Dare to prepare: taking risk seriously

Financing emergency preparedness: from fighting crisis to managing risk

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# Contents

Acknowledgements ii
Preface 3
Executive summary 7

1. Emergency preparedness: the current state of play 17
   1.1 Introduction 19
   1.2 Preparedness in context 20
   1.3 Informing the post-2015 agenda 22

2. How we understand emergency preparedness 24
   2.1 What is emergency preparedness? 27
   2.2 The preparedness continuum 29
   2.3 Emergency preparedness and conflict 30
   2.4 International support: the ideal scenario 32

3. Emergency preparedness in context: the architecture 35
   3.1 Introducing the financing architecture 37
   3.2 Humanitarian mechanisms/tools 39
   3.3 Risk-related mechanisms 43
   3.4 Climate finance mechanisms 45

4. How emergency preparedness is funded: lessons from five country case studies 49
   4.1 Mapping the funding sources: five country case studies 52
   4.2 Emergency preparedness in case study countries: national financing 55
   4.3 How the international funding architecture works in the case study countries 57

5. The business case for emergency preparedness: Niger and beyond 77
   5.1 The costs and benefits of emergency preparedness 79
   5.2 Emergency preparedness in Niger: a cost-benefit analysis 80
   5.3 Effectiveness analysis for emergency preparedness in Niger 82

6. Understanding what makes for effective financing of emergency preparedness 85
   6.1 Identifying the ‘best fit’ mechanism for financing emergency preparedness 88
   6.2 What does this tell us about existing financing mechanisms? 89
   6.3 Non-financial issues for effective and efficient emergency preparedness 89
7. Recommendations: a set of options for change
   7.1 A set of options: from beyond business as usual through to transformational change 99
   7.2 Expansion where it makes sense: 'no regret' options 100
   7.3 Maximising opportunities: an enhanced system 102
   7.4 Transformational change: solutions beyond the current system 104
   7.5 A new fund: how might it work? 107
   7.6 The case for development financing 109
   Emergency preparedness and resilience 110

8. Conclusion: preparing for the foreseeable future 113
   8.1 Moving the agenda forward 116

Annex 1: Case studies and background papers 121
Annex 2: Key definitions 122
Annex 3: Opportunities beyond funding mechanisms 124
References 126
Acronyms and abbreviations 132
Preface

Under the leadership of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the humanitarian community has supported a two-phase study analysing the financing environment for emergency preparedness. This report represents the second phase of the project. The first phase, undertaken by Development Initiatives, was completed in 2012. Phase one undertook a global analysis of elements of the financing system in which emergency preparedness exists, and examined data drawn from global databases, donor structures and policies, and the architecture of key parts of the system. For the findings and recommendations of phase one, see Kellett and Sweeney (2011) and Kellett (2012).

Phase two has been undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), and seeks to deepen the analysis by examining how the global financing architecture plays out in practice. Field research was undertaken in five country contexts to better understand how the financing architecture supports emergency preparedness at a national level. This included analysis of the risk context, needs, institutional arrangements, policy environment, financing instruments and channels of delivery for emergency preparedness. The countries selected by the IASC and ODI were Myanmar, Niger, the Philippines, Haiti and Sudan. This country selection sought to include diversity in risk contexts, crisis history, financing patterns and governance contexts. In-country research was conducted between March and May 2013 and, in all but the case of Niger, representatives of the IASC accompanied the research teams.

The objective of the second-phase research was to understand the grounded realities of preparedness financing within a diverse set of country contexts. The evidence gathered was situated within the financing patterns for emergency preparedness at the global level identified in phase one. In addition, findings from the five country case studies were supplemented by a further 15 background papers – i.e. 20 including the case studies which included research analysing the extent to which emergency preparedness features in each of the main humanitarian, risk-based and climate financing mechanisms; the relationship between preparedness and resilience; conflict preparedness; how best to code and track preparedness financing in national systems; and cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis for preparedness. For a full list of case studies and background papers, see Annex 1.

This report has undergone significant review, including – to the extent possible – verification of findings with respondents in each of the five county case studies, with representatives of funding mechanisms/tools, through ODI internal peer review and by the IASC Sub-Working Group on Financing for Emergency Preparedness Task Team and Advisory Panel (see Acknowledgements) and, in particular, its Chair, Sandra Aviles. In recognition that the funding environment is continually evolving, the authors welcome further contributions and additions.

The background papers prepared for this report (see Annex 1) will be made publicly available on www.odi.org.uk and will be released throughout 2014.

Enquiries on the research should be directed to Katie Peters, Research Fellow at the Overseas Development Institute at k.peters@odi.org.uk.

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Executive summary

A sea change is needed in our approach to international aid financing, one that prioritises the management of risk. For development approaches, this means taking measures to avoid potential gains being lost or undermined, while for humanitarians it means being better prepared to deal with the geography of risk in 2015 and beyond. Preparing for current and future risks is a responsibility and a basic prerequisite for effective humanitarian and development work – it is not optional.

Emergency preparedness: the current state of play

Emergency preparedness has the potential to be truly transformative, a means to reshape the way the aid system approaches crisis. Investment in preparedness seeks to reduce the cost of response over the long term and the ever increasing burden on the humanitarian system – a burden that stretches it beyond its means and, in some cases, its mandate. It offers a marked change to post-crisis ‘business as usual’ and reflects the lessons learnt from decades of humanitarian response, as well as the necessity of building national capacity for preparedness as a fundamental part of a longer-term strategy to reduce pressure on humanitarian finances.

In many ways the reality is a simple one: in order to be prepared to deal effectively with disasters or crises, preparedness measures need to be put in place before a crisis occurs.

This study comes 10 years after humanitarian reform helped change the face of financing. It appears at a time when the international community is grappling with ever increasing humanitarian needs, set against a backdrop of continuing pressure on donor financing and, with it, demand from donors that effectiveness and value for money become central to the system. Set in this context, preparedness is being advanced throughout the international community. It is pursued in many forums and at many levels, by agencies in the field, by working groups within the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and up to and beyond the IASC Principals. These credible efforts to drive forward the agenda are not a comprehensive ‘solution’ to address preparedness needs – but neither are they supposed to be. They will – it is hoped – be a catalyst for the far-reaching changes that are required. In many ways the reality is a simple one: in order to be prepared to deal effectively with disasters or crises, preparedness measures need to be put in place before a crisis occurs.

Humanitarian funding clearly contributes towards preparedness. However, this is predominantly either through finance for response released after a crisis or the ‘planned’ humanitarian assistance of consolidated appeals. In addition, discrete ‘preparedness activities’ are undertaken, rather than continuing support to a comprehensive preparedness system. This is symptomatic of a fundamental flaw in the financing architecture. If we were to design channels of funding with a blank slate, then it is likely that funding arrangements would look quite different from those that we see today. This is not to suggest that preparedness should always be top of the agenda; weighting of priorities is a reality in a world where funding is constrained. It is not always feasible to undertake comprehensive preparedness measures for all risks. Moreover, risk and uncertainty present specific budgetary challenges. As a basic minimum, however, it should be possible for the international system to support the creation of national systems of preparedness for the most likely crises (based on a comprehensive assessment of risk within each country).

This is not, however, solely a financing challenge. Getting the financing architecture correct is an important starting point, but it needs to be complemented by improved coherence of preparedness efforts through coordinated decision-making, planning and implementation. This requires a global consensus to make risk fundamental to all aid decisions, and that this translates into prioritised programming and resourcing. The ultimate goal is fully functioning national systems of preparedness, led by national actors capable of responding to the range of risks that a country may face.
In the context of fiscal austerity, donor government signatories to post-2015 agreements will be mindful of the financial implications of those commitments. In these circumstances, the notion of preparedness as a ‘no regret’ option must be conveyed. The post-2015 development agenda thus marks a critical juncture. Will the international community continue to do more of the same, perhaps under a new banner, terminology or buzzword, or will it take a radically different approach to challenge the inadequacies of ‘business as usual’ crisis response?

**Key messages**

- The ultimate goal should be comprehensive national systems of preparedness, capable of responding to the range of risks that countries face.
- Emergency preparedness has the potential to be transformative, offering a marked change to ex-post (i.e. after the event) ‘business as usual’.
- For national and international actors, emergency preparedness presents the specific budgetary challenges of assessing risk and dealing with uncertainty.

**How we understand emergency preparedness**

‘Emergency preparedness aims to build the resilience of states and societies by strengthening the local, national and global capacity to minimise loss of life and livelihoods, to ensure effective response to crises.’

The activities that comprise ‘emergency preparedness’ span the responsibilities of both development and humanitarian actors, as part of a portfolio approach. The suite of activities required to create and sustain a system of preparedness work in tandem and support one another. For example, early warning systems will not be effective unless they are supported by a contingency plan that clearly delineates roles and activities in the case of an early warning, or without the institutional capacity to put this in place. Similarly, pre-positioning and stockpiling are redundant unless there is a system for indicating when and how stocks will be used. As a result, the issue is not what to invest in, but rather a clear imperative to invest in the whole package.

**The preparedness continuum**

When made to ‘fit’ into an institutional and financing architecture that is bifurcated between humanitarian and development activities, the continuum becomes disjointed. The international community faces a challenge: to continue ‘feeding’ the bifurcated system or to alter and transform it for the better. To split preparedness activities in two would simply be to recreate the humanitarian/development divide. This is problematic because the short- and long-term aspects of preparedness are necessarily interlinked, as the concept of resilience indicates. However, to bring together preparedness activities as a discrete set of concerns risks creating (yet) another silo. This is further complicated by the uneven level of attention that is given to some types of shocks and stresses over others. For instance, while preparedness for natural hazard-related disasters is well articulated (though not necessarily funded), there is a dearth of analysis on preparedness for conflict and on the links between the two.
Key messages

- Emergency preparedness activities work in tandem with one another to create a holistic system, and span what is conventionally understood to be the bifurcation between development and humanitarian action.
- There remains a lack of connection between strategic engagements with fragile states and natural hazard-related disaster risk.

Emergency preparedness in context: the architecture

The intentionally illustrative figure on the previous page indicates broad trends in the kinds of emergency preparedness activities that each of the main financing tools/mechanisms supports. In practice, the combination of tools and mechanisms present in each country differs greatly. At first glance, the figure may imply that preparedness is adequately supported by various mechanisms. In reality, not all mechanisms are present in every country, leaving gaps in the availability of funding. Moreover, not all mechanisms willingly support emergency preparedness, and those that do may support only specific sectors or types of preparedness interventions, creating a disjointed and fractured system.

Summary of the key financing mechanisms

Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF): Despite guidance that states clearly that the fund does not cover preparedness, a narrow range of preparedness activities have been financed, most notably health-related, or for stockpiling and warehousing.

Emergency Response Funds (ERFs): The least regulated of humanitarian funds, most ERFs do not fund emergency preparedness. Where this has occurred, however, this is highly dependent on context and usually limited to community level activities.

Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs): Closely connected to consolidated appeals, CHFs have funded a range of emergency preparedness activities across the more ‘humanitarian’ part of the continuum: contingency/response planning, training exercises, emergency services/standby arrangements, pre-positioning, information management and communication systems.

Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP): Many appeals address preparedness as a theme and official guidance now includes preparedness as a priority. Activities financed are somewhat broader than other instruments, including early warning and hazard risk analysis, legislative frameworks, inter-agency coordination, contingency/response planning, community preparedness, training opportunities and stockpiling.

UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund (CPR TTF): Emergency preparedness features across a wide range of larger initiatives funded by the CPR TTF, including in areas of disaster risk reduction (DRR), conflict prevention and early recovery. Activities financed range from improving legislative frameworks through to crisis coordination.

Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR): Focusing exclusively on disaster risk, GFDRR undertakes emergency preparedness activities, usually as part of a broader package of work. This includes hazard and risk analysis, community-based preparedness, early warning systems, information management systems and legislative work.

Adaptation Fund: Preparedness activities supported by the fund – where they exist – are part of climate change adaptation objectives. They are almost exclusively for hazard-mapping and early warning systems, from national down to local levels.

Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF): Focusing on adaptation needs of least developed countries, the LDCF finances emergency preparedness through a narrow range of activities: early warning systems, hazard-risk analysis and information/communication systems.

Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR): Its work focuses on the integration of climate risk and resilience into development planning. Emergency preparedness activities are challenging to draw out of larger projects, but where they appear, they are focused on early warning, information management, countrywide planning and legislative work.

Key messages

- Financing across the ‘preparedness continuum’ needs to be coordinated. In reality, when made to ‘fit’ into the existing institutional and financing architecture, the continuum becomes fractured and disjointed.
- None of the mechanisms examined adequately finances emergency preparedness across the ‘preparedness continuum’, and few have the necessary geographical reach to address priorities globally.
Lessons from five country case studies

How preparedness is financed from international sources varies considerably across the five countries examined (Haiti, Myanmar, Niger, the Philippines and Sudan). It reflects the nature of the relationship with national governments and the current contexts of development, governance and risk, and in each case the aid profile is heavily shaped by both current and past events. In some contexts, especially those involving conflict, the international community is called upon to do much more than it might otherwise do, fulfilling the role and responsibilities of national authorities that may be in one way or other party to that conflict.

CERF: There are isolated examples of preparedness activities being funded, but this is largely ad hoc and heavily dependent on the individual context.

ERFs: Of the five case study countries, ERFs are present only in Myanmar and Haiti. Evidence shows that funds have been allocated to support preparedness activities in Haiti, largely for cholera-related projects.

CHFs: There is no CHF in Myanmar, Niger, the Philippines or Haiti. In Sudan, a CHF has provided preparedness financing through many sector priorities, though it is not labelled as such.

Consolidated Appeal Process: Preparedness is found in UN appeals, but almost exclusively within consolidated appeals. Having an appeal that includes preparedness as a core element does not guarantee funding.

GFDRR: Funding for preparedness has been received in the Philippines and Haiti, in support of the more developmental part of the preparedness continuum.

CPR TTF: Financing for preparedness is found in four of the five case study countries. It includes a rare example of a mechanism funding conflict prevention, of which a portion is believed to be for preparedness.

Climate adaptation financing (Adaptation Fund, LDCF, PPCR): Where adaptation financing features, there is evidence that it supports the developmental aspects of emergency preparedness – this is evident in Niger and to a lesser extent in the Philippines. This is only for areas that climate risk shares with risk management in general.

In-country bilateral funding (humanitarian and development): Financing from in-country donors occurs in all five case study countries, but it is highly variable and highly dependent on the context.

Country-specific financing mechanisms: Heavily dependent on context, in some cases country-specific mechanisms fund emergency preparedness activities, but only as part of a wider set of objectives.

Core and multi-use funding: Core funding is difficult to track, with few institutions or agencies separating out emergency preparedness investments. Where there is evidence, preparedness is largely supported through the use of existing human resources, often part of a broader programme of work.

The Red Cross: Both the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are heavily involved in emergency preparedness in the case study countries, most often utilising the Red Cross National Societies that exist in each country as implementing partners.

Multilateral banks: Multilateral banks’ investments in risk management for disasters tend to mirror international engagement in general. Where risk management is high on the agenda, so it is for the banks, often informing their country assistance strategies.

Private sector: Private sector investment in preparedness is limited – for various different reasons – in Sudan, Myanmar and Niger. Most evidence is found in the Philippines and, increasingly, in Haiti.

Despite the evident need, attention to emergency preparedness still coalesces around the existing financing architecture rather than targeting ‘need’ or responding to ‘risk’

Evidence from the case studies reveals that emergency preparedness regularly ‘falls through the cracks’ in the international financing architecture – a consequence of the fragmented aid system. This reflects a system that has been grappling with a rapidly changing set of risks to which it is expected to respond, and of a financing architecture that has failed to evolve at the same pace. Investment in systems, processes and projects for emergency preparedness by national and international actors occurs in discrete, concentrated efforts. Yet coverage of all the requirements falls far short of need. Inadequate emergency preparedness is not just about the volume of funding. Across each case study context there is a lack of a shared vision or plan of action that would articulate risks, needs, responsibilities, programmes and activities (with connections to national plans and systems). And, despite the evident need, attention to emergency preparedness still coalesces around the existing financing architecture rather than targeting ‘need’ or responding to ‘risk’.
National governments, however, appear to have a rational and logical approach to preparedness (if conflict situations are excluded). In all of the case study countries except Sudan, even when overall funding is low, national governments are delivering legislation and policy for creating an adequate system and processes for disaster preparedness, usually as part of a long-term set of DRR measures. However, needs obviously remain, and arguably these could be prioritised by the international system. Technical capacity-building, some of which is already under way, is needed even in the most positive of contexts, i.e. the Philippines, as the recent and devastating Typhoon Haiyan highlights. To an extent, although the contexts are very different, Haiti and Niger are in similar need of support for long-term preparedness. In Sudan and Myanmar, there is much to be done to get even the basics of ‘preparedness for response’ up and running, and the reasons are largely the same in both contexts, though in different ways: the challenge of aid financing in general and the heavy focus on humanitarian financing. Recent evidence suggests that the international community has some way to go to prioritise financing in the right places in terms of risk, need or bolstering domestic capacity.

**Key messages**

- Financing for emergency preparedness is complicated, fragmented and piecemeal, especially the international contribution, with an array of separate institutions, mechanisms and approaches determining which parts of the preparedness continuum are funded, and in what ways.
- Despite significant challenges, national governments appear to have a much more rational and logical approach to financing for natural hazard-related preparedness.
- Evidence suggests that the bulk of international funding – where it is available – is not concerned with building the long-term capacity of national systems of preparedness but is reinforcing a piecemeal and project-led approach.

**The business case for emergency preparedness: Niger and beyond**

In a changing political and economic landscape, a risk-based approach to development and humanitarian work offers significant potential to use official development assistance (ODA) to great effect. A risk-based approach aligns with the recent trend in ‘resilience’ and with economic analyses that build the evidence base for why ex-ante investment and action are cost-effective. Yet this is not just an agenda for the international community. A more risk-informed approach to development, and the ambition to pursue sustainable development, require national ownership and responsibility for preparedness. This necessitates improved national fiscal policy, allocations to preparedness in budgetary processes and improved understanding of the national financial contributions required. International efforts must focus on building the capacity of national actors to prepare for all hazards, natural or man-made.

**International efforts must focus on building the capacity of national actors to prepare for all hazards, natural or man-made**

Cost benefit analysis for Niger

A cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis for emergency preparedness in Niger provided indicative evidence that there is a clear financial imperative for greater investment in effective preparedness in the country. The monetary benefits of investing in preparedness in relation to drought – assuming that is it implemented in a manner that delivers the expected gains – clearly outweigh the costs. This suggests a clear fiduciary duty on the part of donors and the Government of Niger (GoN) to focus more support on emergency preparedness.

The GoN’s Annual Support Plan (Plan de Soutien) estimates overall needs for food security and nutrition assistance, related to all hazards, allocating an average of $231 million per year over the six years between 2008 and 2013. In 2013, the Plan de Soutien estimated the cost of emergency preparedness at $14.1 million, equivalent to approximately 6% of the total costs estimated for that year. In addition, by April 2012 the 2012 consolidated appeal stood at $487 million. With needs in Niger on a staggering scale, the benefits of emergency preparedness are of heightened importance.

The cost of emergency preparedness meanwhile is described in both the Plan de Soutien and a GoN flood risk management plan, with the total estimated cost of emergency preparedness at $47.9 million per year. The costs and benefits were input into a 20-year model, to estimate the costs of emergency preparedness compared with the benefits, monetised in terms of avoided costs of aid and disaster losses. Because of the number of assumptions required in the modelling, three scenarios were modelled, varying the assumptions around the absolute level of disaster losses, the potential reduction in disaster losses and the discount rate.

The costs and benefits are positive across all scenarios. In the most conservative scenario, it is estimated that
$3.25 of benefit is generated for every $1 spent, and this increases as high as $5.31 of benefit for every $1 spent in the least conservative. The findings clearly support further investment in emergency preparedness activities, as the benefits in terms of reduced caseloads and disaster losses far outweigh the costs.

Key messages

- The benefit-to-cost ratios for emergency preparedness in Niger are very positive, regardless of the scenario being used.
- Findings support further investment in emergency preparedness activities, as the benefits far outweigh the costs in terms of reduced caseloads, unit costs of response and disaster losses.
- Evidence is still lacking on the costs and benefits of emergency preparedness, and so what we know of the value of emergency preparedness represents only a fraction of what preparedness could offer.

Understanding what makes for effective financing of emergency preparedness

The assumption is misplaced that financing mechanisms function exactly as they were designed to. Evidence from the five case studies and the 15 additional background papers produced for this study reveals differences in the way that financing tools and mechanisms operate at the country level. There are also issues that are not strictly financial but which impact on adequate emergency preparedness:

Semantics: Definitions and meanings of key emergency preparedness terms are not shared across the different actors.

Knowledge of risk: There is often a lack of joined-up understanding of all risks. Much is known, but often this knowledge is ‘parcelled out’ amongst particular actors within their own sectors.

National systems: Government frameworks and institutions for risk management are weak and lack capacity and clear policy directives.

International architecture: Emergency preparedness is either oriented towards emergencies, humanitarian actors, humanitarian donors and to an extent humanitarian mechanisms, or divided into humanitarian/development ‘areas’ without adequate coordination. Existing coordinating structures are struggling to address the full range of needs.

Planning: There is a lack of a systematic approach and of planning not just for emergency preparedness, but for risk management overall. No case study country approaches the range of emergency preparedness activities comprehensively.

Roles and responsibilities: These are often unclear, especially amongst the international community.

International capacity: There is a lack of capacity internationally to coordinate risk management issues, especially when part of long-term development.

Recommendations: a set of options for change

While any mechanism can be adjusted to include a greater focus on emergency preparedness (either solely or as part of a wider-ranging series of objectives), this does not mean that all of them should be. Careful consideration is needed of the investment required to make changes to current models, which means more than just ‘artificially’ expanding a mandate or a geographical scope to address preparedness needs. The analysis found:

- Humanitarian financing mechanisms and tools are not a ‘silver bullet’ to financing emergency preparedness. The CERF, ERFs, CHFs and successor to the CAP, the Strategic Response Plan, all offer varied possibilities, but also face a number of constraints to better financing.
- Climate adaptation funds offer considerable potential for expanding into more specific preparedness financing. There are shared weaknesses too, however: none of the funds supports preparedness for non-climate-related risks or conflict.
The two mechanisms with a specific focus on risk (GFDRR and UNDP CPR TTF) perform strongly on the questions formulated by the research team to determine the ‘best fit’ mechanism for financing, thus warranting further exploration. This report’s recommendations are broken down into four elements.

Expansion where it makes sense: ‘no regret’ options

There is much that can be achieved within the current system to improve the financing of emergency preparedness that does not require radical overhauls of practice and policy. On balance, there is considerable potential for improving the scope of all of the core mechanisms and tools.

- **Emergency Response Funds**: opportunities should be maximised to include preparedness in the ERFs as part and parcel of good humanitarian practice.
- **Common Humanitarian Funds**: preparedness should be a fundamental part of the work of CHFs, and established within each new and existing set of fund guidelines.
- **The Central Emergency Response Fund**: the inclusion of preparedness should not be inhibited where the case has been effectively made, but the CERF’s focus on life-saving response should be maintained.
- **Agencies** should actively utilise other resources in-country for emergency preparedness.

Maximising opportunities: an enhanced system

Improvements to existing mechanisms are not sufficient; they will, even if all implemented, only patch over existing cracks in financing for emergency preparedness. Elements of the current system can (and should) be pushed beyond their current comfort zone, with steps taken to ensure that preparedness becomes a core component of all relevant mechanisms managed by the international community.

- **Strategic Response Plans**: all plans should be multi-year, and take heed of the latest guidance to include preparedness in longer-term frameworks.
- **Risk-focused financing mechanisms**: emergency preparedness should be made an explicit goal of all country programming.
- **Climate change adaptation mechanisms**: all climate change adaptation financing must be integrated within a wider appreciation of risks in each country context.
- **Pilot Program for Climate Resilience**: the existing entry points to fund emergency preparedness should be maximised through projects that relate to climate services, disaster/climate risk reduction and community preparedness.
- **Least Developed Countries Fund**: funding should be used to support emergency preparedness activities where they have been (or could be) included in National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs). Future NAPAs should have an obligatory emergency preparedness component.
- **Adaptation Fund**: the already close thematic relationship between the Adaptation Fund and emergency preparedness should be built upon by making the connections systematic.

Transformational change: solutions beyond the current system

While there are advantages to enhancing existing mechanisms, this report argues that bolstering existing mechanisms is not sufficient, and at the very least a global solution must be considered. Either an enhancement of GFDRR or the CPR TTF is recommended, expanding the remit of their work in emergency preparedness, or – the preferred option – the establishment of a dedicated mechanism. The rationale for a global solution is as follows:

- **Decisions to engage with a particular country are not always determined by an adequate assessment of risk or need; some countries can be ‘left behind’**.
- **Country-level financing is inadequate. Not all countries have enough donors present in-country to adequately engage with emergency preparedness needs. Capacity to engage with donors directly, either regionally or globally, is limited in many cases.**
- **Existing funds, whether at country level (most often humanitarian, though in some cases bespoke to that context) or at global level, do not target preparedness specifically.**
- **As evidence from across the case studies reveals, funding is ‘silied’, with limits to the feasibility and willingness of individual fund managers to support preparedness.**
In essence, if all we do is improve the preparedness focus of existing mechanisms, no matter how good that is, key questions will always remain. How will underfunded preparedness needs be met? How will priorities across countries be determined? A global fund meanwhile could, if designed and directed appropriately, prioritise funding across a range of countries, and make decisions as to the most appropriate contexts for external support. It could raise the profile of emergency preparedness as an issue for donors and agencies alike, in a way that any country-based fund is simply unable to do. It could also pilot a new way of working and thinking, seeking funds drawn from both development and humanitarian funding streams, where a holistic all-risk approach to emergency preparedness is pursued.

Donor governments: the case for development financing

Donor governments should consider a range of actions to address the current preparedness challenges with, throughout, an emphasis on bringing development financing to bear on underlying risk.

- Re-assess global and country programming priorities. Investment in preparedness should be based on a global assessment of risk, related to capacity and vulnerability, need and exposure. Such an assessment would allow for a concentration of efforts where the need is greatest.
- Ensure that risk is not just part of humanitarian and crisis-related structures, but also becomes the foundation for development investments.

A set of options for future funding of emergency preparedness

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<th>Expansion where it makes sense: ‘no regret’ options</th>
<th>Maximising opportunities: an enhanced system</th>
<th>Transformational change: solutions beyond the current system</th>
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<tr>
<td>There is considerable potential in maximising the use of existing mechanisms for financing emergency preparedness more effectively.</td>
<td>These opportunities will entail considerably more effort from the international system in order to be achieved.</td>
<td>This represents a considerable change in the way that emergency preparedness is financed, with a new dedicated approach and financing sourced beyond the system.</td>
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<td>Bolster existing humanitarian financing mechanisms, so that opportunities for funding emergency preparedness are continually sought – including, for example, within the CHFs, ERFs and CERF. GFDRR to make preparedness a priority action within all its selected countries. CPR TTF to prioritise preparedness within its priority countries when it makes new grants. All agencies should investigate how they can utilise other resources for emergency preparedness where they are most appropriate.</td>
<td>Multi-year Strategic Response Plans (SRPs) should be obligatory across protracted complex emergencies. All new humanitarian mechanisms to include a consideration of preparedness, and this should be reflected in the relevant set-up policy documentation and guidelines including, for example, in SRPs. Climate change adaptation financing to be implemented in ways which support a broader preparedness system for risk, including improvement for the PPCR, Adaptation Fund and LDCF.</td>
<td>Significantly enhance either of the existing risk-focused global mechanisms: GFDRR or CPR TTF. Or: Create a new global pooled funding mechanism. Beyond the system: enhanced support for preparedness through private sector and remittances.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Donor support for preparedness

Support preparedness throughout and greatly increase the role of development financing.
• Flexible financing should be encouraged as a means to support more tailored and adaptable preparedness interventions. Evidence from across the case studies reveals the need to accommodate fluctuations in context, whether conditions of conflict, fragility or risk. There are numerous examples where elements of preparedness are working successfully – e.g. early warning based on assessment of risk – but where a lack of flexibility in existing funding limits a country’s ability to prepare.

• Proactive internal advocacy within donor countries, institutions and multi-donor groups is required to ensure that preparedness is part of funding decisions. Vocal support can be sustained in broader international debates only with the backing of key donors. It is suggested that donors invest in understanding the added value that emergency preparedness can have for their own caseloads in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, including value for money, across both humanitarian and development departments.

• Consideration should be given to earmarking funding for emergency preparedness, whether from humanitarian or development sources. The most important advantages of earmarking are that it guarantees some level of funding and that it commits a donor to change. However, on the whole this is not recommended unless a much better global understanding of need can be articulated.

• Emergency preparedness is an inherent part of resilience; making the resilience agenda operational should entail an adequate focus on preparedness. It is recommended that emergency preparedness be embedded into current and future indicators of what makes for a resilient system.

Key messages

• Much can be done to improve the way that the international system finances preparedness, from ‘no regret’ incremental changes, to an enhanced system, through to considerable institutional review (‘transformational change’).

• Incremental changes to current mechanisms will leave gaps. This report recommends the establishment of a global fund for preparedness: either an enhanced GFDRR or UNDP CPR TTF, or alternatively a new dedicated fund.

• More dedicated funding for preparedness should not result in the ‘extraction’ of emergency preparedness from existing processes, systems and approaches.

• Donors can and should do more to address preparedness through the system and within their own spending priorities: development funding for emergency preparedness is seen as an essential way forward.

Conclusion: preparing for the foreseeable future

In moving towards a post-2015 era, with evidence pointing towards a world in which disasters are even more frequent than today, the centrality of ‘risk’ is becoming an essential component of all development and humanitarian work. Beyond the rhetoric, at some point real progress is required. This means making a decision that will cost something, either in terms of political effort, bureaucratic changes or financial resources. Tinkering around the edges with existing mechanisms is not enough: the country case studies undertaken as part of this research have proved that. While increased support will cost in the immediate term, financing emergency preparedness activities has enormous potential to reduce the costs of response and the pressures on the humanitarian system, while transferring responsibility to national actors. Risk therefore needs to be embedded in national and international planning and budgetary frameworks.

Cost is not limited to the way that we fund. It is also about how much is funded. Increasing the necessary commitment to emergency preparedness clearly requires a coherent business case built on solid incentives and a calculation of the return on investment, something that draws upon methods such as cost-benefit analysis, economics of preparedness and robust, clear messaging. This business case should be tied directly to calls for specific budgets to support emergency preparedness (as well as risk management in general) from national resource allocations. Moreover, the international community needs to get serious about the funding volumes involved in creating sustainable and functioning national preparedness systems.

The international community needs to get serious about the funding volumes involved in creating sustainable and functioning national preparedness systems

In advocating for emergency preparedness, as part and parcel of a risk-based approach to international aid, a ‘no regret’ narrative should be adopted. Emergency preparedness has relevance not just for humanitarians.
In the medium to long term, it will almost certainly save money, lives and livelihoods. The financial responsibility therefore needs to be shouldered by all, firstly by national stakeholders and governments, and supported by both international humanitarian and development actors. Taking this agenda forward will require continued efforts on the part of the IASC and engaged stakeholders to translate the recommendations of this report into action.

Moving the agenda forward: advancing emergency preparedness

- Deliver the recommendations contained in this report, secure commitment on the part of representatives to formulate a plan of campaign to address the changes required, including ensuring recommendations on mechanism change feeding into all key debates.
- Learning from the experiences of the Political Champions for Disaster Resilience group, a high-profile champion should be designated to be responsible for promoting action on preparedness.
- Reach out to the international system working on conflict. Make direct contact with the DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and influence the New Deal for Fragile States.
- In discussions on post-2015 development goals, communicate clear messages on the value of preparedness for disasters and conflict, and the links between the two. Ensure stronger inclusion of emergency preparedness in the successor to the Hyogo Framework for Action.
- In preparation for the World Humanitarian Summit 2016, advocate for emergency preparedness to be included as a central component of one of the four thematic areas. Advocacy is needed for emergency preparedness to be part of the final Road Map and Plan of Action for Post-2016.
- In preparation for the 20th session Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in Lima, Peru, preparedness should be integral to actions required to support climate change adaptation across vulnerable and high-risk contexts.
- Risk needs to be embedded in international planning and budgetary frameworks. The potential cost-benefit of investing in emergency preparedness across all sectors should be calculated, informed by a comprehensive assessment of risk, vulnerability, exposure and capacity.

Agencies engaged in bilateral relationships with national governments should emphasise the importance of risk in all humanitarian and development work. Where national fiscal planning, policy and budgetary processes are being crafted, preparedness for risk must be embedded.

Ensuring practical connections: recommendations beyond the purely financial

Effective and efficient financing for emergency preparedness is not just a financial issue. The research team recommend the following supporting enhancements to the system:

- Clear guidance should be developed for the adequate coding, tracking and reporting of investments in emergency preparedness.
- The IASC Principals should support the roll-out of the Common Framework for Emergency Preparedness and related work of the Sub-Working Group for Preparedness.
- Systematically integrate emergency preparedness within the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), making use of existing guidelines on DRR/CCA. The positive role that the Common Budgetary Framework can play in highlighting (and funding) gaps in preparedness should be investigated.

Key messages

- In the future disasters will be more frequent than today; the centrality of ‘risk’ is thus an essential component of all development and humanitarian work and its inclusion in the post-2015 development agenda is paramount.
- While increased support will cost in the immediate term, financing emergency preparedness activities has enormous potential to reduce the costs of response.
- A new international consensus and compact are required between national governments and the international community on the need for countries to be better prepared.
- The IASC must seize opportunities to advance preparedness, with a high-profile champion responsible for ensuring that the cause does not ‘fall off the agenda’, supported by an appropriate agency or IASC structure.
1. Emergency preparedness

the current state of play
1. Emergency preparedness: the current state of play

**Key messages**

- The ultimate goal should be comprehensive national systems of preparedness, capable of responding to the range of risks they face.
- Humanitarians can only be effective if they are prepared. Investment in preparedness activities must come before a crisis takes hold. The current system ‘puts the cart before the horse’ – funding is largely allocated to preparedness activities only after a disaster strikes.
- Funding for emergency preparedness is highly fragmented, with unequal and uneven coverage of the range of activities needed to develop sustainable preparedness systems.
- Development approaches are increasingly embracing risk management as central to poverty reduction; humanitarians need to move away from being ‘crisis fighters’ to ‘systematic risk managers’.
- Emergency preparedness has the potential to be transformative, offering a marked change to ex-post ‘business as usual’.
- There remains a lack of connection between strategic engagements with fragile states and natural hazard-related disaster risk.

1.1 Introduction

The destruction wrought by Typhoon Haiyan and the total cost, in terms of shattered lives and financial loss, are colossal. Haiyan, one of the strongest storms on record, created a devastating impact usually seen only with tsunamis (Harris, 2013). ‘Before and after’ photographs are similar to those we saw in Aceh after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami: villages wiped from the landscape, communities scattered and cargo ships piled up along the coastline (BBCa, 2013). As was seen before, the world’s attention has now shifted from the challenge of response to the failure to prepare, and the challenge of prevention.

That this happened in the Philippines was somewhat perverse. Disaster risk is considered as a threat to national security and is built into the country’s development planning. Politicians are sometimes not elected if they do not give prominence to disaster in their manifestos. The government is investing heavily in risk reduction – close to $1 billion a year (Kellett, 2014 forthcoming). Note that the prices for this report are current, when drawn from the case studies. Prices used in tables and graphs may be different and are marked accordingly. Other prices used may refer to reference material; wherever possible this is indicated in the text. And, perhaps more important, disaster risk has entered civil consciousness: prevention and preparation for the regular impact of typhoons, landslides, flooding and earthquakes are of central importance across society.

Yet in the weeks after the disaster, officials admitted to inadequate preparedness of government systems and of logistics, communications and contingency planning, and stories circulated of the failure to convert early warning into complete evacuation (Marshall, 2013). On the other hand, there were considerable successes: for example, community preparedness and contingency planning, coupled with early warning, enabled all 1,000 residents of the island of Tulang Diyt to evacuate to safety (McElroy, 2013).

What does it mean for the international community when a developing country with arguably one of the most advanced risk management legislative frameworks, a committed government and significant national investment
The ultimate goal is fully functioning national systems of preparedness, led by national actors capable of responding to the range of risks that a country may face

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cases its mandate, by reducing the cost of response over the long term. Yet this is not just a financing challenge. Getting the financing architecture correct is an important starting point, but it needs to be complemented by improved coherence of preparedness efforts through more coordinated decision-making, planning and implementation. This requires a global consensus on the need to foreground risk as a way to understand how development investment decisions should be made, and how official development assistance (ODA) is spent. Strengthening risk-based approaches to humanitarian and development action should translate into prioritised programming and resourcing. The ultimate goal is fully functioning national systems of preparedness, led by national actors capable of responding to the range of risks that a country may face.

1.2 Preparedness in context

Risk is becoming the new mantra of our time. The latest evidence suggests that, by 2030, up to 325 million extremely poor people will be living in 49 most hazard-prone countries (Shepherd et al., 2013). And of the 11 most hazard-prone countries, four – Pakistan, Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia – also appear amongst the top 10 recipients of humanitarian funding (for 2011).\(^1\) Risk management is becoming central to poverty reduction efforts for development actors (ibid.), and signals the need to move away from humanitarians as ‘crisis fighters’ to being ‘systematic risk managers’, according to World Bank Group President, Jim Yong Kim (World Bank, 2013a). Complicating matters is the renewed evidence that climate change will add to the complexity of risk in countries that regularly receive humanitarian assistance (IPPC, 2012).

This study comes 10 years after humanitarian reform helped change the face of pooled humanitarian financing. It appears at a time when the international community is continuing to grapple with what appear to be ever

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\(^1\) The 11 most hazard-prone countries are Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda (Shepherd et al., 2013). The top 10 recipients of international humanitarian aid in 2011 were Pakistan, Somalia, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Japan, Sudan, Kenya, Haiti and Libya (Development Initiatives, 2013).
increasing humanitarian needs, set against a backdrop of continuing pressure on donor financing and, with it, demand from donors that effectiveness and value for money become central to the system (Jackson, 2012). Set in this context, preparedness continues to be advanced throughout the humanitarian community: through pillar four of the Transformative Agenda of the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Principals (IASC, 2012); the efforts of the Sub-Working Groups on Humanitarian Financing and Preparedness mandated by the IASC Working Group; the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) and the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA); and resolutions of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Key parts of the aid system are also assessing (and changing) their roles and responsibilities in relation to preparedness, with notable examples being the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reviewing its ‘place’ in this agenda, substantive revisions to the CAP guidelines and endorsement of the Common Framework for Preparedness by the IASC Principals. These institutional changes are occurring as the fall-out of the global economic crisis continues to cast a shadow over ODA, under a narrative of efficiency and cost-effectiveness.

Existing, and credible, international efforts to drive forward the preparedness agenda are not a comprehensive ‘solution’ to address current preparedness needs, but nor are they supposed to be. They will – it is hoped – be a catalyst for the far-reaching changes that are required. In many ways the reality is a simple one: in order to planning. And yet even in developed contexts, current levels of preparedness have been stretched in relation to natural hazards, as the tornadoes that swept through the American Midwest in 2013 demonstrated (BBC News, 2013b). For countries with a history of conflict and fragility, particularly where the government is a party to conflict, the processes and willingness to engage in conflict preparedness become much more complicated, and it is here that the humanitarian community has a stronger role to play. However, for both natural hazards and conflict, it is ultimately national capacity that must be strengthened to be able to take on leadership for preparedness at all levels. The end goal is a scenario where national actors call upon the international community only in rare, unforeseeable instances that outstrip national capacity to respond.

Currently, humanitarian funding does in places contribute towards building preparedness in the international system, ready for the next event. However, this is predominantly either finance for humanitarian response released after a disaster strikes or the ‘planned’ humanitarian assistance of consolidated appeals. This is symptomatic of a fundamental flaw in the financing architecture. If we were to design channels of funding with a blank slate, then it is likely that funding arrangements would look quite different from those that we see now. The current system ‘puts the cart before the horse’ in that funding is largely allocated to preparedness activities only after a disaster strikes. In addition, discrete ‘preparedness activities’ are undertaken, rather than continuing support to a comprehensive preparedness system. This is not to suggest that preparedness should always be top of the agenda; weighting of priorities is a reality in a world where funding is constrained. It is not always feasible to undertake comprehensive preparedness measures for all risks or eventualities – some risk has to be borne. It should, however, as a basic minimum, be an achievable goal to support national systems of preparedness for the most likely crises (based on a comprehensive assessment of risk within each country). Where conflict preparedness is required, the more immediate near-term actions for preparedness are likely to overlap with those required for natural hazard-related disasters (particularly for some critical life-saving sectors). For longer-term preparedness actions (e.g. establishing adequate legislation), a significantly different set of actors and actions will be required.

There are significant pressures on the humanitarian system. Aid from governments reached a record high of $13.8 billion in 2010, was at the same level in 2011 and fell back only slightly to $12.9 billion in 2012 (Development Initiatives, 2013: 11). Although funding requested through the CAP fell by several billion dollars in 2011 (largely due to the absence of mega-disasters like the Haiti earthquake or Pakistan floods), unmet needs rose to their highest level for a decade, at nearly 38% (Development Initiatives, 2013).
2012: 7). This reality is complicated by a context of fiscal austerity, with donor governments under increased pressure to cut overseas aid in order to apportion higher proportions of revenue to address domestic challenges. As recently as April this year, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reported that international development aid in 2012 had fallen by 4% from its 2011 figure, which itself was a fall of 2% from 2010, and that only a modest recovery was likely in 2013 (OECD, 2013a). This was not as a result of reduced need.

Within this challenging reality, the pressure to ensure greater effectiveness of aid spending presents a pivotal opportunity to ask more challenging questions of the way in which the current financing system works. How can the system be improved to enable more effective responses to crisis across many contexts, whether sudden-onset mega-

How can the system be improved to enable more effective responses to crisis across many contexts, whether sudden-onset mega-disasters, slow-developing crises or armed and violent conflict? or even more critically, where natural hazard- and conflict-related disasters occur at the same time (see ODI, 2013)?

Emergency preparedness has the potential to be transformative, as a means to reshape the way the aid system approaches crises. It offers a marked change to post-disaster ‘business as usual’ and reflects the lessons learnt from decades of humanitarian response. It also reflects the necessity of building national capacity for preparedness as a fundamental part of a longer-term strategy to reduce the pressures on ODA (through increased national capacity and reduced need). This study contributes to the current momentum surrounding the preparedness agenda by investigating the financial practicalities of emergency preparedness at a country level and by making recommendations for the humanitarian and development community to take forward.

1.3 Informing the post-2015 agenda

2015 draws near, marking 10 years since the humanitarian reform process began and bringing under the spotlight the progress made by donors, the IASC and the humanitarian system more broadly. In parallel, debates on upcoming international renewals are intensifying – the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the HFA, as well as a further instalment of climate change negotiations. In the post-2015 development agenda, attention is drawn to the place of conflict and fragility in future agreements, and that of risk and resilience as the new discourse of the time (Melamed, 2012). What is more, the continued presence of complex crises in Niger, Myanmar and Sudan – where conflict and natural hazards intersect – is putting added pressure on development and humanitarian actors to be better prepared to respond to the multitude of crises that arise (see Harris et al., 2013). 3

Evidence on the geography of poverty, disasters and climate extremes points towards an increasing complexity of risk in the future (Shepherd et al., 2013) – a future in which the goal to eradicate extreme poverty by 2030 can only conceivably be achieved if the post-2015 development goals incorporate the management of risk into their central objectives. A report by ODI and GFDRR (Kellett and Caravani, 2013) suggests that there is much to be done, at least for disaster risk. One stark piece of data is that 12 low-income countries which each received less than $10 million for disaster risk reduction (DRR) over the two decades 1991-2010 at the same time received $5.6 billion of funding for disaster response – $160,000 dedicated to response for every $1 of DRR (ibid: vi). With the latest science on climate change pointing towards a significant increase in climate-related disaster trends – to which the international community will, in many cases, be expected to respond – change is needed, or the system will be stretched beyond what is feasible (see IPCC, 2012). The underlying message therefore is that, above all else, significant improvements are critical to build national capacity to mitigate, prevent, prepare for and respond to crises.

The need to ‘strengthen preparedness, and ensure a more effective and efficient response’ has been increasingly voiced as a core message in the post-2015 development agenda, including, for example, in the UN Task Team’s Thematic Think Pieces on the role of risk and resilience in a new MDG framework (UNISDR and WMO, 2012: 7). Translating this into any kind of final outcome is still some way off. Yet the case for preparedness being part and parcel of post-2015 commitments is widely regarded as common sense by large sections of the international community. 4

Indeed, progress to date on preparedness by the IASC, as noted above, demonstrates an international appreciation of the need to redress prior neglect of the issue.

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3 Four of our five case study countries (all bar the Philippines) appear in a ranked list of top 20 countries demonstrating high levels of fragility, disaster risk, poverty and climate change vulnerability (Harris et al., 2013: 9).

4 As expressed in debates at the ECOSOC Humanitarian Segment, Geneva in 2013.
There is still much to do. Action towards commitments in the HFA have seen the most progress in capacities to prepare for and respond to disasters, with evidence pointing towards a downward trend in mortality risk (UNISDR, 2013a: 5). Yet with economic losses trending upwards, more than tripling over the past 20 years in some countries, there is a failure to 'fully internalize' the significance of building national DRR systems (UNISDR, 2013a: 5). For example, despite the increasing availability of risk information and knowledge, there is recurrent frustration that governments and the international aid community often still fail to act before a crisis hits (ibid.). This criticism was levelled at the international community in the wake of the drought and food crisis in the Horn of Africa in 2011, when it was slow to respond (Hillier and Dempsey, 2012). Progress on conflict preparedness is even further lacking, with debates about what this entails still in their infancy (Vaux, 2014a forthcoming). Meanwhile, there appears to be, more than disappointingly, a continued lack of connection between strategic engagements with fragile states and (natural hazard-related) disaster risk. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, for example, does not strongly feature links between state-building and disaster risk, the environment or climate change, wrongly implying that natural hazards have little impact in countries such as Somalia, Pakistan or Niger.

In the context of fiscal austerity, donor government signatories to post-2015 agreements will be mindful of the financial implications of those commitments. In these circumstances, the notion of preparedness as a 'no regret' option must be conveyed: ‘... measures that build capacity and disaster preparedness ... have no negative effect even if the worst forecasts are not realised (either because the cost is very low or because they will build resilience)’ (Hillier and Dempsey, 2012: 20). The post-2015 development agenda thus marks a critical juncture. Will the international community continue to do more of the same, perhaps under a new banner, terminology or buzzword, or will it take a radically different approach to challenge the inadequacies of 'business as usual' crisis response?

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Above all else, significant improvements are critical to build national capacity to mitigate, prevent, prepare for and respond to crises.

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5 The New Deal is the latest attempt by the international community to provide a partnership framework for assisting countries to transition out of fragility. Developed through the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, the New Deal is structured to deliver three inter-connected elements: peace-building and state-building goals, national-led inclusive processes, and partnership and trust between national and international actors (see www.newdeal4peace.org for more details).
2. How we understand emergency preparedness
2. How we understand emergency preparedness

Key messages

● Emergency preparedness activities work in tandem to create a holistic system, and span what is conventionally understood to be the bifurcation between development and humanitarian action.

● Financing across the ‘preparedness continuum’ therefore needs to be coordinated. In reality, when made to ‘fit’ into the institutional and financing architecture, the continuum becomes fractured and disjointed.

● The international community faces a challenge: to continue ‘feeding’ the bifurcated system or to alter and transform it for the better.

● Emergency preparedness activities regularly fall ‘through the cracks’ in the international financing architecture.

● The system has been grappling with a rapidly changing set of risks, and the financing architecture has failed to evolve at the same pace to support these demands.

● Uneven levels of attention are paid to different types of shocks and stresses, and there is a dearth of analysis, practice and resourcing on preparedness for conflict and its links with natural hazards.

● The ‘ideal scenario’ involves national governments enacting budgetary measures to support systems of preparedness, based on a holistic understanding of risk. Of the five case studies, the Philippines goes furthest towards this goal.

2.1 What is emergency preparedness?

‘Emergency preparedness aims to build the resilience of states and societies by strengthening the local, national and global capacity to minimise loss of life and livelihoods, to ensure effective response to crises.’

The definition adopted for this report (above) is informed by the findings of the five country case studies, and seeks to better reflect the natural hazard and conflict dimensions of preparedness for response. It also reflects the centrality of preparedness in the IASC’s conceptualisation of resilience, as one of four critical areas of work (IASC, 2012). This research endorses conceptualisations of disasters as the product of human decision-making and action in relation to natural hazards (see Wisner et al., 2004), though the term ‘natural hazards’ is used here to differentiate natural hazard-related disasters from conflict-related disasters. Definitions of related terms can be found in Annex 2, while the relationship of ‘preparedness’ to other terms is illustrated in Figure 2.1.

A matrix of activities that comprise ‘emergency preparedness’ has been created for this report. It reflects the full suite of activities required to support a sustainable system of preparedness, which span the responsibilities of both

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6 Other types of crisis are captured within this definition, but are not the focus of this study.
development and humanitarian actors (see Table 2.1). This matrix was used to frame the case study research, which enabled cross-country comparisons to take place (in spite of contextual variations in terminology) and provided a means to situate the country findings within global trends.

Importantly, though activities are listed individually in the matrix, preparedness interventions are part of a portfolio approach. The suite of activities required to create and sustain a preparedness system work in tandem and support one other. For example, early warning systems will not be effective unless they are supported by a contingency plan that clearly delineates roles and activities in the case of an early warning, or without the institutional capacity to put this in place. Similarly, pre-positioning and stockpiling are somewhat redundant unless there is a clear system for indicating when and how those stocks will be used and methods for deployment, and with positioning based upon clear risk assessments. As a result, the issue is not what to invest in, but rather a clear imperative to invest in the whole package of necessary activities. In short, emergency preparedness requires a holistic approach.

Understanding what preparedness is and what it means is somewhat limited in the absence of a country, sectoral or crisis context. When applying the emergency preparedness matrix in practice, the experiences of UNDP and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) – which used it to evaluate the preparedness content of its global DRR portfolio – demonstrated that further qualification was needed to distinguish preparedness categories from larger categories of DRR. Furthermore, the research identified differences in the ways in which preparedness is conceived across the five case study countries. These reflect the diversity of development and humanitarian challenges in each context, individual organisational

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7 Drawn from research undertaken by the IASC Sub-Working Group (SWG) on Preparedness (Lawry-White, 2012). It also broadly aligns with the range of activities that constitute ‘preparedness’ as considered by IASC members, UNISDR and Development Initiatives (Kellett and Sweeney, 2011).

8 The relationship between emergency preparedness and risk management was explored in phase one of this work (see Kellett and Sweeney, 2011).

9 For example, in regard to institutional and legislative frameworks, resource allocation and funding and response coordination arrangements.
### Table 2.1: Emergency preparedness matrix: categories and activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hazard/risk analysis and early warning</td>
<td>• Early warning systems</td>
<td>Community, sub-national, national, regional and international</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Hazard/risk analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional and legislative frameworks</td>
<td>• Institutional and legislative frameworks, resource allocation and funding mechanisms</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Institutional arrangements: national platform, national disaster management authority</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• National plan of action</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Informal local through to international agreements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resource allocation and funding</td>
<td>• Risk pooling mechanisms</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Agency funding arrangements – including risk pooling mechanisms (external) and core emergency programme budgets (internal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crisis coordination</td>
<td>• Government coordination mechanisms</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Leadership structures (including between different scales, locations and sectors)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Inter-agency coordination</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cluster/sector established contextual standards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information management and communication</td>
<td>• Information management systems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Communication systems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cluster/sector information management systems</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Contingency/preparedness and response planning</td>
<td>• Contingency/preparedness and response planning</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Training and exercises</td>
<td>• Simulations, drills</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Accredited training opportunities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Specific country-context training opportunities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency services/standby arrangements and prepositioning</td>
<td>• Stockpiling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Civil protection, emergency services, search and rescue</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Contingency partnership agreements</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Framings of preparedness in relation to their own mandates, and the country’s natural hazard and/or conflict profile. In some examples, such as USAID in Myanmar, the terms ‘preparedness’ and ‘DRR’ were used interchangeably (Peters, 2014 forthcoming). In other cases, such as with international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the Philippines, there was sometimes no distinction between humanitarian action and activities that this report would term ‘emergency preparedness’ (Kellett, 2014 forthcoming).

#### 2.2 The preparedness continuum

Across the five country cases, donors, policy-makers and practitioners described a suite of preparedness activities that make up a complete picture of preparedness. These ranged from more ‘developmental’ activities, such as support for establishing an adequate national policy framework for preparedness, through to more ‘humanitarian’ responses, e.g. stockpiling of goods in preparation for rapid response. In reality, preparedness is best considered as a continuum with a natural alignment at each end with the ‘development’ and ‘humanitarian’ arenas.

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10 Hosted by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), UN OCHA and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA).
The notion of a continuum is useful when considering the range of activities required to create a strong preparedness system. Action is required over both the long term (e.g. appropriate legislation and disaster management law) and the near term, in relation to building capacity to respond to an imminent crisis or disaster event.

In reality preparedness is best considered as a continuum with a natural alignment at each end with the ‘development’ and ‘humanitarian’ arenas

When made to ‘fit’ into the bifurcated humanitarian/development institutional and financing architecture, the continuum becomes disjointed. As evidenced throughout this report, the majority of funding for preparedness activities derives from humanitarian channels, which do not align with the full suite of preparedness activities required to create a complete preparedness ‘package’ in-country. This reality is well recognised. In a recent International Dialogue on Strengthening Partnership in Disaster Response, it was observed that ‘the disaster risk reduction and humanitarian agendas could usefully be more engaged with each other … the process of building trust with national authorities, strengthening national capacities and embedding different ways of working in preparedness and contingency plans needs to take place as part of longer term investments in disaster preparedness’ (Harvey and Harmer, 2011).

The current bifurcation presents many challenges for financing preparedness within the international community – not just in terms of volumes, sequencing and responsibility, but also in terms of who is best placed to take on the preparedness activities required to create a strong system. The international community faces a challenge: to continue ‘feeding’ the bifurcated system or to alter and transform it for the better. To split preparedness activities in two would simply be to recreate the humanitarian/development divide. This is problematic because the short- and long-term aspects of preparedness are necessarily interlinked, as the resilience framework indicates (see Harris, 2013). However, to bring together preparedness activities as a discrete set of concerns risks creating (yet) another silo.

Evidence from the five country case studies reveals that emergency preparedness activities regularly ‘fall through the cracks’ in the international financing architecture – a consequence of the fragmented aid system. This also reflects the patterned history of a system that has been grappling with a rapidly changing set of risks to which it is expected to respond, and of a financing architecture that has failed to evolve at the same pace to support those demands. We have also witnessed an uneven level of attention being given to some types of shocks and stresses over others. Thus, while preparedness for natural hazard-related disasters is becoming increasingly well articulated thanks to the international efforts of UNISDR, GFDRR and others, there is a dearth of analysis on preparedness for conflict and on the links between the two.

2.3 Emergency preparedness and conflict

In contrast with natural hazard-related preparedness, conflict preparedness remains in its infancy in terms of comprehensive development of the concept, operational activities and programming on the ground. There are no dedicated financing mechanisms for preparing for conflict, just as there are no mechanisms solely dedicated to...
Table 2.2: Emergency Preparedness Matrix: adapted for conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Hazard/risk analysis and early warning** | • Early warning systems: e.g. reports by the International Crisis Group (ICG)  
• Hazard/risk analysis: scenario planning, conflict analysis (led mainly by donor groups)  
• Monitoring of potential emergency situations by aid agencies such as OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP | Scale will be highly variable depending on the nature of the conflict and the context |
| **Institutional and legislative frameworks** | • Agreements especially by national authorities to respect international humanitarian law (IHL) e.g. civilians in conflict (ICRC), migration (UNHCR), SGBV in case of conflict (UNICEF)  
• Support to police, justice system, etc. in anticipation of widespread violence e.g. around elections (UNDP, donors) |  |
| **Resource allocation and funding** | • BCPR, which administers the CPR TTF, has a specific mandate for conflict; DRR funds focus on natural hazard-related disasters |  |
| **Crisis coordination** | • Informal security meetings of agencies, ambassadors and donors at different levels, UN Country Team  
• No special mechanisms for inter-agency coordination or clusters etc., but ‘conflict sensitivity’ may be introduced in any/all mechanisms |  |
| **Information management and communication** | • Monitoring of actual conflict outbreaks (e.g. OCHA mapping in South Sudan)  
• Informal security meetings as above, but effectiveness may be reduced by limited publication of results |  |
| **Contingency/ preparedness and response planning** | • Contingency planning related mainly to anticipated violence (especially around elections) and migrations predicted to occur following conflict; examples from UNICEF and UNHCR  
• Focus on prevention rather than preparedness in peace-building  
• ‘Resilience’, e.g. at community level, is poorly articulated in relation to conflict: it might take the form of self-defence |  |
| **Training and exercises** | • UNHCR conducts training at global level using simulations of anticipated migrations  
• Security services may be trained in crisis response |  |
| **Emergency services/ standby arrangements and prepositioning** | • Stockpiling, evidence mainly relating to migrations  
• Police prepared for violent outbreaks; this may be linked to security sector reform and/or peace-building |  |

preparing for natural hazards. Except for the UNDP CPR TTF – and here only to a limited extent (see Vaux, 2014b forthcoming) – the financing mechanisms reviewed in this study either do not consider conflict (GFDRR and the adaptation mechanisms) or are focused only on the more ‘humanitarian’ set of activities of the preparedness continuum (the four humanitarian mechanisms/tools). There is still work to do on establishing a clearly articulated or agreed upon understanding of ‘emergency preparedness for conflict’. What we know is that agencies use, to an extent, a separate set of terms for similar types of activities being undertaken (see the adapted preparedness matrix, Table 2.2).

Emergency preparedness for conflict is frequently absorbed into wider processes. For example, conflict prevention,
peace-building and security sector reform activities may, in connection with other activities, constitute elements of emergency preparedness for conflict, such as contingency planning, training of police forces, etc. (Vaux, 2014a forthcoming). In this sense, conflict preparedness is represented in many mechanisms. For example, consolidated appeals often incorporate long-term international engagement in complex emergencies where conflict dominates the humanitarian agenda and where a focus on preparedness is not uncommon. Eight of the sixteen appeals in 2013 (all but one of them a complex emergency) mention preparedness as a key focus (OCHA, 2012a).

In relation to peace-building, violent conflict is always approached as preventable and hence the language focuses on prevention, though there may be elements of preparedness as defined in the matrix. As another example, strengthening the security services is often presented as a way of reducing violence (or conflict prevention) but could be presented as a form of emergency preparedness for conflict. Distinguishing between different activities is very difficult and can become a matter of semantics, and it is consequently even more difficult to track funding sources. The exceptions are events that have clearly been predicted and in which the international community is active, such as critical elections and referendums, where analysis indicates a high chance of conflict and violence. For example, stand-alone preparedness projects for the Sudan independence referendum in 2009, the Kenyan elections in 2013 and the period prior to the Iraq conflict in 2003 (Vaux, 2014a forthcoming).

The political and conflict context will determine and shape the extent to which preparedness measures can be enacted in-country, and the way in which the international community engages with national players. As Niger’s history exemplifies, it has not always been possible to engage in conversations with government on hunger or crisis. In countries where the government is party to a conflict, or is unwilling or unable to engage openly in dialogue on conflict preparedness, the use of alternative language may be employed. For example, the term ‘contingency planning’ is more discreet than ‘conflict analysis’, especially in contexts where the presence of certain forms of ‘conflict’ are denied or are too sensitive to engage with because of possible repercussions.\(^\text{12}\) Thus preparedness activities do not occur in a political vacuum. Furthermore, donor funding is shaped by political preferences; government responsibility for citizen preparedness is influenced by national politics; and the extent to which the international community can engage in dialogue about certain types of risk is influenced by the political context.

While recognising the challenge of incorporating preparedness for both natural disaster and conflict into a single mechanism (see Kellelt and Sweeney, 2011), the two remain closely linked throughout the recommendations contained in this report. The risk contexts of the country case studies demonstrate strong interlinkages (both conceptually and in practice) and the activities pursued on the ground are often the same at the humanitarian end of the continuum from a sectoral perspective (i.e. in preparation for a near-term response) (Kellelt, 2014 forthcoming; Peters, 2014 forthcoming). Moreover, recent evidence suggests that a lack of preparedness for the impacts of natural hazard-related disasters can exacerbate political and societal stressors, which can – if not managed effectively – increase the potential for conflict (see Harris et al., 2013). Thus while the international system – including the IASC – has created means to compartmentalise how it deals with different risk factors, in reality natural disasters and conflict are not so neatly segregated.

The ideal scenario globally would be a situation where national governments are able to enact the budgetary measures required to support systems of preparedness, based on a holistic understanding of risk.

2.4 International support: the ideal scenario

The ideal scenario globally would be a situation where national governments are able to enact the budgetary measures required to support systems of preparedness, based on a holistic understanding of risk. Of the case study countries, the Philippines goes furthest towards this idea, with the government being a major contributor in terms of volumes of financing for DRR. Government spending has been on average close to $800 million per year, contrasting with just $50 million from the international community (Kellelt and Caravani, 2013: 35). Yet the Philippines, especially in terms of specialised capacity, can still benefit from further support from the international community. So what would an idea scenario look like?

Firstly, a blank slate is imagined, devoid of the current financial, institutional and political constraints. If we were to create an international aid system starting from scratch, the likelihood is that it would look quite different from what

\(^{12}\) The authors are not implying that conflict analysis is synonymous with contingency planning, but found evidence that contingency planning can be used as a means for elements of conflict analysis to take place.
Figure 2.3: The ideal scenario

Piecemeal assessment of risk

Country funding for emergency preparedness not based on a global prioritisation of need

Failure to articulate a vision of emergency preparedness in part because of a lack of a shared understanding

Unclear roles and responsibility: coordination mechanisms are not inclusive, involving all actors in a given context

No combined plan of action: plans do not coordinate action across different actors or sectors

Niger
Different conceptions of emergency preparedness.

Myanmar
Emergency preparedness and DRR used interchangeably.

Sudan
Limited articulation of risk, linked to limited incentives.

Philippines
Agencies unsure who is responsible.

Sudan
No UN focal point for emergency preparedness.

Haiti
Recognition of risk has not led to vision or plan.

Sudan
Emergency preparedness is by individual agencies, not consolidated.

Niger
Risk assessments largely by individual agencies, not consolidated.

Myanmar
Agencies assess risk in their own ‘sector’ and programme accordingly.

Sudan
Lack of action on conflict preparedness despite prevalence.

Philippines
Mechanisms available for emergency preparedness cannot fund the range of activities needed.

Niger
Very few donors resident that have funded risk.

Sudan
The dominant humanitarian focus crowds out emergency preparedness.

Sudan/Myanmar
Still lack of progress on integrating risks beyond food security into Dispositif, despite recurrent floods, droughts and population movement.

Funding available in-country does not adequately match needs

No existing mechanism or channel of financing emergency preparedness is based solely on a global assessment of need.
Table 2.3: Framework of questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comprehensiveness</th>
<th>Are funding decisions based on a detailed understanding of all risks?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are funding decisions based on a global assessment of priority countries?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term plans of action and comparative advantage</td>
<td>Are funding decisions for emergency preparedness based on a common plan of action with defined roles and responsibilities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is funding available to a range of necessary actors?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is the timeframe for emergency preparedness funding proportional to needs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National actors and processes</td>
<td>Does funding for emergency preparedness align with government plans and national stakeholder priorities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do preparedness measures target a range of requirements at community, sub-regional and national levels?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong donorship</td>
<td>Does the mechanism have strong monitoring and evaluation component for transparent, accountable tracking in investment, as well as for learning?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Can the fund receive funds from a range of sources?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility</td>
<td>Is there sufficient political support behind the inclusion (or expansion) of emergency preparedness in the fund?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>To what extent are there administration costs in expanding work in emergency preparedness?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visibility</td>
<td>Does the mechanism have a sufficient enough profile to raise the importance of preparedness and drive the agenda forward?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

we see today, unconstrained by politicised historical ties and the gradual evolution of sectoral siloes across linked phenomena (such as natural hazard and man-made disasters with conflict and fragility). Figure 2.3 represents these tensions and challenges, faced in practice as evidenced in the case studies.

Secondly, drawing on the evidence from the five country case studies, the research team has generated a set of questions that represent the necessary criteria for enabling effective financing for emergency preparedness (Table 2.3). These questions highlight a wide range of critical issues that must be considered in order to determine what is required to improve the financing of emergency preparedness.

Sections 3 and 4 examine first the international architecture of funding mechanisms for emergency preparedness, then the practical lessons drawn from the country case studies (from which the framework of questions derives).
3. Emergency preparedness in context

the architecture
3. Emergency preparedness in context: the architecture

Key messages

- Humanitarian mechanisms (the CERF, CAP, CHFs and ERFs) have all funded elements of emergency preparedness, sometimes despite their limited mandates.

- Risk-focused mechanisms (GFDRR and CPR TTF) and adaptation mechanisms (PPCR, LDCF and Adaptation Fund) have also all funded emergency preparedness, but always within the limitations of their mandates.

- Estimating precise levels of emergency preparedness financing across every mechanism and tool examined is challenging, because preparedness is often not coded separately and can be subsumed into broader programmes of action, or data is not openly accessible.

- None of the mechanisms examined adequately finances emergency preparedness across the ‘preparedness continuum’, and few have the necessary geographical reach to address priorities globally.

3.1 Introducing the financing architecture

In this section we examine the main international financing mechanisms in detail, dividing them into three broad categories: humanitarian, risk-related and climate finance. After introducing each, we explore the range of contexts in which these mechanisms do (or do not fund) emergency preparedness. We highlight the policy guidelines of the funds, which lead to the particular funding choices made. Where possible, the way in which the various mechanisms fund different countries across different preparedness activities is examined.

Figure 3.1, which is intentionally illustrative, indicates broad trends in the kinds of emergency preparedness activities that each of the main financing tools/mechanisms supports, using consolidated evidence from the five country case studies (see Figure 2.2). As the individual country figures (Figure 4.1 – Figure 4.5) demonstrate, in practice the combination of tools and mechanisms actually present in each country differs greatly. At first glance, the figures may imply that preparedness is adequately supported by various mechanisms. In reality, not all mechanisms are present in every country, leaving gaps in the availability of funding for preparedness. Moreover, not all mechanisms willingly support emergency preparedness, and those that do may support only specific sectors or types of preparedness interventions, leaving gaps in the system. Box 3.1 provides a brief outline of the main international public financing tools and mechanisms discussed throughout this report. These are abridged summaries of the mechanisms’ own descriptions of their roles and remits.13

13 Further information can be found on their individual websites.
### Box 3.1: The core international funding tools and mechanisms

**Humanitarian mechanisms**

**Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF):** A humanitarian fund set up by the UN General Assembly in 2006 to enable more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance. The CERF’s objectives are to promote early action and response to reduce loss of life, enhance response to time-critical requirements and strengthen core elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises. The CERF has a grant facility of $450 million and a loan facility of $30 million; the former has two windows, one for rapid response and one for underfunded emergencies. In 2012, 49 countries received CERF funding; in 2013 the figure is 43 countries.

**Emergency Response Funds (ERFs):** Established in 20 countries since 1997, ERFs provide NGOs and UN agencies with rapid and flexible funding to address critical gaps in humanitarian emergencies. ERFs, also known as Humanitarian Response Funds (HRFs) in some countries, are usually established to meet unforeseen needs not included in the CAP or similar concerted humanitarian action plans. ERFs predominantly fund NGOs and actively support local NGO capacity-building. They are usually relatively small, disbursement less than $10 million in total per year, and provide small to medium-sized grants.

**Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs):** Country-based pooled funds that provide early and predictable funding to NGOs and UN agencies for their responses to critical humanitarian needs. CHFs look ahead to future humanitarian needs and fund priority life-saving projects identified in a CAP or similar humanitarian action plan. They are currently present in five countries with ongoing, large humanitarian operations: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and the Central African Republic.

**Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP):** From 2014, the CAP is being replaced with the Strategic Response Plan (see Box 3.2), but is assessed in this report on its historical role as one of the principal international funding mechanisms. The CAP was not a pooled financing mechanism but a programme cycle for aid organisations to plan, coordinate, fund and implement humanitarian response; partners across the humanitarian spectrum drew up a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) and an appeal for funds. Consolidated appeals presented a snapshot of humanitarian situations, resource requirements and response plans for the year ahead. In 2012 there were consolidated appeals in 20 countries.
Risk-focused financing mechanisms

Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR): GFDRR’s mission is to assist developing countries to reduce their vulnerability to natural hazards by mainstreaming DRR and climate change adaptation (CCA). Based within the World Bank, it provides grants and technical assistance to leverage larger investments in disaster risk management (DRM). GFDRR structures its work along five ‘thematic pillars’: risk identification, risk reduction, preparedness, financial protection and resilient reconstruction. It has funded activities in 49 countries to date.

UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund (UNDP CPR TTF): Established in 2001, the CPR TTF is managed by the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) at UNDP. The fund was designed as a ‘fast flexible funding mechanism ... to respond effectively to crisis prevention and recovery needs’. It allows for un-earmarked/flexible, thematically earmarked and country-earmarked financing of crisis-related issues. The CPR TTF’s broad themes include conflict prevention and recovery, DRR, early recovery, gender equality and women’s empowerment in crisis, and policy and programme support.

Climate adaptation financing

Adaptation Fund: The Adaptation Fund has the overall objective of reducing vulnerability and increasing adaptive capacity to respond to the impacts of climate change. It operates in countries that are parties to the Kyoto Protocol and are particularly vulnerable to adverse effects of climate change. It has funded projects in 28 countries to date.

Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF): Established under the Convention, the LDCF is managed by the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). It is designed to meet the needs of least developed countries (LDCs) by financing the preparation and implementation of National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs), the roadmap for a country’s priority actions on adaptation. The LDCF focuses on sectors that are central to development and livelihoods. Up to June 2013, it had operated in 50 countries.

Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR): The PPCR is a targeted programme of the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF), one of two funds within the framework of the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs). The PPCR is aimed at jumpstarting ‘climate-smart’ development, by piloting and demonstrating ways to integrate climate risk and resilience into planning. Nine countries and two regions have been selected for this pilot programme.

Bilateral donors

In addition to the core mechanisms described, donors have direct routes for funding projects in recipient countries. As these are contextually specific, the case studies best describe how donors finance emergency preparedness directly in a specific country. Illustrative examples are provided throughout this report, and we have delineated this where possible by highlighting how donors fund directly through both their humanitarian and development financing streams. (Note that although we consider the importance of donor funding throughout this report, we do not, in this section, consider the way that financing for preparedness operates globally; the complexity and diversity of donor approaches prohibits this. However, we do analyse this within each of the case study countries (see Section 4).)

3.2 Humanitarian mechanisms/tools

Central Emergency Response Fund

The CERF is the humanitarian financing instrument with the most clearly defined role and limits. Established in 2006 to ‘enable more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance to those affected by natural disasters and armed conflicts’ (OCHA, 2012b), it works through two ‘windows’, the Rapid Response Window (RRW) and Under Funded Emergencies (UFE) Window, each with separate guidance for applying agencies and allocation. The CERF, with its global reach, is the only one of the humanitarian instruments examined here that can operate in countries with no standing OCHA presence. Whether through the RRW or UFE, the CERF’s ‘Life-Saving Criteria’ apply, requiring applicants to demonstrate a direct life-saving application for all projects. The stance on preparedness is very clear, it being one of the issues not included as eligible for support (OCHA, 2011a: 1):

‘While the CERF does not fund preparedness, the Secretariat is closely following the debate, which is currently on-going within the humanitarian financing sphere aimed at enhancing sources of funding for the preparedness activities. Regardless of the direction
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total CERF contribution15</th>
<th>Projects with likely emergency preparedness components</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>$4,997,385</td>
<td>• Trained water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), nutrition and health cluster members on humanitarian preparedness and response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• WHO and Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP); procured stockpiles; strengthened early warning and reporting systems; improved early diagnosis of health-, nutrition- and WASH-related ailments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Agriculture: improved food security and long-term resilience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>$4,019,325</td>
<td>• Hygiene promotion campaigning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Meeting of WASH cluster to improve overall coordination and emergency preparedness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>$9,995,396</td>
<td>• Protection cluster engaged village leaders in community-based preparedness activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>$14,781,195</td>
<td>• WASH cluster increased hygiene and sanitation sensitisation through radio messages during a cholera epidemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Training for communities and heads of health centres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 249 community workers trained in cholera prevention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>$24,069,716</td>
<td>• WASH project provided treatment and disinfection of water sources in households at risk of cholera contamination in order to prevent a future outbreak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>$13,010,727</td>
<td>• Livelihood support reduced vulnerability and strengthened resilience to shocks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>$20,158,449</td>
<td>• Warehouse space to accommodate and expand supplies as part of emergency preparedness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>$40,044,091</td>
<td>• WASH project: hygiene promotion messages focused on effective water treatment and storage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Multi-sector project increased water supply; curbed the spread of water-borne diseases; preparedness for potential acute watery diarrhoea (AWD)/cholera outbreak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>$2,006,304</td>
<td>• Rapid health assessment on preparedness and response capacity in two districts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 60 schools, 21 clinics and their communities were reached with WASH facilities and hygiene promotion messages.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3.1: CERF contributions to a range of countries with identifiable elements of emergency preparedness (2012)*

*of the discussion, and notwithstanding the usefulness of preparedness activities in the management of humanitarian crisis, the Secretariat remains convinced that preparedness should not be considered, at this stage, within the CERF Life-Saving Criteria, as it is not part of CERF mandate and alternative sources of funding should be pursued.*

Notwithstanding the CERF guidance, a narrow range of preparedness activities has been funded. In keeping with other humanitarian instruments, these tend to be focused on community-level activities (notably training for health workers and hygiene promotion), stockpiling and warehousing (Taylor and Couture, 2014 forthcoming). Total preparedness financing is a challenge to track, but activities outlined in project documentation suggest that of 22 CERF allocations in 2012, activities in nine countries included elements of preparedness (ibid.).

**Emergency Response Funds**

Emergency Response Funds have been the least ‘regulated’ of the humanitarian funds to date (Taylor and Couture, 2014 forthcoming).

15 Of which emergency preparedness activities are a part, though the specific values cannot be extracted without further analysis.
Couture, 2014 forthcoming). Unlike CHFs, which are acknowledged as requiring a critical mass of funding, management and advisory capacity and a CAP or similar appeal, ERFs have been created in a range of different ways in a range of different contexts. The initiative to set up an ERF can come from a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) looking for a mechanism through which to fund under-served priorities or from a prominent donor looking to create a useful disbursement channel in the aftermath of a crisis. ERFs vary greatly in terms of scale; many of the smaller funds are seen as having insufficient management capacity\(^{16}\) and a narrow donor base.\(^{17}\)

The Ethiopia Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF) is an outlier, generally described as a ‘hybrid’ financing instrument, having many of the attributes of a CHF (scale, well-developed allocation and disbursement procedures, and a strong advisory board). The stance of the Ethiopian government and its reluctance to see a standing humanitarian appeal (CAP or similar) established mean that the HRF is likely to remain. In keeping with ERFs, the Ethiopia Fund is characterised as an ERF on the basis of what it lacks (a jointly constructed CAP or similar appeal, and fixed or standard allocation rounds).

There are examples of ERFs being used to fund preparedness activities. As a rule, however, these activities are not prioritised and constitute a relatively small proportion of what are small volumes to begin with. Context plays a significant part in the extent to which preparedness is funded in ERFs, but more significant factors appear to be the nature of the funds and the amount of funding available. Where emergency preparedness is included, activities are largely at the community level, and do not address legislation, national standards, international and regional agreements, resource allocation, coordination or information management systems.

Funding levels for emergency preparedness (as a proportion of overall expenditure) are low: for the 10 countries that released annual reports in 2012, a total of $51.1 million was received. Of this, only $2.3 million is estimated to have been spent on emergency preparedness.

**Common Humanitarian Funds**

There is no single document that puts forward a policy stance on the relationship of CHFs with emergency preparedness. At the country level, guidance is not standard and individual guidelines tend not to address preparedness directly. The specific rules of each fund are therefore of prime importance. In Somalia, for example, guidelines for standard allocations make no reference to preparedness funding (OCHA, 2012c). For the emergency reserve of this particular fund (approximately 20% retained annually for unforeseen emergencies), funding for preparedness is specifically excluded.

All CHFs operate within CAPs or similar appeal frameworks and CAPs define (or should define) priorities within a country context. The majority of CHFs make two standard allocations per year, theoretically taking a snapshot of current priorities at the time of each allocation. Although allocation processes vary slightly by country, most rely heavily on clusters to bring together partners and refine priorities, on a part-consensual, part-competitive basis.

A lack of disaggregated data within a CHF contribution to its respective CAP makes tracking of emergency preparedness very challenging. The 2012 annual reports suggest that a limited range of activities within the preparedness matrix are funded from CHFs. As with the ERFs, attention is predominantly to contingency/preparedness and response planning (including community preparedness); training exercises (specific to each context); emergency services/ standby arrangements and pre-positioning (predominantly through stockpiling); and information management and communication systems.

Suggested volumes of emergency preparedness in each country, as indicated in the 2012 reports, are as follows: Central African Republic, $1.8 million (maximum); Somalia, $3 million (estimate); South Sudan, no figure, although three clusters report some preparedness activities; Sudan, no clear data; DRC, no clear data.

However, the largest allocation (under the ‘multi-sectoral’ category) was the provision of $13.5 million to UNICEF’s Rapid Response to the Movement of Populations (RRMP) project in Eastern DRC. In recognition of the highly volatile security context in the east of the country, the RRMP pre-positions implementing partners, financial resources and supplies to enable a rapid humanitarian response to population movements (either displacements or returns) after assessments by partners. It provides emergency non-food items, water and sanitation, and/or emergency education services to the most affected communities (JPFU, 2012: 11). Listed as a response project, the RRMP is also an example of a clearly targeted preparedness mechanism.\(^{18}\)

**Consolidated Appeal Process**

The CAP is not a pooled financing mechanism. It is a tool to bring aid agencies together to jointly plan, coordinate, implement and monitor response to natural disasters and
complex emergencies. However, given the importance of the CAP in preparing costed projects and appealing for the funding of these projects, it is included in our analysis of the options of improved financing for emergency preparedness. For most complex emergencies, an annual appeal is launched at the end of each year, covering the humanitarian needs of the coming year, based upon the CHAP, which provides a foundation of common analysis, needs assessment, scenario planning, etc.\textsuperscript{19}

CAPs have shown flexibility in adapting to humanitarian trends, and many of them address preparedness in elements or as a theme. CAP guidelines include pre-disaster planning, which in turn includes crisis monitoring and preparation for emergency relief management as a potential area of focus. Furthermore, guidelines include assessments to determine the scope of the emergency or potential emergencies. Based on the scope of the activities listed in the mid-year reviews, the most recent CAPs seem to be effective at fulfilling these guidelines. CAPs contain a somewhat broader range of emergency preparedness activities across the matrix than many individual instruments. These have included early warning and hazard risk analysis, legislative frameworks, inter-agency coordination, contingency/preparedness and response planning (including community preparedness), training opportunities and stockpiling/pre-positioning.

Preparedness components most frequently referenced by country reviews were contingency preparedness and response planning, capacity-building (including training opportunities) and stockpiling/pre-positioning, including vaccinations and immunisations. In 2012 seven countries reported preparedness activities attributed to contingency/preparedness and response planning. The categories for training opportunities and stockpiling/pre-positioning were both evident in five countries.

Most preparedness financing articulated by the CAP is, however, difficult to disaggregate. In most cases it is only possible to track preparedness through specific references to CAP documents and reports – however, the diversity of emergency preparedness activities and their reach across different contexts are very important. For example, Sudan’s 2012 CAP (OCHA, 2012d) had a specific section on preparedness, with a clear requirement of $13.2 million. In other examples from 2012 CAP documents:

- In Afghanistan, the CAP included flood preparedness workshops, pre-positioning of health supplies and the establishment of emergency health teams. It also contributed to the establishment of a National Contingency Plan and inter-agency contingency plans for conflict, floods, landslides and earthquakes.
- In Djibouti, the CAP gave support to the WASH cluster for planning in emergency preparedness and response.
- In Chad, the CAP helped to develop local support through contingency plans for natural disasters and, in the health sector, supported the procurement of 22 cholera kits to be provided to high-risk health districts.
- In Kenya, 80% of projects funded via the CAP incorporated early recovery and DRR components (OCHA, 2012e: 26). These included rain assessments for food security, the drafting of a law for DRM and the training of government staff in every county.
- In South Sudan, the CAP included a significant amount of preparedness. This included the pre-positioning of supplies in regions likely to be cut off by rains/flooding and a revision of the South Sudan Humanitarian Contingency Plan to ensure that preparedness plans addressed potential fall-out from border conflict with Sudan.
- In Somalia, the CAP had a significant emphasis on preparedness, including AWD, cholera prevention and preparedness in high-risk areas; training in disaster preparedness of 1,500 teachers and facilitators; training in DRR for 300 community education committees; and contingency plans for 12 distracts, including the provision of early warning action systems.

\textbf{BOX 3.2: FROM CONSOLIDATED APPEAL PROCESS TO THE STRATEGIC RESPONSE PLAN}

During the finalisation of this report, new guidance was released by the IASC that replaced the CAP with the Strategic Response Plan (SRP). Effective from 2014, SRPs replace the preparation and publication of the traditional CAP document. They are designed to be similar to the CAP, with many existing features retained or enhanced. Key elements include a Humanitarian Needs Overview, Country Strategy and Cluster Plans.

Note that, for the purposes of this report, the CAP is referred to throughout until the recommendations section, when the latest guidance on Strategic Response Plans is used.

\textsuperscript{18} While clearly fitting within the preparedness matrix, it is again worth noting that this is preparedness in a very narrow sense – preparedness for the international system to respond with a narrow range of activities and a limited geographical area against a clearly specified, and very predictable, set of risks. This makes it similar to the Sudan referendum project described earlier.

\textsuperscript{19} In addition to consolidated appeals, the UN also coordinated the preparation of flash appeals, to provide rapid funding for three to six months after a crisis. There was just one of these in 2012, for food insecurity in Lesotho. For the purposes of this report, flash appeals are largely irrelevant for emergency preparedness; the focus is therefore on consolidated appeals. However in Section 4 of the report where we analyse financing across a range of countries, we include flash appeals where appropriate, as elements of the overall funding context.
The CAP in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) included the training of community members and health providers in emergency preparedness and the strengthening of WASH cluster partners’ capacity for preparedness.

In Yemen, funding via the CAP was allocated to contingency plans at national level and within preparedness and response plans and stockpiling of critical supplies.

In Zimbabwe, the WASH sector reported $5.5 million for ‘emergency preparedness and response’, including assessment of typhoid risk factors and outbreak preparedness. The protection cluster focused on thematic preparedness/contingency plans; early warning indicators; training in DRR; and district-level DRR workshops.

3.3 Risk-related mechanisms

UNDP Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

Managed by the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) within UNDP, the CPR TTF has a broad remit in preventing and recovering from crisis, focusing largely on a group of priority countries agreed in advance of the upcoming year (Vaux, 2014b forthcoming). Emergency preparedness features across a wide range of initiatives within reports from the CPR TTF, including in areas of DRR, conflict prevention and early recovery (ibid.). Where the CPR TTF funds emergency preparedness activities, they are often bound up with these ‘larger’ areas and rarely articulated as separate projects. Interestingly, this was not so typical in the early years of CPR TTF funding, where financing was often granted for stand-alone projects specifically for disaster preparedness.20 Most of the funds are utilised directly by UNDP country offices, but they could be more widely used with appropriate strengthening of policy and guidelines.

The geographic range of the CPR TTF is almost unlimited (ibid.). It is a global fund without restriction beyond UNDP’s own focus and mandate, and CPR TTF funding has been used across a diverse group of conflict- and disaster-affected countries. The top 15 countries by expenditure in 2011 were (in decreasing order) the OPT, Haiti, DRC, Somalia, Pakistan, Liberia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Chad, Sudan, Niger, Timor-Leste, Yemen, Côte d’Ivoire and Lebanon.21 The CPR TTF covers a wide range of countries: the 2011 report states that UNDP helped 59 governments to establish comprehensive DRR programmes. Activity may continue over long periods (five years plus) but may be supported by different funding sources during that time. The CPR TTF typically helps in the early stages after a crisis, wherein UNDP may then seek to attract longer-term funding from donors.

Despite the availability of overall data on recipient volumes, disaggregation of emergency preparedness is not possible with openly accessible material. This is in part due to the integration of preparedness into larger initiatives, as already mentioned. For example, although there is breakdown by ‘window’ for 2011, it only captures broad overall funding (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2: Expenditures of the UNDP CPR TTF, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPR TTF window</th>
<th>Expenditure ($ millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict prevention and recovery</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster risk reduction and recovery</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early recovery</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy and programme support</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>111.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)

Established in 2006, GFDRR is a partnership of 41 countries and eight international organisations committed to helping developing countries reduce their vulnerability to natural hazards and adapt to climate change. It works to mainstream DRR and CCA into country development strategies by supporting country-led and managed implementation of the HFA (Hill, 2014 forthcoming).

GFDRR is responsible for allocating funds entrusted to it in line with geographic and thematic priorities set by its donors and partners. In any given country, it adopts a number of criteria to help in allocating resources, including established vulnerability indicators; past evaluation of impact; the political context (including existing relations

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20 Discussion with senior BCPR staff member, 10 September 2013.
21 The list of top countries changes rapidly, often to reflect most urgent recovery contexts; Haiti was the biggest recipient in 2009 and 2010.
22 Excluding core funds allocated by UNDP to crisis, termed ‘targeted resources at the Core’ or more usually within UNDP, TRAC 1.1.3 funds. This is set at 7.2% of UNDP’s core programme resources, intended for crisis, both conflict- and disaster-related.
with governments); and donor priorities. There are also criteria for determining in which country funding is granted. To date it has funded activities in 49 disaster-prone countries, selected through its eligibility criteria (risk and vulnerability indicators with consideration of geographical representation) (GFDRR, 2013a).

GFDRR has prepared comprehensive programmes of support in DRM for 20 priority countries,11 donor-earmarked countries (GFDRR, 2009) and the African-Caribbean-Pacific European Union (ACP-EU) programme countries (GFDRR, 2012a). Core priority countries are financed primarily through the multi-donor trust fund; non-core countries that are earmarked by specific donors are financed primarily through three single-donor trust funds (Australia, Spain and Japan); and other countries are financed with flexible funds or special initiatives (such as the ACP-EU programme) (GFDRR, 2012b). Currently 70% of funding is invested in priority countries, with the remaining 30% used flexibly across all countries. In financial year 2012, GFDRR approved 22 projects worth $20.3 million and disbursed a total of $27.5 million through its trust fund to support the

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23 At its fifth meeting in Copenhagen (2008), the GFDRR Consultative Group asked the secretariat to focus on priority countries to increase impact. This led to a prioritisation of operations in 20 core countries: Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Indonesia, Kyrgyz Republic, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mozambique, Nepal, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Togo, Vietnam and Republic of Yemen. The countries were selected due to their high vulnerability to natural hazards and low economic resilience to cope with disaster impacts, including anticipated climate change and variability. Two thirds are least developed countries (LDCs) and 12 are highly indebted poor countries; nine are in Africa and several others are small island states at high risk. These 20 countries will receive 80% of available funds, while 20% will be made available for flexible, high-impact grants, such as those that catalyse increased investment programmes and integration of DRR and CCA in any disaster-prone country.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project description</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Estimated emergency preparedness value</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>GFDRR pillar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical and advisory support to ‘Managing Natural Hazards’, which includes forecasting and early warning. Community-based preparedness, targeting 6,000 most vulnerable communities.</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Hazard/risk analysis and early warning Contingency/ preparedness and response planning</td>
<td>Risk identification, preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support establishment of early warning system (EWS), technical support and capacity development. Support establishment of information management system across institutions.</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>$0.5 million</td>
<td>Hazard/risk analysis and early warning Institutional and legislative frameworks</td>
<td>Risk identification, preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support preparedness and response capacity. Priorities include local contingency and emergency preparedness plans; linking plans to early warning; community-based preparedness, including drills and simulation exercises.</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>Contingency/ preparedness and response planning Training and exercises</td>
<td>Risk identification, preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a weather-based index for triggering emergency financing (LEAP) to strengthen the Productive Safety Net Programme.</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>$0.7 million</td>
<td>Hazard/risk analysis Information management systems Funding mechanisms</td>
<td>Preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve preparedness by modernising the evacuation shelter network and engaging communities in mapping and emergency planning.</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>$0.2 million</td>
<td>Contingency and preparedness Emergency services/ standby arrangements</td>
<td>Risk identification, preparedness, risk reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Plan for Flood Management in Metro Manila, identifying investments to protect residents from floods with up to a 100-year return period.</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>$1.65 million</td>
<td>Hazard/risk analysis Institutional frameworks</td>
<td>Risk identification, risk reduction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Hill, 2014 forthcoming)
integration of DRM in development, providing targeted grant financing, knowledge products and technical assistance to disaster-prone countries (GFDRR, 2012a). Implementation is largely by the World Bank and by national governments.

GFDRR structures its work through five pillars: risk identification, risk reduction, preparedness, financial protection and resilient reconstruction. Of these, the preparedness pillar is clearly relevant for this exercise, as are almost all of the elements of the ‘risk identification’ package (‘understanding hazards, exposure and vulnerability’) (GFDRR, 2013b). There are clear examples of financing for emergency preparedness, although costs are often unknown, usually due to a lack of disaggregated data. Some of the accessible examples, which represent a selection rather than a comprehensive list, are indicated in Table 3.3.

The latest strategy and workplan of GFDRR has increased the prominence of preparedness, with a commitment to strengthen ‘national and local agencies and civil society organisations (CSOs) in a minimum of 23 partner countries … to provide better early warning and response more effectively when disasters occur’ (GFDRR, 2013b: 23).24 The mechanism does not appear to fund outside of its mandate or areas of specialisation. It funds the largely development-based aspects of preparedness and does not fund preparedness for conflict.25

3.4 Climate finance mechanisms

24 It is worth noting that a reported strength of GFDRR is its ability to leverage funds from wider resources available within the World Bank. One example is its work in hydromet services, where it has managed to leverage further funds from PPCR and from both the International Development Association (IDA) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), amongst others (GFDRR unpublished note, 2013).

25 Note that this does not equate to ‘not funding countries for conflict’. While GFDRR’s focus is on DRM, some of its priority countries (such as Pakistan and Yemen) are affected by conflict.

26 A concrete adaptation project is defined as a set of activities aimed at addressing the adverse impacts of and risks posed by climate change. The activities should aim to produce visible and tangible results on the ground by reducing vulnerability and increasing the adaptive capacity of human and natural systems to respond to the impacts of climate change, including climate variability (Adaptation Fund Board, 2010).

27 The fourth one is generic: ‘Starting to implement adaptation activities promptly where sufficient information is available to warrant such activities, inter alia, in the areas of water resources management, land management, agriculture, health, infrastructure development, fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosystems, and integrated coastal zone management’ (UNFCCC, 2001).

28 In the vast majority of countries where the Adaptation Fund has financed emergency preparedness, it has been in the form of early warning systems (EWS). These include: Argentina, the Cook Islands, Ecuador, Eritrea, Georgia, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mauritius, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka and Uruguay. In Colombia, the Fund has financed EWS and risk analysis, and in Honduras and Tanzania risk analysis alone.

29 This figure reflects the 100% allocated to projects with emergency preparedness activities (17 projects). It does not represent the amount for specific activities.

Adaptation Fund

The Adaptation Fund was established with the overall objective of ‘reducing vulnerability and increase[ng] adaptive capacity to respond to the impacts of climate change, including variability at the local and national levels’ (Adaptation Fund Board, 2010: 2). This is done through financing the total costs (as opposed to only incremental or additional adaptation costs) of climate change adaptation projects and programmes.26 Of the indicative set of four activities to be supported by the Adaptation Fund since its establishment in 2001 (UNFCCC, 2001), three are aligned to emergency preparedness: hazard and risk analysis and early warning, particularly around vector diseases affected by climate change; institutional and legislative frameworks for integrating climate risks, particularly to extreme weather events; and information and management communication for information networks at national and regional levels and contingency/preparedness planning for extreme weather events.27 This preliminary list of ‘fundable’ adaptation activities was established under the Marrakesh Accords in 2001, as a guide for adaptation projects that could be approved under any of the mechanisms of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The list also reveals how the relationship between resilience and preparedness has been established since the early stages of the adaptation finance debate.

From a preliminary review of the 28 projects approved by the Adaptation Fund, 17 (61%) include at least one emergency preparedness activity in their climate change adaptation objectives.28 The total approved budget for all projects was $184 million, of which projects including emergency preparedness activities represent $113 million.29 Understanding the total value of emergency preparedness is challenged by the lack of disaggregation of activities within the $113 million worth of projects. Of this group, 16 projects are receiving financial support for the establishment of early warning systems (EWS), mainly for climate-related hazards such as droughts and floods (including coastal, inland and glacial types). Seven of the projects also include the improvement of the country’s hydro-meteorological network, at both national and sub-national levels, and in all cases they are linked to the establishment or expansion of EWS. Four also include preparedness planning activities at the community level, mainly for the identification and participatory monitoring of local-level hazards. Although adaptation normally requires the establishment of, or specific support to, national planning and institutional frameworks, there was no strong indication that such processes included emergency preparedness, and so no support for coordination activities was identified. Finally, no specific preparedness training exercises or emergency services were evident in descriptions of the projects.
Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)

The LDCF is a multilateral fund under the UNFCCC, established in 2001 to respond to the adaptation needs of least developed countries (Caravani and Nakhhooda, 2014 forthcoming). It focuses on reducing the vulnerability of sectors and resources that are central to development and livelihoods, such as ‘water; agriculture and food security; health; disaster risk management and prevention; infrastructure; and fragile ecosystems’ (ibid.). Key limitations of the LDCF in terms of emergency preparedness are therefore relatively self-evident: funding goes only to LDCs; it is limited to natural hazards (i.e. not conflict); and within those natural hazards its focus is on climate risks (UN FCCC, 2009).

Table 3.4: Recipients of emergency preparedness financing through the LDCF, 2001-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient country</th>
<th>Approved amount ($ millions) for emergency preparedness activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>14.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>11.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>9.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>8.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>8.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>8.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>6.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>6.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>5.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>4.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>4.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>4.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>4.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>3.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>2.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That said, there is evidence of financing for emergency preparedness. Since the Fund’s inception in 2001, 148 projects have been created, of which 33 have included preparedness activities. These account for $150 million of the total LDCF allocation (Caravani and Nakhhooda, 2014 forthcoming). A further 81 projects have emergency preparedness as a secondary or supporting activity (equivalent to $156.1 million). Fifteen of the 33 projects that include emergency preparedness cover more than one component of the preparedness matrix: 23 include EWS from the local to the national levels, while 10 projects cover hazard and risk analysis. These components are also complemented by information and communication systems, and community preparedness (ibid.) – Table 3.4.

BOX 3.3: MALAWI’S NAPA

Malawi’s National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) provides a useful example of the importance of emergency preparedness activities related to the LDCF. During its development, 31 adaptation options from eight sectors were identified to address urgent adaptation needs, with an emphasis on vulnerable rural communities. The 31 options were ranked using a multi-criteria analysis, and a shortlist of 15 priority adaptation options was developed. These were further ranked and prioritised to produce a list of five top-priority actions:

- improving community resilience to climate change through the development of sustainable rural livelihoods
- restoring forests in the catchments of the Upper and Lower Shire Valleys to reduce silting and associated water flow problems
- improving agricultural production under erratic rains and changing climatic conditions
- improving Malawi’s preparedness to cope with droughts and floods, and
- improving climate monitoring to enhance the country’s early warning capability and decision-making.

Source: Caravani and Nakhhooda (2013)

Source: Climate Funds Update, $ millions, current (database searched in September 2013; see www.climatefundsupdate.org)

30 This list is derived from a detailed review of funding reports across the range of LDCF recipients.
One particularly interesting aspect of climate financing through the LDCF (and adaptation financing in general) is that funding appears to be more ‘balanced’ across different recipient countries, with far fewer differences in volume than for other financing, such as DRR. This indicates one of the strengths of global mechanisms in being able (at least theoretically) to view the landscape of need globally and to finance appropriately, rather than being driven by the demands of a single country context (see Kellett and Caravani, 2013: 18-20).

### Pilot Program on Climate Resilience (PPCR)

The PPCR is a targeted programme of the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF), one of two funds within the framework of the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs). The financing window is aimed at jumpstarting ‘climate-smart’ development, by piloting and demonstrating ways to integrate climate risk and resilience into countries’ core development planning. The PPCR supports funding for activities that address climate resilience, especially technical assistance to support its integration into national and sectoral development plans. The focus is on piloting projects that integrate climate risk and resilience into core development planning, while

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project description</th>
<th>Type of finance</th>
<th>Amount approved ($ millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Project for the improvement of climate forecasting systems and operationalisation of EWS</td>
<td>Grant and concessional loan</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Climate risk management and rehabilitation of small- and medium-scale irrigation schemes in the Tonle Sap Basin</td>
<td>Project preparation grant</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Enhancement of flood and drought management in Pursat Province</td>
<td>Grant and concessional loan</td>
<td>9.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>Disaster vulnerability reduction project</td>
<td>Project preparation grant</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>Disaster vulnerability and climate risk reduction project</td>
<td>Concessional loan</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Improving climate data and information management</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Climate resilience: transforming hydro-meteorological services</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Building resilience to climate-related hazards</td>
<td>Grant and concessional loan</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific region</td>
<td>Identifying and implementing practical climate change adaptation and related DRR knowledge and experience</td>
<td>Project preparation grant</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific region</td>
<td>Mainstreaming CCA and related DRR</td>
<td>Project preparation grant</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>Disaster vulnerability and climate risk reduction project</td>
<td>Grant/concessional loan</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Improvement of weather, climate and hydrological delivery project</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Climate information system and PPCR programme coordination</td>
<td>Project preparation grant</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total to date</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$77.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

complementing other ongoing activities of the CIFs, thus leading to increased awareness of the potential impact of climate change, improved coordination for climate resilience and scaled-up investment for broader investments (CIF, 2011). The overall goal of the fund is therefore to leverage additional financing from both national and international sources, which determines its available funding.

Nine countries and two regions were selected to participate in the pilot programme. Selection was based on a range of climate-related natural hazard types, levels of country vulnerability, country eligibility, country distribution, coherence with existing adaptation funding and value added, replicability, sustainability, scalability and development impact, and the potential to implement rapid results (CIF, 2011). The countries are Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Tajikistan, Yemen and Zambia. The Caribbean region comprises Grenada, Haiti, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Saint Lucia; the Pacific region comprises Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Tonga (PPCR, 2013). Each country is able to receive investments of up to $110 million.31

31 PPCR finance includes grant finance (up to $1.5 million to prepare a country’s Strategic Programme for Climate Resilience in phase one), preparation grants (estimated $1.5 million for detailed preparation of activities in phase two), and finally both grants and concessional loans to finance the additional costs necessary to make a project climate-resilient.
4. How emergency preparedness is funded

lessons from five country case studies
4. How emergency preparedness is funded: lessons from five country case studies

Key messages

- Financing for emergency preparedness is complicated, fragmented and piecemeal, especially the international contribution, with an array of separate institutions, mechanisms and approaches determining which parts of the preparedness continuum are funded, and in what ways.

- Despite significant challenges, national governments appear to have a much more rational and logical approach to financing for natural hazard-related preparedness.

- Case study evidence suggests that volumes of financing are considerably below requirements, except arguably in the case of the Philippines.

- Financing for emergency preparedness fails to target need or be respondent to risk. What financing exists mostly follows the fragmented nature of the existing financing architecture.

- Evidence suggests that the bulk of international funding – where it is available – is not concerned with building the long-term capacity of national systems of preparedness but is reinforcing a piecemeal and project-led approach.

- For national and international actors, emergency preparedness presents the specific budgetary challenge of assessing risk and dealing with uncertainty.

- The case studies reveal huge potential for growth in preparedness activities, given the increasing interest in disaster risk in general and its impact on sustainable economic development.

This section outlines the funding profile of each of the case study countries: the Philippines, Niger, Sudan, Myanmar and Haiti. The financing of emergency preparedness systems from national government resources is highlighted, before turning to the international architecture and its financing mechanisms. The analysis explores the key financing options described in Section 3: the humanitarian mechanisms (CERF, ERFs, CHFs, CAP), the risk-focused mechanisms (GFDRR and CPR TTF), the climate funds (Adaptation Fund, LDCF, PPCR) and finally bilateral donor funds (humanitarian and development). Other sources of emergency preparedness financing are then considered: country-specific mechanisms, core and multi-use funding, the Red Cross, multilateral banks and the private sector. The section ends with a summary of the current state of emergency preparedness financing, as evidenced by the case studies.
4.1 Mapping the funding sources: five country case studies

Emergency preparedness is not just a matter for the international community: a diverse range of actors in each country funds it formally and informally, knowingly and unknowingly. Evidence tells us that emergency preparedness may not be described as such in many cases; in Niger many international NGOs report undertaking emergency preparedness activities but rarely formulate them as being distinct from their humanitarian programming. This partly informs how funding for emergency preparedness activities originates from a variety of different sources. These range from global pooled funding mechanisms involving international donors and UN agencies through to national systems of preparedness involving small and medium-sized businesses taking initiatives to prepare for local-level risk, and NGOs using existing human resources to prioritise emergency preparedness activities.

In-depth research in Haiti, Myanmar, Sudan, Niger and the Philippines reveals this complexity of financing. As an illustration and by way of comparison, a mapping of the main international channels of emergency preparedness financing and national fiscal contributions in each country is shown in Figures 4.1 – 4.5, in relation to the different preparedness activities they fund.32

32 Note that these illustrations depict the funding sources for emergency preparedness, not the implementation. The actual channel of final delivery can be complicated, with agencies able to act as donor, fund manager or implementer depending on the particular structure of financing. The activities listed in the figures reflect those used by the funding tools/mechanisms; hence they differ slightly from the comprehensive set shown in Figure 2.2.

Figure 4.1: Financing mechanisms and tools for emergency preparedness in Myanmar
Figure 4.2: Financing mechanisms and tools for emergency preparedness in Sudan

Figure 4.3: Financing mechanisms and tools for emergency preparedness in Haiti
Figure 4.4: Financing mechanisms and tools for emergency preparedness in Niger

National government
- LDCF
- Bilateral in-country mixed development / humanitarian: SDC/EC
- UNDP CPR TTF and core resources
- CERF
- Consolidated appeal
- Core/multi-use agency funding

Development
- Legislation policy
- Framework & planning
- Information systems
- Community preparedness
- Crisis coordination
- Contingency planning
- Stockpiling
- Early warning systems
- Risk assessment
- Training
- Exercises & simulations
- PPCR

Humanitarian response

Figure 4.5: Financing mechanisms and tools for emergency preparedness in the Philippines

National government
- GFDRR
- Bilateral in-country development: Japan
- Special Climate Change Fund
- German International Climate Initiative
- World Bank
- Private sector
- Core/multi-use agency funding
- Flash appeal

Development
- Legislation policy
- Framework & planning
- Information systems
- Community preparedness
- Crisis coordination
- Contingency planning
- Stockpiling
- Early warning systems
- Risk assessment
- Training
- Exercises & simulations
- Bilateral humanitarian
  AusAID, USAID, DIPECHO

Humanitarian response

Legislation
- Policy

Crisis coordination
- Training
- Exercises & simulations

Community preparedness
- Stockpiling

Contingency planning
- Core/multi-use agency funding

Risk assessment
- CERF

Framework & planning
- Consolidated appeal
4.2 Emergency preparedness in case study countries: national financing

The case study countries all have very different capacities and levels of financing for emergency preparedness. Economic levels give us some indication, as a proxy, of how likely it is that governments have both the capacity to manage risk and the funding to undertake that management.\(^\text{33}\) The World Bank classes three of the five countries as low-income and two as lower-middle-income (World Bank, 2013b). Average per capita government revenues\(^\text{34}\) vary significantly from country to country. In Niger and Myanmar they are amongst the lowest in the world, putting these countries on a list of just 13 that have revenues of less than $50 per capita (Kellett and Caravani, 2013). On this indicator, Myanmar is the poorest country in South-East Asia; however, its overall available revenue is still greater than that of Haiti, the poorest country in the western hemisphere (World Bank, 2013c).

Table 4.1: Economic indicators from the five case study countries\(^\text{35}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income status</th>
<th>Average government revenues, 2007-2011, per capita ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Lower-middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Lower-middle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Philippines hosts the most advanced risk management of the five countries, and the consciousness of disaster risk is high across civil society. The government is very committed to preparedness, in particular through the implementation of the 2010 Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) Act. Overall it is the major contributor in terms of volume of spending for DRR, spending up to $1 billion each year. Financing, especially for key preparedness institutions – early warning, hazard/risk analysis and building local government capacity – was a minimum of $107.5 million combined over the years 2009-2011 (Kellett, 2014 forthcoming: 39), exceeding financing volumes from international actors. The government is also particularly strong in the area of health preparedness, and has a dedicated specialist team that finances specific preparedness activities for the sector (ibid.: 24). The targeting of resources towards local government units (LGUs) most in need of support remains an issue, as does the overall coherence of actions between international and national actors for risk management. Preparedness for conflict – namely in the island of Mindanao – is not clearly articulated, and is part of a separate process to DRM. However, government agencies responsible for elements of the DRRM Act (including elements of preparedness) do extend their support to conflict-affected populations.

In Niger, national and international action has traditionally been concentrated on the country’s largest risk, namely food security, which is related largely to the significance of drought. In recent years, broader DRM has been progressively incorporated into sectoral and national policies, strategies and plans. This evolution also led to the government establishing a risk management system called Le Dispositif National de Prévention et Gestion des Crises Alimentaires au Niger (the Dispositif) in 1998. This system initially aimed to prepare and respond to food security-related crises, but over time has evolved to be responsible for a wider portfolio of risk. Despite national policy commitments, there is little national funding for preparedness, even at a central level, where key institutions are largely donor-funded. What financing exists for emergency preparedness is focused on supporting the Dispositif, including early warning systems, as well as the National Market Information System (SIMA). Between 1 June 2012 and 30 November 2013, the Dispositif’s planned expenditures were estimated at FCFA 2.08 billion ($4.21 million), of which the national government was to provide 32.6%, the European Union (EU) 46.5% and other partners 20.9%. Key areas such as health emergency capacity and activities such as pre-positioning of food and non-food items (NFIs) are consistently underfunded. Financing beyond the capital Niamey is reportedly non-existent, with the exception being relatively small levels of funding for international actors (Robitaile et al., 2014 forthcoming).

In Myanmar, emergency preparedness is a relatively new concept, and is commonly embedded within DRM financing and policy architecture. New engagement with the international community is helping to prioritise risk within government policy, with the development of the national Myanmar Action Plan on Disaster Risk Reduction (MAPDRR) and the development of the Myanmar Peace Centre, two important achievements. However, national financing is weak, and the government’s national budgetary systems require significant strengthening. While progress has been made, with 21 priorities under the

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\(^\text{33}\) That said, due to the lack of precise coding and tracking of emergency preparedness in national fiscal systems, the cost of preparedness according to the matrix is often not identifiable. In many places only the price of projects exists, which is indicative but by no means comprehensive of the total cost of preparedness needs.

\(^\text{34}\) The methodology for this calculation can be found in Kellett and Caravani (2013).

\(^\text{35}\) Sources: income status from World Bank (2013c); average government revenues from a methodology developed in Kellett and Sparks (2012). Note that the negative figure for Haiti is due to the deduction of international aid from overall government revenues.
MAPDRR, for example, funding is limited, and tracking of national expenditure is at best incomplete. Thus far, the government has focused its attention on establishing the national policy environment, structures for DRR and support to ongoing peace processes. Translating these initiatives into a fully funded and functioning preparedness architecture remains some way off. International funding is primarily humanitarian, with small, inconsistent portions of funding for preparedness, released as part of broader risk reduction components of crisis response. There is a strong commitment by national and international actors to invest more in emergency preparedness, but this is constrained by the financing architecture, relatively small donor base and the challenges of spending funds in a difficult governance context.

In Haiti, the response to the 2010 earthquake has generated financial and technical resources for emergency preparedness and has also increased general awareness of the importance of other types of risk beyond the seismic, which are significant in type and scale across the country. This has spurred a heightened engagement with and strengthening of Haitian stakeholders, particularly in the context of the transition process that aims to transfer responsibilities, systems and capacities to the national government. Disaster risk has become a priority and is likely to play a key role in future development. Legal provisions for disaster preparedness have been in effect since the 1980s and the country has had a national disaster management system for more than a decade (Fan et al., 2014 forthcoming). However, there are concerns that humanitarian funding is being reduced too quickly, while national preparedness and response capacities remain fragile. The Department of Civil Protection (the lead agency for DRM), which sits within the Ministry of Interior, established a National System for Risk and Disaster Management in 2001, which included a National Emergency Operations Centre (COUN).

Much of this structure was significantly under-resourced. The government has now begun to prioritise resources for DRM, with its 2012-2013 budget allocating $7.55 million to the Ministries of Interior and Environment, with $2.3 million from its own resources.

In Sudan, decades of conflict across a number of areas (with some conflicts still ongoing) have resulted in national and international actors focusing on large-scale response year on year. Financing for emergency preparedness from government resources is at best modest, but the sense in-country is that there is a slow move towards ex-ante risk management (i.e. before the event). This is made problematic by at least eight different government agencies or ministries having a mandate for aspects of preparedness. There is no clear understanding of responsibility across different elements of the preparedness system or how the work of the various agencies interconnects. What appears relatively clear is that funds for all preparedness activities are limited. Crisis response drives the bulk of government funding (including a significant focus on areas of conflict) and, while anecdotal evidence suggests that elements of that response may include preparedness (Hockley, 2014 forthcoming), there is little confirmed data to substantiate this.

As the case studies reveal, public financial management is lacking across the five countries (arguably with the exception of the Philippines). Poor fiscal management undermines the ability of governments to ensure that the necessary budgetary processes are in place to apportion funds to support preparedness systems. Creating regular financial support to emergency preparedness requires effective national budgetary systems and processes. Box 4.1 provides suggestions for how the international community can support improved methods to code and track budgetary processes.

**BOX 4.1: IMPROVING METHODS TO CODE AND TRACK BUDGETARY PROCESSES**

National budgetary allocations in support of preparedness are critical for sustained financing, and also help determine the extent to which emergency preparedness is catered for, financially and in policy action. The fact that 168 countries endorsed the 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action stands as testament to national governments’ understanding of the importance of adopting risk-informed approaches to development (UNISDR, 2011). Yet while no equivalent exists for conflict preparedness – a significant gap to be addressed – there remain gaps in our knowledge of both conflict- and natural hazard-related preparedness spending. In fragile and conflict-affected contexts where public financial management systems are weak or sometimes non-existent, the starting point for understanding how to strengthen financial support to preparedness actions will be quite different – as in the case of Myanmar. The international community can help in supporting improved methods to code and track national fiscal policy and budgetary processes in this regard.

There is often a significant difference between how domestic funding is structured, governed and delivered compared with international funding. A preliminary analysis of the linkages between emergency preparedness and national policy (e.g. national development plans) and expenditure (e.g. Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF)) and the annual budget need to be undertaken. This will provide an indication of the national prioritisation of emergency preparedness in...
The domestic funding modalities for emergency preparedness would need to be examined; two main channels are the national budget and extra-budgetary funds. There may be one or more national emergency response funds, supported by national legislation, which should be examined. In addition, the national budget may have an emergency fund that any emergency preparedness response can draw on (this may be a component of the contingency fund).

The governance of expenditure should be analysed (e.g. the roles played by ministries of finance and planning, and emergency preparedness units within sector ministries); also the relationship between national and sub-national agencies. There is often a central administrative unit responsible for national crisis management, and its location within government should be documented, as this often reveals national policy priorities. Whether it resides within central government, such as in the prime minister’s office, or is positioned in a line ministry, e.g. the environment ministry, or is a government agency, is likely to influence funding allocations.

Coordination mechanisms that exist between national and international agencies and national emergency preparedness coordination structures (and their supporting secretariats) should have a financial ‘footprint’ that can be traced and analysed. Such coordination can involve a large number of disparate parts of the government administration (e.g. ministries of home affairs, defence, health), raising an obvious challenge to securing an effective emergency preparedness response.

Source: Bird et al. (2012)

4.3 How the international funding architecture works in the case study countries

How preparedness is financed from international sources varies considerably across the five countries examined. It reflects the nature of the relationship with national government and the current context of development, governance and risk, and in each case the aid profile is heavily shaped by both current and past events. In some contexts, especially those involving conflict, the international community is called upon to do much more than it might otherwise do, fulfilling the role and responsibility of national authorities that may not exist or may be a party to that conflict.

36 It should be noted that not all engagement of the international community in a context is necessarily picked up by traditional methods of tracking aid expenditures. Contributions to UN peacekeeping missions are, for example, largely outside of ODA. While troop contingents themselves are often made up of developing nation armies, financing is through assessment, and largely therefore from developed nations. The volume of expenditure on these missions can be significant. In 2010 expenditures on multilateral peacekeeping operations reached just under $10 billion, with $5.6 billion being spent on UN missions (Development Initiatives, 2012: 81).

Figure 4.6: ODA to the five case study countries, 2002-2011

Source: Based on OECD DAC, 2011 constant prices
For both Myanmar and Sudan, preparing to respond in complex risk environments is complicated by broader political conditions and international relations. Sanctions and restrictions on spending shape the volume and timing of ODA that is provided. However, Myanmar is also undergoing rapid change. The country is opening up, sanctions are being lifted or revised, and the need for preparedness is becoming increasingly self-evident in view of recent natural and conflict-related emergencies. In Haiti, development assistance spiked significantly in 2010, when funds pouring into earthquake response and reconstruction reached more than $4 billion, a figure usually only seen in post-conflict state-building, such as in Afghanistan and before that in Iraq.36 For the Philippines and Niger, ODA over a decade has been relatively stable; the peak to Niger in 2006 was largely accounted for by almost $1.5 billion of debt forgiveness (see Table 4.2).

While donor coding and tracking of preparedness remain poor, it is impossible to know from global datasets how much of a priority emergency preparedness has been for donors (regardless of the mechanisms they might use). A useful proxy of in each of our five case studies can be drawn from data from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). While this data is not a complete representation of emergency preparedness, since it focuses on natural disasters only and moves beyond preparedness to prevention, it provides us with an indication of how prevalent ex-ante investment in risk is across each context. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given what the case studies have told us, Haiti and the Philippines have seen the most funding. Niger, Myanmar and Sudan have seen little since OECD DAC recording began in 2004.

Outlined below is a snapshot of the funding profile in each of the five case study countries.38

Traditionally the Philippines has been a significant recipient of ODA, largely from development funds rather than humanitarian assistance. Over the 10 years to 2011 it received $13.4 billion of ODA from a variety of donors, up to $1.6 billion per year. Almost $8 billion of this was in the form of loans, the bulk of which came from the Japanese government ($7.2 billion). Humanitarian assistance meanwhile amounted to just $322.9 million over the decade, rather a small figure considering the many crises the country has faced. Of this humanitarian financing, $100 million came in a single year (2009), largely in response to Typhoon Ketsana. That year, the proportion of international humanitarian financing peaked at just over 8% of ODA; over the decade the proportion was just 2.5%, though if loans are factored out, the proportion increases to just over 6%. The international community has placed disaster risk at the heart of much of its work in the country, and there is evidence of multiple preparedness activities under way (usually within a larger programme of action), which are considerable in both scale and scope.

Niger has traditionally been a significant beneficiary of ODA, receiving $7.8 billion over the decade 2002-2011. The total volume of assistance increased from $410 million in 2002 to $743 million in 2010, falling back slightly in 2011. While the share of humanitarian aid to Niger was low in the first half of the decade (3.7% in 2001 and 0.9% in 2003), it increased continually thereafter, reaching 30.3% in 2010, making Niger the 11th largest recipient of official humanitarian aid that year (Development Initiatives, 2013b). Since then, humanitarian aid has represented a considerable part of the total ODA received by the country, reflecting the international community’s acknowledgement of the many crises it faces. This has also led to continued support for government risk management structures, by humanitarian and development financing.

In Myanmar, it is widely anticipated that if the economic and political reforms that started in 2011 continue and result in substantial progress, the country’s economic future could mirror that of its Asian neighbours over the long term. The current transition, characterised by political and economic liberalisation, has also raised hopes of a better future and of increased international support, accompanied by the lifting of current restrictions and sanctions (see, for example, OECD, 2013b). This transition is likely to be challenging, with continued support required for some decades into the future. The data reflects the past relationship clearly, with the majority of international aid between 2002 and 2011 granted for humanitarian relief. This increased from $1.5 million in 2002 to $43.5 million in 2011 and peaked at $620 million in 2008 (related to relief and recovery after Cyclone Nargis). In its renewed engagement with the Government of Myanmar (GoM), the international community is supporting the formalisation of the policy architecture for national risk management more broadly. Yet international politics still shapes donors’ interests, and the ability of operational agencies in-country to persuade donors to prioritise risk appears weak. At the time of research, for example, international agencies were struggling to obtain funding for preparedness for conflict-related population movement and for a response anticipated in lieu of the upcoming rainy season. Response still dominates the international community’s engagement in the country, and funding for both conflict- and natural hazard-related disasters is ex-post (i.e. after the event).

In Sudan, financial assistance from the international community continues to be primarily humanitarian,39 accounting for more than 60% of ODA over 10 years; only

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37 OECD DAC data.
38 The analysis in this sub-section is drawn from case study data, GHA programme data and author analysis of OECD DAC data.
39 In addition to ODA financing, Sudan has received a huge investment from the international community relating to peacekeeping. In 2009, for example, the costs of the United Nations Mission for Sudan (UNMIS) and the hybrid mission for Darfur (UNAMID) had a combined budget of more than $2.5 billion (see Development Initiatives, 2010: 124).
Table 4.2: Breakdown of development and humanitarian aid to case study countries, 2002-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Official development assistance, $ millions</th>
<th>Development component, $ millions</th>
<th>Humanitarian aid, $ millions</th>
<th>Proportion of ODA as humanitarian aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>7,801.6</td>
<td>7,071.0</td>
<td>730.6</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>16,496.3</td>
<td>6,335.2</td>
<td>10,161.1</td>
<td>61.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>11,418.0</td>
<td>8,595.8</td>
<td>2,822.3</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>13,474.2</td>
<td>447.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>2,699.1</td>
<td>1,705.6</td>
<td>993.5</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on OECD DAC data (downloaded August 2013)

Figure 4.7: DAC country financing of disaster prevention and preparedness, 2004-2011

Somalia has a higher proportion. This is directly related to the large scale of long-term humanitarian need, with the international community using financing mechanisms and tools for obtaining, prioritising and managing the considerable volumes of assistance. The 2013 United Nations and Partner Work Plan, for example, appealed for over $383 million to implement 364 projects. The objectives of the Work Plan include building the capacity of national actors to address humanitarian needs in Sudan, a prerequisite for the transition to recovery and development. This is complemented by the 2013-2016 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), which has a proposed budget of $877 million. The last two years have seen a decrease in the funds available for humanitarian interventions, with the Work Plan receiving $741 million in 2011 and $586 million in 2012. This downward trajectory is likely to continue as donors shift attention away from Sudan (Hockley, 2014 forthcoming), both increasing the challenges of delivering humanitarian assistance and forcing a focus on transition.

In Haiti, overall funding from the OECD DAC countries increased (albeit gradually) from very low levels throughout the decade before the 2010 earthquake. This was in part due to response and reconstruction related to the series of cyclones and considerable flooding in both 2004 and 2008. Despite significant ongoing natural and man-made risks, the almost unprecedented financing following the 2010 earthquake included more than $1.5 billion for humanitarian response alone. The scale and impact of the earthquake has prompted considerable attention from the international community to all aspects of risk management in Haiti.
4.3.1 The mechanisms in detail\textsuperscript{40}

Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)

There are isolated examples of preparedness activities being funded, but this is largely ad hoc and heavily dependent on the individual context.

The experience in Niger is somewhat typical across our five case studies. The CERF is an important resource for humanitarian response and there is some – though limited – evidence that it has funded emergency preparedness. In 2012 the CERF channelled $24.6 million of humanitarian aid (OCHA, 2012f). Despite many individuals in-country stating that CERF funding has not been used for preparedness, nor even considered as a possible vehicle, an analysis of 2012 projects shows that some do include preparedness, as defined by the matrix applied throughout this research. For example, the CERF has given $2 million to UNHCR to provide protection and relief for 30,000 people; part of these funds has been used to build the capacity of local authorities to respond to the needs of refugees, an element of preparedness according to the matrix. The CERF has also provided $1 million to WHO and UNICEF to support government efforts to prevent cholera and treat victims by, amongst other things, strengthening disease surveillance throughout the country. Similar evidence can be found in Haiti, where in 2012 and 2013 the CERF contributed several million dollars for projects that mix response, preparedness and prevention in relation to cholera, with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNICEF and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) implementing (see OCHA, 2013b).

Myanmar has received funding from the CERF each year since 2006 through one or both of its Rapid Response and Underfunded Emergencies provisions. A total of $71.1 million has been allocated, with peaks in 2008 ($28.4 million) after Cyclone Nargis and in 2010 ($12.5 million) in response to Cyclone Giri and widespread flooding, particularly in Rakhine Statet. However, there was minimal evidence of CERF funding for preparedness, apart from relatively minor funding for health sector preparedness through the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (see Peters, 2014 forthcoming).

It is a similar story in the Philippines. While the country has regularly received funding from the CERF – more than $45 million over the past seven years – analysis reveals very little expenditure on preparedness. Only two out of 40 projects were identified as having partial preparedness objectives – two very similar World Food Programme (WFP) projects undertaking disaster preparedness in conflict-affected areas of Mindanao (Kellett, 2014 forthcoming).

Sudan’s CERF allocation mirrors the country’s overall preoccupation with managing the sustained humanitarian situation. In January 2013, Sudan received $17 million from the CERF; this followed a $14 million allocation in the previous year that was directed to underfunded priorities within the Work Plan. No evidence was found of emergency preparedness in any of these projects.

Emergency Response Funds (ERFs)

Of the five case study countries, ERFs are present only in Myanmar and Haiti. Evidence shows that funds have been allocated to support preparedness activities in Haiti, largely for cholera-related projects.

The Haiti Emergency Relief Response Fund (ERRF) was established in 2008 and was an essential tool to kickstart critical activities in the 2008 hurricane season (OCHA, undated a). The budget dramatically increased following the 2010 earthquake, exceeding $80 million (an exceptional amount for an ERF, the only fund with higher volumes of funds being Ethiopia’s; see OCHA, 2013c). Since its inception, the ERF in Haiti has funded 98 projects. In 2011 and 2012, a portion of funds was allocated to cholera prevention and epidemiological surveillance. Through a detailed examination of projects, 11 ERF contributions have been identified as supporting emergency preparedness activities in 2011 (OCHA, 2012g). Ten of these were to support cholera: for example, $500,000 granted to AMURT to undertake prevention and preparedness interventions in the municipalities of NW Artibonite, Terre-Neuve and Anse-Rouge, and $300,000 for Mercy Corps for similar work on the Central Plateau. A noteworthy project is the funding of internships to run a CDAC network in Haiti (CDAC, 2013); this is one of the first examples of building up communication networks for both humanitarian response and preparedness, and was targeted to reduce the ‘vulnerability of cholera-affected and at-risk communities and to increase community resilience and disaster preparedness’ (OCHA 2012g: 16).

Since 2007, the Myanmar ERF (which is called the Humanitarian Multi-Stakeholder Fund (HMSF); see OCHA, undated b) has allocated $8.2 million to national and international NGOs for work in conflict-affected areas and with internally displaced persons (IDPs). On investigation, it does not appear that any projects funded include emergency preparedness components. In 2012, for example, the total funding was $1.2 million, all for emergency response.

\textsuperscript{40} Note that overall funding volumes that a mechanism may provide to a country (and indicated in this section) are not necessarily reflective of strong financial support to preparedness. Identifying spending on preparedness requires (in all five countries) manual tracking and coding of activities.
Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs)

There is no CHF in Myanmar, Niger, the Philippines or Haiti. In Sudan, a CHF has provided preparedness financing through many of its sector priorities, though it is not labelled as such and is therefore difficult to track.

Sudan’s CHF has been supporting humanitarian needs since 2006, and by the end of 2012 it had contributed $1.2 billion to ‘support the highest priorities of the UN and Partners Work Plan, directly reaching people who are most in need throughout the country and covering critical humanitarian gaps’ (OCHA, 2012h: 5). An analysis of the most recent years of the CHF reveals a mixed picture for emergency preparedness. The CHF is used to finance 10% of the Work Plan, which includes special allocations of seeds, tools, livestock vaccines and drugs, NFIs and emergency shelter, and of ready-to-use therapeutic food (Hockley, 2014 forthcoming). Similarly, the 2012 CHF report states that two sectors have a particular focus on prioritising CHF funds for preparedness: health and nutrition (OCHA, 2012h: 18, 22). The full list of emergency preparedness activities and the sectors in which they are found is as follows:

- strengthening capacity of national actors (coordination and common services)
- strengthening coordination and capacity of state and non-state actors for effective and timely response (food security and livelihoods)
- improved emergency preparedness, risk reduction, disease surveillance (health)
- predictable logistical response (logistics and emergency telecommunications)
- core pipeline stocks (non-food items and emergency shelter)
- national capacity and core pipeline stocks (nutrition)
- early warning mechanisms (protection)
- disaster preparedness through building capacity (water, sanitation and hygiene).

CHF sector priorities are found in eight of 13 sectors in Sudan, though deepening the analysis by trying to track preparedness is made difficult because the term itself is not used. Sectors where emergency preparedness cannot be discerned are basic infrastructure, education, mine action, refugee/multi-sector, and returns and early reintegration.

UN Appeals Process

Preparedness is found within organised appeals, but the extent depends on the kind of appeal – consolidated or flash – and, for the former, on how much importance is given to emergency preparedness inside the CHAP. Having an appeal that includes preparedness as a core element does not guarantee funding.

Evidence on the use of appeals for emergency preparedness is largely determined by what kind of appeal has been used in each of the five country contexts, and the extent to which the humanitarian community has made preparedness a priority. Consolidated appeals have some evidence of preparedness being funded; flash appeals have little or no evidence of this happening. In regards to the case studies, four have consolidated appeals (Haiti, the Philippines (for Mindanao), Sudan and Niger). Only the Philippines has regular flash appeals, driven by the need to respond almost every year to cyclones, such as Cyclone Nargis in 2008. Haiti has also had a flash appeal, following the earthquake in 2010.

Levels of commitment to emergency preparedness, even in consolidated appeals, are variable across contexts. The strongest evidence is found in Niger. Here, preparedness is central, as one of three pillars under a ‘resilience’ objective within the CHAP. Of 83 projects in the most recent appeal, 53 have some element of preparedness; of these 53, contingency planning and training/exercises account for approximately one third, followed by hazard/risk analysis and early warning with 16% each. We estimate that close to $14 million has been raised for preparedness through the CAP. To a lesser extent, in the Sudan Work Plan, elements of preparedness can also be found. Through a manual tracking of the 2013 appeal, 57 of 364 projects were found to have an element of preparedness. The value of these 57 projects was $100 million; the allocation for preparedness is estimated at 3% of the overall requested volume, approximately $3 million – hardly a significant volume, given the predicted needs.

The appeals context in the Philippines is complicated by the mix of consolidated and flash appeals. Mindanao is a focus for consolidated yearly appeals, but is increasingly being complemented by urgent (flash) appeals due to cyclones, in recent years focusing on the same area. Overall there have been only minimal attempts to use the appeals process to obtain preparedness funds; those that have succeeded have been largely for humanitarian coordination and logistics. For example, since 2004 there have been six UN appeals in the Philippines with conflict in Mindanao or typhoon response usually being the focus, with final requirements of $394.9 million drawn from 352 projects. A detailed analysis reveals that only 11 of these

Humanitarian donors appear unwilling to prioritise emergency preparedness activities in the context of limited overall humanitarian resources for action plans and appeals
projects have at least a partial objective of preparedness, five of which were funded: three for UN OCHA, one for WFP and one for Plan International. All of these came from the consolidated appeal for Mindanao. As of July 2013, none of the 2013 projects with preparedness components had been funded. The total amount requested through appeals for emergency preparedness was $3.6 million (1% of the total requested), with $2.7 million of that funded.

The 2011, 2012 and 2013 appeals for Haiti have all included objectives on preparedness (OCHA, 2010, 2011b, 2012). The 2013 Haiti Action Plan (HAP) has an objective to shift humanitarian response plans and coordination away from the international community to the Haitian government. It is anticipated that moving humanitarian coordination mechanisms to national structures and promoting increased response capacities will support government leadership in responding to future disasters. The mid-term review of the HAP stated that a Coordination Transition Plan, detailing the transfer of humanitarian coordination structures to national counterparts, was completed in the first quarter of 2013 and was awaiting approval. A total of $17 million would be required to implement this plan, though the only costs included in the 2013 HAP were for the transition of the remaining coordination clusters not yet handed over to the government ($1.8 million was requested, which was 43% financed as of September 2013, according to OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS)). The revised 2013 HAP also references the national strategy and contingency plan prepared by the Directorate of Civil Protection (DPC) and the role of international humanitarian actors supporting it, listing six emergency preparedness projects. However, these projects have received very little financing (OCHA, 2013d). It is rare that CAP/HAPs are fully funded, but Haiti appeals in recent years have fallen significantly below global averages (46% funded in 2012; the 2013 appeal was 42% funded as of September 2013). The projects under the emergency preparedness objective had received only 4% of the requested $6.4 million funding as of September 2013. Humanitarian donors appear unwilling to prioritise emergency preparedness activities in the context of limited overall humanitarian resources for action plans and appeals.

Similarly, in Myanmar, collective appeals have been put in place to mobilise resources. For example, in response to crises such as Cyclone Nargis in 2008 and the violence in Rakhine in 2012, immediate appeals were launched – the former a formal flash appeal and the latter an appeal organised by the UN, but not a formal part of the CAP process. Perhaps surprisingly (in comparison with evidence from other flash appeals), both appeals were used to articulate emergency preparedness, albeit in only a few projects. OCHA’s FTS reports that in 2008 two projects that had preparedness components were actually overfunded: a Merlin health sector ‘DRR and preparedness’ project for $4.2 million and a $349,000 project for the NGO Malteser International for ‘disaster preparedness in the cyclone-affected region’. The 2012 appeal project for emergency preparedness was also for Malteser International, directed to ‘improved basic infrastructure and disaster preparedness’ for the population in Rakhine.

Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)

Funding for preparedness has been received in the Philippines and Haiti, for the more developmental part of the preparedness continuum.\footnote{Only two of the five countries selected for this research are GFDRR priority countries: Haiti (a GFDRR priority) and the Philippines (a country selected by donors as their priority). Given that GFDRR’s mandate reaches beyond preparedness into a range of disaster risk-focused financing initiatives, it is not surprising to see a range of risk-related projects being undertaken with financing from the facility where preparedness is a component of larger objectives (GFDRR, 2013a).}

In the Philippines, GFDRR has funded five projects to date. Two of these – support for Post-Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNAs) in the 2009 typhoon season and a project to support high-risk local government – have been completed. Three were ongoing at the time of writing: support to the Philippines disaster risk management agenda ($2.7 million); reducing vulnerability to flooding in Metro Manila ($1.65 million); and ‘City-To-City’, which supports the sharing of government capacity to manage natural disaster risks ($1.15 million). Of these, only the first project (supporting the country’s DRR agenda) has explicit emergency preparedness components, which take the form of long-term capacity-building of government for response.

In Haiti (GFDRR, 2012c), GFDRR has financed nine projects; all but one of these (a needs assessment following the four hurricanes of 2008) came after the earthquake of January 2010. Of the nine projects, two were needs assessments and three were largely sector-specific risk reduction projects (health infrastructure, housing and cholera prevention\footnote{Elements of this cholera project are likely to be emergency preparedness, taking into account project descriptions.}). The remaining four projects include elements of emergency preparedness, one specifically on multi-hazard assessments ($1.2 million) and three for a range of institutional capacity-building (of which certain elements appear to be for preparedness). These projects total $3.2 million; however,
the proportion of preparedness spend could not be determined due to lack of access to an itemised budget.

**UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund (CPR TTF)**

Financing for preparedness is found in four of the five case study countries. It includes a rare example of a mechanism funding conflict prevention, of which a portion is likely to be for preparedness.

The CPR TTF has been used in all of the case study countries apart from Sudan in recent years. In 2011, for example, CPR TTF funding was received for the Philippines, Myanmar and Haiti, in each case for disaster-related projects. Haiti was the most significant in terms of volume, with close to $4 million in three projects funded by the TTF; the majority of this financing was for early recovery programmes (see UNDP, 2013a) in response to the 2010 earthquake. Early recovery expenditure through the TTF also accounted for the bulk of financing in 2011 to both the Philippines and Myanmar. It appears unlikely from the project descriptions that could be accessed that any significant proportion – if any – of this early recovery expenditure was for emergency preparedness.

Niger provides an interesting case where CPR TTF funding combines risk management for different types of risk. In 2011, $2.1 million was committed by UNDP to conflict prevention, of which a component was likely to be for preparedness. Of this, $611,348 came from the TTF directly. This funding in part has supported two specialists focusing on a mix of crisis prevention and recovery, moving beyond conflict prevention to support national action on the Dispositif and implementation of the HFA.

It should be noted that UNDP also manages its own core resources allocated to crisis, through the same management structures and decision-making processes as the TTF. While not formally considered to be part of the TTF, these could be considered as UNDP’s own core resources to the fund. For the five case study countries, in 2011 these resources would add an extra $1.6 million for conflict prevention/recovery in Niger, $66,429 and $53,345 for the Philippines and Myanmar respectively for ‘response’, and $219,432 for DRR in Haiti. Often programmes funded by UNDP and managed by BCPR include financing from both these ‘core resources’ and the TTF; for example, the Niger conflict prevention project mentioned above is a single project financed by both sources.

Table 4.3 highlights the scope of both of these funding sources managed together by BCPR. Note that (as indicated above) not all these volumes are for emergency preparedness.

**Climate adaptation financing: Adaptation fund, LDCF, PPCR**

Where adaptation financing features in a country, there is evidence that it supports the more developmental aspects of emergency preparedness – this is particularly evident in Niger and to a lesser extent in the Philippines. This financing does not support the full range of emergency preparedness required, only those areas that climate risks share with risk management in general.

Financing for climate change-related activities has occurred in all five of the case study countries. The Philippines has seen by far the highest volumes of financing, with more than $400 million since 2007, while Niger has also received more than $100 million.

In the Philippines, $184 million of financing has been for climate ‘mitigation’ (IPCC, 2012), with no projects identifiably related to emergency preparedness. Of the $225 million approved since 2007 for adaptation or ‘multiple foci’ (the two broad areas of climate financing where preparedness

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44 These are termed TRAC 3 or sometimes TRAC 1.3. ‘TRAC’ standing for ‘Targeted Resources at the Core’. In total, 7.2% of UNDP’s core funding is allocated to crisis.

45 Note that in this section we also include an analysis of other sources of climate financing beyond the core mechanisms being examined.

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Table 4.3: Expenditures managed by BCPR from the CPR TTF and crisis-related core resources, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CPR TTF</th>
<th>Core resources</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Disaster</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>611,348</td>
<td>1,576,541</td>
<td>2,187,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>375,471</td>
<td>53,345</td>
<td>428,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>3,895,967</td>
<td>219,432</td>
<td>4,115,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>66,429</td>
<td>66,429</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

activities may be captured), only marginal investments in preparedness can be discerned. Two of these are funded by Germany’s International Climate Initiative (IKI, 2013). The first is a $3.6 million project entitled ‘Adapting Climate Change and Conserving Biological Diversity’ (GIZ, 2008), and the second is a $3.8 million project supporting the Philippines Climate Change Commission in implementing a national climate strategy. A third project for ‘climate change adaptation’ to a value of $4.97 million is funded by the Special Climate Change Fund (SSCF). There are considerable efforts under way in the Philippines to integrate CCA and DRM, so it is anticipated that adaptation funding will have some impact on broader risk management, specifically in regards to institutional development and risk management, including risk assessments. However, government officials state that this is very much a work in progress.

Niger’s $117 million of climate financing, except for $1 million, is solely dedicated towards adaptation. The PPCR has funded just over $100 million of this and the LDCF has contributed another $11.25 million. Descriptions of the two largest projects – both for the ‘Niger Community Action Project for Climate Resilience’ – include language referring to ‘mainstreaming climate resilience into development strategies at national and local levels’, with expectations of risk assessment and preparedness being included. In addition, within other projects references are made to ‘private sector investment to build climate resilience’ and ‘implementing National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) priority interventions’. Not all project descriptions are this ambiguous: some projects are clearly within the bounds of emergency preparedness. Three for ‘climate forecasting and the operationalization of early warning systems’ totalling $13.5 million, were all funded by the PPCR. In addition, $3.25 million of LDCF funding was used for ‘community based adaptation’, including some community-related emergency preparedness activities.

Sudan’s $40 million of climate financing is largely accounted for by seven adaptation projects totalling just under $37 million. Of these, the majority is for energy and water resources. One project to the value of $13.9 million is funded by Japan’s Fast-Start Finance initiative, which, while not one of our three global mechanisms, is still worth considering. It is termed as a ‘countermeasure through food aid in collaboration with WFP’ and is categorised as ‘prevention of disaster and rehabilitation’.

Volumes of climate financing to Myanmar and Haiti are relatively small at $6 million and $8.9 million respectively, of which $5.83 million for Myanmar is for adaptation, and $6.88 million for Haiti. In Myanmar, a small project for ‘training on DRR utilizing mobile/water knowledge’ is the only likely preparedness project, funded by Japan’s Fast-Start Finance. In Haiti, three LDCF projects receive just over $6 million; one of those – $2.73 million for FAO for ‘reducing disaster risk in agriculture’ – speaks to preparedness in its fourth focus area, ‘strengthening of local institutions and

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46 From interviews with both the Philippines Head of the Office of Civil Defense (the body responsible for guiding disaster risk management in the Philippines) and the deputy head of the Climate Commission (Kellett, 2014 forthcoming).

47 Note that for the purposes of this study ODI considers the creation of a NAPA as being equivalent to the ‘legislative and institutional framework’ elements within the emergency preparedness matrix guiding this research. An investment in creating a NAPA is therefore, in part – given the crossover of NAPAs into DRR in general – considered an investment in emergency preparedness.

48 Additional funding for these projects came from the African Development Bank (AfDB). Developed and supported by the AfDB, the African Union and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the Climate for Development in Africa Programme (ClimDev-Africa) in Niger ‘aims at constructing a solid foundation for the response to climate change’. The AfDB developed this fund to support the ClimDev-Africa programme related to the generation and dissemination of reliable climate information, the integration of climate change information into development programmes and the implementation of pilot adaptation practices.
associations to encourage awareness and dissemination of risk management’ (GEF, 2013).

In summary, of the three selected adaptation mechanisms, only two fund in all five case study countries: PPCR and the LDCF. There is no discernible pattern in support of preparedness in this or other adaptation financing, which comes from a variety of global- and country-level mechanisms. Furthermore, the lack of integration of climate adaptation financing with activities funded through DRM risk mechanisms was highlighted as an issue in several of the case studies, especially for the Philippines, Niger and Haiti.

**In-country bilateral: humanitarian and development**

**Financing from in-country donors occurs in all five case study countries, but it is highly variable and highly dependent on the context.**

Bilateral in-country financing for emergency preparedness from donor countries is heavily shaped by the country context, including (amongst other issues) the risk context, political and economic status, governance arrangements, conditions of conflict, peace and security, and crucially the historical and political relations between the donor, the international community and recipient country governments.

![Figure 4.9: Adaptation financing to the five case study countries, by financing source, 2007-2011](chart)

Source: Climate Funds Update, current prices (accessed August 2013)

Bilateral financing, which excludes all funding that goes through one of the global or country mechanisms/tools discussed above, occurs in each of the five case study countries, though to significantly varying degrees and for a variety of emergency preparedness purposes.

Donor representation within each country is key to understanding bilateral contributions from development and humanitarian funding. Global pooled financing mechanisms, such as those discussed in this study, allow many non-resident donors to prioritise funding for specific themes or sectors, without necessarily being present in the recipient country – this is one of the arguments for pooled mechanisms in general. However, broadly speaking, most donor countries undertake a large proportion of their development programming at a country level. This is an important distinction if the argument is put forward for more donors to fund emergency preparedness in greater quantities and in more countries with development financing. Simply put, there would need to be more resident donors, which would be a considerable challenge to achieve, or alternatively a better division of labour (thematically and in-country) (see OECD DAC, 2010 and 2011).

Global data on the number of donors to each country (see Table 4.4) does not tell us if those donors are resident – however, it does suggest how much reliance a country may have on a particular set of donor partners. The data tells us that the Philippines, for example, has a rather narrow overall donor base for ODA. Of the DAC donor governments, five (the US, Japan, Australia, Germany and the EU) accounted for $3.9 billion of grant ODA between 2002 and 2011, 77.9% of the country’s total. The top 10 donors accounted for more than 93%. The other case study countries appear to have a wider donor base. Certainly for Niger, Sudan and Haiti, the regular presence of consolidated appeals in part explains this, giving donor nations without in-country representation.

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49 In both cases, tracking what elements of emergency preparedness are financed is a challenge.

50 Note that, although none of the case study countries is currently receiving support from the Adaptation Fund, a project in Myanmar has been recommended but has not yet been approved. It was formulated by a multilateral implementing agency (Adaptation Fund Board, 2013a). At present, only 50% of Adaptation Fund financing can be channelled through multilateral agencies, and all available funds have already been programmed (Trujillo and Nakhooda, 2013).

51 ‘Resident donors’ is a term used to describe donors that have a presence in-country. ‘Non-resident donors’ refers to those that do not.
a conduit for both prioritisation and funding of humanitarian needs. The 2011 data highlights the differences between recipient countries. However, this is not necessarily a suitable indicator for the range of donor options for emergency preparedness, and data at a global level is not comprehensive. A more useful indicator would be to look at how many donors have funded preparedness activities. In a recent study, ODI has highlighted how some countries have very few donors in disaster risk-related activities, even over a long period: the Philippines has had 14, Haiti 15 and Niger just six over 20 years (Kellett and Caravani, 2013: 22).

Given the challenges within the global data, our analysis relies more heavily on the case studies for a clearer picture of how donors use bilateral funding in-country for emergency preparedness. The Philippines has the most bilateral donor financing in terms of volume that can be tracked. Of the $84.6 million of emergency preparedness funding currently under way, $66 million (75%) comes directly from donors in-country. This is split broadly into two distinct channels: Japanese development funding for long-term early warning infrastructure and related institutional development, and the remaining donors (most prominently Australia and the US) funding largely humanitarian coordination and preparedness for response.

In Myanmar, preparedness features strongly for a few donors, especially the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Department (DIPECHO), USAID and AusAID; however, for most donors (except DIPECHO) there is no disaggregation of funding for preparedness from larger DRR programmes. Bilateral funding is largely humanitarian in origin, triggered after a crisis strikes. DIPECHO’s disaster preparedness programme is the primary donor for DRR, under which emergency preparedness activities often fall. These funds are channelled to operational UN and non-governmental agencies. In 2011, DIPECHO funding in Myanmar reached €1.5 million. In 2012, the EC’s humanitarian aid to Myanmar reached €24.7 million, and emergency preparedness received €1.65 million through DIPECHO. Despite the risk context, there is no equivalent approach to funding preparedness for conflict-related emergencies. Donor presence – if any – is minimal in Yangon, and increasingly minor in the capital Naypyidaw.

In Niger, donor funding for preparedness is primarily humanitarian in origin and is generated by the CAP. Funding is largely not in-country, which in part reflects the small number of donors that are resident in the country and the few avenues for donor financing at country level. Over a 20-year period, only six donors have contributed any money at all (Kellett and Caravani, 2013: 22). However, the EC’s support to the Dispositif, the main governmental risk management body, is a rare example of development funding for the main institutions for preparedness. The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) also supports the Dispositif to prevent and manage crisis, doing so with a mix of humanitarian and development financing.

In Sudan, almost all funding clearly targeted to preparedness (what little exists) comes through the consolidated appeal. Only one donor, Japan, has contributed funds to preparedness outside of the CAP through a number of agricultural projects with FAO in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan regions. In both cases this was development finance.

For Haiti, the major donors are the US, the EC and Canada. Both the US and the EC have emphasised the importance of DRR within their approaches, and have funded directly to partners. In Haiti, assistance to DRR from the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has been overwhelmingly in the form of programmes that integrate risk within disaster response. Examples include cholera prevention and reinforced shelters, as opposed to stand-alone DRR interventions. In 2011, $44 million of disaster assistance to Haiti integrated DRR; by contrast, only

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Table 4.4: Donors to case study countries in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Volume of ODA ($ millions)</th>
<th>Number of donors</th>
<th>Volume of funding from the top five donors ($ millions)</th>
<th>Volume of top five donors % of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>672.0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>437.4</td>
<td>65.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1,201.3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>649.0</td>
<td>54.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1,698.2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1,199.4</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>943.8</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>769.7</td>
<td>81.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>386.3</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>226.4</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on OECD DAC (accessed August 2013). Note that number of donors includes institutions as well as donor countries.

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52 Most bilateral development financing for emergency preparedness we have traced through the country studies has been confined to either broad risk reduction activities in ‘development sectors’ such as agriculture or to technical elements of early warning.
$298,000 was for stand-alone DRR projects (USAID, 2011). ECHO has provided €25.9 million for DRR projects from 1998 to 2013 (ECHO, 2013). ECHO’s financing to DRR in Haiti represented 6.6% of its total funding in 2010 and 8% in 2011; in 2013, €3.5 million was planned for specific disaster preparedness projects. ECHO-funded DRR projects that have included emergency preparedness also involve working in close collaboration with the national system of DRM and reinforcing government capacities to respond to emergencies (ibid.).

4.3.2 Other sources of emergency preparedness financing

The case studies also revealed other significant investments in preparedness, which go beyond the financing mechanisms and channels being investigated in detail here. These additional sources of finance are important for understanding the full picture at a country level.

**Country-specific financing mechanisms**

Heavily dependent on context, in some cases country-specific mechanisms fund emergency preparedness activities, but only as part of larger or wider objectives.

According to the evidence from the five case studies, country-specific mechanisms do not exist in the Philippines or Niger. In the other three countries specific financing mechanisms do exist, in response to the particular context.

In Myanmar the Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT) a multi-donor trust fund established in 2009, includes three projects that have an element of preparedness, protecting livelihoods from the impact of disaster. At the more developmental end of the preparedness continuum, these activities can be considered to be supporting preparedness more broadly: ‘Civil society led community based livelihood resources development’, projects with a $1.9 million budget, implemented by ActionAid; ‘Community initiated livelihoods and poverty reduction projects’, a project with a $2.8 million budget, implemented by the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA); ‘Reducing Risks and Improving Livelihoods in the Rice Environments’, a project with a budget of $2 million implemented by the International Rice Research Institute. In-country, many believe that LiFT could go much further to incorporate preparedness into its investment decisions.

Since 2005 and the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Sudan has had many mechanisms specific to the country. Two of the most important are the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) administered by the World Bank and the Darfur Community Peace and Stabilisation Fund (DCPSF) administered by UNDP. Of the more than $500 million committed to the MDTF since 2005 (two thirds of which has come from the Sudanese government (Sudan MDTF-N, 2011)), no project has either focused on emergency preparedness or has had preparedness activities as a component. The DCPSF is, in terms of mandate, closer to preparedness, with its overall objective being to ‘promote peace building and reconciliation in Darfur through the implementation of community-based recovery and development activities’ (UNDP, undated a). However, more careful investigation into specific projects undertaken through its funding reveals negligible amounts for emergency preparedness. The United Nations Fund for Recovery, Reconstruction and Development in Darfur (UNDF) was created in May 2013 to support the implementation of the Darfur Development Strategy (DDS), the development tool intended to ‘move Darfur out of a cycle of conflict and poverty, towards a stable and prosperous future’ (UNDP, undated b). Its focus is on reducing conflict, to ‘restore peace, security and social stability’. There are also references to ‘improved government functionality’ and strengthening of civil administration – however, whether this is to manage risk is as yet unknown.53

The January 2010 earthquake in Haiti prompted a substantial response, followed almost immediately by a considerable volume of funds for reconstruction. Part of this was channelled through the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF), set up by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank and the UN in support of the government’s Action Plan for the Recovery and Development of Haiti. To date, $380 million has been committed to the fund, making it the largest single source of finance for reconstruction. Since its inception, it has funded a number of projects in which emergency preparedness is a partial component. These are all DRR programmes and include the HRF’s contribution of $8 million towards multi-sector risk reduction and $14 million for ‘natural disaster mitigation’. The fund is also financing a (somewhat unrealistically titled) ‘earthquake prevention plan’ for the north of the country (HRF, 2012), with $9.9 million. One project stands out as particularly important for preparedness: a $2 million ‘capacity building for DRM project’, which includes supporting the Civil Protection Department (CPD). This project is largely about crisis coordination.

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53 UNDF TOR, 20 March 2013, p.4.
Core and multi-use funding

Core funding allocated directly to emergency preparedness is difficult to track, with few institutions or agencies separating out such investments from the rest of their work. Where there is evidence, it is largely through the use of existing human resources for preparedness activities, which may often by part of a larger programme.

All of the case studies report on at least some use of existing resources for emergency preparedness activities; often these resources are ‘human’, with staff drawn from other functions to undertake preparedness plans. Evidence suggests that this human resource capacity comes either from core resources i.e. staff retained to manage overall operations, or alternatively from staff drawn into preparedness from other project activities.

In Myanmar, this was evident when impending natural hazard-related risks were identified through early warning. It should be noted that the case studies suggest that institutions and agencies do not necessarily separate out ‘duties in the area of preparedness’ from other activities.

In the Philippines, several agencies and institutions report undertaking preparedness work by utilising existing human resources. These largely take the form of technical support to government in and around coordination capacity, or for supporting their own response activities; they are not substantial in terms of financial volume. For example, IOM runs trainings for camp management throughout the year, continually updating its own and government staff skills. Plan International has elements of preparedness integrated into much of its work. UNDP and the World Bank extend their technical support to government for improving risk management, beyond specific programmes and projects.

A similar picture is found in Myanmar, Haiti and Sudan, though to a lesser extent. The Niger case study found more evidence of existing resources being applied specifically to emergency preparedness, especially within the NGO community while implementing largely humanitarian programmes and projects. The case study suggests that the volume of this financing from core resources is ‘considerable’.

In Niger, many NGOs report using the same funding lines and staff to conduct preparedness activities, as a way to improve their response time and efficiency. It was strongly suggested by several organisations that preparedness (for them at least) was an essential part of ‘good’ humanitarian aid, and not divisible from that aid.

The Red Cross

Both the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) feature in the case studies, and Red Cross National Societies exist in each country.

IFRC: The IFRC places significant emphasis on disaster preparedness as part of its overall work in ‘disaster management’. It ring-fences 10% of each appeal budget for ‘resilience-building’ measures, to ‘ensure that the operation includes enough investment in disaster preparedness and risk reduction to help keep communities safe and resilient in the future’, while also strengthening national capacity (IFRC, 2011: 5).

As a rule, the IFRC does not break down the amount of actual money spent on disaster preparedness globally; its 2011 report, for example, shows $438 million divided into percentages for its development programme (31%), disaster response programmes (55%), other projects (7%) and supplementary services (7%).

The Red Cross movement as a whole is seen as a key actor in Haiti and the Philippines, and perhaps to a lesser extent in Niger and Myanmar (though in the latter its role is growing fast). In all four cases, disaster preparedness strategies exist that link together Red Cross National Societies with the IFRC and the National Societies of resident donors. Identifying the amount of money spent on preparedness is made challenging by the many routes in which funding can flow within the IFRC system, with individual societies able to act as donor, recipient and implementer of funding.

In Haiti in 2011, for example, ECHO funded French, German and Spanish Red Cross societies as well as the IFRC itself to work on projects that included emergency preparedness activities; Luxembourg financed its own Red Cross society to do the same in 2012. It is highly likely that the Haitian Red Cross played a key role in implementing these projects. A similar pattern is found in the Philippines, where the IFRC and six visiting National Societies are funding the Philippines Red Cross to ‘significantly reduce the impact of disasters’ (2012-2016 Philippines Red Cross Strategic Plan).

ICRC: The ICRC has an annual budget of $1 billion exclusively for humanitarian purposes. It does not track exact values for emergency preparedness, though funding is likely to be spread across its four standard programming areas: protection, assistance, prevention and cooperation with National Societies. Its 2011 annual report suggests that preparedness is part and parcel of delivering on its humanitarian mandate and a foundation of its work within the global Red Cross movement, enhancing ‘preparedness and response by optimizing complementarity and strengthening the global Movement network’ (ICRC, 2012: 14). The report goes further.

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54 Note that we use the term ‘core and multi-use’ to indicate the usage of funding for ‘core’ activities of an agency set aside for emergency preparedness, as well as the provision of resources from other activities undertaken by an agency.

55 Note that it is not possible to state exactly what that means in terms of financial value due to the lack of individual time records for personnel activity. See Niger case study (Robitaille et al., 2014 forthcoming).
stating that the ICRC supports emergency preparedness capacities of its National Society partners in many countries (ibid.: 33) to enable them ‘to meet the specific needs of women in situations of armed conflict or internal violence’. Finally, it understands emergency preparedness as part of attempts to prevent displacement, alleviate the effects of displacement and ease return or relocation (ibid.: 47). Perhaps surprisingly given its conflict-focused mandate, it also makes reference to strengthening the disaster preparedness of its member societies, such as in the Middle East. (ibid.: 369).

The clearest evidence of emergency preparedness from the case studies is drawn from the Philippines. Here the ICRC reported expenditure of $1.7 million in 2012 and 2013 for preparedness activities, largely targeting the conflict-affected population of Mindanao. In addition, the ICRC released stocks and supplied its own staff to assist when Typhoon Bopha struck the country in 2012.

Multilateral banks

Multilateral banks’ investments in risk management for disasters tend to mirror international engagement in general. Where risk management is high on the agenda, it is also for the banks, often informing their country assistance strategies.

The involvement of multilateral banks in the five country contexts mirrors very closely general international engagement in emergency preparedness. Where risk is high on the agenda for international and national communities, it is also so for the banks, as can be seen in the Philippines, Haiti and, to a lesser extent, Niger. Where the relationship between the international community and a country has changed, so does the work of the banks. This can be seen politically in the opening up of Myanmar to the international community in general, and also in relation to risk, such as the massive impact of Haiti’s earthquake and the sudden surge in international support. The type of emergency preparedness activities funded depends largely on the context.

56 Note that in this section we make a distinction between the World Bank and GFDRR, the latter being a financing mechanism managed by a secretariat based within the Bank. In this section, the financing described relates to funding through the World Bank, outside of GFDRR contributions.

57 However, none of them target preparedness alone and it is difficult to extract the exact funding levels, at least not until project completion when a line-by-line expenditure analysis can take place.

58 One project has preparatory elements within it, however, which can be found after considerable investigation: ‘agricultural/food security preparedness through preparation of local cereal banks and animal fodder banks’, part of a $15 million project. This is part of the Niger Second Food Security Support Project; see World Bank (2013e) for more details. Note that the Bank’s strategy does talk of supporting more risk-related programmes in the future, including early detection of locust populations and supporting food security and the Dispositif.

Bank strategies have a very clear focus on disaster risk in the Philippines. Both the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have substantial risk programming in the country. The World Bank has 10 initiatives under way in the area of DRR, a mix of both stand-alone capacity-building programmes and programmes with a heavy risk-related cross-cutting element. Four of these are for the Philippines alone, the rest being regional. One of the country-level programmes is implemented through GFDRR funding. The three remaining programmes are:

- ‘Capacity-Building Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) and Transparent Monitoring of Disaster-Related Expenditures’ – $500,000
- ‘Reducing Vulnerability to Flooding in Metro Manila’ – $1.6 million
- ‘Supporting Local Government Capacity to Manage Natural Disaster Risks in the Philippines’ – $1.1 million.

There are elements of preparedness within each of these (especially in the building of long-term national response capacity). 57

In Niger, both World Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB) strategy papers (2005-2012 and 2013-2016 respectively) recognise that the country is seriously challenged by drought and flood, and both banks state these as priority issues to be addressed (World Bank, 2013d; AfDB, 2013a). The AfDB currently has two projects under way, one focusing on economic development and the other on utilisation of water resources; neither appears to include any emergency preparedness activities. The World Bank has 16 projects under way; the majority do not feature risk, but instead deal with ‘competitiveness and growth’, HIV/AIDs, the transport sector and support to national statistics. 58

In Haiti the World Bank has 21 ongoing projects, all but six of which started after the 2010 earthquake. Two projects are important for emergency preparedness. The first is a $15 million ‘Cholera Emergency Response Project’, which has a sub-component of ‘strengthening government’s capacity to manage and respond to outbreaks’ (World Bank, 2013e).

In addition, a DRM and reconstruction project (World Bank, 2013f) is especially important; three of its five components are key – natural hazard risk assessment mainstreamed in line ministries; strengthening civil protection and improving communications/decision-making; and improving rapid response and recovery coordination. Given that the total budget of this project is $60 million, the investment in preparedness is likely to be considerable. (The IDB has five projects under way in the country to a value of close to $150 million; none of these incorporate preparedness.)

In Sudan, the development banks mirror the minimal focus on emergency preparedness from other mechanisms and sources. The World Bank’s current portfolio (outside of the MDTF-administered projects) consists of six projects. These
cover health, education and livelihoods (World Bank, 2013g), but none relates directly to emergency preparedness. Similarly, the ADB has two ongoing projects in the country, both related to debt management (ADB, 2013b).

In Myanmar, conditions have only just made it possible for development banks to consider operating in the future. The World Bank is in the process of setting out its future re-engagement with the country. This includes a focus on supporting the government’s efforts to transform institutions, building confidence in reform and preparing for a possible resumption of a full country programme (Peters, 2014 forthcoming). At the time of writing, the World Bank was conducting missions in Myanmar, though it is clear that there is a long way to go before the systems and processes are in place that would allow in-country funding and financial investment. Similarly, the ADB has not approved any loans in Myanmar since 1986, but a resumption of engagement is anticipated with the development of an ADB roadmap in 2012 (ADB, 2013). This sets out a range of activities, including the current interim country partnership strategy for 2012-2014, technical assistance and assessments of key economic sectors.

Private sector

Private sector investment in preparedness is limited – for various different reasons – in Sudan, Myanmar and Niger, and only isolated examples were identified. Most evidence is found in the Philippines and, increasingly, in Haiti.

Private sector investment is mixed across the five case studies. In Niger and Sudan it barely registers. There are, however, individual examples in Myanmar and significant investment in the Philippines and, to a growing extent, in Haiti. The evidence from the five case studies suggests that the level of engagement with preparedness issues is correlated with the level of consciousness of risk across civil society.

Disaster risk consciousness within Filipino society is high (Kellett, 2014 forthcoming), and it is perhaps unsurprising that the private sector is also a significant and influential actor, contributing considerably to response activities and increasingly to preparedness. The case study revealed several examples, which represent only a portion of private sector investment. Yum, a restaurant chain, has contributed $100,000 to a WFP emergency preparedness capacity-building project; the Corporate Disaster Response Network is implementing 11 local preparedness projects (worth just under $100,000) funded by eight different companies or corporations; and Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP) is implementing community preparedness to a value of $1.5 million, with funding from a range of institutional and private sector sources.

Private sector support is bolstered by government legislation. The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP) and the Philippines Development Plan (PDP) name ‘Industry and Services’ as a specific area of focus, with the requirement to ‘Assess the level of DRR awareness and activities among the private sector and disseminate materials on DRR to ensure their support, participation and cooperation’. Similar encouragement to formalise the role of the private sector in risk management is seen in Haiti. In 2012 the UK funded a forward-looking review of the 2010 earthquake response, specifically to explore strategies for integrating the private sector into the Haiti Earthquake Preparedness Plan as a potential first responder.

Preparing for conflict, according to the case study evidence, is barely articulated by the private sector, although this does not exclude the possibility that evidence could be extracted from a more detailed understanding of each country’s civil society. The Philippines was the one case where the private sector did appear to be involved in emergency preparedness for conflict, in Mindanao, with business associations and the PBSP involved in ‘conflict management’ (Rood, 2005).

Some of Haiti’s largest companies have taken up disaster preparedness very seriously, both in terms of their own preparedness (i.e. contingency plans for operations and assets) and in the services they provide – for example, the mobile communications company Digicel distributes disaster alerts via SMS. As early as 2006, a private sector coalition, the Alliance for Risk Management and Business Continuity (AGERCA), was established, with a 15-member network including companies such as Digicel, Comme Il Faut, UNIBANK, Rebo, Nassa and AIC insurance. A number of AGERCA’s members have facilitated the development of preparedness teams within companies, as well as the improvement of delivery mechanisms and the development of a strategic plan to engage small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in preparedness.

59 The methodological challenges of tracing and tracking private spending on preparedness impede the extent to which we can establish the level of investment coming from the private sector. Anecdotal evidence suggests that private sector involvement in preparedness is significantly greater than the case studies have uncovered, partly due to simple under-reporting and partly because companies may not use the term ‘preparedness’ in the same way that the study has done. The lack of any central source of information (either national or international) for understanding the full contribution of the private sector in any of the five countries adds to this challenge, and tracking therefore remains ad hoc at best. Where possible, additional detail is provided in each of the five case studies.

60 See annex of PDP concerning relationship with the NDRRMP (PDP, undated).

61 No final report for this project is yet available.

62 Disaggregating emergency preparedness within the set of activities that are regarded a ‘conflict management’ has not been possible within the frame of this study.
Box 4.2: Philippines private sector and preparedness: growing and shared experiences

Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP) is the country’s ‘largest business-led social development organisation’. It works with its 243 member companies to integrate corporate social responsibility (CSR) into their core work, and examines the impact of business on the country’s growth. It also has a philanthropic wing; in 2012 it reported giving support to more than 14 million people, both from its members and from other sources. Its work on preparedness comes as part of a DRR/CCA agenda.

The Corporate Network for Disaster Response is similar to the PBSP, and focuses on disasters in particular. Again sponsored by a mix of member and external contributions, it works in areas from disaster response to preparedness, with a particular focus on the country’s most vulnerable areas.

One of the most promising public-private sector partnerships for emergency preparedness (and indeed for a wide range of risk-related activities) is the Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation (PDRF). Set up after the 2009 typhoon season, the PDRF is venturing beyond reconstruction into ex-ante initiatives, such as using mobile phone company installations to install rain gauges for monitoring purposes.

The Filipino private sector is also expanding its influence and sharing its expertise beyond its own borders. In early 2013, SM Prime Holdings (the country’s largest chain of shopping malls) became a member of UNISDR’s Private Sector Advisory Group (see UNISDR, 2013b).

Evidence from the other countries reveals little private sector engagement with preparedness issues.63 In Myanmar, only a few minor examples of private financial support to response and recovery or reconstruction were identified.64 For example, Serge Pun Associates of Singapore, one of the largest foreign companies present in the country, assisted with response and built a model village following Cyclone Nargis. A report by Trocaire (2011) discusses the role of Myanmar’s private sector in humanitarian response, largely through the philanthropic work of companies in responding to Cyclone Nargis. It may be reasonable to consider that under likely improved conditions for private business,65 current support for response may venture into preparedness, something that Trocaire anticipates in recommending public-private partnerships (PPPs) for DRR.66

In summary, private sector engagement with preparedness varies considerably. Only in the Philippines and Haiti has the level of risk consciousness in civil society prompted national private sector involvement. In the Philippines this has evolved over several decades, while in Haiti it was largely a spontaneous reaction to the shock of the 2010 earthquake. Evidence from the case studies does suggest potential for growth, especially given the increasing interest in disaster risk in general and its impact on economic development and growth.67 The role of international corporations needs further investigation. While the case studies suggest that this is limited to a few cases in Haiti,68 Myanmar and the Philippines (at least in terms of financing), actual preparedness activities are considerably under-reported.69

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63 See case studies for Myanmar (Peters, 2013), Sudan (Hockley, 2013) and Niger (Robitaille et al., 2014 forthcoming).
64 It should be noted that the lack of data available in Myanmar does not negate the likelihood of business investment in preparedness nationally, especially through informal or small community-based enterprises. This is anecdotally reported in the case study, but data is lacking on its scale.
65 See, for example, PwC’s report of significant developments in Myanmar’s economic and social landscape, which have resulted in optimism from the global business community’ (PwC, 2012: 4).
66 The leveraging of PPPs has also been considered by at least one of the country’s main donors, USAID. USAID is promoting PPPs through its latest Global Development Alliance (GDA) Annual Programme Statement (APS) call, with up to $1 million available for each collaboration. In 2013, one of the funding opportunities focuses on DRR and preparedness in Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, with private funding to at least match USAID contributions.
67 In Haiti, and in comparable cases beyond the five case study countries, the potential for disasters to undermine the economic growth of a country is helping make the case for the need to more proactively consider risk management as a factor affecting economic growth. As an example, in the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the Post-Earthquake Disaster Needs Assessment 2010 and the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti included DRM as a cross-cutting priority for both the public and private sectors. In addition to managing and reducing risk, DRM was presented as an opportunity to support decentralisation, strengthen civil society and promote CSR and innovation in the private sector. As noted by GFDRR, the inclusion of DRM in these plans and strategies demonstrates a consensus within the Government of Haiti and its partners on the importance of integrating DRM ‘as a core component of sustainable poverty reduction and economic growth’ (World Bank and GFDRR, 2010: 4).
68 For example, while we note that more than $1.3 billion of private funding arrived in Haiti in the post-earthquake period (much of which came from private sector companies, corporations or foundations), accounting for one third of humanitarian financing that year (OCHA FTS), we are unable to track how flexible the use of this funding was, i.e. whether it was also directed to preparedness activities.
69 See Kent and Burke (2011). This report outlines the current scale of private sector involvement in humanitarian response, preparedness and DRR; it sees preparedness as a yet undefined role for the private sector, but one likely to see growth.
Table 4.5: Overview of the scale and scope of emergency preparedness financing in case study countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanitarian funding mechanism/tool</th>
<th>CERF</th>
<th>CAP</th>
<th>CHF</th>
<th>ERF</th>
<th>Direct donor funding</th>
<th>Bilateral donor – humanitarian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>In both 2012 and 2013 the CERF contributed several million dollars for projects that mixed response, preparedness and presentation in relation to cholera.</td>
<td>The CAP included preparedness as a key issue in 2010, 2011 and 2012. But funding for preparedness remains limited.</td>
<td>No CHF present</td>
<td>11 ERF projects specifically identified as having preparedness components in 2011. Ten of these were for cholera. One stand-out project is the funding of a CDAC network in Haiti.</td>
<td>Substantial attention to wider DRR from USAID and ECHO over a long period. Total value to preparedness difficult to track. $3.5 million from ECHO, $300,000 from USAID minimum values in recent years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Only two of 40 projects (for WFP) have had partial preparedness objectives.</td>
<td>Since 2004 there have been six UN consolidated or flash appeals, with $394.9 million from 352 projects, of which only 11 have had a partial preparedness objective. Total funded $2.7 million</td>
<td>No CHF present</td>
<td>No ERF present</td>
<td>Mostly Australia and United States, funding largely humanitarian coordination and preparedness for response. Value: $29.6 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Provided $1 million to WHO and UNICEF to prevent cholera and treat victims. UNHRC received $2 million for IDPs. Preparedness components exist but remain hidden and rare. Emergency preparedness a proportion of $3 million</td>
<td>Preparedness is central to the CAP, one of three pillars under a resilience ‘objective’. Of 83 projects in the most recent appeal, 53 have some preparedness element.</td>
<td>No CHF present</td>
<td>No ERF present</td>
<td>A part-humanitarian, part-development SDC support project to the Dispositif</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Minor preparedness funding, for UNFPA for health-related preparedness.</td>
<td>The post-Nagirs appeal was the only official CAP – a flash appeal. Two projects for ‘DRR and preparedness’ are traceable. Value $4.5 million</td>
<td>No CHF present</td>
<td>Allocated $8.2 million to national and international NGOs in conflict-affected areas and with IDPs. No evidence of emergency preparedness activities</td>
<td>Preparedness features strongly for a few donors, especially ECHO, USAID, AusAID; however, for most except ECHO there is no disaggregation from larger DRR programmes. Known value: $3.15 million over two years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Funding allocated often for underfunded priorities within the Work Plan. No evidence of emergency preparedness in any of these projects</td>
<td>2013 Work Plan is appealing for over $963 million to implement 364 projects, it is estimated about 3% of this overall requested volume. Value through the CAP estimated at $3 million.</td>
<td>No CHF present</td>
<td>No ERF present</td>
<td>No financing discovered</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: No fill indicates no mechanism/tool present or used, light grey indicates minimal emergency preparedness included in the mechanism/tool, darker grey indicates more substantive financial support for emergency preparedness. The estimated value of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bilateral donor – development</th>
<th>Risk-focused mechanisms</th>
<th>Climate adaptation mechanisms</th>
<th>Pilot Programme on Climate Resilience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None tracked</td>
<td>Nine projects funded, eight after the 2010 earthquake. Four projects contain elements of preparedness. Value a proportion of $3.2 million</td>
<td>Three projects funded to the value of $6.4 million. One project in particular references ‘reducing disaster risk in agriculture’, valued at $2.7 million and implemented by FAO. Value a proportion of $2.7 million.</td>
<td>One project ($0.4 million) to design a national programme for climate resilience. No clear emergency preparedness component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese development funding for long-term early warning infrastructure and institutional development. Value: $35.3 million</td>
<td>GFDRR has funded five projects to date: A ‘support to the DRM agenda’ project will likely have emergency preparedness components. Value a proportion of $2.7 million</td>
<td>No funding</td>
<td>No funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both the EC and SDC support the Dispositif. Total value: around $16 million</td>
<td>Not a priority country – no funding</td>
<td>$2.1 million for conflict prevention (of which $600,000 from CPR funds, the rest from UNDP core funding). Value a proportion of $2.1 million</td>
<td>No funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No financing discovered</td>
<td>Not a priority country – no funding</td>
<td>$375,000 for early recovery unlikely to have preparedness components, $53,000 for response. No emergency preparedness funding identified</td>
<td>No funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan funded FAO for agricultural preparedness in Blue Nile and South Kordofan regions. No total figure for preparedness available</td>
<td>Not a priority country – no funding</td>
<td>Three projects financed, to a value of just over $6 million. No obvious emergency preparedness components</td>
<td>No funding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Emergency preparedness for each mechanism in each case study is indicated in bold. Where the exact preparedness value is not known, this may be indicated as ‘value part of x million.’

4.4 Summary: the current state of emergency preparedness financing

This research suggests that investment in systems, processes and projects for emergency preparedness by the national and international community occurs in discrete, concentrated efforts. Yet coverage of all the requirements (geographical, sectoral and temporal) falls far short of need. Critically, from an international perspective, a coherent or coordinated approach across humanitarian and development action from the international community is consistently lacking. Inadequate emergency preparedness is therefore not just about the volume of funding. Across each of the five contexts the research team noted the lack of a shared vision or shared plan of action that would articulate risks, needs, responsibilities, programmes and activities (with connections to national plans and systems). And, despite the evident need, attention to emergency preparedness (or rather the persistent lack of it) still coalesces around the existing financing architecture rather than targeting ‘need’ or responding to ‘risk’.?

Despite the evident need, attention to emergency preparedness (or rather the persistent lack of it) still coalesces around the existing financing architecture rather than targeting ‘need’ or responding to ‘risk’.

In fact, all of the mechanisms and channels analysed here fund at least some part of the emergency preparedness matrix. Humanitarian funding mechanisms play a considerable role, in some cases despite their mandate; anecdotal evidence suggests this is in part due to the absence of other channels of finance. We have tracked elements of preparedness in the CHFs, ERFs and even the CERF, as well through consolidated appeals. In general, financing for emergency preparedness comes largely from humanitarian sources (mechanisms and donors) and there is evidence that the apparent logic and rationale for investing in emergency preparedness is in part crowded out by the humanitarian financing architecture, which inhibits more proactive and sustained preparedness efforts. The most significant financing (in terms of volume) is for support to ‘preparedness for response’ activities, with a focus on coordination (both national and international), logistics, training and pre-positioning. The evidence from the case studies is that the bulk of funding for these activities – where it is available – is not concerned with building the long-term capacity of national actors, which reflects the limitations of the mechanisms.

The risk-focused mechanisms we have analysed in some detail – GFDRR and the UNDP CPR TTF – fund activities in the case study countries that are priorities for their intervention, and this financing is more likely to go towards longer-term preparedness activities, usually as part of a larger package of work and usually focused on natural disasters. There is some evidence that development money for emergency preparedness direct from donors is encompassed within broader DRR or climate-related goals, or sometimes for resilience or poverty reduction. Where we can identify development money from larger initiatives, we see that it goes primarily towards longer-term DRR initiatives, largely attached to legislation, institution-building and key technical areas such as early warning and risk assessment. Climate adaptation financing, at least in the case study countries, connects with emergency preparedness exclusively where climate risk meets DRM, with shared objectives largely towards the development end of the preparedness continuum.?

A key issue for attracting emergency preparedness financing in each of the case study countries is the availability of in-country donors, especially worrying for countries that have little profile or lack financing tools and mechanisms that can engage donors beyond the country itself. There is also some evidence of donor fragmentation, which is exacerbated by a lack of funding coordination for risk management across each context. On balance, most donors’ funding of preparedness appears to come through consolidated appeals, which represent both a long-term engagement with complex emergencies and a tool for non-resident donors to fund preparedness activities. However, even when the CAP has an overall target or goal of preparedness, such as in Niger, actual funding levels are relatively low – an articulation of emergency preparedness needs is no guarantee that funding will come. There appears to be a gap between country-level prioritisation of emergency preparedness and donor engagement. On the other hand, there is evidence that multilateral development banks can act as substantial donors themselves when ‘risk’ is put at the heart of their

71 In addition, resources for emergency preparedness are sometimes ‘hidden’ by the way it is defined and managed; there is, for example, evidence of a key role being played in agencies providing other resources (such as core funding, humanitarian or risk-related programming) towards emergency preparedness, without it being identified as such. It is also important to note that the lack of shared semantics, coding and reporting of emergency preparedness has been shown throughout the case studies to considerably inhibit our understanding of all that is financed.

72 Perhaps unsurprisingly, evidence from the case studies shows that, despite having this shared risk agenda, financing for CCA and DRR is often segregated, with largely separate agencies, either national or international, involved.
country strategies. Given that banks respond to a great extent to a country’s own priorities, this happens naturally when a country itself has a high consciousness of risk, such as in the Philippines.

For conflict preparedness, the picture is very mixed across the different contexts, with this being largely a secondary concern, in different ways depending on the context. In the Philippines, agencies (both national and international) direct their disaster-related resources towards preparing for conflict in Mindanao. In Myanmar, the little conflict preparedness that exists is focused almost exclusively on food and non-food items. There is little segregation of conflict preparedness from overall food security needs in Niger. In Sudan, conflict is the major issue, and response dominates. Although in some ways it is secondary to other objectives, preparedness for conflict is not non-existent; the consolidated appeal in Sudan, for example, which barely mentions preparedness specifically, articulates emergency preparedness activities that are clearly in response to predicted conflict.

National governments appear to have a rational and logical approach to financing for preparedness (if we exclude conflict situations). In all of the case studies, even though overall funding is low (except in the Philippines), national governments (and to an extent civil society) are unified by delivering legislation and policy for creating an adequate system and processes for disaster preparedness, usually as part of a long-term set of DRR measures. However, needs obviously remain at a country level, and arguably these could be prioritised by the international system. Long-term technical capacity-building, some of which is already under way, is needed even in the most positive of contexts – the Philippines – as the recent devastating Typhoon Haiyan highlights. To an extent, although the contexts are very different, Haiti and Niger are in similar need of support for long-term preparedness. In Sudan and Myanmar, there is much to be done to get even the basics of ‘preparedness for response’ up and running, and the reasons are largely the same in both contexts, though in different ways: the challenge of aid financing in general and the heavy focus on humanitarian financing. Recent evidence suggests that the international community has some way to go to prioritise financing in the right places (in terms of risk, need or domestic capacity) (see Kellett and Caravani, 2013).

In summary, the evidence from all five case study countries suggests that emergency preparedness is inadequate regardless of the context. There is unequal attention across the range of activities, with an abundance of actors working on some activities and significant gaps in others. This is not to suggest that there should be equal weighting across all activities, but that weighting should be appropriate to the nature and scale of that activity. Overall, the financing picture for emergency preparedness is both unnecessarily complicated and piecemeal at best, a situation that is exacerbated rather than combated by the international aid architecture. Where noteworthy actions have taken place, they have not added the value that they potentially could have done, had a stronger systematic approach to preparedness been adopted by all actors engaged in high-risk areas.
5. The business case for emergency preparedness

Niger and beyond
5. The business case for emergency preparedness: Niger and beyond

Key messages

- In Niger, the monetary benefits of investing in preparedness in relation to drought clearly outweigh the costs; this suggests a fiduciary duty on the part of donors and the government to focus more support on emergency preparedness.
- The benefit-to-cost ratios for emergency preparedness in Niger are positive across all scenarios, ranging from $3.25 of benefit generated for every $1 spent, on conservative estimates, up to $5.31 for every $1 spent.
- Findings support further investment in emergency preparedness activities, as the benefits far outweigh the costs in terms of reduced caseloads, unit cost of response and disaster losses.
- The international community has a stronger role to play to support systems of preparedness for conflict, even in the most challenging of working environments. To date, conflict preparedness (as a concept, and in practice) has been neglected.
- Change will cost; minor adjustments to existing mechanisms will not be enough to adequately support preparedness on a global scale.
- Evidence is lacking on the costs and benefits of emergency preparedness, and so what we know of the value of preparedness is only a fraction of what it could offer.

5.1 The costs and benefits of emergency preparedness

It is increasingly being recognised that, in a changing political and economic landscape, a risk-based approach to development and humanitarian work offers maximum potential to use ODA to great effect (see Mitchell et al., 2012). A risk-based approach aligns with the recent trend in ‘resilience’ (Harris, 2013) and economic analyses that build the evidence base for why ex-ante investment and action are cost-effective (Cabot Venton et al., 2014 forthcoming; Mechler, 2014 forthcoming). Yet this is not just an agenda for the international community. A more risk-informed approach to development, and the ambition to pursue a sustainable development trajectory, require national ownership and responsibility for preparedness actions. This necessitates improved national fiscal policy, allocations to preparedness in budgetary processes and improved understanding of the national financial contributions required to address in-country preparedness needs.

The national landscape must be at the forefront of all international efforts to build the capacity to respond to both natural hazards and man-made crises within any country context. Where the international community has a stronger role to play is in better understanding what conflict preparedness can entail, and to support national systems to strengthen preparedness for conflict even in the most challenging of working environments.

Evidence on the costs and benefits of emergency preparedness is lacking in relation to other interventions, thus what we know of the value of emergency preparedness is only a fraction of what preparedness
could offer. Moreover, challenges abound in coding and quantifying emergency preparedness, inhibiting the generation of reliable and quantifiable evidence on preparedness spending in individual contexts (see Bird et al., 2014 forthcoming). Yet there is growing interest in providing quantitative evidence to back up what humanitarians have argued for decades in relation to preparedness and broader risk-based approaches to development. Decision-makers and donors are increasingly becoming interested in the ‘business case’ for investing in disaster risk management. There is a small but growing trend for using cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as a tool for comparing the costs and benefits of interventions in order to make this case. Yet emergency preparedness, as one critical element of risk management contributing to reducing risk, has not previously been studied specifically in this regard.

**Box 5.1: Research into the cost benefits of emergency preparedness**

A background paper for this report suggests that the economic case for DRM – which incorporates emergency preparedness for natural hazards – is strong and that the benefits of investing in DRM outweigh the costs of doing so – on average by four times the cost in terms of avoided and reduced losses (see Mechler, 2014 forthcoming).

Mechler’s paper highlights how preparedness has increasingly been tackled, with 10 out of the 30 prominent studies it reviewed having a preparedness component. Nine of these cover emergency/response preparedness in terms of considering the returns to land use and evacuation planning, training and capacity-building, early warning, shelters and the provision of emergency kits. Also, three studies cover systemic preparedness interventions, such as the establishment of women’s self-help groups. Overall, the preparedness studies seem to offer substantial net benefits across different evaluations, hazards and locations. While some interventions exhibit benefit/cost ratios of less than 1 (i.e. interventions were not considered cost-efficient), many times these ratios are positive, and an upper value of 4 for the best estimates per study seems a reasonable number for this set of studies. Variation is high, however, and the gains from preparedness may often even outweigh benefits from exposure modification, with ranges of benefits-to-cost ratio estimates from early warning of up to 70 and preparedness (in terms of planning and enhancing resilience) of up to 24.

**5.2 Emergency preparedness in Niger: a cost-benefit analysis**

As part of this research, a detailed investigation was carried out into the costs and benefits of emergency preparedness in Niger (Cabot Venton et al., 2014 forthcoming). The findings provide indicative evidence that there is a clear financial imperative for greater investment in effective preparedness in the country. The monetary benefits of investing in preparedness in relation to drought – assuming that is it implemented in a manner that delivers the expected gains – clearly outweigh the costs. This suggests a clear fiduciary duty on the part of donors and the Government of Niger (GoN) to focus more support on emergency preparedness.

**The cost of support**

The GoN’s Annual Support Plan (Plan de Soutien) estimates overall needs for food security and nutrition assistance, related to all hazards. It has allocated an average of $231 million per year over the six years between 2008 and 2013. In 2013, the Support Plan estimated the cost of emergency preparedness at $14.1 million, equivalent to approximately 6% of the total costs estimated for that year. In addition, in November 2011 the 2012 consolidated appeal stood at $229 million. By the time of its revision in April 2012, needs had reached a total of $487 million. With needs in Niger on a staggering scale, the benefits of emergency preparedness are of heightened importance, and have been articulated as:

- reduced unit cost of response
- reduced caseloads and
- reduced losses.

**The cost of humanitarian response is likely to decrease if emergency preparedness measures are in place and functioning well**

**Reduced unit cost of response**

The cost of humanitarian response is likely to decrease if emergency preparedness measures are in place and functioning well. This is for a variety of reasons – for example, contingency planning can allow for pre-

73 Adapted from IPCC (2012), exposure modification refers here to ‘the presence of people; livelihoods; environmental services and resources; infrastructure; or economic, social, or cultural assets in places that could be adversely affected’.
positioning of stocks, leading to a reduction in last-minute transport costs, and sourcing of supplies can be pre-arranged at lower price points. WFP Niger estimates that pre-planning in response to drought could reduce aid costs (food and non-food aid) to 89% of the cost under a scenario without any pre-planning, based largely on reduced costs of cereal prices and transport costs (Ballo and Bauer, 2013). These savings are also applicable for flooding and conflict, as the savings on pre-planning apply to food and non-food aid in any emergency as it arises. This would suggest that the cost of humanitarian response could decrease from an average annual estimate of $217 million under the Plan de Soutien to an annual average of $193 million.

Reduced caseloads

Emergency preparedness is also expected to lead to a reduction in caseloads, by facilitating early response before asset depletion has taken hold. This will be true especially in the context of drought, as slow-onset disasters present a greater opportunity to intervene before a crisis stage has been reached. In the case of floods or conflict, while the reduction in caseloads may not be as pronounced, emergency preparedness measures such as evacuation plans and early warning should facilitate a decrease in loss of lives and assets.

Ballo and Bauer (2013) use the Household Economy Approach to model the reduction in caseloads that could occur with an early response to drought in Niger. The modelling suggests that caseloads from an early response to a high-magnitude drought are 51% of the caseloads under a late response (Cabot Venton and Coultier, 2013). Applying this potential reduction to the cost of response as a result of preparedness is not straightforward, however. The Plan de Soutien provides an aggregate cost of response for all events. However, it is unlikely that this level of reduction could be achieved for rapid-onset events such as floods and conflict – the reductions are likely to be much smaller, but data does not exist to quantify them. Applying a reduction in caseloads to the cost-benefit figures identified suggests that humanitarian response costs would decrease even further to an average annual cost of $98 million, a total reduction in humanitarian response costs of $119 million.

Reduced losses

Emergency preparedness aims to reduce losses due to the impact of crisis – early warning and contingency planning, for instance, can reduce losses associated with lost lives, assets and livelihoods. Because data on reduced losses with preparedness measures is not available with any certainty, the analysis looks at three potential scenarios. Under the most conservative assumption, losses are estimated to decrease by 10%, a second scenario considers a 20% reduction in losses and a third scenario considers a 30% reduction in losses. These percentages were chosen as illustrations, but are considered to be conservative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated reduction in losses</th>
<th>Value of reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>$4m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>$8m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30%</td>
<td>$12m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Costs

The cost of emergency preparedness measures is described in two plans: the Plan de Soutien (estimated at FCFA 6.96 billion, or $14.1 million) and a GoN flood risk management plan (estimated at FCFA 50.18 billion, or $101.4 million for three years, equivalent to $33.8 million per year). The total estimated cost of emergency preparedness is therefore $47.9 million per year.

Benefit-to-cost ratio

The costs and benefits outlined above were input into a 20-year model, to estimate the costs of emergency preparedness as compared with the benefits, monetised in terms of avoided costs of aid and disaster losses. Because of the number of assumptions required in the modelling, three scenarios were modelled, varying the assumptions around the absolute level of disaster losses, the potential reduction in disaster losses and the discount rate. Table 5.2 summarises the three scenarios modelled, ranging from the most conservative assumptions to the least conservative.

The benefit-to-cost ratio (BCR) for each of these scenarios is presented in Table 5.3.

The BCRs are positive across all scenarios. In the most conservative scenario, it is estimated that $3.25 of benefit is generated for every $1 spent, and this increases as high

---

74 While this was not specifically explored in Ballo and Bauer (2013), WFP did a similar analysis in Mozambique for both flooding and drought, and found that similar levels of savings in unit cost were achieved.

75 The discount rate is used to reflect the time value of money. In other words, a dollar today is considered more valuable than a dollar tomorrow, because it can be put towards productive purposes immediately. A 10% discount rate is typical for most development projects and is used here.
as $5.31 of benefit for every $1 spent in Scenario 3 in the least conservative. The findings clearly support the case for investment in emergency preparedness activities, as the benefits in terms of reduced caseloads and disaster losses far outweigh the costs.

### 5.3 Effectiveness analysis for emergency preparedness in Niger

Cost-effectiveness analysis is used to assess the cost of various measures to achieve a given outcome. However, in this analysis, the aim is not to weigh up different components of emergency preparedness; it would not be appropriate to invest in some measures and not others, as preparedness measures are inter-related and designed to work together. Having an extensive early warning system, for example, will be of marginal use if governments and communities do not have the capacity to act on information. In the case of emergency preparedness, the objective is to reduce the cost of recovery per person (in other words, the cost per person to return them to a pre-disaster state). Here, this cost is compared for the counterfactual – i.e. late humanitarian response – and emergency preparedness.

#### Drought and floods

The Economics of Early Response and Resilience (TEERR) report on Niger conducted extensive modelling, based on probabilistic hazard assessment for drought, and using the Household Economy Approach dataset (see Ballo and Bauer, 2013). The WFP research found that the average cost of response per person under the counterfactual – late humanitarian response with no emergency preparedness – was between $92 and $106. By comparison, under early response, including early procurement and pre-positioning of supplies, WFP estimated that the cost of humanitarian response would be $41 per person. Furthermore, the modelling estimated that caseloads would decrease by half, reducing the cost of response to effectively $20 per person. 

This implies an average annualised cost of $30 and $35 under the counterfactual, as compared with $7 per person under early response/emergency preparedness.77

Emergency preparedness does not eliminate the need for humanitarian response, but it does significantly reduce it. When its cost is combined with the residual need for aid the cost per person affected, as shown in Table 5.3, is $46 (under drought) or $9 (under flood). Table 4.1 presents the summary cost-effectiveness analysis.

---

### Table 5.2: Modelling scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Scenario 1</th>
<th>Scenario 2</th>
<th>Scenario 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disaster losses</td>
<td>$44m</td>
<td>$88m</td>
<td>$132m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crop losses</td>
<td>annualised</td>
<td>doubling of losses</td>
<td>tripling of losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in losses</td>
<td>10% ($4m)</td>
<td>20% ($18m)</td>
<td>30% ($40m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discount rate</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5.3: Benefit-to-cost ratio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>BCR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 1</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 2</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 3</td>
<td>5.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5.4: Summary cost-effectiveness analysis for droughts and floods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost per person affected</th>
<th>Drought</th>
<th>Flood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counterfactual: late humanitarian response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Aid costs</td>
<td>$92</td>
<td>$46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Annualised</td>
<td>$30</td>
<td>$9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late: total cost per person</td>
<td>$30</td>
<td>$9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency preparedness/early response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Aid costs</td>
<td>$41</td>
<td>$23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Adjusted for reduction in caseloads</td>
<td>$2076</td>
<td>$2379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Annualised</td>
<td>$7</td>
<td>$5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Cost of emergency preparedness</td>
<td>$12–$21</td>
<td>$60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early: total cost per person (c+d)</td>
<td>$19–$28</td>
<td>$65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

76 These costs specifically relate to high- and medium-magnitude droughts, which have a return period of once every three years in Niger.

77 These figures refer purely to humanitarian response costs, and do not include losses. Clearly savings would also include a reduction in losses, though data in this regard is weak and therefore cannot be included in this analysis.

78 Reduction in caseloads in drought estimated at 50%.

79 Reduction in caseloads in flood estimated at 0%.
humanitarian response, the total cost is between $19 and $28 per person per year. At the high end, this suggests that an emergency preparedness scenario would cost half that of late humanitarian response. At the low end, costs of emergency preparedness are slightly lower than the counterfactual.

**Emergency preparedness does not eliminate the need for humanitarian response, but it does significantly reduce it**

The cost of emergency preparedness in Niger, as contained in the Plan de Soutien, is between $12 and $21 per person per year. This amount needs to be invested every year, regardless of whether a drought takes place, to ensure that the systems and capacity are ready when a crisis strikes.

Floods occur more or less every other year in Niger, but medium-magnitude floods that require more consistent humanitarian response occur on average once every five years. Despite their prevalence, data on floods is far more limited, though the government assessment of the 2012 floods provides some useful data. This is used to annualise the estimated cost of response. The indicative estimate used here shows the cost of response at between $46 and $53 per person. By way of comparison, the cost of response per person affected in the 2012 floods – a one-in-100-year event – was $55 per person, very much in line with these estimates.

Under an early response/emergency preparedness scenario, costs would be reduced by approximately half, to between $23 and $27 per person. However, caseloads are less likely to decrease in a rapid-onset event as compared with a slow-onset event, where there is significantly more lead time to act to reduce caseloads. Therefore, it is assumed that caseloads under flooding are not affected by early response/emergency preparedness.

**Cost-effectiveness analysis: the caveats**

The findings for floods suggest that emergency preparedness is not more cost-effective than the counterfactual. However, this is based purely on comparing aid costs with emergency preparedness costs; and emergency preparedness costs are estimated on the basis of the flood response plan for contingency measures for a one-in-100-year flood and therefore are likely to be out of proportion to the kinds of measures necessary for a one-in-five-year flood. Further to this, this analysis was not able to account for potential losses, or for losses avoided under emergency preparedness, which are likely to be significant.

The effectiveness of an emergency preparedness plan will depend on the degree to which these various criteria are properly assessed and incorporated. For example, while the quantitative analysis suggests that emergency preparedness is more cost-effective than the current approach, this conclusion relies heavily upon the assumption that emergency preparedness measures will be fit for purpose and hence effective at delivering gains. An emergency preparedness plan that is not carefully designed, or does not account for the various criteria listed above, may fail to deliver outcomes, and hence ultimately be more expensive than ‘business as usual’.

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80 Personal communication by Courtenay Cabot Venton, WFP, October 2013.

81 Total aid costs of approximately $30m divided by 547,000 people affected.
6. Understanding what makes for effective financing of emergency preparedness
6. Understanding what makes for effective financing of emergency preparedness

Key messages

- Humanitarian financing mechanisms and tools are not a ‘silver bullet’ to financing emergency preparedness. The CERF, ERFs, CHFs and CAP offer varied possibilities, but also have a number of constraints to better financing.

- Climate adaptation funds also offer considerable potential for expanding into more specific preparedness financing. There are shared weaknesses too, however: none of the funds supports preparedness for non-climate-related risks or conflict.

- The two mechanisms with a specific focus on risk (GFDRR and UNDP CPR TTF) perform strongly in the framework questions, warranting further exploration.

- The entrenched, bifurcated donor government structure has contributed to establishing an artificial divide between development and humanitarian communities; both provide a partial solution to improved financing of emergency preparedness.

- Unless country-based funding is allocated using a tailored percentage relative to in-country needs, earmarking of funds is a somewhat arbitrary exercise.

- Simply increasingly volumes of funding for preparedness will not overcome the non-financial challenges identified and – as the example of the Philippines suggests – may add confusion to an already complicated preparedness picture.

BOX 6.1: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH FOR DETERMINING THE ‘BEST FIT’ MECHANISM

The methodological approach for determining the ‘best fit’ mechanism involved i). detailed analysis of the case studies (Section 4), ii). research into emergency preparedness financing mechanisms beyond the case study countries (Sections 3 and 6), iii). Identification of a set of key determining questions for effective and efficient emergency preparedness.

The five case studies were analysed in detail to come up with a comprehensive list of criteria identified as enabling effective and efficient emergency preparedness.

The importance of each criterion to each country was then considered, indicating the extent to which the countries meet that criterion. Each of these was then ranked by the overall importance given to them by the full range of case studies.

As not all criteria examined are seen as essential for effective and efficient financing of preparedness, or at least not for the financing mechanisms themselves, each was closely examined and a decision was made on what was appropriate to be included as key questions specifically for financing. These questions were then brought together into a framework of questions, as indicated in Table 2.3.

The questions were then used to analyse each of the core mechanisms and channels of financing in order to identify the ‘best fit’ mechanism for financing emergency preparedness (see Table 6.1).

Answers to these questions were then considered in the light of an examination of core mechanisms beyond case study countries and the current context of preparedness policy debate, to come up with a set of options for improved emergency preparedness (see Section 7).

For further details of the methodology used in this report, including the criteria for effective/efficient preparedness, the importance of the criteria across contexts and the appropriate of criteria to financing, see the background documents.
6.1 Identifying the ‘best fit’ mechanism for financing emergency preparedness

Section 4 demonstrates the clear need to reconsider or re-imagine the design of the current funding system in order to effectively finance emergency preparedness. Section 5 makes it clear that there is a business case to be made for investment in emergency preparedness. This section uses the framework of questions (Table 2.3) and the ideal scenario (Figure 2.3) introduced earlier to consider the current financing mechanisms in detail. The purpose is to identify the ‘best fit’ tools/mechanisms, meaning those that could be targeted to strengthen the financial support provided for emergency preparedness, now and in the future.

The assumption that financing mechanisms function exactly as they were designed to is misplaced, as the evidence from the country case study shows. The analysis conducted investigated not only the mandate of the most viable mechanisms and tools, but also the way they play out in practice. Evidence from the five case studies and the background papers (including comparative cases) reveals differences in the way that financing tools and mechanisms operate at the country level. Thus Table 6.1 and the discussion below are not a ‘test’; indeed, many of the mechanisms considered were not designed to fund emergency preparedness. What the analysis represents is a detailed consideration of the ‘best fit’ mechanism for financing emergency preparedness, based on what already exists.

Table 6.1 provides a snapshot of that analysis, which has been verified by international experts and, to the extent possible, by representatives from each of the mechanisms themselves.

6.2 What does this tell us about existing financing mechanisms?

Analysis of the financing mechanisms against the framework reveals certain patterns that deserve further exploration.

The humanitarian financing mechanisms and tools analysed offer varied possibilities for, but also a number of constraints to, better financing of emergency preparedness. ERFs have the weakest potential for addressing the current global preparedness gap and the weakest possibility for expansion to do so, being significantly limited by the range of actors that they can finance. The CERF offers much in terms of its own profile and in the possibility of raising the profile of emergency preparedness, a key condition that appeared repeatedly throughout the case studies and in prior evidence (see Kellett and Sweeney, 2011). However, it is weak on addressing many of the questions, especially those focused on national actors and processes, and on being connected to long-term plans and comparative advantage.

The CAP and the CHFs appear to offer much more potential. Although different in form (the CHF being a funding mechanism administered in-country and the CAP largely a strategic planning and coordination tool for humanitarian interventions), they share many positive conditions for emergency preparedness. They are both strong in areas of common plans of action and reasonably strong in both accessibility to actors and in several preconditions important to national actors and processes. However, they also have weaknesses that are shared with both the CERF and the ERFs. These relate to the constraints of being country-based humanitarian mechanisms, which limit their ability to be used as strategic tools to address global priority needs beyond the specific country in which they are established (noting, of course, that they are present in only very few of those countries that require preparedness finance). All four mechanisms fail significantly on this test. Moreover, the cost (political and financial) of expansion into a broader range of countries arguably calls all these mechanisms into question as feasible options for addressing the needed global reach for preparedness.

Climate adaptation funds also offer considerable potential for expanding into more specific financing of emergency preparedness, at least on the face of it. The three examined most directly in this report, the LDCF, Adaptation Fund and PPCR, have considerable strengths. These are especially noticeable in the areas of accessibility to actors and multi-year funding, as well as support to national actors and processes. There are also shared weaknesses, however. None of the funds is focused on non-climate-related risks or on preparing for conflict, and the level of integration with DRR processes, actors and planning is decidedly low. One of the key drawbacks is the significant cost involved in changing what are very clearly climate-based mechanisms to focus attention much more obviously on the range of emergency preparedness needs. Moreover, they are almost entirely devoid of links with humanitarian actors. While three mechanisms are considered here, there are others that could warrant further attention, such as the Green Climate Fund, as a potential channel of funds.

The two mechanisms with a specific focus on risk (GFDRR and the CPR TTF) have some similarities and some key differences. The main difference is that GFDRR focuses on DRR alone, while the CPR TTF looks at a wider range

82 For example, the CERF has funded activities which appear within the matrix of activities to be regarded as emergency preparedness (see Taylor and Couture, 2014 forthcoming).

83 In the concluding sections we consider the suitability of the mechanisms, with changes to their current form, and, discuss whether ‘best fit’ is sufficient or whether ‘transformative’ adjustments to the current financing architecture are required.

84 This table (and its qualitative comments) have been prepared in collaboration with several experts in the appropriate funding channel: Kamal Kishore (BCPR TTF), Daniel Kull (GFDRR), Smita Nakhooda, (Climate Adaptation Funds), Lisa Doughten (CERF), Shoko Arakaki (CHF, ERF).
of risks. This difference informs some of the key variations that each fund has in relation to the questions in the framework. GFDRR is strong in areas of multi-year funding, alignment with government plans and priorities, and to an extent in the area of having a prioritised set of countries for implementation. It also benefits from a reasonably high profile in and beyond the DRR community. The CPR TTF performs even more strongly than GFDRR overall. It is strong in the framework questions related to supporting long-term plans of action and comparative advantage, and equally so in demonstrating its links to national actors and processes. Unlike GFDRR, it also has the potential to focus on a range of man-made and natural hazard-related disasters. Where it has weaknesses, it is largely because at present it is a reactive fund, responding to demand, rather than looking at the wider picture of global need for preparedness. It also arguably (at least in comparison with GFDRR) arguably has a lower profile.

Finally, direct donor funding is considered, in this case limited specifically to funding that is granted bilaterally at a country level to a range of actors, from donors to UN agencies, NGOs and governments, and drawn from humanitarian and development sources. One of the key findings from phase one of this research (Kellett and Sweeney, 2011) was the entrenched nature and strength of the bifurcated donor government structure, which has contributed to establishing an artificial divide into which emergency preparedness has often fallen. While the evidence from the case studies shows some hope for joined-up interventions in the area of emergency preparedness, the picture is still largely divided into these two donor communities, development and humanitarian.

It is worth examining, however, how each of these two communities could be at least a partial solution to improved financing of emergency preparedness. Both are relatively strong compared with other solutions discussed. Both require minimal obvious costs to expand into more funding for emergency preparedness, and both can fund from government down to community actors. Humanitarian funding is slightly weaker than development funding on a number of key issues around sustainability of funding. This is especially the case for multi-year funding (or lack thereof) and alignment with government processes and priorities. It is also arguably the case in the area of accessibility to key implementing actors, with humanitarian financing more unlikely to fund government actors (for many legitimate reasons, particularly in relation to working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts). Although overall development funding decided upon in-country has clear potential for expansion into, or bolstering of, emergency preparedness, this would only service countries where donors are present and there is a wider political commitment for a donor country to support a state and its citizens. Thus while bilateral funding is particularly strong in addressing the framework questions related to country planning and programming, in-country donors cannot (rather obviously) look at the global picture of needs. There remains a need to channel funding based on an overall assessment of priority countries.

Finally, across the five country case studies, concerns were raised about rhetoric on funding for preparedness not translating into its actual availability. Earmarking funds, namely a percentage of bilateral funds, was often cited as necessary to ensuring that rhetoric on funding was translated into reality. However evidence suggests that this would be a somewhat arbitrary exercise unless country-based funding was allocated a tailored percentage to suit in-country needs. Simply getting more funds for preparedness will not help overcome the non-financial challenges that have been identified and in fact – as in the case of the Philippines – may serve to add confusion to an already complicated preparedness picture.

6.3 Non-financial issues for effective and efficient emergency preparedness

There are also issues that are not strictly financial which impact on adequate emergency preparedness. All of the non-financial issues outlined in Table 6.2 were detected across some or all of the case study countries. Some of the non-financial issues have already been introduced, especially where they have an impact on financing itself. This should not imply that little is being done to address these challenges, but rather that there remain key issues; some of these could be addressed in part through financing, effectively incentivising good practice.

Taking a closer look at the non-financial issues affecting conflict preparedness, they are somewhat rudimentary, with a lack of clear or common understanding about what preparedness entails. In adapting the activities outlined in the preparedness matrix for conflict (Table 2.2), the activities at the more ‘developmental’ end of the preparedness continuum (Figure 2.2) look quite different, involving different sets of actors and types of engagement. In these areas (hazard/risk analysis, institutional and legislative frameworks, coordination) the international community is likely to play a much stronger role in conflict preparedness than in disaster preparedness (where, under stable conditions, the government should take the lead). Yet in the future this may also require consideration of different ways of engaging (see Box 6.2).
Table 6.1: Current funding tools and mechanisms measured against the framework of questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework question</th>
<th>Humanitarian funding mechanism/tool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comprehensiveness of decisions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are funding decisions based on a detailed understanding of all risks?</td>
<td>CERF: The CERF is demand-driven, based on humanitarian requirements and priorities identified by the HCT. Activities are prioritised taking into consideration the CERF’s life-saving criteria. An analysis of short-term risks is undertaken and informs decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAP: This is possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHF: This is possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ERF: The ERF is a short-term, response-driven fund. Risks are considered to a certain extent at the time of development of the CHF allocation strategy papers. However, there is no structured risk management framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are funding decisions based on a global assessment of priority countries?</td>
<td>CERF: Not based on priorities for emergency preparedness; however, the CERF refers to OCHA’s Global Focus Model when deliberating on allocations, particularly in the Underfunded Emergencies analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAP: No, only based on where the CAP currently exists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHF: No, only based on where CHFs exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ERF: No, only based on where ERFs exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supporting long-term plans of action and comparative advantage</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are funding decisions based on a common plan of action with defined roles and responsibilities?</td>
<td>CERF: No, the CERF is largely not funding emergency preparedness. However, it has allocated limited funding for early action when a common plan of action exists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAP: Yes, this is possible within the CAP, and it also requires detailed planning/roles and responsibilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHF: Yes, this is possible, and it also requires detailed planning/roles and responsibilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ERF: No. That said, ERF funding decisions should be aligned with cluster priorities and overall humanitarian plans (i.e. CHAP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is funding available to a range of necessary actors?</td>
<td>CERF: UN only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAP: UN, INGOs, national NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHF: UN, INGOs, national NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ERF: UN, INGOs, national NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INGOs and NGOs access funds through a UN agency that assumes financial and programmatic responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the timeframe for emergency preparedness funding proportional to needs?</td>
<td>CERF: No, single crisis-related funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAP: No, but in reality the same projects (or similar) can appear year on year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHF: Not explicitly, but evidence suggests that some projects are funded year on year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ERF: No, very short-term.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

87 Note that this refers to consolidated appeals, not flash appeals, the latter having little traction for emergency preparedness.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In-country donor funding</th>
<th>Risk-focused financing</th>
<th>Climate adaptation mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bilateral donor – humanitarian</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bilateral donor – development</strong></td>
<td><strong>GFDRR</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence to date suggests that this is rarely the case, with decisions based on a combination of factors including need, media profile, political position, historical position, etc.</td>
<td>Evidence to date suggests that this rarely happens. Funding is sliced across risk where it exists.</td>
<td>Understanding of risk is focused on natural hazards. The fund can work in contexts of conflict but does not ‘prepare for conflict’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A as in this case we are talking of how donors operate in each context.</td>
<td>N/A as in this case we are talking of how donors operate in each context.</td>
<td>20 countries are prioritised by GFDRR; 11 are earmarked by donors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is possible, but limited in practice by differences in humanitarian/international focus.</td>
<td>Not currently, but potentially possible within current context.</td>
<td>Not currently, but potentially possible within current context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All possible, but emphasis towards international system.</td>
<td>All recipients possible.</td>
<td>Focus is on government and World Bank implementation. With government endorsement other actors can access; however, it is not common practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding can stretch beyond one year in some cases, but often demands that new decisions are made each year.</td>
<td>Funding is usually multi-year.</td>
<td>Funding can be multi-year (typically three years but sometimes more).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key**

- **Weak evidence**
  - Lacks compelling answer to the question
- **Strong evidence**
  - Positively answers the question

**Continued**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework question</th>
<th>CERF</th>
<th>CAP</th>
<th>CHF</th>
<th>ERF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National actors and processes</strong></td>
<td>Does funding for emergency preparedness align with government plans and national stakeholder priorities?</td>
<td>No, response-driven, internationally focused; on the limited occasions the CERF has funded early action, it has taken into consideration government and national plans.</td>
<td>This is context-dependent, but can align.</td>
<td>This is context-dependent but can align to an extent – though funding does not go directly to government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do preparedness measures target a range of requirements at community, sub-regional and national levels?</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Where preparedness is identified as a key objective, projects can exist at any level. Many CAP projects are already focused on community work.</td>
<td>Where preparedness is identified as a key objective, projects can exist at any level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strong donorship</strong></td>
<td>Does the mechanism have strong M&amp;E for transparent, accountable tracking in investment, as well as for learning?</td>
<td>Limited to intervention-based M&amp;E, including the annual RC/HC reports and annual independent review in multiple countries, based on the Performance and Accountability Framework.</td>
<td>Mid-year review acts as an M&amp;E ‘window’.</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Can the fund receive funds from a range of sources?</td>
<td>Yes, from almost any source.</td>
<td>Donors only.</td>
<td>Donors only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administration</strong></td>
<td>To what extent are there administration costs in expanding work in emergency preparedness?</td>
<td>An additional preparedness ‘window’ for the CERF would not necessarily be particularly costly (but would require additional staffing in the CERF secretariat). It remains unclear as to whether a GA resolution would be needed to amend the focus of the fund.</td>
<td>Difficult to determine given that they are driven by complex emergencies, but unlikely to be easily or cheaply replicated.</td>
<td>Significant costs. Country HCT would need to approach OCHA, making the case. Would need to demonstrate the need, and likely donor support. CAP needs to be in place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feasibility</strong></td>
<td>Is there sufficient political support behind the inclusion (or expansion) of emergency preparedness in the fund?</td>
<td>Independent CERF evaluations have raised the question of the place of emergency preparedness in the CERF; at present emergency preparedness is deliberately not included.</td>
<td>The CAP is already stretching to incorporate enhanced preparedness, an evolution of the last few years.</td>
<td>CHFs are relatively large, and have support in each country context. Expansion to fund emergency preparedness has to be placed firmly in the context of the CAPs, which the funds support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visibility</strong></td>
<td>Does the mechanism have a high enough profile to push preparedness forward?</td>
<td>High profile, connected to media around crisis and with a yearly donor conference.</td>
<td>High profile, connected to media around crisis, and with a launch and mid-year review which enhance attention.</td>
<td>Profile only within countries where they exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-country donor funding</td>
<td>Risk-focused financing</td>
<td>Climate adaptation mechanisms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bilateral donor – humanitarian</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bilateral donor – development</strong></td>
<td><strong>GFDRR</strong></td>
<td><strong>CPR TTF</strong></td>
<td><strong>LDCF</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context-dependent but on balance funding is much less likely to be tied to government priorities than development funding.</td>
<td>Development funding is more likely to be tied directly to government plans and priorities.</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
<td>UNDP cannot spend any of these resources without government approval; in most cases support follows a national strategy, or can provide support for its development</td>
<td>It should, as funding is directed to an adaptation programme developed with stakeholder input.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is possible.</td>
<td>GFDRR is largely not funding preparedness at local levels.</td>
<td>This is possible. Historically, support has included a range of activities from community to national levels.</td>
<td>It should, but may not in all cases.</td>
<td>Yes/usually.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potentially yes.</td>
<td>Limited to date, but planned evaluations in preparation.</td>
<td>A multi-year results framework is adopted, which is compiled and published annually.</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, fixed by government.</td>
<td>Potentially yes, but in practice none to date.</td>
<td>Yes, but in practice this has been very rare.</td>
<td>Potentially.</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs of expanding work in emergency preparedness minimal.</td>
<td>Costs of expanding work in emergency preparedness minimal.</td>
<td>Relatively low, expanding beyond current priority countries.</td>
<td>Costs of expanding work in emergency preparedness minimal.</td>
<td>Substantial (this is not an emergency preparedness fund by design/ objective).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growing support following increased evidence on the cost-effectiveness and improved response as a result of emergency preparedness.</td>
<td>Growing realisation of the place of risk and preparedness in mainstream development programming.</td>
<td>GFDRR donors have asked the fund to focus its attention on existing priority countries and activities.</td>
<td>No specific reference discovered supporting (or not) enhanced work in emergency preparedness (but 1998 GA resolution does mandate UNDP for work on disaster preparedness at a country level.)</td>
<td>Minimal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian donor funding often has higher profile than development.</td>
<td>High profile, although many competing priorities.</td>
<td>Reasonably high profile.</td>
<td>Generally low profile.</td>
<td>Potentially (though unlikely): it is not a DRR fund, but it is a high-profile/norm-setting space.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key**

- **Weak evidence**
  - Lacks compelling answer to the question
- **Strong evidence**
  - Positively answers the question
Table 6.2: Non-financial issues affecting emergency preparedness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-financial issues for emergency preparedness</th>
<th>Some examples from the case studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Semantics</strong>: Definitions and meanings of key emergency preparedness terms are not shared across the different actors.</td>
<td>In Niger, very different conceptions of emergency preparedness exist, from narrow ‘humanitarian’ through to long-term capacity-building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Knowledge of risk</strong>: There is often a lack of joined-up understanding of all risks. Much is known, but often this knowledge is ‘parcelled out’ amongst particular actors within their own sectors.</td>
<td>In Sudan, humanitarian response has dominated engagement (and still does) by both national and international actors – combined risk assessments have largely not been undertaken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National systems</strong>: Government frameworks and institutions for risk management are weak, lack capacity and lack clear policy directives.</td>
<td>In Sudan, the preponderance of humanitarian response means that there is little incentive for highlighting emergency preparedness; as a result, any activities that do exist are incorporated into humanitarian interventions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International architecture</strong>: Emergency preparedness is either oriented towards emergencies, humanitarian actors, humanitarian donors and to an extent humanitarian mechanisms, or divided into humanitarian/development ‘areas’ without adequate coordination. Existing coordinating structures currently struggle to address the full range of needs.</td>
<td>In Haiti, development donors remain reluctant to fund preparedness, seeing it as a humanitarian issue, even when this means the capacity-building of national institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Roles and responsibilities</strong>: These are often unclear, especially within the international community.</td>
<td>In Sudan, there is no single focal point for emergency preparedness within the UN system: for example, early warning information across agencies is not coordinated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**International capacity:** There is a lack of capacity internationally to coordinate risk management issues, especially when part of long-term development.

Very few of the case study countries have the necessary ‘central’ capacity to coordinate work across risk. This is, for example, an issue in some of the Resident Coordinators’ offices.

**Planning:** There is a lack of a systematic approach and planning not just for emergency preparedness, but for risk management overall. No case study country approached the range of emergency preparedness activities comprehensively.

Myanmar has a largely piecemeal, project-based approach.

In Haiti, recognition of the importance of emergency preparedness has not led to a clear vision or plan of action.

In Sudan, emergency preparedness is undertaken by individual agencies; no consolidated plans exist.

**Tracking and reporting:** There is poor tracking of emergency preparedness, in itself a consequence of the many approaches, the different semantics and the inability to disaggregate emergency preparedness from larger programmes, etc.

In Niger, 53 of 83 CAP projects in 2013 had at least one emergency preparedness activity – yet only one project had ‘preparedness’ in its title.

In Myanmar and Niger, many agencies considered preparedness as something indistinguishable from response, and therefore did not track it separately.

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**Box 6.2: Non-financial challenges: preparedness in conflict contexts**

Defining and operationalising emergency preparedness for conflict requires concerted attention to the nuances of each conflict and risk context. In some contexts it may not be possible to hold such a conversation overtly; in others, international actors will have a job to do in negotiating the way for such dialogue to happen. Evidence from across Haiti, Myanmar, Sudan and Niger, supplemented by background papers exploring South Sudan, Kenya and other caseloads (Vaux, 2013a), shows that preparedness for conflict is largely in its infancy, at least in terms of a comprehensive approach. Nonetheless, it is possible to conceive of a set of activities – based on the emergency preparedness matrix developed for this report (Table 2.2) – which support national capacity in conflict preparedness. This may require working in quite different ways to those currently adopted.

Two examples are ‘brokerage’ and ‘entrustment’ (see Allouche and Lind, 2013). In the former, preparedness could be enacted through strengthening national capacity through ‘brokerage [that] involves actions to build a shared understanding amongst actors whose interest may vary significantly and whose capacity to act in support of these interests may be unequal’ (ibid.: 32). Such concepts support the idea of finding pathways to working even in situations characterised by fragmented authority ‘where power is mediated through local processes to reconcile the interests of different actors’ (ibid.). Emergency preparedness for conflict would look quite different to the activities currently conceived by the humanitarian actor used to dealing with crisis response. Relatedly, calls have been made to identify new and innovative ways to operationalise DRM in fragile and conflict-affected states; to challenge the predominantly state-centric approaches currently in place (see Harris et al., 2013).

Similar applications can be made for the term ‘entrustment’, whereby decisions and power are brought closer to the population through the use of local actors and structures. This would represent a marked difference from the way that actors operate today, and could help address the criticism that ‘aid stakeholders have tinkered at the edges when what is needed is a wholesale reinvention of development in these [fragile and conflict-affected] contexts’ (ibid.: 34).

Source: (Peters, 2014 forthcoming), Sudan (Hockley, 2014 forthcoming), and Niger (Robitaille et al., 2014 forthcoming).
7. Recommendations

a set of options for change
7. Recommendations: a set of options for change

Key messages

- Much can be done to improve the way that the international system finances preparedness, from ‘no regret’ incremental changes, to an enhanced system, through to considerable institutional review (‘transformational change’).
- Given the cost-benefit evidence for emergency preparedness, governments and donors have a duty to consider greater integration of options to improve the current system of financing.
- Incremental changes to current mechanisms will leave gaps. This report recommends the establishment of a global fund for preparedness: either an enhanced GFDRR or UNDP CPR TTF or alternatively a new dedicated fund.
- More dedicated funding for preparedness should not result in the ‘extraction’ of emergency preparedness from existing processes, systems and approaches.
- Donors can and should do more to address preparedness through the system and within their own spending priorities: development funding for emergency preparedness is seen as an essential way forward.

7.1 A set of options: from beyond business as usual through to transformational change

The recommendations start from the premise that existing financing mechanisms, and channels or flows of finance, should be strengthened in support of emergency preparedness, where appropriate and where they can add value. Table 7.1 summarises this report’s recommendations, broken down into four inter-related parts. The three options are underpinned by enhanced support by donor governments for emergency preparedness:

- Expansion where it makes sense: ‘no regret’ options
- Maximising opportunities: an enhanced system
- Transformational change:88 solutions beyond the current system
- Donor governments: the case for development financing.

While any mechanism can be adjusted to include a greater focus on emergency preparedness (either solely or as part of a wider-ranging series of objectives), this does not mean that all of them should be expanded. A balance needs to be struck between achieving the financing needed for preparedness and recognising what is practical and feasible within the existing context. This means taking careful consideration of the investment required to make changes to current models, and not ‘artificially’ expanding a mandate or a geographical scope to address preparedness needs.

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88 This section adopts an understanding of ‘transformation’ as described by Tanner and Bahadur (2013: 6): ‘Transformation is commonly interpreted as radical change requiring innovation and testing of new approaches. This entails the generation/use of new knowledge and a markedly different way of doing things’.
Table 7.1: A set of options for future funding of emergency preparedness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expansion where it makes sense: ‘no regret’ options</th>
<th>Maximising opportunities: an enhanced system</th>
<th>Transformational change: solutions beyond the current system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is considerable potential in maximising the use of existing mechanisms for financing emergency preparedness more effectively (see section 7.2).</td>
<td>These opportunities will entail considerably more effort from the international system in order to be achieved (see section 7.3).</td>
<td>This represents a considerable change in the way that emergency preparedness is financed, with a new dedicated approach and financing sourced beyond the system (see sections 7.4–7.5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolster existing humanitarian financing mechanisms, so that opportunities for funding emergency preparedness are continually sought – including, for example, within the CHFs, ERFs and the CERF.</td>
<td>Multi-year Strategic Response Plans (SRPs) should be obligatory across protracted complex emergencies.</td>
<td>Significantly enhance either of the existing risk-focused global mechanisms: GFDRR or CPR TTF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFDRR to make preparedness a priority action within all its selected countries.</td>
<td>All new humanitarian mechanisms to include a consideration of preparedness, and this should be reflected in the relevant set-up policy documentation and guidelines including, for example, SRPs.</td>
<td>Or:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPR TTF to prioritise preparedness within its priority countries when it makes new grants.</td>
<td>Climate change adaptation financing to be implemented in ways which support a broader preparedness system for risk, including improvement for the PPCR, Adaptation Fund and LDCF.</td>
<td>Create a new global pooled funding mechanism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All agencies should investigate how they can utilise other resources for emergency preparedness where they are most appropriate.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beyond the system: enhanced support for preparedness through private sector and remittances (see Annex 3).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Donor support for preparedness

Support preparedness throughout and greatly increase the role of development financing (see section 7.6).

7.2 Expansion where it makes sense: ‘no regret’ options

There is much that can be achieved within the current system to improve the financing of emergency preparedness that does not require radical overhauls of practice and policy. On balance, there is considerable potential in improving the scope of all of the core mechanisms and tools. The ‘no regret’ recommendations outlined below draw on analysis of what makes for effective financing (see Section 6).

Common Humanitarian Funds: advocacy to encourage greater consideration of emergency preparedness in CHFs and any forthcoming guidelines.

In some ways the CHFs have considerable strengths for expanding into more work in emergency preparedness: they are a tool for looking ahead (before the humanitarian need actually arises); they can look to address a range of risks; and they are based on a consultative process to reach an agreed set of interventions. Their weakness in comparison with the CAP is that their ‘profile’ is largely restricted to the country concerned.

This report’s recommendation is that the CHFs should follow the preparedness developments of the CAP (and now its Strategic Response Plan replacement) more explicitly, and ensure that adequate attention is placed on building capacity for preparedness within national and international actors. Practically, this means that each CHF should have an inbuilt demand for Humanitarian Country
Teams (HCTs) to examine emergency preparedness need and ensure that it is a core part of all consultation/prioritisation exercises, both within and between clusters/sectors. Unless preparedness is made a clear responsibility for CHFs, then the work of the HCT in this area will remain ad hoc and dependent solely on the strength of the humanitarian appeal. South Sudan’s decision to allocate $56.5 million of CHF money to a mix of both humanitarian aid and emergency preparedness is a positive example (OCHA, 2013e) that could be followed across all existing and future CHFs.

Emergency Response Funds: opportunities should be maximised to include preparedness in the ERFs as part and parcel of good humanitarian practice.

Where it is deemed plausible and of need, ERFs should include preparedness activities relevant to the context in which they operate; these, evidence suggests, are likely to be focused on the immediate requirements for improving emergency response. However, beyond their current role ERFs in particular have, at present, few plus points for expanding greatly into more funding for emergency preparedness: they are not well designed to answer the questions identified for effective emergency preparedness financing, nor for an expansion to do so.

The research undertaken for this report indicates that ERFs are the least ‘regulated’ of the humanitarian funds (Taylor and Couture, 2014 forthcoming), and are highly dependent on the context in which they are created. To maximise the relatively few appropriate opportunities that the ERFs present, strong leadership by the relevant ERF lead agency, and further consideration of the place of preparedness in policy guidance, are required to support increased incorporation of emergency preparedness.

The Central Emergency Response Fund: do not inhibit the inclusion of preparedness where the case has been effectively made, but maintain the CERF’s focus on life-saving response.

The CERF is strong in answering a number of the framework questions (see Table 6.1), for example those related to the high profile and yearly donor conference that provides for a dedicated focus of funds. It is weaker on a number of critical areas (such as explicit policy support for preparedness), and changes required to address these would involve significant political and leadership support and a change in mandate. Such a change would necessitate overcoming significant barriers, including the need for a General Assembly resolution to change the structure of the CERF to include, for example, a ‘preparedness window’.

Yet, while preparedness is regarded as ineligible for CERF support (OCHA, 2011a), evidence suggests that this is interpreted variably in practice. In light of the findings of the five-year evaluation (OCHA, 2011c), it may be reasonable in some instances to further embed emergency preparedness more institutionally within the CERF. Positive examples of emergency preparedness being successfully included in CERF applications should be replicated. These include where:

- the CERF has been directed to priority response projects, of which a proportion that was deemed reasonable was directed to preparedness
- the applying agency (possibly in conjunction with the Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator (HC/RC)) has successfully made a case that the project meets the life-saving criteria.

Dedicated attention to emergency preparedness should cut across both disaster and conflict risk where they exist in the same country context

Risk-focused financing mechanisms: make emergency preparedness an explicit goal of country programming.

Both of the risk-focused financing mechanisms (GFDRR and the CPR TTF) performed well in the analysis and are, in different ways, well placed to enhance their role of financing emergency preparedness. This is in part because they already focus their attention on financing before crisis. They do this in different ways, however, as the earlier analysis highlighted, with GFDRR focused on broader DRR and the CPR TTF focused on preventing crisis from both conflict and natural hazards.

The ‘no regret’ recommendation for these funds is that both give specific and dedicated attention to emergency preparedness (in line with their current mandate). For both mechanisms, this means making preparedness a priority action in each of their focus countries, as well as ensuring that it is included within all future country priorities. For GFDRR the focus should remain on disaster risk, given its quite specific mandate, where the cost (in many ways) of including preparedness for conflict is considered to be too substantial. It should, however, place greater emphasis on cases where (natural hazard-related) disaster risk requires preparedness in fragile and conflict-affected states. For the CPR TTF, dedicated attention to emergency preparedness should cut across both disaster and conflict risk where they exist in the same country context.
Agencies should deliberately utilise other resources in-country for emergency preparedness.

Evidence from the five case studies suggests that existing resources available in-country also fund emergency preparedness across a range of agencies. This includes the use of core resources and those drawn from humanitarian programming as well as broader risk-related activities, such as DRR and conflict prevention. In many cases, emergency preparedness activities (such as stockpiling and risk assessment) are undertaken using these resources, though these are rarely termed ‘preparedness’.

The ‘no regret’ recommendation here is that all implementing agencies and organisations should analyse how best existing and core resources can be used to deliver emergency preparedness. To the extent possible, this should address needs within that country in a systematic and coordinated manner. In addition, agencies should actively ensure that emergency preparedness features more heavily in their core funding, becoming an essential part of all relevant activities.

7.3 Maximising opportunities: an enhanced system

The improvements indicated above, while useful in themselves, are very limited; they will, even if all are implemented, only patch over existing cracks in financing for emergency preparedness. Elements of the current system can (and should) be pushed beyond their current comfort zone, with steps taken to ensure that preparedness becomes a core component of all relevant mechanisms managed by the international community.

Strategic Response Plans: all plans should become multi-year, and take heed of the latest guidance to include preparedness in longer-term planning frameworks.

The predecessor of the Strategic Response Plans, the CAP, has already seen some considerable improvement in its ability to articulate the need for emergency preparedness. During phase one of this research project, evidence found that the CAP was being used for emergency preparedness despite the absence of clear policy (Kellett and Sweeney, 2011: 34). The most recent guidance for the CAP has gone beyond previous considerations of preparedness, where it was largely permitted but not advertised, for the first time asking that HCTs explicitly include preparedness in their plans. The guidance went further to outline the kind of preparedness that can be articulated within the CAP – ‘preparedness for response’, with specific activities being those closest to humanitarian response within the preparedness continuum (Figure 2.2). It included many activities focused on preparing the international community to respond, but also on national capacity to manage response. Preparedness is an obvious responsibility both within and between clusters, according to this latest guidance.

In addition, there has been experimentation with multi-year funding, with several HCTs adopting a framework for longer-term planning, often using community ‘resilience’ as a hook upon which to hang these various longer-term initiatives. To date, the OPT, Kenya and Somalia have all used elements of multi-year programmes of work (OCHA, 2012)). There is much that is positive for emergency preparedness in multi-year humanitarian planning: funding for priorities beyond one-year boundaries, building national capacity as an increasing priority and building resilience as a key area of work. The multi-year CAP has ‘multi-year targets for a wider range of humanitarian actions; includes more early recovery actions and social services; identifies specific interventions to develop national and local capacities for emergency preparedness and response; and focuses more on building the resilience of affected populations so as to work towards a gradual drawdown of humanitarian assistance’ (ibid.: 30). All of these help shift the burden from humanitarian assistance towards investments in risk management before crises occur. It is welcome that the guidance document for the Strategic Response Plans takes this a step forward by providing systematic guidance on how to plan and manage a multi-year programme.

It is welcome that the guidance document for the Strategic Response Plans takes this a step forward by providing systematic guidance on how to plan and manage a multi-year programme

The recommendation is that multi-year plans become the norm, rather than the exception, especially in complex emergencies. The argument is that these plans in themselves are tools for examining the year ahead, and by their very nature go beyond response into planned

89 [N]eeds assessment and risk analysis; cluster and inter-cluster emergency response planning; community preparedness, including early warning; stockpiling of materials needed for early response; improved communications systems for early warning and early response; improved logistics capacity to support early action; training, simulation exercises and drills with national or local counterparts to improve coordination, speed and quality of response; and increasing government understanding of how to manage the influx of international assistance’ (OCHA, 2012): 28.)
humanitarian interventions. There is arguably no reason for all plans not to be multi-year. Increasingly, the emphasis needs to be on why HCTs are not looking at supporting longer-term solutions and are not increasingly prioritising sustainable funding, national capacity and community preparedness, all leading towards the eventual drawdown of humanitarian assistance. The factors highlighted by the latest guidance offer no deterrent to such planning in year-upon-year humanitarian interventions in the same context.

**Climate change adaptation mechanisms: climate change adaptation financing must be integrated within a wider appreciation of risks in each country context. This recommendation needs to be applied beyond the three mechanisms examined closely in this report.**

On the surface, climate adaptation funding appears to offer potential for increased financing of emergency preparedness, for some aspects on the more 'developmental' end of the preparedness continuum. There are important strengths in being tied to national processes and supporting a range of actors. However, it is clear from the evidence that climate funds are not a feasible option to expand beyond their current remit. Although some funding has gone to countries in which conflict (of various kinds) exists, CCA mechanisms do not support preparing for conflict or for natural risks that are not climate-related. Furthermore, they are seriously hampered by their current lack of integration with DRM financing and conflict prevention/preparedness processes. Perhaps above all else, the costs of expanding these mechanisms to look specifically at emergency preparedness are very high – they are simply not designed to support such an approach, and cannot easily be adjusted to do so.⁹⁰

That said, there are some clear recommendations to be made. It is increasingly important that CCA and DRM are better coordinated at all levels, to maximise the likelihood of harnessing opportunities to combine approaches towards different types of risk (climatic and non-climatic). At present national governments routinely manage DRM through interior ministries, civil protection or national disaster management authorities, while CCA is managed through environment ministries. Support for a more holistic approach towards risk within a country context is required and should be encouraged.

The preliminary evidence on the country case studies reveals considerable amounts of adaptation funding beyond the three mechanisms explored here. These other mechanisms, such as Japan’s Fast-Start Finance and Germany’s International Climate Initiative, are not pooled funds. However, the need for them to be more closely coordinated with the activities financed under DRR is still very relevant, though this will require a different kind of advocacy, reliant more on donors themselves (see below).

**Pilot Program for Climate Resilience: maximise the existing entry points to fund emergency preparedness through projects that relate to climate services, disaster/ climate risk reduction and community preparedness.**

The PPCR prioritises investments in climate information and services (e.g. early warning systems, hydrological information services). One of the exceptions is in Bangladesh, where the focus is on coastal zone management, with investments in early warning systems, including for non-climate risks such as tsunamis.

The recommendation is to build upon the interconnection between climate adaptation and disaster risk systems coherently and systematically at a country level. In line with the general recommendations for adaptation funding mechanisms, the PPCR should maximise opportunities in its operations, by ensuring that early warning systems and risk identification (such as its capacity-building for climate monitoring) are integrated into a more holistic risk reduction approach. Specific attention should be paid to the PPCR enhancing its support of community preparedness (highlighted in recent evaluations), particularly the increased involvement of vulnerable communities or the use of community-based approaches to building adaptive capacity (ICF, 2013; PPCR, 2013).

**Least Developed Countries Fund: funding should be used to support emergency preparedness activities where they have been (or can be) included in NAPAs. Future NAPAs should have an obligatory emergency preparedness component, including an analysis of current capacity.**

With its focus on first supporting the creation of a NAPA, the LDCF already gives attention to emergency preparedness activities, since the NAPA has sections that look precisely at climate risks and the relationship to preparedness. It is recommended that all future NAPAs – which are essentially the guide through which the LDCF operates – should include emergency preparedness activities systematically. This should be coupled with a holistic analysis of risks (including those beyond climate) in relation to existing roles, responsibilities and action, such as activities working more specifically on DRR. These emergency preparedness activities should be supported by the LDCF.

Supporting advocacy will be required at the GEF (the managing authority) to highlight the links between financing for adaptation, DRR and emergency preparedness.

**Adaptation Fund: build upon the already close thematic relationship between the Adaptation Fund and emergency preparedness by making the connections systematic.**

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As shown earlier, the Adaptation Fund has an indicative set of four activities, three of which are aligned to emergency preparedness (UNFCCC, 2001; Trujillo and Nakhoda, 2014 forthcoming). The expansion of support for preparedness through the Adaptation Fund could involve the following actions, ensuring that preparedness becomes a clear focus of its investment decisions.

There should be more systematic analysis of the scope and impact of emergency preparedness-related activities that the Adaptation Fund has supported to date, with a view to helping strengthen their impact and effectiveness. Guidance to this effect could be developed through the Fund’s Operational Guidelines, in the context of a forthcoming overall comprehensive evaluation of the Adaptation Fund (Adaptation Fund Board, 2013a).

The operational guidelines could include:

- Project review eligibility criteria – these could include specific emergency preparedness questions such as: does the project include coordination with emergency-related institutions at the corresponding levels?
- Guidelines for the results framework – these could include qualitative questions around key indicators and outcomes where sustainability is related to Adaptation Fund implementation alongside emergency preparedness activities
- Guidelines for complying with the annual reporting formats, including clear examples of reporting back on emergency preparedness activities, and integration with risk management in general.

7.4 Transformational change: solutions beyond the current system

A global mechanism for emergency preparedness financing

There are many advantages to enhancing and improving existing country-based mechanisms and tools in support of preparedness (in some cases, as indicated above, this means enhancing current mechanisms significantly). Concentrating efforts on improving the scale and scope of preparedness without involving new actors, channels or mechanisms will be less complicated for the current system. However, bolstering existing mechanisms is not sufficient, and at the very least a global solution must be considered, the rationale being:

- Decisions to engage with a particular country are not always determined by an adequate assessment of risk or need; some countries can be ‘left behind’. 91
- Country-level financing is inadequate. Not all countries have enough donors present in-country to adequately engage with emergency preparedness needs. Capacity to engage with donors directly either regionally or globally is limited in many cases.
- Existing funds, whether at country level (most often humanitarian, though in some cases bespoke to that context) or at global level, do not target preparedness specifically.
- Finally, as evidence from across the case studies reveals, funding is siloed, with limits to the feasibility and willingness of individual fund managers to support preparedness.

In essence, if all we do is improve the preparedness focus of existing mechanisms, no matter how good that is, key questions will always remain: how will underfunded preparedness needs be met? How will priorities across countries be determined? Who will take charge of redressing the neglect of conflict preparedness?

A global fund meanwhile could, if designed and directed appropriately, prioritise funding across a range of countries, and make decisions as to the most appropriate contexts for external support. It could raise the profile of emergency preparedness as an issue for donors and agencies alike, in a way that any country-based fund is simply unable to do.

If all we do is improve the preparedness focus of existing mechanisms, no matter how good that is, key questions will always remain

It should be noted that this is not to advocate for the ‘extraction’ of emergency preparedness out of existing processes, systems and approaches, such as DRR, sector-by-sector preparedness measures or conflict prevention. The current research sees value in many of the current approaches, yet seeks to address the evidence that points to the gaps in delivery. A global fund for emergency preparedness can help fill those gaps, working carefully to prioritise investments in those contexts that most require international assistance.

However, one key feature of the mechanism is that it should be designed to pilot a new way of working and thinking (see Table 7.3 for how a new fund would function), seeking funds drawn from both development

91 See individual case studies for examples.
and humanitarian funding streams (even from the same donor), where a holistic all-risk approach to emergency preparedness is pursued. Special attention should be paid to proposals that look to fund a range of activities across the preparedness continuum.

In addition, more concentrated efforts to partner with, and leverage greater support from, other stakeholders in-country should be considered. This includes, for example, greater links through PPPs, leveraging support through exchange of expertise in civil protection and generating a stronger civic voice around preparedness as a means to influence the spending of remittances.

**Special attention should be paid to proposals that look to fund a range of activities across the preparedness continuum**

**Options for a global funding mechanism dedicated to emergency preparedness**

The first and most obvious consideration is how a new fund could, if it were so designed, meet many of the existing framework questions, and do so in a way that would be more effective and efficient than potentially expanding the most promising preparedness financing mechanisms (as per the analysis) – GFDRR and the CPR TTF.

During consultations conducted to consider this question, it was suggested that the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) office of the United Nations, for example, could set up a fund with such a range of preconditions built into its operational functioning. This would be a relatively simple process (at least in terms of administration), although decisions on how it could work, and who would do what, including the decision-making process for funding allocations, could possibly take considerable negotiation. Returning to the framework of questions, the one consideration on which, unsurprisingly, a new fund scores very low is feasibility in terms of obtaining political support needed. This is a considerable challenge that should not be underestimated. Similarly, establishing a new fund risks creating a silo for preparedness, when it should in fact serve to better link the current humanitarian/development bifurcation. There would need to be included in the set-up criteria the means for this ‘linking’ role to be fulfilled to leverage greater coordination and collaboration with existing work – a high ambition for any funding mechanism.

The cost of change (i.e. adjustments to GFDRR and the CPR TTF) has to be weighed up against the value of the investment in making that change. For example, altering the CPR TTF is believed to be the easiest of these three options, but it does not meet the full range of criteria as well as a new fund would. (This is not surprising, given that it is possible, according to advice from the MPTF office, to set up a fund to meet whatever range of criteria was required.) GFDRR could be expanded, though not without its consultative group and the World Bank itself agreeing to new priorities – and consultation and review processes for this report suggest that this would prove a hurdle too high to overcome.

An analysis of the three options against both the framework questions and the cost of change suggests that GFDRR would be the least feasible in terms of expanding its emergency preparedness remit. Its lack of conflict focus is obviously a main reason, but to this could be added recent calls by donors for GFDRR to focus its attention on existing priorities. What then of expanding the work of the CPR TTF or addressing the full needs of emergency preparedness through a dedicated mechanism? Weighing up these two alternative routes is difficult. Although a new fund could probably answer all the framework questions, the existing UNDP-managed fund could also do so, with appropriate guidance and policy changes.

On balance, given the demands of emergency preparedness in meeting a set of needs that cross the humanitarian/development and disaster/conflict divides (which should be reflected appropriately in the way in which decisions are made) and the need for a significant increase in public (and donor) attention to preparedness, a new, highly visible fund is recommended. This would involve what the MPTF office would consider a ‘light’ model of operation, with clear, precise guidelines, a small review board drawn from relevant UN agencies and a small secretariat (see Box 7.1). It is further felt that this model would be the one that would obtain both political and financial support, which is identified by the MPTF office as absolutely essential to the success of any new mechanism. The political (and financial) support necessary for creating a successful fund should not be underestimated, and investment in advocacy would be essential to make a new mechanism a viable and sustainable improvement to the current system.
Table 7.2: Assessing the potential to expand preparedness financing: GFDRR, UNDP CPR TTF and a new global fund

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework questions</th>
<th>GFDRR</th>
<th>UNDP CPR TTF</th>
<th>New global fund</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comprehensiveness</strong></td>
<td>Are funding decisions in-country based on a detailed understanding of all risks?</td>
<td>Can work in contexts of conflict, but does not ‘prepare for conflict.</td>
<td>Potentially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Long-term plans of action and comparative advantage</strong></td>
<td>Are funding decisions based on a global assessment of priority countries?</td>
<td>20 countries are prioritised by GFDRR; 11 are earmarked by donors.</td>
<td>Potentially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National actors and processes</strong></td>
<td>Are funding decisions for emergency preparedness based on a common plan of action with defined roles and responsibilities?</td>
<td>Potentially possible within current context.</td>
<td>Potentially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strong donorship</strong></td>
<td>Is funding accessible to a range of actors?</td>
<td>Focus is on government and World Bank implementation. With government endorsement other actors can access; however, it is not common practice.</td>
<td>Potentially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administration</strong></td>
<td>Is the timeframe for emergency preparedness funding proportional to needs?</td>
<td>Funding can be multi-year.</td>
<td>Potentially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feasibility</strong></td>
<td>Are funding decisions in-country based on a detailed understanding of all risks?</td>
<td>Partially yes, as priority is given to a set of countries based on level of risk, need for support and likelihood of success.</td>
<td>Potentially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visibility</strong></td>
<td>20 countries are prioritised by GFDRR; 11 are earmarked by donors.</td>
<td>Funding is limited to about 40 priority countries agreed upon with UNDP bureaux, and based on assessment of risk.</td>
<td>Potentially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Is funding accessible to a range of actors?</strong></td>
<td>All recipients possible but in practice UNDP Country Offices have been the common recipients of funding.</td>
<td>Potentially possible within current context.</td>
<td>Potentially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Is the timeframe for emergency preparedness funding proportional to needs?</strong></td>
<td>Funding can be multi-year (typically three years but sometimes more).</td>
<td>Potentially possible within current context.</td>
<td>Potentially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Does funding for emergency preparedness align with government plans and national stakeholder priorities?</strong></td>
<td>Yes.</td>
<td>UNDP cannot spend any of these resources without government approval; in most cases support follows a national strategy, or can provide support for its development.</td>
<td>Potentially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Does preparedness measures target a range of requirements at community, sub-regional and national levels?</strong></td>
<td>GFDRR is largely not funding preparedness at local levels.</td>
<td>This is possible. Historically support has included a range of activities from community to national level.</td>
<td>Potentially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Can the fund receive funds from a range of sources?</strong></td>
<td>A multi-year results framework is adopted, which is compiled and published annually.</td>
<td>Potentially possible within current context.</td>
<td>Potentially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>To what extent are there administration costs in expanding work in emergency preparedness?</strong></td>
<td>Costs of expanding work in emergency preparedness minimal.</td>
<td>Potentially possible within current context.</td>
<td>Potentially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Is there sufficient political support behind the inclusion (or expansion) of emergency preparedness?</strong></td>
<td>GFDRR donates have asked the fund to focus its attention on existing priority countries and activities.</td>
<td>Unknown, but this area could take some substantial work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Does the mechanism have a high enough profile to push preparedness forward?</strong></td>
<td>Reasonably high profile.</td>
<td>Generally low profile.</td>
<td>Potentially</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

92 For example, for 2010-2011, see UNDP (2012).
A new global emergency preparedness fund, created in a way that positively addresses the framework questions outlined in this research (Table 2.3), would demonstrably add value to the current system. (Furthermore, stronger incorporation of emergency preparedness into the CPR TTF and GFDRR as they stand would still help add value – in addition, not in competition.)

The proposed new mechanism would be guided by the framework questions, and would be designed to respond specifically to each. It would also address urgent needs currently neglected by existing channels and would be a means to pilot a new approach to financing, prioritising approaches that look beyond current international silos and sponsoring innovation in new areas, such as leveraging funding from the private sector and through remittances. A proposed response is put forward in Table 7.3.

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93 This box is based upon a review of MPTF guidelines (see UNDP, undated c) and conversations with the head of the MPTF office of the United Nations.
### Table 7.3: Criteria for a new global fund for emergency preparedness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework questions</th>
<th>Suggested parameters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comprehensiveness</strong></td>
<td>Decisions will be guided first and foremost on a detailed understanding of combined risks in each country. Without this no funding will be granted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are funding decisions based on a detailed understanding of all risks?</td>
<td>The fund will distribute according to a global comparison of risks, including slow- and rapid-onset natural hazards, conflict and fragility – such as the forthcoming InfoRM (InfoRM, 2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are funding decisions based on a global assessment of priority countries?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Long-term plans of action and comparative advantage</strong></td>
<td>Funding will only be granted on approval of a combined plan of action. (This will include an analysis of the current capacity of actors, and a review of the work currently underway across the emergency preparedness continuum.) Priority will be given to proposals that look to build on existing initiatives, especially where they cut across traditional boundaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are funding decisions for emergency preparedness based on a common plan of action with defined roles and responsibilities?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National actors and processes</strong></td>
<td>All funding decisions will be based on an analysis of the comparative advantage and role/mandate. Favour to partnerships that demonstrate building of national capacity will be favoured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is funding available to a range of necessary actors?</td>
<td>Any feasible project length will be considered, dependent on the activity being proposed: projects where they look to build national capacity over a period of time will receive special attention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the timeframe for emergency preparedness funding proportional to needs?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strong donorship</strong></td>
<td>All plans and projects put forward must articulate the current system of national preparedness, and be aligned to national priorities. Government and other national counterpart lead in projects will be especially encouraged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does funding for emergency preparedness align with government plans and national stakeholder priorities?</td>
<td>The mechanism will fund all activities across the continuum, but will look to join up elements into a coherent plan of action, wherever possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do preparedness measures target a range of requirements at community, sub-regional and national levels?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feasibility</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there sufficient political support behind the inclusion of emergency preparedness in the fund?</td>
<td>This will be the major challenge within a new fund; see concluding ‘making the business case’ section for more on this.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administration</strong></td>
<td>Relatively little to start up; as low as 1% for administration during the fund’s operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent are there administration costs in expanding work in emergency preparedness?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visibility</strong></td>
<td>A yearly event, either in New York or Geneva, will bring together donors and partners together to assess the impact of the fund, and advocate for financing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the mechanism have a high enough profile to push preparedness forward?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.6 The case for development financing

A huge amount of progress has been made on emergency preparedness in recent years, largely as a result of learnt experience and the evolution demanded by responding to continual crises in complex political emergencies. Moreover, the growing interest in establishing DRM policy and institutional architecture in national government systems (as seen in all the case studies except Sudan) has raised the profile of risk management more generally as a fundamental component of a country’s development armour. Yet fundamental challenges remain, which constrain the ability of international and national actors to pursue integrated approaches to the range of risks being faced. These include the artificial division between efforts to work on different types of risk present in the same location (see Harris et al., 2013) or where the same types of preparedness activities are required. Moreover, there are ample opportunities to improve the coherence of preparedness efforts through more coordinated decision-making, planning and implementation (see Kellett, 2014 forthcoming). The country case studies highlight the fact that donor funding for preparedness is undermined by the way in which funding is structured. This presents a challenge, as there is a fundamental tension between the suite of emergency preparedness activities that need to take place to enable a more effective and efficient response to crisis and the bifurcated funding system that resources those activities. The silos in the system allow gaps and, to a lesser extent, create scope for duplication.

Fundamental challenges remain, which constrain the ability of international and national actors to pursue integrated approaches to the range of risks being faced. These include the artificial division between efforts to work on different types of risk present in the same location.

The recommendations outlined here are based on the nature of the system, in particular the considerable and arguably unsustainable pressure on humanitarian financing currently witnessed, and the strong performance of bilateral in-country development funding within the framework questions. This is also informed by the authors’ assessment that the recurrence of complex emergencies (and the humanitarian financing that goes to those contexts) represents to some degree a failure of transition, and that more money targeting the building up of national stakeholders and systems is required. In many cases, this goes beyond the funding practices and policies that have been examined at a country level to the way in which donors commonly view preparedness, and risk in general. That said, a shift of emphasis towards development financing for emergency preparedness does not rely upon donors alone; the system needs to make the case and advocate for change, including within individual agencies.

Support for system change

This report proposes a series of changes to the current way in which preparedness is financed (or in many cases in the ways in which it is not financed). Donor support is required to make these changes happen:

- Support should be given to the specific measures proposed here to improve the existing system, including enhancing preparedness throughout humanitarian mechanisms, obligatory multi-year Strategic Response Plans, risk-focused mechanisms making preparedness an essential part of all country prioritisation, and preparedness becoming a core component of key adaptation financing mechanisms.

- In addition, increased support is essential within the current system and in various guises: support for practical steps that can help improve the coherence of preparedness and clarify the current division of labour, and a commitment to increase financing. Donor advocacy for change is essential.

- Donors are asked to seriously consider the options for a global mechanism that can address the preparedness issues and priorities that remain after existing mechanisms have been enhanced to their most appropriate limit. This mechanism will pilot a new way of working, across existing divides between humanitarian and development approaches.

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94 For example, the Niger CAP of 2013, despite having preparedness as a core goal, still contains only a single project with the word “preparedness” in its title, despite 53 of these 63 projects articulating preparedness activities. This suggests that agencies are at best sceptical of the value of making it clear that emergency preparedness is a clear part of a project’s objectives, perhaps out of concern that donors will not fund it.
Prioritising of risk

In addition, donors should consider a range of actions to address the current preparedness challenges from within their own structures and working practices, with, throughout, an emphasis on bringing development financing to bear on underlying risk. This includes action to:

- Re-assess global and country programming priorities for risk. Investment in preparedness should be based on a global assessment of risk, related to capacity and vulnerability, need and exposure. Such an assessment would allow for a concentration of efforts where the need is greatest. A specific example is to consider using the Index for Risk Management (InfoRM), which seeks to address the fact that ‘there is currently no global and common evidence-base which could provide a transparent, objective and shared understanding of humanitarian risk’ (InfoRM, 2013).

- Ensure that risk financing initiatives are not just part of humanitarian and crisis-related structures but also become the foundation for development investments.

- Flexible financing could be encouraged as a means to support more tailored and adaptable preparedness interventions. Evidence from across the five case studies reveals the need – particularly in challenging working environments – to accommodate fluctuations in context, whether conditions of conflict, fragility and risk or engagement by different stakeholders in policy processes. There are numerous examples where elements of preparedness are working successfully – e.g. early warning based on assessment of risk – but where a lack of flexibility in existing funding limits a country’s ability to prepare appropriately. This is what could be termed ‘preparedness for response’, at the humanitarian end of the emergency preparedness continuum.

- Proactive internal advocacy within donor countries and institutions and multi-donor groups is required to ensure that preparedness is part of funding decisions. Vocal and visual support can be sustained in broader international debates only with the backing of key donors. It is suggested that donors invest in understanding the added value that investments in emergency preparedness can make to their own caseloads in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, including value for money in the mid- to long term. On the basis of this, stronger internal advocacy can be undertaken to encourage a widespread internal change in donors’ understanding and the value given to emergency preparedness (within both humanitarian and development departments).

- Consideration should be given to earmarking funding for emergency preparedness, whether from humanitarian or development sources. The most important advantages of earmarking are, firstly, that it guarantees some level of funding and, secondly, that it commits a donor to change. However, on the whole this is not recommended unless a much better global understanding of need can be articulated.

- Emergency preparedness is an inherent part of resilience; making the resilience agenda practical and operational should entail an adequate focus on preparedness. This can be framed in many ways – as a means to improve the resilience and adaptive capacity of both national and international actors, and the humanitarian and development systems that operate in-country. It is recommended that emergency preparedness be embedded into current and future indicators of what makes for a resilient system.

It is suggested that donors invest in understanding the added value that investments in emergency preparedness can make to their own caseloads in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, including value for money in the mid- to long term.

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95 Although not a core part of the analysis in this work, multilateral development banks have been shown in the case studies to be an important financing source for the disaster element of preparedness, where disaster risk consciousness is sufficiently high and there is relatively stable governance. Some of the recommendations in this list may therefore be appropriate to these banks, as key actors in some contexts and substantial development donors themselves.

96 Also known as the Open Humanitarian Risk Index.
Emergency preparedness and resilience

There is no conception of resilience that does not— in some form— incorporate emergency preparedness (Harris, 2014 forthcoming). As the IASC (2012) argues: ‘Resilience itself is not achievable without the capacity to absorb shocks, and it is this capacity that emergency preparedness helps to provide.’ Preparedness is understood to be a fundamental component of the resilience agenda and one of the more practical aspects of the concept, lending itself to a grounded set of activities that can be implemented in practice, thus enabling a system to absorb shocks while retaining the same fundamental system attributes. This is sometimes described as ‘bounce back’, i.e. returning to a pre-disaster state (or to an improved state) more rapidly and more easily.

Conceptualisations of the relationship between emergency preparedness and resilience vary between agencies. For some, such as the European Commission (2012) or DFID (2012), emergency preparedness ‘provides the necessary grounding to enable better prepared, more capable and ultimately more “resilient” recipient communities, agencies and governments’ (DFID, 2012). Others recognise the multi-dimensional aspects of resilience but, for operational purposes, pursue linked sectoral approaches that all contribute to resilience. The World Bank, for example, has strategies that specifically target the building of resilience in DRM, climate change, conflict and fragility, environment, social protection and labour.

Given the increasing number of policy statements recognising that investing in resilience is cost-effective when compared with approaches that rely exclusively on response and recovery after the event (European Commission, 2012), there is reason to suggest that preparedness, as part of a broader contribution to risk management, is fundamental to the pursuit of resilience. Yet while according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), ‘the cost effectiveness of ex-ante disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness measures show that the benefits outweigh the costs by a factor of between 3 and 7’ (IPCC, 2012; and World Bank, 2010a, in Harris, 2014 forthcoming: 3), funding priorities remain skewed to post-disaster recovery, underlining how the current funding architecture misses major opportunities to invest in resilience.

ODA committed to supporting national systems of preparedness – which in turn contribute towards building resilience – is minimal at best, as this report details. The latest data suggests that funding for DRR has amounted cumulatively to $13.5 billion over the past 20 years, a minute fraction (0.4%) of the $3 trillion in overall development commitments (Kellett and Caravani, 2013: 5). Moreover, consultations in the Arab states, Asia and the Americas have revealed a strong desire to incorporate a stronger awareness of risk into national budget allocations and to establish national risk financing strategies that build on all available financing mechanisms in-country (UNISDR, 2013a). Such an approach would support more risk-aware and risk-adjusted development trajectories, and the development of national systems that are more resilient to the range of shocks and stresses likely to be faced in any given context.

Resilience, and the role that emergency preparedness has to play in it, is thus a useful springboard from which to address the prevailing neglect of pre-emptive action and the current split between ex-ante and ex-post investment. It is, in many ways, an oxymoron to attempt to build resilience within the binary constraints of the humanitarian and development systems, given that these concepts focus on inter-acting system components. Thus a new alternative ‘business as usual’ needs to be found, one which works to support cost-effective ex-ante action, and one in which there is a global consensus on the importance of addressing risk as a crucial component to building resilience.

It is yet to be seen how ‘resilience’ will inform or shape the international financing architecture for emergency preparedness, if at all. It is clear that at the project level donor funding is being infused with the term but, as a signal of more significant changes to ODA, there is little evidence to suggest that any marked change is in the making. What the ‘resilience agenda’ does represent is a new way of thinking and approaching age-old humanitarian and development challenges – one that must be embraced to mark the shift in supporting both national and international communities to be better prepared.
8. Conclusion

preparing for the foreseeable future
8. Conclusion: preparing for the foreseeable future

Key messages

- In the future disasters will be more frequent than today; the centrality of ‘risk’ is thus an essential component of all development and humanitarian work.
- While increased support will cost in the immediate term, financing emergency preparedness activities has enormous potential to reduce the costs of response.
- Financial responsibility needs to be shouldered both by affected governments and by international humanitarian and development actors.
- A new international consensus is essential between national governments and the international community on the need for countries to be better prepared.
- Inclusion of emergency preparedness as a key feature of the post-2015 development agenda is paramount.
- The IASC must seize opportunities to advance preparedness, with a high-profile champion responsible for ensuring that the cause does not ‘fall off the agenda’, supported by an appropriate agency or IASC structure.

In moving towards a post-2015 era, with evidence pointing towards a world in which disasters are even more frequent than today (Shepherd et al., 2013), the centrality of ‘risk’ is becoming an essential component of all development and humanitarian work. Beyond the rhetoric, at some point a decision has to be made to make a change. This means making a decision that will cost something, either in terms of political effort, bureaucratic changes or financial resources. Tinkering around the edges with existing mechanisms is not enough: the country case studies undertaken as part of this research have proved that. While increased support will cost in the immediate term, financing emergency preparedness activities has enormous potential to reduce the costs of response. This in turn will create a more sustainable platform from which to address the current pressures on the humanitarian system, which is stretched beyond both its means and its mandate. Risk therefore needs to be embedded in national and international planning and budgetary frameworks.

Cost is not limited to the way that we fund. It is also about how much is funded. Increasing the necessary commitment to emergency preparedness clearly requires a coherent business case built on solid incentives and a calculation of the return on investment, something that draws upon methods such as cost-benefit analysis, economics of preparedness and robust, clear messaging. This business case should be tied directly to calls for specific budgets to support emergency preparedness (as well as risk management in general) from national resource allocations. Moreover, the international community needs to get serious about the funding volumes involved in creating sustainable, functioning national preparedness systems. For example, how much has it cost developed country governments in at-risk areas (e.g. Japan, the US, Germany or Australia) to achieve the advances in preparedness and risk management that they have? How does this compare with what is being invested by developing country governments and their international partners?

In advocating for emergency preparedness, as part and parcel of a risk-based approach to international aid, a ‘no regret’ narrative should be adopted. Emergency preparedness is relevant beyond preparedness for response and is thus not just to the benefit of humanitarians. In the medium to long term, it will almost certainly save money, lives and livelihoods. The financial responsibility therefore needs to be shouldered by international humanitarian and development actors, as well as by national stakeholders and governments. Taking
this agenda forward will require continued efforts on the part of the IASC and engaged stakeholders to translate the recommendations in this report into action.

A sea change in our approach to international aid financing is needed, one that puts at the forefront the importance of managing risk. For development approaches, this means taking measures to avoid potential gains being lost or undermined, while for humanitarians it means being better prepared to deal with the geography of risk in 2015 and beyond. Preparing for future risks is a responsibility and a basic prerequisite to effective humanitarian and development work – it is not optional.

A selection of possible spaces for engagement and action is outlined below.

8.1 Moving the agenda forward

- Deliver the recommendations contained in this report to the IASC in Geneva and New York (and where appropriate, regional centres) securing commitment on the part of representatives to formulate a plan of campaign to address the changes required. The IASC Task Team on Financing for Emergency Preparedness should spearhead this.

- The IASC must seize opportunities to advance preparedness. Learning from the experiences of the Political Champions for Disaster Resilience group, a high-profile champion should be designated to be responsible for promoting action on preparedness and ensuring that the emergency preparedness cause does not fall off the political agenda.

- In addition, the IASC should reach out more overtly to key elements of the international system working on resolving conflict, often in the same fragile contexts that attract considerable amounts of humanitarian assistance, but which in terms of planning and programming have to be outside of the IASC. The focus should be on direct contacts with the DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and more integration with its New Deal for Fragile States.

- In discussions on the post-2015 development goals, clear messages should be communicated with regards to the added value of emergency preparedness for natural hazard-related disasters and conflict, and the links between the two.

- National governments, UN agencies and NGOs should seek to ensure stronger inclusion of emergency preparedness as a key feature of the post-2015 agreement on DRR (i.e. the successor to the Hyogo Framework for Action).

As has been highlighted throughout this report, effective and efficient financing for emergency preparedness is not just a financial issue. There are many ways in which having adequate financing mechanisms for preparedness needs to be supported by enhancements to the preparedness system in general. The research team recommend the following:

- Clear guidance should be developed for the adequate coding, tracking and reporting of investments in emergency preparedness.

- The IASC Principals should support the roll-out of the Common Framework for Emergency Preparedness across both the HC and RC networks.

- In addition, the Principals should endorse other key and related work of the SWG for Preparedness: the Reference Modules for Cluster Coordination at the Country Level, and the Humanitarian Programming Cycle (and their enhanced focus on preparedness).

Box 8.1: Ensuring practical connections: recommendations beyond the purely financial

- CADRI, as an inter-agency tool for capacity-building for DRR, should be supported as a way of better harmonising support to UN Country Teams.

- More should be done to integrate emergency preparedness within the UNDAF; the IASC should advocate for more integration, making use of existing guidelines on DRR/CCA.

- Options exist beyond the financing system through which the IASC largely operates. Other sources of funding (such as the private sector and remittances) should be harnessed, and integrated approaches, such as the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium, examined for possible replication (see Annex 3).

- Finally, and perhaps most influentially in the long run, the positive role that the Common Budgetary Framework can play in highlighting (and funding) gaps in preparedness should be investigated.

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97 For Haiti, Sudan, Myanmar, Niger and the Philippines, specific sets of recommendations are outlined in the individual country case studies. (These will be made available via the CDI website during 2014.) Appropriate platforms in-country should be used to discuss and explore the potential for taking these recommendations forward and making them a reality.

98 An inter-agency initiative of UNDP/BCPR, OCHA and the UNISDR secretariat, CADRI's mission is to advance knowledge of, and strengthen sustainable capacity development for, disaster risk reduction worldwide. See: http://www.cadri.net/
The recommendations on improving the existing financial mechanisms and tools should feed into debates at, for example, UN ECOSOC’s fourth Development Cooperation Forum 2014 in New York.

In preparation for the World Humanitarian Summit 2016, advocacy is required for emergency preparedness to be included as a central component of one of the four thematic areas to be determined through the 2014-2015 consultation process. While preparedness already appears as part of the theme ‘reducing vulnerability and managing risk’, it is also highly relevant to the other three: ‘humanitarian effectiveness’, ‘transformation through innovation’ and ‘servicing the needs of people in conflict’ (OCHA, 2013f). Furthermore, advocacy is needed for emergency preparedness to be part of the final ‘Road Map and Plan of Action for Post-2016’.

As follow-up to the 19th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in Warsaw in 2013 and preparation for the 20th session in Lima, preparedness should be included as an integral part of the actions required to support climate change adaptation across vulnerable and high-risk contexts.

Risk needs to be embedded in international planning and budgetary frameworks. At the level of individual national governments, agencies and donors, efforts should be made to assess the potential cost-benefit of investing in emergency preparedness across all sectors. Recognising the financial constraints that currently prevail, decisions should be made about what preparedness priorities are to be supported, informed by a comprehensive assessment of risk in relation to need, vulnerability, exposure and capacity.

Agencies engaged in bilateral relationships with national governments – in all manner of contexts – should endeavour to emphasise the importance of taking a risk-based approach to humanitarian and development work. Where national fiscal planning, policy and budgetary processes are being crafted, preparedness for risk must be embedded, taking heed of lessons from governments across diverse risk contexts in developed and developing countries.
Annexes
Annex 1:
Case studies and background papers

The following papers have been prepared by the Overseas Development Institute to inform this report. Depending on the sensitivity of the information they contain, those that are for public release will be available on the ODI website.


Annex 2:
Key definitions

Definitions are adapted from UNISDR, ‘Terminology’: http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology

Adaptation
The adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.

Contingency planning
A management process that analyses specific potential events or emerging situations that might threaten society or the environment and establishes arrangements in advance to enable timely, effective and appropriate responses to such events and situations.

Disaster
A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources.

Disaster risk management
The systematic process of using administrative directives, organisations and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster.

Disaster risk reduction
The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events.

Early warning system
The set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning information to enable individuals, communities and organisations threatened by a hazard to prepare and to act appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the possibility of harm or loss.

Emergency management
The organisation and management of resources and responsibilities for addressing all aspects of emergencies, in particular preparedness, response and initial recovery steps.

Emergency services
The set of specialised agencies that have specific responsibilities and objectives in serving and protecting people and property in emergency situations.

Ex-ante/ex-post
Ex-ante means ‘before the event’, ex-post means ‘after the event’. Ideally, funding for emergency preparedness should be ex-ante, but in reality it is often ex-post.

Hazard
A dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption or environmental damage.

Mitigation
The lessening or limitation of the adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters. (It should be noted that in climate change policy, ‘mitigation’ is defined differently, being the term used for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions that are the source of climate change.)

Natural hazard
Natural process or phenomenon that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption or environmental damage.
Preparedness
The knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery organisations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to and recover from the impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard events or conditions.

Prevention
The outright avoidance of adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters.

Resilience
The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions.

Response
The provision of emergency services and public assistance during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected.

Vulnerability
The characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard.
Annex 3: Opportunities beyond funding mechanisms

A plethora of opportunities exists beyond formal funding mechanisms for supporting preparedness activities through different ways of working and alternative funding sources. Three are explored here: the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (as an example of the former) and the private sector and remittances as examples of the latter.

Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC)

The NRRC represents a successful opportunity to bring national and international, humanitarian and development actors together around a shared risk agenda. Though limited to natural disasters, the NRRC has potential for expansion though not without significant consideration of the country context and appropriate adaptation of the model.

Now in its fourth year of operation, the NRRC has generated considerable national and international interest, and has supported the mobilisation of significant donor resources, both technical and financial. The Consortium was built around five programmes, arranged thematically and known as ‘Flagships’. The five areas were set out on the basis of government priorities, patterns of risk and vulnerability in Nepal and the ongoing programmes of Consortium members.

Each Flagship, therefore, contains components of disaster preparedness, as well as elements of broader risk reduction. Flagship 2 is badged as the focal area for emergency preparedness and response capacity and has the broadest range of activities related to disaster planning across governmental and international systems, including clusters, national and international militaries and civil protection.

Overall, a review (Taylor, 2014 forthcoming) found that, as an innovative structure that brings together a range of important actors and retains attention on the key issue of risk reduction in Nepal, the NRRC can be viewed as a success. As a platform for action and operational coordination, its results are varied, but it has to be acknowledged that the NRRC represents a new way of joint working for a number of institutions and that such institutional adaptation can be a slow process.

The incumbent UN RC/HC was able to provide a vision around which an impressive array of international agencies could rally. The NRRC was backed from its inception by the Government of Nepal, and was bolstered further when three important donors extended significant financial and vocal support. The NRRC is unquestionably an innovative framework. From the perspective of international aid architecture, it sits astride humanitarian and development architectures. Although development is clearly the dominant paradigm, the NRRC holds the structural ‘tension’ between the priorities of the government and those of development and humanitarian partners. It has required humanitarian actors in the system to consider: how to operate in a manner that complements development norms; the need for sustainability; longer timeframes; and perhaps above all, the need to work with and through government. Similarly, it has required development actors to consider programming with a humanitarian mindset: targeting and prioritising according to risk and the humanitarian imperative, as well as the need to collapse normal development timeframes for project development and completion.

The NRRC came into being in post-conflict Nepal. A familiar trajectory is seen. The CAP has given way to the UNDAF as the main appeal mechanism. Clusters established and strengthened during the conflict and the Kosi flood response have been handed over to a government lead. OCHA’s coordination function has been handed over to government, with the support of UNDP through its DRM programme, which continues to build capacity in legislation.

Private sector

As the economic impacts of disasters grow (PwC, 2013; Munich RE, 2013) and state finances continue to be depleted, the risk burden for emergency preparedness is increasingly transferring from the public to the private sector (UNISDR, 2013c). Not only does the private sector often end up paying for the majority of disaster losses, often by small business and farm owners (ADPC, 2013a), but the challenges in mobilising private finance to bridge the financing gap in a number of different emergency preparedness-related areas is well recognised (UNISDR, 2013c), especially in the world’s poorest and most vulnerable nations. Furthermore, the challenges and complexity of stimulating responsible private sector development and investment in frontier economies (where
corruption, lack of transparency and accountability are major concerns), often in conflict-affected states, remain a serious obstacle for both multilateral development banks and national governments.

Growing levels of risk and exposure are driving private sector organisations and multinationals to not only better account for disasters in their risk management planning processes, but also to more actively engage with governments and other public institutions to fund and support emergency preparedness activities (ADPC, 2013a). There have therefore been growing and repeated calls for enhanced private sector engagement in support of emergency preparedness (UNISDR, 2013c), specifically in relation to private business initiatives and investment, enhanced public-private partnerships to leverage private sector expertise and finance and an increased consideration of disaster risk to financial and corporate assets across globalised value chains.

Key areas include:

- political leadership to more effectively use public sector funding to leverage private sector expertise and investment
- private sector leadership to fully recognise the benefits of preventive actions and risk analysis to better understand and reduce the exposure of corporate and financial assets to disasters
- technical assistance from and leveraging of private sector innovation and expertise
- PPPs to provide additional support to local communities to have sufficient financing pre- and post-disaster agreed prior to disaster).

Remittances and emergency preparedness

Opportunities exist to increase local-level spending on preparedness through the use of remittances. The number of migrant workers worldwide increased by 42% between 2000 and 2010, and overall remittances increased by 300% over this same period, reaching $325.5 billion in 2010 (World Bank, 2010b).

Remittance flows play a major part in the family, community and country economies of several of the case study countries. In 2012 the Philippines received remittances to the value of $24.5 billion. Only China and India had greater volumes of remittances and, per capita, the Philippines outstripped these two countries considerably. Haiti’s 2011 figure of $1.6 billion in remittances was equivalent to 21.1% of the country’s GDP – essentially one in five dollars the country ‘produced’ was actually sent back home from abroad.
References


Jackson, P. (2012) Value for money and international development: Deconstructing myths to promote a more constructive discussion. OEFC Development Co-operation Directorate.


OCHA (2012a) Overview of the 2013 Consolidated Appeals.

OCHA (2012b) ‘What is the Central Emergency Response Fund?’ http://www.unocha.org/cerf/about-us/who-we-are


## Acronyms and abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>BCR</td>
<td>Benefit-to-cost ratio</td>
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<td>BCPR</td>
<td>Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeal Process</td>
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<td>CBA</td>
<td>Cost-benefit analysis</td>
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<td>CCA</td>
<td>Climate change adaptation</td>
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<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund</td>
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<td>CHAP</td>
<td>Common Humanitarian Action Plan</td>
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<td>CHF</td>
<td>Common Humanitarian Fund</td>
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<td>CIF</td>
<td>Climate Investment Fund</td>
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<td>CPR TTF</td>
<td>Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP)</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
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<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate social responsibility</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DCPSF</td>
<td>Darfur Community Peace and Stabilisation Fund</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DIPECHO</td>
<td>Disaster Preparedness Programme of the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO)</td>
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<td>DNGPCA</td>
<td>Dispositif National de Prévention et Gestion des Crises Alimentaires au Niger</td>
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<tr>
<td>DREF</td>
<td>Disaster Relief Emergency Fund</td>
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<td>DRM</td>
<td>Disaster risk management</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster risk reduction</td>
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<td>DRRM</td>
<td>Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2010</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>UN Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>ERF</td>
<td>Emergency Response Fund</td>
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<td>ERRF</td>
<td>Emergency Relief Response Fund</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EWS</td>
<td>Early warning system</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>UN Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>FCFA</td>
<td>CFA francs</td>
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<td>GEF</td>
<td>Global Environmental Facility</td>
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<td>GFDRR</td>
<td>Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic information system</td>
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<td>GoM</td>
<td>Government of Myanmar</td>
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<td>GoN</td>
<td>Government of Niger</td>
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<td>HAP</td>
<td>Haiti Action Plan</td>
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<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
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<td>HCT</td>
<td>Humanitarian Country Team</td>
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<td>HFA</td>
<td>Hyogo Framework for Action</td>
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<td>HMSF</td>
<td>Humanitarian Multi-Stakeholder Fund (Myanmar)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRF</td>
<td>Humanitarian Response Fund</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICVA</td>
<td>International Council of Voluntary Agencies</td>
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<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International humanitarian law</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
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<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least developed country</td>
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<td>LDCF</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries Fund</td>
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<td>LGU</td>
<td>Local government unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIFT</td>
<td>Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (Myanmar)</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAPDRR</td>
<td>Myanmar Action Plan on Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Trust Fund</td>
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<td>MPTF</td>
<td>Multi-Partner Trust Fund</td>
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<td>MTEF</td>
<td>Medium Term Expenditure Framework</td>
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<td>NAPA</td>
<td>National Adaptation Programme of Action</td>
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<td>NFI</td>
<td>Non-food item</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>NRRC</td>
<td>Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official development assistance</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPT</td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>Philippine Business for Social Progress</td>
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<td>PDRF</td>
<td>Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPCR</td>
<td>Pilot Program for Climate Resilience</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-private partnership</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator</td>
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<td>RRMP</td>
<td>Rapid Response to the Movement of Populations</td>
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<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCCF</td>
<td>Special Climate Change Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and gender-based violence</td>
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<td>SWG</td>
<td>Sub-Working Group</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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The views presented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of ODI or our partners.