Relationships between water supply, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) service delivery and peace-building and state-building

A review of the literature

Nathaniel Mason
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* Disclaimer: The views presented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of ODI, Tearfund or DFID.
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## Acronyms

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMCOW</td>
<td>African Ministers’ Council on Water</td>
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<td>CAFs</td>
<td>Conflict affected and fragile (states and situations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Community-driven development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Community-driven reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLTS</td>
<td>Community-Led Total Sanitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>GSDRC</td>
<td>Governance and Social Development Resource Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSP</td>
<td>Non-state service provider</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-private partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water supply, sanitation and hygiene</td>
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<td>WDR</td>
<td>World Development Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>WSP</td>
<td>Water and Sanitation Program (World Bank)</td>
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<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
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Executive summary

This literature review explores the potential contribution of water, sanitation and hygiene service delivery towards peace-building and state-building in conflict-affected and fragile states. The review considers how different service delivery modalities – namely who delivers what services, for whom, and how – can help or hinder state-building and peace-building goals. The review is the first output of a research project conducted by the Overseas Development Institute on behalf of Tearfund. The project seeks to capitalise on the evidence and experience of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) service delivery in a number of conflict-affected and fragile states, undertaken by Tearfund with funding from the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The project aims to identify implications for Tearfund’s programmes as well as a wider audience, mindful of the increasing prioritisation of peace- and state-building in humanitarian and development policy and programming.

The links between service delivery and peace- and state-building are asserted by a range of major development actors, including DFID, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the World Bank. Insofar as peace-building and state-building can be considered mutually compatible, a reciprocal relationship with services is commonly assumed. Among their many negative impacts, conflict and fragility disrupt services. Reinstating them, in the right way, can enhance the prospects for peaceful, stable societies and states. A number of routes are identified for services to contribute to peace- and state-building, including: increasing economic and livelihood opportunities at the individual, household and economy level; offering space for cooperation around commonly recognised ‘goods’, both within society and between society and state (the so-called ‘social contract’); and rebuilding confidence in government institutions. In the case of peace-building, this may be a matter of providing visible evidence of the cessation of conflict – the ‘peace-dividend’; while for state-building, the provision of services is said to enhance state legitimacy, of which ability to meet society’s expectations around public goods is a commonly identified component.

This is not to say that the literature, both academic and policy-oriented, proposes a straightforward relationship between service delivery and peace- and state-building. The causal pathways are recognised to be highly complex. Moreover, several core concepts are disputed or problematic, including legitimacy and the notion that peace- and state-building are necessarily mutually reinforcing, especially where the contribution of service delivery is concerned. Services intended to support peace-building, emphasising rapid response to reduce health risks and social volatility, may entail a different set of actors and approaches from those which are intended to enhance the state’s capacity and legitimacy. The review commences by setting out the commonly understood definitions of core concepts including peace-building, state-building, fragility, legitimacy and service delivery. It also outlines some of the tensions that arise between these concepts. With regards to the above ‘scene-setting’, a key observation is that the evidence for links between service-delivery and peace- and state-building is relatively limited. Such links are often asserted on the basis of common-sense or a limited number of case studies. The scarcity of evidence intensifies when moving from generalities about service delivery, to the particular contribution of social services (understood for this review to include health, education and WASH), and then again in moving from social services to WASH in isolation.

A range of arguments are made for the particular contribution of WASH to peace- and state-building. A key proposition is that WASH is relatively apolitical – at least compared to education or security, though the use of water as a political weapon would seem to present a counterargument. Two further arguments relate to the ‘infrastructural’ nature of WASH. First, that this infrastructure is conspicuous, and that it offers a tangible ‘entry-point’ for less substantive areas of intervention such as capacity building; second, that the infrastructural nature of WASH aligns it with other infrastructure services such as electricity or roads, that are fundamental to the functioning of the economy as a whole (as a key component of a functioning state). Other arguments relate to the particular societal implications of WASH: as an aid to social cohesion through community
involvement in planning, implementing and managing services; and as a vehicle for empowerment of women. As with services generally, the review discusses these links with some circumspection, for example whether the above qualities are the preserve of WASH, or are found to a similar extent in other services.

As mentioned, it is not just the service which potentially contributes to peace- and state-building, but the manner in which it is delivered – in the terminology of this research project, the service delivery modality. The review therefore examines the various dimensions in which service delivery modalities can vary, and the potential implications for peace- and state-building. Foremost among these is the extent of local involvement – something of a catch-all that embraces the role of the state versus non-state actors, both international and national. The latter category is diverse, comprising non-governmental organisations, the private sector, and community- or faith-based organisations, and is of particular interest given the widely acknowledged need to develop in-country capacity of some sort, even if it is not at the level of the state (equated, for this purpose, with government agencies). Different forms of collaboration between state and non-state service providers (NSPs) are considered, acknowledging that capacity constraints may extend far beyond the state to private sector and civil society. The second consideration is the extent of inclusivity in the service delivery modality – given the asserted potential for exclusion of different groups to lead to social tension and, potentially, conflict. On this point, the review identifies the need to consider carefully the implications of patronage and clientelism which, though commonly associated with exclusion of some groups in favour of others, need to be picked apart.

The next dimension highlighted is the degree of citizen engagement – associated with inclusion but often discussed in terms of the absolute degree of involvement of communities as a whole, rather than subsets thereof. The implications of differing degrees of citizen engagement for state- and peace-building are considered in brief (drawing on the limited evidence available) ranging from community-driven approaches which entrust a high degree of discretion and responsibility to communities, to more modest attempts to increase accountability. Old and new mechanisms for enhancing citizen engagement, from utilising traditional institutions to developing accountability mechanisms through mobile technology, are identified. The fourth of the dimensions considered is the extent of decentralisation inherent to the service delivery modality. This is a pertinent issue since, while capacity constraints may extend to local levels in fragile contexts, it might also be that, during conflict, the service-gap is filled on an ad-hoc basis by local actors, with implications for centre-periphery relations as the (central) state re-emerges. The final dimension of note relates not so much to the who and how of service delivery, but the when – timing and prioritisation. Several authors reflect the idea of a transition from fragility and conflict to peace and statehood, and the stages at which different forms of intervention are appropriate. While acknowledging the complexity of these transitions, a particular focus of the literature is the potential ramifications of moving from humanitarian emergency responses to more long-term development-oriented service delivery modalities. Not to be overlooked on the issue of prioritisation is the question of when a focus on social services such as WASH is appropriate, relative to services to establish security and the rule of law.

In view of the widely acknowledged shortcomings in the evidence, the review closes with consideration of both the established and emerging forms of research and evaluation which might be used to test the service delivery – state-building/peace-building link. Case-studies have tended to dominate to date, some of which include the perspectives of service users. As the achievement of statehood and peace depends fundamentally on the attitudes of citizens, their opinions regarding the relationships between state, peace and services are a central concern. The potential for accessing these perspectives via accountability mechanisms such as community scorecards is briefly discussed, as well as the emerging use of randomised experimental techniques to assess the impact of certain aspects of service delivery on social and political attitudes. In view of the risk that expressed opinion is liable to response bias, the use of innovative techniques to directly test behaviour is also considered. Given the limitations and generalities of the evidence to date, however, the review proposes that a first step is to develop a conceptual framework to adequately capture the causal links between WASH services and peace- and state-building, so as to isolate and test them in turn.
1 Introduction

This review seeks to provide an overview of the literature which touches on the relationships between WASH service delivery in conflict affected and fragile states, and peace- and state-building. The literature review directly informs the development of a methodology for a research project, conducted by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) on behalf of Tearfund, with funds from the Department for International Development’s Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (DFID CHASE). The research project seeks to establish ‘how to support effective water supply, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) service delivery in ways that maximise their contribution towards peace- and state-building’. The sub-questions which unpack this overarching research question are listed in Box 1. The focus is on the potential contribution of WASH service delivery to peace-building and state-building, and the possible ways to tailor WASH service delivery to maximise that contribution, in conflict affected and fragile states and situations (CAFs). The literature available on programming WASH and other services in CAFs is relatively extensive, but the focus to date has mainly been on the more immediate concern of delivering services in difficult operating environments, rather than the question of how to contribute to the longer-term goals of building peaceful and prosperous, stable and accountable states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 1: Research questions for the research project as a whole</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Overall question:</strong></td>
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<td>How can effective water supply, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) service delivery be supported in ways that maximise its contribution towards peace- and state-building?</td>
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<td><strong>Key sub-questions:</strong></td>
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<td>1. To what extent and in what ways can the processes of improving access to WASH make an explicit contribution to peace- and state-building in CAFs?</td>
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<td>2. Given the impact WASH service delivery can have on peace-and state-building, what does effectiveness look like in CAFs and how can it be measured both qualitatively and quantitatively?</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. What diagnostic tools or indicators might guide future WASH service delivery programmes in CAFs, to help maximise the extent to which they can contribute to peace-and state-building?</td>
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Source: Project terms of reference

A later component of the research involves the development of diagnostic tools to identify entry points for peace building and state building (sub-question 3), so as to inform the design of WASH programmes in CAFS. As such, the literature review includes a preliminary overview of existing methods for analysing how different service delivery modalities, whether provided by the state or others, may impact upon peace-building or state-building.

The literature review is primarily written to inform an audience with an expertise in either WASH service delivery, or peace-building and state-building in CAFS. The focus is more on the former, but effort is made to distinguish particular aspects of WASH service delivery which may be unfamiliar to non-WASH specialists, but which set it apart from other services, in terms of relations between client, provider and (where different) state, or the potential impacts of services and the way they are delivered on dynamics of peace and governance.

This review provides a relatively brief overview of relevant literature, in response to the specific requirements of the research project. It should be noted that several other literature reviews have been produced assessing the links between service delivery and peace-building and state-building. These include:
• Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) – Topic Guide on Fragile States, which includes a specific section on Service Delivery and State-building (Mcloughlin, 2011)
• GSDRC – Topic Guide Supplement on State-building and Peace-building in Situations of Conflict and Fragility (Haider, 2010a)
• GSDRC – Topic Guide Supplement on State-Society Relations and Citizenship in Situations of Conflict and Fragility (Haider, 2010b)
• Practical Action, Save the Children & CfBT Education Trust – State Building, Peace-Building and Service Delivery in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: Literature Review, Final Report (Ndaruhutse et al., 2011), which includes chapters on the sanitation and water sectors

Additionally, a literature review has been developed by ODI’s Humanitarian Policy Group on WASH services in CAFs (considering service delivery in fragile contexts, with limited emphasis on the links between WASH and state-building/ peace-building):

• ODI – Improving the Provision of Basic Services for the Poor in Fragile Environments: Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene International Literature Review’ (Welle, 2008)

This review does not attempt to duplicate the above studies, but they are variously used to provide a steer to issues of interest, and referred to where the authors provide insights of their own.

The present literature review is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces key concepts, including peace-building, state-building, services, service delivery modalities, and legitimacy. Section 2 explores the possible relationship between services generally, and peace-building/ state-building. Section 3 focuses on the (limited) analysis and evidence for the relationship between service delivery and peace- and state-building in the case of WASH in particular. Section 4 examines a range of service delivery modalities, and how these might impact peace-building and state-building, with an emphasis on the particular dynamics of WASH as a whole, and its constituent services: water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion. Section 5 returns to the question of how the relationship between service delivery and peace-building and state-building might be assessed, with an eye to the development of a diagnostic tool to inform programme design.
2 Key concepts

2.1 Fragility

There is no commonly agreed definition for what constitutes a fragile state, nor a universally agreed list of such states. DFID’s working definition refers to states where ‘the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor’ (DFID, 2012). The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) had previously adopted a similar definition, but in order to incorporate concepts of legitimacy, as well as capacity and ability to discharge its functions, it has revised its definition to make reference to political processes, defining a fragile state as one which is ‘unable to meet its population’s expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process’ (OECD, 2008a:16). The World Bank uses two thresholds to diagnose ‘fragile situations’; either a composite rating on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessments of the World Bank, African Development Bank and Asian Development Bank of 3.2 or less; or the presence of a UN and/or regional peace-keeping or peace-building mission (excluding border monitoring operations) in the last 3 years (World Bank, 2011a).

In an effort to encompass the various definitions proposed by different donors, Stewart and Brown (2010:6) define fragility as a failure or risk of failure in three dimensions:

- **Authority failures**: the state lacks the authority to protect its citizens from violence of various kinds.
- **Service failures**: the state fails to ensure that all citizens have access to basic services.
- **Legitimacy failures**: the state lacks legitimacy, enjoys only limited support among the people, and is typically not democratic.

The World Bank’s reference to fragile situations reflects recognition that ‘fragility is not exclusively determined by the nature and boundaries of states – there is a need to look beyond the state to the state of society in both assessing and addressing fragility’ (Mcloughlin, 2010:10). This reflects one of a range of concerns around the fragile states concept as a whole, as being insufficiently precise. Other concerns, described by Ndaruhutse et al. (2011), include:

- Thinking around fragility is excessively influenced by western conceptions of the state, built substantially on the theory of thinkers such as Max Weber, which underplay the potential for forms of social contract such as patronage and clientelism to contribute to state functionality.
- The label ‘Fragile States’ implies a mission on the part of donors and other international actors to reduce fragility, which assumes i) that there is a normative end-point constituting a non-fragile state, ii) that this can be brought about through external intervention and in a relatively short time period, and iii) that expectations of socio-political forms (including democracy) can be realised in countries marked by a violent recent history.
- The label often occludes the important distinction between the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its people (de facto sovereignty) and in the eyes of (international) law (de iure sovereignty) – as for example when states have sufficient legal recognition to sign international treaties, but are illegitimate in the eyes of their citizens (Ghani et al., 2005).

Like any abstract concept, however, fragility can be understood in different ways, and the above concerns in part reflect a growing level of nuance in the way the term is applied and debated by the international community.
2.2 Peace-building
Like fragility, the concept of peace-building has evolved from its early incarnations. DFID starts by distinguishing the concept of ‘positive peace’ – entailing social harmony, economic and social development, and respect for human rights and the rule of law, with the support of political institutions capable of managing disputes and change. This definition thus encompasses the prevention of ‘structural forms of violence, such as discrimination’ (DFID, 2010:14), and goes far beyond early definitions which tended to focus on ‘negative peace’ i.e. the absence of armed conflict (Rocha Menocal, 2010). From this definition of positive peace, peace-building is described by three interrelated elements:

- Supporting inclusive peace processes and agreements
- Building mechanisms to resolve conflict peacefully
- Addressing causes and effects of conflict

The United Nations (UN) refers to ‘a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development’. Peace-building is acknowledged to be a long term process, addressing the core issues affecting not only the functioning of the state, but also society. It is demarcated as the broadest component (in scope and timeframe) in a hierarchy extending from conflict prevention, to peacemaking/ enforcement, to peacekeeping, to ‘post-conflict peace-building and preventing relapse into conflict’. Relating it to state-building (below), peace-building aims ‘to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions’ (UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2008:18f).

There has been some scrutiny of the ‘liberal’ model of peace-building, with its roots in liberal democracy and capitalism, which emerged from the 1980s onwards as the dominant theoretical framework for peace-building. Thinkers such as Roland Paris have questioned whether such political and economic models can be successfully imported without first significantly strengthening institutions – for example achieving sufficient security presence and rules and mechanisms for dispute resolution, before going ahead with elections (Rocha Menocal and Kilpatrick, 2005).

2.3 State-building
In DFID’s interpretation, ‘State-building is concerned with the state’s capacity, institutions and legitimacy, and with the political and economic processes that underpin state-society relations’, whereby the state is ‘the principal unit for exercising public authority in defined territories in modern times’ and ‘the central structure in international relations’. For DFID, ‘State-building is a long-term, historically rooted and internal process’, fraught with ‘tensions between state and non-state actors’ (DFID, 2010:12). Again, the difference with earlier thinking is stark. The very emphasis on state and state-society relations contrasts strongly with the development paradigm under the Washington Consensus, where the role of the state was viewed as something to be minimised (Rocha Menocal, 2010).

Notwithstanding the complex and variable ways in which states can evolve, DFID points to three especially important factors contributing to ‘robust state-society relations’: the nature of the political settlement and processes; the state’s ability to discharge its core functions; and the ability to meet the expectations of the population regarding those functions (Figure 1). The thinking appears to relate to DFID’s working definition of fragility (above) but incorporates the notions of political process and legitimacy.
The definition of state-building proposed by the OECD has a similar tripartite emphasis on capacity, institutions and legitimacy, though the OECD definition omits economic processes, emphasising political processes only:

‘... an endogenous process to develop capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relationships. Positive state-building processes involve reciprocal relations between a state that delivers services for its people and social and political groups who constructively engage with their state. This necessarily requires the existence of inclusive political processes to negotiate state-society relations’

OECD (2008b:1)

As outlined in Box 2 and explored at appropriate intervals throughout this review, there may be tensions between peace-building and state-building processes.

**Box 2: Peace-building and state-building: complementary or contradictory?**

The increasing volume of research and thinking around peace-building and state-building has given rise to a search to integrate the two around the common aims of strengthening relations between state and society, and promoting representative and inclusive social and political systems. Haider (2010a:5) sees the primary aim of state-building as being ‘to transform states and make them more responsive’ and of peace-building ‘to transform societal relationships’, but concedes that in practice they are often interlinked in complex environments where both endeavours can impact on peace, stability and state-society relations.

The title of DFID’s 2010 practice paper ‘Building peaceful states and societies’ reflects this desire to integrate peace-building and state-building in a mutually reinforcing manner.
However, the practice paper also reflects on the tensions between peace-building and state-building, including the desire to secure a ‘peace dividend’ by providing basic services in the immediate aftermath of conflict. Where government capacity is very low, there may be a temptation to bypass government systems and deliver services via non-governmental organisations (NGOs), but this risks undermining the wider (state-building) goal of developing state capacity to discharge these functions and so increase its legitimacy. The tension here has been explored in the WASH sector by the World Bank Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) describing it as a ‘capacity conundrum’, which has important implications for service delivery.

The project terms of reference use ‘PBSB’ as shorthand, which implies that peace-building and state-building should, wherever possible, be mutually reinforcing. The desire to create a stable peace, i.e. to go beyond peacekeeping, means that in theory the ultimate ends of peace-building and state-building are aligned - for example around establishing the rule of law, conflict management systems, and democratic forms and processes – even if trade-offs exist between peace-building and state-building, as to the means to achieve these ends. ‘It would seem sensible, therefore, to align peace-building actions with longer term planning for support to state-building, to provide the foundations for state-building and help bridge short and longer-term issues’ (Eldon and Gunby, 2009:8).


Finally, although conceptions of state-building have acquired considerably greater nuance in recent years, certain assumptions, which arguably derive from the historic evolution of Western statehood, could be further explored. These include the assumption that the state is the optimal guarantor, if not provider, of services for reasons of bureaucratic competence, neutrality or equity (arising from ability to generate and control revenues through the tax system). As will be touched on in later sections, these assumptions, which provide the normative underpinnings to state-building efforts, need careful reflection in particular contexts.

2.4 Services

Though the focus of this review and the wider DFID CHASE funded study is on WASH services, much of the research to date has been general in nature, referring to ‘basic’ or ‘social’ services, or looking at other services such as health (e.g. Eldon and Waddington, 2008) or education (e.g. Berry, 2007; Pavenello, 2008). To avoid confusion, this review follows the distinction proposed for the World Development Report (WDR) 2011 by Baird (2010), whereby ‘basic services’ include ‘social services’ as one of three subcomponents, alongside social protection, and security/justice. Social services include WASH, as well as health and education. Given the limited literature on the relationship of WASH to peace-building and state-building, the next section (3) devotes considerable attention to social services generally, as well as the interactions with other basic services (notably security and justice). Nonetheless, the particular features of WASH services are explored in the remainder of the review (section 4-6).

2.5 Service delivery modalities

As mentioned, this review explores the thinking to date on how different service delivery modalities can be analysed for their potential impact on peace-building and state-building.

In the terminology of this research project, different service delivery modalities are primarily about what services are provided, who provides them (for whom), and how they are provided. The what question is most obviously answered by distinguishing between the different subsectors within WASH, since water supply, sanitation and hygiene involve very different configurations of actors, and different roles and expectations on the part of each. Beyond this, the specifics of technologies, for example boreholes as opposed to protected springs, further distinguish the what of service provision as, arguably, do broad contextual factors such as whether the location is urban or rural.
The other questions – who provides services, but also for whom and how those services are provided – become especially relevant as the aim transcends sustainable and equitable services in and of themselves, and extends to goals like peace-building and state-building. For example, in exploring the relation between service delivery and peace-building and state-building a key issue with regards to who provides services is whether services are provided, or at least organised, regulated or guaranteed, by the state.

2.6 Legitimacy

As noted, the concept of legitimacy has become increasingly important in defining situations of fragility and the requisites of state-building. As a result, several authors have started to unpack ‘legitimacy’ itself. While a number of typologies are proposed, there is relatively broad agreement that legitimacy is a multi-dimensional concept, with service provision being one component among several.

The WDR 2011 distinguishes between: ‘political legitimacy’, vested in political processes which clearly show that decisions are made on the basis of equal voice, shared values and accountability; and ‘performance legitimacy’, which is acquired by the state through the discharge of its ‘agreed duties, particularly the provision of security, economic oversight and services, and justice’ (World Bank, 2011b:85). By ‘services’, the emphasis here and elsewhere in the WDR 2011 appears to be on core system services (financial management and justice) rather than social services. Furthermore, the WDR 2011 points out that state legitimacy is a complex mixture of various ingredients, and does not consist of effective service delivery alone. In countries which have experienced severe curtailments or abuses of rights, work on justice and transparency may be more a more urgent priority for state-building in the near-term than delivering social services – especially in countries with strong but illegitimate institutions. However, different mechanisms may contribute to reinforcing state legitimacy at once, and wherever resources permit a multifaceted approach may be preferable to supporting any single mechanism.

The OECD (2010) proposes a four-way typology of legitimacy, including:

- Input or process legitimacy, tied to agreed rules of procedure
- Output or performance legitimacy, tied to effectiveness and quality of public goods and services (again acknowledging a key role for security in fragile situations)
- Shared beliefs, whether secular (e.g. political community), religious, traditional, or tied to commonality around a charismatic leader
- International legitimacy, constituted by sovereignty and international relations
3 Relationships between service delivery and peace-building/state-building

3.1 The reciprocal relationship between services and peace-building and state-building

The OECD argues that there is a ‘reciprocal’ relationship between service delivery and mitigating the risks of conflict and fragility:

‘Just as mounting fragility and deteriorating services can be mutually reinforcing tendencies, improving services may enhance social and economic recovery, overcoming fragility in a virtuous upward spiral. The influence is reciprocal.’

OECD (2008c:21)

Several possible routes for service delivery to reduce the risk factors for conflict are identified, including: the potential for basic service provision to disrupt persistent poverty cycles, increase opportunities for economic participation, encourage cooperation across social divides and, in the post-conflict transition, provide visible evidence of the return of a functioning state or society – the ‘peace dividend’. The causal logic applied by the OECD is principally derived with reference to education and health services, for example: the potential for education to improve the employment prospects of young males; or to help children of both sexes avoid recruitment to activities including combat, forced labour or prostitution, which might alienate them from society and state. Health, meanwhile, is emphasised for its potential to be delivered in an apolitical manner, providing a neutral ground for cooperation across ethnic or ideological divides. Here too, however, water supply and sanitation are identified as often benefitting ‘from a similar non-partisan treatment’ (OECD, 2008c:22).

Baird (2010), in a background paper for the WDR 2011, follows the view expressed by OECD (2008c) arguing that, as well as services disintegrating under increased fragility, improved service delivery ‘can help strengthen civic engagement, rebuild public confidence in government institutions, contribute over the longer term to state legitimacy, and reduce the chances of future conflict by addressing its structural causes’ (Baird, 2010:8).

3.2 Intermediaries between service delivery and peace-building and state-building

The above causal pathways on which this reciprocal relationship is founded nonetheless need unpacking and interrogating.

For Baird, the reciprocal relationship is established primarily with economic growth as an intermediary – the logic being that low-income countries are particularly prone to civil war and coups in the first place, or to relapsing into this situation (Baird, 2010, citing Collier, 2007). Access to basic services is stated to be a key mechanism for poverty reduction and raising incomes, and thence to reducing the risk of conflict and fragility.

However, Collier’s hypothesis that there is a causal link between low incomes and civil wars (the ‘conflict trap’) has been critiqued for jumping from statistical correlation to causality (Easterly, 2008). As Baird points out, the second stage in his logic, that service delivery contributes to poverty reduction, ‘depends a lot on how it’s done’ (Baird, 2010:8). This implies that service delivery for poverty reduction needs to be targeted to the poor and avoid privileging certain groups – a difficult task even in non-fragile developing countries. Moreover, the strength of the relationship between services (even pro-poor services) and poverty reduction appears to be another doctrinal assumption in development theory, with less in the way of empirical studies than might be
expected. That said, more recent thinking has to some extent negated the need to establish a causal link between services an income growth, by redefining poverty as a 'multi-dimensional' interaction of deprivations in health, education, and living standards (UNDP, 2010) i.e. to be poor is to lack services and the opportunities they facilitate, rather than simply to lack income. But even if poverty equates, in a large part, lack of services and opportunities, this still leaves the links from poverty to political and social instability somewhat underspecified.

A related hypothesis is that, in addition to providing opportunities for poor people and communities, services can enhance the prospects of stability by creating an enabling environment for the private sector, for example by reducing operating costs (notably energy services), in turn providing opportunities including employment. The latest WDR emphasises the importance of private sector development for livelihoods and employment for youth, as a group particularly at risk of alienation from society and the state, and consequently violence (World Bank, 2011b). Lack of services certainly appears to impinge private sector development. According to the WDR 2011, drawing on the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, electricity is the most commonly cited infrastructure constraint to business in violent areas (World Bank, 2011b).

![Figure 2: The accountability triangle](source: OECD 2008c, derived from World Bank 2004)

Berry et al. (2004) propose that, in addition to increasing economic opportunity and breaking a cycle of poverty, service delivery can act as a catalyst for long-term social, economic and political change in difficult environments by mitigating social and political exclusion, and increasing accountability from state to citizen. Berry et al. refer to the conceptual framework established by the Chars Livelihood Programme in Bangladesh to argue that increasing the voice of poor people to demand better services, as well as the responsiveness of service providers, can help ‘subordinated people make the transition from clients to citizens’ (Fox, 1994:152f, in Hobley, 2004), thereby reducing the risks of disenfranchisement and alienation which may catalyse conflict. For such a transition to occur there would need to be some degree of state involvement in the provision, or at least organisation, of services. The accountability framework developed by the WDR 2004 and applied to fragile contexts by the OECD (2008c) helps to understand this proposition. In Figure 2, a ‘transition from clients to citizens’ occurs via the long-route of the accountability triangle. But, as Baird (2010) points out, in fragile situations the long route of accountability, whereby citizens can hold service providers to account via a policy-making apparatus (which is, ideally, politically neutral), breaks down so that ‘public services often become
the currency of political patronage and clientelism’ (Baird, 2010:5). Patronage and clientelism have the potential to exclude groups that are not favoured, whether on ethnic, religious, political or gender lines, which could potentially exacerbate violence and disorder (Pavenello and Darcy, 2008).

Berry et al. (2004) take the argument around voice and accountability a stage further, arguing that by fostering citizen-state accountability through the ‘entry-point’ of services, people may subsequently be empowered to demand more systemic governance reform.

Taking a step back, however, many initiatives have focused on the ‘supply-side’ of the accountability relationship, aiming to use increased transparency on the part of government and the private sector as an entry point. However, the evidence from such ‘transparency and accountability initiatives’ of improved outcomes, or indeed of links between increased transparency of information and improved voice and accountability, is mixed (Deverajan, 2011 in Bergh et al., 2012). An alternative framing of accountability challenges reads them more as collective action problems, as not so much ‘about one set of people getting another set to behave better, but rather about multiple groups finding ways to act collectively in their own best interests’ (Bergh et al. 2012:1).

3.3 Interrogating assumptions around service delivery and state- and peace-building – neutrality and politics.

The logic in each of the above arguments appears sound, but there has arguably been a lack of empirical testing of the underlying assumptions. One particularly crucial assumption, deserving of more rigorous examination, is that the most appropriate provider of services is a Western ideal of the state: a politically neutral bureaucracy, providing or organising services equitably and transparently, financed through a broad-based tax system. This assumption is evident in Baird’s reference to ‘political patronage and clientelism’, as the inevitable alternative when the state is excluded from services, as may occur in fragile situations. But the use of clientelism and patronage by state actors, even in established liberal democracies like the United States, cannot be ignored (Hopkin 2006). Keefer and Khemani draw similar conclusions from their analysis of ‘political markets’ in the Indian states of Kerala and Uttar Pradesh where many poor people experience underprovision of services due to a lack of ‘personal connections with a powerful patron’ (Keefer and Khemani, 2005:21).

In fragile contexts patronage and clientelism, whether deployed by state or non-state actors, need to be handled especially carefully. On the face of it, patronage and clientelism are inherently negative because they imply exclusion of some from benefits, including services, which in turn may lead to alienation and potentially, to conflict. At the same time, where patronage and clientelism are deeply embedded in political and societal relationships, they can play a powerful role in shaping social norms and expectations, and thus have a potentially stabilising role (at least insofar as dissenting voices among excluded groups can be marginalised).

The OECD’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility has explored this in expanding on different forms of legitimacy in non-Western states (OECD, 2010) and points out the importance of kinship and community ties in underpinning state-society relations, which can often appear to run counter, or more likely in parallel, to the Western model of the state (a so-called ‘hybrid state’). The OECD argues that in hybrid states, patronage can underpin both input and output legitimacy (see section 2.6) i.e. the agreed rules of procedure for state-citizen interactions, and the provision of public goods and services. The WDR 2011 conceptualises state legitimacy as ‘agreed rules and processes that promote accountability (of the state) to its citizens’, for which tradition, shared beliefs, collective identities and religion can be as important as the effective provision of services (World Bank, 2011b:95). The WDR 2011 here draws on the theory of Clements (2010) to argue for the importance of ‘grounded’ state legitimacy, which seeks to marry formal systems of governance
with local realities and local problem-solving capacity. Ultimately, then, the key questions would be to what extent patronage and clientelism lead excluded groups to feel alienated, and thence how this alienation plays out: can it be managed and diffused within the existing social, political and cultural architecture, or is suppression or conflict the inevitable outcome?

Even leaving aside contentious terms like patronage and clientelism, moreover, the idea that the state is a neutral actor in service delivery can be brought into question. Van de Walle and Scott (2009) reflect on the role of public services in European state- and nation-building, arguing that they have been used as inherently political tools for building a state and enhancing its legitimacy via three main processes: penetration (establishing the visible presence of the state or ruling powers); standardisation (developing a common culture through widely recognised services); and accommodation (utilisation of services to settle disputes and develop political loyalty). The authors argue that the inherent politicisation of services in European history provides lessons for state-building projects in fragile states. They encourage donors to consider whether there may be instances when penetration, standardisation and accommodation may need to trump the more often asserted attributes of effective service delivery, including efficiency and even equity.

There are of course limits to how far most authors advise the development community to ignore ‘good practice’ principles for service delivery, such as accountability, in the face of the realpolitik of state-building. Patronage (or corruption) is more viewed as a contextual feature, which should inform service delivery, rather than as something to be encouraged or strengthened in and of itself. Eldon and Gunby (2009) in their detailed case studies of social services in Cambodia (health), Nigeria (education), Zimbabwe (water and sanitation) and South Sudan (all three sectors) conclude that patronage and corruption are inherent to the political systems of all countries. This creates varying degrees of ‘shadow states’, which are ‘characterised by manipulation by local elites to enhance their own power and wealth, who often actively seek to undermine state effectiveness so as to encourage citizens to seek patronage and protection’ (Ibid.:10). Rather than assuming that such phenomena have negative implications in all circumstances, Eldon and Gunby emphasise understanding the particular role of patronage in each context through political economy analysis. As such, they define it as a key contextual determinant for the political settlement in each country, alongside other, interrelated factors such as the degree of fragility, violence, ethnicity and economic growth.

Eldon and Gunby put to the test the distinction made by Whaites (2008) between ‘responsive’ states, which develop more stable political settlements by increasingly responding to public expectations (including demands for social services), and ‘unresponsive’ states, which have far less resilient political settlements, characterised by low legitimacy, patronage, and predatory politics, which in turn yields little state interest in effective service provision. Their analysis does not, ultimately, confirm a role for service delivery in building or reinforcing strong and stable political settlements. They find that rapid extension of services in Zimbabwe during the 1980s, driven in a centralised manner but with some decentralisation, made a significant contribution to the legitimacy and popularity of the government, and to some extent the acceptability of the existing political settlement (even as it excluded portions of the population). In Cambodia, South Sudan and Nigeria, however, Eldon and Gunby find it harder to discern a link between service delivery and stable political settlements. The authors also conclude that normative ideals such as legitimacy and social contracts do play a role in state responsiveness, but that these must be set among other drivers, including political (and general) survival for individual leaders, and a desire to address legacies of the past (such as Zimbabwe’s liberation war, which created a politically conscious, and in some cases armed, population).

Eldon and Gunby conclude with a number of pragmatic considerations relating to the context in which service delivery programmes operate, which underscore the difficulty in making any assumptions about whether and how services can contribute to state-building (Box 3).
Box 3: Key contextual issues for service delivery

Selected issues highlighted by Eldon and Gunby to consider when understanding the relationships between service delivery and state-building include:

General political economy issues

- Identify the ways in which the country is ‘fragile’. Each one is different and dynamic.
- Appreciate the history of the country from a political economy point of view, especially noting the legacies of past problems, injustices and conflicts.
- Identify the ways in which the Government acts in a responsive or unresponsive manner, and why this may be so. Appreciate the different ways in which the Government responds to different service sectors and how this might vary between different levels of government and between the political and administrative sectors.
- How is patronage and corruption manifest? How does it impact on the governance and administration of the state?
- Appreciate the influence of ethnic and religious differences in the country and the way this may impact on the content of service sectors and how they are delivered.
- Identify the strengths and weaknesses of civil society organisations and how they may contribute to responsive service delivery and how they may strengthen or weaken state building.
- Appreciate the extent of leverage that donor support offers and work within these constraints.

Context issues for service sectors

- What are tensions between expectations for services and the political realities? What are tensions between ‘technical’ best practice and expectations of clients?
- Recognise that support for services is primarily predicated on achieving sector outcomes but identify possible state building approaches that can be used in service modes and delivery mechanisms.
- Appreciate that providing support to service delivery that has a state-building element requires a longer time frame with less certain outcomes.
- Recognise that every sector makes the case that they are the key sector.
- Identify key factors in the relationship between state and non-state providers. If a non-state model is to be supported ensure it does not undermine state building.

Source: Eldon and Gunby (2009:25-26)

The above points touch on only a fraction of the many nuanced relationships within society and between state and society, which condition how and how far service delivery might impact on state- and peace-building. Important underpinning concepts such as legitimacy and patronage are still frequently used in a one-dimensional way. This is insufficient for the serious challenges posed by fragile contexts, where difficult choices must be made between political expedience and social justice – for example whether existing norms like patronage and clientelism can be used to reinforce a political settlement in the short term, while inevitably excluding some sections of society. Such choices are, at the extreme, manifestations of the tensions between peace- and state-building objectives, outlined in Box 2.

For Eldon and Gunby, there is a need to empirically test a wide range of beliefs and assumptions around the impact of service delivery on state-building, including legitimacy, responsiveness, the social contract and accountability. McLoughlin also calls for greater interrogation of assumed links,
for example ‘that the visible presence of services extends the state’s reach and authority, supports state legitimacy and strengthens the social contract’ (Mcloughlin, 2011:80). While only a small subset of these complex issues can be considered here, they apply just as much to the focus of this paper – WASH service delivery – which follows.
4 Relationships between WASH service delivery and peace-building/ state-building

Robust evidence to underpin assumptions about the impact of service delivery and peace-building and state-building becomes even scarcer when looking at an individual sector, in particular the sanitation subsector (Ndaruhutse et al., 2011). Nonetheless, as with service delivery generally, such impacts are often asserted, exemplified by this statement from a World Bank director:

‘Water and Sanitation is among the most basic of services, with major social and economic implications. Water and sanitation services provide an entry point around a very practical concern for people affected by conflict, from which we can demonstrate benefits of moving out of conflict, and around which it may be possible to build peace and institutions....’

Jose Luis Irigoyen (Director, Transport, Water and ICT at the World Bank), quoted in WSP (2011b:29)

This subsection reviews the ways in which WASH services, particularly, are viewed as contributing to peace-building and state-building. In most cases these contributions stem from the perceived peculiarity of WASH (what is delivered and how it is delivered) in comparison to other social services, notably health and education. At the same time, it is often argued that WASH services contribute to education and health services (WaterAid, n.d.). Sanitation and hygiene, especially, can be viewed as a preventative public health service. However, detailed exploration of these other services’ contribution to peace-building and state-building (and any secondary role for WASH in this regard) is beyond the scope of this review – readers are recommended to consult chapters 4 (Education) and 5 (Health) in Ndaruhutse et al. (2011).

4.1 The distinguishing features of WASH services and WASH service delivery

Before introducing some of the ways in which WASH services, as opposed to other social services, may impact upon peace-building and state-building, non-specialists may require an introduction to the salient features of water, sanitation and hygiene service delivery, with an eye to conflict-affected and fragile situations, and interactions between the state and other actors.

In the immediate aftermath of conflict, towards the peace-building end of the peace-building and state-building spectrum (see Box 2) water supply and sanitation are cited as some of the most urgent priorities, whether in communities affected by conflict, or in camps (UNICEF, 2009). Often, the emphasis is on health, with WASH in some cases viewed as an important environmental health component within a broader emergency health response (WHO, 2007). In this regard it may be harder to make a claim for WASH’s ‘special status’ in comparison to health services. Baird (2010) finds it easier to contrast water supply and sanitation (and health) services as ‘an urgent priority, to control outbreaks of disease and to reduce high mortality’ with the somewhat more long-term considerations of education ‘to provide a sense of normalcy and shared values/ identity to children’ (Baird, 2010:6). However, WASH may also be distinguished for its additional personal security dimension, since women and girls are especially vulnerable to assault or molestation if they have to travel in insecure areas to find private places for defecation, or to collect water (UNICEF, 2009).

While in the aftermath of conflict a relatively narrow range of actors are likely to provide WASH service delivery (notably humanitarian agencies and NGOs), this range diversifies as the space for state-building opens up. It therefore becomes imperative to consider the roles and relationships of different actors in providing WASH services – notably the state and non-state service providers. Ndaruhutse et al. (2011) argue that there is a greater role for private sector and community service provision of water supply and sanitation in CAFs, than there is for health or education. No explicit reason for this is given, and so it is is worth reflecting whether there are any strong structural justifications for this. Ultimately, it may be that health and education are so explicitly linked to key public goods around welfare and socialisation, respectively, that both government and society are
reluctant to see responsibility ceded to private enterprise or community groups, which may be viewed as having insufficient expertise or even ulterior motives. While the links between WASH services and welfare, including health but also time-savings, are widely attested to in the literature (Hutton, 2012), they may not be so apparent to people from their daily experience, and thus the perceived imperative for state supervision or direct provision may be lower. That said, continued controversy over private sector involvement in provision of services in a number of developing countries suggests this is yet another truism deserving of closer inspection.

Meanwhile, whatever the particularities of WASH compared to other services such as health and education, there are important differences in the way state and NSPs interact in the three subsectors within WASH – water supply, sanitation and hygiene.

Water
The role of the state, NSPs and communities is highly variable, but in many fragile contexts the extent and effectiveness of piped water services, provided by public utilities or private water companies, is very low. Banerjee and Morella (2011) found that a lower proportion of residents within utility service areas are actually served by these utilities in the case of low-income, fragile countries, than in the other country categories they analysed (i.e. low-income non-fragile, resource rich, and middle-income). This leaves informal providers stepping in to fill the gap, often entailing higher costs for water. There is limited analysis of who exactly gets blamed when private water companies fail to provide affordable water services, but a failed attempt to introduce private sector participation in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, is instructive. A 2005 public opinion survey revealed high levels of dissatisfaction with government performance on water service delivery, compared to health and education, even though a private operator had been in place since 2003 (de Waal & Cooke, 2008). While this may be a product of how the survey was phrased, it lends credence to the position that public authorities may be viewed as ultimate guarantors of water services even if they are not the provider per se.

The role of utilities and private water companies is in any case largely limited to urban areas across the developing world. In rural areas, the role of the state has been changing, with one notable trend being the decentralisation of responsibility for water services from central state agencies to local government, with implementation, management and maintenance in some cases further deferred to the private sector, community organisations, or individual households (Lockwood and Smits, 2011). However, there is wide variation as to how, and how far, these patterns have advanced, and evidence is weak for fragile states (CAFs were excluded from Lockwood and Smits’ study). As in the case of urban water supply, there also appears to be a lack of evidence to determine how service failures in these complex, multi-actor contexts affect citizens’ perceptions of the state.

Small towns, often nominally the responsibility of local government municipalities but frequently underserved, are of particular concern given they represent nuclei of rapid population growth (Caplan and Harvey, 2010) and often defy either conventional urban or rural service delivery approaches (Pilgrim, 2007).

Sanitation
Ndaruhutse et al. (2011) argue that society’s expectations of the state may be limited in the sanitation subsector, associated with a lack of spontaneous demand for sanitation services on the part of communities. This demand gap has two potential implications for state-society relations: first, that there may be no strong negative reaction if sanitation services are not provided (at least until there is a disease outbreak); second, that the state has an assumed role to stimulate demand, if it is informed of the health implications of inadequate sanitation. Indeed, Ndaruhutse et al. conclude that, in the case of sanitation, ‘software’ (i.e. demand stimulation, market development, and hygiene promotion) is the service-delivery component. The ‘hardware’ (infrastructure for containment, collection, transport and treatment of human waste) is more likely to be self-supplied, or supplied by small or large NSPs. While there may be a state role for provision of large-scale
infrastructure (e.g. sewage networks and treatment stations), the extent to which such infrastructure benefits the poor, or is even viable, in CAFs is debatable.

Another important consideration is the institutional fragmentation which is commonly alleged to afflict sanitation subsectors. The African Ministers’ Council on Water (AMCOW) Country Status Overviews found that many sub-Saharan Africa countries were still ‘establishing’ their sanitation subsectors (implying a lack of policies and institutional responsibilities). This was identified for notably more countries than was the case for the water supply subsector, including a large proportion of fragile states, as well as a number of countries that are not conventionally thought of as fragile (WSP, 2011a). The need for the state to provide an enabling framework, including policies and a coherent approach to delineate private and public roles, is often attested to by the case of Bangladesh – a country that has made significant progress on sanitation, and in particular, on reducing open defecation with high level political support and adoption of community-led total sanitation into policy (Ahmed, 2009).

These perceived roles for state, NSPs and communities have implications for how sanitation can contribute to state-building, as discussed in the following subsection. However, it should be noted that overall the role of the state in sanitation service delivery is not very clearly distinguished in the literature (Ndaruhutse et al., 2011) nor is the role for NSPs, self-supply or community managed options in CAFs well elaborated with empirical case studies or evaluations (Batley and Mcloughlin, 2010).

Hygiene

Hygiene promotion is often referred to as a subcomponent of sanitation (on the software side), and the above observations relating to the state's role may therefore apply to the hygiene subsector also. Hygiene promotion messages may be delivered by government extension workers, as in Ethiopia (WSP, 2011a), but NGOs also commonly perform this role, implying that even where government has nominal responsibility, intermediaries may interface with the public, disrupting any simple state-society relationship. In any case, the evidence base for the role of the state in the hygiene subsector is particularly unresearched, according to Ndaruhutse et al., and ‘it is not known how [hygiene promotion] helps in state-building. For instance it is poorly understood how citizens perceive improvements in their health through a state-led initiative and whether this increases their trust in the state’ (2011:37).

4.2 Particular contributions of WASH to peace-building and state-building

A number of specific ways that WASH, as opposed to other services, can contribute to peace-building and state-building are proposed or adumbrated in the literature. Most of these are either asserted on the basis of logic, circumstantial evidence or, in some cases, more in depth case studies. A selection are highlighted here.

WASH as apolitical

The OECD identifies water and sanitation, alongside healthcare, as the most ‘politically neutral’ (2008c:9) of services, yielding advantages in terms of social cooperation and partnerships between citizens and government. However, the argument is mainly made through a contrast with education and security services, as being more transformative, but also more prone to manipulation and polarisation. The idea of WASH as being somehow outside political manipulation, and therefore less likely to exacerbate social and society-state tensions, is brought into question by Eldon and Gunby, who reflect on the use of water as a political weapon in Zimbabwe, ‘to dominate, even punish society, particularly those elements which oppose the ZANU [Zimbabwe African National Union] state’ (Eldon and Gunby, 2008:120). The potential for highly complex interactions of past and present politics around water is further illustrated in Box 4, highlighting the importance of well-grounded empirical analysis to understand relationships between service delivery and peace-building and state-building.
The role of water in provoking and resolving conflict itself is comparatively well explored and insights may be relevant to understanding the potential links between water and peace-building. However, many of the recommendations derived from such studies could apply equally to other service sectors – for example, making use of conflict analysis, allocating more resources to software, and targeting services to centres of internal displacement/migration (CECORE and Saferworld, 2008; Welle, Malik and Slaymaker, 2008). Ndaruhutse et al. argue that sanitation is ‘a relatively less ideological service’ (2011:38), though the political and ideological implications of sanitation appear less well explored.

**Box 4: Complex interactions of state, services and society in Zimbabwe**

‘... water played an important role in the ‘reintegration’, of Matabeleland into the Zimbabwe nation state. The first state sector to engage with local people in the region was the water sector, as it was seen to be more ‘neutral’ than other sectors and as providing more direct links to the population at large. The first state technicians to arrive were met by local leaders who complained that they had been forced to get their drinking water from animals’ watering holes. They gladly accepted the offer of state-supplied water and sanitation. However they insisted that the technicians first visit the site of mass graves in the vicinity, to underline the point that whilst they welcomed state services, this did not confer legitimacy upon the ZANU state.’

Source: Eldon and Gunby (2008:108)

**WASH as a useful entry point**

Welle argues that the ‘attractive outputs’ of WASH, such as waterpoints, ‘could be used as an incentive for less tangible state-building activities such as capacity-building of local administrations’ (Welle, 2008:9). The idea of tangible outputs aligns with the concept of the ‘peace-dividend’, but there is little exploration in the literature of why functioning WASH infrastructure should be viewed as a more potent sign of a return to normalcy than, for example, health and education staff returning to work. Eldon and Gunby (2009), in their analysis of several country case studies on service delivery and state-building, cite evidence of a peace dividend in South Sudan, where the Basic Services Fund combined rehabilitation, construction, training, and operational support across health, WASH and education sectors.

**WASH as an infrastructure service**

As well as being a social service, WASH can also be viewed as an infrastructure service, aligning it with services like electricity which potentially contribute to state-building by enhancing opportunities at the level of the economy, as well as the household. As mentioned, electricity is the most commonly cited infrastructural constraint to business in violent areas, according to the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (World Bank, 2012). The surveys do not offer respondents the opportunity to select water supply constraints as one of the ‘biggest obstacles for business’, although continuity of water supply is considered as one of 16 infrastructure indicators. Figure 3 shows that, according to the latest enterprise surveys, of the 18 countries experiencing 10 or more instances of water supply insufficiency in a typical month almost half are fragile states.

While no more than circumstantial evidence, it seems that the potential for water services (and indeed, sanitation) to facilitate private sector participation and job creation at the economy-level (an emphasis of the WDR 2011) could be investigated further.
Figure 3: Fragile and non-fragile states where business reports more than ten water supply insufficiencies in a typical month

![Graph showing number of water insufficiencies](image)


WASH as facilitating community cohesion

A prevalent theme in the literature is the potential for both water supply and sanitation to provide a focal point for community collaboration and thus reduce tensions within society, if not between state and society. The use of community-based structures to manage and maintain water facilities has been in vogue since the 1980s, although the focus has been primarily on enhancing sustainability of infrastructure, rather than community cohesion. However, Cleaver and Toner (2006) have analysed the role of Water User Associations in Uchira, Tanzania, to highlight that community ownership is itself contested, and that 'community-owned' institutions evolve in complex ways. Simple assumptions about community participation and cohesion therefore need to be further interrogated.

In the case of sanitation, Ndaruhutse et al. (2011) reflect on the potential for demand-led approaches, notably Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS), to provide space for community collaboration, citing the experience of Tearfund in Afghanistan. In the village of Surkh, close and inclusive collaboration between households was observed for latrine construction, though the authors note that this was also facilitated by the existing topography of the village, divided into small hamlet communities (Tearfund, 2010). Certainly, community interaction is at the heart of CLTS, not least the use of shame and disgust as peer pressure mechanisms to reduce open defecation. However, the potential implications of CLTS-type approaches for state-society dynamics also need to be contrasted with conventional approaches, which often involve the provision of public subsidies and thus give a more conspicuous role to the state as benefactor.

WASH as empowering women

The particularly severe implications of inadequate WASH services for girls and women are commonly elaborated in the general literature for the sector, on the basis that they are: usually responsible for water collection and caring for sick children; vulnerable to attack if seeking a private place for open defecation; and, in the case of girls, liable to have a disrupted schooling if there are no facilities to manage menstruation in a dignified way. In this regard, a gender-sensitive approach to WASH service design, implementation and management has been recommended for some time (UNDP, 2003; GWA, 2003). Castillejo (2010) proposes that non-state, civil society structures in
post-conflict reconstruction can provide an entry point for mobilisation and involvement in state-building, which might be denied to them by formal political institutions and embedded elite interests. Given the particular gender dimensions of WASH services, there may be some room for community-level WASH structures to provide a similar catalytic role (Ndaruhutse et al., 2011) though this specific angle does not appear to have been extensively explored in the context of state-building, to date.

In conclusion, then, the links between WASH services and peace- and state-building outcomes appear to have been articulated in less detail than for service delivery in general and even for other specific services, notably health and education. There is commensurately even less empirical evidence to attest to those links that are asserted. That said, even a brief review of the particular characteristics of water supply, sanitation and hygiene points to a range of subsector-specific routes for influence, that arise in the particular modalities of service provision: who provides what service, for whom, in what way.
5 Service delivery modalities for peace-building/ state-building

Sections 3 and 4 introduced the possible impacts on peace-building and state-building, of service delivery in general, and WASH service delivery in particular, in generic terms. However, the service delivery modality (the what, who and how of the service, see Section 2.5) matters greatly, and is the subject of this section. The first subsection below introduces some of the important dimensions which characterise debates around service delivery modalities in CAFs. The second section investigates the implications of these dimensions for state-society relations, and by extension peace-building and state-building.

It should also be emphasised here that, just as a context of fragility necessitates certain forms of service provision, which may or may not then contribute to state-building, those fragile contexts are not fixed:

‘Fragility and resilience are neither fixed nor immutable, but rather should be seen as shifting points along a spectrum. Fragility and resilience are the consequences of factors that range from the structural, the historical, and the global, to very short-term events. Fragility and resilience are not necessarily temporary or chronic.’

OECD (2011:22)

The adage ‘context matters’ applies in all service delivery programming, but the particular diversity and mutability of fragile situations jeopardise any attempt to say generically which service delivery modalities work better than others. On a similar note, generic contextual labels – such as ‘post-conflict’, ‘emergency’ or ‘transitioning’ – may not allow us to get to the heart of particular situations, especially when the relatively fluid and potentially rival goals of peace-building and state-building are at stake.

Throughout this section, the focus on WASH established in Section 4 is maintained where possible, but literature relating to other services is introduced where the evidence for WASH is scarce.

5.1 Understanding how service delivery modalities potentially shape peace-building and state-building

In reviewing the literature on state-building in CAFs, Mcloughlin (2011) distinguishes a number of considerations that should inform ‘strategies for external engagement’. With slight adaptation, these considerations constitute important dimensions in which service delivery modalities may vary, and thus differently affect peace-building and state-building outcomes. They include the extent to which the modality:

- is delivered in cooperation with, or by, local institutions
- addresses exclusion, including gender-based exclusion
- encourages citizen engagement
- is decentralised

Timing (and by extension prioritisation) are also discussed in the literature as an important consideration for service provision in CAFs, and as another potential dimension in which service delivery modalities can impact on peace-building and state-building. Welle (2008:6, citing Harvey, 2006) advises that project cycles for WASH service provision need to be longer-term in fragile states, so as to ‘allow for building trust and maintaining a dialogue with government, while also having more time to support user voices and agency for increased accountability’. The sequencing of different interventions within broader state-building endeavours (though not specifically service delivery) is discussed by OECD, who advise that priorities ‘will vary depending on the broad stage of state-building’ (OECD, 2011:47). That broad stage is in turn defined by progress on milestones...
including establishing basic security, developing an inclusive political settlement, and the degree to which long standing structural causes of conflict or state illegitimacy have been addressed.

The importance of timing is also alluded to by the WDR 2011, which refers to ‘best-fit’ reforms – pragmatic responses to the risks of political backlash and premature overloading of weak institutions, which contrast with ‘best-practice’ technocratic reforms. Best-fit reforms may entail unorthodox modes of delivery (e.g. using state, private, faith-based, community-based and traditional structures simultaneously), but also require difficult decisions about the prioritisation of reforms and services, for example whether payment and settlement of combatants should take precedence over provision of social and basic services. The concept of best-fit reforms, with their emphasis on what context means for programming, leads us from considering the key dimensions of service delivery modalities in CAFs, to a deeper investigation of the implications of each dimension for state-building and peace-building, in the next section. Meanwhile, the ‘elephant in the room’ which must be kept in view, is whether basic services as a whole should be recognised as less urgent priorities for peace- and (particularly) state-building, when compared to security, justice, and jobs. While this is a view implied by the WDR 2011, it is not one for which the evidence is conclusive, as yet.

5.2 Implications of different service delivery modalities for peace-building and state-building: who does what, for whom, and how?

Local institutions
This dimension relates primarily to who is providing the service. Within the literature the incapacity of very weak states to provide services is widely acknowledged, but the need to work with local institutions, including the state and non-state actors is simultaneously emphasised (Rocha Menocal, 2009; Batley and McLoughlin, 2010). In the immediate aftermath of conflict, when ‘quick and visible improvements in everyday conditions’ are necessary (Rocha Menocal, 2009:3) and peace-building is more of a priority than state-building, it may be acceptable to use international NGOs to provide services directly. However, it appears almost to be a given within the literature that bypassing local (i.e. national) institutions for protracted periods is undesirable, and attention quickly turns to the relative merits of using different local (i.e. national) institutions, principally different types of non-state providers. Within this discussion other institutions are often drawn in, notably the state, as the intended ultimate guarantor of services, and the international agencies that often fund services in CAFs (and that are arguably the main audience for the policy and academic literature).

The WDR 2011’s best-fit approach to service delivery proposes a range of non-state providers, including the private sector, traditional structures, communities, NGOs and faith-based organisations. In the latter case the example of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is highlighted, where schools were kept running through the 1990s by religious organisations, responsible for 81% of public primary schools and 77% of public secondary schools (World Bank, 2011b). Multiple configurations are possible between the state, non-state providers and funding agencies, with differing levels of visibility and responsibility for the state, and potential implications for state-building both in terms of how it is perceived and its capacity (Box 5).

The OECD views contracting out of services as a particularly useful option, especially in comparison with core government roles such as internal policy making, administration and defence. With regards to capacity, it acknowledges the ‘common perception that contracting out may reduce incentives for governments to develop their own systems and processes for providing services or functions directly’ but argues that by retaining a strategic role in policy setting, service standards, and performance monitoring, state capacity need not be undermined (OECD, 2009:34). In terms of legitimacy, the OECD similarly argues that the state does not necessarily need to be seen as service provider, but rather as the ultimately responsible party, organising or guaranteeing
the work of other actors. Where these non-state actors work outside any framework defined by the state, they may undermine state legitimacy, supplementing or competing with it (OECD, 2010).

This latter scenario seems especially plausible where contracts are arranged between the funding agency and a non-state provider directly, with government as a marginalized third party. An evaluation of AusAid’s support to WSS in East Timor points out that subcontracting NGOs to provide services, bypassing government, has doubly undermined the state-citizen relationship – by denying the government the opportunity to be recognised as a service provider in the first place, and by leaving the government hamstrung to provide repair and maintenance support when systems break down, or to extend systems to meet increased demand (AusAid, 2009).

Box 5: Forms of collaboration between conflict-affected and fragile states and non-state service providers

**Contracting out:** The working definition adopted by the OECD and AfDB for contracting out is ‘the transfer of competences and/or authority between a delegating authority (the purchaser) and a third party (the contractor), for a given period of time, based on a contractual agreement’ (OECD, 2009). Contracted services may be funded from the government’s own budget, but external funding sources may also be used, with external entities in some cases also undertaking to execute and manage the contract.

**Grants:** A non-state service provider defines the scope of services (usually through a project proposal), rather than the state, though the latter may impose some conditions, for example to ensure coherence with national frameworks.

**Public-private partnerships (PPPs):** The state and (private) NSP mutually undertake to collaborate, but without the formal legal basis of a contract. PPPs cover a broader range of forms of collaboration than contracting out, and may imply private sector investment in, and some degree of control over, assets.

**Mutual agreements:** Voluntary undertakings by the state and NSP to plan and implement together, with separate funding directed to common ends, enforceable by common desire to maintain good relations and reputation, rather than a legal contract which delegates authority from purchaser to contractor.

**Co-production:** Often informal agreements between the state and organized groups within the recipient communities to collaborate over service provision, with resources contributed by both parties.

*Source: OECD (2009)*

While there is a tendency to see service provision by NSPs as potentially detrimental to state capacity and legitimacy, Ndahutse et al. argue that, in the case of water supply, ‘even where the state has capacity it may only be effective when combined with activities of NSPs and with the functioning of informal institutions’. This implies a more nuanced view of the role of state versus non-state providers, with considerable interplay between the two. ‘State ideas may penetrate non-state and informal (or ‘twilight’) institutions whilst conversely plural institutional channels also provide routes through which the state can ‘read’ and respond to society’ (Ndahutse et al., 2011:43).

However, it should also be expected that in fragile situations capacity constraints will extend beyond the state, and political and conflict legacies may further constrain the options for utilising non-state providers. Plummer and Slaymaker (2007) point to legacies of anti-NGO sentiment within the Mozambican government and a similar resistance to private enterprise involvement on the part of Ethiopia, in their respective post-conflict politics.
Furthermore, there are questions about the state’s capacity to regulate and manage NSPs, though Batley and Mcloughlin (2010) argue that insufficient capacity or information to properly ‘manage’ or ‘harness’ NSPs is found in all developing countries, not just CAFs. The authors argue that successful engagement between the state and non-state providers depends on the capacity of both parties, and that the demands and risks are highest where the state is directly responsible for NSPs, either through long-term formal contracts, or as a regulator. As a lower risk alternative, they argue for policy dialogue and local, mutual agreements (Box 5) between state and NSPs.

Finally, it is perhaps worth considering the implications where NSPs are acting in direct competition with the state, for example where rebel organisations or organised criminal elements use service provision as means to establish their own legitimacy with the people (Box 6). This is particularly significant where it challenges the authority of the state throughout all of its territory, which lies at the very foundation of the definition of statehood.

**Box 6: Hezbollah’s provision of water services in Lebanon**

‘The Jihad Construction Foundation, Jihad El Binaa, has become one of the most important NGOs in Lebanon. This institution is responsible for infrastructure construction and, in the early 2000s, delivered water to about 45 percent of the residents of Beirut’s southern suburb. Following the Israeli aerial bombardment of Lebanon in summer 2006, the Jihad Construction Foundation became indispensable, assessing damage and paying reconstruction compensation to residents of southern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburb.’

Source: Flanigan and Abdel-Samad (2009:124)

**Inclusivity**

The issue of inclusiveness of services is recognised within the literature to contribute to both peace-building and state-building (Ndaruhutse et al., 2011), based on the arguments that social exclusion is itself a driver of conflict (OECD, 2008c) and lies at the core of unequal, unstable power relations.

The OECD (2008c) raises some important (if contrary) points, for example by suggesting that while clientelism can result in exclusion (Keefer and Kemani, 2003), at the same time there are often ancillary benefits which are more widespread – citing the example of wells drilled ostensibly to reward political support in Pakistan. They also pose the important question of whether there are situations in which rights to equitable services may be trumped by political calculations that potentially hold greater significance for stability and peace – another case where peace- and state-building goals may appear to be in tension.

Welle (2008) and DFID (2010) argue that while the use of traditional structures such as tribal authorities can enhance social cohesion, they can perpetuate the exclusion of certain groups, including women. Scott (2007) has nonetheless pointed out that gender issues are a particular gap in the literature on state-building, and there appears to be little evidence on the potentially complex ways in which marginalised groups, including women, can increase their role in peace-building or state-building through involvement in service provision. Burt and Keiru (2011) make an important contribution with case studies from DRC, Afghanistan and Liberia, showing the role women have played in establishing security for themselves and their communities by taking a lead role in water management structures.

Ndaruhutse et al. (2011) point out that user fees, while controversial for their potential to exclude the poorest, may be appropriate in some instances, for example where they permit a wider range of services to be provided than might otherwise be possible (Ndaruhutse et al., 2011, drawing on Hutton, 2004).
Citizen engagement

The extent to which citizens are engaged in the process of service delivery is raised as an issue for peace and state-building not only from the perspective of enhancing inclusion (see above) but also with a view to strengthening civil society more generally, with community-driven approaches recommended especially in this regard (e.g. Welle, 2008; Plummer and Slaymaker, 2007).

The WDR 2011 derives a number of key insights for programming in fragile contexts, in order to ensure early results can lead to institutional transformation in the longer term. Of these, the concept of ‘multisectoral community empowerment programs’ is especially relevant to the provision of social/infrastructure services. The WDR highlights two models for such programs, which emphasise community consultation with the aim of building state-society relations from the bottom up, by delivering services in a demand-led manner. The first, exemplified by the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan, seeks to direct block grants to community structures who then identify and respond to priorities at local level (broadly, this is the concept of community-driven development or reconstruction). The second leaves it to NGOs and state agencies to provide services, but insists that they consult extensively with community councils. Other insights of the WDR 2011 for programming which may be relevant for WASH service delivery in support of peace-building and state-building include: the importance of social accountability mechanisms and civil society/community monitoring to limit pernicious misuse of funds; and the importance of involving women in decision making – a practical as much as an ethical concern given that post-conflict demographics often feature a larger number of female-headed households (World Bank, 2011b).

The potential role for traditional institutions may also be relevant here, as these may be more representative of citizens, and suited to conflict mediation, than new, imposed political forms (notwithstanding concerns over exclusion, mentioned above). The role of tribal and related structures in mediating conflicts over water in pastoral regions of Ethiopia is described by Nassef and Belayhun (2011), who advocate for increased integration of these community-level structures in government policy and planning.

Ndaruhutse et al. (2011) caution that citizen engagement in service delivery is unlikely to be easy in fragile contexts. Households in CAFs are characterised by high dependency ratios, implying families with large numbers of young children and other care-dependent members, or child or grandparent headed households, which may struggle to be fully involved in water service planning, implementation or management. In violent or emergency contexts, basic survival needs will necessarily be prioritised and reduce, or remove entirely, the time available for such activities.

A further important aspect of citizen engagement, even if it does not go as far as a full community-driven development approach, is accountability and responsiveness – emphasised as integral to state-building according to DFID’s model (Figure 1). However, despite the relatively rich literature on accountability generally, Ndaruhutse et al. (2011) find that across health, education and WASH sectors there has been little research on how service-related governance and accountability processes may contribute to peace-building and state-building. The WDR 2011 points to the potential for new technologies to facilitate citizen-state communication and accountability, for example citizen surveys conducted via SMS (short messaging service) in DRC (MDRP, 2006).

Decentralisation

Decentralisation occupies an important place in the literature on peace-building and state-building. The OECD (2011) points out that an evolving political settlement will often necessitate negotiation over centre-periphery relations and choices over the degree of decentralisation of services (as well as power), with potential implications for state-building and peace-building – as for example when patterns of exclusion arise between sub-national groups, or between sub-national groups and the centre.
Ndaruhatse et al. (2011) argue that decentralisation can provide opportunities to increase accountability and respond to local needs (and thus potentially enhance its legitimacy). On the other hand, decentralisation may reinforce asymmetries of power, leaving poor people to access services through local elites – as Mapedza and Geheb (2010) assert in the case of Zimbabwe’s water sector.

Booth (2010), reflecting on the variation in public goods provision at sub-national level in a number of sub-Saharan African countries (not specifically fragile states), proposes that the success of decentralisation may well hinge on the presence of an effective state at the centre, while differences in outcomes can be attributed to: a coherent vision for public goods’ provision; a sufficiently resourced and regulated bureaucracy; and institutions which can enable local collective action combining problem solving capacity with motivating elements borrowed from past tradition. While these attributes are not impossible to envisage in CAFs, they appear somewhat less likely, implying that the potential for decentralisation to improve public goods provision (and by extension, the ability of the state to meet expectations) needs to be evaluated carefully in fragile contexts.

**Timing and prioritisation**

The OECD’s careful reference to ‘broad stages’ (OECD, 2011:47; see section 5.1 above) adumbrates a common distinction made in the literature on services in CAFs, between emergency/humanitarian forms of service provision, and those more oriented towards development objectives – with an intermediate ‘recovery’ phase also sometimes mentioned.

Mcloughlin (2011) argues that the importance of striking a balance between the different needs of these phases is especially well recognised in the literature on WASH in fragile states – though much of this would appear to arise from the imperative to effectively deliver services in difficult environments, rather than the grander goals of peace-building and state-building. Plummer and Slaymaker (2007) point out that, for all the discussion of an ordered and deliberate transition from humanitarian provision of water supply towards sustainable development of a water service, best practice thinking for WASH still enforces a boundary between two different sets of roles and responsibilities. They recommend a ‘conscious effort... to maintain coherence’ on the part of both humanitarian and development specialists, throughout the slow development of capability, accountability and responsiveness on the supply and demand sides (Plummer and Slaymaker, 2007:31). Examples from Timor Leste and Rwanda illustrate two potential ‘transitions’ from services provided by international humanitarian agencies, to development of a sector proper (Box 7). While any implications for peace-building and state-building are inferred in general terms, both examples point to the importance of strong and collaborative relationships between donors and the (re)nascent state, and between donors themselves, with clear expectations around the procedure and timing for transferring responsibilities. It is also during this type of transition that tensions between service delivery modalities aiming at peace-building (the humanitarian goal of meeting basic needs and securing the peace dividend) and state-building (the development goal of sustainable services with clearly articulated roles and responsibilities) are most apparent.

Again, it is here important to note that the question of prioritisation means choices not just within sectors, but potentially also between them. The OECD (2010) argues that a macro-economic framework to facilitate economic activity, infrastructure, and social services (referring to health and education) are essential components of output legitimacy (see section 2.6) but are somewhat secondary to provision of security, which is a prerequisite for those other goods and services to be provided.
### Box 7: Transitioning from international humanitarian to state-owned service delivery in Timor Leste and Rwanda

The WDR 2011 proposes that a phased transition from international humanitarian aid to services delivered by local institutions may be appropriate, as exemplified by the health sector in Timor-Leste. In the first phase of this transition, international and national NGOs provided emergency health services, funded directly by humanitarian aid; responsibility was then transferred to an interim health service which developed performance indicators and signed memoranda of understanding with NGOs to standardise service packages; in the third phase humanitarian NGOs were contracted directly by the interim health authority. For the fourth and final phase the interim authority was replaced by a new ministry of health, assuming management of the system and facilities at district level, with NGOs continuing to provide specialist services and capacity building. By 2004 (four years after the independence referendum) this strategy, under which all major international agencies agreed to work, had achieved 90% access to health facilities within a two hour walking distance; and over a similar timeframe the number of outpatient visits per capita rose from 0.75 to 2.13. The central ministry and its district operations also proved resilient to a resurgence in violence in 2005-2006.

In the WASH sector, WSP argues that Rwanda provides an instructive example of a country that has succeeded in transitioning from donor-executed emergency projects in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, to country-led sectoral programmes with funding routed through core government systems. The development of a sector policy within four years of the genocide (subsequently updated to integrate principles of decentralisation and delegated management) is regarded as a key development. The policy provided the basis for a US$20m rural WSS project, to be executed by the government with World Bank funding. Importantly, the project did much to develop the capacity of local private sector contractors for construction of water infrastructure, helping to rapidly increase the sector’s adsorptive capacity and accelerate access to water. These improvements allowed the government, in 2002, to negotiate for budget support provided through a series of Poverty Reduction Support Credits for sectors including health, education and water.

Source: for Timor Leste, Klaus and Cliffe (2002), cited in World Bank (2011b); for Rwanda, WSP (2011a)
6 Concluding remarks: weighing the evidence and research approaches

The fact that many assertions made in the literature, of links between WASH and peace- and state-building, appear to be derived from logical deduction and circumstantial evidence is perhaps unsurprising. The causal pathways are complex and outcomes often intangible, expressed in attitude and behaviour. Where empirical data is available to attest to the asserted links, it usually comes from case studies.

The case study evidence base on the links between WASH services and peace-building and state-building has recently been strengthened with a number of papers published in the journal Water International (Volume 36, Issue 2), ahead of an expanded collection in a book (Weinthal et al., forthcoming). Whilst several articles focus on water resources management, there are interesting insights from Afghanistan, Liberia and DRC with regards to the potential impacts of water supply and sanitation services on peace-building and state-building.

Burt and Keiru (2011) reflect on the development of community-managed water supplies for a group of villages in South Kivu, DRC, in a manner which appears to have substantively helped to resolve conflict. The initial beneficiaries in the village of Swima were threatened by the neighbouring residents of Ihua village, who were aggrieved at the perceived imbalance in service provision, and reportedly resorted to attempting to contaminate the intake of the Swima water supply. However, the water committee established for Swima was able to negotiate with the Ihua villagers to secure an extension that integrated Ihua into the piped distribution system. The negotiation was brokered mainly by women, who have seized new opportunities for participation in community and public life following the period of conflict. In another paper in the series, Pinera and Reed (2011) point to the successful integration of informal water vendors into the municipal supply framework in Clara Town, Liberia, led by Oxfam. By lobbying for a number of vendors to be legalised, and providing plastic tanks and meters to enable them to supply water 24 hours per day and contribute to the financial sustainability of the utility, the authors argue that the project was able to conspicuously improve the reach of municipal services (i.e. a local manifestation of ‘the state’) in otherwise underserved areas. The approach is contrasted with other community-based projects in Monrovia which favoured autonomous wells and so lacked the opportunities for building links between the state, or at least the municipality, and citizens.

Case studies can provide rich information, and designed and implemented with care, can add insights around personal and collective attitudes and behaviour, for example in relation to citizens’ attitudes to one another and the state. For example, Burt and Keiru reflect on the importance of water supply development for women’s personal security in the village of Henry Town, Liberia, attested to by their expressed demands for handpumps – on the grounds that this would reduce the risks to personal safety incurred when collecting water from an enclosed creek in the forest (Burt & Keiru, 2011).

But despite these advantages, case studies have limitations, for example: around generalisation i.e. extrapolating from the single case to arrive at a general truth; the risk that case studies can be misused to confirm preconceived notions; and, often, the absence of a counterfactual to confirm that, without the intervention, the observed impact would not have occurred.

Academics and donors are increasingly demanding more experimental forms of assessment, commonly grouped under the term impact evaluation, to test if outcomes can be attributed to a specific intervention. Such approaches have also been adapted to investigate intangible outcomes of interest from a peace- and state-building perspective, such as strengthened social capital, and capacity for collective action. A particular focus for such evaluations is community-driven development (CDD) programmes, an approach that has also been imported to post-conflict and fragile contexts, for example the Community-Driven Reconstruction (CDR) approach employed by
organisations such as the International Rescue Committee. CDD and CDR programmes are based on the principles of demand-led intervention and entrusting project planning, execution and monitoring to local communities and populations (Cliffe et al., 2003:2). CDD and CDR programmes can therefore involve WASH components, but only if these are identified as a priority by the community itself. The policy and programming logic for CDD/ CDR is predicated on the assumption that catalysing and supporting community-level institutions to take charge of their own development initiatives will strengthen not only tangible outcomes (e.g. infrastructure services) but also intangible outcomes such as social capital. But after several decades of CDD/ CDR programmes, experimental impact evaluations are providing mixed evidence for such intangible outcomes, at best. Given the policy momentum for mainstreaming peace- and state-building into WASH service delivery in CAFs is relatively less advanced, the reality check on impacts of community-driven approaches provides an instructive lesson – better to rigorously test assumptions now, and modify approaches accordingly, than to embed a resource-intensive way of working without being sure it will have the assumed effects.

Some evidence for intangible outcomes is provided by a randomised impact evaluation of a CDR project implemented by International Rescue Committee in Liberia, financed by DFID with objectives of increasing social cohesion, reinforcing political attitudes, and improving material wellbeing (Fearon et al., 2009). Randomisation, itself a methodologically and ethically challenging issue, was embedded in the project, with ‘treatment’ communities selected for participation through a public lottery. While standard household surveys could be used to assess the effects of the project on material wellbeing, a novel experimental game was developed to assess differences in political practices and social cooperation between treatment and control communities (Box 8).

Box 8: Experimental games to assess the impact of community-driven reconstruction on social cooperation and cohesion

Political and social attitudes can be very difficult to measure, making it hard to assess the relative merits of different types of intervention (or indeed ‘service delivery modalities’) on peace-building and state-building. An impact evaluation of a CDR project implemented by the International Rescue Committee in Liberia developed an experimental game to test actual behaviour, rather than expressed opinion which is more susceptible to the desire to respond ‘appropriately’ to questions. The game was applied to both the treatment communities, who received the CDR project based on random selection through a lottery, and control communities.

In this game, all communities were offered the chance to compete for funds from a Liberian NGO, to implement a public goods project (to a maximum of $500). The competition was based on the results of a community-wide public goods game, ‘in which 24 randomly selected individuals could choose privately to retain a sum of money for their own use or contribute it to a community fund... to be used for the public good’ (Fearon et al., 2009:51). Data was gathered to assess how communities and individuals might differ in their behaviour.

The evaluation’s comparison of treatment and control communities established that the CDR project had (i) a measurable positive impact on community cohesion (collective action to fund-raise and implement); (ii) an apparent positive impact on social inclusion (e.g. higher contributions to the community project from traditionally marginalised groups) and (iii) some evidence of reinforced democratic values and practices (higher likelihood of democratic selection processes for community representatives in treatment communities). Interestingly, while the evaluation succeeded in demonstrating the positive socialisation impacts of the CDR approach, it was less able to demonstrate an increase in material wellbeing (livelihoods and asset holdings) at the household-level, though improvements in community-level facilities were observed.

Source: Fearon et al. (2009)
Other evaluations of CDD/ CDR programmes have been less conclusive, or have found no evidence for impacts in terms of enhanced social capital. A multi-year evaluation is being conducted on Phase II of Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program, for which interim impact estimates have been published (see Beath et al., 2011). Though preliminary, the results indicate that alongside material benefits, improved perceptions of government figures and changes in village governance (principally arising from the creation of Community Development Councils to disburse block grants for infrastructure and human capital development projects) have arisen from the program, alongside material benefits. There is no appreciable change in interpersonal trust among villagers as a result of the program, or of the likelihood of the village suffering violent attack. The latter, material benefits are more in terms of access to community-level services, including availability and use of safe drinking water, than household level consumption or income.

Avdeenko and Gilligan (2012) assess the impacts of the Sudan Community Development Fund on development of social capital, attempting to separate out internal social processes and attitudes between community members, and those between community members and local governing institutions. Using both surveys and the experimental behavioural games of the sort employed by Fearon et al. (2009), they find ‘no difference in the pro-social behavior between villagers in program communities and control communities’ (Avdeenko and Gilligan, 2012:22). The same paper also brings into question the validity of Fearon et al.’s conclusions, noting that impacts on social capital were observed only in one treatment arm, a mixed gender group, but not in all-female groups. Another important study by Casey et al. (Forthcoming:1), of a CDD programme in post-water Sierra Leone, found ‘no evidence for sustained impacts on collective action, decision-making, or the involvement of marginalized groups, suggesting that the intervention did not durably reshape local institutions’.

But just as there are criticisms of reliance on case studies for testing the links between interventions and intangible outcomes such as those associated with peace- and state-building, so are there a number of difficulties with impact evaluations. Foremost, the use of experimental approaches such as randomised control trials needs to be an integral part of programme design, rather than an ex-post addition to the programme in the mould of most other forms of assessment. This requires significant advance preparation, which may not be possible in tight project cycles (especially those responding to emergencies), as well as willing partners among funders, implementation agencies and communities. The evaluators of the Liberia CDR project provide further useful methodological lessons – not least the fact that while randomised design provides for robust assessment of impacts on socio-political behaviour, assessing the magnitude of such impacts and thus establishing value for money is much harder (compared to, say, looking at impacts on material welfare, which are more easily monetised and quantified).

Other important challenges of conducting rigorous impact evaluation in fragile contexts are highlighted by Garbarino and Holland (2009) with reference to DFID’s programmes in DRC, commencing in 2006. These include: the difficulty of obtaining even basic monitoring data in a ‘data-free’ environment (particularly for the purposes of establishing a baseline); the difficulty of conducting survey work in an insecure environment; the low levels of local capacity for monitoring and evaluation in universities and national bodies; and the difficulties of convincing political actors that sensitive questions (about social and political attitudes) need to be asked during a time of transition from conflict. However, these limitations arguably also apply to other analytical approaches, such as case studies or political economy analysis.

There is unlikely to be a single research approach which will conclusively establish how far, and how best, WASH interventions can support peace-building and state-building outcomes. Even with experimental approaches, it would be difficult to conclusively prove causality, because the causal pathways are so complex. As Ndarahutse et al. (2011) argue:

‘There is an assumption that aspects of legitimacy can be measured, and that the relationship of models of service delivery to legitimacy can be understood. Yet the dynamic nature involved in looking at how service delivery can generate legitimacy and thus build a
more resilient social contract, implies that any inference of causality is... an inference [at best].’
Ndaruhutse et al. (2011:11)

The sheer complexity of the problem, as well as the flaws in each research approach, point to the need for mixed methods, potentially combining case study analysis to construct a workable conceptual framework and hypotheses for the particular routes of influence, which can then be tested in greater depth using experimental methods, as well as further explored with non-experimental approaches such as ethnography and political economy analysis. Community scorecards, increasingly used to enhance accountability in basic service delivery, may also offer a tool to assess the perceptions of WASH service users of the state, peace and society – provided that simple yet robust indicators pertaining to peace-building and state-building can be developed. Wild and Harris (2012) reflect on the potential for community scorecards to catalyse communities’ own capacity for self-help and collective problem solving, which may make them especially attractive from a peace-building and state-building perspective (though care would need to be taken to distinguish social capital benefits arising from the service itself, from those which arise from the scorecard evaluation process).

The policy space to engage on some of the most intractable developmental and governance challenges faced by fragile states is rapidly opening up, with leadership from the governments of such states, and commitment from donors - most prominently around the ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’ which emerged from the Busan Conference on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, and includes among five Peace-building and State-building Goals the aim to ‘Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery’ (OECD, 2012). The challenge is now for the research and practitioner communities to work together in establishing how best to deliver on expansive ambitions around peace and statehood, without distracting from basic humanitarian and development objectives such as equitable and sustainable services.
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