Securing communities: the what and the how of community policing

Background paper

Lisa Denney and Sarah Jenkins

July 2013
Securing communities: the what and how of community policing

Background paper
Lisa Denney and Sarah Jenkins

- There is little consensus on the definitions, objectives and models of community policing; it means different things to different communities of practice
- The way in which community policing manifests is intimately connected to broader histories of state-society relations
- The merit of community policing is that it can encourage a focus on the community and their needs
- However, community policing is not a panacea, and those supporting or implementing such practices need to be aware of the associated risks
- Given the current donor interest in community policing, there is a need for greater analytical clarity about the above features
Acknowledgements

We are grateful to our external reviewers, Bruce Baker and Sinclair Dinnen for their invaluable comments on an earlier version of this paper. We would also like to thank Alina Rocha Menocal, Pilar Domingo and Marta Foresti for internal review. Responsibility for the content of the paper of course lies solely with the authors.
# Table of contents

Acknowledgements ii
Executive summary 2
Introduction 4
Evolution of community policing 6
What is community policing? The diversity of definitions and objectives 8
1.1 Diversity of COP definitions 8
1.2 Diversity of COP objectives 11
How does community policing manifest? 17
The diversity of models and factors that shape COP 17
1.3 Diversity of COP models 17
1.4 Key factors that shape the community policing context 24
Risks of community policing 32
Conclusion 35
Annex 1: Methodology for case studies 36
Bibliography 38
Executive summary

Community policing (COP) is a concept that has gained popularity amongst donors, governments, police departments and communities as a mechanism for achieving a diverse range of goals – from crime reduction, to more accountable policing, to improved state-society relations, and so on. Perhaps due to its fungible nature, COP initiatives are widespread across the globe – from Western countries to Africa, Asia and Latin America. Yet it manifests differently in many of these contexts, implemented in some cases by governments and in others innovated by local communities. It can focus on the state police or it can refer to policing practices by a more plural set of authority structures. Given this prevalence and ambiguity surrounding its precise meaning, objectives and manifestations, this paper maps the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of COP – what it means and hopes to achieve (definitions and objectives) and how it manifests and what factors shape such manifestations (models and factors).

Generally traced to Sir Robert Peel’s enunciation of the concept in 1829 with the creation of the London Metropolitan Police, community policing practices have a significantly longer history in the modern Western state. The COP philosophy has subsequently been exported internationally through colonialism, training of foreign police and police reform. The development community has become particularly interested in COP in recent times, with the recognition that security and justice are fundamental to development processes and that security must be tailored to the needs and interests of local communities. On this basis, community policing programmes have proliferated within donor support, including in fragile and conflict-affected countries (FCAS).

COP is a vague and ambiguous term, meaning many things to many people. In part, the diverse understandings of what COP means derives from the fact that it is mobilised as the headline terminology for a variety of policing programmes – from zero tolerance policing, to intelligence-led policing, to establishing a service mentality within the organisation to addressing perceived local crime priorities. All of these programmes take a different approach to policing and this helps to explain why COP, which is often used across all of them, is understood in so many different ways. Numerous definitions and criteria have been put forward, including the widely cited ‘strategy and philosophy’ definition, but none has attained overwhelming consensus. Largely, these share a common focus on a handful of key concepts that seem to speak to the core of community policing – partnership, community consent, accountability, a service orientation and preventative/proactive/responsive/problem-focused approaches to crime. Yet important divergences also remain, for instance around the notion of ‘community’, the political sensitivity of the COP terminology, and over whether COP refers just to policing with the community or can also extent to policing by the community, meaning a less central role for the state. Thus, while it is possible to pinpoint some general principles of COP on which there is broad agreement, beyond this what COP means is still the subject of intense debate.

In addition to this, the objectives that the various actors involved in COP see it as achieving are also diverse. Shifting constellations of interests mean that police, governments, donors and NGOs, and communities can all hold different ideas about what the goal of COP should be, which can complement or compete with each other. While it is often the case that police see COP primarily as a strategy to assist in crime reduction, and communities see it as a mechanism for holding the police to account, these objectives can shift depending on the context in which COP is being
initiated. Understanding the shifting interests of those involved is important in understanding why COP may play out in certain ways, or why it may achieve different results in different contexts.

How COP manifests is also subject to substantial diversity and can be driven by states or by communities. While COP practices can fit neatly into one category or the other, more frequently they exist along a spectrum of state-led to community-innovated. In addition, development agencies and international NGOs are increasingly involved in COP and so often also results in donor-support COP practices. The diversity of models underscores the extent to which there is a limited consensus on what COP is and how it unfolds in practice.

Community policing does not develop in a vacuum, but rather is intimately connected to factors that shape police-community relations in important ways that are critical to consider in embarking on, or providing support to, COP. These include, for instance, histories of state formation, political ideology, state presence, experience of conflict or emergency, social cleavages and state-society relations. An understanding of these and other factors is critical to understanding the constraints within which any COP practice is undertaken.

The popularity of COP underscores the extent to which it is largely seen as a positive area of programming that can:

- Tap into community-innovated practices that often attract a high degree of local support and can thus help to convey greater legitimacy for COP programmes;
- Ensure strong local ownership of safety, security and justice by making the community a key partner in their delivery;
- Build locally owned policing approaches that are more likely to be sustainable in the long-term;
- In relation to non-state policing, complement state policing and extending the limited resources of the state.

However, important risks also remain that need be taken into account. These include, but are not limited to:

- Highly contested evidence as to whether COP is achieving the (multiple) objectives often ascribed to it, including because it is so varied in form;
- Creating silos of good policing divorced from the broader national policing context;
- Creating or reinforcing inequalities between communities
- Reinforcing power imbalances within communities in potentially destabilising ways;
- Supporting groups that have weak democratic representation and accountability, thus undermining rather than contributing to community security and justice.

While COP provides opportunities that can strengthen accountable safety, security and justice, it is not a panacea. Important risks remain that those supporting or implementing COP need to be aware of.

This background paper is the first output under the ‘Securing Communities’ project at ODI, and will be followed by country case studies and a synthesis report throughout 2013 and 2014.
Introduction

Community policing is an old concept that has been implemented by governments to make policing more responsive to community needs and/or to more effectively prevent crime; and innovated by communities to address local dispute resolution needs and enforce behavioural norms. Community policing has also, since the mid-1990s, come to be regarded by donors as a mainstay of institutional reforms for fragile and conflict-affected countries (Brogden 1999). In this context, community policing (COP) interventions have largely been seen as a vehicle for (re)building community-police relations and trust to facilitate more peaceful and accountable societies. Yet despite the widespread use of COP, the term means many things to many people and significant ambiguity remains as to what community policing means (its definition), what it is (its models), and what it does (its objectives). This poses difficulties for international development actors interested in utilising this widely-accepted policing concept as, in reality, the COP label exaggerates the extent of agreement between the different actors involved. Indeed, as Ellison and Pino note, ‘community policing can be transformed chameleon like into whatever its practitioners want it to be’ (2012: 71). This presents both opportunities and challenges that donors supporting COP interventions need to be aware of.

Box 1: ODI’s work on Securing Communities

This community policing project, of which this background paper is the first output, aims to develop a clearer understanding of what the various actors involved in COP are trying to achieve through it, and whether the programmes that are innovated/supported connect with those intended outcomes. In so doing, the project aims to refine our understandings of the diversity inherent within COP, as well as to identify some recurrent challenges and drivers of success across the broad ambit of COP forms, and donor interventions to support them. In particular, the project will seek to understand how donors objectives – to improve relationships between the police and communities – can be better supported by the donor community in light of the particular context in which COP is being forged and the other interests and objectives at play. Key questions to be considered include:

- What is the extent of variation within community policing? How does it differ in different contexts?
- What are the various objectives of COP as seen by the different actors involved? How do these complement or compete with each other?
- How can COP programmes capture community needs effectively while ensuring they are not disconnected from broader statebuilding goals?
- How effective have COP programmes been in bringing change to justice and security for the people targeted?

1 This project, funded by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) Accountable Grant with the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), sits within the Governance Flagship in ODI, focused on providing an evidence base to support more effective strategies for strengthening the provision of public goods and services in transition contexts, particularly poor, conflict-affected or conflict-vulnerable countries.
Box 1: continued
This project is particularly interested in what donors can do to improve and strengthen their support to COP initiatives, and our focus is accordingly on how community policing can be supported by the donor community, as opposed to by governments or communities themselves.

This paper first provides a brief overview of how COP has evolved to become an ‘emblematic international creed’ is useful (Brogden 2005: 9). Second, it aims to provide relevant background material to inform the case studies by mapping the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of community policing – what it means and hopes to achieve (definitions and objectives) and how it manifests and what factors shape such manifestations (models and factors). Of particular note, the examination of the factors that shape COP in different communities is important in demonstrating that the nature of policing does not develop in a vacuum, but rather is intimately connected to the historical and institutional context of particular places and the specific nature of political ordering in those contexts. Understanding the influence of these factors on why policing happens the way it does is critical if attempts to reform policing are to be relevant and in any way sustainable. The diversity demonstrated across the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ highlight significant ambiguity within the COP field. In short, it is apparent that it there is not a consensus on what COP means, what COP does or how it happens. While particular COP interventions may be clear on these factors (although, as this paper suggests, there is often diversity of opinion amongst the various actors involved even in a single intervention), the broader community of practice involved in COP is characterised more by cacophony than coherence. Finally, the paper examines some of the risks associated with community policing that donors need to consider in providing support. While COP is often considered a straightforward ‘good’, there are important ways in which programming can do harm which need to be taken into account. The paper draws on broad academic and policy literatures, as well as relevant empirical examples. From this conceptual basis, case studies will dig into 3-4 instances of COP that cut across models that are community innovated and those that are instituted in a more top-down manner. A methodology to guide these case studies (to be further expanded) is set out in Annex 1 of this paper. In 2014, a synthesis paper will draw together the findings from the case studies.
Evolution of community policing

Within the field of development, community policing has emerged as a popular strategy as part of state building interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS), aiming to restore community confidence in the police, improve police responsiveness and ensure adherence to human rights and professional standards. Indeed, community policing has been pointed to as a lucrative export industry, sustaining a ‘phenomenal outflow’ of policing knowledge from the West or North to the global South (Ellison and Pino 2012: 1-2). Indeed, COP has come a long way since its original articulation in 19th Century Britain.

Western community policing in its contemporary form is said to have originated predominantly in the Anglo-American context, and it often draws upon a mythology of its former prominence in a ‘golden age’ of history (Brogden and Nijjar 2005: 24). In Britain, COP is often traced to Sir Robert Peel’s establishment of the metropolitan police in 1829, even though there were examples of what we now call COP before this. According to Peel, prevention of crime was the core objective of policing and officers thus patrolled their communities on foot in order to deter criminal activity and were invested only with common law powers of arrest and prosecution, thus reflecting the notion that the police officer was simply a local ‘citizen-in-uniform’ (Brogden and Nijjar 2005: 25). In the United States, COP emerged through the experience of a frontier society, in which groups of citizens appointed individuals, accountable to the community, to carry out policing functions (Brogden and Nijjar 2005: 26). COP has not consistently been the policing ethos in Britain and the US since the 19th Century, however. Rather, COP has ascended and descended in popularity in reaction to social change. In both contexts, the preventative focus of COP was diluted by the start of the 20th Century by a crime-fighting, law enforcement approach to policing (what became known as ‘traditional policing’) (Barlow and Barlow 2009: 180). COP was reintroduced in both countries in reaction to the failure of traditional policing to reduce crime rates and to the repressive, politicised and militarised police responses to social unrest during race riots in the UK and civil rights and anti-war protest movements in the US (Kalunta-Crumpton 2009: 152; Barlow and Barlow 2009: 180-182). Despite these shifts, the Anglo-American context is usually seen as the birthplace of COP.

The philosophy of community policing, informed by the British and US models, has subsequently been ‘exported through a process of diffusion to Western countries’ (Brogden 1999: 179). This happened through a number of processes:

- Colonialism: whereby district officers of British indirect rule acted as kinds of community policing constables (Dinnen and Braithwaite 2009);
- Training of foreign police forces: whereby the US, in particular, shaped the policing ethos of many Latin American police forces; and
- Police reform: which has been a more recent phenomenon since the early 1990s in which Western police officers provide technical assistance, training and restructuring to police services in predominantly FCAS, usually as part of broader security and justice sector reform or statebuilding operations.
It is through police reform that the development community’s interest in COP has most recently emerged.

A number of factors have shaped and legitimised donor engagement with policing and a focus on the community level. An interest in policing has emerged, in part, from the importance now placed on achieving security, justice and the rule of law as a foundational prerequisite for development (World Bank 2011; Beswick and Jackson 2011: 7-17; Duffield 2001a). Security, it is argued, will provide the stability necessary to attract investment, thus leading to economic growth and development. Justice will allow for the enforcement of contracts and rights to redress for breach. The police, of course, are a key component of the security and justice sectors and thus their ability to contribute to them and a potential development dividend needs to be fostered. Further, the importance of establishing non-violent mechanisms for resolving disputes, essential in FCAS where violent incidents can be particularly destabilising, means that ensuring the police are trusted and utilised by the community has been perceived to be key. If communities look to the police as a trusted avenue for reporting disputes, then it is less likely that they will feel the need to take matters into their own hands, leading to potentially arbitrary policing and an absence of the rule of law. Of course, in reality, this theory underlying the justice and security reform aspects of the statebuilding agenda does not reflect the ways in which people actually resolve disputes, which is often through a more plural range of security and justice actors that may be more accessible, affordable and trusted than the state – and may not be arbitrary at all (Tamanaha 2007).

Donors increasingly recognise, at least in policy if not in practice, that the above policing goals cannot be achieved through top-down approaches to reform alone. Given that one of the biggest challenges in many FCAS is that the police are unresponsive to local needs and perceived as contributing to community insecurity and injustice, a centralised and top-down approach to reform can miss some of the most pressing reform priorities. Shifting the policing culture from one that serves elite interests to one that provides an inclusive and non-discriminatory service to communities requires fundamental changes in the nature of politics and cannot be achieved through police reform alone. However, a more bottom-up approach to policing, such as that provided by COP, can help. A focus on community policing, specifically, reinforces the importance of connecting the provision of safety and security to local needs. This recognises that if the police are to contribute to a just and secure environment in which people are willing to invest in their futures (by going to school, planting crops, buying property, etc.), they must not only be seen as effective guarantors of order but they must also enjoy the trust of the community. They must be regarded as facilitators of safety, protection and justice, rather than agents of insecurity, corruption or persecution.

On this basis, community policing programmes have proliferated within donor support; they are frequently implemented in FCAS, as well as in some more stable aid recipient countries. Yet the sheer diversity of understandings in relation to what COP can mean, look like, and achieve means that donor support directed at realising the above goals is far from straightforward. Rather, donors must contend with the many manifestations of COP, their differing (and, at times, competing) objectives and the multitude of factors that shape policing in different ways in any given context. This project aims to examine this diversity of COP practices and approaches and assist donors in navigating this complexity in order to support the building of policing mechanisms that are more responsive, legitimate and inclusive from the perspective of communities, or what are increasingly termed the ‘end users’ of policing (Luckham and Kirk 2012).
What is community policing? The diversity of definitions and objectives

A lack of consensus characterises debates surrounding both the definitions of COP and the objectives that those involved see it as achieving.

1.1 Diversity of COP definitions

Community policing is a vague and ambiguous concept ‘bedevilled by definitional problems’ (Brogden 2003: 167). Indeed, Eck and Rosenbaum have commented that:

*Organising the diverse views on community policing into a coherent whole is a daunting and possibly futile task. So much has been said by so many police officials, policy analysts, researchers and theoreticians that one sometimes wonders if they are talking about the same thing* (1994: 5).

There are a wide range of views reflected in the academic and policy literatures, extending from Goldstein’s (1990: 23) broad formulation that community policing refers to ‘any activity whereby the police develop closer relations with the community and respond to citizens’ needs’ to more limited understandings of it as a ‘return to the bobby on the beat’ (Waddington 1984: 91). It has been described as a ‘paradigm’ (Kappeler and Gaines 2011: 484), a ‘body of ideas’ (Brogden and Nijjar 2005: 39) and a ‘system, a style and a method of providing police service and managing the police organisation’ (Zwane 1994). Here, we do not seek to rationalise all available definitions, but rather to map the definitional field, highlighting the points of agreement and contention. Indeed, given the breadth of community policing cultures and their diverse legal, cultural and organisational origins, we accept the impossibility of a universally agreed definition (Brogden 2003). What is more, in part the diverse understandings of what COP means derives from the fact that it is mobilised as the headline terminology for a variety of policing programmes – from zero tolerance policing, to intelligence-led policing, to establishing a service mentality within the organisation to addressing perceived local crime priorities. All of these programmes take a different approach to policing and this helps to explain why COP, which is often used across all of them, is understood in so many different ways.

Despite this, there appears to be agreement on at least some limited descriptions. COP is routinely referred to as ‘a philosophy (a way of thinking) and a strategy (a way to carry out the philosophy)’ that allows the police and community to work together to solve problems of crime and disorder (Saferworld 2006: 1; Ferreira 1996). The philosophy component is explained as the promotion of a problem-solving approach to public safety involving partnership with the community; whereas the strategy component refers to practically involving members of the community in public safety (Lanre and Olabisi 2013: 50).

Beyond this rather vague ‘philosophy and strategy’ definition, various principles and characteristics of COP are proposed. Trojanowicz and Bucquoux (1994: 2-3) have put forward the ‘Nine P’s’ of COP: ‘a philosophy of full service personalised
policing, where the same officer patrols and works in the same area on a permanent basis, from a decentralized place, working in a proactive partnership with citizens to identify and solve problems.’ Mathias et al (2006) identify four components of the COP model: the philosophy, the operational strategy, the required organisational structure, and the management policy. Saferworld highlights ten COP principles (2006) (see box 1); and Manning proposes eleven COP assumptions (1993: 423-425). Furthermore, some commentators have suggested that it is easier to define COP by its negative – that is, by what it is not. For instance, Mike Brogden argues that COP is not military style policing; policing autonomous of public consent and accountability; reactive crime-fighting; or output measured professional efficiency (2005: 2). As Casey (2010: 61) notes, community policing has been used as a catch-all term that is associated with other descriptors and strategies including “partnership,” “problem-solving,” “problem-oriented,” “proactive,” “responsive” and “reassurance.”

**Box 2: Saferworld’s Ten Community Policing Principles**

1. Philosophy and organizational strategy
2. Commitment to community empowerment
3. Decentralised and personalized policing
4. Immediate and long-term proactive problem solving
5. Ethics, legality, responsibility and trust
6. Expanding the police mandate
7. Helping those with special needs
8. Grass-roots creativity and support
9. Internal change
10. Building for the future

*Source: Saferworld 2006: 1-2*

Largely, these lists and definitions share a common focus on a handful of key concepts that seem to speak to the core of community policing – partnership, community consent, accountability, a service orientation and preventative/proactive/responsive/problem-focused approaches to crime (Ferreira 1996). In addition, some definitions also list respect for human rights, although in other accounts this more normative aspect is covered through concepts like accountability and community consent (Ruteere and Pommorelle 2003: 4; Mathias et al 2003: 14).

Yet despite these commonalities important divergences in approach remain. The notion of ‘community’ itself is problematic and often assumes more uniformity and cohesiveness within a group than in fact exists, particularly in FCAS (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 50-51). In addition to the diversity of definitions of COP itself, there have also been attempts to clarify meaning by proposing new terminology to distinguish some forms of COP. Thus, democratic policing (Bayley 2001), policing by the community (Nalla and Newman 2013: xi), policing for the community (Kalunta-Crumpston 2009: 152), policing with the community (Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland 1999), community-oriented policing
Securing communities: the what and how of community policing

(Nalla and Newman 2013), and proximity or neighbourhood policing (Mouhanna 2009: 115) are also used, further muddying the conceptual waters.

Some of these differences in terminology refer to domestic political factors. The United States, for instance, uses the term ‘democratic policing’, reflecting more overt normative goals and capturing the connection seen in that context between community policing and the broader policing culture of democratic civilian control (Bayley 2001). In France, given the foundational principle of the Republic that a direct link exists between the citizen and the state, it is impossible to recognise the community as an intermediary because ‘the community’ and ‘the state’ cannot be distinguished (Mouhanna 2009: 115). As a result, rather than using the COP label, France prefers ‘proximity’ or ‘neighbourhood’ policing.

Other differences in terminology underscore debates over the role of the state in community policing, and this constitutes perhaps the greatest divide in contemporary understandings of COP. In traditional conceptualisations of COP, the notion that the state holds a monopoly over the use of force is largely uncontested. Community policing, then, is a strategy of the state police (Wisler and Onwudiwe 2008: 428). This conventional understanding underscores – either implicitly or explicitly – many of the definitions and principles of COP set out above. For instance, Clegg et al (2000: 1) note that the police should be centrally involved in COP partnerships, and Groenewald and Peake (2004) state that COP ‘proposes police and communities working together in partnership.’ However, the field of COP has increasingly come to recognise that policing is not only what people in blue uniforms do (Brogden 2003: 167). Rather, the reality in many contexts, and particularly in FCAS, is that there is a plurality of policing providers and not a Weberian-style state monopoly on the use of force (Dinnen and McLeod: 2009; Baker 2002, 2004, 2005; Kyed 2009). These actors are variously referred to as local, non-state, informal, self-help, bottom-up or community-led policing.

This plural reality is increasingly recognised, including in donor policy documents (see for instance, OECD 2007; DFID 2004), yet it remains contested whether non-state policing practices are included within the scope of community policing. Some NGOs include them, with Actionaid (2013), for instance, referring to a community-initiated response to escalating crime in Woreda 8, a district in Addis Ababa, as a form of ‘community policing’. Governments differ in their approaches; some see community-innovated practices as useful supplements to the limited capacity of state policing, and can even co-opt such practices (such as in the case of Sungusungu in Tanzania or the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria), whereas others see non-state policing as a threat to government control. Government support for non-state policing practices, however, should not be equated with police support. In Liberia, for instance, while the government has supported non-state policing by chiefs and Monrovin vigilante² groups, the police have strongly opposed such practices. Donors also seem to take diverse approaches, regarding some non-state practices as potentially useful ways to address community needs and viewing others as beyond the pale, although donor engagement with non-state policing actors remains limited in practice.

A recent UNDP report notes that informal justice and policing systems have been largely neglected by most development assistance, and that, despite the potential problems associated with them, ‘we need to develop strategies to take advantage of their benefits’ (Wojkowska 2006). This coheres with arguments made by some

² It should be noted that the term ‘vigilante’ has different connotations in different contexts. While in the West it has a negative connotation related to being arbitrary and outside of the rule of law, in West Africa, for instance, it is more synonymous with ideas of vigilance. It is used in this paper to refer to policing whereby groups of usually men form patrols of an area with varying degrees of connection to the police.
COP experts that non-state policing providers should be engaged, given the important roles they play in many contexts (including, at times, attracting greater support from local populations than the state police, on the basis of what works, is affordable, accessible and accords with local values) (Baker 2005). Others advocate for greater autonomy for non-state providers, suggesting minimalist policing, whereby the state police undertake only serious criminal justice matters, with all other policing duties delegated to non-state providers (Marks and Wood 2010: 1-20). Marks et al call for a ‘new imagining of community policing’ (2009: 154-155) that moves ‘beyond a community policing narrative that the police own and control, toward a model that accounts for police limitations and the range of alternative policing sources that are already out there’ (2009: 163). However, there are also concerns about expanding COP too far, not least because it potentially means including groups such as gangs within the broad ambit of ‘policing’ (Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland 1999; Bayley 2001). This divide over whether to include non-state forms of policing within the scope of COP is reflected in the language that some experts have developed to distinguish their position – such as ‘policing with the community’ (excluding instances where the community takes on policing duties) and ‘policing by the community’ (including the possibility of community-led policing) (Nalla and Newman 2013: xi).

Thus, while it is possible to pinpoint some general principles of COP on which there is broad agreement, beyond this what COP means is still the subject of intense debate. As the following sections demonstrate, so too are the objectives and models of COP.

1.2 Diversity of COP objectives

In FCAS, as well as in some ‘decaying urban metropolises of the West’, community policing has come to be seen as the ‘antidote’ to problems of crime, disorder and insecurity (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 13). With its emphasis on police-community partnerships, its concern with addressing locally-specific issues, and its potential to bring neighbourhoods together (Ochieng 2004), COP is seen by many as a key to crime reduction and consequently poverty reduction (Baker 2008: 24) and a central component of broader development goals (Groenewald and Peake 2004: 3). COP has been identified, for example, as a valuable resource in addressing a wide range of issues including the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, tackling organised crime, generating political legitimacy, improving the image of the police and as an answer to human rights problems. There are thus a myriad of objectives underpinning COP interventions and understanding these is critical in clarifying how and why COP is used.

Importantly, the various actors involved in COP often have different expectations and understandings of the objectives of COP and there is no coherent, cohesive or agreed purpose. Call (2003: 2), noting the diversity of objectives suggests that police reform ‘resembles the famous story of five blind men feeling different parts of an elephant, each man holding an entirely different perception to the others.’ This problem affects security sector reform in general, but is particularly pronounced in COP, where the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the concept renders it highly susceptible to a diversity of priorities and expectations displayed by police officers, local communities, government officials and international actors. While they are not always wholly incompatible these varied interpretations can dilute, distort and sometimes ‘defeat the stated objectives’ of COP (Ruteere and Pommerolle 203: 590). This section outlines some of the COP objectives commonly associated with particular actors and draws attention to the ways in which these can coalesce or conflict.
It is important to note that the common objectives set out below are not static; they are influenced by a number of factors that can shift priorities and expectations. These can include, for instance, changes in levels of crime, which influence government, police and community perceptions as to what the objective of COP should be, as well as changes in the international environment or discourse, which can mean that the objectives of donors and international NGOs shift to reflect the latest global trends. COP reforms are thus not linear progressions, but are rather, as Hills (2008: 217) notes ‘interactive processes that are best described as a waltz: one step forward is followed by one step sideways or backwards.’

1.2.1 Objectives of the State Police

A number of scholars examining COP initiatives in diverse contexts have noted the strong tendency of the police to see the objective primarily as an information-gathering tool for more effective crime-fighting. Ferreira (1996), for example, writes: ‘Once the citizens trust the police they will provide the police with information and assistance to help prevent crimes and to arrest more criminals.’ From this perspective, police expect an improved relationship with the community to facilitate intelligence-led policing, and in some cases it has led to more effective criminal investigations. In Hong Kong, Lee King (2009: 198) has noted that community policing programs have encouraged communities to provide the police with information ‘critical to the intelligence-led investigation of organised crime groups.’ Yet, this emphasis on the ‘intelligence-gathering character’ of community policing (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 138) can conflict with communities’ expectations of greater involvement and collaboration in policing their neighbourhoods and with their desire to act as ‘co-producers of safety and order’ (Skolnick and Bayley 1988: 5). It has been suggested that the police can interpret COP as ‘a means of instructing local populations rather than listening to them’ (Biddle, Clegg and Whetton 1999).

Police have also, at times, used COP as a way to justify a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to crime, emphasising the preventative principles of COP and the need for a strict handling of petty crime and other manifestations of disorder (Ruteere and Pommerolle 2003: 590). This approach is related to the ‘broken windows’ idea which suggests that signs of incivility, disorder and neglect – such as broken windows – can create the impression that no-one is in control, leading to a greater fear of crime and more serious criminal activity. Zero tolerance approaches have been referred to as the ‘hard edge of community policing’ (Dixon 2000).

However, while some experts see zero tolerance as a form of COP, others suggest it is a misunderstanding of the ‘broken windows’ concept, encouraging a return to more traditional paramilitary policing which distorts the primary principles of COP (Scheider 2009). Indeed, in FCAS this perspective can promote practices that reproduce and intensify authoritarian values and brutal policing approaches which can contribute to poor police image and high levels of community mistrust – some of the very factors COP reforms seek to address. Ruteere and Pommerolle (2003: 590) point to the ‘Clean and Safe’ and ‘Good Hope’ operations in Cape Town as examples of how zero tolerance programs can damage the public image of the police. These focused on maintaining order and removing ‘undesirable elements’ from the city, through crack downs on the presence of beggars, informal parking assistants and street children and led to increased harassment and more frequent arrest of these members of society (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007: 249). While the outcome may have been a safer community for some more affluent residents, the process by which this was achieved appeared antithetical to some COP principles around community consent and human rights, that others involved in COP hold as the ultimate objective.
The tendency, noted in the literature, of police establishments to view COP objectives as contributing to a stronger ability to fight crime is not to suggest that there are no human rights advocates within the police. Indeed, it is often key ‘champions’ within police services who push for the uptake of COP strategies. However, in doing so, such champions may have to contend with a culture that is more focused on fighting crime than on involving the community and becoming more accountable to them. In contexts where the police has a poor human rights record, this can be particularly difficult and the police may be resistant to admitting past failings. Ruteere and Pommerolle, for instance, illustrate how the Kenya police were reluctant to cooperate with the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) in implementing reforms, as they had been the object of damning reports by the KHRC and had a history of confrontation with the Commission (2003: 600).

1.2.2 Objectives of Local Communities
In spite of its name, COP is rarely introduced at the request of communities or with prior consultation with them. Rather, COP programmes are frequently imposed on communities. Nonetheless, local communities in different contexts display a wide variety of understandings of community policing, and their priorities are highly dependent upon a number of factors including their historical relationship with the police, crime levels, and the political economy of their neighbourhoods. In many cases communities have seen COP as an opportunity for making the police more accountable and responsive to local needs. That is, they expect to collaborate with the police to identify problems and develop shared solutions, seeing community-policing consultative forums as avenues for accountability, complaint and redress. This is particularly apparent in places where the state police have previously acted as instruments of state oppression. These objectives of COP can come into direct conflict with those held by some police officers, set out above. In South Africa, for example, Brogden and Nijhar explain that while the police saw the objectives of COP as accessing information and remained attached to notions of police authority and control, the agenda of many poor communities was ‘to reverse the imbalance of power and bring the police to be accountable to their needs. Community policing was about the control of the police and much less about preventing crime’ (2005: 138).

However, Brogden and Nijhar (2005: 207) also assert that the human rights perspective ‘presumes too much’ about the priorities of local communities. In contexts where crime rates are high, local communities’ objectives may, in fact, coalesce with the crime-fighting priorities of the police as they ‘clamour for tougher policing … [and] advocate for the police to take almost any actions necessary to combat crime’ (O’Neill 2005: 4). Thus, in some cases communities tolerate and even call for more visible and tough forms of policing. Both communities and the police are thus susceptible to the belief that community policing is ‘soft’ on crime and that a focus on human rights can impede police effectiveness.

In other contexts, communities may not see community policing as a priority at all, or may see it as being opposed to their interests. In some poor neighbourhoods, crime can be an integral part of the local economy and many residents benefit from the proceeds of these illicit activities. Consequently, there may well be a tolerance for their continuation (Minnaar 2009: 50). In more tranquil settings the community may not see crime as a problem (Grabosky 2009: 2) and in other circumstances COP may simply be one issue along with many others with which the community is concerned (Cain 2000: 248). Cain notes that in Trinidad and Tobago, neighbourhood watch schemes were ‘not co-opted to the police agenda of information exchange or crime control’, but rather developed their own agendas in...
the absence of the police ‘locating crime problems in a hierarchy of neighbourhood … priorities’ (2000: 248). In such contexts, communities may be disinterested in COP – not seeing it as a priority. This can hinder other actors involved in COP in achieving what they regard as its key objectives.

It should also be noted that it is rarely, if ever, possible to speak about the community in a singular, cohesive sense, as this suggests a uniformity and homogeneity that rarely exists. The heterogeneity of many neighbourhoods and communities, particularly in urban areas, means that they encapsulate a wide variety of competing interests and priorities. It is well-documented that the deeply stratified nature of society in Northern Ireland, for example, was a significant barrier to the implementation of community policing (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 220). Understanding community objectives in COP thus requires an understanding of the community itself – the various interest groups involved, the power relations between them, as well as an understanding of the contexts in which communities find themselves, which will prioritise different perspectives on the best ways to combat crime. It is the powerful, educated and politically connected that tend to dominate community policing committees and hijack them for their own purposes or interests. These circumstances will influence the objectives that communities see COP as fulfilling.

1.2.3 Objectives of Government Actors

States have turned to COP reforms for a number of reasons and prioritise different objectives. In some countries – particularly in the West – COP was seen historically as a more effective way of addressing and preventing crime than the reactive strategies of traditional approaches (Brogden and Nijhar: 2005: 27). In other states, it has been adopted as an essential part of broader democratic reforms, and emphasis has been placed on human rights, transparency and accountability. Marks et al (2009: 156-157), for example, state that the ‘impetus in the South African case for embracing community policing was a commitment on the part of the new “democratic” government to bottom-up governance and civic participation.’ In some contexts, states use COP as a strategy for projecting power into spaces where the state has limited presence as a way of supplementing constrained resources. By cooperating with (or, in some cases, co-opting) community actors or traditional authorities, the state can extend its authority, as was apparent in policies of indirect rule during colonialism, such as the kiap in Papua New Guinea (Dinnen and Braithwaite 2009).

Other scholars, more cynically, have identified the tendency for states and government officials to adopt the language of COP in order to access donor resources attached to it, or to enhance the public image of the police without investing in genuine efforts to reform repressive practices. Alice Hills, for example, argues that governments often have little incentive to accommodate reforms that would reduce their political power. She suggests that the goals of elites rather pertain to improving the image of the police and not to making it more democratically accountable. She concludes that this response ‘challenges the theory of knowledge and practice underpinning western policies’ of police reform and democratisation and are suggestive of more self-interested reasons for the adoption of COP (Hills 2012: 752).

1.2.4 Objectives of Donors and International Non-Government Organisations

The involvement of donors and international NGOs in COP initiatives as part of their development programmes adds further levels of complexity to understanding what COP is trying to achieve. Not only do their priorities frequently come into
conflict with those of the various national actors, but they also have competing objectives and priorities internally, both between donor organisations and within them, which do not necessarily cohere.

One of the key objectives of many donors and NGOs involved in COP is to establish democratic institutions committed to addressing and improving human rights (Broden and Nijjar 2005: 207). Donor-supported COP interventions usually fit within a broader suite of post-conflict reforms that reflect the liberal ideals of the statebuilding agenda (Ellison and Pino 2012). Yet the objectives of donors (less so NGOs) have also been augmented by changes in the international context. From the mid-1990s, there has been a growing interest in transnational crime – such as drug trafficking, illicit financial flows and terrorism. This has meant that the objectives of international development assistance, particularly in relation to policing, and the security sector more broadly, have taken on an international security dimension (Bayley 2001; Duffield 2001a). This is apparent, for instance, in the G8’s Africa Action Plan, which states that ‘Poverty, underdevelopment and fragile states create fertile conditions for violent conflict and the emergence of new security threats, including international crime and terrorism. There will be no lasting security without development and no effective development without security and stability’ (quoted in Willett 2005: 56). This growing emphasis on the connections between development and security has meant that donor objectives for COP have also, at times, shifted towards a stronger crime-fighting response (Bayley 2001). Casey (2010: 61) states, for example, that this shift in operational priorities is reflected in funding availability for policing projects, suggesting that ‘community policing has been swept away by Homeland Security.’ Similarly, Bayley (2001: 41) suggests that international program assistance to South Africa shifted from encouraging greater involvement with the community in 1994 to raising its law enforcement capabilities by 1998.

Furthermore, this ‘securitisation of development’, as some have termed it (Duffield 2001b), beginning in the mid-1990s and amplified by the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 and the subsequent War on Terror, has reinforced the view of the state as central to security provision. In turn, this has meant that non-state security actors are more likely to be viewed as a threat to liberal orders and have thus been marginalised in some contexts (Richmond 2003). Thus, the COP objectives of donors, like those of the community, cannot be assumed to correlate with a human rights approach. Rather, their objectives will vary depending on the international, as well as national, political context.

There are also often problems of congruence of objectives within donor agencies providing COP assistance. Biddle et al (1999) note, for example, that the implementation of community policing by the UK Government often reflects the competing perspectives of the constituent agencies, rather than adhering to a coherent policy. That is, DFID’s developmental objectives differed from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s more diplomatic and political objectives. Furthermore, donors and NGOs often hold particular interests that are likely to be reflected in the objectives they see COP as achieving. Organisations concerned with reducing the proliferation of SALW, for example, are likely to place greater emphasis on the information gathering potential of community policing, whilst those concerned with democratisation and social justice are more likely to prioritise accountability, transparency and inclusion. Further, the effect of numerous donors and NGOs working with multiple agendas in countries with limited local capacity can be to crowd out critical space for local actors to develop capacity and their own approaches (Dinnen 2007: 261). This can have the opposite of the intended effect – closing down possibilities for local capacity building rather than creating them. Donors and NGOs thus bring added complexity to the objectives of COP, and the
political interests and objectives of these organisations must also be taken into account.

1.2.5 Making sense of competing objectives
The competing objectives of community policing mean that success may well look different to the various actors involved, potentially constraining a coordinated approach within COP interventions. In some cases, there are likely to be allied objectives amongst some actors – such as donors, NGOs and local communities who may have an interest in improving police accountability and respect for human rights. However, the interests of each of these actors are subject to change as the contexts in which they operate evolve. As a result, alliances based on shared objectives are not static, but will change with the evolving interests of the parties involved.

As with the definitions of COP, therefore, its objectives are similarly neither agreed nor straightforward. This raises important questions about whether the various objectives are compatible or not. Are human rights objectives, for instance, compatible with increased police effectiveness to fight crime (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 232)? If the diverse objectives are not compatible, what does this mean for measuring COP programme success? Such questions will be important to consider in the case studies in order to understand the various objectives of those involved, to what extent these objectives coalesce and with what consequences.
How does community policing manifest?

The diversity of models and factors that shape COP

In addition to the lack of clarity on what COP means, there is a notable diversity of how it manifests, with multiple models emerging in different contexts. Moreover, there are also an array of often forgotten factors that shape police-community relations in ways that impact upon the possibility of COP and how it manifests.

1.3 Diversity of COP models

Countries as diverse as Australia, Belgium, China, Russia, India, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe have embraced COP and it has arguably become the dominant paradigm of policing globally (Casey 2010: 55). However, the form that COP takes and the types of activities it involves differ substantially from one context to another. COP can take place at the national or sub-national level and can be implemented by the state or innovated by communities, or, as is often the case, by a combination of the two. Depending on the level of focus and who is implementing programming, COP can encompass a wide range of activities.

COP practices fall along a spectrum from state to community led. Moreover, they shift backwards and forwards along this spectrum in response to changing contexts. In advance of the 2014 football World Cup and the 2016 Olympics in Brazil, for example, there has been a marked shift from community-led COP to more state-led COP in an effort to ‘clean up’ the urban favelas (Fruhling 2012: 82-83). This section provides a brief outline of some of the dominant models implemented at the two ends of this spectrum by states and by communities – illustrating the diversity of COP models. While we separate out state and community models for our purposes here, in practice these are not discrete and often COP practices do not fit neatly into one category. In addition to state and community COP models, donors are also increasingly playing a role in COP and their influence is also discussed.

1.3.1 State models of community policing

While most state models of COP focus broadly on improved police-community relations and a greater level of engagement with the public, the way that this is achieved and even the nature of the relationship desired display significant differences. The model of COP is influenced by a wide range of factors, including institutional structures, organisation and culture, historical and cultural traditions, state ideology, state resources, donor pressure and the way in which the citizen-state relationship has historically been perceived, as will be explored in the following section. Western-style COP, for example, is rooted in Weberian ideals and consequently maintains a ‘strong concern that security remains a monopoly of the government’ (Wisler and Onwudiwe 2008: 433). In contrast, the Chinese model of COP is embedded in Confucian/Maoist ideologies and an emphasis on communal existence which has produced forms of social control very different to the Western model (Brogden and Nijjar 2005: 99). As a result, the different models
of COP are not comparing like with like. The table below provides some key examples of state COP models that illustrate their diversity and the practices associated with them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State models of community policing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The British Model of Community Policing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The French Model of Community Policing – proximity policing</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The British Model of Community Policing**

The UK is often considered the home of community policing, linked to Sir Robert Peel's enunciation of the concept in 1829. In fact, ideas of COP in Britain can be traced back further to the policing role of the Tythingman some 800 years ago, who was an elected community member responsible for tax collection and law enforcement and considered by some to have been the first community constable (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 25). However, it is Peel's ideas that are more regularly associated with COP, focused on making policing more accountable to the people, involving foot patrols and close police-community relationships. But by the 1960s these elements had been marginalised; a greater emphasis was placed upon the development of a professional, bureaucratic, specialised, and technologically-advanced force which focused on law enforcement. In this context, police-community relationships diminished. However, increasing crime rates, and the militarised-style policing of public disorder in the 1980s – particularly in the heavy-handed response to race-related riots – led to a recognition that closer police-community relationships were needed. Community policing in the UK, while not clearly defined, encompasses the ethos of policing for and with the community.

There are three key elements of community policing in practice in Britain:

- Police community consultative groups
- Presence of community police officers in communities – achieved predominantly through foot patrols
- Community involvement in crime prevention partnerships – this is a problem-oriented approach in which local communities are seen as sites for informal social control of crime, for example through neighbourhood watch schemes in which residents watch out for suspicious behaviour in their neighbourhoods and liaise with the police.

There are also a number of other initiatives which can be considered community policing initiatives:

- Special Constabulary – members of the public join the police as formal volunteers to provide support.
- Police Community Support Officers – civilians are recruited to police communities under the formal control of the police force. They tend to be used as an alternative form of police patrol, providing a visible presence in the community through foot patrols.
- Neighbourhood policing – introduced in 2006, promotes the creation of visible and accessible neighbourhood policing teams including police, special constables, community support officers, volunteers, neighbourhood wardens and others. Aims to ensure policing services are driven by local needs.
- Use of local authorities and professionals such as doctors, teachers and social workers in risk assessment and incident reporting.

*Source: Kalunta-Crumpton 2009*

**The French Model of Community Policing – proximity policing**

While the term ‘community policing’ is not officially used in France, there have been two attempts to facilitate a closer relationship between the police and the public that represent the ‘French model’ (Mouhanna 2009: 115).
Ilotage is a form of localised policing that was revived in the 1970s. It involved the establishment of foot patrols and the creation of a ‘beat’ system in which police officers work in the same area. Patrol officers were encouraged to spend their time talking to members of the community about their concerns and building up relationships with local residents. The project was abandoned in the late-1990s in the face of rising crime rates (Mouhanna 2009).

‘Proximity policing’ is the second French model of community policing, introduced in 1999 in order to make the police more responsive to local needs. Key features include (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 112):

- Police action is structured around specific localities and districts
- Permanent and continuing contact with the local population
- Versatile police role encompassing functions from coercion to social service
- Substantive responsibility and discretion delegated to the police
- Qualities of interpersonal service required of police officers

It is widely suggested that the emphasis in this model ‘has been more on being operationally in the community, as opposed to being part of it’ and has focused on improving contacts in order to ‘take complaints and to arrest offenders’ rather than to significantly alter the policing culture or how police work is undertaken.

Source: Casey 2010: 62

The Chinese style of community policing, termed ‘mass line policing,’ is rooted in the Communist ideology of ‘for the masses, relying on the masses, from the masses and to the masses’ (Zhong and Jiang 2013: 170). It depends heavily upon the mobilisation and empowerment of the people to solve their own problems, rather than relying on the police to fight crime (Wong 2009: 216).

The mass line model is embedded in historical forms of social control, where such powers were decentralised and based around communal groups such as family and clan. It is infused with Maoist ideals in which people are the masters of their own destiny. Thus, the Chinese model delegates broad policing powers to the family and the community as a whole. The family unit provides education and discipline, neighbours provide supervision and sanction, and the community sets the moral tone and customary norms. This is operationalized through:

- Neighbourhood committees elected by residents and responsible for educating residents on safety, resolving disputes before they escalate into criminal cases, and reporting criminals to the police.
- Work units based in employment settings that serve to discipline individuals, offering rewards, penalties and providing quasi-justice and para-security functions.
- Social order joint protection teams collaborate across districts to prevent crime and maintain order (Zhong: 2009 171-172).
- Combating crime and managing social order is thus seen as ‘everyone’s business’ (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 96).

The Building Little Safe and Civilised Communities (BLSCCs) program was established in 1994 in Shenzhen province in the face of rising crime levels, combining Western models of COP with traditional Chinese models of social control. The BLSCC program divides cities into zones, each encouraged to meet the standard of a Little Safe and Civilized Community. Rewards and LSCC status is based upon certain safety and civil standards including: moral education, harmonious relationships, healthy community culture, and purification of the
environment. The leadership structure requires that all levels of government, agencies, companies and organisations are responsible for implementing BLSCC and the police are an integral part of this.

Source: Zhong and Jiang 2013

### Community policing of Aboriginal communities in settler societies – First Nations policing in Canada

In Canada, the severe social problems faced by many Aboriginal communities have posed a policing challenge. In the community of Elsipogtog, for instance, a Mi’kmaw community of approximately 3,000 residents, social problems include:

- high underemployment
- high numbers of single-parent households
- high rates of serious violent crime
- substance abuse at such extreme levels that rates of authorised methadone treatment are 50 times higher than in metropolitan Halifax, often deemed to be the drug capital of Atlantic Canada.
- highest crime rate of all Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) detachment units in Canada between 2004 and 2005.

Community policing strategies have been trialled to address such problems. In the 1960s a band constable system was introduced in First Nation communities through hiring of local residents as village constables within the RCMP, to whom they would turn over criminal cases or federal or provincial offenses. However, critics noted that this policy did not provide sufficient autonomy and accountability to First Nations communities.

To address this, a First Nations Policing Policy (FNPP) was developed in 1991 and FNP Program rolled out in 1992, requiring greater Aboriginal involvement and partnership in policing First Nation communities. 'It mandated a ‘community-based policing plus’ (CBP+)’ strategy of policing, parallel to the ‘citizenship plus’ conception of Aboriginal rights in Canada, as rooted in the treated and protected in the Constitution Act of 1982’ (Clairmont 2013: 83). The objectives of the FNPP were:

- To enhance the personal security and safety of First Nation communities
- To provide access to policing that is professional, effective, and culturally appropriate; and
- To increase the level of police accountability to First Nation communities.

Communities could choose between self-administered policing, or Community Tripartite Agreements (CTAs, whereby the RCMP provides contracted policing services). There are 46 self-administered First Nations police services policing 190 Aboriginal communities, mostly in Ontario and Quebec. The FNPP and the partnerships it mandated between the federal and provincial governments and First Nations made Canada the first country to have developed a comprehensive national policing approach for its Aboriginal people.

Source: Clairmont 2013: 83-89

### Community policing in Brazil – Diverse practices in a federal state

Public distrust and mounting evidence of police corruption in the mid-1980s led to COP programs in Brazil. In 1996, the Federal government recommended that all states implement COP. Of the 14 states that have done so, each has emphasised different elements of COP, leading to a diversity of practices.

In Rio de Janeiro the COP model included:

- Foot patrols and officers tasked with fostering relationships with local residents in order to identify and resolve problems

Source: Clairmont 2013: 83-89
• Community councils or committees corresponding to patrol areas to promote dialogue
• Suggestion boxes to receive anonymous complaints and recommendations

In São Paulo the military police created police-public partnerships to assist in crime prevention. Core elements included:
• Establishment of small fixed bases
• Foot patrolling
• Community Safety Councils – comprised of groups from the same neighbourhood – mostly community leaders – who met to discuss local concerns

In Minas Gerais the reforms involved:
• Creation of community safety councils which employed problem-solving techniques – the groups would cooperatively plan policing strategies and are meant to establish mechanisms of accountability.
• Emphasis on decentralisation and regionalisation of police activity
• Use of geo-processing tools to analyse crime, assess results and set quantitative goals.

Source: Davis et al 2003

PolCom in Mozambique - Local adaptations of community policing

Following the end of the 16 year civil war in 1992, Mozambique struggled to democratise and demilitarise the national police and make it more democratically accountable and sensitive to human rights issues. In 2000, the Ministry of Interior, with the strong support of international donors, launched a community policing initiative – PolCom – to reform the police and to address rising crime rates.

PolCom adopted a model which emphasised community forums – CPCs (Conselhos de Policiamento Comunitário – where voluntary members, selected by local populations gathered to discuss local security problems. CPC members were able to facilitate patrols and mediate minor conflicts, such as family or neighbour disputes, but were prohibited from carrying weapons and expected to hand over anyone arrested to the police.

However, the model was reinterpreted and reformulated by local authorities and state police officers, so that CPC activities were shaped by police and elite perceptions of what constitutes effective maintenance of law and order. Rather than being elected by the local populations, the selection of CPC members followed historically embedded modes of appointing local police; they were frequently selected by the Chief, and tended to be close relatives of chiefs and councillors. The common understanding of CPCs, then, was that they served the chiefs, not the community. PolCom members were also at times used by the national police as a way of outsourcing less desirable police work – such as patrols and making village arrests. Extra-legal practices, such as beating persons under interrogation were also delegated to them by the state police.

(Kyed 2009)

1.3.2 Community-led models of community policing
COP practices are also innovated by communities and may have little or no connection to the state police. These have emerged and flourished in transitional, weak and failed states in particular, often where the service delivery capacity of the state is limited, where levels of insecurity are (perceived to be) high, and where there are deep-rooted mechanisms of informal justice and self-policing (Dinnen 2001; Dinnen and McLeod 2009: 344). The practices incorporated within this
rubric are hugely diverse and include reactive, loosely organised vigilante groups which operate independently of the state and at times outside the rule of law, unarmed neighbourhood watch groups whose focus often extends beyond concerns with crime, security and disorder alone, and the private security industry. Johnston (1991) labels these three types of non-state policing as ‘autonomous citizen responses’, ‘responsible citizen responses’ and ‘private security.’ These policing actors are institutionalised within state apparatuses to varying degrees, with some operating as constitutionally and legally approved; some initiated by the state; some simply with tacit approval and non-interference of the state; and some being co-opted by the state or incorporated within formal police structures and acting as extensions of state agency and others operating without the approval of, or in direct contravention to, state authority (Dinnen and McLeod 2009: 344-345; Scheye 2009). The table below offers examples of these different models of community-led COP and their relationship with the state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community-led models of community policing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Autonomous policing:</strong> Rondas campesinas in Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rondas campesinas or peasant patrols in rural Peru emerged in the 1970s against the backdrop of the collapse of the peasant economy, increasing cases of cattle theft by organised gangs, and the inability of the Peruvian state to respond effectively and provide security for peasants. Men from villages in northern Peru began organising night patrols to protect their homes, crops and cattle. Patrols initially caught thieves and handed them over to the police, but they have increasingly adopted a broader and more independent judicial and governance role in the context of an ineffective state system. While they have been granted some formal legal recognition, they remain largely an entirely informal organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partial institutionalisation:</strong> Sungusungu in Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The demobilisation of soldiers in the aftermath of the Tanzania/Uganda conflict led to increasing insecurity and violence associated with cattle-rustling and banditry in Tanzania. The state was largely ineffective in managing the violence and as a result, in the early 1980s, villages responded autonomously, forming defence groups called Sungusungu in order to confront these gangs of thieves. Groups of men patrol their village on a rotational system, protecting property, apprehending and arresting thieves, and recovering stolen cattle. The Sungusungu committees are well-rooted in traditional governance mechanisms and elected by democratic village assemblies. The Sungusungu movement was encouraged by the ruling party and has been partially institutionalised and incorporated within administrative structures (Heald 2009). As their success spread, however, so too did their jurisdiction, until sungusungu groups became widespread and often enforced highly discriminatory and harmful practices across a broad range of areas, from cattle raiding, to witchcraft, to petty crime. These have changed over time and recent research explores the positive impact of human rights discourses on the practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plural policing in Nigeria</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the context of rising crime rates in Nigeria, poor police-citizen relations and an inability or unwillingness of the state to provide protection, local communities have formed policing structures for self-protection. These groups include religious groups such as the hisbah groups enforcing Sharia laws, and have been granted the authority to arrest citizens; ethnic groups such as the Oloko (hunters) in Jigawa state, who have historically fulfilled security and...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
protection roles; state sponsored groups such as the Bakassi Boys, which originated as a self-help group to confront crime in market towns, but which was later legalised and commandeered by the state and then later criminalised because of severe abuses; and community/neighbourhood watch groups which are organised by street or village associations to man the entrances and gates and carry out foot patrols (Alemika and Chukwuma 2004; Onwudiwe 2009).

The Nigerian government welcomes the establishment of informal policing groups as long as they:
• Register with the police
• Submit to police screening
• Do not carry weapons
• Do not detain suspects, but rather hand them over to the police.

1.3.3 The role of donors in community policing
In addition to the state-community spectrum of COP, donors are also now playing an influential role in shaping COP models. While this kind of international influence is not necessarily new, with long histories of colonialism and training of police overseas, for instance, the current form of such influence through donor-sponsored reforms of the police and security and justice sectors more broadly, has only been underway since the mid-1990s. This donor support is wrapped up in the peacebuilding, statebuilding and democracy promotion agendas, and security and justice reforms as a key component of them in predominantly FCAS. The ability of donors to influence the way that COP unfolds within a country depends on their overall influence within the country – this will be stronger in countries heavily reliant on donor support and weaker in countries where governments have more financial independence.

Within their COP programmes, donors tend to infuse their own domestic model of COP to some extent. This means that recipients of British aid, for instance, receive a British-inspired model of COP, recipients of French aid receive a French-inspired model and recipients of US aid receive a US-inspired model, albeit hopefully with some effort to also tailor models to the context of the recipient countries. Yet despite these national models infusing donor-led COP, a relatively standard set of ‘best practice’ programmes have also emerged within the donor community. These most commonly include community-consultative fora, neighbourhood patrols, training and problem-solving mechanisms. The table below provides some examples of donor-led COP in different contexts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor approaches to COP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community-Consultative Forum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Sierra Leone, DFID funded a community policing project which centred on the introduction of police-community forums in the form of Local Police Partnership Boards, as part of a broader philosophy of Local Needs Policing. They were designed to enable local communities to participate in setting the policing agenda in their localities and were comprised of key representatives of the community, including youth groups, women’s representatives, religious leaders, business persons and chiefs. In order to facilitate dialogue and collaboration a Community Relations Office was established at each police station. This office was responsible for identifying and liaising with key members of the community, and was tasked with circulating security information to and from both the police and the community.
Training and citizen engagement

In Afghanistan, Germany undertook training of the national police in human rights, women’s rights and the problem of domestic violence and community policing principles. Community policing principles were later operationalized with UNDP support to encourage police-citizen engagement through beautifying the entrances to police stations and creating platforms for exchange with Local Councils, where the community could inform the police, for instance, about the importance of driving slowly in school zones, and the police could provide education about, for instance, the danger of explosive ordinances.

Source: Friesendorf and Krempel 2011: 28-29

Bicycle patrols

In Sri Lanka, the Asia Foundation has been working with the national police to encourage improved relationships with the community, especially in Tamil areas, as well as more proactive policing. During the civil war, the police were often preoccupied with country-insurgency efforts and were not always looked to as a source of security. One strategy to rebuild trust has been through the use of bicycle patrols. These patrols get police out of stations and into the community, allow the police to cover local neighbourhoods quickly, and also make them more accessible to the communities they are charged with policing. There are also indications that the patrols are helping to deter petty crimes.

Source: Sabharwal 2012

Neighbourhood Watch

In 2000, the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), with support from a number of bilateral and multilateral donors and international NGOs, initiated a community policing project in Kangemi, an informal settlement on the outskirts of Nairobi. Utilising existing neighbourhood watch groups which had been organised by the owners of land and rental structures in the settlement, the KHRC project facilitated the creation of eleven ‘security zones’ and assisted in setting up community policing committees for each area. These committees conducted night patrols and monitored crime in their neighbourhoods, and facilitated dialogue between the police and residents on security issues.

Source: Ruteere and Pommerolle 2003: 595-596

As this section demonstrates, various models of COP exist and a wide range of practices are deployed in its name. These exist along a spectrum of state-led to community-led approaches, with donors also playing a stronger role in shaping COP in the last 15 years. Having focused initially on mapping the diversity of COP definitions, objectives and models, the paper now turns to examine the factors that shape the varied manifestations of COP.

1.4 Key factors that shape the community policing context

The definitions, objectives and models of community policing, set out above, do not develop in a vacuum. Rather, the form that COP takes is profoundly shaped by the context of particular places and are ‘a product of the physical environments and cultures’ specific to each setting (Nalla and Newman 2013: xii). The diversity and indeed, lack of agreement, on its definitions, objectives and models underscores the sheer number of countries that have internalised some form of COP and made it...
their own (Wisler and Onwudiwe 2009: 3). Often, the importance of context in shaping particular manifestations of COP is overlooked. As Mike Brogden notes:

As an export, COP has a unique appeal. It resonates as a value-free commodity, unencumbered with the trappings of economic and political interest ... Community policing is often portrayed as devoid of the kind of cultural impediments that characterise other policing models ... COP is an emblematic international creed (2005: 9).

Yet COP, in its various manifestations, is not value-free. What policing looks like in a particular context is intimately connected with the country’s history, social make up, political context, and so on. This does not mean that policing approaches cannot change, but rather that change needs to be cognisant of historical, political, cultural and institutional legacies, in addition to the vested interests that shape what is possible. Understanding why policing happens in the ways that it does is thus an important first step in undertaking reforms that are locally owned and sustainable.

What is more, where donors are implementing COP, the practices they put in place, even if derived from a relatively clear set of ‘best practice’ programming approaches (see box 12 in section five above), are also infused with the philosophy of the donor country’s COP model. The manner in which countries react to foreign community policing models reflect their own historical, cultural and political context. What results, therefore, is a hybrid of the donor-supported model and its interactions with local political processes. It is not possible, therefore, to simply apply donor COP models and assume that they will evolve to look the same as the countries in which they originated. Rather, they will react and develop in unique ways. Fruhling (2007), for instance, notes that exportation of the United States model of COP to Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s did not take sufficient account of local realities; as a result, it has had more limited success than its advocates anticipated and it does not (and likely will not) resemble US COP practices. Similarly, it is naïve to think that practitioner efforts to tailor programme approaches to local realities will not still carry with it some residue of influence from the donor or practitioner’s home country.

In order to appreciate both why certain forms of COP emerge to look the way they do, and how donor-led programmes may react when applied to alien contexts, it is important to develop a nuanced and granular understanding of the factors that influence how safety, security and justice are provided within different societies. It is only through an appreciation of these factors that we can understand why policing looks the way it does in particular contexts. This section will examine some of these factors, demonstrating how they can shape policing. While not all factors will be relevant everywhere, and there are undoubtedly others not covered here, those set out below give a sense of what considerations are necessary to understand the reasons for the kind of policing that countries experience. It should be noted that these factors are not distinct but rather overlapping and interconnected. An awareness of them will be important during case studies in order to understand how community policing practices are embedded within a broader political economy context and whether donor support to COP interventions are sufficiently aware of these factors and their impacts.
1.4.1 History of state formation

The history of state formation – that is, the circumstances in which the state emerged and the trajectory of its evolution – influences how security is provided within a country. The manner in which policing is provided differs depending on whether the state emerged through, for instance, revolution, federation, or colonialism. Herbst (2000: 20) argues, for example, that European states were forged in the context of territorial conflict and the constant threat of war, forcing leaders to establish links between the core political areas – the cities – and more remote regions – a process that was not apparent in much of Africa. The differences between countries can be explained, at least in part, by the different histories of state formation in each of these contexts, as the examples below demonstrate. It should be noted, however, that state formation is not just a historical process, but rather an ongoing, contingent and deeply contested issue in many parts of the world, particularly in FCAS.

The French policing administration is considered one of the most centralised Western systems (Bayley 1985). This degree of central control is deeply embedded within the ideology of La Republique and the state’s understanding of the police function, both of which can be situated within France’s revolutionary history. Indeed, Mouhanna argues that security is a fundamental ‘pillar of the French Republic’ and asserts that France’s tradition of revolution and demonstration has engendered the state’s insistence upon national control of the police (2009: 107). He states:

In France, security concerns are national in nature; they cannot be delegated to local authorities, citizens or communities. The national government wants to be the one who decides. That is why the centralization of the national police forces has always been the main rule (Mouhanna 2009: 104).

This is further reinforced by the use of gendarmeries within France (and elsewhere in Continental Europe), following the Napoleonic structure of policing, where a more militaristic police wing is developed alongside the state police to deal with armed violence and social unrest (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 108).

In contrast, the United States retains a strongly decentralised system of policing, which is linked to its history of state formation through a federation of independent States. This means that, each State, or even town, in the US retains its own police department, while the nation-state also has a federal police department. The two levels have different jurisdictions, but are intended to cooperate, although often with a good deal of tension.

Those parts of the world that experienced colonial rule are different again, and their policing cultures have been shaped, in part, by their former colonizers. The legacies of direct and indirect rule are, in some cases, still apparent in police structures across former-colonies, particularly in Africa. While in former-British colonies the experience of indirect colonial rule bequeathed a more decentralised policing administration, especially for those countries that retained chieftaincies following independence, in former-French colonies that experienced direct rule, a more centralized police administration emerged (although it should be noted that Africa as a whole tends to have more centralised police services relative to Western countries). Igbinovia (1981: 12) notes, for example, that while in Ghana control of the police is devolved to nine regions, in Côte D’Ivoire the national police are
maintained through a more centralized system. Further, in many, if not most, colonial states the police were geared largely towards the protection of the state and pacification of local communities. In Kenya, for example, the British faced local hostility and opposition in the construction of the railway and during the Mau Mau emergency and the colonial police force was employed to manage this unrest, ‘cementing its alienation from the African population’ (Ruteere and Pommerolle 2003: 591-592). As a result, police forces in newly independent ex-colonies faced an uphill struggle improving police-community relations.

The processes by which the state came into being, therefore, have important influences on the manner in which policing happens within a country. It can be particularly important in determining the degree of centralisation of the police administration. Understanding the roots of centralised or decentralised administrations is particularly important in relation to COP, as it is often suggested that decentralised systems provide ‘a more fertile ground for community policing initiatives than strongly centralised states’ (Wisler and Onwudiwe 2009: 4). For instance, Ungar (2013: 75) asserts that ‘COP cannot work in Argentina without efforts to make its hierarchical centralized police structures more localized, flexible and preventative’ and Brogden and Nijhar (2005: 207) note that ‘centralised state structures are not just passive towards the implications of decentralised policing, but officials may actively oppose it.’ Centralised policing systems are not, however, just the outward manifestation of a stubborn and power-hungry state, but may be steeped within different histories of state formation that influence interests and incentives in those contexts in different ways from states with more decentralised policing systems. Thus, an understanding of the nature of police administration and an appreciation of the depth of its historical roots is important for understanding the potential challenges COP reforms might encounter.

1.4.2 Evolution of the political system and state-society relations
The nature of government, national ideologies and the conceptualisation of the state-citizen relationship, also play a role in framing the understanding of the role and function of the police. The differences are likely to be most striking between democratic and authoritarian systems, given that authority in the former derives ultimately from the people, whereas in the latter it is held by a political leader or party. To a large extent, this determines the degree of centralisation and politicisation of the police institution. Given the importance of maintaining control, authoritarian systems of government are likely to keep tighter, more centralised control of the police, and are likely to use the police for their own purposes.

In Nigeria, for example, the military coup of 1966 altered the structure of police administration from the decentralised system of early independence (inherited from colonialism) to a militarized unit under one central police command. This centralisation was prompted by fears of insurrection and challenges to authority on the part of the new military rulers (Onwudiwe 2009: 85). Similarly, in Sudan, a new state ideology following the 1989 coup was central to strengthening paramilitary institutions (Wisler and Onwudiwe 2008: 435).

In Nigeria, the politicisation of the police has continued since the 1960s due to complete presidential control over the institution, orienting accountability towards political elites rather than the public (Hills 2007: 420). This politicisation of the police force has significant consequences for the police-citizen relationship, leading to an understanding of the police as representative of the interests of particular dominant groups or individuals, thus weakening trust (Ruteere and Pommerolle 2003: 592). This underscores the fact that security institutions need to be situated
within the broader political and governance context. State police are also susceptible to co-option by private commercial actors, particularly in countries which experience high levels of crime and insecurity and which have a significantly under-resourced police force. In such contexts – and often with either the active or the tacit approval of the state – businesses provide the state police with fuel, cars and other basic equipment, invest in the improvement of police accommodation, and provide other incentives in return for policing in their areas. In Papua New Guinea, for example, the police have inadequate funds for basic equipment and supplies, such as uniforms and fuel, and as such, ‘the more enterprising officers-in-charge of provincial police stations seek assistance from local businesses’ (Dinnen and McLeod 2009: 338). Similarly, Ruteere and Pommerolle (2003: 590) note that professional groups and businesses in Kenya have appropriated the state police for private interests, supplying them with the resources they need to patrol efficiently in their areas. In such cases, a blurring of public and private policing is apparent.

In authoritarian settings, the police are also more likely to be used as a tool of state oppression to deal with dissent. This can also mean that the separation between the police and the military is less distinct, given that the greatest security threat to the regime may be perceived to come from within the state, rather than being external to it. Kalmanoveicki (2003: 210), for example, suggests that the police and the military in Argentina were jointly involved in protecting the state against both internal and external threats so that the ‘functional distinctions between the police and the military become blurred.’

Political ideologies can also have an important impact on approaches to policing. Socialist countries, for instance, might actively encourage the devolution of social control, so that safety and security is seen as the responsibility of not just the state (as it is in most Western countries, steeped in Weberian ideas of the state possessing the monopoly of violence). For example the mass line policing model in China, as outlined in Box 5 above, appreciates the plurality of service provision and has produced a distinct form of COP based upon the collective. Similarly, the emergence of the Sungusungu in Tanzania was facilitated by former-President Julius Nyerere’s ideology of village socialism and community self-reliance (Wisler and Onwudiwe 2008: 435). Understanding how the political system and its related ideologies have developed, and what this means for relationships between the state and society will have a strong influence on the style and administration of policing and how COP might develop.

1.4.3 State presence

The degree to which the state is able to control or extend its services to the entirety of its territory is another factor that will determine the shape of policing in a country. Herbst argues that the fundamental challenge confronting many African states since the pre-colonial period has been extending authority over sparsely settled lands (2000: 11). Relating this issue to pervasive state failure on the African continent, Herbst suggests that ‘rural-based movements should come as no surprise given the documented inability … of African countries to extend their writ of authority into the distant rural areas’ (2000: 254). Mamdani similarly draws attention to these urban-rural disconnects and disparities, asserting that legacies of indirect rule through customary law created a ‘decentralised despotism’ (1999: 57) which persists in African states, bifurcating the population and privileging urban inhabitants over rural dwellers.
Where the state is too weak for its power to penetrate nation-wide, alternative policing providers or mechanisms may either emerge to fill the gap, or in many cases, continue to operate much as they have done in the past in the absence of the state. This is apparent in Melanesia, for instance, where rural villagers rely on a combination of state approved and illegal non-state policing providers, such as Peace Committees, that mediate disputes and raskols that recover stolen property or administer punishments for criminal behaviour (Dinnen and McLeod 2009). Some non-state policing practices may build on traditional authority structures and custom (however contested this may be within communities), while others are more recent reactions to a weak or absent state presence (Dinnen and McLeod 2009; Baker 2005).

The manner in which non-state policing emerges will also depend on the local political economy. Wealthier parts of society may decide to contract their own private security, where they feel state-provided services are not sufficient. In South Africa, for example, as well as much of the rest of Africa, wealthy neighbourhoods frequently use private security companies to fortify their security, while low-socioeconomic neighbourhoods, often black townships, rely on reactive state policing, or to innovate community-led practices that range from neighbourhood watch schemes, to vigilantism and mob justice (Baker 2002: 43; Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 155).

1.4.4 Experience of conflict or emergency
A history of conflict or emergency can influence security provision in important ways and is particularly pertinent given the focus of many donor-supported COP interventions in FCAS. Police often take on more militaristic functions during conflict or periods of emergency, and can be complicit in atrocities, making police-community relations difficult when peace is restored (Friesendorf and Krempel 2011: 7). During the civil war in Mozambique, for instance, the state used the police to confront opposition supporters, and excessively violent measures were employed against Renamo demonstrators (Kyed 2009: 356-357). Similarly, the Solomon Islands Police Force was associated with a particular ethnic group – the Malaitans – during the 1998-2003 conflict and this legacy of both perceived and actual association engendered deep distrust amongst many non-Malaitan communities and posed a challenge to post-conflict police-community relations (Goldsmith and Harris 2012: 240). In Southeast Asia, Dan Slater has pointed to how internal conflict has ‘made’ the state there as clearly as international warfare did in the European context (2010: 5). He explains the ‘perplexing political patchwork’ of the region in relation to internal threats, suggesting that strong authoritarian states such as Malaysia or Singapore emerge and endure when elites perceive endemic and unmanageable contentious politics – specifically class conflict which affects urban areas (2010: 7; 14). In contrast, when contentious politics is not perceived to be threatening, elites are less likely to ‘crawl under the apron of authoritarianism’ (2010: 97).

In some cases, police and other parts of the security apparatus are disbanded following conflict, due to histories of abuse or discriminatory representation within the forces. In these contexts, post-conflict police forces can actually be incredibly inexperienced, posing opportunities but also challenges for COP. Timor-Leste, for example, faced both these challenges as the police force was largely built from scratch during transition to independence in 2000, but also integrated 370 officers from the Indonesian Police Force, who had previously enforced Indonesian occupation of the country (Belo et al 2011: 6). Similarly, more recent efforts to use the police in South Africa to quell, at times violent, union strikes can position the
police as the defender of the state and elite interests, rather than of the people. This shapes community-police relations in important ways and poses particular challenges for community policing.

It should also be noted that the way in which donors themselves engage in conflict contexts can impact upon local attitudes towards policing assistance. In the case of Bougainville, for example, Australia’s role in providing support to the PNG security forces before and during the separatist conflict, as well as its perceived complicity in disputed mining operations, led to negative attitudes towards its policing programme (Saovana-Spriggs and O’Collins 2003: 5). Thus legacies of conflict and the ways that external actors engage in those conflicts can shape police-community relations.

1.4.5 Social cleavages and inequalities
The make-up of communities and the inequalities and divisions within them are also an important factor in shaping policing. In some contexts, policing can be seen to serve the interests of certain groups in society over others, reinforcing existing cleavages and inequalities and creating distrust between the police and other groups. For example, such inequalities in policing have been pointed to in South Africa, where it has been argued that policing has at times reinforced, rather than mended, social cleavages (Baker 2002; Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 234). Similarly, in Kenya the partnership between the state police and the Nairobi Central Business District Association (NCBDA) to curtail crime in the area has defended the interests of large businesses at the expense of other key actors in the community. Unlicensed hawkers, small business owners, taxi drivers and people living on the street in the Central Business District have been excluded and the criminalisation of poverty in the area continues unabated (Ruteere and Pommerolle 2003: 600). The manner in which inequalities and social cleavages can be contested and resolved within these settings is especially relevant to the police and they have a role to play in being an unbiased arbiter in the process, thus potentially helping people to exercise their rights. However, in many FCAS, the police protect, or are seen to protect, some groups’ rights over those of others.

1.4.6 Cultures of protection and dispute resolution
What it means to be protected and what is considered important to protect is the product of social and cultural norms and histories that differ across societies. Understanding these cultural and historical differences is important in order to understand the value of protection and its function. For instance, the fact that policing in Europe was initially innovated to protect the land of the wealthy and collect taxes from those who lived on it has made property rights a central focus of policing in many Western countries, which is not necessarily universal. Similarly, while the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria were originally a community-innovation, they were later co-opted by the state to protect the large central market that serves the region. While insecurity in many places is often lamented as being the outcome of insufficient police resources, it also often underscores the lack of political and/or cultural will to value and protect certain things. This is particularly pertinent in relation to issues of gender, which are often overlooked due to both policing and wider community cultures. In South Africa, for example, while members of community forums identified rape as the crime that worried them the most, ‘the police were confused and lethargic because they regarded sexual or domestic assailants as being peripheral to police concerns’ (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 142). Similarly, Cain (2000: 248-249), notes that in Trinidad and Tobago ‘violence within the home is certainly not seen by … neighbourhood groups as having a place
on their self-constructed agendas.’ Thus, cultural norms may dictate that issues such as violence against women are marginalised by both police and communities, and regarded as unimportant and not in need of protection. Of course, culture, however, is not monolithic, and perceptions that violence against women is not a policing issue is the result of particular configurations of power regarding who defines agendas of policing and protection.

Long-standing cultural mechanisms for resolving disputes can also form the basis of COP practices and should be looked to as a potential resource. In Bahrain, for instance, the police have built upon ‘traditional’ conflict resolution mechanisms to mediate some minor offences (Strobl 2013). Working with cultural practices that are often viewed as highly legitimate within communities, is importantly different from the presumption that such ‘traditional’ practices will simply wither away as state policing takes hold.

**1.4.7 How these factors affect policing**

While this paper cannot offer a comprehensive analysis of the wide variety of factors that shape the nature of policing in any given context, the above discussion demonstrates the significance of some of the most influential. The peculiar interaction of these and other factors helps to explain why policing and police-community relations look the way they do. Attempts to improve police-community relations need to start with an appreciation of the constellation of these factors, which will both constrain and create opportunities for change. Blueprint approaches to COP that do not take account of these factors will be limited in their ability to create sustainable improvements in relationships between the police and communities and may risk doing more harm than good.
Risks of community policing

Donors frequently include community policing as an integral component of post-conflict reforms. This is in spite of (or maybe, precisely because of) the diversity of meanings, models and objectives that mean it can appeal to donors, governments, police and communities for a variety of different reasons. The value of locating safety, security and justice at the community level through COP remains given its potential for:

- Tapping into community-innovated practices that often attract a high degree of local support and can thus help to convey greater legitimacy for COP programmes;
- Ensuring strong local ownership of safety, security and justice by making the community a key partner in their delivery;
- Building locally owned policing approaches that are more likely to be sustainable in the long-term;
- In relation to non-state policing, complementing state policing and extending the limited resources of the state (Baker 2002: 44)

Yet while COP clearly provides some promising opportunities, it also brings with it a number of potential risks. Those who choose to support already existing COP practices, or to implement new COP strategies need to keep these opportunities and risks in mind. Five key risks are highlighted here.

Perhaps the greatest risk in supporting COP programmes is that there is highly contested evidence as to whether they in fact work. Shearing, for instance, argues that COP is encompassed within a predominantly positive rhetoric, emerging as a “‘hurrah’ word, which carries with it warm connotative meanings that have been employed to paper over denotative difficulties’ (Shearing 2013: x). Yet the empirical basis for this confidence in COP is in fact not clear.

Disagreement is most notable in the debate over the potential for COP to reduce crime or the fear of crime. Fruhling (2007: 141), for example, states that, ‘the results are inconclusive with regard to the impact of these programs on the crime rate’ in Latin American countries. Pelser (1999: 13) notes that it is unclear whether any reduction in crime in South Africa can be attributed to the implementation of COP, and states elsewhere (2002: 116) that COP has had ‘no significant impact on levels of crime’ in the country. MacDonald (2002: 613) argues that ‘there is little evidence to suggest that community policing … has reduced violent crime across major American cities’; and Brogden and Nijhar (2005: 161) assert that while COP has been portrayed as a success story in the West, ‘the evidence is otherwise.’

Yet although the evidence for COP reducing crime may be weak, other analysts highlight the ability of COP to achieve other goals – like improved police-community relations. A number of scholars point to the potential for COP programs to enhance the image of the police, to increase trust, and to promote more effective communication between police and communities. Bruce Baker, for example, argues that Partnership Boards have significantly improved police-community relations in Sierra Leone, and the ability of COP to increase levels of trust and decrease hostilities has been noted in Kenya (Ochieng 2004), Serbia (Groenwald and Peake 2004: 7), Tanzania (Scher 2010: 1) and Latin America (Fruhling 2007: 141).
Indeed, in the case of Kuajok, South Sudan, community-police forums have been identified as providing a safe space for civilians and police to build relationships and strengthen lines of communication. The Saferworld programme manager for South Sudan has noted that ‘community members have gone from passively attending meetings to feeling empowered to hold the police to account in a constructive and respectful manner’ (Moore 2013). Others have emphasised the link between improved police-community relations and effective criminal investigation, arguing that COP reduces crime and fear of crime. Lee (2009: 197), for example, notes COP programs in Hong Kong have enhanced public confidence in the police and encouraged residents to report elements of organised criminal groups and activities in their neighbourhoods. Similarly, the Independent Commission for Policing for Northern Ireland highlighted the beneficial results of a neighbourhood policing project in the Markets area of Belfast in terms of crime reduction (Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland 1999: 42).

Thus, the widespread use of COP by governments, police and donors may be surprising given the lack of evidence that it reduces crime. Indeed, this may be a risk if COP is instituted to solve problems that the evidence suggests it is not capable of solving. However, it also seems that COP can contribute to other goods, such as improved trust between police and communities, and the risk to be avoided, therefore, is that COP is used without clearly articulating what it is intended to achieve.

The second risk is that even if COP is successful in creating silos of good policing at the community level, this may detract attention away from transforming the overall quality of policing at the national level. An important issue that needs to be grappled with, therefore, is how community-level practices can be better connected to broader statebuilding processes so that COP is not just limited to a handful of communities, but is genuinely transformative at a larger scale. How the local level connects with the national will be specific to both context and specific models of COP. A key question for the case studies will be whether COP interventions in fact contribute to these wider statebuilding processes. This is particularly pertinent in cases where COP does not engage with state police forces and so is less directly involved in building the capacity of the state apparatus.

A third risk is that COP can create or reinforce inequalities between communities. For instance, it is often communities which are most able to mobilise and generate resources that are more successful in implementing COP initiatives (Cain 2000: 248; Clegg et al 2000) and scholars recognise that community policing may be most effective in the places least in need of it (Fruhling 2007; Baker 2002). Improved policing in one area may simply displace crime to another locality, creating or reinforcing schisms between communities – potentially leading to more stratified policing between wealthier and safer and poorer and more dangerous communities.

Fourth, COP can also reinforce power imbalances within a community in potentially destabilising ways. Indeed, community ‘togetherness’ can actually mean the exclusion of some elements, depending on who ‘the community’ is considered to include by those who are powerful. Cain, for example relates a story of how one neighbourhood group in Trinidad and Tobago creatively addressed a problem of an open space being used as a congregation point by troublesome youth by turning it into a tennis court. Yet as she notes ‘the youths driven off by the tennis court probably had nowhere else to go’ (2000: 248). Similarly, an initiative developed by a wealthy community in South Africa – called the community Active Protection – intimidates suspicious looking people to make them feel uncomfortable and leave.
the area. This has led to the discriminatory harassment of people, often without good cause (Marks et al 2009: 156).

Finally, support to COP practices can mean working with groups that have weak democratic representation and accountability. While this is true of all community policing practices, it is most frequently pointed out in relation to non-state practices, often (erroneously) considered to be more arbitrary given that they can operate in violation of the law. In particular, representation of women and minority groups is often low in community-innovated policing practices and decision-making processes, again, as above, because those powerful within a community can exclude them (Wojkowska 2006). Alemika and Chukwuma (2004: 7), for instance, note that the lack of representation of women is a serious shortcoming of many informal policing groups in Nigeria. Similarly, Dinnen and McLeod (2009: 148) assert that traditional forms of security and justice provision in Melanesia are based upon ‘underlying imbalances of power … not least in respect of gender’; and Ruteere and Pommerolle (2003: 601) illustrate how neighbourhood watch groups in Kangemi settlement in Nairobi are dominated by landlords, and how tenants are under-represented in consultative committees despite constituting 80 per cent of the population. Two points are important to note here. First, such a lack of representation is also apparent in most state policing organisations in FCAS, so should not be a challenge considered solely in the context of community-innovated COP practices. Second, it is important to recognise that ‘custom’ and ‘tradition’ are not fixed or static but rather hotly contested and usually represent the interests and views of those that hold power within society (Dinnen and McLeod 2009: 148).

Support to COP must ensure that it does not simply contribute to the calcification of ‘custom’ or ‘tradition’, as interpreted by the powerful, but rather provide a mechanism for challenging the potentially oppressive, discriminatory, coercive and violent aspects of ‘custom’ and ‘tradition’. For these reasons, it is critically important that support to COP practices are clear about the nature of the practice they are working with and what the implications of working with them are.

There are undoubtedly other risks that will also emerge through the life of the project, such as creating unsustainable projects that the state will not be able to finance once donor support dries up, but those highlighted here stand out in the literature as important caveats to the optimism with which COP is otherwise largely greeted. While COP provides opportunities that can strengthen accountable safety, security and justice in FCAS, it is not a panacea. Important risks remain that donors need to be aware of when attempting to support improved community-police relations. Most prominent of these, perhaps, is the extent to which donor support can play a role in reforming local policing systems (both state and non-state) that exhibit discriminatory, oppressive or brutal practices, at times while also enjoying strong local legitimacy. As Brogden and Nijhar note, ‘the new COP missionary is faced with a formidable dilemma’ (2005: 76).
Conclusion

This paper, the first in an ongoing project on community policing, has broadly mapped the diversity of definitions, models and objectives of COP. It has also set out some of the key factors that shape the nature of policing and community-police relations in any given context, and some of the risks associated with support to COP that donors must consider. These discussions provide the groundwork for case studies, which will cut into particular COP practices in 2-4 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Following the methodology set out in annex 1, the case studies will examine with greater specificity how COP is understood within the country, what its objectives are, what the model looks like and how it emerges from a range of historical, political and institutional factors. They will also consider whether the COP practice is doing harm, considering some of the risks that COP can fall prey to. A synthesis paper will follow in 2014, examining the potential roles for donor support in light of case study findings.

Ultimately, the case studies will demonstrate the breadth and diversity of COP, while also drawing out key characteristics that link the practices. This will assist in clarifying a field in which donors have become heavily involved despite a lack of consensus on some key underlying ideas. Importantly, the research will also seek to bring to the fore the inherent political nature of COP and support to it. As David Bayley notes regarding ‘democratic policing’:

> In giving assistance to foreign police ... [development agencies] must be alert to the effects of such assistance on the distribution of power and influence. Assistance serves some interests more than others, strengthens the ability to do one thing rather than another, and encourages some people and discourages others. All foreign assistance to police must be examined for these effects ... It follows that reform should not be soft-pedaled simply because it may be “political,” (i.e., controversial). The question is not whether assistance is political—it all is—but what its likely consequences are’ (2001: 26).

Given that COP is characterised by a high degree of disagreement and lack of clarity on basic underlying ideas and is also highly political, going to the very heart of how power is allocated within a society, understanding the nature and impact of donor support seems particularly imperative. This project aims to contribute to developing this understanding more fully and, on this basis, to provide development partners with guidance as to how to best support COP practices in future.
Annex 1: Methodology for case studies

Case studies will look at community policing practices that are donor-supported, government-led, community-led, or some combination thereof. The purpose is to better understand donors’ objectives for supporting COP initiatives, whether these cohere or conflict with the aims of the other actors involved and whether the manner in which COP initiatives happen in practice is the best way to achieve the intended outcomes. Central to this will be an understanding of how the various actors involved in COP understand success and how their different interests intersect and play out as a change process.

3-4 case studies will be undertaken (dependent on funding) in Africa, Asia and Latin America in an attempt to capture the diversity of practices deployed under the COP label across regions. As a result, case studies will, where possible, try to cover some state-led COP practices and some community innovated practices. Wherever possible, the most diverse examples of COP will be selected for investigation in order to highlight the variety of practices. Where possible, case studies will be carried out with local partners who have been working on community policing, such as the Asia Foundation.

The case studies will aim to provide analysis of 1-2 COP practices within a country. These will be situated within the broader policing context of the country, allowing for identification of other COP practices that might be ongoing, while retaining a specific and in-depth focus on just one or two practices. This should allow for a detailed examination of a particular practice, rather than an overview of all practices that can be conceived of as COP within a country. This more specific focus is important in allowing researchers to drill down into the political-economy factors of why community-police relations look the way they do and how this shapes efforts by donors, governments, police and communities to alter those relations. Below, some guiding questions are set out which will be further refined ahead of case study fieldwork, tailored to the specific community policing practice to be examined.

Case studies will focus on communities as recipients – or ‘end-users’ – of policing. This approach recognises that safety and security are provided by a plural set of actors from the community to national levels, and thus will examine COP practices along the state–non-state continuum. Indeed, one of the qualities of COP is that it makes recipients the analytical starting point in examining policing practices, rather than the providers and thus is able to circumvent the conventional polarisation of state versus non-state forms of policing.

How are community-police relations shaped within a particular context?

- How have factors such as history of state formation, political ideology, type of government and state-society relations, state presence, history of conflict or emergency, social inequalities or cleavages, or cultures of dispute resolution and protection, influenced the way that the police and communities interact?
What are the objectives of the various actors involved?

- What do donors, the government, police and communities see as the ultimate aim of the practice?
- Do these objectives complement or compete with each other?
- How do these competing interests play out on the ground and with what result?

What does the community policing practice/initiative look like/involve?

- Do all actors conceive of it as community policing? Why or why not?
- Who in the community were consulted before the programme/reform process was implemented?
- What are its (various) objectives and assumptions that underpin COP initiatives? Are these shared by all actors involved?
- What are the theories of change at play (on the part of donors, government, police and communities)? Why is the community level important in achieving this?
- How is ‘community’ understood within the model? Who does this include/exclude?

What is the effect of the community policing practice?

- Is it viewed as legitimate within all parts of the community? How is its legitimacy derived?
- Does the practice represent local needs? Are these local needs connected to a national policing framework, policy or approach?
- Has the COP practice or intervention led to improved perceptions of the policing provider? Has the COP intervention made people feel more secure within their community? According to who?
- Has the programme made any material difference to security justice and security (or reducing crime and disorder) for the members of the community where it has been delivered? Has it had any downsides?
- How has it contributed to statebuilding processes?

In conducting the case study research, we will use qualitative research methods, drawing on semi-structured interviews with relevant policing and community stakeholders, as well as government, civil society and donor representatives and policing experts. Where survey data is available, this will also be drawn upon. An ODI researcher will spend at least two weeks in country, working alongside a local researcher familiar with the policing context. Interviews will be complemented by desk research of relevant academic and policy literatures. Case study reports will be publicly available and inform a roundtable discussion with COP experts, as well as a synthesis report.
Bibliography


Bayley, David H., 1985, Patterns of Policing: A comparative international analysis, The State University, Rutgers.


Securing communities: the what and how of community policing


Securing communities: the what and how of community policing


Trojanowicz, R. and Bucqueroux, 1994, Community Policing: How to get started, Anderson publishing company, Cincinnati.


ODI is the UK’s leading independent think tank on international development and humanitarian issues.

Our mission is to inspire and inform policy and practice which lead to the reduction of poverty, the alleviation of suffering and the achievement of sustainable livelihoods.

We do this by locking together high-quality applied research, practical policy advice and policy-focused dissemination and debate.

We work with partners in the public and private sectors, in both developing and developed countries.

Readers are encouraged to reproduce material from ODI Reports for their own publications, as long as they are not being sold commercially. As copyright holder, ODI requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. For online use, we ask readers to link to the original resource on the ODI website. The views presented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of ODI.

© Overseas Development Institute 2013. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial Licence (CC BY-NC 3.0).

ISSN: 2052-7209

Overseas Development Institute
203 Blackfriars Road
London SE1 8NJ

Tel +44 (0)20 7922 0300
Fax +44 (0)20 7922 0399

Cover image: Mark Knobil