Securing communities: summaries of key literature on community policing

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About

This document contains extended summaries of key background texts and readings from both academic and policy literatures which elucidate and debate the definitions, objectives, models and influencing factors of community policing in different contexts. There is an extensive literature on community policing and it was not possible to cover it all in these summaries. What is included here are key contributions to the literature that have been helpful in understanding the different manifestations of community policing around the world. The material is organised alphabetically.

Resources


Clegg, I., Hunt, R., and Whetton, J., 2000, *Policy Guidance on Support to Developing Countries*, Centre for Development Studies, University of Wales, Swansea


OECD, 2005, Issues Brief: Introduction to security system reform, Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention


Wojkowska, E. 2006, *Doing Justice: How informal justice systems can contribute*, UNDP, Oslo Governance Centre, Oslo

Brief Summary:
There are numerous different non-state groups and informal policing structures that provide security at the local level. While they raise some concerns, particularly in their employment of mob justice and in their sheer multiplicity, they also present opportunities for programmatic intervention in communities.

Extended Summary:
Apart from the state police, a number of different types of informal policing structures are established in communities in order to deal with crime. These community-initiated policing mechanisms tend to arise out of a perceived failure of the state to provide security and protection, often in the context of rising crime rates. Many of these groups are rooted in their communities, they enjoy significant levels of legitimacy and they often work in close collaboration with the formal police. In the literature, the term ‘vigilante’ is often used to describe these groups, however this masks their diversity. This paper identifies four different types of ‘vigilante’ or informal policing structures: religious, ethnic, state-sponsored and community/neighbourhood watch.

It should be noted that the term ‘informal policing’ is problematic. While these groups are often ‘informal’ in relation to the contemporary state, they are central aspects of lived experience for many communities. Indeed, they are often rooted in culture and are part of traditional criminal justice structures.

The Nigeria Police Force does not oppose the formation and activities of community-initiated crime watch groups as long as they:

- Register with the police.
- Ensure that members are screened by the police.
- Guarantee that members do not bear arms.
- Ensure that suspects are not detained by the group, but rather are handed over to the police.

While informal policing structures present opportunities for effective programmatic intervention, they are also subject to a number of concerns:

- Multiplicity of security providers and lack of coordination.
- Non-representative of the community – sections of the community – such as women, age groups, occupational groups, or ethnic groups – are often excluded.
- Use of arms and mob-justice – the presence of groups that are armed and that exist outside the control of the state raises concerns for human rights, accountability and the legitimacy of the state.

The following recommendations are made for engaging with informal policing structures:

- Establish Community Safety and Security Forums to build trust and improve relationships between the people and the police.
- Regulate IPS activities by identifying groups that do not use weapons or mob justice and coordinate them through meetings with police authorities. Such meetings could serve as a structure for information exchange, peer review, the standardization of procedures, the screening of members, registration, and improvement of relationships with the state police.
• Establish structures of accountability for IPS groups.
• Introduce reward mechanisms – such as the provision of raincoats, torches, and other non-lethal equipment – to encourage groups to play by the rules.
• Encourage NGOs to invite IPS members into their human rights education and training programmes.

Full text available at:
http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/SSAJ126.pdf


Brief Summary:
Policing activities – that is the maintenance of order and stability, the prevention and response to criminal activity, and the use of coercion in these roles – are typically understood to be the sole responsibility of the state. However, in many places around the world, in reality, policing is carried out by a wide range of groups independent of the state police; that is to say, policing is not simply ‘what The Police do’ (p. 30). Nevertheless, the prevalence of non-state policing in democratic societies has engendered significant debate over the appropriate stance to adopt in response. Is it a valuable resource, supplementing the over-stretched police force, or does it threaten the hegemony of state power? This paper explores these questions in relation to South Africa, examining the different forms of policing that operate on the ground, reflecting upon the state’s response to these activities, and highlighting some of the problems and challenges presented by the ubiquity of non-state policing.

Extended Summary:
Non-state policing activities in South Africa are wide-ranging and include a number of disparate groups and practices, from private security companies, to neighbourhood watch groups, to vigilante gangs. However, they are bound together by certain commonalities and origins, most notably that they by-pass the South African Police Service (SAPS), are continuations of a culture of self-reliance, and emerge from a dissatisfaction with state policing services. In the last twenty years, in the context of rising crime and insecurity in South Africa, there has been an increasing overlap and interpenetration of public and private, of state and non-state forms of policing.

Following Johnston’s (1991)1 categorisation, there are three different types of non-state policing:

1. Autonomous citizen responses – often called vigilantes, these are groups that act independently of the state police and often do not cooperate with it. They are prepared to break the law to investigate and respond to crime and insecurity and are willing to employ violent methods of control. Such groups are prominent in the townships of South Africa. While they tend to be small, reactive, and loosely organised, some are larger and more formal.

Mapago a matamaga is one of the largest vigilante groups in the country. They work with communities to investigate and arrest alleged criminals, and are renowned for exacting brutal assaults upon them before handing them over to the police.

State Response: While these groups have been denounced by authorities at the national and local level, this does not account for the attitudes of people on the ground. There is significant support for alternative or traditional forms of punishment which are justified on the grounds of their effectiveness and in the support given to traditional leaders.

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2. Responsible citizen responses – these are activities which are carried out with the approval or cooperation of the police. These ‘responsible’ groups do not necessarily abstain from violence and some have been reported to engage in assaults and attacks. Examples of such groups include:

- Car guards in Grahamstown who offer personal surveillance of parked cars in the city centre in return for a voluntary contribution. This initiative was established by a local man who approached the SAPS and the municipality with the project, asserting that it would protect tourism, provide employment and reduce car theft.
- Traditional courts and justice systems where tribal police and courts police customary law within the framework of the Constitution and the law.
- In a small wealthy, suburban area of Grahamstown, residents have employed their own ‘bobbies on the beat’ and four police reservists are paid to patrol the roads during the day.

State response: Local police see these groups as a valuable means of supplementing their limited resources. However, local politicians are more uneasy; whilst the DP takes a pragmatic approach, the ANC preferred that these groups fall under Municipality control to ensure adequate training and full accountability.

3. Private security industry – which is supervised and overseen by a government agency. The industry employs approximately 167,000 active security officers who operate as guards or armed response units for wealthy, predominantly white, suburbs in South Africa. The private security industry has also recently expanded and is utilised by large businesses. The industry has been subject to a number of accusations, such as allegations of illegal activity and the misuse of weapons.

State Response: The SAPS welcome partnerships with security firms and tend to cooperate with them. While local and national politicians are suspicious of key figures in the industry, they adopt a pragmatic approach, accepting that non-state policing is prevalent and ‘here to stay’ (p. 43).

The three different types of non-state policing are all evident in the city of Grahamstown, which remains spatially divided by race. Private security firms patrolled business premises in the city centre and guarded private school premises; informal groups and vigilantes operate largely in the black townships, acting as investigators tribunals and judges; and the car guards and bobbies on the beat are evidence of ‘responsible’ citizen policing in the town. Thus, there are clear spatial patterns to non-state policing: while the townships resort to vigilantes, the wealthy elements of society employ private security firms.

Few challenge the legitimacy of non-state policing in South Africa, given its ubiquity in the country and the state police are not adequately resourced or accountable to assume sole responsibility for policing in the country. However, there are a number of dangers inherent in the prevalence of non-state policing in South Africa:

- Exclusion and social isolation can be an unintended side-effect of non-state responses to insecurity. ‘No-go’ areas and physical barriers serve to insulate communities, fragmenting the urban arena and presenting a significant obstacle to the consolidation of a common identity.
- Support of non-state policing undermines the legitimacy of the SAPS.
- Non-state-policing exacerbates inequalities as access is dependent upon location and wealth, and consequently, race.
- Some forms of non-state policing identify certain elements of society as ‘undesirables’ who need to be ‘cleansed’ from the area, and thus they nurture attitudes of discrimination.
- Some forms of non-state policing provoke the use of violence.
Since the state is unable to act as the sole guarantor of security in the country due to inadequate resources, other avenues of ensuring an accountable, consistent and humane form of policing must be sought.


Brief Summary:
Community policing, and particularly community forum initiatives have been widely recommended for developing countries. These projects – which emphasise police-neighbourhood partnerships in addressing local concerns – are seen by many as a key to reducing both crime and, ultimately, poverty. Yet, despite the attention and positive rhetoric, we have limited knowledge of community policing in practice and little empirical evidence supporting its validity. This paper seeks to address this imbalance, and provides an assessment of Police Local Partnership Boards in Freetown, Sierra Leone. It argues that the criticisms of community policing have been exaggerated, and that despite flaws in implementation and design, and despite their over-ambitious objectives, there is evidence to suggest that they are valuable, relevant and sustainable.

Extended Summary:
Following the war in Sierra Leone, the police were perceived as a tool of state repression, incompetent, corrupt, unaccountable, heavily politicised and engaged in human rights abuses. As a strategy for overcoming the depths of mistrust which had grown between citizens and the police, and with DFID funding, the police adopted the community policing concept. Police-community forums, known as Police Local Partnership Boards were introduced in 1999. Comprised of representatives of local groups and in partnership with the newly-established Community Relations Offices, the Partnership Boards sought to give local communities a voice in local policing and to increase security in the country.

Strengths of the Partnership Boards
The Partnership Boards were largely welcomed and valued by the state police in Freetown as well as by local communities. A number of strengths can be identified, and the Partnership Boards arguably:

- Enhanced the police image and facilitated cooperation and trusting relations between the police and local communities.
- Increased the flow of intelligence, facilitating more efficient criminal investigation.
- Augmented police manpower by providing informants, night patrols, criminal investigators, mediators in civil dispute and action teams for tackling local disputes and supplemented police resources such as providing fuel or food for night patrols.
- Raised awareness of security issues amongst local communities.

Weaknesses of the Partnership Boards
Despite these strengths, however, a number of criticisms have been directed at the program by local communities and Partnership Board executives, and several limitations and challenges remain. These include:
• Partnership Boards are undemocratic, being dominated by educated and influential elders. This can lead to particular interests being represented at the expense of those of the wider community.
• The lack of continuity brought about by the high turn over of police staff obstructs the development of relationships.
• Input of local communities in defining policing agendas is limited, and ‘the police saw no obligation to listen or to accept these suggestions’ (p. 28).
• The relationship is unequal and communities tend to put more effort and resources into developing and financing activities than the police.

Thus, there are a number of issues that need to be addressed in COP projects:

• Community input – police resistance to community-involvement in setting the agenda for security provision raises questions over the level of community input. ‘Is this lip-service to participation or is it to have substance?’ (p. 35).
• Representational community forums – forums tend to be unrepresentative of the wider community, largely dominated by educated members of society and traditional elites. True representation may be impossible, but it should be accounted for when assessing ‘local’ opinion.
• Community awareness is essential for the legitimacy of such initiatives. In Freetown, for example, there were significant limitations in terms of local knowledge of the Partnership Boards; community programmes should be actively promoted.
• The unequal investment in these projects – where community members contribute more in the relationship – should be addressed. There is a danger that the voluntarism inherent to these projects will run its course and raise the thorny issue of introducing incentives for involvement.
• There is a danger of mission creep, as the causes of crime have become part of the agenda of some Partnership Boards.

The community policing agenda in Sierra Leone has sought to transform the police in order to address poverty and prevent future conflict, and while there have been significant improvements, the transformation has not been as radical as intended. Criticisms have often been too severe and generalised, but a nuanced picture reveals a number of unresolved issues, and suggests that community policing will likely remain a police-led initiative designed to supplement resources and improve intelligence gathering techniques. There is not, as of yet, a model that fully engages the community. As a result, community-based forms of policing continue in the absence of state police.


Brief Summary:
The three primary components of community policing that are the most dominant in exported models – community-consultative forums, neighbourhood watch schemes, and problem-solving policing – have not been as successful as some might suggest, and in some cases have actually exacerbated social schisms. Imported Western models of COP are irrelevant in many transitional and failed societies. To be more successful, community policing must draw on local experiences and practices that are effective in managing insecurity. Western policing reforms should only be employed if they come with an attested success record, if they are sensitive to local conditions,
and if they have accounted for local knowledge. Public ownership of policing practices, not state
or police control is the key to effective community policing.

Extended summary:
Western approaches to transitional and failed societies are embedded within an understanding of
policing as ‘the thin blue line’, as the key institutional guarantor of social order, legitimacy and,
ultimately, development. In countries marked by rising crime rates, weak judicial institutions,
and low economic investment, police reform – and community policing in particular – has
become a dominant strategy for effecting social change and acting as a catalyst for development.

A wide range of disparate practices are incorporated within the COP rubric. However, in
practice, three key activities are central to exported community policing models: neighbourhood
watch schemes, community forums, and problem-solving mechanisms. The exportation of
policing strategies in the contemporary era is being driven by donor interest in addition to
customer demand. Several different actors are involved in this process of exportation, including:

- Individuals – rank and file police officers from the West deliver COP training
  in transitional societies.
- Bilateral police exchanges – police officers from the global south attend COP
courses in Western societies.
- NGOs – community policing has been adopted by various NGOs as an
  answer to human rights problems.
- Policing for profit – private companies, agencies and individuals sell and
  promote community policing as they would any other product or good.
- International Organisations – such as the UN and the EU. Furthermore, the
  IMF and World Bank are increasingly making economic assistance
  conditional upon the reform of policing in a COP direction.

However, these reform packages ‘often suit sellers rather than consumers’ (p. 71) and Western
COP policies have dominated reform efforts. However, this export process has been marked by a
failure to account for the different social, economic and political realities in transitional and
failed states.

Community policing has enjoyed an unequivocally positive rhetoric in official discourse both in
the West and in many transitional societies. Indeed, it is often regarded as an ‘antidote’ to crime
problems (p. 77). However, this discourse has masked the realities and confusions of community
policing. There have been significant challenges to COP reforms in a number of cases. In Africa,
for example:

- In Kenya, the Nairobi police unilaterally decided to introduce COP. There
  was limited discussion with marginalised communities and a number of
  groups were excluded from any form of engagement. Communities were
  simply expected to cooperate.
- Neighbourhood watch schemes in Zambia are subject to minimal oversight
  and accountability mechanisms. In many cases they have disintegrated and
  have been associated with mob justice.
- Community policing has met with significant organisational and individual
  resistance in many cases. Police reform is very difficult in the context of a
  grossly underpaid and undertrained police force, which suffers from a legacy
  of distrust amongst local communities.
- Despite the markedly diverse contexts of the urban and rural arenas, the same
  model of COP is often adopted in both contexts.
- A lack of community participation and consultation in many instances has led
to failures of COP, such as in Uganda where little consideration was afforded
to differing community needs.
Local demands for immediate solutions to rising crime rates have led to diminished enthusiasm and the virtual abandonment of community policing practices. South Africa is a well-documented case.

Similar criticisms have been directed at community policing efforts in South Asia where adaptations in police-community relations are more genuine in some areas than in others; where there was little public interest in neighbourhood watch schemes in many areas; and where many senior police officers resisted the implementation of COP, regarding it as an encroachment upon their exclusive domain.

Organizational factors and implementation problems have undoubtedly played a role in these failures. However, the central argument in this paper is that the problem is systemic; COP is largely irrelevant to many transitional societies.

Community policing practices have largely ignored or discredited informal forms of security provision and policing which is conducted outside of the purview of the state. The dismissal of such practices has been for the good reasons of non-accountability and lack of legal status. Nevertheless, community ownership is central to success. Initiatives must be local, borrowing from the west only when they come with an attested success record, and only when they are sensitive to, and draw upon, local experience.


Brief Summary:
Community policing comes in a variety of forms and it is shaped by the histories, institutions and cultures of the immediate context. Despite their popularity, Western models of community policing are inappropriate to the context of transitional societies. There are major problems with the readiness of governments, police institutions and communities to adapt to these models, and they tend to exacerbate existing social schisms.

Extended Summary:
Chapter 1: Globalising Community policing
Community policing lacks a clear and coherent definition and it is manifested in a number of different ways around the world. In this book it is understood as a style and strategy of policing that reflects local community needs. Community policing has become a popular vehicle for police transformation, particularly in failed and transitional societies and it has been presented as a ‘policing elixir that will resolve a range of social ills’ (p. 3). However, scholars have identified a number of problems that occur when western models of policing are superimposed on different social, economic and political contexts.

Chapters 2 & 3: The Anglo-American Model
While a universally applicable definition of community policing is impossible, the key characteristics include community partnerships, problem-solving, and a commitment to policing a limited geographical area. Nevertheless, community policing as a concept remains vaguely articulated, often referred to as a philosophy or a body or ideas, rather than a specific plan of action. Advocates of community policing in the West often hark back to a ‘golden age’ of Peelian policing, characterised by close police-public relations and the understanding of policing as a practice carried out by ‘citizens-in-uniform’ (p. 25). However, the realities of contemporary society – modern, diverse, and socially unequal – raise significant questions regarding the applicability of Peelian principles today. Indeed, the role of the police officer as a ‘uniformed social worker’ advocated by the community policing paradigm may obscure the fact that the police role was and always will be, law enforcement based on legal powers (p. 44).
There are a number of criticisms that have been directed at community policing:

- It incorporates diverse and unrelated procedures and practices. This is reflected in Goldstein’s conceptualisation that community policing is, ‘any activity whereby the police develop closer working relations with the community and respond to citizens’ needs.’
- The ‘community’ as a singular, coherent unit is an illusion. Very few places possess unitary cultural traits, and contemporary society is characterised by plurality.
- Community participation often only mobilises small segments of the local population and therefore does not necessarily reflect broader values and concerns.
- Community participation might be limited to an intelligence-gathering technique used by the police, rather than a means of transforming policing philosophy.

Community policing can be successful when the police are able to link with already existing community networks. However, advocates of community policing face significant dilemmas when these local networks are based on informal security and justice mechanisms and illegal activities that sustain the local economy.

Chapter 4: Community policing in the Pacific Rim
Community policing strategies in the Asia Pacific Rim region have very different origins from those of the Anglo-American model and a critical analysis of these structures may require a different starting point. For example, what might be perceived as state intrusion into personal life and community affairs assumes a different meaning when it is viewed through other cultural lenses. In China, combating crime and managing social order is seen as ‘everybody’s business, a community affair’ (p. 96) and the notion that it should be the exclusive responsibility of an official state institution is alien.

Chapter 5: Community policing in the European Union
There are different perceptions and manifestations of community policing across Europe that are reflective of different understandings of the police role and function. In many places the development and implementation of community policing has been inhibited by police structures, traditions and cultures, and it often appears as an ‘add on’, a supplement to traditional policing methods, rather than marking a significant transformation in police practice.

Chapter 6: South Africa: the failure of community policing
There are four common practices which are most often associated with community policing reforms: neighbourhood watch schemes, community-police forums, problem-solving and foot patrols. South Africa faced a wide range of social and political problems in the post-apartheid era, and, in particular, demands for a more accountable and transparent policing system were prominent amongst local communities and international donors. Community policing reforms were implemented to resolve many of the issues facing the country. However, there were vastly divergent understandings of what community policing and conflicting expectations regarding its objectives in the country. The police saw community policing primarily as an intelligence-gathering technique in which communities would become a valuable police resource. However, communities were more concerned with the potential for COP reforms to make the police more accountable, to shift the balance of power and to give them more control of the police. In addition to this problem of competing perceptions, the community forums which marked the most common vehicle for implementing community policing in the country were problematic. Not only were their purposes unclear, facilitating the emergence of the different priorities of police and communities, but they also dominated by particular sections of society, and less organised or articulate groups were marginalised and excluded.

Since 1999, crime-fighting has become the dominant discourse and community policing has been all but abandoned. Political democratisation of the police was perceived to be incompatible
with effective crime-fighting, and in the context of high levels of crime and insecurity this created a lack of support for the program. Furthermore, growing international concerns about global crime has meant that international assistance is directed towards different policing activities, most notably combating drug trafficking and illegal migration.

Private security could be said to fall within the rubric of community policing. However, this raises the issue of equality; more affluent areas are able to invest in efficient private security policing, whilst black townships must rely on the under-resourced state police or must resort to informal policing initiatives.

South Africa draws attention to the difficulties of implementing community policing in contexts where communities are divided and where police are regarded with suspicion by the population. Finally, it should be noted that there is a major contradiction in popular calls for community policing as a way of making the police more effective and demands for increased accountability. In South Africa, many communities are more concerned about a lack of efficient and effective policing than they are about questions of accountability.

Chapter 7: Community policing in other transitional societies
This chapter touches upon many of the issues raised in Chapter six, and argues that community policing is, at best unproven practice, and at worst it has served to reinforce social schisms in recipient countries. It concludes by asserting that police reform is only likely to be successful in developing countries if two conditions are satisfied:

- Local experience and practice is drawn upon in developing reform strategies.
- Policing practices borrowed from the west must come with an attested success record.

Community policing should only be implemented when constructed through local knowledge and when it is sensitive to local contexts.

Chapter 8: Community policing in failed societies
This chapter focuses upon former soviet countries which are negotiating the disappearance of command economies and the onrush of the free market system. It argues that the implementation of community policing reforms is even more difficult in these contexts than it is in transitional societies. Officials may actively oppose the decentralisation of policing, and police forces characterised by low morale, poor pay, limited resources and little tradition of the use of discretion, are ill-equipped to adopt a community-oriented style of policing. Further to these institutional problems is the lack of popular demand for community policing; primarily driven by a human rights perspective, these projects often presume too much about local priorities. Effective crime-fighting may be more important than human rights in these contexts.

Chapter 9: A new beginning? Community policing in Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland provides an important test case for community policing; it presents an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of community policing reforms in a divided society with a police force characterised by paramilitary traditions and structures. Following the Troubles, the Pattern commission proposed a community-based approach to policing in Northern Ireland, introducing mechanisms of accountability and seeking to improve police-citizen relations. There were some successes; militarism is no longer evident in policing in Northern Ireland and a degree of accountability has been established. However, it was not feasible to move directly from paramilitary policing to community policing, and the deeply stratified nature of the society with regards to politics, class and religion, was not considered. Vastly divergent perceptions of policing remain between Catholic and Protestant communities, and COP has largely been reduced to problem-solving.

Chapter 10: Transforming policing
Community policing, due to its lack of clarity and its vague articulation, has always been subject to cherry picking. It has been transported to transitional and failed societies without adequate reference to context and historical factors. This book has argued that community policing may be
impossible in contexts where the police have a legacy of repression and where they have become irrelevant to large sections of the population. There are three final issues that are raised by community policing:

- the problem of inequality – who does community policing secure? The police are often used to maintain the existing social order, which may be characterised by division and inequality.
- the functions of community policing – are human rights objectives compatible with effective policing? How is community policing to be implemented where the population may regard certain rights as an obstacle to crime control and the maintenance of order?
- community policing as independent from state police – can community policing be initiated by citizens without state police involvement? Informal policing structures may well possess the local knowledge required to be effective, but they are subject to major problems of accountability.


Brief Summary:
This paper explores neighbourhood watch schemes and women’s self-protection groups in Trinidad and Tobago. It argues that we should avoid the view that reductions in crime and disorder are the sole objective of community policing exercises, and asserts that there is no good reason for thinking that security provision should be geographically bounded; ‘community’ and ‘neighbourhood’ can be understood differently.

Extended Summary:
While occidentalist tendencies of western scholarship presume a uniformity to cultural categories, practices and institutions, the relationship between policing, crime, poverty and development is, in fact, not universal. Failing to appreciate this can lead to a misdiagnosis of problems, and a misallocation of resources.

Neighbourhood watch schemes in Trinidad and Tobago
Based upon the Western faith in police-sponsored neighbourhood watch groups, similar schemes were established in Trinidad and Tobago in 1994 by the local Chamber of Commerce, together with police authorities and the Ministry of Community Development. However, three years after their initiation, the formal relationships between neighbourhood groups and these bodies had ceased to exist. Nevertheless, the groups continued to meet regularly and assumed a much broader range of functions than simply ensuring communal security. Crime reduction became just one of many priorities which included: fire watch, environment watch, and the beautification and creation of facilities by clearing bush, carrying out external repairs and creating open play areas. Security was addressed by fencing the drains to stop thieves using them for access and by providing alarm bells for the elderly. Incivilities were handled by taking preventative action, such as turning an open space where young outsiders had begun to congregate into a tennis court. The groups seemed to be representative of their neighbourhoods and they appeared to be effective in reducing petty theft and incivility in the community. Thus, such neighbourhood groups can enhance the quality of life if they develop their own agendas, locating crime in a hierarchy of activities and priorities. Indeed, these groups were successful because they were not co-opted to a police agenda of information exchange and crime control. However, these groups are subject to the problems of any other informal policing group: community ‘togetherness’ may mean excluding others – the youths driven out by the construction of the tennis court may have had nowhere else to go, for example; such schemes are most effective when communities can generate resources, and so may fail to take root in poorer neighbourhoods; and local community
values may sit in contrast to those of wider society – in these neighbourhood groups, for example, there was no mention of security within household and no attempt to address domestic violence.

**Women’s self-protection groups**

The remainder of the paper describes women’s self-protection groups – that is, women who are involved in the prevention of violence against women and children through NGOs and ad hoc response groups. An example of the latter is of women phoning each other when a key issue affecting their vulnerability arose and mobilising around it. Cain emphasises that these women are starting from their own unique place and for their own reasons – they want equality of life for women. They have their own experience and resource networks upon which to draw and their own agendas and priorities. Thus, when studying citizens’ self protection, we must not remain bound to concepts of ‘neighbourhood’ and ‘community’. Indeed, protection – whether led by the community or by the police – need not be geographically bounded.

‘In a society where community is interpreted differently, where progressive collectivities are strong, community policing has the potential, paradoxically, to work exactly as a POP [problem oriented policing] handbook might prescribe, with the problems being formulated by the victim group’ (p. 258).


**Brief Summary:**

Community policing is a widespread paradigm that has been implemented in a variety of ways across the world. This paper identifies four typologies of police culture: Anglo-industrialised, continental Europe, developing and transitional societies, and centralised regimes and explores the manifestations of community policing in these contexts. Casey argues that we should adopt a broad conceptualisation of ‘effectiveness’ and see community policing as moving towards democratic ideals, whatever its shortcomings.

**Extended Summary:**

Community policing is both a philosophy and a strategy that seeks to develop closer police-community relationships through restructuring police organisations and transforming police practice. Common to all community policing initiatives are efforts to build trust between police and citizens, and to facilitate collaboration and problem-solving approaches in addressing crime and insecurity. However, despite some central components and practices, community policing has not been applied uniformly around the world. There are four identifiable styles of policing culture within which community policing has been implemented:

**Anglo-Industrialised** – Community policing emerged in response to a number of factors, including: changing conditions of crime which made reactive policing ineffective; diversifying communities that required more localised responses; and increasing demands for police accountability. It appears that COP initiatives were successful in areas with lower crime rates and existing community networks, but less so in areas where they were most needed. Some have argued that recent shifts of priorities in the post 9/11 context have been at the expense of community policing, whilst others insist that counterterrorism initiatives are compatible with COP principles as intelligence-gathering requires close police-public relations.

**Continental Europe** – Whilst in Anglo-industrialised countries there is a significant focus upon ethnic and racial ‘communities’, across Continental Europe the ‘community’ is understood almost exclusively in geographic neighbourhood terms. Indeed, community policing has been rebranded as ‘neighbourhood policing’ in France and Spain. COP reforms have been stunted by centralised structures and militarised policing, and a culture of local accountability is markedly
absent. Indeed, ‘the emphasis has been more on being operationally in the community, as opposed to being part of it’ (p. 7).

Developing and transitional – Community policing initiatives have been proposed as part of wider democratic reforms and have become core aspects of funded development programs. However, implementing COP in such contexts has faced a number of challenges, notably in the lack of resources available to the police, a legacy of distrust and hostility between citizens and the police, lack of political will, and community fragmentation in conflict/post-conflict contexts. Forms of self-policing and traditional processes of justice may continue to function in societies.

Centralised regimes – In China, there is significant emphasis upon collective responsibility for governance, and policing is based upon a philosophy of ‘for the community and by the community.’ Consequently, ‘security is maintained through local social and political structures that demand conformity to the collective and to the state’ (p. 9). More recently, China is moving away from this notion of a collective responsibility to a more industrialised, professionalised model of policing. Concepts that are central to community policing, such as ‘community cooperation’ and ‘community consent’ are highly subjective and politically malleable. Community policing could conceivably be reduced to the localisation of policing and communication with residents.

‘As a consequence, any police agency that has ever required officers to become more knowledgeable about crime in a specific neighbourhood or location can lay claim to practice community policing’ (p. 10).

The paper concludes by identifying a number of factors that are likely to impact attempts to implement community policing:

- Stability and community cohesion
- Pay, motivation and morale of the police
- Levels of trust in the police
- Political will and commitment to change
- Sufficient resources for implementing change
- Capacity for decentralisation of police administration
- Strong networks of community organisations
- Donor support and coordination

Despite their shortcomings, it is far better to assess community policing reforms in relation to their achievements in moving towards democratic ideals.

Full text available at:
http://www.academia.edu/1057458/Implementing_Community_Policing_in_Different_Countries_and_Cultures

Clegg, I., Hunt, R., and Whetton, J., 2000, Policy Guidance on Support to Developing Countries, Centre for Development Studies, University of Wales, Swansea

Brief Summary:
This document offers policy guidance on implementing community policing in developing countries, arguing that the police should be centrally involved in building partnerships with formal and informal bodies of security provision that exist the community. The document also highlights the key challenges of implementing community policing in developing countries and offers some recommendations for ensuring its success.
Extended Summary:
The key to strengthening policing for the poor and vulnerable in developing societies is to ensure that it is carried out through a variety of partnerships between the state police, government agencies and citizens. These partnerships can be with both formal and informal actors in the criminal justice system, but it is essential that the state police remains a central – though not dominating – actor. Thus, the police should be one actor in the co-production of safety and order. However, this co-production approach can present difficulties in developing countries that have a history of authoritarian policing, and where normal policing has been disrupted by conflict and war. Indeed, in many of these states, there is no real tradition of accountable policing with the consent of the citizenry.

There are limitations to the effective implementation of community policing. While it may enhance the legitimacy of the police, and facilitate more positive police-community relations, there may also be significant institutional resistance to its implementation. Senior police managers often see the benefits of the improved police image resulting from community policing, but they perceive it to be too ‘soft’ to be effective and a distraction from other priority areas. Furthermore, the police fear that communities will seek to control the police through their partnerships with them. In Namibia, for example, there was increasing disenchantment with the concept of community policing at the senior level. The initial mission statement in 1992 emphasised consultation with and involvement of the public and it emphasised the idea of a collaborative partnership. However, three years later the Inspector General produced a revised mission statement in which the role of the community was limited to assisting and cooperating with members of the police force, particularly in relation to information gathering. Perhaps the most oft-cited problem associated with community policing is its failure to incorporate all sections of the community. In South Africa, for example, there is clear evidence that the poor were marginalised and that certain racial groups and women were excluded from the community forums. Indeed, community policing served to reinforce societal divisions in the country; while it was relatively successful in wealthy areas, this simply displaced crime to other places. Thus, marginalised groups may become increasingly disadvantaged by community policing.

There are four requirements for effective community policing:

- Provision of basic resources needed by both the police and the community, including education and equipment.
- A basic level of trust between the police and the community.
- A full partnership in which the police and community policing institutions are able to develop an active relationship with other actors.
- A willing leadership within the police.


Brief Summary:
This paper examines community policing models in Brazil, Haiti, Uganda and South Africa, arguing that there is no single and uniform model of community policing. Key factors that influence the nature of community policing and the success of its application are the levels of community cohesion, the centralization of the police, levels of respect for the police amongst the population, and existing networks of community organisation.

Extended Summary:
In Western democracies it is generally agreed that the basic elements of community policing include: decentralisation of authority and patrol strategies designed to promote communication; problem-oriented policing; public participation in the setting of police priorities; empowering
communities to help solve their own crime problems. As community policing has travelled to different countries, it has assumed different forms, influenced largely by elements within the local context, including:

- Community cohesion – it has been argued that community policing is most likely to be successful in ethnically and socio-economically homogeneous communities where there is a shared sense of values. In heterogeneous communities more energy is needed to reach out to the various groups and to tailor programs to their interests and needs.

- Strong network of community organisations – anti-crime programs can be built on top of existing organisations.

- Respect for law enforcement – community policing is more common in countries with traditions of respect for the state police.

- Centralization of the police administration – decentralised systems are more open to influence from local civil society organisations. There is also greater diversity and experimentation in community policing models in countries with decentralised systems.

- Technological development – countries with computer mapping software, for example, are better able to carry out problem-solving oriented and preventative policing as a result of their ability to identify hotspots.

Brazil - Public distrust along with mounting evidence that the police were corrupt led to the introduction of community policing programs in Brazil. Fourteen states currently implement COP programs, but their emphasis is different from place to place. In Rio de Janeiro community policing initiatives aimed to build civilian confidence in the police in order to improve intelligence gathering and crime fighting. The model involved: foot patrols over geographic areas; the creation of community councils to promote dialogue; the introduction of suggestion boxes in the area to receive anonymous complaints and recommendations. There were some challenges to its implementation:

- Military police administrators were concerned that COP activities would detract from the provision of ordinary service and that the autonomy attached to these officers would compromise the hierarchy of command in the institution.

- Significant socio-economic inequalities within districts and alternative mechanisms of security in the shanty towns (favelas) hampered COP efforts.

- The police suffer from a lack of trust and respect. They are considered to be responsible for many civilian deaths and they are plagued by corruption.

Less than a year after it was created, the political administration in the district changed and the new public security commander deactivated the project.

Haiti – a non-military national police force was first established in Haiti in 1994. It was believed that community policing, through its reliance on community observation, recommendation and assistance, would make up for staff shortages and a lack of resources. A COP program was developed in Cap Haitien dividing it into 12 zones with officials who patrolled the areas. The project withered with a lack of international support, insufficient funding and limited manpower and it was dismantled when a new commander assumed power. Thus, successful reform implementation is contingent on political will and commitment.

Uganda – community Policing was introduced in Uganda in 1989 and has been isolated to specific officers called CLOs (Community Liaison Officers). As part of the COP initiative, public seminars educate participants about the role of the police, about how neighbourhood watch programmes are conducted and about citizens’ rights. CLOs have strengthened the link between the police and the communities. However, the effectiveness of COP programs in Uganda are limited by:
- Poor resources and low wages, leading police officials to extort and accept bribes.
- Inadequate government funding to expand the ranks of CLOs.
- Poor public image of the police due to past oppression and violence.

Nevertheless, community policing seems popular among the public. More top-down support, further integration of community policing into mainstream practice, and increased resources are needed to bolster it.

**South Africa** – the SAPS was characterised by politicisation and paramilitary traditions. Community policing was adopted to transform the police, and community-policing consultative forums became central aspects of this project. One initiative in Nyanga, Western Cape, emulates the Western style of community policing that emphasises foot patrols. However, due to limited resources the community became involved in patrols in a way that would have been unthinkable in London, for example. Community policing faces a number of challenges in South Africa:

- Low morale of officials, and a police culture that has placed little value in discretion.
- Apartheid dealt has limited the ability of some communities to organise effectively and to mobilise the resources they do possess.
- Non-white residents are reluctant to serve on forums due to their mistrust of police or because old alliances keep them out.
- Police and local communities have different expectations and understandings of what community policing was intended to achieve.
- The mobilisation of the community as a resource for intelligence creates an unbalanced relationship where the community is a tool not a partner.

The case studies in this paper reveal that COP efforts in developing countries encounter a number of serious difficulties:

- There is often a lack of commitment to implementing reforms amongst political elites and senior police officials.
- Community policing contrasts with the training and experience of officers in an authoritarian regime.
- Citizens fear and dislike the police.
- Communities characterised by extreme poverty are unlikely to have well-developed networks that can be tapped by community policing organisers.

Successful reform is most likely where there are high levels of political support and extensive grassroots community organisations. Where there is little political support, limited community organisation, and where the police are under-resourced, distrusted and corrupt, community policing is likely to be an isolated effort. Not all strategies are transferable and reforms cannot be expected to resolve all the problems and challenges facing the police in different contexts. Nevertheless, community policing strategies do play a significant role in rebuilding police-citizen relationships and they can be ‘a positive step in the right direction’ (p. 299).
Brief Summary:
While international donors have prioritised state police reforms in Melanesian countries, local actors have displayed a lack of interest in or demand for such reforms. A wide range of actors are engaged in the provision of security and justice at the local level, and the Weberian ideal of a state monopoly over security is inappropriate in the Melanesian context. If any real and lasting improvements to security are to be made, reforms need to engage creatively with the larger spectrum and policing and justice providers.

Extended Summary:
The countries of Melanesia have experienced high rates of crime, secessionist conflict, ethnic tensions and instability to varying degrees in recent years and while efforts at police reform are not new in the region, interventions have become more robust in the post 9/11 era. In Melanesian states the small-scale, self-regulating societies and local cultures have not been displaced by the modern state. Moreover, institutions are weak and have a limited presence in rural areas. Consequently, local non-state mechanisms are the predominant means of security provision and there are a multiple actors who engage in policing practices. Indeed, the idea of a state monopoly over security ‘stands in marked contrast to the complex reality of regulatory pluralism found in such countries’ (p. 335). International interventions have, nevertheless, been wholly preoccupied with reforming and developing the capacities of the state police, at the expense of non-state actors. They have been largely insensitive to the constraints and the opportunities of the pluralist environment. This paper suggests that police-building needs to engage with the broad spectrum of actors engaged in policing in Melanesian societies.

While informal policing has deep roots in Melanesian society, the formal state police is a product of the recent colonial past. Due to the shallow penetration of the colonial state in rural areas, people continued to rely on traditional mechanisms of justice, security and conflict resolution. As such, citizens were largely unfamiliar with state police and judicial systems. Moreover, local understandings of conflict resolution diverged significantly from the emphasis on procedural justice, individual responsibility and punishment espoused by state institutions.

The state police in Papua New Guinea (PNG) suffers from a lack of government support and it is seriously underfunded and under-resourced. As a consequence, efficiency and competence has suffered, and police officers increasingly engage in corrupt practices to supplement low wages and poor working conditions. There is little political will in the country to implement police reforms, and the lack of confidence in the police amongst the citizens means that there is little local demand for reform either. Traditional forms of informal policing continue, and the private security industry has flourished to meet the needs of the wealthy and the business classes. There is a marked reluctance to rely on the state police in PNG, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. A number of factors serve to explain this reticence:

- The inability of state police to extend into and effectively cover these overwhelmingly rural countries.
- Confidence in the police has been eroded by fear in some cases, and there is widespread scepticism about relying on the police for assistance.
- In the context of a plurality of policing providers, the state police carry limited appeal.

In rural areas, traditional and long-standing forms of order maintenance enjoy far greater legitimacy than state security structures; moreover, they are highly resilient and adaptive to change. In addition other forms of informal policing have emerged which are not embedded in traditional practices or modes of authority. At times these initiatives operate as relatively
autonomous extensions of the state apparatus; sometimes they act with the tacit approval of the state; and sometimes they operate in direct contravention to state authority.

- **Autonomous extensions of state agency** – the community auxiliary police in Papua New Guinea are an example of this type of community level policing. In an effort to supplement their lack of resources, the state police have appointed uniformed community-based proxies; they police their own communities subject to supervision and direction.

- **Tacit state approval** – tacit approval is often afforded to informal urban security groups through the involvement of individual state officials. Peace Committees comprised of the leaders of different ethnic groups which have been established in Saraga are an example. These committees work closely with local security companies and officers from a nearby police station and they operate to ensure security and to resolve disputes in their communities.

- **Illegal activity** – local *raskols* provide informal security services without the approval of the state. They punish thieves and recover stolen property, and are often hired by politicians and businessmen to intimidate rivals or carry out contract killings.

Churches have also been involved in policing activities – such as negotiating the disarmament and surrender of criminal groups in Papua New Guinea – and they enjoy high levels of legitimacy amongst the Christian majority population.

However, despite the ability of these groups to provide security and to manage local disputes, they are subject to a number of shortcomings:

- Traditional authority is deeply contested in many areas, and is under assault from forces of social, political and economic change. Moreover, traditional practices can be discriminatory, coercive and violent.

- Informal policing initiatives can be co-opted and manipulated by powerful actors.

- Unregulated policing providers can be responsible for human rights violations and elements of criminality.

While it is important to identify appropriate actors with whom to engage, these concerns should not blind us to the opportunities informal policing structures provide. Indeed, the state police can often equally be accused of discrimination, corruption, violence, brutalisation and a lack of accountability. Reform efforts should target both state and non-state systems ensuring that the former is more accessible, responsive and accountable whilst bringing the latter into a human rights and rule of law framework. It is important to recognise that state monopoly over security is ill suited to the Melanesian contexts, and that partnerships between the state police and non-state actors will facilitate more legitimate, effective and affordable policing.

**Ferreira, B. R., 1996, ‘The Use and Effectiveness of Community Policing in a Democracy’, in M. Pagon (ed), Policing in Central Europe: Comparing firsthand knowledge with experience from the West, College of Peace and Security Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia**

**Brief Summary:**
This paper draws provides a discussion of the academic and policy debates regarding the effectiveness of community policing. Ferreira concludes that, despite the many criticisms directed at it, community policing has the potential to re-establish the integrity of the police in
many Central and Eastern European states that experienced totalitarian governments and repressive policing.

**Extended Summary:**
There is no general consensus regarding the definition of community policing and many scholars have suggested that the concept eludes clear definition. Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1994: 2-3) propose the ‘Nine P’s’ of community policing:

*Community policing is a philosophy of a full service personalized policing, where the same officer patrols and works in the same area on a permanent basis, from a decentralized place, working in a proactive partnership with citizens to identify and solve problems.*

Others have emphasised the close, consultative and collaborative aspects of police-public relations in a community policing philosophy. There are also different models of community policing, such as:

- Crime prevention and peace preservation – where these are the main task of policing the police must secure the cooperation of the community.
- Communications policing – where the police are agents of consensus, and interact with the community to facilitate cooperation and collaboration.
- Community-building policing – the police build personal relationships within communities and work to re-establish community cohesion, enabling communities to deal with their own problems.

The effectiveness of community policing has sparked significant debate within the literature. While some scholars criticise it, claiming that it is little more than rhetoric, a ‘public relations gimmick’ that is unrealistic in its objectives, others have insisted that it has practical applications and is effective in combating crime and disorder. Those in favour of the philosophy assert that the police cannot prevent crimes alone and must cultivate and utilise partnerships within the community. Moreover, they assert that community policing ensures a transparent and accountable police force which is proactive and preventative in its approach to crime. Those who have criticised it have claimed that:

- It is difficult to implement and police resistance is likely.
- It is little more than a restoration of the Bobby on the Beat concept of policing, which is inappropriate to modern society.
- The expansion of police powers to facilitate involvement in community development has dangerous implications and would raise questions over political accountability.
- Some patrol experiments have failed to reduce criminal activity.

Thus, some of the criticisms of COP have been based on issues of implementation and the difficulty in measuring success, rather than on the potential for community policing to do some good. Nevertheless, community policing can improve police-public relations and it can satisfy expectations of police accountability. To be effective community policing needs a democratic environment, where the police and the community cooperate in an equal, trusting partnership. Community policing based upon this trust and cooperation could heal the wounds opened by legacies of oppressive police action.

**Full text available at:**
https://www.ncjrs.gov/policing/usc139.htm

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2 Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1994, *Community Policing: How to get started*, Anderson Publishing company, Cincinnati
**Brief Summary:**

Community policing programs in Latin America have enhanced public trust in the police and should be viewed as a step towards improving citizen access to the police. However, it is too much to expect these programs to produce the degree of institutional transformation generated in the context of developed, democratic countries. Community policing in Latin America to date has not failed, but its impact is more limited than initially expected by its advocates.

**Extended Summary:**

Police reforms initiatives have been influenced by three key factors:

- Democritisation in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s which highlighted the incompatibility between democratic and human rights norms and the actions of Latin American police forces.
- A recognition that the rising levels of crime and insecurity necessitated urgent action.
- State reforms based upon decentralisation, scaling back the size of state apparatus, and mechanisms of accountability drew attention to the deficiencies of law enforcement agencies.

Community policing became a key means of addressing these three issues.

Core components of the dominant US model of community policing include an emphasis upon developing preventative, neighbourhood-focused policing; close community-police relationships; resolving community security problems; recognising the community in setting policing priorities and agendas; and decentralising the police. In Latin America, however, police reform efforts have assumed a number of different forms. While some seek a complete transformation of policing culture and practice, others are more limited in their objectives, aiming to develop closer community involvement without accepting all the premises promoted by the community policing model. Two examples of community policing are:

- **Bogotá, Colombia** – community policing initiatives included the training of police in civilian security and the introduction of local security fronts. These security fronts were neighbourhood support networks that collaborate with the police, carry out informal patrols and provide assistance to residents in the event of suspicious activity.
- **Belo Horizonte, Brazil** – launched a broader program known as ‘result oriented policing’ which focused on deploying police to geographical areas based on information about local criminal activity. Community Security Councils were also created to collaborate with the police in planning strategies for crime prevention in keeping with the security needs of each area.

There are a number factors that influence the successful implementation of COP reforms in Latin America, including:

- Institutional obstacles
  - Authoritarian and hierarchical police traditions persist, making COP reform difficult.
  - Police cultures are unconvinced about the potential for COP to tackle crime effectively and so not all principles are applied in full.
  - Community policing projects are normally isolated to a few officers, so there are insufficient personnel to cover the beats.
Police officers often move around the country due to crisis situations and promotion. Consequently, the continuity necessary for building up relationships with the community is lacking.

- Police-community relations
  - Communities in Latin America are not well-prepared to interact with the police or to take action to resolve security issues.
  - In neighbourhoods with high crime rates, residents are reluctant to collaborate with the police, and the police prefer to use coercive methods in contexts of violence and insecurity.

- Police relationship with other public agencies
  - Local governments in some areas make financial contributions to the police force, but a lack of coordination means that resources tend to be used to support traditional, reactive strategies.
  - Centralised police institutions lead to a reluctance on the part of police officers to assume responsibility for demands for urban and social measures that they feel are outside their remit.

Community policing programs in Latin America have improved the public image of the police, and have brought police and communities closer together; they are strongly supported by the population and they seem to reduce the fear of crime. However, evidence suggests that community outreach may favour wealthier areas that already have access to private security, and there are significant difficulties in the implementation of community policing projects.


Brief Summary:
Community policing is the dominant paradigm of policing in the contemporary world. However, it means different things to different people and there are significant challenges to its implementation. This chapter outlines the key issues raised throughout the edited volume, arguing that whatever difficulties the application of community policing faces in established democracies, they are greatly exacerbated in post-conflict settings.

Extended Summary:
Community policing – that is policing which is founded upon consultation with the community, responsiveness to local needs, and collective problem solving – has become an almost universally accepted paradigm. However, it is exceedingly difficult to implement and it is rarely done well:

- Police and community perceptions and expectations of community policing do not always coalesce.
- Consultative processes may benefit well-resourced or more articulate sections of the community at the expense of disadvantaged and marginalised groups.
- Police officers may resist change, dismissing tasks associated with community policing as demeaning and lying outside of their purview.
- It may be difficult to mobilise the public in areas where crime is not perceived to be a problem, where levels of distrust for the police are high or where the community lacks the necessary skills to engage with the police.
- Community policing is costly and requires significant investment of time.

The chapters in this volume explore the issue of community policing from a variety of perspectives, examining its manifestations in different contexts and they discuss these issues in
greater depth. Several contributions in the volume reflect on whether forms of community policing can be achieved without police involvement, or with a different style of police-community relationship: Thacher discusses forms of informal policing and their potential for managing disorder in the absence of the police, but draws attention to the problems of accountability and legitimacy that these initiatives face; Marks et al. advocate for a minimalist role for the state police, proposing the development of non-governmental institutions of social control, such as include street committees, traditional courts and neighbourhood patrols; and Zhong describes the pluralistic system of policing in China where both the police and neighbourhood committees undertake surveillance and provide conflict resolution service.

External reform assistance is often required in weak states and post-conflict settings where the police are corrupt, ineffective or guilty of human rights abuses. However, community policing is extremely difficult to implement in these contexts.

- A key issue that is often faced is the ‘cultural distance’ between the public and the police in peacekeeping settings. Whilst it is generally accepted that the police force should reflect the composition of the population, a demographic mirror of the community is not always possible.
- Community policing requires individual officers to build and foster relationships of trust within the community through regular face-to-face interaction. However, the lack of continuity engendered by frequent transfers and reassignments renders this objective problematic.
- Assistance provided by donors is likely to reflect their own interests and funding may be directed accordingly. Donor countries may be concerned with drugs, terrorism, and human trafficking, for example, whilst the recipient nation may emphasis other issues, such as violence against women.


**Brief Summary:**
Police reforms – if they are based upon a well-understood philosophy, a clearly thought out plan and a well managed process – have the potential to play a significant role in long-term, sustainable economic, social and political development. Community based policing approaches move beyond a narrow focus on crime and seek to bring the police and citizens closer together in a collaborative effort to address broader community concerns. This paper explores some of the factors that are critical to successful community based policing engagement, emphasising the need for a minimum degree of order as well as support from the government, police and civil society.

**Extended summary:**
The police are an instrument of conflict management and without the order and security that they provide, wider political, social and economic developments are elusive. Thus, police reform has become a key strategy in post-conflict settings, as well as an important tool in conflict prevention efforts. However, transforming the institution and changing public perceptions of the police has been extremely difficult in many societies; indeed, legacies of mistrust are persistent. Saferworld and its partners developed a conceptual framework for police reforms exploring community-based policing and its place in conflict management efforts.

Community policing rests on two core elements: transforming police methods and practice, and taking steps to establish a relationship between the police and the public. Under a COP approach, policing is expected to move beyond crime fighting; it is intended to transform the police from a
force into a representative and responsive service which works in partnership with local communities to address local concerns. For such a philosophy to take hold, it is not only the police institution that requires reform; the public’s distrust of the police must also be addressed.

Policing does not operate in a vacuum; community based police reforms, when linked with broaderinstitutional reforms within the security and judicial sectors, can make a significant contribution to poverty reduction and broader development goals, such as reducing the proliferation of small arms. Nevertheless, police reform is subject to a number of challenges including poor implementation and a lack of coordination between implementing agencies, insufficient planning, inadequate funding, and institutional resistance.

Three cases of community-based policing reform are explored and evaluated in the remainder of the paper.

**Sierra Leone** – COP reforms have enjoyed a number of successes:

- Individual police officers were trained in COP approaches and the institution was restructured in order to embed a community policing philosophy.
- Police officers have been made more accountable and there have been significant efforts at reaching out to communities through raising public awareness of their rights, of the role of the police, and of the methods that the police can use to support community security.
- Local communities have been given a voice in policing, a role in crime prevention, and a means of monitoring the police through the introduction of civil society forums.

**Serbia** – COP reforms have been successful in some respects:

- Community based approaches have enhanced the representativeness of the police force, seeing the introduction of more female police officers and the development of multi-ethnic policing.
- The police have begun to regain the trust of Serbian people as a result of COP reforms.

However, a number of challenges remain:

- Structures of accountability are limited.
- Highly centralised and hierarchical management of the police hampers implementation of community policing.
- The line between the political and operational aspects of the police remains blurred, leaving the institution open to political manipulation.

**Northern Ireland** – COP reforms have not yet fulfilled their potential as apathy and scepticism hamper its implementation:

- There is a lack of political support which is a significant barrier to reform.
- Policing remains deeply divisive and members of the Catholic community continue to be underrepresented.
- Involvement in community policing initiatives is dangerous and members of policing partnerships have been attacked and intimidated.
- The public display a lack of interest and police-community meetings are poorly attended.

Community policing reform efforts must recognise the specificities of the context in which implementations are taking place as this will influence the timing and duration of the process and will determine which elements of COP should be emphasised.
Factors which are critical to the success of COP reforms include:

- A minimum degree of order in the country – to give space for undertaking police reform.
- A demonstrated political will to change – among politicians as well as within the police.
- Civil society involvement.
- Donor support, coordination and commitment.

Report available at:


Brief Summary:
The sungusungu movement emerged in Northern Tanzania the context of increasing violence and insecurity associated with cattle-rustling activities. In some places it began as a spontaneous, bottom-up initiative. However, since it met necessity and resonated with the socialist ideology of the state, it soon became incorporated within official state policy. Thus, communities have developed their own policing capacity, reforming and reclaiming the state. The administration demonstrates an increasing responsiveness to the priorities of local communities and allows them a greater degree of autonomy in the management of their own affairs. This chapter focuses in particular on the Kuria of Mara Region in the north of the country.

Extended Summary:
The demobilisation of soldiers following the invasion of Uganda led to large-scale insecurity in Tanzania, as former soldiers engaged in cattle-rustling activities and other forms of banditry. In the Mara region – the home of Kuria clans – cattle-raiding and warfare has been a regular feature of the local scene. However, the violence which rocked the region following the Uganda/Tanzania war was particularly acute due to a number of factors: firstly, raiding was an entrenched part of Kurian life and had long held a commercial aspect; secondly, the region was home to high numbers of highly trained fighters as military service had long been favoured as an occupation amongst the Kuria; thirdly, former soldiers’ contacts from the war meant that guns were easily obtainable and created the means to facilitate violent raids; and finally, the Kuria could move livestock across borders relatively easily due to the group’s representation in Kenya.

Serious fighting was concentrated particularly in the Serengeti district, but it spilled over to engulf the entire region as gangs from various clans, with shifting allegiances, launched raids against neighbouring groups. The government struggled to quell the violence.

An army officer named Kubiha is often credited with bringing in a new era of peace and effectively addressing the growing insecurity in the region. Kubiha emphasised Kurian values in seeking a resolution to conflict, and used the iritongo – the Kurian democratic assembly – to interrogate thieves, to elicit a public confession, and to determine an appropriate punishment. His methods were effective and in two months he is said to have collected hundreds of guns from thieves in the region. Noting the power the iritongo could yield, the regional administration encouraged the establishment of a new form of sungusungu in the region – one in which the group was incorporated more fully within, and was made more accountable to, the iritongo.
The iritongo are democratic assemblies which are led by the ruling generation, but where all adult men are allowed to speak. From 1995 onwards, this form of sungusungu spread through the districts. The links between the iritongo and the local administration remain strong. While government officials do not usually attend the iritongo, minutes and reports are communicated with divisional and district secretaries. Trials are usually heard first by the sungusungu committee, but they are always held before the entire iritongo. Punishments can be severe, including whipping, shunning and family banishment, heavy fines, beatings and breaking the ankles of thieves, but these groups have had a tangible effect on security.

While the Tanzanian state has allowed sungusungu groups to codify their own laws and exact their own forms of punishment, it has ultimately been ‘unable to flout its own judiciary by fully legalising them’ (p. 77). The groups occupy a quasi-legal space and consequently are, to an extent, left in danger or prosecution. Nevertheless, the sungusungu have enabled communities to take back power and have heralded a new vision of community responsibility for local safety and security.


Brief Summary:
Security sector reform programmes often fail to appreciate the location of power and influence in African policing and are predicated on an assessment of police governance that underplays the political significance of the police. Presidents maintain complete authority over the state police and they appoint and control commissioners through patronage and loyalty networks.

Extended summary:
In many African countries, the president retains almost complete control and authority over the state security apparatus, including the police. While police forces are often under-resourced and tend to be regarded as secondary and subordinate security units by presidents, they are nevertheless seen as valuable tools in the enforcement of political decisions, the maintenance of order and the regulation of activities. Authority is exercised through police commissioners who are appointed, controlled by and co-opted into presidential networks of patronage and loyalty. Security sector reform programmes that emphasise the transformation of the police into an effective and democratically accountable institutions often fail to appreciate this reality; they do not consider why presidents should accommodate such objectives when they would lead to a drastic reduction of presidential powers.

As a result of the high levels of insecurity, the distrust with which presidents view police competence, and the elevation of the military in the provision of security, African policing is heavily militarised. Paramilitary traditions are evident in the ranks, discipline, uniforms and training of security personnel and institutions and it is not unusual for police commissioners to have a military background. In Nigeria, the militarisation of policing is apparent in the fact that MOPOL squadrons have access to helicopter gunships and other armoured vehicles. While militarisation undoubtedly influences police governance, the more important factor is the high levels of politicisation in many African countries. This affects the length of a commissioner’s tenure and the manner of his ‘retirement’, as well as the levels of intimidation to which he and his officers are subjected. Indeed, it is usual for ‘commissioners to be retained while useful, and dismissed after offending the President in some way’ (p. 411). In Zimbabwe, commissioner Chihuri’s relationship with Mugabe is reflected in his overtly political role; for example, he campaigned for the ruling ZANU-PF party in the 2005 elections in violation to the Police Act of 2000. In Ghana, while the police is seemingly less politicised there are still a number of instances of political interference and the president enjoys significant influence in the Police Council – the governing body of the Ghana Police Service.
Thus, policing in Africa is defined by a president’s political calculations and senior police officers are constrained by political factors. Hills concludes by identifying six key elements of her argument:

- Liberal models of police governance are not the norm in Africa. Police commissioners are accountable to political elites, not civilians, and are usually co-opted into patronage networks.
- Presidential control of the police is complete and is usually embedded in the constitution. Thus, it is the president’s personality, agenda and ethnicity that are critical variables in implementing reforms rather than the nature of the regime.
- The role and actions of police commissioners are indicative of presidential priorities.
- Power and influence is located with the commissioner in police institutions.
- Commissioners face structural obstacles in operationalising their power such as inadequate resources, political imperatives and institutional incapacity.
- The police are content to be used; senior officers rarely build power bases and are typically attached to other groups who have more direct control of resources.


**Brief Summary:**
This article explores the ways in which imported ideas of community policing are received by police officers and the political elite in Nigeria, highlighting the ways in which they are transformed as they are filtered through local interests. Hills suggests that in Nigeria the process of reform is accepted, but the political will to ensure its successful implementation is absent, and she raises questions over whether the paradigms, norms and practices of liberal democracies can or should be transferred to Africa’s police.

**Extended Summary:**
While the transmission of policing values and practices from the West to developing nations has received significant attention in the literature, few accounts explore how recipient countries perceive and indeed respond to these policies. This paper, through an analysis of COP reform efforts in Nigeria, argues that the acceptability, effectiveness and sustainability of externally supported projects are dependent upon political calculations and social realities. Hills suggests that the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) accommodates liberal practices and knowledge for pragmatic and political reasons, rather than demonstrating any real commitment to their inculcation.

There are three significant factors that influence the transfer of policing knowledge and practice in Nigeria:

- The president – who authorises and tolerates externally supported reform projects.
- The inspector-general (IG) of the police – IGs in Africa often tend to be conservative figures. In Nigeria, IG responses to externally-supported police reforms ‘are better described as acknowledgement, exploitation or manipulation rather than the facilitation or implementation of democratic-style policing’ (p. 743).
• Politicised and personalised context in Nigeria – each IG began their term with a reform plan, but in reality, many manipulated western ideals as much as they acknowledged them.

In 2001, following the publication of an NGO report highlighting the adversarial nature of police-civilian relations, the British government was invited to introduce community policing in Nigeria. Whilst Nigerian police officers saw the benefit of community policing in its potential to improve police-society relations, the potential for change was limited by vested interests and social realities and there was a significant difference between outside assessment and local material interests. While the British envisaged a paradigm shift based upon core values of respect and human rights, Inspector-General Ehindero’s interpretation related to ‘his ambition to “restore the glory” of the paramilitary Police Mobile Force’ (p. 747). Real commitment to community policing in Nigeria is weak and it has been suggested that senior officers tolerate COP projects because of the financial resources it provides.

The reception of community policing in Nigeria reflects Chabal and Daloz’s argument that elites give the impression of adhering to international priorities, whilst actually working to preserve their power and interests. There is a trend of accommodation and manipulation. Community policing does not affect the lifestyle of elites, and consequently they are happy to publically welcome it. However, they will remain uncommitted to enhancing police accountability and to using the police as a means for justice, development and poverty alleviation as it is not in their interests. They are able to manage this tension because their agendas run parallel with those of donors: Nigerian elites seek to improve the image of the NPF, whilst donors seek to make it democratically accountable. In essence, donors regard ‘knowledge’ of good policing as a form of truth, whereas Nigerian officers understand ‘knowledge’ as a means of achieving a specific result.


Brief Summary:
This report reveals that the police force in Northern Ireland has been unaccountable, heavily politicised, repressive, unrepresentative and ineffective in the past. There are significant challenges to policing in a heavily divided post-conflict society, particularly where there are such high levels of mutual distrust and suspicion between the police and the population. This report recommends an overhaul of policing in Northern Ireland in favour of a ‘policing with the community approach’ that emphasises human rights, accountability, transparency and police-community partnerships. It outlines a series of policies designed to achieve this transformation of policing philosophy and practice.

Extended Summary:
In Northern Ireland, the police force has been unrepresentative, dominated by members of the Protestant and Unionist communities and so, for a significant section of the population, it has become a symbol of oppression. Negative public attitudes towards the police and their effectiveness in fighting crime are prevalent in Northern Ireland, with hostility and distrust of the police being particularly prominent amongst the Catholic community. The police force is not accountable to the public and it is perceived by many to be an instrument of the state, rather than a service that addresses local issues. The violence of the last three decades has only intensified societal divisions and exacerbated the mutual distrust that exists between police and citizens. As such, a new approach to policing is recommended in Northern Ireland, which is geared towards the development of an effective, democratic and accountable police service that is able to gain and sustain the support of the community as a whole. The report emphasises that involvement in
Policing should not be limited to the police force, but rather should be a collective community responsibility, advocating for ‘a sustained commitment to community policing’ in Northern Ireland (p. 9).

This report prefers the phrase ‘policing with the community’ rather than ‘community policing’, defining its practice as the police working in partnership with the community, and the community participating in its own policing. The report asserts:

*What we emphatically do not mean by “community policing” is vigilante groups policing neighbourhoods with baseball bats, or, at the other extreme, what… [has been] described as “sitting around the trees, holding hands and singing Kumbaya” (p. 40).*

Partnership is both a policing style and an attitude of mind for the police and for the public; it is a philosophy as much as a method and it requires a profound shift in thinking. Box 1 describes one successful community-based policing initiative in the Markets area of Belfast, highlighting the potential for such strategies for transforming police-community relations in Northern Ireland.

**Box 1: Markets Neighbourhood policing project**

Before the early 1990s in the Markets area of Belfast, a predominantly nationalist/republican neighbourhood, the police had very little support amongst the population. Paramilitary organisations in the area patrolled the streets and provided security. However in 1990, a team of police officers was established in Markets and over the years it has built up support within the community and developed an atmosphere of trust and respect. The police now operate effectively in the area and have made a positive impact upon crime reduction and public order.

The report outlines a model of community policing that incorporates a number of different practices and recommendations. The model is designed to establish an accountable, democratic and representative police service dedicated to the protection of human rights, and the policing activities are intended to foster trusting relationships and good working partnerships between the police and local communities:

- Neighbourhood policing should be at the heart of police work, not determining policing activities, but also shaping the structure and culture of the police service, the training of its officers and the deployment of resources.
- Each neighbourhood should have a team of officers responsible for policing in the area. Members of the team should serve for at least three years in the same neighbourhood and should carry out foot or bicycle patrols wherever possible.
- Community liaison mechanisms should be established in each district and decisions relating to the programming of patrols should be made in partnership with the local community.
- Problem-solving techniques – such as crime pattern or complaint pattern analysis – should be a key aspect of policing.
- Police stations should be made less forbidding in appearance and more accessible to the public, and that police cars should be favoured over armoured Landrovers.
- While the present security situation renders the disarming of the police unfeasible, this question of moving towards an unarmed police service should be reviewed periodically in light of developments in the security situation.
- There should be a greater delegation of decision-making authority and management responsibility to district commanders; they should have the
authority over the deployment of personnel in their areas and over the financing of local policing initiatives, for example.

- The police service should be more representative of the population and the underrepresentation of women, Catholics, and minority communities must be addressed.
- A human-rights-based culture should be instilled in the police service and politicised symbols should be replaced.

The report concludes with an overview of its recommendations, noting that the transformation of the police service in Northern Ireland should be geared towards a service that:

- Adopts a human rights-based approach
- Emphasises accountability
- Has the concept of policing with the community at its core
- Transforms the image of the police
- Is representative of the population

Report available at:


Brief Summary:
The various community policing programs in Hong Kong have engendered high levels of satisfaction with police service provision. Indeed, public confidence is consolidated regardless of whether crime is successfully controlled by the police. This chapter examines a community policing scheme in Kwi Tsing District. It argues that the levels of confidence and trust in the police, developed through community policing initiatives, have facilitated the effective investigation of organised crime groups whose power bases tend to be located within the community. Thus, in Hong Kong, the influence of organised crime is counteracted by the effective implementation of community policing.

Extended Summary:
In Hong Kong, Chinese organised crime groups are rooted in local communities; they recruit youths from disadvantaged neighbourhoods and they extort protection fees from street level businesses. Community policing may help to suppress organised crime by encouraging members of the community to report incidents of extortion and blackmail. Moreover, by creating a positive image of the police, community policing can help to reduce the influence of these groups on neighbourhood youth. Thus, community policing can be used to control and suppress gang activity and can prevent the proliferation of organised crime.

In Hong Kong, the ideology of community policing pervades police ranks, and the primary strategy of the state police is to be a highly visible, police presence that is responsive to the population and that provides a quality service. The scheme in Kwai Tsing district fosters close police-community relationships, facilitating mutual trust and enhancing social cohesion within the community. This facilitates intelligence-led investigations as the community is willing and forthcoming in providing the police with information. Since the police do not patrol high rise buildings, one of the main tasks of the program is to develop partnerships with private security companies in the area. The scheme is implemented through:
• A security communication network to enhance email communication between local police, security companies and other security staff in public housing estates.
• Taskforce hotline stickers placed at security company posts to ensure visibility.
• Police notice boards set up in lobbies of public housing estates to enable the police to provide residents with information on crime prevention.

In Hong Kong, there are high levels of trust in the police, which are a direct reflection of police effectiveness in controlling crime, and are, in large part, the result of community policing policies. The emergence of community policing in Hong Kong may also be linked with the socio-political context; organised crime groups operate within communities, recruit members from the neighbourhoods, and live in the area where they conduct criminal activity. By enhancing public confidence and trust in the police and encouraging residents, private security services and businesses to report criminal activity, community policing facilitates effective combating of organised crime.


Brief Summary:
This article explores how state-initiated community policing was implemented in a former war zone in rural Mozambique. POLCOM was launched in Mozambique by the Ministry of the Interior in the 1990s. Drawing upon the Western model of community policing, it sought to implement a new philosophy of policing based on police-community partnerships and liberal democratic values. However, the state police perspective was more concerned with expanding their outreach and addressing its problems of contested authority; as such, community policing in practice looked very different from the official model of community policing councils (CPCs). In Mozambique, police officers used POLCOM to outsource policing tasks and extra-legal practices. Moreover, community policing was mediated through localised historical and cultural repertoires and the selection of CPC members was dependent upon traditional leaders’ methods of organising policing groups.

Extended Summary:
The state police in Mozambique suffered from a legacy of partisanship, paramilitarism, oppression, and incompetence. In order to address this, the government sought a return to citizen participation in the provision of security both through police-community partnerships and through state-recognition of community authorities. The philosophy underscoring the model was that policing and public order maintenance should not be the sole responsibility of the state police, but rather, should involve more active participation by citizens. It sought to reduce crime, strengthen community cohesion and enhance trust in the state police. Membership of the CPC was supposed to be voluntary and should represent important social actors in society. Furthermore, the inclusion of community authorities, such as chiefs, was compulsory, due to their local legitimacy and their knowledge of community affairs. Thus, CPC members were legitimised by their position as ‘important social actors’ rather than by their free election. Community policing committees were intended to act as a forum to discuss and gather information about local problems, to mediate minor conflicts and to facilitate patrols. However, they were not permitted to carry weapons of any kind and were expected to hand over suspects to the police.

However, the implementation and local practices of POLCOM was far removed from this model. Community perceptions are reflective of this disparity, with many local people believing that the CPCs work for the police and for the chief. The selection of communitários (POLCOM members) followed historical modes of appointing native police rather than being based upon
free election by local communities. Thus POLCOM membership is embedded within the lineage-based system of authority, and members are chosen by – and are typically close relatives of – chiefs and their councillors. Local authorities, then, saw POLCOM as either a reactivation of native police, or as the mobilisation of young men who could supplement to state police, carrying out arrests and patrols, for example. Furthermore, the project was widely understood through a political lens, as a Frelimo-state project, and consequently was met with resistance in Renamo-influenced areas. The *communitários* were not trained in awareness of the law, human rights or accountability, but rather as a local police force. Consequently they operated not as consultative discussion forums, but as a means of reasserting the authority of the police in areas that had been lost during the war. This is evident in everyday policing practices, as the *communitários* were used as an extended arm of the state police and were under its command. They were sent out to carry out arrests, and were ordered to beat suspects under interrogation, imposed extra-legal curfews at night. In fact, the state police used POLCOM as a way of outsourcing illegal practices. There are three conclusions to be drawn here:

- POLCOM patrols bore a striking resemblance to the social control methods of the 1970s and 1980s, suggesting that they were ‘informed by historically embedded policing cultures and past central-state directives’ (p. 365).
- The outsourcing of extra-legal tasks reflects dominant police understandings of effective measures of law and order.
- POLCOM was about the state policing asserting its control over public order and security provision, and demonstrating that the police were an effective institution.

While communities agreed that POLCOM helped the police to better control areas, they increasingly feared to move around and held that police violence had increased. Patrols restricted freedom of movement and only those with the right documents were treated as citizens. However, many people had lost their documents as a result of the war and so struggled to avoid police punishment.

Police officers lost control of POLCOM and in one site there was evidence that communitários extorted money from the local population and threatened to beat them if they refused, blurring the lines between criminals and law enforcers.

Thus, this article advocates caution in the use of community policing for tackling policing cultures, violent crime and social disorder in post-conflict settings. In Mozambique the community policing committees were appropriated by local state police to deal with the difficult situation they faced, and consequently, the practice of community policing on the ground looked very different from the official model.


**Brief Summary:**

The notion of a state monopoly over policing is no longer possible in South Africa and it conflicts with the plurality of providers that exists today. This chapter seeks to move beyond the conception of the police as ‘all things to all people’ and to provide a new imagining of community policing. The police should adopt a more minimalist role within a broader framework of nodal policing.
Extended Summary:
It is widely accepted that in both established and transitional societies, ‘the demand for security exceeds the capacity of the government to provide it’ (p. 155). While the police in South Africa lacks legitimacy and has a poor record in the management of crime and disorder, forms of non-state policing have been both popular and effective. Indeed, South Africa is characterised by a plurality of policing providers, from the private security industry, to youth-organised street committees, from traditional courts to neighbourhood patrols. While some are not strictly legal, such as street patrols in black townships, they have not been curtailed by the police, and local communities allow them to operate. Others, such as community schemes in wealthy neighbourhoods, have displaced crime, and have relied on discriminatory harassment, are nevertheless effective in reducing criminal activity in their area.

The term community policing was first used in 1977 in South Africa and it is based upon the understanding that effective policing must be a collaborative effort. However, the police remains the central actor and efforts have remained focused upon mobilising communities to legitimise and increase the effectiveness of the state police. There is little engagement with alternative policing initiatives. Partnerships are largely limited to facilitating communication and the flow of information between the police and the public, as well as supporting public policing initiatives. More recently, there has been a shift away from community engagement as crime and fear of crime have increased. While the police continue to pursue the establishment of an exclusive monopoly of the policing domain, a plurality of policing provision nevertheless remains and there is a marked lack of clarity about the role of all these nodal players.

Defining a clear role for the police, and identifying which security functions can and should be outsourced to non-state actors is essential. Moreover, the police should adopt a more minimalist role based upon their unique functions in society. That is, they should ‘maintain the unique right and requisite skills to use legal bureaucratic violence with the discretion to resolve conflict and create social order’ (p. 162); in weak and developing states, the police are in no position to be community activists and problem solvers. By delineating a narrower and more defined role, the police will ‘feel less pressured to respond to an ever widening demand for interventions’ (p. 162). A form of nodal policing, where all actors are clear about each other’s role and contribution, will engender good security governance in South Africa.

Thus, this chapter advocates for a community policing model that takes into account both the limitations of the state police, and the range of alternative policing sources that exist in South Africa. Horizontal and vertical networks should be created linking the police with non-state providers and encouraging collaborative action amongst the different nodes to fill security gaps. The local government would coordinate the system and the public police, while not monopolising policing, would be key actors, tasked with ensuring that force is used effectively and that democratic rights are protected.


Brief Summary:
The various countries that constitute the former-Yugoslavia are characterised by highly centralised, repressive, politicised, unaccountable and corrupt police forces that have been largely unable to counter insecurity and the rise in arms trafficking in the region. However, a number of initiatives are in place to address these issues, and the context provides an ideal opportunity for introducing community-based policing. The document conceptualises
community policing and develops a model for its implementation, before examining some of the
different strategies and initiatives in operation around the world.

Extended Summary:
Community policing is a philosophy and an organisational strategy that facilitates a collaborative
partnership between police and communities in efforts to solve problems of crime, disorder and
security in the community. At the core of this philosophy are the notions that, firstly, people
have the right to a voice in the policing of their neighbourhoods, and secondly, that policing
should move beyond a narrow focus on individual crimes and incidents to a broader problem-
oriented approach. In a COP approach, the police need to:

- Police by consent not coercion
- Be a part of the community not isolated from it
- Liaise with members of the community to identify local needs and concerns
- Be accountable
- Be proactive
- Provide a quality service

It should be emphasised that community policing is not soft on crime.

Community policing can play an important role in tackling the availability and circulation of
small arms and light weapons (SALW); if there are greater degrees of trust in the police and
greater levels of confidence in their efficiency, citizens will be more willing to surrender their
weapons. Furthermore, improved communication and partnerships between the police and local
communities will enable the police to obtain better information about arms caches or transit
routes.

There are four components of the community policing model:

- The philosophy – which emphasises neighbourhood policing, consultative
  mechanisms, problem-solving approaches and police-community partnerships
  of mutual responsibility.
- The organisational structure – which requires delegation of authority and a
  commitment to meeting local needs.
- The management policy – which relies less on rank-based deference, rather
  emphasising a bottom-up approach.
- The operational strategy for implementation – which identifies the existing
  police-community relationship and implements community policing through
  pilot sites and initiatives.

There are a number of key factors that can facilitate or hamper the implementation of community
based policing approaches, including:

- Leadership and political will – strong leadership within the different
  institutions involved in police reforms and COP efforts will be significantly
  challenged in the absence of political will, institutional resistance, or lack of
  understanding.
- Local context – COP initiatives must be adapted to address local issues and
  should build upon existing local institutions. Tensions between different
  groups in the community need to be sensitively addressed, and while
  traditional mechanisms should be built upon, care must be taken not to
  reproduce their negative aspects.
- Broader criminal justice apparatus – police reforms can be undermined if
  other security agencies and judicial institutions are incompetent and corrupt.
• Ownership – a sense of ownership amongst the police and the community is essential to sustainable long-term change. This ownership can be challenged by competing interests, and can be difficult to foster in the context of externally imposed reforms.

• Partnerships – effective police-community partnerships are central to community based policing, and a lack of trust from either side will prevent their development.

The document offers accounts of and reflections upon some community-based initiatives in different contexts. The table below consolidates the key points of a small selection of the diverse practices discussed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and type of CBP activity</th>
<th>Methods of implementation</th>
<th>Lessons Learnt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FYR Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introducing the police back into the community</td>
<td>Police made more ethnically representative Foot patrols and Citizen Advisory Groups introduced in neighbourhoods</td>
<td>Trust building is a long process Police should reflect the ethnic composition of the population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public-private partnership to deliver crime analysis</td>
<td>Citizen Police Liaison committee established to manage crime databases Integrated into the police</td>
<td>Private sector has an interest in security and has resources Initiatives should be embedded within government structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community safety initiatives as a support to CBP</td>
<td>Residents established links with the police, KOFOR and KPC to develop responses to specific problems</td>
<td>Participatory approach ensured commitment to solving problems Confidence building was necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation process</td>
<td>Greater focus on conflict resolution to deal with recurring disputes Both parties meet with a police facilitator to reach a resolution of dispute</td>
<td>Proactive approach to policing is effective The needs of the community must be identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing community consultative structures</td>
<td>Consultative structures developed Built on traditional authorities and systems of justice</td>
<td>Important to understand cultures and to draw on the legitimacy of existing authorities Creating an acceptance of volunteerism is important</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Brief Summary:
The community policing model introduced in South Africa was largely an adaptation of the Western model, but its implementation was problematic. The structure and culture of the police meant that there was significant institutional resistance to community policing principles. As a consequence of police inefficiency and the failure to tackle the high rates of crime in the country, community policing was largely abandoned and communities fell back into forms of self-policing in the absence of state security provision.

Extended Summary:
Community policing was adopted in South Africa in the context of significant weaknesses and deficiencies in traditional forms of policing. The country suffered from very high crime levels, an almost complete lack of trust and confidence in the police, and a policing strategy that was entirely reactive. Before 1994, the South African Police (SAP) was a highly centralised, paramilitary and authoritarian institution, and consequently, while it was a useful tool of political repression, it was ill-equipped for crime control and prevention. Moreover, the force was largely unaccountable and lacked the capability to gather intelligence and detect criminal activity effectively. Consequently, the SAP lacked legitimacy and was distrusted by the population.

While there was no real tradition of formal community policing in South Africa, there were various forms of self-policing that occurred at the local level during the apartheid regime, such as anti-crime street committees and people’s courts in the black townships. The community policing program implemented in South Africa was largely an adaptation of Western European and American principles, emphasising democratic control, accountability, impartiality, transparency and a demilitarised style of policing. Social crime prevention became a key area of focus, and problem-solving approaches were emphasised. Community Police Forums were established and were designed to be the link between local communities and the new South African Police Service (SAPS).

The implementation of this community policing philosophy was, however, problematic.

- These initiatives required skills that the SAPS did not have and the culture of a ‘soft’ style of policing – that is one based on social problems and crime prevention as opposed to the more militarised and forceful enforcement activities of the past – was alien to the South African Police.
- There was resistance to the notion of a shared responsibility in the provision of security amongst the SAPS. While the police regarded community policing as a means for more effective intelligence gathering, communities ‘viewed the new form of (community) policing as an opportunity to change the balance of power in their communities and make the police accountable to community needs and structures (p. 33).
- The history of self-policing in black townships exacerbated problems as many thought that under the new policy, communities would be allowed to police themselves under limited supervision form the state police and that the resources required to do so would be provided.
- Inequalities in policing continued under the COP model; community forums in more affluent areas turned themselves into not-for-profit companies and then contributed money towards equipping and resourcing the police, whilst poorer areas could not afford to do this.
The effectiveness of community forums was questioned as members were typically unelected and represented particular interest groups. Moreover, the forums were treated with disdain by the SAPS and had little impact upon policing.

Community policing faded into the background after just five years and other policies designed to aid the SAPS in fighting crime became more prominent.

It should also be noted that since 1994, and in the context of pervasive disillusionment with the service delivery of the state police, the private security industry as become prolific in South Africa. Indeed, it has assumed many of the traditional roles of the state police, such as responding to alarms, patrolling areas and investigating crimes. The prevalence of private security actors has led to a revitalised interest in private-public partnerships; in 2007, for example, President Mbeki made mention of a possible role for the private security industry in working with the SAPS.

Community policing has floundered in black townships due to public apathy, lack of trust in the police and a reluctance to work with them. Furthermore, since many community members benefit from the proceeds of crime, illegal activities are tolerated by many, and fears of intimidation or retribution ensures the silence of others. Consequently, forms of self-policing – such as mob justice – continue; indeed, in the anonymity of the crowd, people can ‘strike a blow against criminal depredations in their communities’ (p. 51). As high rates of crime have continued in the country some communities have revived community forums and established neighbourhood watch patrols. These remain, however, forms of self-policing; there is no talk of cooperation or partnership with the SAPS under formal community policing structures.

Community policing in South Africa failed to meet expectations of reducing crime and responding to community needs in a more humane way. The SAPS soon reverted to more traditional methods in an effort to counter crime in a more effective manner.


Brief Summary:
The centralised and hierarchical nature of the French police forces, and their culture of protecting the state rather than engaging with the people, has meant that attempts to bring them closer to the citizens have largely failed. While the police de proximité could have enhanced government control of the population, the law and order policy has, in fact, produced a more alienated society that is far less easy to control.

Extended Summary:
The French police forces are highly centralised and hierarchical in structure and organisation and any reform that seeks to change this is likely to fail. The consequences of this centralisation include:

- Police officers follow national policies and do not answer to the demands of the public.
- Recruitment and career progression emphasise movement and mobility, preventing the development of strong police-community relationships. Since recruitment is made at the national level, many officers are posted in areas away from their homes. They subsequently continue to move every few years.
until they come to a city that they prefer. As such, they do not build up links with the local community, making it difficult to investigate crimes.

- National, top-down policies and guidelines are not adapted to suit local circumstances. Moreover, individual officers have limited discretion to adapt their strategies to local contexts; rather, they must follow the national priorities.

- In addition to this, France’s historically embedded tradition of revolution and demonstration means that the government wants to control the police and use it for protection. Consequently, a large proportion of staff are directed to activities that protect the state, its building and its services. The large riot force that is maintained to enforce public order is reflective of this.

The philosophy of community policing conflicts with this context of centralised police forces designed to protect the state. Indeed, one of the central principals of the French Republic is that the state maintains a direct link with the population which is not mediated by any group or actor. Therefore, it is not possible to recognise any community as a partner for public policies. This is the reason why the term ‘community policing’ is not officially used in France. Rather, the term ilot policing was preferred, and later, police de proximité (neighbourhood policing) became official policy. The main aim of these policies was to bring the police closer to the population without involving the public in policing strategy.

- **Ilot** – In response to the growing violence in French society in the 1970s, and the lack of confidence in the police force, the French government sought to enhance police-citizen relations. They promoted an old practice of *ilototage* which was based upon police officers carrying out foot patrols in the same area where they could spend time with and talk to members of the local community.
  - **Challenges** – this practice met with institutional resistance to this policy. Individual officers were reluctant because they did not consider it to be a ‘real police job’, and police chiefs did not want to encourage individual officer discretion and abandon the hierarchical and centralised organisational structure.
  - **Successes** – where *ilototage* was implemented it was popular amongst many members of the public. However, increasing crime rates justified the abandonment of the policy.

- **Police de Proximité** – the main goal of this policy was to use a closer police involvement in the community to improve investigations in order to catch suspects. Police officers improved their links with the local population, but only to take complaints and arrest offenders.
  - **Challenges** – While the police succeeded in improving their relationships with local populations, this resulted in more people passing cases on to the police. Thus there was a dramatic increase in official crime rates as more complaints were registered that the police were unable to solve.

Policing strategies experienced a change of direction with the transfer of political power. Now emphasis is placed more on improving the centralised system and giving the police force all the means necessary to ‘win the battle against crime.’ Zero tolerance policies are most apparent in contemporary French policing. However, one of the key criticisms of this is that it dramatizes otherwise minor problems and consequently encourages conflict. For example, if guests at a restaurant complain to the police about youngsters playing football too nearby, the zero tolerance policy would have the police come and arrest them rather than simply quietening them down. This reaction promotes conflict and engenders distrust in the police.

As a result of the failure of state police to act as a service that is responsive to public demand, private security companies have emerged and proliferated. Moreover, local police forces have enjoyed increasing powers, as they are better equipped in some cities than the national police
force. These forces must hand over any suspects they arrest to the national police force. Community policing still struggles to take root in local forces, as many officers want to arrest offenders and fight crime, not be social workers.

The law and order policy currently adopted in France has alienated society and made the population less easy to control.

**OECD, 2005, Issues Brief: Introduction to security system reform, Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention**

**Brief Summary:**
This paper provides a general and basic account of the need for security system reform and outlines some ways in which to approach it. Most notably, the briefing emphasises the need to understand the local context and the necessity of ensuring local ownership of security system reforms.

**Extended Summary:**
Security, conceived in the broad terms of human safety, well-being and freedom from fear, is an essential precondition for development and poverty reduction. Security sector reform is important to governance and development for a number of reasons:

- A state based upon democratic ideals and accountability is unlikely to take root if the government is unwilling or unable to control security actors.
- Order and stability is essential for development and is a core responsibility of the state.
- The rule of law is essential for the promotion of economic, social, civil and political rights.

In the context of ineffective, corrupt, weak and sometimes repressive policing and judiciary structures, the poor suffer disproportionately from crime and fear. An effective, responsible security system, whose agencies respect human rights, are accountable to the public and under civilian control can be a force for peace and stability. Thus, security sector reform is crucial for development and the protection of human rights in many transitional contexts.

It is essential that local contexts are understood in order to identify the constraints and the opportunities of reform; among the key factors that should be considered are:

- The nature of the existing security system and its relationship with both the state and the public.
- The nature of security provision, the various actors involved in policing at the local level, and what role existing institutions – whether informal or formal – can play in the reformed security sector.
- The weaknesses of the existing system.
- The level of political support for reform and how commitment to the process might be fostered by international actors.

State security actors must be regarded as integral to society, operating in tandem with other social and political structures, including those in the community and in the private sector.

Security sector reforms cannot be imposed externally; local ownership is fundamental to their successful implementation. Consequently, stakeholders should work with international actors to identify security needs and the objectives of reform. Furthermore, engaging civil society actors
and members of the public will enhance demands for reform, ensuring its sustainability. Key components of security sector reform include:

- A legal framework to ensure that institutions operate in line with democratic principles.
- Structures of oversight to ensure the accountability of security actors.
- Enhancing the technical capacity and capability of security actors to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.

Security sector reform should take place as part of a coordinated and coherent development effort that targets governance reform as a whole. Thus, coordination between security, political and development communities is essential both at the planning stage and in the implantation phases.

In post-conflict contexts, continued rebel activity, bandits and other ‘spoiling’ group can disrupt the reform process; the integration of members of these groups into normal life is essential to long term peacebuilding and development.


**Brief Summary:**
This report examines police reform in general, offering guidelines for their successful implementation, including the need to fight the perception that human rights approaches are incompatible with crime fighting, to anchor reform programs in local realities, and to build up confidence in the police through mechanisms of accountability.

**Extended Summary:**
Police reform is now a central component of both post-conflict interventions and broader conflict prevention strategies. In many societies in which reforms are being implemented, the police are highly militarised forces, complicit in numerous human rights violations and subject to high levels of mistrust and suspicion amongst the communities they serve. As such, their transformation into effective and accountable police services has proved challenging.

**What we know so far is that:**
- Police reform takes a long time – it is not simply a matter of introducing new police practices and doctrine, but rather requires a fundamental transformation in how society is governed. There will be resistance amongst those who benefit from the status quo.
- Organisational change is difficult – and transforming the police in a post-conflict setting is particularly problematic. Historical legacies of mistrust must be broken down and the relationship between the police and the population must be rebuilt.
- Respect for human rights and effective crime fighting go together – the perception that a human rights based approach to reform will be soft on crime must be combated; the police will reject reform if they believe it will lead to greater criminality and the population will call for more robust action if they feel threatened by crime.
- Police reform must be coupled with broader judicial reform.
Police officers should play a meaningful role in developing reforms – some of the best ideas have come from rank and file police officers, and reform cannot simply be imposed from above.

Reforms must be anchored in local historical, traditional and cultural realities – this involves developing a detailed understanding of the nature of the police and their relationship with local communities in the past; indeed, ‘reform efforts must not in any way even hint that discredited and abusive symbols, units or tactics will continue to be used’ (p. 5).

Oversight bodies must be objective, transparent and effective, as well as adequately resourced. Mechanisms of accountability will secure public trust and improve respect for human rights.

There are still some issues that remain challenging in police reform, most notably:

- How to engage civil society in police reforms, particularly in societies marked by lack hostility and mistrust for the police and state governance.
- How to sustain reform efforts – particularly in terms of funding – once the international community leaves.
- How to coordinate police and judicial reforms.

Available at:


Brief Summary:
Nigeria enjoys a historical legacy of decentralised policing which was brought to an abrupt end by the military coup in 1966. In the context of rising crime rates and an ineffective centralised police force, informal policing structures have become prominent. A return to a decentralised police force in the country would bring the police closer to citizens, closer to informal groups and familiar with their operations, and would enable them to work as a team with local citizens in the provision of security.

Extended Summary:
The Nigerian Police force suffers from a poor relationship with citizens in the country marked by hostility and distrust as a result of its historical legacy of coercion and oppression. Like many police forces during the colonial period, the NPF was employed primarily as a tool of the state, and it continued to play this role in the early years of independence. The police were used by local leaders and chiefs in an effort to suppress political opposition and they engaged in coercion, harassment and intimidation of opposition groups.

However, despite this legacy, community policing remains suitable in the Nigerian context; the original structure and formation of the NPF was designed to reflect community needs as local governments maintained local police forces. However, following the coup in 1966, fearing overthrow by the police and local leaders, the military rulers prevented local authorities from maintaining these local forces. The police was transformed into a unitary, militarized and centralised force against fierce opposition from local authorities. The state’s ability to protect citizens from criminal elements was compromised by this top-down militarised police force, and consequently informal policing structures emerged as a form of self-protection.
Informal policing emerges as a response to the government’s inability and failure to ensure the safety and security of its citizens. Across the African continent, scholars have identified the revival of traditional forms of informal policing in the context of high crime rates and ineffective state security provision. In Nigeria, one example is the pre-colonial practices of security provision that have been noted in Afikpo town, where age-grades have been mobilised to combat crime and protect the community from external attack. In Nigeria, these forms of informal policing are largely welcomed by the state, so long as they register with the police, submit to police screening, remain unarmed, and do not detain suspects. While informal policing groups appear to enjoy some popularity at the local level and are identified as closer to the people and more responsive to their needs, they nevertheless are subject to a number of problems. They lack funding and resources, and are confronted by police persecution and threat. Furthermore, membership is often closed, excluding women, age-sets and other groups, and they lack accountability.

The chapter advocates for a decentralised policing system in Nigeria which reflects the judiciary. The judicial structure in Nigeria includes federal courts, state courts, and lower local courts; a reform of the police along similar lines will facilitate closer relationships with traditional police structures and ‘allow the various units to prepare and control their own security needs’ (p. 95).

Some efforts have been made to integrate community policing strategies within NPF practice. However, community policing programmes must be adapted to incorporate the customary bottom up informal policing groups that pervade the country. Partnerships between informal policing groups and the NPF will ensure far better provision of security in the country. The strength of informal policing and traditional systems of justice should be capitalised upon; these practices should be stimulated, rather than repressed. Imported community policing brands are likely to be far less efficient.


**Brief Summary:**
While community policing might have the potential to transform policing, it faces serious challenges in contexts marked by hostile police-citizen relations, clientelism, corruption and coercion. This paper explores two community policing initiatives adopted in Kenya, arguing that on closer examination these projects – and the conflicting expectations and objectives attributed to them by the various actors involved – may simply reproduce the undemocratic and oppressive structures of Kenyan society.

**Extended Summary:**
Community policing emerged as a popular concept in the UK and the United States in the 1980s in the light of a growing disillusionment with traditional policing methods, and soon grew in popularity around the world. However, the concept is ambiguous; it has become a catch-all term, encompassing a wide variety of rather disparate practices. The conceptual ambiguity has facilitated the range of interpretations and expressions by different actors in different contexts.

Community policing became a dominant policy in the aftermath of apartheid in South Africa in an effort to transform the police from a feared and hated force into a trusted law and order service. However, understandings of the concept and its aims varied significantly between different groups in the country:

- Local communities expected to be included in and consulted about police initiatives.
- The police perceived these consultative forums as soft on crime and preferred to use the increased interaction with communities rather than an intelligence
gathering device, an opportunity to develop an 'eyes and ears' mechanism of crime control.

- Businesses and wealthy communities have appropriated police forces, providing them with equipment and other resources to enable them to patrol in their areas.

Community policing initiatives in South Africa are also being challenged by private security companies in affluent areas, and by vigilantes and self-defence units in the townships.

The Kenya police force has historically been seen as an agent of the state, a politicised and ethnicised instrument of repression, lacking in any real accountability. This legacy of mutual distrust between police and citizens, coupled with the increasing crime rates and the high levels of insecurity in the country, raise serious questions about the relevance of community policing in such contexts. The rest of the paper explores two community policing projects adopted in Nairobi in 1999:

- The Nairobi Central Business District Association (NCBDA) concerned with the inability of the police to deal with growing insecurity, and motivated by the impact crime rates were having on business activity, explored options for partnerships with the police to reduce the levels of insecurity. The project involved:
  - The installation of police booths in the central business district.
  - The provision of the police with equipment – such as a Land Rover – to enable them to respond to incidents.
  - The creation of a community policing unit within Nairobi Police headquarters.
- The KHRC implemented a COP project in Kangemi slum, Nairobi, establishing neighbourhood watch schemes, and community-police liaison committees.

The different actors involved in these projects had vastly different objectives, interpretations and expectations of the community policing projects:

- The police perceived community policing as oriented towards the maintenance of order, de-emphasising issues of trust, cooperation and accountability.
- The NCBDA saw it as a public-private partnership in which the community would define security needs and provide the police with the means needed to satisfy them.
- The KHRC saw community policing as a means of addressing both crime and human rights abuses and a way of improving police-community relations.

The NCBDA project enjoyed smooth relations between the police and the NCBDA. The latter provided the police with sorely needed equipment and resources and invested in the living conditions of police officers, whilst the NCBDA itself benefitted from a safer environment in which to conduct its business. However, while the project has facilitated the delivery of services to a slice of the community, it has marginalised and excluded other groups Unlicensed hawkers, small business owners, and taxi drivers, as well as people living on the streets in this area have reported increased harassment by the police and ‘all argue that what the project has done is to bring police repression closer to them’ (p. 600).

The KHRC project suffered from lack of police interest and involvement. The uneasy relationship was exacerbated by the KHRC objectives of denouncing human rights abuses, as well as the vastly different, and often competing objectives of the two institutions: whilst the KHRC sought to improve accountability and to address human rights issues, the police emphasised efficiency in addressing crime. In addition to these implementation issues, the
KHRC project, like the NCBDA initiative, is, in many ways, undemocratic. The majority tenant population has been largely excluded and marginalised in security committees and neighbourhood watch groups in favour of the minority landowners. Furthermore, local communities are very suspicious of the police and only invite them in as a back-up; as a result, formal security provision is being replaced by community initiatives and the line between vigilantism and community policing becomes blurred, ‘opening up the possibility of violence and anarchy’ (p. 601).

Thus, there are a number of obstacles to the implementation of community policing initiatives in Kenya, all of which relate to the failure to account for a context which is marked by clientelism, corruption and coercion:

- The police lack commitment to improving accountability and are ‘almost hopelessly corrupt’ (p. 602).
- The NCBDA’s interest in tackling insecurity whilst ignoring institutional failures neglects adequate attention to the roots of insecurity.
- By providing police with the resources needed to patrol their areas, and by forming partnerships with police, professional groups and business people have appropriated the police, leading to the emergence of preferential policing in certain areas.
- Heavy-handed government responses to crime destroys the limited public trust that exists between police and citizens.
- Distrust between the police and local communities facilitate the growth of almost entirely community-led initiatives, blurring the line between vigilantism and community policing.
- COP initiatives in Kenya are undemocratic, addressing the needs of small sections of society at the expense of other groups.
- Contradictory and conflicting perspectives and objectives stall COP projects.


Brief Summary:
This report provides a definition and a breakdown of key characteristics of community policing, before documenting community-based policing (CBP) approaches that have been implemented in Kibera and Isiolo, Kenya, since 2003. It outlines the objectives and achievements of these particular projects and draws attention to some of the challenges and the lessons learned from these cases. The report notes that crime has been reduced in up to 40% of the pilot sites, levels of trust have significantly increased between police and communities, and increased accountability is evident. However, despite these achievements, crime rates remain high, corruption continues and the police are still, to an extent, politicised. This has stalled the extension of CBP to other parts of Kenya.

Extended Summary:
Definitions and characteristics of community policing

‘Community policing is both a philosophy (a way of thinking) and an organisational strategy (a way of carrying out the philosophy), that allows the police and the community to work together in new ways to solve problems of crime, disorder and safety issues to improve the quality of life for everyone in that community’ (p. 4).

There are a number of key characteristics of a police agency which is embedded within CBP principles, notably that the police are: a service, not a force; accountable; open and identifiable;
visible and accessible; people-centred; efficient and effective; consultative and participative; proactive; and preventative.

Community based policing approaches makes security everybody’s responsibility, gives the community a voice in developing solutions for crime and insecurity, improves police accountability and trust, enhances social cohesion within the community, and ultimately 'contributes to safer societies, leading to enhanced economic development (p. 5).

Community policing in Kenya

The high crime rates and levels of insecurity in Kenya, coupled with a heavily politicised and repressive police force have formed the backdrop for attempts to reform the police in the country. In 2002, consultations and committees spearheaded by the newly elected government revealed that the police needed to be radically transformed into an institution which was both transparent and accountable, and that was based upon partnership with, and responsiveness to, local communities, was required. Saferworld was requested by the government to support the reform agenda. Saferworld and its partners have initiated a programme in Kenya which places local communities at the centre. It aims to improve police-citizen relations and to facilitate collaborative efforts in the search for solutions to local safety concerns. Saferworld have worked to assist with the development of a national policy, to provide CBP training, and to launch pilot sites, two of which are located in Kibera – an informal settlement in Nairobi – and Isiolo – situated in a rural area in the Eastern Province of the country.

The CBP project in Kibera sought to re-establish peace and security in the slum by responding to the safety concerns of residents. Activities included:

- A police-community forum which meet on a monthly basis to allow police and residents to identify strategies for addressing local criminal activity.
- Police open-day and medical camp where police provided free medical check ups in an effort to build trust and facilitate police-community interaction.
- Information drop-boxes to facilitate information sharing.

In Isiolo, the main aims of the initiative were to prevent crime, improve community safety and reduce the proliferation of small arms. Activities included:

- Participation in monthly safety forums, providing an opportunity for communities to raise security with the police and to help generate solutions.
- Joint police-community patrols.
- The establishment of a customer care office to allow people to access information about security in the area.

Both pilot schemes exhibited some successes. They have improved levels of trust and cooperation between police and communities; increased information sharing which has helped police to tackle crime; and increased awareness of security issues, which has empowered communities to demand support from political representatives. Moreover, schools which had been closed down due to the insecurity in Isiolo have been reopened, and business and tourism are now flourishing.

However, despite these achievements there are many challenges facing police reform in Kenya. Some of the key challenges are:

- Lack of wider judicial reform – frustrating the efforts of the police to ensure that criminals are punished.
- Frequent rotation of police officers – disrupting continuity and limiting the growth of trust and the development of relationships with the community.
- Lack of police capacity and resources – making it difficult to meet expectations.
Institutional resistance and low morale of the police.
Low levels of trust in the police due to the legacy of suspicion and mistrust.
Reliance on traditional justice systems – many Kenyan rely on traditional justice systems, but there have been few attempts to incorporate these within formal mechanisms, or to improve links between the two systems.

A number of lessons have been learned from the Kenyan case, most notably:

- The importance of sector-wide approach where police reform is just one aspect of broader government and judicial reform.
- The importance of ownership and participation.
- That civil society has a central role to place in security sector reform that extends beyond raising awareness in local communities.
- That accountability of the police must be strengthened.
- That police-community partnerships are essential to addressing mutual distrust that has developed.
- That reform takes time.
- The focus should be on crime prevention, which, in its broadest sense, means emphasising social health and community cohesion.


Brief Summary:
In 2006 the newly appointed Inspector General in Tanzania, Saidi Mwema, launched a long-term reform program in an effort to address the rising crime rates, to improve the public image of the police, and to resolve the problem of an under-resourced and under-manned police force. The program noted some successes, primarily in the improved relations between the police and the public, and it offers lessons for other police services seeking to overcome poor reputation and community distrust through community policing initiatives.

Extended Summary:
In Tanzania, the police service faced a number of difficulties:

- Recruitment, training and promotion structures were weak and selectively implemented and there were no clear guidelines for everyday policing activities.
- Police-public relations were poor and characterised by distrust and hostility.
- The police force was underfunded and under-resourced, and it relied on informal policing groups that were untrained and employed vigilantism in their activities.

In 2006, a number of factors coalesced to create an opportunity for police reform, most notable among which were the rising crime rates which drew attention to the weakness of the police, and the election of President Kikwete who stressed the importance of peace and security as a precondition for economic development. Saidi Mwema, the newly appointed inspector general, together with a team of experts, developed a long-term reform plan that emphasised three key objectives: Improving public perception of the police; enhancing police infrastructure; revising the legal framework to reflect a community policing philosophy.

Mwema took some immediate, short term steps to begin improving relations whilst the longer term strategy was being mapped out in consultation with wider Tanzanian society:
He released the private telephone numbers of senior officers, including himself, to encourage the public to engage with the police, and to demonstrate that the police were there to protect the public, not the state.

He took steps to repair relations between the police and the media, urging the media to investigate corruption and offering assurances that they would not be punished for criticising the police.

A complaints division was established through the Department of Public Security and Safety, providing the public with an institutional outlet for their grievances.

Suggestion boxes were introduced and distributed at the local level to enable people to leave anonymous suggestions for how to improve policing.

Regional police commanders were tasked with setting up community meetings to build closer relationships and to give the public a voice.

Despite the political and popular support, police officers themselves resisted change. Significant efforts were made to counteract this recalcitrance through consultation and compromise. Nevertheless, improved police-public relations were cited as a major success and concerns over the program’s future related primarily to fears that political support might be withdrawn. As one officer stated, ‘Simply put, without political support, you cannot move’ (p. 9).

Full text available at:
http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties/content/data/policy_note/PN_id123/Policy_Note_ID123.pdf


Brief summary:
This paper outlines strategies being developed in South Africa which adopt a radical form of community policing. The author advocates mechanisms that would allow residents of black townships to access tax revenues so that they can utilise private security actors to ensure local safety. Thus, Shearing develops a conception of community policing that takes its lead from private policing actors, rather than from the state police.

Extended summary:
Existing strategies of police reform in emerging democracies tend to focus upon the transformation of the state police. However, the conventional understanding of policing which underscores this wisdom is far too limited and it fails to appreciate the transformations in security provision that have taken place over the last few decades. It is founded upon notion that the state maintains a monopoly over security provision, coercion and governance. However, increasingly there have been suggestions that governance should not be exclusively state-based; rather, people should be actively involved in their own governance and regulation. Thus, ‘governance must be re-institutionalized in ways that will ensure that governing is done more directly by the people’ (p. 32). Partial devolution is happening through community policing initiatives that emphasise police-community partnerships and a collaborative responsibility for security provision. However, a more radical form of reimagining governance is apparent in the re-emergence of private policing. Across the world, ‘corporate governments’ – such as gated communities, or large corporate entities – are assuming the traditional responsibilities of the state. The state role is reduced to providing a framework for the regulation of multiple sites of governance. Thus focusing attention exclusively on the state and its institutions fails to appreciate the multiplicity and the ‘new feudalism’ of contemporary governance (p. 33).
In South Africa, Shearing and others have sought to promote police reform initiatives that recognise and appreciate these new forms of devolved governance. In their proposed model of community policing, local governments in South Africa will not be required to use funds to set up police departments in their areas, but rather will be expected to fund initiatives that will provide a safe and secure environment for their constituents. These initiatives may, or may not, involve the national police. This position is at odds with traditional community policing by reducing rather than expanding the state police role. They seek to develop a model of community policing that will allow poor people to access tax revenues and enable them to become customers in the security market. This involves developing two institutional arrangements:

- **Safety Centres** – assuming the municipalities’ responsibilities of ensuring a safe and secure environment for local communities, their task will be to identify groups in need of security and to create collaborative forums to meet and discuss how security can be accomplished.

- **Forums** – will involve three principal parties: interest group representatives, a police representative and a Safety Centre representative. They will work together to develop plans for policing that will benefit the group.

The aim is that this process of dialogue will help to develop structures that will:

- Define policing in terms of the networking of a range of resources that is not limited to the state police.

- Establish a system for allocating tax revenues to local communities so that they can participate in a market for security.

- Decentralise control over policing, shifting it from the hands of the state police into the hands of the people who require security.

**Full text available at:**
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/167024.pdf


**Brief Summary:**
Western understandings of community policing are predominantly state-centric and the practices and policies which are considered to fall within its rubric are those which are initiated and controlled by state actors. However, local communities across the world practice forms of informal ‘community policing’ independent of the state. Whether, and the degree to which, these informal practices become institutionalised within the state apparatus is dependent upon four key factors: the dominant state ideology; the way in which the state has traditionally dealt with challenges to its authority; the extent of elite division and the nature of political alliances; and cultural frameworks.

**Extended Summary:**
In Western conceptualisations, community policing is anchored in the Weberian ideal of a state-monopoly on the legitimate use of force. That is to say, community policing is understood to be a philosophy and strategy of the police alone, and community-generated informal policing is criminalised and regarded as subversive. However, some scholars are beginning to call for more bottom-up, anthropological and descriptive analyses of community policing, which bracket these imported, Western ideas in favour of recognising the popularity and legitimacy that informal policing often enjoys at the local level. Phenomenological analyses which reflect the reality of policing and security provision on the ground can help to ensure that police reform efforts are not irrelevant to the contexts in which they are applied.
There are two main forms of community policing: top-down practices that are initiated and controlled by the state (such as militias or departments of the regular police tasked with COP activities), and bottom-up activities (such as vigilantism, and gated communities) which originate from society. In addition, there are also regional variations in community policing. In some African states, for example, community policing is understood as vigilante or quasi-police groups which enjoy varying degrees of institutionalisation within the state. In China, community policing is assured at the village level through informal social control channels and the inculcation of moral values and discipline. In the West, community policing varies from the neighbourhood watch schemes are popular in the United States, to the European emphasis on problem-solving, community-consultative mechanisms and other top-down approaches.

The authors go on to argue that develop a theoretical model for understanding variations in community policing patterns, arguing that COP practices are shaped by the features of the state. In some contexts, community policing reforms are the result of diffusion and globalisation. In others, crises – where there is a loss of faith in existing policing institutions, and a sense that change is needed to address insecurity – can prompt the introduction of COP. The following factors influence and shape the introduction of community policing and the forms it takes.

1. **Service delivery capacity of the state:**
   - Weak states and under-resourced police forces create a ‘policing gap’ in which vigilantism can emerge. Indeed the state might even be tempted to tolerate or encourage vigilantism to compensate for its lack of policing capacity.
   - Strong states and high service delivery capacity states are less likely to delegate policing powers – except through formal decentralisation – and so vigilantism is unlikely in these contexts.

2. **State Ideology** plays an important role in the emergence of informal policing, and the degree to which it comes to be institutionalised within state structures.
   - In China, the combination of Confucianist values and modern mass line ideology ensured that local security problems are dealt with at the community/clan/family level.
   - Western neoliberal values infuse community policing initiatives in these states, notably in the privatization of policing and neighbourhood watch schemes.
   - In Tanzania, the Sungusungu were partially institutionalised because they corresponded with Nyerere’s ideology of village socialism and community self-reliance.
   - In other contexts, strong state-building agendas can explain the rejection of both top-down and bottom-up community policing. In Mozambique, for example, community policing was not initially welcomed following the 1992 peace agreement for fear that any decentralisation of security could disrupt the peace.

3. **State tradition in dealing with challenges to its authority** effects the emergence, the form, and the success of informal policing. Vigilante groups must constantly negotiate with the state in order to survive.
   - In Italy, fascist traditions were reflected in the hard protest policing styles of the 1970s and 1980s, whereas the ‘rule of law’ tradition of German policing translated into a more moderate style of protest policing.
   - The British style of indirect rule during the colonial period, for example, gave legal and political space to native authorities and encouraged community self-rule. This tradition makes the institutionalisation of informal policing more likely.

4. **Elite division and political alliances** – in order to grow and thrive, informal policing needs political sponsors.
• The case of the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria is interesting. It demonstrates that even when the state ideology is opposed to vigilantism, powerful allies can nevertheless ensure that there is sufficient political space for informal initiatives to grow.

• In Tanzania, the state remains divided over how to deal with the Sungusungu. Traditionally, the majority political party supported the movement, whilst the judiciary and police were opposed to it, claiming that it challenged their exclusive field of competencies.

5. Repertoire of actions – to facilitate the transformation of crises and opportunities into mobilisation for institutional change, actors have to engage in framing. Policing actors and providers must be able to tap into a repertoire of actions, popular myths, historical references and other cultural frameworks which resonate with local communities.

• The justification of vigilantism is likely to be relatively in post-colonial states with a history of indirect rule, for example. In these contexts, ‘continuity’ between traditional forms of justice and modern vigilantism can be emphasised. In Tanzania, forms of informal policing are associated with the cultural traditions of different ethnic groups.

A number of studies have pointed to the ‘failures’ of exported community policing reforms in transitional societies. Perhaps, however, it is not that community policing itself does not ‘fit’, but rather that western-style COP is irrelevant to the context. Nigerian criminologists have demonstrated the value of informal policing by elucidating its everyday manifestations at the village level. We should not overlook the readiness and the resources of communities for self-regulation and community-driven security provision.


Brief Summary:
Policing does not operate in a vacuum and it is highly contingent upon political, social and economic context. There are structural and institutional conditions that influence the success of community policing implementation. In some contexts, state-initiated COP projects are likely to fail and bottom up models – or informal policing initiatives – may offer a more appropriate solution to security and justice provision.

Extended Summary:
Community policing is not a universal and coherent paradigm, but rather is an ambiguous concept, lacking in clarity and open to multiple interpretations. The lack of clarity has led to a marked diversity in its application in different contexts and it has contributed to misunderstanding, frustration and confusion in the implementation of COP reforms. From one perspective community policing is a strategy of the police which facilitates intelligence gathering; from another, it is a philosophy which is based upon accountability and public participation in the setting of policing agendas. Whilst the former perspective focuses upon increasing the productivity of existing institutions, the latter necessitates a fundamental transformation of governance provision where communities have a normative voice in how they are policed. These conflicting objectives, held by the police and local communities respectively, were a significant factor in the unofficial abandonment of reforms in South Africa.
Community policing is essentially a redress of the position of the citizen in governance and policing, and as such both its form and its likelihood of success is dependent upon context.

- In France the ideological emphasis upon direct state-citizen relations has precluded a significant development of community policing. In contrast, the philosophy of community policing finds a more fertile environment in countries where communities are considered to be legitimate elements of the state, such as in the UK and the United States, as decision making powers can be easily devolved to these social groups.

- The community policing doctrine might be embedded in the very structure of the state; federal states that maintain numerous local police forces and where ‘the politics of the police is mostly decided at the local level’ may be practicing community policing ‘unintentionally’ (p. 8).

- Processes of political modernisation weaken and eliminate the power of intermediaries in favour of the emerging state.

- In India, for example, political modernisation has been coupled with social modernisation in the increasing rejection of castes, classes and other social markers. While traditional mechanisms of security and justice are disappearing in this rapidly modernising context, the state has yet to gain full authority and legitimacy. In order to fill the vacuum the state has introduced pseudo panchayats (traditional courts) in the form of ‘friends of the police’ committees.

- In some circumstances political modernisation can take place too soon, be too ideological and precede social change. In Western Sudan the central state dismantled traditional power structures in the 1970s, but, being poorly institutionalised and under-resourced, was unable to replace them with effective institutions. This vacuum of governance coupled with other economic and social factors, led to increasing violence in Darfur.

Some states, facing growing crime rates and increasing insecurity, have sought to revive or create new intermediaries. In Tanzania, villages organised themselves and took policing into their own hands, creating the popular and effective sungusungu movement. In Nigeria, traders responded to violent theft in market places by forming a vigilante group called the Bakassi Boys. State recognition is critical for such informal policing initiatives, which are otherwise unwelcome and in a precarious position. There are three forms of state response to informal policing, none of which are mutually exclusive and a state may oscillate between them:

- Institutionalisation – this can be achieved in a number of different ways:
  - Decentralisation – in Nigeria, for example, state governors (who maintain local police forces without any constitutional basis to do so) are demanding decentralisation.
  - The introduction of laws formalising mechanisms of accountability – such as in the private security industry.
  - Strengthening traditional mechanisms of governance through legislation.
  - Informal policing can be incorporated within a framework of legal pluralism.

- Repression – in South Africa the state’s response to informal policing is selective and dependent upon the level of violence employed by groups, but in some circumstances it adopts a repressive response.

- An informal modus Vivendi – which offers a platform for negotiation, where more controversial practices are eliminated. In Kenya, for example, sungusungu leaders reached an informal agreement with regional authorities, providing assurance that they would hand thieves they arrest over to the police.
There are a number of dangers that are often associated with informal policing. Among those most often highlighted are the human rights abuses associated with these groups, issues of governance and the rule of law. Informal policing is often not recognised as a rational response to insecurity in poor and traditional communities. However, it important to note that it is often deeply-rooted in community based governance structures and the image of these groups as ‘angry and uncontrollable mobs’ often mask their democratic nature. The irtongo in Tanzania and Kenya, for example, is a general village assembly that gathers at times of crisis and that functions as a village court for criminal cases.

This book chapter demonstrates that the nature of policing is highly contingent upon the development and characteristics of the state. Thus, importing policing practices from places with markedly different structures, cultures and histories, is likely to result in failure. Indeed, even within democracies, community policing does not translate comfortably from one state to another. In developing countries there are a number of other factors which constrain the implementation of COP:

- Internal resistance amongst the police themselves.
- The different and often irreconcilable expectations of the different groups involved.
- There is a danger that community forums will be co-opted into ‘friends of the state’, rather than having the police become ‘friends of the people.’
- Community policing is very difficult to implement in highly divided societies.
- When the state is distant, under-resourced, corrupt, weak or partisan police are likely to be ineffective and inefficient and their relationship with communities may be irreconcilable.

Informal policing in some states may be superior to any top-down, state-initiated project. They have popular support, are embedded in local governance structures and are more efficient.


**Brief Summary:**
Despite the challenges it presents, engaging with informal justice systems is necessary for enhancing access to justice for the poor and disadvantaged. Reform initiatives should work towards improving the quality of dispute resolution and addressing the weaknesses faced by informal justice systems.

**Extended Summary:**
Most development assistance adopts a ‘rule of law’ approach, focused on strengthening institutions in a top-down manner. While this approach is important, it is also slow and insufficient In post-conflict contexts, formal mechanisms of security and justice provision may have broken down or become discredited and informal systems emerged in their place. There are a number of advantages to these informal justice systems and they may in fact be crucial to the restoration of law and order. Indeed, they may have the potential to provide quick and cheap solutions which are embedded in local cultures and which are more accessible to poor and disadvantaged members of society. As such, a comprehensive reform strategy needs to take greater account of these systems and actors. However, at the same time, it is important to note that these informal systems are subject to a number of concerns, such as discriminatory attitudes towards women and disadvantaged groups, violations of human rights, and their susceptibility to elite cooptation and manipulation. If informal systems are to be utilised, they might be voluntary,
with open and public participation in decision-making, accountable, non-discriminatory and respectful of human rights. Furthermore, serious cases, such as rape and murder, should be tried through formal institutions.

Whilst there is an increasing appreciation of and investment in the informal sector, most development assistance neglects informal actors. Support for informal justice systems remains minimal in UNDP assistance, for example, and none of the numerous World Bank projects which promote justice sector reform engage with informal systems.

Often, the poor do not turn to formal institutions of security and justice. The reasons for this include: mistrust; fear and intimidation; lack of understanding; unequal power relations; physical and financial inaccessibility; the disconnect between formal systems and cultural practice; lack of legitimacy; past complicity in oppression and corruption; and slow response. By contrast, informal systems are usually the primary means of dispute resolution in many countries. The strengths of informal justice systems are numerous. They are easy to understand and compatible with local cultures; they focus on reconciliation and social harmony rather than narrow punishment of perpetrators; they can supplement under-resourced formal institutions; they offer swift solutions to disputes; they enjoy legitimacy and trust amongst local communities and they understand local problems; and they can be of value in post-conflict settings. They are also subject to a number of weaknesses. They have the potential to reinforce existing power hierarchies at the expense of disadvantaged people; for example, in Somalia a militarily strong clan may refuse to comply with a judgement that favours a weaker clan. Similarly they often exhibit practices which are discriminatory towards women. They lack accountability and do not adhere to human rights standards.

There are a number of ways in which the state can engage with these actors:

• Abolition – the state explicitly abolishes informal mechanisms through legislation.
• Full incorporation – the informal justice sector is incorporated within the formal state apparatus.

Limited coexistence/incorporation – the informal system exists independently of formal state structures, whilst developing mechanisms of monitoring and accountability. An example of this strategy is the sungusungu in Tanzania.


Brief Summary:
The high rates of crime and high levels of insecurity in South Africa present a serious challenge to democratic consolidation and the construction of a peaceful society. Experiences in other countries have demonstrated that the police are not able to resolve these complex social problems by themselves; rather, a more proactive, preventative approach, which relies upon the involvement of the whole community is necessary. The election of the new government, and the commitment to democratic reform in the country has created an opportunity for transforming the previously reactive, politicised and forceful police force into a proactive, accountable, and legitimate service through COP reforms.

Extended Summary:
Community policing requires long-term institutional change, transforming the police from an institution concerned with state security to one concerned with the security of the people. It recognises the constraints upon existing resources in security provision and it encourages police-community partnerships in an effort to maintain peace and stability.
The paper outlines the differences between conventional policing and community policing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Conventional Policing</strong></th>
<th><strong>Community Policing</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The police are the central institution in fighting crime and violence</td>
<td>A wide variety of actors are involved in crime fighting; the police and local communities are connected through partnerships and consultative forums</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policing is reactive in nature, responding to incidents after they have occurred and dealing with the symptoms rather than the underlying conditions of crime and insecurity</td>
<td>Policing is preventative and proactive, with efforts directed towards identifying and analysing problems and developing solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information supplied to the police is limited to victims, witnesses and other police sources</td>
<td>Information is available to the police from a broader base, including the consultative forums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police force is managed in a top-down, hierarchical manner with decision-making concentrated at the top of the organisation</td>
<td>The police force is managed in a bottom-up fashion, with greater decision-making responsibilities for individual officers and community members</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are five common strategies in community policing initiatives:

- The creation of community consultative forums to facilitate public input.
- The reorganisation of the local police organisation to ensure equality within the service and to facilitate problem-solving.
- The philosophy of community policing must be adopted by the entire police service – a single department dedicated to COP is insufficient.
- The introduction of special programmes that serve the needs of marginalised and vulnerable groups in the community.
- The creation of ‘beat’ areas, where individual officers regularly patrol the same small geographic area on a long-term basis in order to establish contact with and build trust amongst communities.

Community policing must be accountable at four levels:

- Political – where the minister of security can be held responsible for the actions of the police.
- To the law – bad policemen must not be protected.
- To the internal professional code which is consistent with the values of a democratic, non-racial, non-sexist society.
- To the local community – where the police can be held accountable for causing disorder in the community.

There are four obstacles to the implementation of policing in South Africa:

- The current structure of the six task specialist divisions in the SAPS is inappropriate to community policing, which necessitates geographical ‘area’ specialisation.
• The police are perceived as the dominant partner in the police-community relationship, and capability of local communities to have a voice in local security provision is not recognised.
• The SAPS needs are not representative of the diverse gender, racial, ethnic, regional and linguistic groups in the country.
• Rural communities have specific needs which can differ from those of urban groups and these are not currently recognised in COP reforms.

Tribal areas in former homelands display their own means of security and justice provision. In some parts of the country, modernisation is challenging the authority of these traditional structures – particularly where apartheid policy co-opted the tribal system and discredited it. In other places, however, traditional structures are not only intact, but enjoy a significant degree of legitimacy amongst local communities. In these contexts, traditional methods should be built upon and incorporated within the new forms of community policing.

Paper available at:
http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/asr/ADR18/Zwane.html
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Cover photo taken by ODI Researcher, Lisa Denney, of an Ethiopian Community Police Officer in Amhara National Regional State adjusting a dial outside his office indicating his whereabouts in the neighbourhood.