Devereux et al note in their study of the Amhara region in Ethiopia “younger men (many of them unmarried and either landless or unable to farm through lack of other resources) were attracted by the more open-ended experience of urban migration, with its greater risks but greater and more varied opportunities.” Although urban migration required more capital and contacts a general advantage is that work can be found all year round, independent of the season. Informal economy opportunities may be particularly beneficial to historically disadvantaged groups such as tribals, lower castes (in South Asia) and women.

**Box 12: The urban informal sector**

A majority of migrant workers find work in the informal sector. This is what the ‘over-urbanisation’ theory of Hoselitz (1957) predicts: migrants supply far more labour than the formal sector can absorb and labour is absorbed into the informal sector which then leads to low productivity and limited prospects for exiting poverty.

However, it has been observed in number different contexts that most migrants never “graduate” to the formal sector, by contrast with the widely cited Harris and Todaro model (1970). There is also compelling evidence that migrants can escape poverty even when they have remained in the informal sector. Deshingkar and Start (2003) document accumulative migration streams in both informal farm and non-farm work which have allowed numerous poor people in Andhra Pradesh to improve their standard of living. Papola (1981) noted in the case of Ahmedabad city in India that although a majority of the migrants were in informal sector employment, their urban earnings after migration were double their rural earnings.

The informal economy is growing in most developing countries, even in rural areas (Becker 2004). (See below for the share of informal workers in different sectors by continent.)

**Share of informal workers in various sectors by continent**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informal Workforce as share of</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Latin America and Caribbean</th>
<th>Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-agricultural employment</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>45–85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Employment</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40–60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New jobs</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Charmes 1998, updated 2000 in Becker 2004*

The growth or decline of the informal economy is linked to the growth or decrease of the formal economy especially in Asia where the growth of one has led to a reduction in the other. In countries where incomes and assets are not equitably distributed it tends to be more fixed: if economic growth is not accompanied by improvements in employment levels and income distribution, the informal economy does not shrink.
Self-employment comprises a greater share of informal employment than wage employment and represents 70% of informal employment in Sub-Saharan Africa (if South Africa is excluded, the share is 81%), 62% in North Africa, 60% in Latin America and 59% in Asia. The two largest subgroups are home-based workers and street vendors who taken together represent 10–25% of the total workforce in developing countries. Within these two groups, women in the developing world constitute 30–90% of all street vendors, 35–80% of all home-based workers and over 80% of home-workers (industrial outworkers who work at home) (ILO 2002).

Many governments remain unaware of the huge economic contributions of the informal economy and its potential for poverty reduction. In fact most activities in the informal sector continue to be illegal. But because both demand for, and supply of these services are so overwhelming, they continue and support rent-seeking among petty officials and policemen that is of gargantuan proportions. There is a need to review government and donor policies to ensure that they are not hostile to the livelihood strategies pursued by a majority of the urban poor in the informal sector.

4.2.2 New opportunities in agriculture
Since the time that high yielding varieties, assured irrigation and agro-chemicals were introduced across the developing world in the 1960s high productivity agricultural pockets have become a magnet for poor migrant workers from poor areas. This continues to be an important pull due to the marked wage differences in many countries even today: for instance there is much rural to rural migration between lowland and upland Vietnam (Winkels 2004). Workers go from the densely populated Red River Delta in the North, to the Central Highland frontier which had until very recently a growing export oriented agro-economy primarily in coffee. Similarly rural-rural migration in Ethiopia has increased since 1991 where young men from heavily populated areas go to irrigated farms for 3 to 5 months (RESAL 1999).

4.2.3 The relaxing of restrictions on population movements
The relaxing of restrictions on population movements has been an important reason for the increase in mobility in some countries. The best known example of this is China. In pre-reform China migration was controlled by the state through a complex network of employment and residential controls, chief among which was the Hukou system. This has been progressively dismantled since the late 1970s and has, together with other factors mentioned previously, resulted in increased rural-urban migration. Similar increases in movements have been noted in South Africa following the lifting of restrictive legislation (‘pass-laws’) at the end of Apartheid. The other well-documented example is Ethiopia where labour movement which had virtually come to a standstill under the Derg regime have resumed since 1991.

It is also worth mentioning here that internal migration may also be driven by international migration and vice versa. For example diaspora communities can have a marked impact on internal mobility and poverty reduction. But these relationships are very poorly understood and need to be explored further (Skeldon 2003b).

5 The Impacts of Migration

5.1 Effects of outmigration on local labour availability
Several earlier studies hypothesised that male-outmigration would deplete household labour and this in turn would cause a worsening of poverty. There has been some evidence of this from poor parts of Asia and Africa. For example the prolonged absence of men was found to deplete labour in Bangladeshi villages and reduce agricultural productivity (Irfan 1986). Recent research from Nepal (Bal Kumar 2003) and Uttaranchal (Bora 2000) shows worsening poverty in poor hilly areas as a result of the outmigration of young males. This has occurred mainly where outmigration is male dominated and also where remittances have been so low that the household has not been able to hire in labour or invest in other income generating assets. In situations where remittances are more substantial and compensate for labour depletion, the effects of male outmigration do not appear to have a lasting negative impact on the economy of the sending area. For example Yang’s research in areas of high outmigration in China shows that total grain output in several locations declined by less than 2% while household disposable income increased by 16% as a result of migration.

5.2 The impacts on family structure

While women participants voiced worries about the effect of migration on their families and social structure during many PPAs (Moldova 1997, Ghana 1995, Ecuador 1996, India 1998, Madagascar 1996) it was also noted that the prolonged absence of male decision makers can result in a change in the social order with women becoming more vocal in village decision-making and participating more often and openly. For example a PPA conducted in Indonesia shows that women have gained more power in the domestic sphere because they earn more cash income and manage landed assets more often now than they did ten years ago. Similarly in Ecuador (PPA) women are participating in greater numbers in community development activities because of the high outmigration of males. In the Senegal River Valley also women have adapted to long absences of their emigrated husbands by becoming more active in farming. While migrant work has stressed household relations, many women may also benefit from related independent incomes (Moldova 1997; Georgia 1997). It was also pointed out in the synthesis report of the PPAs (Voices of the Poor) that family dissolution is not necessarily a disempowering experience for women, and it is certainly empowering for some women.

**Box 13: Migration and STDs**

Migration has been linked to STDs in many countries. For example villagers in Thailand PPA1998, Uganda PPA, Niger and Ghana mentioned that migrants often return with HIV/AIDS. The rapid spread of AIDS, particularly in urban areas, has led to one group of women in Igosi village, Tanzania, taking a stand and refusing to allow husbands to migrate for fear of contracting AIDS Mung’ong’o (1998, Bryceson 1999). Establishing a causal link between STDs and migration, however, is generally problematic. Migratory movements as such cannot be blamed for the spread of STD; the root cause is unsafe sex practice. Certain migratory movements may increase STD infection rates, as can be argued in the case of the male-only migration in the South African mining industry and its social consequences (e.g. drawing on unprotected sex services, the creation of second families). HIV/AIDS infection rates apparently also increased quicker along lorry overland routes throughout Africa. In the case of India, Varma (2003) argues that relationship between AIDS and migration is still hypothetical and not substantiated through research.

5.3 Migration as a livelihood strategy

Migration is a routine livelihood strategy of poor households which helps to smooth seasonal income fluctuations and earn extra cash to meet contingencies or increase disposable income.
It is one of many activities in the *diversification portfolio* of households and is undertaken if and when there is surplus labour in the household and when it can be combined successfully with other activities either in parallel or in sequence. Migration can be either a component of individuals’ diversification strategies or household diversification strategies. In the case of seasonal work at the destination, migration is undertaken at certain times of the year for a certain duration as in the case of tourism sector services in Jamaica; street vending, construction, and work in the oil industry in Nigeria (Naryan et al 2002) and informal work in Bulgarian towns (Narayan et al 2002). The PPAs in the Russian Federation show how many men in Belasovka spend their summers building *dachas* (country cottages) for city people, and sometimes go to Moscow to work one-month shifts in construction.

**Box 14: Migration as a Survival or Accumulation Strategy**

While many studies on migration have tended to emphasise the impoverishing effects of migration they have rarely posed the question of what these households and individuals would have done in the absence of the opportunity to migrate. In Indian writings, the term *distress* migration and migration for survival have often been used; explaining migration by the poor as a response to natural calamities and other shocks (Murthy, 1991; Reddy 1990; Rao, 1994, Mukherjee 2001 who calls it “distressed” migration). Distress migration has also been noted in a variety of African contexts by the PPAs though not necessarily using the same terminology.

But there is compelling evidence showing that the returns from migration can improve over time as migrants acquire more knowledge, confidence and skills; when they can cut out exploitative middlemen and contractors. The concept of *accumulative* migration (Deshingkar and Start 2003) has been gaining acceptance. Rao’s (2001) study of Andhra Pradesh distinguishes between migration for survival and migration for additional income. He observes people from Rayadurga district were migrating for survival in the 1970s but changed to migration for additional income in the 1990s. In Vietnam the IIED study in the Red River Delta reported that overall, migration is widely perceived in the villages as an opportunity rather than a constraint. Another example is Bihar where earlier studies described distress migration and more recent ones such as the one by Karan (2003) describe migration in much more positive terms. In the PPAs synthesised in “Crying out for Change” migration was identified by both men and women as an important factor leading to upward mobility: the importance of migration was greatest in Asia, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean and less so in Africa. For example in the Nigeria PPA a group of women in Ikot Idem, located in the palm oil belt of south-eastern Nigeria identified migration to urban centres among the main ways of improving their lives because of more employment opportunities, more factories, and more access to credit.

5.4 Remittance flows

The analysis of remittance flows has tended to focus on flows between rich and poor countries and internal remittances have not received much attention. Although the individual quantities are smaller, the total volume of internal remittances is likely to be enormous because of the numbers of people involved especially in China, Southeast Asia and South Asia. In Cambodia for instance roughly 3 per cent of the labour force is employed in garment manufacturing units. Most garment workers are migrants and they remit earnings home (Sok et al, 2001). Remittances can account for a *substantial proportion of household incomes* especially for the poor: in Morocco remittances from urban to rural areas are estimated to account for as much as 30% of the income of poor people (Al-Ali 2004). In the poor State of
Bihar remittances constituted one-third of the average annual income of households studied by Karan (2003) with the proportion being much higher among the landless.

In situations where urban wages are high and employment is regular (even if informal) remittances can be significant. In China a recent Ministry of Agriculture sample survey of 20,089 rural households estimated that in 2004, the remittance contribution by migrant workers to rural household incomes was about to overtake earnings from agriculture (quoted in Harris 2004). These projections were made on the basis of the previous year’s figures where the 98 million or so rural outmigrants remitted roughly $45 billion (Rmb 370 billion). This was 8.8% up from the previous year.

**Box 15: Remittances in Africa - small but important**

In Africa, remittances from urban to rural areas in general seem to have declined due to increasing economic uncertainties in towns (Tacoli 2001). The structural adjustment processes in the 1980s had a negative impact on urban incomes. The irregularity and small amounts of remittances are also noted in the PPA in South Africa and also the DARE study in Tanzania. However even if remittances are small and infrequent, they may be important for food security and reducing poverty and vulnerability in general. (David et al, 1998). The Uganda PPA shows for example that a common means for survival for the elderly, disabled and female headed households is the receipt of cash remittances from children employed in the city. Temporary migration is part of the overall survival strategy of a household faced with declining real incomes in both rural and urban areas (Weeks 1995).

5.5 Migration as a driver of economic growth and poverty reduction

There seems to be little doubt that migration can reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth. While the evidence is most clear in situations where economies are growing rapidly as in Asia, other contexts present a more mixed picture with both push and pull factors operating, creating less accumulative types of migration as seen in African countries with stagnant economies. For example Afsar (2003) argues that migration has reduced poverty directly and indirectly in Bangladesh as remittances have expanded the area under cultivation and rural labour markets by making land available for tenancy. Similarly two studies in Thailand by Guest (1998) show that remittances are an important supplement to household income and have a multiplier effect on the economy with many major items of expenditure such as construction materials and labour being obtained locally. A PPA conducted in the Mekong delta area also illustrates the positive multiplier effects of migration and the important role that it has played in the development of the entire Mekong Delta region (ADB 2003). There the development of infrastructure raised the productivity of agriculture which created a demand for migrant labour and the remittances sent by them helped people staying behind. Anh (2003) draws similar conclusions based on data from Bangladesh, China, Vietnam and Philippines. Anh identifies migration is a driver of growth and an important route out of poverty with significant positive impacts on people’s livelihoods and wellbeing and concludes that attempts to control mobility will be counterproductive.

Although there are no formal data on the economic contribution of migrant labour, guessesmates by contractors, employers and policy makers are very high. According to one unnamed source nearly 90% of all construction work in India is carried out with migrant labour. Without migrant labour, timely transplanting and harvesting would not be possible in many parts of South Asia, especially where land parcels are too small to mechanise. Many industries geared towards export use migrant labour: prawn processing and garment manufacturing are but two. Ping (2003) draws attention to the huge contribution of migrant...
labour to overall development and says “without migrants there would be no Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou or Shenzhen”.

It has been widely observed that the investment of remittances into productive uses is limited and consumption spending is greater. But this is not necessarily a problem as consumption can include a variety of uses which may have a positive impact on wellbeing and multiplier effects in the economy. There are many uses of remittances (see Box 16)\textsuperscript{13}:

**Box 16: How remittances are invested**

- Daily needs and expenses including food which improves food security and nutritional status
- Medical / health care expenses or education which can improve the livelihood prospects of future generations
- Consumer durables (stereos, bicycles, motorbikes, milling machines, kiosks, televisions) some of which can help in income generation
- Improving or building housing
- Buying or leasing land or livestock
- Investment in socio-cultural life (birth, wedding, death)
- Loan repayments (often loans to pay for cost of migration)
- Savings
- Income or employment generating activities
- Purchase of cash inputs to agriculture (hired labour, disease control etc), resulting in better cultivation practices and higher yields (Carter, 1997) investment in agricultural implements or machinery (water pumps, ploughs etc).

### 5.6 Investment by migrants and returnees in sending areas

Returning migrants can bring skills, funds, information about markets and new technologies and different values back to their native village. This can lead to far-reaching changes. For instance a PPA in Thailand conducted in the community of Baan Chai Pru showed that community organisation had increased as a consequence of the economic crisis and the presence of returned migrants who were using “their knowledge and experiences” to help villagers come together to solve local problems. The Malawi PPA (From many lands) showed that men who had returned from South Africa helped their women to fight the 1987 mealy bug attack on cassava the staple. Zhao’s (2001) study of Chinese migrants indicates that return migrants are more likely to invest in farm machinery especially for harvesting, ploughing and threshing. Supporting return migrants in their endeavours should certainly become a policy objective. There have been some efforts in this direction although not always successful (see Box 17).

### 5.7 Migration and inequality

There has been much discussion on whether migration increases or decreases inequality. A commonly held view was that migration increases inequality. Lipton’s (1982) widely quoted work asserted that rural-urban migration does not tend to equalise incomes, between or within regions for the following reasons\textsuperscript{14}:

\textsuperscript{13} Adapted from Sander’s (2003) study on international remittances, mentions the following uses, many of which also apply to internal remittances; also from Ellis (2003), IIED (2004) and Deshingkar (2004a).

\textsuperscript{14} Taken from de Haan 1999.
1. The selective nature of migration, providing higher returns to the better-off and better-educated, prevents equalisation within areas of origin.
2. There are costs and barriers associated with migration, including access to information about opportunities, which tends to steer the gains of migration to the rich.
3. The absence of the most productive household members leads to a lowering of labour-intensity, which according to Lipton is “socially maladaptive, especially in the medium run, while the rural work force is growing much faster than other, scarcer factors of production”.
4. The volume of net remittances is usually low, and
5. Return migrants are likely to be the old, sick, and unsuccessful, and skills brought back are unlikely to be of much help.

The negative effects that he lists have been documented but as we discussed previously there is also plenty of new evidence especially from Asia showing that remittances can be substantial and can offset the negative impacts of labour depletion; return migrants can bring back useful skills and so on. In addition as Oberai and Singh (1983) reason, inequality may be reduced if the very poor migrate, as the resulting increase in wages will bring up the wages of those who were at the bottom of the scale. The studies by Guest (1998) in Thailand referred to previously have shown that remittances help to reduce intra-rural household income inequality. Migration may also reduce inter-regional inequality. New research in Thailand has shown that remittances help redistribute income toward poor provinces, resulting in a lower level of crossprovince inequality in household incomes (Yang 2004). Migration may provide an escape from social hierarchies and in that way increase equality at least in the destination areas where discrimination based on ethnicity can be lower than traditional villages. For example Breman observed that migrants broke away from caste-prescribed behavioural norms of subservience at the destination. The India PPAs (1997, 1998) also reported that migration had led to an erosion of the hold of the upper castes on lower castes as they were no longer dependent on degraded land and local labouring for survival.

6 The Government and Elite View of Migration

Policy-makers have tended to perceive migration largely as a problem, posing a threat to social and economic stability and have therefore tried to control it, rather than viewing it as an important livelihood option for the poor (see for example Deshingkar 2004a for a review of policy perspectives in Asia and Ellis 2003 on Africa) A study by the Sussex Centre for Migration Research (Black et al. 2003) examined 48 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), of which only 27 made reference to migration at all, mostly “in negative or pejorative terms” (with the notable exceptions of Cape Verde, Mali, and Niger); seventeen of the examined PRSPs posed internal migration as a problem for development; eight PRSPs expressed the need to control and contain migration from rural to urban areas. Several countries have followed policies of restricting population movements and these have taken various forms.

South Africa and Ethiopia: Implicit in many agricultural or rural development policies in Africa is the aim of controlling population movements. Governments, national and provincial, are concerned “about issues relating to changing demographics and the implications of internal migration for service provision” (personal comm. from S. Peberdy of SAMP, 8 July 2004). The West African gestion de terroir is explicit in the conceptualisation of the space of livelihoods, as being limited to a particular area. Blockages to migration exist throughout
Africa in the form of discouraging “permits, fees, fines, roadblocks, harassment (Ellis and Harris 2004). The most outright policy to prohibit durable internal migration was pursued by Apartheid South Africa (with its notorious ‘pass laws’). This policy was ended in the late 1980s. Internal migration – by both sexes – has increased since. Although Ethiopia has dismantled extreme controls on population mobility the government is still trying to limit urbanisation and settle its nomadic population. Integrated rural development has tended to do the same. Other well known examples are China, Vietnam and Russia.

China: Population movement in pre-reform China was controlled by the State through employment and residential controls, chief among which was the Hukou system. This originated in 1951 but was intensified in the 1960s, following the collapse of the Great Leap Forward and the devastating famine which resulted in 30 millions deaths. The Hukou system severely hindered rural-urban movements and the urbanization process in China. After 1978 a Household Responsibility System (HRS) was introduced and this allowed some freedom of movement. Despite all these changes, the basics of the Hukou system remained intact until recently. Some provinces and cities are starting to reform the Hukou system, though official restrictions on migration still exist. Vietnam also relaxed controls after adopting Open Door policies.

India: Attitudes to migration in India are very negative. Although not stated explicitly, many rural and urban development programmes aim to control migration: for example the Delhi Master Plan aims to keep rural-urban migrants out (Kundu 2003). Likewise rural development programmes on common property resource management, watershed management and agricultural development aim to reduce migration flows through employment creation and resource regeneration (see for instance IFPRI evaluation of the National Watershed Development Programme for Rural Areas and, studies of CPR rejuvenation in Rajasthan cited in Chopra (2000) and more recent evaluations of watershed programmes under the Department of Rural Development). Not only that; a large number of academics and NGOs with leftist leanings view migration mainly as an exploitative process and are very reluctant to acknowledge its more positive aspects.

7 The Vulnerability of Migrants

Whether or not migration is poverty reducing, it is a tough undertaking. Migrants travel and live in very difficult conditions. Mosse et al (2002) for instance note in their study of Madhya Pradesh, India, that migrants work long hours in harsh conditions; injuries are common and there is inadequate medical assistance or compensation. Water, fuel, sanitation and security are major problems. They quote a study by DISHA, an NGO in Gujarat which found that over half the migrants slept in the open and the rest had very perfunctory accommodation. They face harassment, abuse, theft, forcible eviction or the demolition of their dwellings by urban authorities or police. The sexual exploitation of women by masons, contractors, the police and others is routine but unreported by women for fear of the consequences (loss of employment, violence). Children are even more vulnerable to such abuse.

Similarly the PPA in Russia highlighted the vulnerability of migrants without permits who are almost always harassed by the police and other authorities. Even those who have permits can have them confiscated or destroyed. New arrivals in the city who live in culvert cylinders and garbage areas stay in hiding often because the police have confiscated their registration papers.
Poor people in Battala and Bastuhara Bangladesh (Narayan and Petsch 2002) spoke about the high levels of insecurity faced by migrants. Rickshaw pullers lose their rickshaws if they are late with rental payments, factory workers may be fired immediately if they miss a day of work, as others can replace them immediately. Workers are also at great risk if they attempt to organize. The owner of one garment factory in Battala cut employee wages to compensate for his losses during a strike.

There are many more examples: Vietnamese migrants are described as “living in unstable conditions; they have not benefited from any special social policies; no labour union, no medical insurance, no social insurance” (Grace 2002); the Ecuador PPA notes “many of the urban squatters, migrant labourers, rainforest colonists, and highland farmers feel deeply insecure and believe that they are forced to eke out a living in dangerous places because they are exploited, mistreated, and forgotten.”

7.1 Higher costs in the destination

Several studies show that migrants face higher costs of living at the destination. A study conducted in Baroda city in Gujarat (quoted in Mosse et al 2002) estimated that 56% of migrants interviewed spent more than 75% of their income on food; and another 74% spend 40% of their income on other expenses including fuel, soap, tea, medicines. The Uganda PPA discusses the problem of impoverishment due to double taxation. For example, migrants in Kabarole from other districts are taxed both in their home district as well as the district in which they work. The PPA also mentions how men migrants to Kampala often have a very frugal existence: They live in sub-standard accommodation and eat modestly in order to save money for supporting their family in rural areas.

7.2 The need for migrant support programmes

These diverse cases point to the urgent need for migrant support programmes. Mosse and others (Rogaly et al 2001) have proposed a rights-based approach to providing migrant labourers with just wages, working conditions and freedom from personal danger and risk. The need for a means of redress and for the capacity to act in defence of basic rights is crucial. While a number of laws exist to protect the rights of migrant workers, especially in India15 these are widely disregarded by employers and intermediaries because of a lack of political will to implement them and ignorance among illiterate migrants of their rights as workers.

Particularly needed is better infrastructure for migrants, e.g. better transport for movement to and from urban centres and service provisions, such as access to health services. Some authors point out the need for mobile health care, child care for female workers, temporary settlements, and problems of security in these settlements (Ellis and Harris 2004).

The transaction costs involved in sending remittances are a particular concern for migrants. Rarely do official channels (private or public) exist in the region of origin; money is usually carried back by migrants themselves or sent through trusted friends and relatives (Ellis 2003).

15 Existing Central and State legislation in India includes: the Minimum Wages Act (1948); the Inter-State Migrant Workmen (sic) Act (1979); the Contract Labour System (Regulation & Abolition Act) (1970), the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act (1975), for women under the Equal Remuneration Act (1976), the Construction Workers Act (1996), or the Factories Act (which e.g., sets a handling limit for women of 20kg).
Improved channels for internal remittances, e.g. via Post Offices, could ideally reduce the cost, delays and risks of sending money within a country.

7.3 A few success stories of migrant support

There are very few examples of successful migrant support programmes. A now well-known example is the one initiated by the Grameen Vikas Trust in Madhya Pradesh under the DFID funded Western India Rainfed Farming Project. GVT has worked closely with the local government of source villages and has developed an informal system of identity cards for migrants. With these cards, migrants have some protection against official harassment. GVT has liaised with NGOs in the neighbouring state of Rajasthan to set up migrant resource centres that provide them with information on job availability, wage rates and rights. Other NGOs such as Sudrak in South Rajasthan are now thinking along similar lines and have formulated a proposal with the involvement of the UNDP. Another very successful initiative is the one by Sadhana, an NGO in Andhra Pradesh. Sadhana has started a residential school for the children of migrants in the high migration area of Narayankhed with support from UNICEF and the district administration. Now the children of migrants can stay behind and continue with their studies. Such migrant support programmes appear to have achieved more success than official programmes in ensuring fair pay and better working conditions. Continued support from NGOs and donors is important.

Other examples of policies that have helped migrants include the government health insurance programmes in the Mekong. These have been effective and helpful for poor migrant sex workers but the issuance of cards is on different criteria in different areas and these need to be looked into. Another example is the land resettlement programme in Zimbabwe which has helped return migrants in making real welfare and income gains (Potts and Mutambirwa 1997). Strong support for the programme was expressed by a large sample of rural-urban migrants in Harare in 1994.

8 Conclusions and Implications for Policy

A failure to fully understand mobility and migration results in an insufficient understanding of what the poor do to make a living and how policy can help them to maximise the benefits of multi-locational livelihood strategies. Since many internal migrants in Africa and Asia are poor and come from drought prone areas, the policy implications of internal migration are at the heart of poverty reduction. This review has shown that there are marked differences in the pattern of internal migration by region: in East and Southeast Asia, migration is driven by economic booms; in India new “pushes” created by population pressure, commodity price crashes and drought have emerged at the same time as new “pulls” created by urbanisation and manufacturing; in the more stagnant economies of Sub-Saharan Africa mobility has increased but with mixed poverty reducing impacts and in the already highly urbanised countries of Latin America inter urban movements are increasing. While the evidence on the positive impacts of internal migration in terms of poverty reduction is more clear in Southeast and East Asia, there is also evidence that mobility is critical to livelihoods in Africa. It is also evident that migration can have multiplier effects on the entire sending area through stimulating land and labour markets, increased agricultural production and improved nutrition, health and education. Controls on population movement are likely to hamper economic growth and poverty reduction. While some important policy for a such as the Club
du Sahel (2000) and the European Food Security network (see RESAL 1999) have recognised this, there is still a policy gap in many donor organisations, government and decision-making circles. Urgent policy attention is needed in three areas.

8.1 Improve data on internal migration

Levels and patterns of migration need to be reassessed as the understanding is seriously distorted by the way data collection exercises are structured. With their emphasis on quantitative data they tend to miss the finer details of mobility patterns. While it is probably unrealistic to expect large-scale surveys to engage everywhere with highly in-depth and time consuming analysis, it should certainly be possible to include some case studies using multidisciplinary approaches and a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. For example the Indian national censuses in the 1960s and 1970s used to supplement quantitative data with a number of high quality multidisciplinary village studies that provided important insights into rural life and how it has evolved across different contexts. The extent to which such studies can be undertaken for throwing more light on migration processes will depend on financial, human and institutional resource availability and there is a case for providing donor assistance for building capacity in these areas. Better information on migration and the role that it can play in poverty reduction is also likely to lead to a change in official attitudes. It will also help in developing an understanding of how policy can support migration and respond to its effects.

8.2 Migrant support

While there is a clear case for supporting migration, exactly how this should be achieved will depend on governments identifying migration hot-spots and working out whether it is appropriate to increase agricultural productivity, create non-farm opportunities at home or help people to move out to higher productivity areas. Some mix of the three may be required.

Some lessons could be drawn from the recent experience of China where there are proposals to facilitate migration. For example, experts at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences recommended massive migration projects to move people out of the deforested upper Yangtze River16. Similarly the county government in Yongjing has decided that it will be more cost effective to move populations from inaccessible locations rather than struggle to provide them with the services that they lack (IDS 2003). There are powerful arguments against enforced relocation and resettlement but serious consideration should be given to facilitating the existing movements of people. In any case governments and donors should query whether greater investments in low-potential areas are appropriate, given the growing mobility of people.

To make migration a less arduous process migrant support requires some combination of:
- Better access to information on the job market
- Mechanisms that allow access to services, food etc.,
- and to reduce potential harassment
- Personal insurance
- Improved education facilities for the children of migrant families, and
- More accessible transport systems

The provision of basic services would require better coordination among departments located in different sectors and different areas. In countries such as India where there are marked regional differences in language and State government regulations such coordination will pose a great challenge. It is very likely that the richer States will resist the responsibility of providing assistance to poor migrants because of the costs. This is an area for Central government to ponder over while making resource allocations. Donors can help by raising the profile of migration through discussion and highlighting the need to develop joint policies. The private sector can play a role by providing personal insurance to migrant workers. But they do not represent a commercially attractive proposition for most companies; an element of subsidy may therefore be essential and ways would need to be devised to ensure that the system can operate without becoming corrupt and inaccessible to poor and often illiterate labourers.

Rural-rural migrants are in the greatest need of support because they are often poorer, invisible to the official regulatory system and much more vulnerable to abuse and hazardous living conditions. NGOs and other civil society organisations that have better links with poor rural communities need to work closely with local governments to develop location-specific strategies. Where NGO presence is thin, there may be a case for setting up support cells that could be established by government with donor support. These cells could provide migrants access to information on job availability, skills enhancement possibilities and perhaps identity cards to minimise harassment by the police etc. when they are travelling. A clear focus on women and children in support programmes is important given their especially vulnerable position.

Return migrants embody a valuable resource for sending areas because they often bring back skills, funds and different values which could help in say, improving agricultural practices. But there are not many examples of successful policies in supporting return migrants (see Box 17). Further study is needed in understanding the constraints and opportunities faced by return migrants and what policy can do to help.

**Box 17: Policies for return migrants**

During the 1980s the federal government of Nigeria pursued a policy of return migration and provided new States and local governments with start-up grants which were meant to attract private investments. Improvements were achieved in physical infrastructure and 200 new branches of commercial banks opened in rural settings. The actual achievement of this policy – aimed at reversing the trend of rural-urban migration – cannot be measured as there are no reliable (census) data for this period. Tacoli (2001), however, suggests that the policy did not prove successful, partly because of ‘hidden impact of structural adjustment on agriculture’, partly because of inadequate funding and corruption, and partly because of delays in payments to redundant and retired workers, who would have needed the money to setup their small-scale enterprises.

**8.3 Developing ways of maintaining social and financial links with sending areas**

A major hindrance in gaining more fully from the many different possibilities for livelihood enhancement through migration is the difficulty in maintaining social and financial links. Better infrastructure, transport services and communication networks can help to keep social links alive. These may be especially important for the elderly and women in situations where they cannot take on the tasks that were performed by outmigrating males. Regular and substantial remittances can offset some of these difficulties by say, allowing the hiring-in of labour or servants. Therefore a linked requirement is to facilitate the sending of remittances
which is highly problematic nearly everywhere. Post Offices could offer a delivery system that is relatively efficient and free from corruption in many countries.

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## Appendix: Migration streams in some villages of Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AP village name and characteristics</th>
<th>Caste, skill and asset base of migrants</th>
<th>Type of work and when</th>
<th>Who migrates</th>
<th>Source, amount and purpose of credit/advance</th>
<th>Coping or accumulative and wage rate</th>
<th>Impact on migrant household and source location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VP: Narsapur hamlet. Far from urban centres but good transport links, unirrigated agriculture, sericulture was important until recently.</td>
<td>Vaddi (BC) skilled earthworkers, small and marginal farmers, good contacts with government officials who award contracts.</td>
<td>Non-farm: digging trenches for cable networks. Migrate during non-rainy season.</td>
<td>Able-bodied men and sometimes their wives. New/young families: all members migrate. In older/larger families couples take turns so that others can care for livestock, farm and children.</td>
<td>Contractor pays for food, transport and shelter until they get paid for the work at the end of the contract.</td>
<td>Accumulative and always has been. Averages Rs 110/day.</td>
<td>Increase in wealth, much construction work and drilling of tubewells in village, buying more land from neighbouring villages. They are educating their children in good schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP: SC hamlet.</td>
<td>Mala (SC) marginal farmers.</td>
<td>Work alongside teams of Vaddi migrants but on the ‘lighter’ jobs in plantations and for the Forest Department. Migrate only during drought and lean months.</td>
<td>Able-bodied men. Women migrate only if household economic situation is very bad.</td>
<td>Contractor pays for food until they get paid for the work at the end of the contract.</td>
<td>Coping when no work at home. Rs 65/day. Work availability low.</td>
<td>Manage to survive during the lean season and drought.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OP: dry, partly tank-irrigated. Near district capital.</td>
<td>Mixed.</td>
<td>Non-farm and farm labouring in nearby urban and 12 nearby villages with irrigated farming. Migrate for 15–30 days at a time.</td>
<td>Single person from household.</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Accumulative Average earning is Rs 50/day and this kind of work is available all year round.</td>
<td>Better paid than local casual labouring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD: remote, unirrigated Very large number of marginal and submarginal holdings. Much of the land is unproductive.</td>
<td>Madiraj (BC) and Lambada (ST). Small and marginal farmers. Pair of bulls and cart essential.</td>
<td>Harvest sugarcane for the sugar factory in Bodhan (Nizambad, a neighbouring district), work usually from October–March.</td>
<td>Two–three adults from a household migrate (usually two males and one female), together with children.</td>
<td>Employer in destination (he comes or they go in advance of the migration season). No middleman or contractor.</td>
<td>Accumulative now, started as coping migration in the 1970s. Migrants can save up to Rs 3000/month after meeting expenses and paying off debt. Most families return with a saving of at least Rs 10,000 in a season</td>
<td>More wealth but children’s education suffers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD: remote, unirrigated.</td>
<td>Mala (SC), poor Madiraj (BC) marginal farmers</td>
<td>Construction labour in Hyderabad. This kind of work is more opportunistic and risky so may be left with no work and may have to sell utensils, etc. to pay for ticket back home or to meet expenses at destination.</td>
<td>Young men, women and breastfeeding children.</td>
<td>Local moneylender.</td>
<td>Coping. Rs 70/day when they get work but this is not every day. Expenses in the city are high. For those families that have been doing this for several decades and have acquired skills/contacts, the work may be more regular and therefore accumulative.</td>
<td>Survival in the off-season. But can result in savings and investment in children’s education for the longer-term migrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KO, KA: canal irrigated, prosperous. In KO, very large proportion of landless households; KA has more small holdings but land is highly productive.</td>
<td>Mala (SC), Gowda (BC). Some of them may be tenant farmers.</td>
<td>Agricultural labour in other coastal districts. Only for 15 days–month in a year when there is no work locally, but it is available in neighbouring district. The agricultural seasons are slightly different in neighbouring districts.</td>
<td>Able-bodied men and women, no children.</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Coping. Rs 50/day and 0.5 kg of rice.</td>
<td>Without this work they would have to borrow money.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Village name and characteristics</td>
<td>Caste, skill and asset base of migrants</td>
<td>Type of work and when</td>
<td>Who migrates</td>
<td>Source, amount and purpose of credit/advance</td>
<td>Coping or accumulative and wage rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>PT: hilly with limited agricultural development. 15km off main road, restricted access and transport. But relatively close to Jabalpur city and associated high productivity Havelli areas.</td>
<td>Majority of (ST) Baiga and Gonds migrate, about 50% of (SC) Pankas. Pankas are most advanced agriculturalists, particularly in newly emerging irrigated paddy. Baigas have the worst land.</td>
<td>Wheat harvesting in Havelli region west of Jabalpur along Namada plains. Main migration is in March, though some go for paddy harvesting in other regions in November and some are able to secure pulse harvesting in April, although this overlaps with Mahua collection at home.</td>
<td>Families migrate in groups via contractor (<em>martri</em>), and often to landlords with whom they have a long term relationship. Sometimes groups of related single women may migrate.</td>
<td>Contractor pays food, and sometimes transport.</td>
<td>Contract work means that returns can be higher if whole family works together. Accumulative compared to other works. These routes have been plied for 30 years and more. Wages in grain are approx equivalent Rs30/day/person.</td>
<td>Families can save up to Rs 50/day/family. If they get two weeks’ work, they can save up to Rs 1000. Secures year round food security. Involves children, so has impact on schooling, though some schools shut in March anyway.</td>
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<td>GG: irrigated agriculture, but polarised land holdings. Commutable to Mandla district town.</td>
<td>All castes, including non-poor cultivating households such as Lodhis (OBC).</td>
<td>1–2 month trips to urban centres such as Bhopal and Nagpur.</td>
<td>Mainly young males, looking for good pay and experience of city life.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>High savings are possible but there is the risk of unsuccessful work search and of being cheated. Some have developed good skills and returns from masonry. Returns from urban work are Rs40–60/day but costs are high (at least Rs20/day plus return transport).</td>
<td>As these are often opportunities for single men, the main impact on the home household is positive, if remittances are sent or savings accumulated for return.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG: irrigated agriculture, but polarised land holdings. Commutable to Mandla district town.</td>
<td>Mainly poorer castes such as Pradhans (SC).</td>
<td>23 weeks to nearby Bhamni Banji for paddy harvesting in November.</td>
<td>Whole families for contract work. Often in groups, connected by kin or friendship.</td>
<td>Contractor pays food, and sometimes transport.</td>
<td>Contract work means that returns can be higher if whole family works together. Accumulative compared to other works. Wages, in grain, are approx equivalent to Rs30/day/person.</td>
<td>Generates surplus income over and above the regular <em>Kharif</em> income from in-village agricultural labour.</td>
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<td>MB: land very poor despite lake irrigation. Close to small block town, Close to bus route, but far from major town.</td>
<td>Single caste village of (OBC) Dhimar fishermen. Two thirds migrate, mostly those with marginal landholdings.</td>
<td>Paddy harvesting in Bhind district. Some wheat/mustard harvesting in Gwalior district. Trips are short: 1–2 weeks.</td>
<td>Groups of women are the main agricultural migrant workers. Most families have some marginal land so men may remain to manage this land.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Ag. migration is secure and fairly predictable and therefore accumulative. These links are often well-established. Wages, in grain, are approx equivalent to Rs30/day/person.</td>
<td>Women can face high risks, though these are mitigated by the established relations they have with landlords, and by travelling in groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Source: Deshingkar and Start (2003).</td>
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| MB: land very poor despite lake irrigation. Close to small block town, close to bus route, but far from major town. | Single caste village of (OBC) Dhimar fishermen. | Non-farm, work in Tikamgarh, Gwalior, Jhansi and Delhi. | Mainly young men, though older men and even women may migrate if times are bad. | None | Work is more opportunistic, e.g. when a contractor comes or friends tell of an opportunity. It has higher returns compared to agricultural work but is more risky. This could be called accumulative, when it comes off. Those who have established secure links are best off. Returns from urban work are Rs40-60/day but costs are high (at least Rs20/day plus return transport). | Migration by young men brings remittances into the household. If female members migrate, children can suffer and if older members migrate, health can suffer. Urban out-migration is disruptive for the education of children. There are no formal facilities and children end up helping their parents or playing by the roadside. |

| SM: good land, but much landlessness. Daily commutable to district town. | The semi-skilled artisan Sahu caste (OBC) have turned to ice-cream making from oil pressing. | Migrate en masse to Maharashtra during the tourist season. | Whole Sahu families migrate, though if they own land some members remain. Young children may remain with grand-parents. | None | Previously out-migration was part of a strategy to cope with shocks. However, now it is accumulative as expanding niche market has been located. At least Rs 60/day, sometimes more if business good. | Migration has lead to investment in land. |

| SM: good land, but much landlessness. Daily commutable to district town. | The landless Ahirwar (SC). | Casual non-farm wage work in nearby urban locations. | Usually men only, while family remain at home. | None | Work is sporadic and often the work-search is not successful. Therefore coping. Wage rate is Rs60/day. | Many workers have suffered accidents, which have left them permanently disabled and unable to work. Little or no compensation is received. |

| LJ: good land but no irrigation. Surrounding villages with irrigation are more prosperous. Close to small block town and bus route but far from Ujjain city. Traditional links into Rajasthan. | Traditional cultivating marginal and landed (OBC) Thakurs (70%) are main migrants. The former have problematic agriculture due to divided landholdings, drought and lack of irrigation. | To local villages for agricultural wage work. | Whole family migrates as they have no land or livestock to keep them in the village. | None | This is coping migration because work availability is not good, particularly following droughts. Rs 30/day person, though more if whole family contributes labour. | Disruptive to the education of children. Low labour demand, particularly during drought, places migrants in a weak bargaining position where they may be open to exploitation or cheating. |

| PR: very high productivity agriculture but highly polarised holdings and much landlessness. Daily commutable to Ujjain city. | Mainly landless (SC) Balar and Chamars (90%). | Chamars work in brick kilns and in construction in Ujjain for 1–2 months. | Men and whole families, depending on childcare facilities available in the source village. | Where good relations have been built up, advances and preferential rates may be offered. Where worker are new, terms are often at coping levels. | Depends on the nature of contract. Rs 40 for construction but Rs 60 for brick kiln work. | Where strong relations are built up with employer, reasonable domestic facilities are provided, though work is hard and sometimes dangerous. |