Climate change in UK security policy: implications for development assistance?

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### Contents

**Executive summary** iv  

1. Introduction 1  
2. Outline of the paper 2  
3. **Part I. Climate change and security: a contested relationship** 3  
   The UK and the UNSC: the UK as agent provocateur 3  
   Europe and the UK: advancing the narrative 5  
   The UK’s national security strategies: new threats, new risks 6  
   Concluding remarks 9  
4. **Part II. UK ODA expenditure on the climate change–security nexus: an uncertain path** 10  
   Understanding the figures: a blurred account 10  
   DFID 2011–2015: the future in store 11  
   The ICF 12  
5. **Conclusion: why the securitising narrative?** 14  

References 16
Executive summary

As a key champion of climate change action at the international level, the UK is committed to national emissions targets and funding to adaptation globally. Most recently, this has taken the form of the newly established International Climate Fund (ICF), which commits substantial financial resources to tackling climate change through ODA. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department for International Development (DFID) and other government departments will administer this fund together, thus making understanding the differences in framing climate change and security pivotal to an understanding of the influence of the UK’s contribution to international climate finance.

The framing of an issue largely determines the level of priority, the departmental responsibility, the mechanisms established to manage the issue and the way it is subsequently funded and programmed. At a basic level in the UK, the framing of climate change as an environmental and developmental priority brings it under the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and DFID. As a security concern, other actors, such as the FCO and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) take the lead. The subsequent funding and action taken to address climate change will thus vary drastically depending on the framing.

This paper explores changes related to the inclusion and framing of climate change in UK security policy and the possible implications for ODA. However, as this paper argues, the framing of climate change within the security realm does not necessarily equate to a subsequent shift in the priorities of UK ODA programming priorities and funding allocations. There is evidence to suggest climate change has been ‘securitised’, if this is understood to mean the (re)framing of climate change from an environmental/developmental to a security perspective. However, if securitisation is understood to mean a subsequent change in practice, programming and funding (as a result of a shifting discourse), this has not occurred in ODA. The changing narrative has not translated into changes in programme priorities and funding allocations, largely controlled by DFID.

The UK’s FCO championed the first-ever (of two so far) UNSC debate on climate change, energy and security in 2007. Both of these debates, and the fact they have even taken place, have been the source of much controversy: many members of the UN have accused the UNSC of ‘encroaching’ into areas covered by other UN bodies. This raises important questions as to the extent to which a common understanding of the climate change–security nexus is accepted at the international level. The period following the debate marked the start of heightened discussion on climate change and security within Europe. The UK has been a key actor in this movement, as have Germany and Sweden and the European Council.

Within the UK, through the latter part of the 2000s, there was a dramatic shift in the weight given to and inclusion of climate change in national security strategies. For example, the MOD Strategic Defence Review of 1998 mentions neither climate change nor environmental security. The 2008 National Security Strategy (NSS) and its 2009 update, however, outline a range of climate security-related ‘threats’ (meaning the security implications of climate change (Mabey, 2008)). This framing has continued to the present day, with the UK coalition government’s formation of the National Security Council (NSC), the 2010 NSS and its accompanying Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), which mark a new assemblage of actors related to framing and dealing with international security threats. Included in this is the framing of climate change as a ‘risk multiplier’. However, subsequent strategies, namely, the 2011 Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS), do not give equal attention to the mechanisms for dealing with the suggested security threat of climate change.

It is challenging to determine whether the emerging security narrative has influenced the programming priorities and funding allocations of ODA. Climate change has not historically been a priority of the UK government, thus extracting information on expenditure is difficult at best, largely because of the coding system employed, which means projects can be allocated to non-climate sectors even if they
contribute to climate change. This also reflects a broader set of challenges related to how to disaggregate climate change adaptation in development expenditure more broadly.

As the department responsible for international development, DFID largely determines the UK’s ODA agenda. However, DFID’s Business Plan 2011–2015 and its 2011–2015 country and regional operational plans do not provide any clear indication as to how the climate change–security nexus will play out in real terms. The extent to which the plans include programming for climate change, and what this may involve in practice, varies greatly. This is in part because much was still being worked out at the time of writing, but also because of uncertainty around the likely effect of the ICF, a cross-departmental fund and the government’s flagship climate change initiative. The ICF will disburse the largest volume of funds specifically allocated to climate change programming, and is set to account for the UK government’s pledge of £2.9 billion in climate finance over the spending review period (2011/12–2014/15).

Although the ICF was established only in 2010, there are questions as to the way the framing of climate change as a security threat will be incorporated into this initiative. To endorse a genuine ‘whole of government’ approach, negotiation will need to take place and common ground will need to be identified on how to handle the climate change–security nexus. Given the differing approaches to framing and understanding climate change among different UK government departments, this is not necessarily going to be an easy task.

In conclusion, the strongest links between climate change and security are present in the most recent national security reports and among representatives of the FCO and MOD, but this framing has not as yet translated into tangible mechanisms to take this agenda forward—although the ‘desired impact’ of the security framing is somewhat difficult to pin down. If the intention is to raise the profile and urgency of action on climate change, then this has been achieved, certainly at the international level. However, there are as yet no clear answers to the policy questions arising as a result of this process. There remains a disconnect between the climate change and security framings different arms of the government within the UK employ, the implications of which for the ICF, the BSOS and DFID are likely to emerge in the coming years.

These findings pose several challenges to the UK’s commitment to a cross-departmental approach to addressing climate change. Moreover, current institutional and policy arrangements provide little clarity on how to overcome these challenges. Nevertheless, because of built-in ‘firewalls’ that protect DFID funding from being manipulated or subsumed under broader security objectives, the risks of climate change ODA becoming securitised under its control seem to have been kept at bay for the time being.
1. Introduction

Since climate change was included on the UN Security Council (UNSC) agenda in 2007, championed primarily by the UK (Parry, 2007), much has been written about the possible links between climate change and security. Yet little of this is grounded in sound empirical evidence. There has also been much postulating about a possible ‘securitising’ of climate change within the international arena—heavily influenced by the politics and ‘speech acts’ of prominent leaders, particularly within the US (e.g. former US President Bush, US President Barack Obama and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon—see Romm, 2011). Since 2007, climate change has increasingly been labelled a security threat (Buhaug et al., 2008; Hartmann, 2010). However, although the body of literature on the securitisation of climate is growing, little work has taken place on this within the UK. Even less analysis has sought to move beyond the realm of narrative to look at the possible implications on official development assistance (ODA) policies, programming priorities and the allocation of funds.

There are many potential entry points to understanding the climate change–security nexus in the UK. The task requires an exploration of the framing of climate change within the security realm as well as of the incorporation of climate change within development work on security in fragile and conflict-affected states. To add to the complexity, both climate change and security are incorporated into a number of government departments, each with its own understanding of how to frame the relationship between the two. Moreover, although there may be official ‘lines’ on climate and security, views within government departments on how best to understand the relationship are far from homogenous. This paper focuses on two departments: the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DFID). The FCO has been the most public UK government department in terms of making strong correlations between climate change and security, thus contributing to what can be deemed a securitising narrative (i.e. its narrative, discourse and practice contribute to the securitisation of, in this case, climate change). Meanwhile, DFID, as the primary department responsible for ODA, largely determines the way attempts to securitise climate change influence or do not influence programme and funding priorities.

As a key champion of climate change action at the international level, the UK government is one of the most committed to national emissions targets and funding adaptation. Most recently, this has taken the form of the newly established International Climate Fund (ICF), which commits substantial financial resources to tackling climate change through ODA.1 The FCO, DFID and other government departments will jointly administer the ICF, which means that understanding differences in the framing of climate change and security will be pivotal to understanding the influence of the UK’s contribution to international climate finance.

The importance of this analysis cannot be overstated: the framing of an issue largely determines the level of priority, the departmental responsibility, the mechanisms established to manage the issue and the way it is subsequently funded and programmed. At a basic level within the UK, the framing of climate change as an environmental and developmental priority brings it into the domain of the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and DFID. As a security concern, other actors, such as the FCO and Ministry of Defence (MOD), take the lead. As a result, depending on the framing, the subsequent funding and action taken to address climate change will vary drastically.

2. Outline of the paper

Part I of this paper explores the UK's role in UNSC debates on climate change and that of the FCO since the early 2000s. In line with the concept of securitisation, it considers 'speech acts', in the form of political speeches and interviews, to trace the identification of climate change as a security threat and the possible 'moment of intervention'. Speeches from various Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs are analysed, as is the inclusion of climate change in the UK’s national security strategies. A focus on reports and documents (as well as speeches and interviews) attempts to trace the emergence of climate change within a security framing in the UK government, paying specific attention to the period between the Labour government’s Strategic Defence Review of 1998 and the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) in 2010.

Part II builds on this analysis of the narrative to investigate the possible impacts on ODA programme priorities and funding allocations. It first outlines the challenges associated with unpacking the UK's spending on the climate change–security nexus, then presents the available data. Information is drawn from across government departments, with a particular emphasis on DFID, as the department primarily responsible for ODA. Special attention is also paid to the ICF, the government's most prominent climate change fund. Despite the challenges of sourcing, extracting and analysing data on climate change-related spending, it is possible to investigate the potential implications of the securitisation narrative for ODA, to reveal interesting findings, namely, that the majority of development assistance to climate change initiatives aligns with narratives (primarily in DFID) that do not adhere to the securitising narratives seen within other arms of the UK government.

The paper concludes with a discussion on why some government departments have employed a securitising narrative and what this seeks to achieve.
3. Part I. Climate change and security: a contested relationship

Part I explores the construction of the climate change–security nexus, from the international down to the national level. It presents an understanding of how different groups of actors have constructed, contested and transformed the narrative, and shows how the difference in these framings is representative of a broader set of processes and politics associated with attempts to negotiate the extent to which a security framing of climate change is accepted and acted on.

The UK and the UNSC: the UK as agent provocateur

On 17 April 2007, the UNSC held its first-ever high-level debate on climate change, energy and security, chaired by UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett. The debate was initiated by the UK, on the basis of a letter to the President of the UNSC outlining the need for a discussion emphasising energy security and resource scarcity as a ‘shared dilemma’ facing the international community (Parry, 2007: 2). The letter cites the security implications of climate change, placing the issue squarely within the realm of security. These implications, which became the items on the meeting’s agenda, included border and land disputes that will lead to conflict over maritime zones and territorial rights; displacement as a result of natural resource scarcity or rising sea levels, resulting in mass migration; climate change having a ‘complicating’ role in energy security and availability; increased resource scarcity leading to increased vulnerability to conflict; societal stress as a result of poverty and inequality; and an increase in the incidence of humanitarian crises (ibid., 2007: 3–4).

In the week prior to the debate, the 130-member G77 group of developing countries plus China registered its strong disagreement with the decision to hold the event (Deen, 2007). The UNSC was accused of ‘encroaching’ on areas covered by other UN bodies and, in doing so, moving climate change from an environmental and developmental framing into a security framing. The 117-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) similarly raised strong criticisms of the proposed debate (ibid.). Nevertheless, the debate went ahead. However, no formal outcome was reached, largely because of differences in opinion in terms of whether or not climate change is compatible with the mandate of the UNSC under the UN Charter.

On 3 June 2009, the UN General Assembly held a debate on the security implications of climate change, at the request of the small island developing states of the Pacific Ocean. This time, the outcome was a resolution calling the UN to focus its efforts on assessing the possible security implications of climate change (UN General Assembly, 2009a). This was the first time a UN resolution had explicitly linked climate change and security. The resolution stated that the UN General Assembly was ‘deeply concerned that the adverse impacts of climate change, including sea level rise, could have possible security implications’ and invited UN bodies to ‘intensify their efforts in considering and addressing climate change, including its possible security implications’ (ibid.: 2). It also requested a formal report from the UN Secretary-General on the possible security implications of climate change.

Released September 2009, this report recognised that climate change was often referred to as a ‘threat multiplier’ but then placed emphasis on possible ‘threat minimisers’ (UN General Assembly, 2009b). It identified a range of climate change-related threats, associated with loss of territory, statelessness, displacement, resource scarcity and exploitation. It also made strong connections between human vulnerability and national security, and urged for increased action in the forthcoming 15 Conference of Parties (CoP) in Copenhagen.

Despite the contention surrounding the 2007 UNSC debate, and the move to address the issue through the 2009 UN General Assembly resolution and subsequent report, the climate change and security debate re-emerged in the UNSC just two years later. On 20 July 2011, the UNSC held its second debate

on climate change and international security. The debate was initiated by Germany, with strong support from Portugal (Security Council Report, 2011). It raised two main issues, as outlined in a concept note published prior to the debate: (1) the implications of a rising sea level for coastal and small island states; and (2) the implications of climate change for food security and subsequent effects on peace and security (Security Council Report, 2011). In an opening address, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon pointed to a ‘double-barrelled challenge’ relating to climate change and international security:

“We must make no mistake,” he said. The facts were clear: climate change was real and accelerating in a dangerous manner. “It not only exacerbates threats to international peace and security; it is a threat to international peace and security” [...] an “unholy brew” that could create dangerous security vacuums.”

Despite renewed affirmations by the UNSC, the UN General Assembly and many Member States that the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the main instrument for dealing with climate change within the UN system, the debate saw repeated calls by Member States for the UNSC to recognise more formally the security implications of a changing climate. Marcus Stephen, President of Nauru and a representative for the small island developing states of the Pacific Ocean, went so far as to suggest the nomination of a special representative for climate and security, so as to move beyond ‘sympathetic words’ by ‘formally recognizing that climate change is a threat to international peace and security’.

The 2007 and 2011 UNSC debates marked a shift in the framing of climate change. They introduced, on an international stage, the application of security narratives to an issue that had previously been confined to the environmental and developmental realm. Security narratives started to be used in the way climate change was identified and described as a threat, the prescribed implications for international security and proposed responses. Moreover, according to the ‘Council Dynamics’ section of Forecast (Security Council Report, 2011: 15), there was a marked increase in Member States’ understanding of the security implications of climate change after the 2007 debate, and there was less resistance to having climate change on the UNSC agenda itself the second time around. The reasons cited for this are an increased acceptance and prevalence of scientific evidence on the possible long-term implications of climate change; and increased links between recent conflicts and rising food prices and water scarcity—although the forecast does not state what evidence it is referring to in this regard.

Academic and political analysis often cites the UNSC debates on climate change as evidence of a ‘securitising’ of climate change (Brauch, 2008; Hartmann, 2010; Mabey, 2010). However, what is often overlooked is the lack of homogeneity of participating countries with regard to whether this debate should have been on the UNSC table in the first place, and indeed the caution taken when coming to any conclusions. Even in the 2011 debate, the content remained focused primarily on whether climate change was in fact the territory of the UNSC. Indeed, the NAM and the G77+China remain concerned and, in some cases, vehemently opposed to the debate, citing a lack of rigorous evidence to substantiate claims of links between climate change and (in)security and arguing that this is in fact the remit of other UN bodies: ‘Brazil, for example, has argued that there is no direct link established between climate change and peace and security and that social and economic development provides adequate tools to tackle climate change’s impact’ (Security Council Report, 2011: 15). Even countries that are supportive of the debate are ‘prudent about the need for the Council to be seen to be cautious and not as overstepping its boundaries and undermining other processes, such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’ (ibid.: 15).

Of the 65 speakers who took part in the 2011 debate, there was by no means a consensus reached on whether or not climate change and security should be linked, let alone what such a link might look like in practice. The transcript of the debate makes it clear that there remain a number of contrasting framings of the climate change–security nexus. The reasons for this are varied and are not the focus of this paper—what is relevant to note here is that there is no single securitising narrative, and the
process by which an issue becomes framed in security narratives is often contested. In the international arena, there is certainly no sense of a shared securitisation of climate change.

Europe and the UK: advancing the narrative

The period following the first UNSC debate on climate change was one of heightened activity in Europe in relation to the climate change and security discussion. Many countries also began to see climate change as a security threat for the first time.

The majority of European countries have produced reports, policy statements and speeches, characterised by varying degrees of caution, on the links between climate change and security. The UK has been a key actor in this regard, as have the governments of Germany (Schubert et al., 2008) and Sweden (Haldén, 2007) and the European Council (European Council, 2008). Although each report frames the issue in a slightly different way, the overall message calls for greater consideration of the security implications of a changing global climate by European nations.

The proliferation of narratives in the 2000s thus played an influential role in constructing and then applying a security lens to climate change. This was accompanied by dialogue, both formal and informal, between the departments of different governments. For example, the UK's FCO has reportedly been discussing climate change and security nexus with the German Environment Ministry since 2001 (Brauch, 2008). As an example of dialogue with corresponding action, the bilateral relationship between the UK and Germany has been particularly significant.

In an effort to keep up the momentum in Europe to devise a response to climate security, the UK's Foreign Secretary David Miliband and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier delivered a joint article entitled ‘Europe Has to Rise to the Security Challenges of Climate Change’. Referring to climate change as a ‘stress multiplier’, they argued that it ‘will reshape the geopolitics of the world in which we live, with important consequences for peace and security’. In the same year (2008), the European Union (EU) released a report entitled ‘Climate Change and International Security’. This uses the framing of ‘threat multipliers’ to highlight the likely security risks resulting from areas already regarded as fragile and conflict-affected, and the political and security risks this poses to European interests. The report concludes by stating that ‘it is in Europe's self interest to address the security implications of climate change with a series of measures: at the level of the EU, in bilateral relations and at the multilateral level, in mutually supportive ways’ (EU, 2008: 3).

The engagement of David Miliband in Europe is illustrative of the role of successive heads of the FCO, who have played a prominent part in shaping the UK's position on climate change and security. The explicit links between climate change, security and conflict conveyed by Miliband and Steinmeier stem in part from a history of FCO heads of department championing such a narrative. In 2006, the UK's Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, in a speech to the British Embassy in Berlin, regarded climate change as a ‘serious threat to international security’ (in Brauch, 2008: 16). Then, in her opening statement to the aforementioned 2007 UNSC debate, she attested that ‘an unstable climate will exacerbate some of the core drivers of conflict’ (ibid.: 17). Similarly, UK Special Representative for Climate Change John Ashton argued in 2007 that ‘climate change is a security issue because if we don't deal with it, people will die and states will fail’ (ibid.: 17).

The formation of the UK's coalition government in May 2010 saw the appointment of William Hague as Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Since then, climate change has featured heavily as an international and national security issue in a series of speeches. Speaking a few weeks prior to the 16th CoP in Cancún in November/December 2010, William Hague commented ‘climate change is perhaps the twenty-first century’s biggest foreign policy challenge’. He argued that an

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effective response underpins the nation's security and that such a response could take the form of a
global deal and a transformation of the UK energy sector, along with research and climate diplomacy.

In the run up to the 17th CoP in Durban in November/December 2011, William Hague once more
stressed the inter-linkages between climate change and security, this time with a focus on energy. At
the Climate Change and Energy Conference of June 2011, Hague warned that, "[the] pressures on
resources created by climate change will exacerbate conflict and instability and our networked
economies mean the impact of climate change and problems of energy supplies in one region affect
the prosperity of those thousands of miles away".7

The message the coalition government is communicating is very clear: ‘Climate change acts both as a
creator of new threats and a "threat multiplier", magnifying existing weaknesses and tensions around
the world’.8 The rationale provided is as follows: ‘Crop failures, uncontrolled migration, conflict over
scarce resources and the increased incidence of disease will present challenges for all countries given
the interconnected nature of our globalised system, but impact most heavily on already fragile states,
who have the least adaptive capacity to respond to the changes' (ibid.). The same narrative points to
another entry point in the climate change – security nexus, placing emphasis on fragile states' inability
to adapt to the challenges of a changing climate. This would imply a response that seeks to build the
adaptive capacity of those facing what International Alert (2011) refers to as the ‘triple bottom line' of
climate change, conflict and development (discussed in Part II).

The UK’s national security strategies: new threats, new risks

There has been a dramatic shift in the weight given to and inclusion of climate change in the UK’s
national security strategies. Since the Labour government's 1998 Strategic Defence Review, successive
governments, both Labour and coalition, have released national security strategies—in 2008, 2009 and
2010. This section examines these strategies with a view to understanding how climate change is
treated in the UK security realm.

The MOD's Strategic Defence Review of 1998 framed the Labour government's defence policy for the
best part of half a decade. The review contained neither the term 'climate change' nor the term
'environmental security'.

The UK’s 2008 National Security Strategy (NSS)—‘Security in an Interdependent World’—identifies
climate change as both a threat and a risk. The framing of climate change as a security threat manifests
in a number of ways:

- In the context of civil emergencies, climate change is linked to the increased frequency and
- Under challenges to the rules-based international system, climate change is referenced as one
  factor that will increase pressure on international institutions, including the security
  architecture (ibid.: 17).
- Climate change is also seen as a cause of increased population pressure on urban areas and, in
  turn, increased pressure on food and water supply (ibid.: 21).
- Climate change is predicted to lead to increased cross-border movement as people search for
  access to natural resources, which may lead to an increase in disputes (ibid.: 21).
- Border tensions are attributed to climate change in relation to territorial disputes arising from
  the melting of ice and the opening of new sea lanes and possibilities for new borders (ibid.: 18).
- Finally, in acknowledging the interdependence of threats, risk and drivers, climate change is
  linked to both energy security and the spread of disease (ibid.: 23).

In a section focusing explicitly on climate change, the most dramatic linking of climate change and security can be seen in the assertion that countries less able to cope with the effects of climate change ‘are more likely both to suffer humanitarian disaster but also to tip into instability, state failure, or conflict’ (HM Government, 2008: 18). Meanwhile, although the strategy recognises that climate change presents new opportunities for cooperation, this is somewhat overshadowed: ‘Climate change is potentially the greatest challenge to global stability and security, and therefore to national security. Tackling its causes, mitigating its risks and preparing for and dealing with its consequences are critical to our future security, as well as protecting global prosperity and avoiding humanitarian disaster’ (ibid.: 18).

The strategy is less precise in its identification of where overseas threats may come from:

‘The complex and unpredictable interaction of those multiple stresses will increase the pressure on social, economic and political structures, particularly in those countries least able to cope, and therefore most likely to tip into instability, conflict or state failure. That is likely to apply most acutely in parts of Africa and the wider Middle East, where so many of the stresses identified above are present already’ (HM Government, 2008: 23).

The 2008 NSS frames climate change as what could be described as a threat multiplier with caveats. Links are made between climate change and the security implications of migration, demographic changes, emergencies and energy security, but this is considered with a strong emphasis on the interconnectedness of threats and risks. To reflect the multitude of risks, the strategy proposes synergistic policy action. Moreover, in the section focused explicitly on tackling climate change, proposed measures include both defensive technical infrastructure along with changes to energy policy and reductions in emissions. Particular emphasis is placed on the UK government’s work with others such as the World Bank and the UN in support of adaptation, emissions reductions and the transition to a low-carbon economy (HM Government, 2008: 50).

The broad range of responses, from adaptation to mitigation, and from software to hardware, reflects in part the overarching guiding principles for the strategy, which state that ‘wherever possible, we will tackle security challenges early’ (HM Government, 2008: 7). It seems fairly logical, therefore, that the UK government is placing such weight on the transition to a low-carbon economy, reducing dependency on certain energy sources and channelling finance for climate change through a cross-departmental mechanism to support adaption and mitigation (discussed in Part II).

A year after the release of the NSS 2008, the Cabinet Office produced an update entitled ‘Security for the Next Generation’. This provides more explanation of the UK government’s conceptualising and framing of climate change as a security threat. It continues with somewhat bold claims about the climate change–security nexus, in keeping with the 2008 strategy. For example,

‘Climate change will increasingly be a wide-ranging river of global insecurity. It will act as a threat-multiplier, exacerbating weakness and tensions around the world. It can be expected to worsen poverty, have a significant impact on global migration patterns, and risk tipping fragile states into instability, conflict and state failure’ (HM Government, 2009: 8).

Climate change is framed as a ‘driver’ or ‘threat driver’ of insecurity (HM Government, 2009: 31). It is regarded as having two explicit but interrelated negative impacts: acting as a ‘threat multiplier’ and increasing poverty, which is deemed to be a driver of instability, fragility and conflict (ibid.: 52). The 2009 update reiterates many of the links between climate change and security the 2008 strategy makes, including increased migration resulting in a long-term security challenge (ibid.: 22), competition for energy as a driver of instability (ibid.: 20), the increase in emergency response following disasters both within the UK and overseas (ibid.: 20; 25) and the disruption of global supply chains (ibid.: 89).

Rather unsurprisingly, the update places greater emphasis on the global economic crisis. As a result, it raises concerns as to whether development, conflict prevention and mitigation will be de-prioritised in
programming priority and financial support, to be replaced by economic recovery. In what could be interpreted as an attempt to make the case for avoiding such a de-prioritisation, it develops the interconnections between poverty and climate change as a driver of insecurity. The update suggests that poverty can result in a lack of adaptive capacity and resilience to changes in the climate, and goes on to state that ‘poverty acts as a driver of insecurity at a global level’ (HM Government, 2009: 6). Global inequality and climate change are identified as factors contributing to changes in migratory patterns.

In summary, despite the strong emphasis in the Labour government’s 2008 NSS and 2009 NSS update on the connections between climate change and security, the action suggested to manage these risks entails addressing poverty (to enable adaptation and build adaptive capacity) and work on climate change mitigation (to prevent future risks). The strategies suggest that the most serious impacts of climate change will not come to fruition for 20 years and thus frame the UK’s engagement with the UNFCCC and its associated emission reduction targets as a possible response to the climate change challenge. Proposed complementary actions include transitioning to a low-carbon economy; developing a global carbon market; building UK and developing country adaptive capacity and resilience; and funding research on climate change that focuses on low-carbon and energy priorities.

With the new coalition government came the 2010 NSS, accompanied by new security infrastructure. This entailed a continued framing of climate change within the security realm. The 2010 NSS was produced by the newly established NSC and accompanied by a Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) (HM Government, 2010a). The NSC represents a new assemblage of actors in terms of framing and dealing with international security threats. Chaired by the Prime Minister, its permanent members include, among others, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for International Development and the Security Minister (ibid.: 69). Tasked with devising and overseeing the implementation of the NSS, this cross-departmental council places strong emphasis on the impact of environmental and climate change on the dynamics of international security, citing climate change as a ‘risk multiplier’ exacerbating existing international tensions. It also recognises the shift in relation to what is conceived as a security threat: ‘Our security is vulnerable to the effects of climate change […] So the concept of national security in 2010 is very different to what it was ten or twenty, let alone fifty or a hundred years ago’ (HM Government, 2010b: 3).

The 2010 NSS identifies two specific security challenges that warrant international engagement. The first relates to the role of emerging powers, which it identifies as crucial to a global solution on climate change but which are currently insufficiently tied into multilateral approaches, and therefore need to be engaged bilaterally (HM Government, 2010b: 15). The second is the failure of fragile and conflict-affected countries to benefit from growth and development: ‘Compounded by other drivers such as climate change and resource scarcity, this increases the likelihood of conflict, instability and state failure’ (ibid.: 16).

The accompanying SDSR frames climate change and security predominantly in relation to the need to ensure energy security and the resilience of energy infrastructure. What does this mean in practice? Responsibility for national security lies with the DECC, the Home Office and the MOD. In terms of international security, issues related to climate change and resource scarcity are placed firmly in the hands of the FCO. The latter is tasked with coordinating work on the security impacts of climate change and resource competition that may exacerbate existing security threats. That said, the foreword to the SDSR also places an emphasis on the need for integrated approaches to deal with the climate security challenge, through cross-departmental mechanisms such as the NSC (HM Government, 2010a: 3). The SDSR also cites the importance of the role of DFID in conflict prevention and stabilisation, which it sees as crucial to preventing more expensive military interventions at a later date. This makes for a somewhat confusing policy environment, one that the implementing strategies of the SDSR, such as the , do not necessarily make any clearer.
Released in July 2010, and produced by the MOD, DFID and the FCO, the BSOS (DFID et al., 2011a) is just one of many strategies derived from the NSS. Within it, climate change features surprisingly little, given its prominence within both the aforementioned FCO discourses and national security strategies and DFID priorities (discussed further later on). It is mentioned just three times, in fact: once in relation to the need for the BSOS to complement other government strategies, including climate change (ibid.: 5); once in relation to the impact of climate change on increasing resource scarcity, which places added stress on existing fragile countries (ibid.: 10); and once in relation to the need to strengthen the evidence base by commissioning systematic reviews, including one on climate change (ibid.: 34).

Concluding remarks

Part I has demonstrated that the framing of climate change through a security lens is clear and present and that, despite some contestation of this move, this security framing of climate change has become more prominent over time. This is evidenced through a consideration of the climate change–security nexus from international to European and down to departmental level. Moreover, the UK has been a key player in negotiating and advocating for the consideration of the security dimensions of climate change impacts. It is important to stress that this is not the only way climate change is being framed, however. As Part II explores, what the security lens means in practice, in terms of the UK government’s programming priorities and funding allocations to climate change, is somewhat disconnected from the narrative being promoted by the arms of the UK government Part I has explored.
4. Part II. UK ODA expenditure on the climate change–security nexus: an uncertain path

Part I showed how certain arms of the UK government have constructed and championed a security framing of climate change, at various scales. Part II explores the extent to which this has influenced programming priorities and funding allocation within ODA. It first considers the challenges involved in identifying existing expenditure on climate change. Although it is not the aim of the section to undertake a detailed analysis of the UK’s ODA, these challenges do have implications for understanding the extent to which the security framing of climate change influences programme priorities and fund allocation.

Understanding the figures: a blurred account

In order to be able to assess the possible influence of a security framing of climate change on the distribution of ODA, it is first necessary to identify climate change-related ODA expenditure. For various reasons, as this section shows, it is difficult to undertake this task with any accuracy.

In 2009/10, the UK government spent £7.8 billion on ODA. DFID was responsible for 85% of this and the remainder was under the control of the FCO, DECC and MOD (NAO, 2011: 4; 6). The greatest portion (60%) is spent bilaterally, on what can be considered mainstream social and economic development projects. ‘Aid and the Environment’, a 2011 report by the National Audit Office (NAO), a body independent of the government, outlines the distribution of UK ODA as spent on climate change and the environment, focusing on 2009/10 figures. It reveals that identifying the portion of aid spent on climate change as a discrete entity is very difficult, let alone distinguishing climate change from environmental protection, or even climate change and security-related expenditure from climate change more generally.

Despite this, it is possible to attest that, since mid-2000, there has been a significant increase in spending on climate change and environmental protection: ‘Spending directly attributable to environmental protection and climate change has risen in the last five years from £100 million in 2005-06 to around £360 million in 2009-10, but it still accounts for a relatively small proportion of total UK aid (around 4.5 per cent)’ (NAO, 2011: 5).

Nevertheless, it is near impossible to make any thorough comparisons over time, for a number of reasons. Historically, the UK government has not considered climate change a top priority, and therefore the way budgets have been constructed mean this is not simply an exercise in identifying and extracting expenditure coded as ‘climate change’. It is possible to identify figures for spending on the environment and climate change, but these would of course include non-climate-related activities.

Take DFID as an example. DFID’s coding system requires that each project be allocated to a sector or sectors depending on its objectives or classified as a particular activity, such as research. If a project is coded as a type of activity, or its prime objective another sector (even if climate change is a third or fourth objective), the project and funding will not come under the umbrella of climate change and environmental protection, as was the case for a £25 million piece of research on environment and renewable natural resources (NAO, 2011). As the NAO notes, ‘expenditure on projects which are linked to environmental protection and climate change can be allocated to other sectors [...] Thus the sector total may underestimate the amount DFID spend on projects which may further environmental and climate change objectives’ (ibid.: 10). And this is not just a question of limited coding: a consideration of the broader complexities involved in classifying ‘furthering climate change-related objectives’ is pertinent given that it is extremely difficult to separate adaptation and development spend.
Climate change-related ODA expenditure is also wrapped up in the complex politics of climate finance. Any attempt to draw conclusions from facts and figures on ODA must be taken with some degree of caution and within the broader context of changes in climate finance trends:

‘Until the 1990s, little aid was provided for climate change mitigation or adaptation. This was partly because measures to address mitigation, in particular, were considered to contribute to global benefits rather than country-specific benefits, and would therefore not normally count towards ODA [...] however, the DAC [Development Assistance Committee] has relaxed the application of ODA rules to allow climate change mitigation funding to count as ODA’ (NAO, 2011: 29).

Moreover, although the UK government is committed to transparency in its spending, some figures on expenditure on programmes are not readily publically available. Nevertheless, we know enough to establish that relatively little ODA is allocated directly to the climate change and security nexus.

Identifying and extrapolating ODA expenditure on climate change is likely to become less of a challenge in the future. This is because the political weight given to climate change since the new coalition government came in has meant there are now discrete streams of funding which can be identified and assessed. An example is the ICF, discussed further later on. However, the government’s framing of climate change and security as part of a complex interrelated system of risks and threats (as Part I demonstrated) means that any programmes that bring climate change and security together are likely to do so in the context of a broader set of objectives. This means that the challenges of coding are likely to remain in some form.

A further understanding of how climate change and security fits into the broader picture of ODA can be gained by studying DFID’s programming priorities, Business Plan, operational plans and budgets.

**DFID 2011–2015: the future in store**

As the department responsible for international development, DFID largely determines the UK’s ODA agenda. The DFID Business Plan 2011–2015 (DFID, 2011a) outlines the coalition government’s priorities for the department, which include a strong emphasis on combating climate change. Note that, at the time of writing, operationalising the DFID Business Plan was still a ‘work in progress’. Therefore, what is offered here is an insight into future considerations of the climate change–security nexus, to the extent possible.

One entry point is to review DFID’s country operational plans for 2011–2015,⁹ to look for possible overlaps in programming priorities which bring climate change and security together, or for climate change programmes within fragile and conflict-affected states. A recent Bilateral Aid Review (DFID, 2011b) called on DFID to focus on fewer countries, so as to enable more targeted support where the need is greatest. This led to the development of new country operational plans, which outline programme priorities and funding allocations. As one of DFID’s core commitments, each of the plans references climate change in its introduction. However, the extent to which it is identified as a programming priority or is allocated funding varies significantly. For example, countries where climate change is prioritised and resourced include Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Countries where there is no mention of climate change (beyond the standard introduction) within the operational plan, the accompanying summary paper or the budget breakdown (despite there being a budget line allocated to climate change) include Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan. If climate change work is to happen, it will be as a result of a revision of these strategies or stem from alternative funding sources (e.g. the ICF, discussed later).

In addition, DFID has regional programmes and operational plans. These are designed to focus on work that is cross-border or regional in nature, which includes climate change. The Africa regional plan (DFID, 2011c) recognises climate change as having a major impact in terms of floods and droughts, disease

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and agricultural yields. It states that the region will undertake future work to support adaptation and mitigation through regional cooperation on water and forests; scale up low-carbon development opportunities; support African negotiators; and improve the evidence base and understanding of climate change. Climate change is similarly recognised for Asia, (DFID, 2011d), with a focus primarily on water resource management within the region for the period 2011–2015. Central Asia (DFID, 2011e) presents a somewhat different story: minimal funding is allocated to climate change, and there has been a cessation of support previously offered to Tajikistan since it gained access to funding from the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience.

The inclusion of climate change, to varying degrees, within country and regional operational plans poses a number of interesting questions for the possible securitisation of climate change but also a number of uncertainties. The Bilateral Aid Review’s recommendations on reducing geographical focus and better targeting ODA mean there has been no dramatic shift of priorities in countries where climate change work is going to take place. That said, programme plans do not provide the detail necessary to truly assess how the climate change–security nexus may play out in real terms; the operational plans are reviewed annually and thus subject to change; and the distribution of ICF funding is still to be decided. Given the volume of funds available, the ICF could shift the UK’s ODA investment in climate change programming dramatically and the way it is framed in relation to security.

The ICF

At the time of writing, the ICF channels the largest volume of ODA designated for climate change programming by the UK government. This section provides an outline of the ICF and explains why it is important to understanding the links between climate change and security in practice. It also discusses the ICF’s governance mechanisms and its links to the NSC. Finally, as at the time of writing the fund was still in its inception phase, it raises a set of questions about the possible future direction of ICF investments and the potential implications for the climate change–security nexus.

The marked rise in ODA expenditure on environmental protection and climate change that has occurred over the past five years is set to continue into the near future. Set in motion by the introduction of the Environmental Transformation Fund (ETF)–International Window in 2008/09, which committed £800 million of ODA from 2008/09–2014/15, the ETF was subsequently replaced by the ICF (NAO, 2011: 5). The ICF reflects the UK government’s financial commitment to delivering climate finance and thus a possible funding resource for programming on the climate change–security nexus. The ETF and ICF combined will account for the government’s pledge of £1.5 billion in ODA to meet the 2009 Copenhagen Accord (ibid.: 5). The UK government committed to spending £1.5 billion in the ‘fast start’ period (2010–2012) and £2.9 billion over the spending review period (2011/12–2014/15) (DFID et al., 2011b: 5). The latter will be jointly funded by DFID (£1.8 billion), DECC (£1 billion) and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (£100 million) (ICF, 2011: 1.). The ICF will be regarded as ODA and will account for 7.5% of ODA by the end of the spending review period.10

The ICF will be governed by the ICF Board for decision making on the overall strategy and fund allocations, comprising ministerial representatives from DFID, DECC and the Treasury. Joint decisions will also include ministerial representatives from DEFRA and be in consultation with the FCO (ICF, 2011: 1).

A recent report by DFID, DECC and DEFRA (DFID et al., 2011b) outline the priorities of the ICF. Interestingly, in the foreword, Andrew Mitchell (UK Secretary of State for International Development), Chris Huhne (UK Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change) and Caroline Spelman (UK Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) write as follows: ‘Taking action on climate change is in Britain’s interest. We cannot have food security, water security and energy security – or any form of

national security – without climate security’ (ibid.: 3). The report also points to the conflict likely to arise from climate change with reference to water resources in South Asia and deforestation globally.

Overall, the government emphasises poverty alleviation as the determinant of where funds should be spent. Moreover, ICF commitments in delivering the expenditure adhere to broader DFID principles to protect ODA from being spent on anything that does not prioritise the reduction of poverty (ICF, 2011: 3). For the ICF, this includes the commitment to the DAC definition of ODA\(^\text{11}\) and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (ibid.). As much as it is possible to make analyses at this stage, at least in theory the governance mechanisms for the ICF align with the findings put forward by Wild and Elhawary (forthcoming), that DFID has built-in ‘firewalls’ that protect its funds from being manipulated or subsumed under broader security objectives, which could contribute to a securitisation of aid under its control.

However, the ICF is a cross-departmental initiative, therefore a series of challenges are likely to arise as a consequence of pursuing a ‘whole of government’ approach (Mabey, 2010). For example, although regarded as a unit in and of itself, the ICF Board comprises staff from across government departments. As this paper has shown, each department has adopted a different framing of the climate change–security nexus and would thus have a different approach to identifying the best use of ICF funds. Speaking somewhat in caricature, DFID would likely prioritise countries deemed most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change which have high levels of poverty, where they envisage opportunities for success and where there is demonstrable interest. DECC’s priorities would be to champion proactive developing country governments to participate in international climate change negotiations. The FCO would prioritise engagement with countries in which the impacts of climate change pose significant security risks for the UK. How these mixed agendas will play out over the longer term, particularly in relation to the programmes the ICF chooses to fund, will be critical to the future direction of the climate change–security nexus.

The desire both to deliver poverty reduction results and to challenge climate impacts in areas with ‘conducive political and policy environments for taking climate action’ (ICF, 2011: 3) raises questions about the extent to which fragile and conflict-affected countries will receive programme funding and the programming priorities that will be included. The ICF technical working paper (2011: 10) identifies climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ in fragile states and suggests further cross-Whitehall dialogue is required to better understand how to engage in such contexts. However, if substantial amounts of ICF funding are channelled to fragile and conflict-affected countries, we may see a coming-together of climate change and security in the geographical focus of spending and programming priorities. That said, the geographical focus and the ICF will be constrained not only by the aforementioned ‘firewalls’ but also by the commitment to take heed of the findings of the DFID Bilateral Aid Review (ibid.: 2).

Finally, the strategic priorities for the ICF make explicit links to the NSC. ICF (2011) states a commitment to ensuring spending is ‘in the context of the international climate change strategy agreed by the National Security Council and other related NSC decisions’ (ibid.: 1), which raises questions about the likely influence of broader security concerns on programme and funding decisions. At the time of writing, the NSC, following on from the Foresight report (Government Office of Science, 2011), is undergoing research to further explore the international implications of the climate change–security nexus for the UK. The findings of this research are likely to have an impact on the Board’s decisions, or at least the political environment in which they take place. If the NSC, the 2010 NSS and the SDSR are an indication of the future direction, it is likely we will see a stronger emphasis on the links between climate change, security, conflict and fragility in the coming years.

\(^{11}\) www.oecd.org/document/4/0,3746,en_2649_34447_4681892_1_1_1_1,00.html#Definition, Accessed January 2012.
5. Conclusion: why the securitising narrative?

Within the UK government, the strongest links between climate change and security have been witnessed in the most recent national security reports and among representatives of the FCO and MOD. But why has a securitising narrative been promoted and what has it achieved?

The UK’s framing of climate change through a security lens and its role in bringing climate change to the international forum of the UNSC could be understood to reflect a desire to increase the urgency of climate change as a global issue, recognising that a security lens carries with it renewed political weight (Sindico, 2007, in Brauch, 2008). As McDonald (2008: 11) notes, ‘Copenhagen School proponents portray a securitising move as a highly intentional, strategic action’. Thus, UK engagement in the UNSC debate on climate change could be viewed as an important contribution, and as a ‘strategic move’ towards developing a sense of urgency for action in the wake of the international negotiations. Indeed, then-Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett hinted at the FCO’s framing as a tactical move, commenting that ‘flagging up the security aspects of climate change has a role in galvanising those governments who have yet to act’ (in Brauch, 2008: 18).

Three years later, speaking after the second UNSC debate on climate change and international security, UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs William Hague echoed such intent:

‘The UK has been at the forefront of climate security policy and international efforts to take greater action in response to the climate challenge and we are determined to continue to make the case, through the EU and other international organisations, that all countries take action to address climate change. We will use the conclusion of this week’s debates as a springboard to harness the support of countries around the world as we seek progress in the UNFCCC at Durban in November and move towards a binding global deal.’

The extent to which attempts to promote a security framing of climate change have had the desired impact is difficult to determine, not least because of the challenges of attribution but also because the ‘desired impact’ is somewhat difficult to pin down. What will be interesting in the coming decade is following the way the securitising narrative is adopted and transformed for different purposes. Furthermore, this is most definitely not a matter confined to the West. Some of the most interesting dynamics in terms of securitising climate change have come from the reactions of developing countries.

Employing security discourses to raise the profile of and urgency for action on climate change is one possible rationale; David Miliband and Frank-Walter Steinmeier hint at an alternative reason. They suggest that tackling the climate security challenges

‘[...] will help us to avoid growing resentment between those most responsible for climate change and those most affected by it. A potential stand-off between ‘polluters’ – both in the North and among the emerging economies – and ‘victims’, who will be predominantly in the South, would put the already burdened international security architecture under increasing pressure.’

Again, this narrative is not pertinent only for the West. In the second UNSC debate, Bolivia called for ‘an international tribunal for climate and environmental justice to sanction those nations that did not comply with emission reduction commitments’.

The impact on the international community notwithstanding, there remains a disconnect between the climate change and security framings different arms of the UK government employ. To endorse a genuine ‘whole of government’ approach, negotiation will need to take place and common ground will

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need to be identified on how to handle the climate change–security nexus. It comes as no surprise that different departments frame the nexus in different ways: this is to be expected given that each department has its own remit, priorities, ways of framing issues and understandings of complex phenomena such as climate change and security, separately as well as together. Take, for example, the FCO and DFID. DFID frames climate change with a focus on vulnerability, poverty reduction and, more recently, a greater incorporation of the opportunities that it presents. That is not to say DFID has not made the connections between climate change and security: it has, but often through other lenses such as those of poverty reduction, increasing resilience or natural resource management. The FCO frames climate change in terms of its possible implications for domestic and international security, and specifically the impact that it may have on energy security and the UK's overseas interests.

In recognition of these different framings, and the possible contradictions this could produce in-country, there are a growing number of initiatives seeking to develop cross-Whitehall perspectives on climate change and security, and similar issues. The NSC, for example, is investing in understanding the implications of the international dimensions of climate change for the UK. If these findings are made public, how, or rather whose, views are represented is likely to be subject to a tough process of internal political negotiation.

It is difficult to determine why climate change has risen in precedence on the UK agenda. It could be argued that bringing climate change onto the security agenda and framing climate change through security narratives has played an influential role in terms of increasing its significance within the UK government. It is questionable whether such attention, prominence and ultimately financial resources would have been committed, particularly given the current economic crisis and budget cuts, without the influential security narrative.

However, such a position should be treated with some caution. The intention is not to suggest that attempts to securitise climate change, or any issue for that matter, should set a precedent for agenda setting. The counterfactual is obviously unknown, therefore it is impossible to say how climate change may have been treated without the security framings pursued by the FCO and MOD. Moreover, it has not been possible here to explore why particular constructions and framings of climate change have resonated with political leaders, civil servants or other stakeholders associated with the introduction of climate change into the UK's security realm. This is an area that is often left wanting in the majority of securitisation studies and thus warrants further research, as do questions such as:

- What form of evidence basis is required to better understand the climate change and security nexus in practice?
- What does responding to climate change mean in areas that are deemed to be security concerns for the UK?
- Why does there seem to be a lack of focus on climate change in programming in conflict-affected countries?
- What does the UNSC role mean for the UNFCCC process?
References


