Many key programming tools, such as technical assistance and capacity building, are technical in nature, relying on the uptake or use of knowledge in order to have an impact. These tools are not, however, deployed in a vacuum: they are used in contexts with diverse and often deeply-entrenched power dynamics and political economy features. As a result, they unfold at the interface between knowledge and power.

This background note draws on a recent ODI book on Knowledge, Policy and Power in International Development (H. Jones et al., 2012) to argue that in-country programming decisions should incorporate an analysis of the dynamics around knowledge, policy and power (KPP) to improve their effectiveness and value for money.

Background

While our framing of these issues may not be familiar, the challenges faced are well-known to development practitioners – and matter for the effectiveness, impact, and value for money of in-country programming. Knowledge-based modalities, such as technical assistance (TA) and policy dialogue, could have high impact at relatively low cost (Clarke et al., 2009; World Bank, 2004), but not if they are deployed inappropriately. When undertaken without a clear strategy, there is a risk they can be a waste of money, resulting in nothing more than long reports that sit on shelves.

For example, a great deal of money and effort is spent on TA and capacity building (CB) to improve service delivery in such areas as health, education and agriculture. However, evidence shows that the extent to which this might translate into reforms and improved outcomes depends on, for example, whether the service has always been a source of state legitimacy or an expression of the social contract; the origins of elite incentives; as well as the calculations of political returns made by actors at all levels (McLoughlin and Batley, 2012).

Similarly, intense efforts are made to manage sector programming according to principles of good planning and evidence-informed policy, but such efforts may have little impact, and may even undermine the development of locally viable solutions if they do not foster local ownership, make best use of local systems and local knowledge, and respect prevailing power dynamics.

The key questions are: how best to deploy technical instruments, and how to design and manage processes based on assumptions of rational problem-solving for the public good, given a country’s political economy and power dynamics?

Experienced practitioners and programme managers have grappled intuitively with this question for decades, and there are no easy answers. But it is of growing importance as agency staff find themselves managing larger budgets and workloads, making it more important to find workable solutions to this dilemma. Meanwhile, short field postings in-country and fast staff turnover leave less time to build up the tacit knowledge that comes from hands-on experience of managing programmes in a specific country context.
Background Note

Box 1: The Knowledge, Policy and Power (KPP) framework

Processes of decision-making and policy change vary widely across countries, and even within countries across different sectors. However, this variation has four common dimensions, laid out in a recent handbook (Jones et al., 2012). Their relevance for in-country programming is summarised here.

Context: Five context variables cut across a broad range of state types and play a key role in shaping the knowledge-policy landscape, including windows of opportunities and institutional entry points for knowledge production and use.

Actors: A three-part framework offers direction for engaging actors in rational and technical processes, and for mapping and analysing their behaviour. Key drivers revolve around: interests and incentives, values and beliefs, and technical capacity and credibility.

Types of knowledge: A range of tools are presented for understanding how different types of knowledge (such as scientific knowledge, practical experience or citizen voices) shape stability, change and effectiveness, and provide resources and opportunities for improved policy and practice.

Knowledge interaction processes: A final framework provides guidance on understanding how processes such as consultation and collaboration mediate the transfer and use of knowledge and information, functioning to include or exclude actors to differing degrees, and affecting the quality and robustness of decision-making.

There is now, however, help at hand from a growing body of evidence on the dynamics of the interface between knowledge and power. This, combined with emerging toolkits to approach and understand such problems, is making these issues around power relations more explicit, allowing for more analytical guidance, more rigorous appraisal of key issues, and more systematic sharing of good practice. Many agencies are beginning to consider it a wise investment to use this kind of analysis to help secure the ownership and leadership required to ensure the impact of their programming, and to promote rigour, transparency and innovation in these crucial decisions.

Within this broader context, this background note begins by reviewing the interplay of knowledge and power within key development modalities, and then looks at three key tasks faced by managers and practitioners and how KPP analysis has helped decision-making in these contexts. It concludes by asking the reader how they might use these insights in practice.

Development programming at the interface of knowledge and policy

A large proportion of the tools at the disposal of aid agency country offices are technical in nature, but the interface between knowledge and policy is mediated by power. We begin by reviewing four examples within key development modalities: TA, policy dialogue, CB and promoting technology uptake.

Technical assistance (TA)

It is estimated that at least one third of all global aid is spent on TA (Action Aid, 2011). While it takes many different forms in practice, its central aim is to broker expert knowledge into the policy process, to improve policy design and implementation. Its influence often depends on what use is made of technical reports, their findings and related briefings. This process is, however, a function of domestic policy processes and the inner workings of government ministries, which tend to be as much sites for politics, the exercise of power and contestation as they are for rational debate and problem-solving.

Many key issues affecting the impact of TA are influenced by prevailing power dynamics. These include: the spaces afforded to staff and consultants with technical knowledge; the engagement of high level staff with assessment and analysis; the incentives and windows of opportunity for individuals, teams or coalitions to translate findings and recommendations into policy and practice; and the negotiation between different perspectives and proposals.

Understanding the interaction between knowledge and power is also important in choosing the right topic, the correct timing and suitable partners and ‘champions’ in government. Selecting the most suitable, credible experts; designing the process of engagement around the study; and targeting the findings are also key. Second best technical solutions may work more effectively in the face of on-the-ground constraints where, for example, social transfer systems must be acceptable in a particular political and ideological landscape, as well as being technically appropriate (Slater and Farrington, 2009). Even the perception of who is considered an expert on a particular topic can be an issue of power imbalances or political allegiances.

Policy dialogue

Aid agencies are increasingly engaged in policy influencing and policy dialogue activities, especially given the trend towards budget support. Engagement with policy is usually led by an agency’s technical staff or professional advisors, often to promote the uptake or prioritisation of pro-poor measures by national governments or to improve the implementation
or effectiveness of policies (Clarke et al., 2009). However, these are not neutral inputs to processes that are working logically towards the public good. National government counterparts rarely operate outside the incentives and imperfect institutions that shape the functioning of government. Rather, these inputs function at the interface between knowledge and power. The relevance and status of an idea, a ‘fact’ or a perspective emerging from dialogue inputs has as much to do with the coalitions that support it and its ‘fit’ with prevailing ideologies and institutions, as with its technical merit (H. Jones, 2012).

Therefore, agency staff require the technical knowledge and expertise (and often the prospect of funding) to get them into the room where key decisions are made. However, strategic efforts must then be made to capitalise on this entry point, to select the options for advocacy, for leveraging funding for genuine policy ownership, and to find allies in order to get things done.

**Capacity building (CB)**

Working to build individual and organisational capacity through workshops and other training methods with government staff and non-governmental organisations is an important tool of many development programmes. Increasing a country’s capacity to determine and implement their own vision for progress is seen as an effective way to promote sustainable change in developing countries.

‘Capacity’ encompasses acquired skills and technical know-how, but there are also clear issues of power and politics in building it. Questions of whose capacity is built, and why, are crucial, and political economy analysis shows how the level of technical capacity and performance often reflects the incentives for staff in an organisation, organisational cultures and institutional structures, and that limited performance does not always signal a lack of capacity (e.g. Booth et al., 2009). This does not apply only to governments, as civil society capacities are often a function of their standing in relation to government and foreign funding.

Therefore, efforts to promote improvements in capacity should be informed by an understanding of the social and political forces that have led to the current situation, the dynamics of legitimacy and credibility that contribute to ‘beneficiary’ ownership of programme aims and activities, and the implications for increased capacity and agency on the part of certain actors (Land et al., 2009).

**Promoting technology uptake**

Interventions in a number of sectors promote the uptake of new technologies and the promotion or spread of innovations in practices. The aim is to find new, more efficient or effective ways of doing things to, for example, increase productivity in the agricultural sector, or improve the management of natural resources. However, while the supply of knowledge or innovations is one key element in how this works, the demand for knowledge, the networks and linkages between actors, and the opportunities and constraints posed by ‘framework conditions’ that form the basis of an innovation system are all crucial in determining success (Arnold and Bell, 2001).

All of these are, in turn, conditioned by the operations of power. The extent to which some groups can and do ‘demand’ knowledge and new practices is a function of levels of empowerment and organisation, and their expression of voice. Strong networks and linkages are often key features of social capital and work along boundaries of key social groups and strata affecting the distribution, boundaries, and pace of innovation uptake.

Institutional structures and interactions also shape the ‘framework conditions’ as much as factors such as infrastructure, which may often reflect power dynamics as ‘pork barrel’ politics, with resources distributed to preferred groups or constituencies of decision-makers. Equally, the appropriateness of a technology needs to be judged in relation to cultural norms and practices, and the prevailing incentives for different types of behaviour (N. Jones et al., 2009). As such, any effort to promote innovation or take a technology ‘to scale’ needs to focus on political economy dynamics to find entry points and institutional partners, and to understand how best to manage stakeholder engagement.

These four examples of development modalities are key facets of the repertoire of country programmes for development agencies, with central mechanisms for sustainable in-country programming, such as general and sector budget support, usually involving some combination of TA, policy dialogue and CB. Although there have long been calls for recognition that ‘aid is political’, the realities of the sector at home and abroad is that this predominantly technical approach is the only likely option in the short and medium term. It is crucial, therefore, to understand how these knowledge-based modalities can best be used when working with or against the grain of domestic politics and power.

**How KPP analysis can guide programming processes**

When managing knowledge-based modalities and other programming instruments, staff in development agencies and other practitioners have to work with processes that are founded on ideals of collective problem-solving for the public good. Processes of planning, assessment, consultation, review, evaluation (and so on), all build on the assumption
that policy making and implementation, programming and project management are, in essence, problem-solving enterprises, drawing on information, analysis and consultation to set common goals and the best means to reach them.

However, these processes do not exist in a vacuum, and they must be designed and managed in real-world contexts that are (again) infused with power dynamics. The functioning of many key tasks in programming cycles, and the ultimate success of programming efforts, depend on decisions that reconcile rational ideals and realistic assessments of issues such as political context, stakeholder motivations and incentives, and levels of ownership.

Here, we highlight three key tasks faced by managers and practitioners, and highlight how KPP analyses have been used to assist decision-making.

**Strategy and goal-setting**

There are moments when key decisions must be made about the high-level approach to an issue. For example, heads of development agency country offices must select issues on which their office might work to balance different profiles of risk, potential impact, and sustainability within the overall portfolio. Alternatively, country office technical advisors must assess the overall strategic approach to engagement in a sector and must set top-level goals and objectives around which dialogue, TA and CB strategies can be built and resources allocated.

The challenge in both cases is finding issues to work on that could contribute to poverty reduction and other development goals and agency targets, while offering realistic, achievable and monitorable prospects of success. This requires an understanding of current and feasible alignments of domestic interests in programming and reform, existing and potential ownership over different measures, and the opportunities and constraints posed by formal and informal institutions.

Success in policy dialogue often depends on the extent to which coalitions negotiate the ‘art of the possible’ in institutional processes (Harris, 2010). But the dynamics of policy-making, reform, and the development of a sector depends on context and must often be assessed issue by issue (H. Jones et al., 2012) to find adequate space for programmes to work in challenging environments and areas where working towards progressive change might ‘push at an open door’, and to carve out useful roles for donor agencies in these processes. TA, for example, could be used quickly and effectively where the knowledge may help the local elite achieve a political objective, while it may be impossible to address other problems ‘head on’. Improvements in governance that focus on political and electoral processes may often meet strong political opposition, while there may be more space for positive expressions of voice and accountability when working in line ministries on the governance of service delivery. Please see box 2 for an example of where KPP analysis has been used for strategy development.

**Programme design**

Designing projects, programmes and packages of support is a major task for in-country technical staff, professional advisors, hired consultants and others.

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**Box 2: Mapping the knowledge-policy interface: Nepal’s petroleum sector**

The Centre for Inclusive Growth (CIG) in Nepal has used strategic mapping of the interface between knowledge and policy. The mandate of this DFID-funded programme is to broker technical assistance (TA) and expertise in a way that results in practical solutions to accelerate growth and promote greater social cohesion. Its challenge was to select what issues to work on, and with whom, to ensure that the (knowledge-based) tool of TA would make a direct contribution to concrete changes in peoples’ lives. The CIG commissioned studies to highlight priority areas for promoting knowledge-led change.

The studies revealed three central issues in the petroleum sector. First, Nepal has agreed to import all its petroleum products from the Indian Oil Corporation: a ‘bad deal’ for the country, paying above market rates. Second, petroleum products are subject to a *de facto* subsidy, with the Government setting prices for diesel and kerosene that are below the cost price paid. Third, corruption, theft and inefficiency in supply chains leads to lost revenue to the taxpayer. These issues present quite different prospects for reform.

Policy making depends on the distribution of costs and benefits around an issue (H. Jones et al., 2012). The reform of petroleum subsidies, for example, involves distributed benefits (eliminating a large drag on public finances), and costs that fall on specific groups (motorists, and the politicians who take an unpopular move in a period of high political instability). This requires ‘entrepreneurial’ change, where broad groups come together to challenge concentrated special interests. However, such coalitions are rare in a context of high political instability, when the fundamental goals of petroleum policy are not agreed and where there are, therefore, no shared values that would be instrumental to such an effort. It is unwise to broker technical knowledge on such issues where goals are contested.

The issue of supply chain inefficiencies presents a better prospect for engagement using the CIG modalities and over the short term. Despite costing Nepali taxpayers only £10 million per year (compared to £100 million for the subsidies), strong motorists’ interest groups would support such measures, and broad public consensus on cutting corruption would provide the right backdrop for bringing in technical experts (Jones and McWilliam, 2012, forthcoming).
Decisions must be made on prioritising and sequencing different areas of intervention, as well as ways to work with domestic institutions and make appropriate budgetary allocations. Suitable delivery modalities must be used, and interventions need to be based around a sound theory of change. Interventions of many types, but especially larger programmes, will often require parallel policy dialogue.

One challenge facing programme designers is understanding how to tailor programmes to the country context. While the structure of government ministries and line departments might look similar in different countries, underlying and often hidden political factors and informal institutions make the realities of making and implementing policy highly context-dependent. Programme design must take into account the function rather than just the form of institutions (Unsworth, 2010), and identify technical solutions (including improvements in governance) that are politically feasible. This means understanding where there is (or could be) a drive for progressive change and where there might be barriers to such change; where incremental changes can ‘go with the grain’ of informal institutions to have a better chance of generating sustained progress (Booth and Kelsall, 2010); and the dynamics behind issues of ownership of a CB initiative rather than the establishment of stand-alone project management units in order to help institutions better respond to complex and changing organisational and environmental contexts’ (Datta et al., 2012: 26) in transition countries.

Here, experience from Viet Nam shows how large CB programmes need to make careful choices around seemingly quick wins in terms of the number of staff involved in capacity strengthening on the one hand, and investment in negotiating the often more complex and ‘messy’ political dynamics of more sustained change, on the other. The latter may necessitate co-ownership of a CB initiative rather than the establishment of stand-alone project management units in order to help institutions better respond to complex and changing organisational and environmental contexts’ (Datta et al., 2012: 26) in transition countries.

One recent example that illustrates some of these complexities is the use of KPP analysis undertaken for programme design by AusAID’s team working on the health sector in Cambodia. Approaching the end of a long programme of health sector support, there was a need for a broad analysis to provide key inputs for the design of future engagement in the sector.

The study looked at political economy and decision making in the sector, assessing how knowledge, policy and power interact to shape processes, decisions and outcomes (H. Jones et al., 2012). The analysis, drawing on concepts from the context and actors chapter of our book, highlighted the fact that health is marginal to the core strategic interests of the dominant ruling party in Cambodia, given the limited scope for rent capture. This leaves relatively more space for evidence-informed management of the sector, as it is less shaped by vested interests.

However, this low level of government interest also leads to chronic under-funding and limited elite pressure for effective programming. Designing support to the sector to involve elements that ‘go with the grain’ of emerging mass patronage practices (driven by political participation and electoral processes), where infrastructure and services are provided to constituents to win political legitimacy, could garner the required behind-the-scenes ownership. This, in turn, could direct the energies of this informal institution towards rational problem solving in the health sector and, ultimately, to broad, fast and effective roll-out with minimal leakage. Conversely, efforts to tackle rent seeking and patronage need to recognise the limits of such an effort in the (current) absence of domestic demand, and would need to take a flexible and opportunistic approach.

This suggests some types of programme that are particularly suitable for top-down one-off solutions to health problems (such as vaccinations or nutritional supplements), and particular levels of decentralisation to focus efforts on improving the supply and demand for knowledge (especially at provincial level). The downsides of mass patronage could be eased by focusing direct donor funding to areas not currently seen as important enough, politically, to merit such gift-giving. The long-term prospects for sustainability and effectiveness in the sector hinge on whether greater political ownership can be built in this way.

The strong role currently afforded to staff with technical expertise offers a good entry point for donor influence in the sector. Building a stronger level of ownership, however, would involve helping the Ministry of Health lead on the knowledge agenda and strengthening the institutionalisation of links between knowledge and policy in the sector. This includes building the demand for knowledge through CB, strengthening management processes and shifting organisational cultures (H. Jones et al., 2012).

**Partnership and stakeholder engagement**

As part of any programme, decisions inevitably have to be made about appropriate local partners. ‘Partners’ may be needed as primary implementers of different interventions, to provide specific inputs to programming, or they might be important for informational purposes, to be kept informed and provide advice, or a combination of these. Other stakeholders who pose potential obstacles to action may also need to be carefully managed. How, when, and where to work with or through established government systems is crucial, and counterparts in government bodies often need to
be found, to act as key points of contact or ‘champions’ for the programme.

These issues must be considered at the design stage of many programmes, together with remaining key issues in the initial set-up and roll-out of programmes as Memoranda of Understanding need to be written, organisations contracted, and staff hired. Ongoing relationship management and stakeholder engagement are also crucial to the success of any programme throughout its implementation (Eyben, 2006).

These issues are, again, clear examples of negotiating between rational ideals and political realities. The realities of ministries’ functioning, for example, are often very different from the formal units, relationships, roles and responsibilities on paper, with the overall outcome the product of a combination of formal and informal sides. Difficult trade-offs may have to be made, and may have far-reaching ramifications. Stakeholder participation in which all groups are represented may include those that lack the influence or capacities to get the required tasks done, or that are taking part to get ‘their share’ of programme benefits. However, choosing only those with existing individual capacities and influence may result in programmes that simply serve the interests of the elite (Unsworth, 2010).

In analysing these issues, actor interests, beliefs and capacities are important (e.g. whether a group sees themselves as having a common interest or works together to influence decisions for their individual gain), as are the knowledge interaction processes involved. The breadth and depth of ‘ownership’ is often crucial, and this can be fostered or hindered depending on the choice of stakeholders to engage and the type of process, such as informing beneficiaries versus collaborating with them. For example, policy dialogue or TA that engages only with a small ‘technocratic’ circle may lead to policy that excludes a large number of political actors or public groups. This often leads to poor implementation and very little real impact of the policy beyond the statute book (Haas, 1992).

Insights from our work in this area have been put into practice in the design and implementation of a tourism development project in Pokhara and Annapurna, in Western Nepal, implemented by the Nepal Centre for Inclusive Growth (CIG) (in addition to the analysis of the petroleum sector shown in Box 2). Working to tackle the constraint of poor management and development of tourism assets, a number of key choices were informed by KPP analysis (in particular, our ‘actors’ framework). First, the decision was made to work at the sub-national level, as the diversity of social and ethnic groups (and their interests) in Nepal constrains the ability to build collaborative institutions at a national level, and tourism development functions well at the scale of specific destinations.

Second, the choice was made to work primarily with the private sector: the values and capacities of entrepreneurs and business people in the tourism sector are more suitable than those found in local government, as they appreciate the use of technical knowledge and expertise, have strong direct incentives to promote tourism, and function in an internationally-focused sector. This makes them more likely to approach issues with an open, proactive mindset, as opposed to keeping the focus on zero-sum games of local power.

In this context, the theory of change for CIG’s primary modality of brokering knowledge and expertise was hypothesised around two functions: first, providing a common understanding of problems faced collectively, to help bind together a partnership and influence beliefs that would facilitate collaborative action; and second, increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the actions taken by the partnership (playing to the interests of actors with scarce ‘spare’ resources).

The sequencing of the project was designed to select for, test, and build ownership and leadership in key project partners. The project made efforts to deliver tangible benefits within a short timeframe before engaging in the more involved discussion of partnership functions and forms, as information acquired about concrete local action was judged to be the most credible to the actors involved. The process also helped to build local credibility, and to build practical knowledge about facilitating local collective action. Interventions require an up-front contribution of resources, while project plans are flexible enough to allow for the abandoning of initiatives if it becomes clear that genuine ownership has not been achieved.

Making KPP analysis practical

When to carry out KPP analysis: Analysing the dynamics around knowledge, policy and power is important at the design stage of projects and programmes, where goals are set, modalities chosen and partners selected, especially for interventions working with knowledge-based tools such as the four mentioned above (TA, CB, policy dialogue and technological uptake). It could also be particularly useful where an agency is entering a new sector or country to inform a systematic assessment of entry points. Ongoing and/or periodic assessments may also be needed to monitor and, where necessary, reassess programme assumptions and theories of change, and to scan the horizon for new and unexpected trends. KPP concepts may also be important in building an understanding of programme impact for programmes that rely on knowledge uptake for their effectiveness.

How to carry out KPP analysis: The kind of analysis needed builds on the political economy analysis
toolbox; theoretical understandings of the interface between knowledge and power stem in part from this literature (for example, see Devlaux and Mangez, 2008). See box 3 for more on this comparison. It should help to move beyond the perceived dichotomy between knowledge and politics, where agency staff oscillate between cynicism, assuming that government partners and others will be moved into action through material incentives and little else, and optimism, whereby a few ‘good eggs’ are presumed to operate in an altruistic, problem-solving mould, and where moments of positive policy change are somehow a result of a momentary rationality bounded by hard-nosed politicking.

More than that, it can help staff understand and engage with the causal role that knowledge, ideas and discourse can play at key moments (Campbell, 2002). The real nub of what transpires in policy processes is often found in the interaction between knowledge and politics – where the negotiation of perspectives, the flows of information, and the deployment of arguments and knowledge are all crucial parts of the games of power and politics. The body of theoretical and empirical knowledge that this kind of analysis builds upon is by no means ‘complete’, but our understanding of key dynamics is growing. The research frontier is beginning to catch up with the challenges faced in policy and practice, and major efforts have been made to synthesise and collate practical implications (e.g. H. Jones et al., 2012).

Who should carry out the analysis? This analysis can, in many instances, be carried out by country office staff or others who are responsible for design, planning and management tasks. The key is to draw on staff with knowledge of the country’s political economy and of managing programmes or promoting reforms in the country context, as well as those with ‘content knowledge’ of the sector or issue involved. This may be the best option in situations where informal communication and decision making dominate, and where knowledge of key dynamics emerges as a function of the growing engagement and immersion of staff. Having embedded staff with political economy skillsets is important for large technical programmes facing such contexts.

However, it is important to provide concepts, tools and frameworks to these staff, and/or expert facilitation by individuals with an understanding of the interface of knowledge and policy, to ensure that the task is carried out well. It may be that further research and sharing of good practice are required around the key tasks faced by practitioners to ensure that lessons are shared, codified, and built upon.

Alternatively, in some instances, it may be necessary to carry out or commission a stand-alone assessment or study – perhaps where large amounts of money are being spent, in contexts where similar kinds of programmes have faced major challenges, or where the serious consideration or reconsideration of a particular strategic approach are required. Studies, as is good practice for PEA studies, should include individuals with strong knowledge of the specific country context as well as those with broad experience of applying KPP-type concepts (e.g. a national consultant as well as an international expert) and, again, combine both ‘process’ and ‘content’ knowledge.

What will be the outcome? Carrying out such a study is not, of course, likely to provide a ‘magic bullet’ or an easy answer, and will not necessarily produce certainty about likely outcomes. Politics and policy processes are inherently unpredictable. However, they can at least fulfil a ‘due diligence’ function, to ensure programmes are being systematic and rigorous in the way they work with knowledge-based modalities, to highlight and manage key risks, and to fulfil accountability requirements. Indeed, where in-depth analysis is combined with the willingness to think ‘outside the box’ and try new approaches, creative and effective solutions can be found to major challenges facing country programmes.

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### Box 3: Knowledge, Policy and Power (KPP) analysis versus traditional Political Economy Analysis (PEA)

Knowledge, Policy and Power (KPP) analysis builds on theoretical and empirical underpinnings similar to those used in traditional political economy analysis (PEA), but also allows examination of the causal interaction between political economy features and knowledge-policy links. On the one hand, it provides a toolkit for understanding how political economy features shape the space for knowledge-policy links. It does so by, for example, assessing how the level of centralisation affects the types of knowledge needed to improve policy implementation, analysing how actor values and interests affect decision-making processes, or examining domestic institutions and incentives. On the other hand, it also highlights the ways in which knowledge influences political economy features. These include: how solutions to collective action problems depend, in part, on groups’ beliefs about resources and the actions of others that are influenced by flows of knowledge; how values, disciplinary paradigms and new information shape actors’ views of their own interests; and how intensive development and application of knowledge can improve the effectiveness of actors wanting to carry out certain activities.
Background Note

References


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