Assessment of the evidence of links between gender equality, peacebuilding and statebuilding

Literature review

Pilar Domingo, Rebecca Holmes, Alina Rocha Menocal and Nicola Jones, with Dharini Bhuvanendra and Jill Wood

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Table of contents

Acknowledgements
Abbreviations ii
Executive summary iii
State of the evidence and knowledge base: iii
Summary of findings iv

Introduction 1
Approach and Methodology 1

1 Does the literature on peacebuilding and statebuilding include gender issues and gender-sensitive approaches? 3

2 Conflict, fragility and how they are experienced by women: gender-based discrimination, exclusion and violence in FCAS 6

3 Peacebuilding, statebuilding and women’s political voice 10
3.1 Peacebuilding: peace agreements and first constitutions 10
3.2 Post conflict-governance, first elections and women’s political participation 19
3.3 Women and transitional justice 26

4 Statebuilding: gender-responsive support to build core state functions, services and responses 32
4.1 Justice and security 32
4.2 Service delivery 40
4.3 Women’s economic empowerment: economic recovery, livelihoods and job creation in FCAS 47

5 Concluding comments 54
5.1 Key analytical findings 54
5.2 Evidence gaps; priorities for further research 58

References 61

Appendix 74
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Community-driven Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHW</td>
<td>Community Health Worker</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCAF</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCAS</td>
<td>Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGM/C</td>
<td>Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSDRC</td>
<td>Governance and Social Development Resource Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIEP</td>
<td>International Institute for Education Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCAF</td>
<td>International Network on Conflict and Fragility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>R4D</td>
<td>Research for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBV</td>
<td>Sexually Based Violence</td>
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<td>SRH</td>
<td>Sexual and Reproductive Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>TJ</td>
<td>Transitional Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>UN Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>UN Development Fund for Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-INSTRAW</td>
<td>UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>UN Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAW</td>
<td>Violence Against Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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Executive summary

This report provides an overview of the knowledge base on gender-sensitive approaches to peacebuilding and statebuilding in fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCAS). It uses systematic principles of enquiry to assess the evidence, but is not a systematic review. The assessment included a review of the most relevant sources, identifying the key trends and findings in relevant academic and grey literature.

The main research questions included:

- What do gender-responsive approaches in peacebuilding and statebuilding look like?
- What is the impact of gender-responsive approaches on the peacebuilding and statebuilding goals of the international agenda, including inclusivity, participation, responsiveness and accountability?
- Do these approaches substantively enhance the advancement of gender equality goals in FCAS?

For the most part, the literature on peacebuilding and statebuilding does not address these research questions directly or explicitly. As such, the review sought to elicit relevant analytical and empirical findings by taking a closer look at key thematic and sectoral components of peacebuilding and statebuilding, and examined how gender-responsive approaches featured in these.

State of the evidence and knowledge base:

- The evidence on the linkages between peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and outcomes and the adoption of gender-responsive approaches aimed at achieving gender equality outcomes in such processes is relatively weak and small in size, despite the breadth of the subject matter. There are important exceptions to this, with significant contributions to the literature from, for example, Castillejo (2011; 2013), El-Bushra (2012), Justino et al. (2012), Tripp (2012), the studies collated in the UN Women Sourcebook on Women, Peace and Security (UN Women, 2012) and the recent Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Policy Paper, Gender and Statebuilding in Fragile and Conflict-affected States (OECD-DAC, 2013). The latter was finalised and published after the completion of this literature review. For this reason, while it is a relevant policy paper, the findings are reflected only summarily in this review.
- The focus on specific thematic components of peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts, such as support for peace agreements, justice and security reform, service delivery or economic recovery, reveals some useful insights into what gender-responsive approaches look like in these areas. However, there is limited direct reference in this literature to the politics of peacebuilding and statebuilding.
- Notably, the linkages across the thematic areas and sector-specific approaches remain hugely underdeveloped. There is very limited analysis or evidence on how, for instance, including women in peace agreements or processes of constitutional reform affects the quality of or women’s access to basic services. Rather, as with policy processes, including among donors, the analysis and evidence of gender-responsive policy and practice in each thematic or sectoral area remains effectively siloed.

1 The latter was finalised and published after the completion of this literature review. For this reason, while it is a relevant policy paper, the findings are reflected only summarily in this review.
Summary of findings

Key issues and recurring themes identified in the review of the knowledge on gender-responsive peacebuilding and statebuilding are summarised below. See also the Box at the end of this Executive Summary.

Peacebuilding and statebuilding: political settlements and women’s political voice

Peacebuilding and statebuilding are both multidimensional and complex processes that can offer opportunities to renegotiate and transform the terms and quality of state–society relations, including basing these on more inclusive, participatory, responsive and accountable engagement (DFID, 2010; OECD-DAC, 2011). They are processes in which the political settlement (the underlying rules of social, political and economic engagement) is in flux and potentially subject to redefinition and renegotiation. This context offers specific opportunities to establish and/or strengthen arrangements and state institutions to incorporate stakeholders who have not traditionally had any voice, including women.

The emerging body of literature that explores these issues finds that, while women and gender concerns have increasingly been included in peacebuilding and statebuilding, their inclusion and presence remains marginal and uneven at every stage of these processes. In addition, more attention needs to be paid to the substance of women’s inclusion/incorporation, as women’s mere physical presence in different aspects of peacebuilding is not enough to ensure that the process is gender-responsive.

Peacebuilding may include efforts to support peace agreements, and/or new or reformed constitutions. Commitments to inclusivity and effective mobilisation by gender advocates create opportunities for women to be engaged in these processes, either formally or indirectly. A review of the literature further finds that women’s participation in politics has increased in post-conflict settings, at least through formal mechanisms such as quotas and participation in political parties. This is closely associated with women’s social mobilisation and activism in informal political spaces at the subnational and national levels, and through transnational civil society action. Numerous challenges and barriers that hinder women’s substantive participation in post-conflict governance processes were identified. These include customary rules, negative cultural attitudes, male- and elite-dominated political parties and structures, lack of financial resources for women, violence and insecurity, the effect of backlash reactions, illiteracy and political inexperience and lack of support for capacity building, among others.

Legacies of conflict and violence, combined with persistent gender-based structures of exclusion and discrimination, can also inhibit women’s voice in politics and public life. Research on transitional justice (TJ) has begun to address questions about its potentially transformative impact in addressing gendered experiences of conflict-related violence and structural inequalities. However, the empirical evidence remains underdeveloped. This is especially so in terms of how gender-responsive approaches might affect peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts. This is also true of most of the literature on TJ, which until recently was mostly theoretical, prescriptive and normative. Gender-responsive approaches in TJ are very recent, and thus provides little basis on which to assess their wider impact.

Statebuilding: gender-responsive support to building core state functions and services

The literature on gender, security and justice provision in FCAS takes note of peacebuilding objectives, but reference to statebuilding in this field remains negligible. The evidence base for FCAS has grown in the past decade, especially with regard to gender-responsive reform of the security sector. Far less is known about the justice sector. When gender perspectives are considered, much of the focus in the literature is on how security and justice sector reforms address issues related to gender-based violence (GBV), but other questions, related to dispute resolution, access to justice or rights protection issues, such as with respect to women’s property rights or inheritance, are incipient. Gender-sensitive reform approaches in justice and security have included addressing participation and inclusion (such as the proportion of women recruited to these sectors, or whether women’s organisations are consulted on policy), as well the establishment of protection measures and special units to address the safety and security of women and girls. There is also a growing research agenda on understanding the impact of informal security and justice systems on gender relations, and on how customary norms can be contested and redefined. Overall, the knowledge base on justice and security reform (both generally, and specifically on gender-responsive approaches) is dissociated from research on the wider political economy of statebuilding.
In relation to service delivery, despite the numerous references to, and mechanisms by which gender-responsive service delivery can potentially contribute to, the foundations and processes of peacebuilding and statebuilding, these linkages are rarely explicit in the wider literature. A predominant focus at the micro level of service delivery shows that both gender-responsive provision and the role women play in delivering services can potentially contribute to restoring state legitimacy and strengthening social cohesion. Positive examples from the literature include approaches such as the role of education in addressing gender inequalities and reducing GBV; addressing specific gendered vulnerabilities resulting from conflict, such as GBV; strengthening and supporting women’s roles in delivering services by providing training and remuneration; sensitising service providers to develop gender-sensitive sexual and reproductive health (SRH) programmes; flexible service delivery (e.g. mobile services) to address women’s needs; and involving women and men in the planning and delivery of services. The literature also demonstrates that gender inequalities can be exacerbated as a result of failing to take a gender-responsive approach, reinforcing inequalities in access to services because of institutional failures, such as lack of capacity and resources, uncoordinated and unplanned delivery of services and barriers arising from discrimination and socio-cultural norms.

**Economic recovery** is a vital part of sustainable peace processes and statebuilding, and, without stronger and more strategic engagement of women in these processes, societies will be unable to realise and capitalise on important dividends in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process. While conflict and post-conflict environments can shake up gender relations and provide opportunities for women’s economic empowerment, the evidence base suggests that the impacts of conflict and fragility are heterogeneous and can, depending on the context, either increase or diminish existing gender inequalities. Meaningful income-generating opportunities for women, including gender- and market-sensitive vocational training and support in obtaining access to productive assets, are vital preconditions for economic and broader empowerment, but so too is tackling men’s disempowerment and threats to their sense of masculinity. Working with traditional elites and men to shift gender-based discriminatory social norms and secure support for women’s economic empowerment can be fruitful, but it is critical that this does not come at the expense of women’s broader empowerment by reinforcing traditional gender divisions of labour. Accordingly, there appears to be a growing consensus that support for economic empowerment should focus on men as well as women in an effort to facilitate a common basis for development and be underpinned by a more household-oriented approach, while being careful to ensure that interventions are contextually relevant and ensuring that new vulnerabilities are not created for women, children and young people.

**Recurrent themes in the knowledge base**

Overall there are, in general, poor linkages across the thematic areas, resulting in important gaps in understanding how these areas intersect, and the implications for peacebuilding and statebuilding. There are, however, some recurrent challenges and enabling opportunities relating to the prospects for gender-responsive approaches across the thematic areas:

**Challenges**

- Gender hierarchies are resilient. Even when the experience of conflict may result in changing gender roles, patriarchal and discriminatory social norms tend to reassert themselves in post-conflict periods.
- Legal change to eliminate gender-based discriminatory norms and practices tends to be slow to affect the real dynamics of gender relations. The gap between new laws (*de jure*) and practice (*de facto*) is a recurrent challenge across the thematic areas.
- Institutional hybridity and a weak state presence across the national territory is often a prevalent feature in FCAS. This means that gender-responsive approaches should not just focus on formal state institutions, but donors and international funders are not always equipped to engage with non-state actors and informal institutions.
- Donors show a lack of understanding about gender issues across the different sectors. The issues are left to the ‘gender experts’, with the result that gender-responsive approaches often remain peripheral to mainstream donor engagement in peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts.
- There is a tendency to ‘essentialise’ women, reducing them to stereotypes such as victims or nurturing mothers. Moreover, women are often referred to as if they were a homogenous group,
with limited consideration of how gender intersects with class, ethnicity, religion or political preferences.

• Gender-responsive approaches are often dissociated from considerations of how they intersect with wider social, political and economic dynamics in transitional settings. For instance, increasing the number of women in parliament represents only a modest gain where authoritarian structures prevail. Effective support to gender-responsive peace and statebuilding requires a deep understanding of wider context-specific political economy conditions.

**Enabling factors and windows of opportunity**

• Changing international norms, including UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, and subsequent related resolutions, constitutes a cumulative process of increasing international commitments to advancing gender equality and women’s participation.

• Peacebuilding and statebuilding processes can offer unique opportunities to embed gender equality goals in emerging political settlements resulting from the redefinition of the rules of social, political and economic engagement.

• This can result in concrete opportunities to achieve important legal changes to eliminate gender-based discrimination in formal law, for instance to remove barriers to women’s access to political participation, or to ownership of land and other assets.

• The experience of conflict can in some cases result in a redefinition of gender roles, which can partly contribute to changing attitudes, and enhancing opportunities and capabilities for women’s agency and access to decision-making roles.

• Working with non-state actors and informal institutions, including community-level norms, can provide the most effective entry points for addressing gender-based inequalities and discriminatory social norms, as well as renegotiating women’s public and private roles.
Summary of key findings

State of the knowledge

- There are important gaps in the knowledge base regarding gender-sensitive approaches to peacebuilding and statebuilding. The evidence on causal connections between such approaches and advancing the goals of peacebuilding and statebuilding is neither robust nor structured (for the most part) to respond to the research questions of this literature review.

- It is useful to look more closely at thematic and sector-specific components of peacebuilding and statebuilding, but the knowledge base is weak on how the relevant thematic areas intersect to enhance opportunities and capabilities for advancing gender equality goals in FCAS.

- There is limited research on identifying differences among women’s experiences and interests in peacebuilding and statebuilding that result from class, ethnicity, religion or other relevant cleavages, and how these feature in country-specific socio-political histories of fragility and conflict.

Emerging lessons for policy and programming

- Peacebuilding and statebuilding processes can offer historic opportunities for political and institutional change (formal and informal) to enhance women’s voice and participation, and to embed gender equality goals in emerging political settlements.

- Gender-responsive approaches in all sectors and at all levels are deeply political (at both the micro and the macro level of social, political and economic engagement). Deep understanding of context and how the political economy of fragility and conflict intersects with gender inequality is critical to identify opportunities and risks for strategic engagement on gender issues.

- Gender hierarchies are resilient. Understanding the wider social norms as well as concrete interest structures that shape the conduct of ‘resisters’ to gender-responsive approaches is vital in order to achieve change in power relations (gendered and other), and to foresee the force of backlash reactions.

- International actors can contribute to creating enabling conditions for gender-responsive peacebuilding and statebuilding through strategic support to reform-oriented coalitions, and facilitating dialogue among reformers and ‘resisters’ at international, national and subnational levels.

- It is important to identify and work with a range of key stakeholders (gender equality advocates and decision makers) to achieve substantive political, institutional and attitudinal change. This includes support to capabilities for politically strategic and technically informed engagement at key moments in peacebuilding and statebuilding.

- The international community has weak coordination strategies across sectors and thematic areas to promote gender equality in peacebuilding and statebuilding outcomes. Overcoming this requires working in a less siloed and overly technical way.

The gains achieved through gender-responsive approaches to different components of peacebuilding and statebuilding contribute to the goals of inclusion, participation and state responsiveness. This is a useful and observable indicator of progress for the wider policy goals of peacebuilding and statebuilding.
**Introduction**

This report offers an overview of the literature on gender, peacebuilding and statebuilding. It is part of a broader study commissioned by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) to review existing evidence, and to develop a practice-oriented analytical framework to guide the more effective integration of a gender perspective into peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts and programmes. The report presents the findings from the first phase of the study, (i) to assess the evidence on gender-sensitive approaches to peacebuilding and statebuilding in order to achieve gender equality outcomes in fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCAS) and on how such approaches add value to peacebuilding and statebuilding processes; and (ii) to identify knowledge gaps.

**Approach and Methodology**

Drawing on our previous experience in conducting systematic reviews, our literature review drew on systematic review principles (see Hagen-Zanker and Mallet, 2013, for more detail). This approach was considered appropriate to capture a broad range of literature across the relevant thematic areas, and included a more flexible and responsive approach to our literature searches without losing the core principles of a systematic review: rigour, transparency and a commitment to a critical assessment of the quality of evidence. As such, the review consisted of three separate tracks, which enabled us to produce a focused review that captured material from a broad range of sources and locations, and allowed us to look in depth at the issues arising:

1. A meta review of the literature on gender and peacebuilding and statebuilding (i.e. a review of existing reviews). This involved:
   - Evidence of the linkages between gender-sensitive approaches to peacebuilding and statebuilding on gender equality outcomes; and
   - Evidence of the linkages between gender-sensitive approaches to peacebuilding and statebuilding and peacebuilding and statebuilding outcomes.

2. A detailed (but not systematic) review of published and grey literature to find (i) what evidence exists and (ii) what gender-sensitive approaches have been most effective in terms of achieving gender equality outcomes in peacebuilding and statebuilding and, conversely, peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and outcomes that enhance gender inclusivity.

3. Consultation with selected experts to capture the most current and relevant work on gender and peacebuilding and statebuilding and provide insights to inform the conceptual framework and policy approach.

There were four stages in the methodology employed to conduct the literature review.

1. A research protocol to identify and agree on:
   - Research parameters (inclusion and exclusion criteria) including geographic focus; type of intervention (gender-sensitive approaches in peacebuilding and statebuilding thematic areas); type of study (e.g. impact evaluations, conceptual frameworks, policy documents); study design; and outcomes (on gender equality outcomes specifically and on peacebuilding and statebuilding outcomes more generally);
   - ‘Search strings’, based on keywords and search terms for the thematic areas;

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2 Research protocols for each of the thematic areas are available on request.
iii A set of criteria to assess the quality of the quantitative and qualitative research methodology 
applied to impact evaluations and other relevant studies. This included considering the following: is 
there a clear research question; does the study provide information about the sample; is there a 
robust quantitative or qualitative research method; is the method justified; are conclusions based on 
study results or findings? In addition, for each research question, the following issues were 
considered: median quality and distribution of quality of the studies included in the body of 
evidence; size of the body of evidence (small, medium, large); consistency of findings;

iv Sources for the knowledge review search (academic database and journals, experts to be 
contacted, relevant websites).

2. A bibliographic database search: searching an agreed list of academic and bibliographical databases and 
journals, using consistent search strings that were tested beforehand and the set of inclusion criteria 
described above.

3. The snowball technique: consultation with selected international experts for their views on evidence that 
links gender and peacebuilding and statebuilding, and on knowledge gaps, as well as recommendations 
about relevant studies.

4. Hand-searching: a search of websites, including those of DFID’s Research for Development (R4D) site, 
BRIDGE Research and Development, the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre 
(GSDRC), the World Bank and UN Women, for relevant studies using search terms similar to those used 
in the bibliographic database search and drawing on the Overseas Development Institute’s (ODI’s) own 
research and expertise in these areas.

This approach allowed for a comprehensive, but not exhaustive, review of the most relevant sources, and an 
informed estimation of the size and quality of the existing body of evidence across a potentially very broad field. 
Taking the review exercise beyond the peacebuilding and statebuilding literature to address sector-specific 
literatures on governance, justice and security, service delivery and economic empowerment and experience of 
supporting gender-responsive approaches in these areas in FCAS has the advantage of tapping into sector-
specific experiences. These are not typically included in much of the literature on peacebuilding and 
statebuilding.

At the same time, it is important to highlight the caveat that much of this literature is not directed at addressing 
the wider question of whether such approaches contribute to peacebuilding and statebuilding.

Report structure
The report comprises five main sections. Section 1 provides an overview of the extent to which the general 
international policy and academic literature on peacebuilding and statebuilding incorporates gender issues and 
develops gender-sensitive approaches. Section 2 examines the literature on the experiences of women in FCAS. 
It looks specifically at gender inequality, discrimination, changing gender roles and responsibilities and gender-
based violence (GBV). Section 3 reviews the evidence on women’s political settlements and political voice in 
peacebuilding and statebuilding processes, examining peace agreements and first post-conflict constitutions; 
post-conflict governance, focusing on first elections and political participation; and transitional justice. Section 4 
reviews the literature on gender-responsive support to the building of core state functions and services and 
responsive state action, focusing on justice and security, basic service delivery and women’s economic 
empowerment. Section 5 provides analytical conclusions and a summary of key gaps in the literature and 
recommends areas for further research.
1 Does the literature on peacebuilding and statebuilding include gender issues and gender-sensitive approaches?

Support for an approach that combines peacebuilding and statebuilding has become the dominant model for international engagement in post-conflict and fragile contexts. Statebuilding in the current international agenda is concerned with the long-term and historically rooted processes of building state institutions that are capable, accountable and responsive to citizens’ needs (DFID, 2010; OECD-DAC, 2011). Peacebuilding for DFID refers to more than the absence of violence, or ‘negative peace’. It includes addressing the causes of violence and conflict, including through inclusive peace processes and agreements, and supporting the foundations of mechanisms to resolve division and conflict through peaceful means (DFID, 2010). Both are complex and multidimensional processes, which are distinctive but also overlap in important ways.

Thinking in both areas has evolved considerably, and there is now a wide international consensus that peacebuilding and statebuilding should be grounded in renegotiating and rebuilding state–society relations, and the re-articulation of the linkages between the two along more mutually reinforcing lines.

As such, international agendas to promote peacebuilding and statebuilding share a fundamental concern in working with domestic actors to establish and/or strengthen arrangements and institutions that are more inclusive, representative and responsive, and that incorporate stakeholders who have not traditionally had a voice, including women and those from ethnic minorities, and in some cases oppressed ethnic majorities, as in Guatemala or South Africa. The aim of such efforts is to develop new rules of the game of social, political and economic exchange that are acceptable to most of the actors who can be engaged in peacebuilding and statebuilding endeavours, and that can create a legitimate political centre (Rocha Menocal, 2011).

Building on this ambition, various international organisations and initiatives have developed frameworks that outline the necessary areas to support the building of peaceful and effective states and societies, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), the UK DFID, the Institute for State Effectiveness, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding and the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report. While these frameworks vary in some respects, giving different weight to different areas and assigning different characteristics and functions to the state, they share fundamental similarities. Current thinking on what is needed to rearticulate state–society linkages and to foster legitimacy centres on four key areas: making political settlements and political processes more inclusive; strengthening the core functions of the state (however narrowly or broadly these are defined); helping the state meet public expectations; and nurturing social cohesion and the capacity of a society to enable reconciliation.

Developing countries have, in recent years, begun to play a much more active role in defining the direction of peacebuilding and statebuilding, reflected in the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, established in 2008 (Wyeth, 2012). The Dialogue is intended to bring together donors, aid-recipient countries

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1 See OECD-DAC (; 2011); DFID (2010); the Institute for State Effectiveness’ list of the 10 key functions of the state (www.effectivestates.org/ten.htm) and International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2010).
and civil society actors to address the root causes of conflict and fragility in a more realistic and effective manner. Led by Timor-Leste and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a small group of countries affected by fragility and conflict became deeply involved in establishing the Dialogue. Originally known as the g7, this group has continued to expand, and the g7+ now includes 17 countries.\(^4\) The g7+ has called for a New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, which was endorsed at the Fourth High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan at the end of 2011 (Denney, 2011; Wyeth, 2012).

These processes have four important features. First, there is nominal commitment to integrate a gender perspective into peacebuilding and statebuilding action, although this amounts to little more than declaratory statements, and policy debates within these processes have been noticeably weak in engaging substantively with gender equality and the role of women. Second, peacebuilding and statebuilding processes – as moments of political change – present potentially important opportunities to advance gender equality goals, strengthen women’s rights and citizenship and address entrenched gender inequalities (Castillejo, 2013). Third, adding a gender focus to peacebuilding and statebuilding can help the international community meet its goals of inclusivity, participation and representation (ibid.). Finally, gender equality has also been linked to improved economic and development outcomes (World Bank, 2012).

As with any agenda that seeks to incorporate goals of inclusivity, addressing gender and other related inequalities in the allocation of power and resources requires moving beyond technical approaches and engaging with the political nature of peacebuilding and statebuilding. Despite the explicit acknowledgement of the need to ‘engage politically’ in policy documents, peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions have, in practice, been dominated by technical approaches to donors’ operational engagement. This further undermines the potential for gender-responsive approaches in what are the deeply political processes of negotiating the terms of the political settlement and, therefore, the nature of state–society relations (El-Bushra, 2012).

It should also be noted that, for the most part, an explicit focus on gender in the literature on peacebuilding and especially statebuilding is relatively new. Analysis of peacebuilding has a more longstanding trajectory of addressing gender issues (such as essays in Afshar and Eade, 2004). But the field related to statebuilding is much more recent. There are concerns about a general lack of awareness in the literature on how women relate (or not) to the state, about how peacebuilding and statebuilding processes have different impacts on men and women and about the specific challenges that confront women precisely because they are women (Castillejo, 2011; 2013; El-Bushra, 2012). There is a perception that donors need far greater awareness of the multiple barriers that exclude women from politics in post-conflict contexts and should nuance their support for political processes accordingly (Castillejo, 2011), even though the international community has made some formal commitments to integrate gender into peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts, such as UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and subsequent resolutions and the OECD Policy Guidance on statebuilding. Research that does focus on the dynamics of gender-responsive change in governance processes has not, for the most part, focused on fragile contexts, but still constitutes a rich body of research on how women’s citizenship and political participation have evolved and can be supported (e.g. Goetz, 2007; Kabeer, 2005; Mukhopadhyay and Singh, 2007; Robins et al., 2008).

The various policy frameworks that have been adopted, if they mention gender at all, offer no guidance on how to develop a gender-sensitive approach other than mentioning that peacebuilding and statebuilding processes should be as participatory and inclusive as possible, and incorporate women and other marginalised groups. There is also remarkably little disaggregation of the ‘women’ category, with women treated as a single, homogeneous group and little consideration for the range of interests across class, ethnicity, geography and religion that shape incentive structures for all social groups.

Donor approaches to statebuilding do not, at present, include any substantial gender analysis (Castillejo, 2011; 2013), and donors have not seized opportunities to promote gender equality in the post-conflict processes of political, institutional and social change. While donors support a range of gender initiatives in FCAS, these are mostly disconnected from the broader statebuilding agenda; have a technical rather than political focus; and are discrete ‘gender’ projects rather than examples of genuine mainstreaming. In addition, donor approaches to work on gender often de-link gender–power relations from broader patterns of power and resource distribution

\(^4\) See http://www.g7plus.org/
(Castillejo, 2011). One key reason for this identified in the literature is that international actors often purport to face dilemmas and tensions between pragmatic needs (e.g. to secure peace) and normative commitments (e.g. to empower women in more substantial ways) (ibid.). Such dilemmas, however, often reflect false dichotomies that reinforce gender inequalities in both donor approaches to supporting peacebuilding and statebuilding processes, and outcomes in state–society relations that result from these processes and how such priorities are articulated.

There are, therefore, a number of important gaps in the literature. First, the mainstream academic peacebuilding and statebuilding literature seldom engages with gender issues. Second, general policy documents on peacebuilding and statebuilding published in recent years, while acknowledging the importance of incorporating gender perspectives in both policy and practice, have not tended to go beyond such statements to consider the implications of doing so for donor support to these processes. Third, to the extent that there is some emerging literature and reflections on this state of affairs, the importance of integrating gender considerations is argued on the basis that (i) peacebuilding and statebuilding moments present unique opportunities to embed new norms and rules of the game into the political process that can assure the inclusion of gender equality goals; and (ii) working towards gender equality goals is a measure of inclusivity in itself – a key intended outcome for an international peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda that advocates the development of states that are inclusive, participatory and accountable to their citizens.
2 Conflict, fragility and how they are experienced by women: gender-based discrimination, exclusion and violence in FCAS

What is the evidence on how gender inequality and discrimination against women affect conflict and fragility and, conversely, how conflict affects gender inequality, discrimination and gender roles?

The effect of gender inequality on peacebuilding and statebuilding is often based on numerous assumptions about the roles, responsibilities and identities of men and women during conflict and in the post-conflict period (el Bushra, 2012). In this section, we review what the literature says about gender inequality and women’s experience of patterns of exclusion and discrimination in FCAS. This includes a focus on whether gender inequality perpetuates conflict (directly or indirectly), looking at how gender roles, relations and identities change with conflict; and how the experience of conflict affects patterns of exclusion and discrimination and changes expectations or realities related to gender equality, gender roles, responsibilities and identities during and post-conflict.

2.1.1 Quality of the evidence
The knowledge base on the linkages between gender inequality and conflict and fragility constitutes a small, but emerging field of research. Studies include quantitative analyses that establish correlations between gender inequality and discrimination and levels of conflict and fragility; qualitative analyses that address changes in gender roles and identities arising from experiences of conflict; and mostly qualitative analysis on how women experience violence in situations of conflict and post-conflict. There is an insufficient body of evidence to judge whether findings are consistent. The quality of academic studies considered is on average high in terms of methodological rigour.

2.1.2 Is gender inequality linked to conflict?
There is very little literature that looks explicitly at the causal linkages between gender inequality and conflict. The few studies that do exist, however, indicate a correlation between gender inequality and the likelihood that states will engage in conflict through military action, both internally and internationally. Two studies by Caprioli (2000; 2005) use statistical analyses to make this case. In her 2000 study on the use of the military in international conflict, Caprioli finds that greater domestic gender equality in the political, social and economic spheres correlates with fewer and less violent military solutions to resolve international disputes (measured from 1960 to 1992). In her 2005 study, Caprioli finds that states with high fertility rates are nearly twice as likely to experience internal conflict than those with low fertility rates (while controlling for other possible causes of internal conflict), and that states with only 10% of women in the labour force are nearly 30 times more likely to experience internal conflict than states where the proportion is 40%. In another study, Hudson et al. (2012) also argue that women’s security is a vital factor in the security of the state and the incidence of conflict and war.

How do gender roles, relations and identities change with conflict? ‘In times of crisis, in fragile states, women and girls become the repository of tradition, and gender identities become the markers of national and group identities, often presumed central to a process of nation-building’ (Mullally, 2011).
It is well documented that women play important and varied roles – some positive, some negative – during conflict, engaging in fighting directly, supporting conflict indirectly, taking on increased or new economic and social roles and participating in political or social movements. While many of these roles are clear cut, a closer look at the literature shows complex interplays of existing and new gender roles, responsibilities and identities and peacebuilding and statebuilding, and the inter-linkages between conflict and gender with facets that include ethnicity, culture, religion and the expectations of women’s identity as part of a national struggle.

The active role women play in fighting is frequently seen as ‘non-traditional’ or ‘breaking social norms or expectations of women’, and is often based on assumptions that, in order to fight, women must become like men and transgress acceptable female behaviour (Bandarage, 2010; Coulter, 2008; Wood, 2008). In reality, there are many reasons why women participate in fighting – it is sometimes voluntary, but it can also be the result of coercion or abduction. In contemporary African conflicts, McKay (2004) argues that the roles of girls and women in these forces range from porters, servants and ‘wives’ of male fighters to spies and high-ranking military commanders.

Violent conflict changes the economic roles of women in their households and communities. Conflict often forces them to take on new roles, in particular as household heads and as farmers, and increases their participation in the labour market (Justino et al., 2012; Wood, 2008). This trend is also found in displaced populations and in refugee camps (Bandarage, 2010; Justino et al., 2012).

Conflict also changes the social roles of women. Evidence across a range of countries experiencing conflict shows that women tend to marry and have children at a younger age (Barakat and Wardell, 2002; Justino et al., 2012) and that, in some contexts, widows marry members of their deceased husband’s family (this has been seen in Afghanistan in particular) (Barakat and Wardell, 2002). Changes in social roles and social norms for women are often strongly linked to the objectives of the ‘nation’ during conflict, as dominant authorities assign roles to women, typically in the domestic and reproductive sphere. In Sri Lanka, for instance, Tamil women in the north were encouraged by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to support the war effort by having more children to maintain the Tamil population, in opposition to the state’s family planning policy. Their children would be handed over for military training and ‘considered heroes for the nation’ (Bandarage, 2010). Similar roles assigned to women to increase birth rates were found during the Iraq–Iran war (Efrati, 1999), and, in what was then southern Sudan, Jok (1999) states that women’s reproductive role was seen as their ‘contribution’ to the liberation struggle.

These changes in the roles of women during conflict can have both negative and positive effects for them, for their families and for their communities. In some contexts, these changes exacerbate existing gender inequalities and vulnerabilities (and create new ones). Indeed, it is important to see these vulnerabilities as an integral part of the existing and prevailing gender inequalities and discrimination faced by women (see, for instance, Feliciati, 2006, on girls’ experiences in Rwanda). Changes in family structures and women’s increased participation in the labour force can result in greater time poverty as conflict increases their work burden because they must still perform their normal household duties (Bandarage, 2010; Justino et al., 2012). Women entering the labour force in situations of conflict also face inequalities in that market, meaning they tend to enter low-skilled jobs in the informal economy (Bandarage, 2010; Justino et al., 2012). In some contexts, women face more restrictions in social or economic life (Barakat and Wardell, 2002). This in itself is not peculiar to conflict. Ahmed (1999) argues that economic and social crisis can force communities to seek refuge in religious faith; in such situations, communities become more susceptible to the influence of groups that use religious beliefs to gain power. In Somalia, for example, religious extremists have challenged women’s rights within marriage and the family, their economic and political participation outside the home and their freedom of dress and behaviour. Violent conflict can also increase domestic and physical violence as a result of changes to male and female roles (see Section 2.2 for more detail) (Barakat and Wardell, 2002; Coulter, 2008; Justino et al., 2012; Lwambo, 2013; Rostami Povey, 2003). Stigma and social exclusion can also be exacerbated or created in conflict. In Afghanistan (under Taliban rule in civil war), women heads of households have been given a derogatory name meaning ‘unprotected women’. They are seen as outcasts and are socially excluded. Most are very poor and are vulnerable to violence (Rostami Povey, 2003).

Not all the effects are negative, however. There is some evidence that opportunities are also created for women and their families during conflict. Women are empowered in certain situations, and for certain women conflict
results in greater participation in labour markets and social organisations or solidarity networks (Justino et al., 2012; Rostami Povey, 2003). Positive effects on household welfare are also found as a result of women’s participation in labour markets (Justino et al., 2012) and camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) may also offer new opportunities for women to participate in public life and decision-making structures, although this new participation remains constrained by cultural and social norms that consider women’s contributions to be secondary to men’s (de la Puente, 2011).

2.1.3 How are patterns of inequality and expectations about gender equality, roles, responsibilities or identities affected in the post-conflict context?

How gender inequality plays out in post-conflict contexts is influenced by multiple factors. Opportunities to improve gender equality in post-conflict situations therefore depend on a complex interplay of factors, including not only the recent changes to gender relations, roles, responsibilities and identities as a result of conflict, but also the pre-existing and historical context, as well as the opportunities presented by institutional interventions and proactive policies. These are discussed in more detail throughout the rest of this report, but here we provide a brief overview of some of the key factors identified in the literature in relation to the opportunities and challenges to promoting positive changes for women in the post-conflict period.

Despite significant challenges (discussed below), women demonstrate resilience and agency in the post-conflict context, as discussed by Osorio Pérez and Breña (2008) in their study of the Colombian conflict and Rajasingham-Senanayake (2004) on the conflict in Sri Lanka. There is only relatively limited evidence, however, that changes in gender roles make a positive contribution to gender equality in the post-conflict period. This is dependent on many factors, which vary significantly according to the nature of women’s involvement in the war, the type of war, the new shape of economic and social roles and women’s own status, ethnicity and social standing, as well as the dominant space and environment in which women are situated in the post-conflict context, such as political processes and institutions. Evidence from El Salvador, Peru, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka suggests that not all women go back to their pre-war roles once a conflict has ended, and that some women may continue in their leadership roles in new civil society organisations (CSOs) (Wood, 2008). Evidence from Afghanistan suggests that, where women have formed solidarity groups, these have started to challenge patriarchal gender relations and are important agents in the reconstruction process (Rostavi Povey, 2003). Indeed, women’s social and grassroots movements in a number of countries demonstrate a potentially important means to promote women’s rights and gender equality in the post-conflict period, in some cases contributing to peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives. These have included the Mothers Front movement in Sri Lanka (Bandarage, 2010), women’s organisations opposed to the strategy of extremists to marginalise women on religious grounds in Somalia (Ahmed, 1999) and campaigns in Timor-Leste against domestic violence (Hall, 2009). It is important to consider who benefits, however, since not all women benefit in the same way from all social movements (McFerson, 2011; Sørensen, 1998).

In some countries, the range of political and economic roles women perform is greater after a conflict than it was in pre-conflict times (e.g. Fuest, 2008 citing Liberia; Pant and Standing, 2011; Pettigrew, 2012 on Nepal). These changes are not always harnessed in relation to movements or interventions, but they can also be an unintended and positive result of women’s leadership during the conflict (Pettigrew, 2012). This suggests that, at the key junctures of critical shifts towards peacebuilding and steps taken towards statebuilding, women may have become better positioned to participate more actively in shaping the direction of change in transitions from conflict to peace and to renegotiating the underlying political settlement.

Little is discussed in the literature about men’s roles, attitudes and identities (other than their role in perpetuating inequalities). However, Haque’s (2013) study on post-war Cambodia finds that changes in the idea of ‘masculinity’ became measured not by a man’s militancy, as in the war, but by his success in supporting his family economically and supporting the value of education. Annan et al. (2011) find in northern Uganda that conflict has a gendered impact, including in how it drives the social and psychological problems of women experiencing violence. The study also finds, however, that women who return from armed conflict are resilient in their reintegration in the community.

The majority of the literature, however, shows that positive changes in gender roles tend not to continue into the post-conflict period, and that patriarchal structures and gender inequalities remain or resume in the post-conflict context. This is a result of factors such as poor policies (and their implementation) to support women’s roles in
peacebuilding and statebuilding (at micro, meso and macro levels), the reinforcement of existing social norms regarding gender and practical barriers to women’s participation, such as lack of time (Sørensen, 1998). In addition, these processes are never linear (Ranchod-Nilsson, 2006), and can intersect with a continuation of discrimination and inequalities that has been normalised by war (Carey et al., 2010; Ismael, 2004).

In terms of employment and livelihoods, women tend to be the first to lose their jobs in the formal economy once the conflict is over, and women-headed households and women who have taken on new roles as labourers and farmers often return to traditional roles once the war is over (Justino et al., 2012; Wood, 2008). War can also create new conflicts over access to resources (Gengenbach, 1998), eroding livelihoods and creating local insecurity that, in turn, creates vulnerability, especially for women (Kandiyoti, 2007). Similarly, the economic gains made in refugee camps rarely lead to long-term empowerment in the context of persistent poverty (Bandarage, 2010), and refugee women are also socially vulnerable as a result of changed gender relations, despite emerging opportunities to challenge existing stereotypes about gender roles and identities (Payne, 1998). Women also face numerous social challenges in reintegrating into the community and often face marginalisation, discrimination and stigma as a result of their roles in the war, whether or not these roles were voluntary (Baines and Stewart, 2011; Berhane-Selassie, 2009; McKay, 2004).

Although there may be increased female participation in social and political organisations as a result of mobilisation in relation to conflict, this does not necessarily mean a change in patriarchal attitudes towards women’s roles, which means women are usually excluded from formal peace and political processes (Justino et al., 2012; Ní Aoláin et al., 2011). Furthermore, as in other contexts, such organisations rarely represent a homogenous ‘women’s group’ but rather tend to benefit some women more than others (Tamang, 2009).

Evidence also suggests that women’s active participation in conflict does not change traditional attitudes towards gender norms and women’s roles, with notions about ‘ideal womanhood’ and ‘traditional women’ remaining largely unaltered (Wood, 2008). Dominant authorities and ‘masculine’ perceptions reinforce gender restrictions, thus inhibiting women’s empowerment (Bandarage, 2010; Niner, 2011) and their access to power in post-conflict statebuilding processes (Weber, 2011).

2.1.4 Conflict-related violence against women

There is a consensus in the literature that conflict-related violence affects women in a way that is markedly different to how it affects men. In addition to heightened domestic violence seen during conflict, sexual violence can be a deliberate strategy of war, intended to instil terror and intimidation, as part of ‘ethnic cleansing’ or to humiliate the men in the community that has been targeted. Conflict-related violence against women is, therefore, a security issue in itself, which can serve a particular purpose in a conflict. It is also a reflection of a highly militarised context, the breakdown of social and community ties and the collapse of earlier mechanisms of security and protection for the population. In addition, conflict-related forced displacement creates greater exposure to the violence and insecurity associated with life in camps for IDPs and refugees (Anderson, 2012; Valji, 2012).

At the same time, Wood (2008) draws attention to the very complex and variable ways in which women experience conflict-related violence. This is related to the specific dynamics of conflict, the legacies of pre-conflict gender roles and attitudes towards GBV that relate to context. The ‘silent’ face of violence, and how women experience and report it, makes the phenomenon difficult to track in terms of accuracy of data. Analysis of the causes and consequences of conflict-related GBV needs also to take account of the continuum between conflict and post-conflict settings. There is some statistical evidence that, in some cases, post-conflict societies experience an increase in GBV, described as a ‘backlash’ or ‘spillover’ effect from war (Ní Aoláin, 2008). This is either associated with improved reporting in post-conflict contexts, or related to the phenomenon that post-conflict GBV acts as a form of ‘compensation’ for ex-combatants who have lost some public legitimacy or as an expression of their masculinity in returning to domestic life (Tripp, 2012).

Overall, there is limited evidence on the complex intersections between conflict and how women experience conflict-related violence, or the consequences of such violence for the post-conflict reconstruction of societies, the social fabric of community life and the rebuilding of trust in state–society relations (Wood, 2008).
3 Peacebuilding, statebuilding and women’s political voice

3.1 Peacebuilding: peace agreements and first constitutions

3.1.1 What is the evidence, knowledge and analytical base on approaches to peacebuilding and statebuilding that integrate a gender perspective, and/or address gender equality goals, in FCAS?

The international agenda in FCAS has two main objectives: promoting peace and building more effective, accountable, inclusive and responsive states. The ultimate goal is to establish and/or strengthen arrangements and institutions that are more inclusive, representative and responsive, and that incorporate stakeholders who have not traditionally had a voice (including women in particular, but also ethnic minorities). This entails developing new norms that are acceptable to the majority of actors who need to be engaged in peacebuilding and statebuilding endeavours and that can create a legitimate political centre (Rocha Menocal, 2011; Wyeth and Sisk, 2009). The context in which FCAS are being transformed and (re-) built in post-conflict settings can potentially offer an opportunity for renegotiating the ‘political settlement’ (OECD-DAC, 2011).

In such situations, political bargains related to the rules regarding the allocation of resources and power – the contestation of which might have been the root cause of violence – are often rearticulated through such peacebuilding processes as the crafting of peace agreements, and new and reformed constitutions. These processes have the potential to lay the foundations for more inclusive and rights-based statecraft, and are a reflection of how political settlements are renegotiated and redefined. DiJohn and Putzel’s (2009) authoritative piece on political settlements develops an analytical framework to study how the evolving balance of power among key actors creates the basis for negotiating the rules for political, social and economic engagement. Nazneen and Mahmud (2012), in a review of the literature on gender, politics and empowerment, apply a gender analysis to assessing the gendered impact of political economy conditions that underpin the evolution of political settlements. These are key analytical pieces for a study of the gender dimension of statebuilding: the first for the focus on the power dynamics of how the ‘rules of the game’ that underpin state–society relations are forged over time; and the second for introducing a gender analysis of how political settlements are crafted. But this review of the existing literature overall finds a lack of a gender analysis of statebuilding from the perspective of how political settlements are contested and renegotiated (Castillejo, 2011; 2013; Nazneen and Mahmud, 2012).

3.1.2 Quality of the evidence

This section examines the evidence on the extent to which such processes have been gender-responsive and have incorporated a gender perspective in establishing the new ‘rules of the game’, and the impact on peacebuilding and statebuilding.

The quality of the academic scholarship is high, with robust methodologies drawing on quantitative and qualitative analysis. The evidence base, however, is limited by the fact that this remains a relatively young field and still constitutes a small body of knowledge. The quantitative analysis is descriptive and oriented towards counting women’s presence in politics and in the different post-conflict peacebuilding processes. The grey literature is more prescriptive and normatively oriented, and, while it draws on examples of stories of change, the methodological rigour is less clear, so examples may seem more anecdotal. Moreover, it is difficult to assess the degree to which recorded stories of change constitute or contribute to sustainable processes of transformation in gender relations on political voice.
Overall, the emerging body of literature that explores these issues finds that, while women and gender concerns have increasingly been included in peacebuilding processes, their inclusion remains marginal and uneven, and that, in general, they are not included consistently and systematically in the different stages of peacebuilding. More attention also needs to be paid to the substance of women’s inclusion and incorporation, as the mere presence of women in different aspects of peacebuilding is not enough to ensure the process is gender-responsive.

There is now an emerging (if still limited) body of academic and policy literature that explores the question of women’s participation in peacebuilding (in contrast with statebuilding), responding, at least in part, to the interest related to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (such as Bell and O’Rourke, 2010; Ni Aoláin et al., 2011; Olonisakin et al., 2011, among others). The evidence base has tended to focus on the presence of women in negotiating peace agreements, and less on longer-term statebuilding projects.

### 3.1.3 Evidence and findings in the literature

There seems to be agreement in the literature that, although women constitute an important resource for peacebuilding, they have remained far from effectively incorporated into such processes (El-Bushra, 2012). This is true both of peace agreements and of constitution-making processes, which are the two main areas that have been analysed as part of this theme.

UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security provides a clear normative mandate and commitment for international actors to embed in their support to FCAS efforts to enhance the role of women in all aspects of peace processes. Adopted in October 2000, it was the first time that the UN Security Council (UNSC) had focused on the topic of women and armed conflict and acknowledged the role of women as active agents in the negotiation and maintenance of peace agreements. UNSCR 1325 provides for a range of measures aimed at including women in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict. It puts ‘women and peace’ firmly on the map, and it has been followed by a rapid escalation of policies and projects to promote and protect women and girls (El-Bushra, 2012; Olonisakin et al., 2011). More recently in 2011, the UN agreed on a UN Strategic Results Framework on Women Peace and Security of support to women in peace and security interventions, including the establishment of a set of 26 indicators by which to assess practice by various actors including UN member states and UN entities, in advancing UNSCR 1325 (UN Secretary-General, 2011).

The literature suggests, however, that progress in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and other related resolutions and mandates that have followed in its wake has been limited, and the striking absence of women from peace processes reveals a gap between the aspirations reflected in global and regional commitments and the reality for women (Barnes, 2011; El-Bushra, 2012; UN Women, 2012). In addition, although UNSCR 1325 prescribes the inclusion of women, it does not mandate gender auditing of any peace treaty or constitution as a whole to assess whether women’s interests are best served by the final agreed document (Haynes et al., 2011).

Some of the literature explores the extent to which UNSCR 1325 has in practice affected the drafting of peace agreements (Barnes, 2011; Bell and O’Rourke, 2010; El-Bushra, 2012). Much of the literature is qualitative and case-based (e.g. Charlesworth and Woods, 2001 on Timor-Leste; Olsson and Tejpar, 2009 on Afghanistan). Another strand of this literature, which consists of more critical feminist scholarship, is concerned that UNSC resolutions may serve to advance protective stereotypes that ‘essentialise’ women in conflict situations either as victims of sexual violence, as mothers or as uncritical advocates for an end to conflict (e.g. Otto, 2009; Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 2013). More recent research has sought to use both quantitative and qualitative data and analysis to assess the extent to which women and gender issues are addressed in peacebuilding processes (e.g. Bell and O’Rourke, 2010). The literature on this theme is not very abundant and remains relatively new.

**Peacebuilding negotiations**

Women have participated in negotiation processes in different ways: as mediators or as part of a mediating team; as delegates of negotiating parties; through all-female negotiating parties that represent a women’s agenda (with Northern Ireland perhaps the most prominent, if rare, example); as signatories; as witnesses; as representatives of women’s CSOs or as observers; in a parallel forum or movement (often as a result of their exclusion from official mechanisms, e.g. Aceh); as gender advisors to mediators, facilitators and/or delegates; and as members of technical committees of working groups on gender issues (e.g. El Salvador, Guatemala and Sri Lanka) (UN Women, 2012).
A recurrent finding in the literature is that women remain largely unrepresented at the peace table, where key decisions about post-conflict recovery and governance are being made (Bell and O’Rourke 2010; Ní Aoláin et al., 2011; UN Women, 2012). Their underrepresentation in formal negotiation processes appears to be more marked than in other public decision-making roles (UN Women, 2012). Typically, the pre-negotiation phase that comes before formal political agreement between protagonists involves key (mostly male) actors in the conflict and is dominated by the short-term imperative of ending violence, with less immediate concern for medium-term calculations of resilience, legitimacy or inclusiveness. A UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) study (cited in Haynes et al., 2011) looking at 31 major peace processes since 1992 shows that women have accounted for a strikingly small number of negotiators, and there has been little change in this since the passage of UNSCR 1325. Some of the most prominent examples of the inclusion of women in different aspects of the peacebuilding process, including in El Salvador, Northern Ireland and South Africa, precede the passage of the resolution. In addition, no woman has ever been appointed chief or lead peace mediator in UN-sponsored peace talks, although some women have been included by the African Union as conflict mediators (Haynes et al., 2011). The absence of women from peace negotiation processes is deemed problematic because there seems to be a correlation between women’s participation in such processes and levels of gender responsiveness in the eventual political and peace agreements (World Bank, 2012), as discussed further below.

**Peace agreements**

Using comparative data from 585 peace agreements signed between 1990 and 2010, Bell and O’Rourke (2010) explore in quantitative terms whether the prevalence of provisions for women has changed since the adoption of UNSCR 1325. The article also provides qualitative analysis of the nature of peace agreement provisions for women and the extent to which these address the areas specified in UNSCR 1325 (including measures to protect and respect the rights of women and girls; meet their special post-conflict needs, e.g. repatriation and resettlement; support local women’s peace and conflict resolution initiatives; address sexual violence; and include plans for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)).

Bell and O’Rourke (2010) find there have been more references to women in peace agreements since UNSCR 1325, especially in cases where the UN has been involved in the peace process, but that progress has been limited. Only 92 out of the total 585 (or 16%) of the peace agreements in the database include specific references to women. This is further echoed in the World Bank’s World Development Report 2012, which also signals that different reviews of peace agreements have found women’s representation/incorporation to be extremely low. Bell and O’Rourke (2010) stress the need for a more layered understanding of the barriers to making UNSCR 1325 more meaningful in practice regarding women’s role in peace processes.

In terms of the substance and content of peace agreements, the literature suggests that gender-blind peace agreements remain the norm despite the provisions of UNSCR 1325 (Bell and O’Rourke, 2010; El-Bushra, 2012; UN Women, 2012). For the most part, peace agreements tend to include a general equality clause and non-specific references to human rights guarantees and international treaties. But more specific provisions to protect women’s rights and promote gender equality, such as quotas and equitable land distribution, are rare. Addressing conflict-related sexual violence is seldom included in peace accords – and there are rarely mechanisms to offer redress/hold perpetrators accountable (UN Women, 2012).

Another review of major peace accords between August 2008 and April 2012 shows that 17 out of 61 agreements include gender-related keywords, but that these references are often vague and are included in the preamble or annexes rather than the main text (UN Women, 2012). Exceptions include the peace accords for Zimbabwe (which make explicit mention of the right of women to possess land) and for DRC (which make provisions for specific mechanisms to promote reconciliation between men and women in a context that has been acutely marked by sexual violence). While UNSCR 1325 appears to have had greater influence on UN-internationalised processes, references to women have remained more common in locally driven processes, such as that in Northern Ireland.

Overall, the qualitative evidence analysed by Bell and O’Rourke (2010) and others finds that many of the references to women in peace agreements are insubstantial. There is little evidence of systematic inclusion of women within peace agreement texts, or systematic treatment of women’s issues in such agreements. The patchy treatment of women and gender in peace agreements suggests their omission may be the result of ignorance and a lack of gender awareness among the parties and mediators, the absence of women at the negotiating table, the
lack of openness within the process to any inputs from women and an overly narrow and militarised understanding of the issues that drive and sustain the conflict (Bell and O’Rourke, 2010).

Although there is still only limited evidence of the impacts of women’s participation in peace and reconstruction, recent documented experience in a number of post-conflict situations points to the likely gains from giving women more voice at every stage of the process. The few cases where gender-specific issues have been included in a systematic manner show that a key element of success has been the effective mobilisation of women around women’s rights to demand a say at the negotiating table or within the peace process more broadly (UN Women, 2012, echoed in Waylen, 2006). For example, the greater mobilisation of women in the processes in Burundi, Guatemala, Sudan and Uganda resulted in their inputs being channelled into decision making, which enabled gender-related issues to be included in some measures, such as support to victims of sexual violence during the conflict, services for widows and displaced households and ensuring that health and education were more likely to make it on to the policy agenda. In post-apartheid South Africa and in some Latin American countries (such as Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala), the active participation of women shifted post-conflict public spending towards social and economic programmes (World Bank, 2012). In Burundi, women’s representation during the peace negotiations was bolstered by the parallel women’s conference, and by the establishment of quotas for post-conflict elections and portfolio allocations. This occurred similarly in Rwanda (UN Women, 2012). In Northern Ireland, women had seats at the peace table and won formal recognition of equality in the Belfast Agreement. This translated into an immediate improvement in political representation (although maintaining such representation has proved to be more challenging) (Byrne and McCulloch, 2012). So the greater involvement of women in peace talks does seem to support more effective peace agreements from a gender perspective, although implementation remains a challenge even where peace accords are gender-sensitive.

**Constitution-making processes**

Because constitutions lie at the core of the state’s institutional structure and legal system, and define the relationships between the state and its citizens as well as among the citizens themselves, they are viewed as a foundational element in statebuilding. Constitutions and the way in which they are crafted offer the prospect for a fresh start on the basis of a more legitimate, equitable and representative political system grounded in a (new) foundational element in statebuilding. Constitutions (and the way in which they are crafted) offer the prospect for a fresh start on the basis of a more legitimate, equitable and representative political system grounded in a (new) legal framework and perspective. In principle, they crystallise the agreed ‘rules of the game’ on how power and resources are to be distributed and administered, as well as the terms of the state–society relationship – hence the reasoning that the process of constitution making itself should be open and involve the active participation by all sections of society (Haynes et al., 2011; Waylen, 2006).

The growing international emphasis on the importance of process, inclusion and participation in constitution writing would appear to open up spaces for women’s greater participation and, as a result, to increase the potential to achieve favourable gender outcomes. As a result, scholars and policymakers are increasingly beginning to take constitutional change more seriously as a key opportunity to embed women’s rights and gender equality into the rules of the game on social, political and economic engagement (Waylen, 2006).

However, constitution-making processes and constitutions (like peace agreements) are often gender-blind (Haynes et al., 2011). Tellingly, a 2009 report by the Constitutional Design Group that surveyed the contents of 599 of the roughly 800 constitutions that have come into force since 1789 does not identify either gender provisions or socioeconomic redress as part of the methodological capture of constitutional change for a transitional society (Haynes et al., 2011). Looking at constitution-making processes in Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, Poland, South Africa and the European Union (EU), Waylen (2006) concludes that a central factor in determining how far women’s rights are enshrined in new constitutions is the extent to which key feminists lobby and are active in the process of constitutional design, in raising gender concerns and in fighting for inclusion. Waylen (2006) also finds that the openness of the institutional context is also central, as is the receptivity of other key actors to gender-related concerns, together with the strength of any opposition to the fulfilment of gender-related rights. In seemingly more successful efforts from a gender equality perspective, such as those in Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Rwanda, South Africa and Timor-Leste, activists pressing for recognition of gender concerns from both within and outside the processes of constitution writing were able to form alliances with sympathetic allies or reform champions within legislatures, political parties, governments and national women’s machineries. While the substantial mobilisation of women (often with considerable international support) does not in itself ensure that women’s involvement produces better outcomes for women,
it does underscore the necessity of women’s early involvement in constitution-drafting processes to improve the prospects of better outcomes (Haynes et al., 2011; Hudson, 2009).

Even when constitutional change is effective in removing discriminatory formal norms and advancing gender equality goals on paper, it can be only one part of a multi-pronged process to enhance gender-based rights. As with peace agreements, the implementation of constitutional agreements remains an acute challenge in FCAS, and the gap between the legal (de jure) and practical (de facto) reality of how the new rules of the game play out is especially problematic from the perspective of gender relations. The different examples highlighted in the literature underscore the fact that women’s mobilisation and inclusion are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for achieving gender-positive outcomes for women in peace process settings and in new constitutions (Haynes et al., 2011). To the degree to which new constitutions formalise the terms of emerging political settlements, they represent critical moments for the subsequent dynamics and directions of statebuilding. Unless international actors capitalise on these moments for supporting women’s participation (either formally or through lobbying capabilities and engagement), constitutional reform risks becoming a critical missed opportunity to embed gender equality goals in the normative foundations of statebuilding processes. In addition, the implementation of constitutional norms remains a challenge in itself.

3.1.4 What, according to the literature, are the challenges, barriers and opportunities related to the integration and consideration of gender perspectives in FCAS?

**International normative framework**

UNSCR 1325 marked a watershed in calling for the need to incorporate women more fully and explicitly in peace processes, even if its impact and the progress on its implementation have remained limited in practice. The resolution provided formal high-level and international acknowledgement that the exclusion of women from conflict resolution is a threat to peace (Barnes, 2011; Bell and O’Rourke, 2010).

Documented local and transnational activism that has used UNSCR 1325 demonstrates that it has played at least some role in promoting references to women in peace processes, whether directly, by influencing those involved in negotiation, or indirectly, by enabling women to mobilise and influence negotiations even from outside the process itself (Bell and O’Rourke, 2010). However, the internationalisation of a process is not, in itself, conducive to enhancing women’s voice. Rather, it appears that, when a process is more domestically driven, it becomes more accessible to women’s inputs and influence. Conflict situations acquire international visibility because of their capacity for mass violence and regional or international destabilisation. Because of this, there may be a greater tendency in these contexts to prioritise a fairly closed deal between military elites, negotiated formally in a self-contained ‘one-track’ process, and where stability is more of a priority than inclusivity (Bell and O’Rourke, 2010).

Indeed, while having a normative requirement such as UNSCR 1325 may help exert pressure for the greater inclusion and incorporation of women, it is not in itself sufficient to guarantee them. It is essential to understand why women’s inclusion continues to prove so difficult. For example, are women’s quotas hard to implement if there are other quotas, perhaps along ethnic lines, that are seen as more essential to ensure peace, and what is the nature of the forces of resistance, whether through religious opposition to gender equality or the prevalence of social norms that discriminate against women? The knowledge base on how these dilemmas, or dynamics of political prioritisation, occur in relation to how gender equality goals feature in the peace agreements or constitutional reform process remains very underdeveloped.

**Tensions embedded within different peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts**

A crucial challenge to the greater inclusion of women’s issues and concerns in peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts is that there may be an overall perception that these are not as much of a priority as other issues that must be addressed to secure the peace (DFID, 2010). Women are not, in general, seen as central to ‘making or breaking’ a peace agreement, and their interests, as a social group, are not seen as necessary to frame the compromises and inducements necessary to kick-start, continue or conclude negotiations. According to some experts, UNSCR 1325 has had little effect on these core dynamics (Haynes et al., 2011).

This is clear in cases where ethnicity is seen as a much more fundamental fault-line for conflict. In such settings, power sharing among different ethnic groups is advocated, but there tends to be remarkably little gender
sensitivity or awareness in the way such arrangements are put in place. Ensuing tensions mean that women’s issues and concerns, as well as women’s representation, continue to be marginalised. As Bell and O’Rourke (2010) have noted, it has proven remarkably difficult to reconcile quotas for women with ethnic or clan quotas and deal with the intersections of gender and other forms of identity in peace agreement texts, as seen in Bangladesh and Somalia. This means that the potential for cross-identity organisation of women to promote women’s equality within new government structures may be restricted from the outset (ibid.).

Other experts have also highlighted this issue. Byrne and McCulloch (2012), for instance, argue that tensions between power sharing, especially in ethnic and gender mainstreaming, emphasise the rights and role of minority groups in ways that tend to side-line gender and divide women along the lines of geography, ethnicity and social class.

In addition, the need to strike a balance between the international community’s advocacy of provisions that guarantee women’s rights and equality (which may be viewed as a Western imposition), and advocacy by local constituencies of provisions that protect customary and religious laws that may codify inequality for women (Haynes et al., 2011; Kandiyoti, 2004), may generate its own set of tensions. For example, the Constitution of Afghanistan pulls in very different directions in one text, endorsing the various international conventions to which the government is a signatory and granting equal citizenship rights to men and women while proclaiming that no law can contradict Shari’a (Kandiyoti, 2004).

This tension is evident in many other contexts where the revival or affirmation of Shari’a or other religious orthodoxies as part of the constitutional text poses complex issues for women and for enabling and defending women’s rights. In general, the complexity of contexts of institutional hybridity, with lofty generalised norms co-existing with customary and traditional norms, is not resolved by formal constitutional negotiation processes (Haynes et al., 2011).

**Commitments on paper vs. commitment in practice**

The literature highlights an enormous gap between the ideals expressed in peace agreements and constitutions and their actual implementation. Some observers have noted the need for a strong focus on gendered forms of enforcement, including which parts of a peace treaty translate into binding domestic legal norms and which do not (and will, therefore, remain as lofty and under-enforced goals) (Haynes et al., 2011; Nó Aoláin et al., 2011). In the case of Timor-Leste, for example, the constitutional language is strong, but commitments have not been accompanied by strong enforcement (Haynes et al., 2011).

Implementation has proved to be challenging across FCAS because the process of empowering women and recognising and tackling gender-based inequalities is a deeply political phenomenon that entails altering fundamental power structures and gender relations. Not surprisingly, implementation is likely to become an ongoing, contested and highly variable arena that has to engage multiple actors – not only those whose views framed the peace negotiations or the new constitution. In many fragile settings, it is likely that there will be retrenchment of the political compromises previously made, as elements of the peace deal prove unpopular with certain political entities (Haynes et al., 2011).

It is crucial, therefore, to ensure that those committed to incorporating gender issues into peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts and ensuring the success of gendered post-conflict arrangements understand the need to engage not only during the negotiation and writing of constitutions, but also – and critically – during their implementation. Of course, this is likely to be a long-term process, and to require active international support (Haynes et al., 2011).

**The dangers of ‘essentialising’ women**

There is a danger that peacebuilding and statebuilding discourse can reduce women to stereotypes in both conflict and peacebuilding, for example as victims and/or nurturing mothers (Haynes et al., 2011). However, data from across the world show that both women and men are capable of perpetrating violence and of fighting for peace (El-Bushra, 2012).
Lack of understanding of what gender-responsive approaches look like
Gender is a multi-layered and contested concept that tends to be poorly understood, even by those who are supposed to promote it. It is also, to some extent, ‘imposed’ through donor conditionality. In practice, this combination of factors undermines confidence in the approach among a high proportion of peacebuilding actors (El-Bushra, 2012). According to El-Bushra (2012), experiences in Burundi and Nepal reveal that some staff members of donor and government agencies, including those from agencies considered to have relatively advanced policy approaches, have expressed confusion about basic concepts of gender and peacebuilding, and have claimed that their organisations impose gender in programming as a policy agenda without being clear what it means in practice.

3.1.5 Are there concrete examples of positive experiences, approaches, interventions and policies that can contribute to lessons for peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and agendas?
There are a few examples of peacebuilding negotiations and/or constitution-making processes that have been (relatively) gender-responsive and incorporated gender perspectives in the establishment of the new rules of the game. The negotiations in Northern Ireland, for example, illustrate the capacity of women to make gender central to the agreements by using the momentum towards finalised political agreements to create a women’s political party that was included in the core of the negotiation process. To keep negotiations on track, the Women’s Coalition became the de facto facilitator between the male-dominated warring ethno-religious political factions (Fearon, 1999; Haynes et al., 2011; UN Women, 2012).

In the peace process in El Salvador (which preceded UNSCR 1325), women had a place at almost all the post-accord negotiating tables (UN Women, 2012). As a result, women benefited considerably from land redistribution packages.

The processes in Burundi and Guatemala are notable for their inclusion of women in peace agreements. In Guatemala, only two women were part of the formal negotiating teams, but there was extensive civil society participation (including of women’s groups) in the whole process, and the resulting agreement contained important provisions regarding gender equality. Both peace processes were supported by or involved the UN as a third party. In both, broader projects of inclusion, social justice and accountability were viewed as central to resolution of the conflict in question. Both processes used innovative measures to include the voices and influence of civil society, including women’s organisations. But in both cases, lack of implementation of the provisions has remained an acute challenge (Byrne and McCulloch, 2012). This relates to the dynamics of the political economy that shape how negotiations in relation to peace agreements effectively translate into the substantive terms of how political settlements unfold. In the case of Guatemala, for instance, the reassertion, not only of patriarchy but also of elite interest structures that in many respects have remained unchanged since the peace process, reflects the deeply challenging conditions in which gains at certain junctures can come to constitute more meaningful components of state–society relations as statebuilding unfolds. This is true for gender equality goals, as well as for other goals of inclusion that represent efforts to reallocate power and resources to previously excluded groups.

South Africa is an important case study in terms of how the new Constitution enshrined gender equality and incorporated women and women’s issues. There was successful mobilisation of women to demand equal representation at the negotiating table, and approximately 3 million women participated in focus groups. The Constitution provided for a Commission on Gender Equality, which is significant and quite unique – although it has had a smaller budget than other commissions (Budlender, 1997; UN Women, 2012; Waylen, 2006). The Constitution also makes provisions for women to comprise 30% of all new civil servants. But the South African case also helps illustrate the tensions: without a race–gender perspective, affirmative action can too easily promote white women and black men, while black women continue to be marginalised (Budlender, 1997).

3.1.6 Lessons learnt
A number of overarching lessons can be drawn from the review of the literature.

First, the mere inclusion of and reference to women in peace agreements and their provisions is not enough to ensure women’s substantive equality and inclusion. This is likely to be a more drawn-out and contested process in terms of how the real terms of the political settlement are negotiated and play out. Moreover, this has
implications for the substantive and content issues related to the texture of state–society relations, and how patterns of inclusion and participation, as well as the advancement of gender equality goals, unfold in statebuilding. So it is essential to move from the focus on quantity and numbers to address the substance and quality of the gender implications of how political agreements are ‘settled’ in practice. This makes it important to look at peace agreements and processes of constitutional reform against the wider backdrop of political trajectories of transition from conflict to peace to statebuilding, in order to consider how these moments both reflect and contribute to change processes.

Second, the evidence suggests that efforts to include women in peace agreement and/or constitutional processes need to be made from the outset, and not treated in an ad hoc manner, as add-ons or afterthoughts, in order to maximise the prospects for embedding gender equality goals in the emerging rules of the game that set out the formal terms of the emerging political settlement (Abdela, 2003; Bjorkdahl, 2012). The presence of women makes a difference.

Third, women remain underrepresented in formal sites of power, and are more fully represented in civil society spheres. That is, women often play an important role in mobilising for peace – and are often highly represented in groups pressing for peace negotiations. As a result, more attention needs to be focused on how CSOs are enabled to promote the inclusion of women during a peace process (Bell and O’Rourke, 2010; Haynes et al., 2011).

Fourth, evidence suggests the need to continue to invest strategic resources in ongoing support. Even when the conditions for women’s participation in peace processes are in place, resources need to be strategically deployed in supporting women’s groups in order to enhance their mobilising and bargaining capabilities (e.g. in logistics or training). Funding should also be provided for the specific purpose of increasing the participation of women in peace-making processes. The ‘staying power’ of funding matters, as transformation requires a longer-term perspective. This funding should be maintained beyond the short term to ensure gender-responsive agreements translate in practice into sustainable advances towards gender equality goals. Ongoing engagement is needed to provide crucial backing to women’s groups and other CSOs to support implementation (Haynes et al., 2011).

Fifth, it is important that donors train their staff on gender issues in order to be more effective. Gender advisors should provide technical support to all aspects of peace deals. The UN and member states should also do more to ensure the right incentives and accountability mechanisms are in place in country offices to facilitate the appointment of qualified women as chief negotiators and technical advisors, and to train and prepare them accordingly (see UN Women, 2012). It should also be standard mediation practice that mediators consult women and women’s groups on a regular basis (ibid.). All mediators should receive gender awareness training and briefings, and UN Women and Division of Political Affairs at the UN have been working on a joint strategy to provide this since January 2011.

Sixth, the leadership and vision of the individuals involved really matters, as shown by Jean Arnault in Guatemala and Kofi Annan in Kenya.

Seventh, positioning gender as a central issue, going beyond the acknowledgement that women have particular needs, requires transformative action in the social and economic spheres that have consistently been most resistant to legal regulation. It also requires inclusion at all levels, starting at the constitutional norm apex and going down through legislative and policy routes and subsequent processes of regulatory reform (Haynes et al., 2011).

And finally, every peace process is unique, and opportunities and methods for women’s engagement will depend on the context (UN Women, 2012). Technocratic and blueprint approaches to addressing women’s issues and concerns are simply inadequate; there is an acute need to tailor interventions to context.

3.1.7 Key analytical points
The current context in which fragile states are being transformed and rebuilt in post-conflict settings offers an opportunity to renegotiate the political bargain that underpins social, political and economic exchange and dictates the terms of state–society relations. Both peace agreements and constitutional reform processes offer specific opportunities to embed gender equality goals in the emerging normative framework underpinning statebuilding efforts, and therefore to establish and/or strengthen arrangements and institutions that are more
inclusive, representative and responsive, and incorporate stakeholders previously discriminated against or excluded. The emerging body of literature exploring these issues finds that, while women and gender concerns have increasingly been included in peacebuilding processes, their inclusion remains marginal and uneven. There is limited evidence on what works to ensure women are incorporated more consistently and systematically in all stages of peacebuilding. The literature also confirms that more attention needs to be paid to the substance of women’s inclusion and incorporation, as their mere physical presence in different aspects of peacebuilding is not enough to ensure a gender-responsive process.

It is crucial not to lose sight of the fact these processes are located in historical junctures of conflict, transition and post-conflict, where wider historical, institutional and structural trajectories of state formation and political development need to be taken account of in terms of how women’s political voice has evolved in shaping the political settlement. There is never a clean slate. At the same time, peace agreements and constitutional reform processes are potentially foundational moments, and key opportunities for changing the normative direction of the political settlement and of state–society relations – and thus also of gender relations – but, as noted in Section 2, the forces of patriarchy and discriminatory structures remain formidable challenges.

Overall, the knowledge base on gender-responsive peacebuilding and constitutional reform remains disconnected from the recent policy and academic discussions on statebuilding and the crafting of political settlements. While effectiveness from a gender equality perspective is in theory an important measure of effectiveness for the objectives of inclusive, participatory and equitable statebuilding, there is little empirical research on how in practice gender responsive peace agreements and constitutional reform processes and content affect statebuilding goals.

### 3.1.8 Key gaps in the literature

Insufficient attention is paid in the literature to the gendered effects of power-sharing institutions during peace negotiations and post-conflict transitions. Although concrete mechanisms to promote the descriptive representation of women have helped improve women’s representation overall within ethno-national parties, they do not go far enough to transform unequal gender relations (Byrne and McCulloch, 2012).

There is an overarching assumption in the policy literature that the greater participation of women’s groups during peace making will enhance their engagement during the implementation and peacebuilding phase, but this assumption needs further testing, including to identify and analyse the factors that enable or inhibit more effective voice (UN Women, 2012).

Another key gap in the literature relates to the implementation of the gender provisions of peace agreements and why this often remains difficult to achieve (UN Women, 2012). Additional work (both quantitative and qualitative) is needed to assess the impact, if any, of constitutional change on women’s status and experiences in post-conflict societies (Haynes et al., 2011). This is especially so in relation to the implications for achieving more substantive commitment to the advancement of gender equality goals in statebuilding, and how this translates in the specific areas of service delivery, and the provision of justice and security.

‘Add women and stir’ strategies assume women are willing and able to influence peace agreements in relation to gender. But there is little existing analysis of the extent to which gender provisions are excluded in trade-offs with other provisions, or of the fears that they may destabilise a settlement (Bell and O’Rourke, 2010). Moreover, there is limited analysis of how gender inequalities intersect with other inequalities, and how issues of class, ethnicity and ideology are replicated in women’s experiences of and approaches to participation and influence on the outcomes of peace agreements and constitutional reform.

Finally, there is a need for more research on the impact of and inter-linkages between gender-responsive approaches in peace agreements and constitutional reform, and the wider processes of peacebuilding and statebuilding.
3.2 Post conflict-governance, first elections and women’s political participation

3.2.1 What is the evidence, knowledge and analytical base on approaches to peacebuilding and statebuilding that integrate a gender perspective, and/or address gender equality goals, in FCAS?

As suggested elsewhere in this review, attempts to build peaceful states and societies after conflict often focus on efforts to develop more open, inclusive and representative political orders and to revitalise the linkages between state and society. This often entails the re-articulation of new political settlements, peace agreements and/or new or reformed constitutions that call for democratic reforms and increased participation, especially among groups that were previously excluded and marginalised. Elections are a particularly prominent element in this process (Paris, 2005; Sisk, 2013). As such, post-conflict settings offer, at least in principle, the opportunity for the greater engagement of women in governance processes (beyond the constitutional processes discussed in Section 3.1). The literature on peacebuilding and statebuilding focuses in particular on political and electoral processes and civic society activism and mobilisation.

3.2.2 Quality of the evidence

The knowledge base on the connections between women’s political participation, post-conflict governance in FCAS and how these relate to peacebuilding and statebuilding remains very limited. While there is an established body of scholarship on women’s political participation – both formal and informal – in shaping gender equality agendas and (less so) outcomes in democratisation processes, there is only very limited analytical or empirical assessment of the linkages between the political economy of women’s political voice in FCAS and better peacebuilding and statebuilding outcomes. At the same time, there is an emerging research agenda on the need for a greater understanding of the opportunity structures that are related to these processes in FCAS contexts (Castillejo, 2011; Tripp, 2012). In the grey literature, there are studies that point to examples of increasing women’s presence in post-conflict governance, the factors contributing to this and a recognition of the insufficiency of quotas and women’s presence to substantively advance gender equality goals in general (UN Women, 2012). Mostly, examples are included as references to single country experiences. The body of knowledge is small, so there is only very limited analysis of how the increased number of women participating in politics – either through civil society or through formal politics – substantively advances the integration and implementation of gender equality goals, and what this means for the quality of peacebuilding and statebuilding outcomes.

Overall, there tends to be general agreement in the emerging literature on FCAS that women’s participation has increased in post-conflict settings (Castillejo, 2011; 2013; Tripp, 2012), at least through formal mechanisms. This appears to correspond to a number of factors, including changes in gender roles resulting from conflict, the strategic mobilisation of gender advocates and feminist activists, the fluidity of the rules of the game as political settlements are being negotiated and, to some extent, a supportive international discourse on gender equality. This seems to be the case even when women and/or gender concerns have not been incorporated fully into formal peace processes.

3.2.3 Evidence and findings in the literature

A comprehensive baseline study made by Tripp (2012) reveals that legislative representation of women tends to be higher in post-conflict situations than in situations of no conflict:

- In Africa, in post-conflict settings, 27% of members of parliament (MPs) are women, compared with 13% in settings with no conflict.
- In South Asia, the figure is 22% compared with 13%.
- In Southeast Asia, it is 32% compared with 18.5%.

Tripp (2012) also finds that more women in Africa have tended to run for presidential office in FCAS (in DRC, Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, for example) than in countries that have not been afflicted by conflict in the recent past. In Liberia, women make up a third of cabinet members and local government representatives. In Sierra Leone, the number of elected women has nearly doubled and they now account for 19% of the total (up from 10% in 2004), following a Local Government Act that stipulates a minimum of 50% female representation on ward committees, as well as awareness-raising and leadership workshops for women.
Quotas

Quotas have been one of the most prominent mechanisms used in FCAS to increase the participation of women in political processes in post-conflict settings, and they have, on the whole, been an important factor in the increase in the number of women represented in the political system (UN Women, 2012). Quotas are viewed as the fastest way to achieve women’s political participation (International Alert, 2007).

According to a study by UN Women (2012) on women’s participation in peacebuilding and statebuilding, 2011 elections in post-conflict countries that did not have an electoral gender quota resulted in the election of women to, on average, 7% of parliamentary seats (Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Haiti, Liberia) compared with 30% in countries with a quota (Rwanda, South Sudan, Timor-Leste). Further, in post-conflict countries with quotas, women tend to build on their electoral success over time and exceed quota levels in successive elections, something that does not happen in post-conflict countries without quotas. Another study, on women and statebuilding in Burundi, Guatemala, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and both North and South Sudan, confirms an increase in the number of women in politics in countries with quotas (Burundi, Kosovo, North and South Sudan) compared with those that have not (Guatemala, Sierra Leone) (Castillejo, 2011). The study also finds there are fewer barriers to women’s participation in terms of cost, violence and stigma where quotas are in place. Where women have been involved in peace agreements or negotiating constitutional reform processes, this increases the prospects of rules to assure women’s presence in subsequent formal politics being included, as in the cases of Rwanda and Burundi.

The role of the international community is a relevant factor in the success of campaigns for quotas. (Castillejo, 2011; Tripp, 2012). Moreover, this intersects with the development of an international agenda since UNSCR 1325 that is premised on the importance of supporting women’s participation in all aspects of peacebuilding in order to advance gender equality goals.

Such key junctures as peace agreements or constitutional reform processes can contribute to a momentum of institutional reform that assures the establishment of quotas – which helps explain why countries recently emerging from conflict move towards having more women in formal politics (Tripp, 2012). However, the extent to which quotas can make a substantive difference to post-conflict policy and statebuilding remains under-researched. Castillejo (2011) signals that, even where women have greater presence in the legislature, they have not been given decision-making roles within the executive or seats on the most important parliamentary committees. In Burundi, Kosovo and North Sudan, women activists have expressed disappointment that quotas have not resulted in more gender-sensitive policies. On the whole, their ability to operate effectively and to develop a gender equality agenda once elected remains limited (ibid.).

Domingo and Bihirabake (2012), in an evaluation case study of UNIFEM/UN Development Programme (UNDP) support for women’s political participation, found that the presence of women in the legislature in Burundi did not assure that female MPs espoused a gender equality agenda. Rather, other factors, such as regime type, degree of openness of the political system and the nature of the political party system had an important impact in terms of shaping the quality and level of women’s voice and influence in formal politics at the national level. This is in line with Tripp’s (2012) review of the evidence.

A UN Women study on post-conflict governance highlights the importance of the particular quota system and electoral regime in shaping women’s voice (UN Women, 2012). The study also cites research that finds a correlation between different types of electoral system and quotas for disadvantaged groups and the resurgence of conflict, signalling that the combination of quotas in a list proportional representation system has the best outcomes in terms of increasing peace and stability and gradually reducing the primacy of ethnic differences. This research also finds that gender quotas in post-conflict contexts seem to ensure that other disadvantaged groups are more likely to gain access to parliament, with a positive and related correlation between such inclusion outcomes and conflict prevention (UN Women, 2012, citing Buchenshon and Vollan, 2011). The efficacy of quotas is therefore reliant on the prevailing electoral system.

Related to the electoral process, the UN Women study points to findings about the importance of supporting women’s presence in observing electoral processes to enable safer and less intimidating conditions for women to participate and vote freely in the context of strong patriarchal social norms. At the local level, for instance, research suggests that women candidates and women voters are at greater risk of intimidation and violence than
are men. In Senegal, a Women’s Situation Room for Peaceful Elections was established, aimed at protecting women from election-related violence (UN Women, 2012). Such pre-emptive measures can contribute to reducing the likelihood that women will experience violence during electoral periods. In Côte d’Ivoire, support to training individuals as voter registration mentors aimed to sensitise women about their voter rights and on how to use identity cards to enrol on electoral lists (ibid.).

**Political parties**

Political parties are essential vehicles that could enable women’s participation in the political system. They play a central role in generating and fielding potential women candidates. Yet there is very limited research on women and political parties in FCAS. The available research (reviewed in Castillejo, 2011 and Tripp, 2012) signals the role of political parties across FCAS emerging as the main gatekeepers – or barriers – to women’s formal political participation and policy influence. When patriarchy prevails in both the structure and the culture of political parties, this adds to the challenges women face in engaging in formal politics or occupying positions of influence. These challenges are clearly not unique to FCAS, but in post-conflict settings political parties seem especially likely to be highly personalised around male leaders (in some cases ex-combatants) and do business through informal networks and in informal spaces to which women do not have access. In systems that use party lists to appoint candidates, where the political future of candidates depends on the party leadership and not on voters, parties control the selection of women candidates, and the promotion of women into decision-making roles in the party and government, and the policy agenda (Castillejo, 2011). Thus, the wider political economy (such as the logic of patrimonialism and patronage politics), the particular features of the electoral system and the implications of this for the internal politics, incentive structures and power relations in political parties are important in defining the challenges and opportunities for women to gain entry to political parties – and at what level.

**Women’s mobilisation and civil society**

The literature confirms the importance of women’s action in informal political spaces as constituting an effective sphere of engagement and influence. Women have been active in mobilisation and CSOs at different stages of the peacebuilding and statebuilding process. As discussed in Section 3.1, many of the gains achieved on gender issues during peace negotiations and constitution-making processes are in part the result of such activism among women – even when they have been left out of formal processes, as in Burundi and Nepal (Falch, 2010). The evidence remains underdeveloped on whether changed roles resulting from conflict dynamics contribute to sustainable enhancement of women’s political voice. However, support to capacity development of women leaders and civil society capabilities during transition processes enhances the strategic capacity of women to engage politically and exert influence. This includes logistical support to attend meetings, to engage in lobbying activities and to carry out general networking with stakeholders in the political process (Castillejo, 2011; Domingo and Bihirabake, 2012).

Cornwall and Goetz (2005) have noted that donor support to civil society has helped create ‘new democratic spaces’ in which women can pressure the policy process from outside formal political institutions. This seems to be particularly true in post-conflict contexts where there was once little space for women’s political activity (e.g. Burundi, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan), and where donor funding for civil society has provided women with resources, training and networking opportunities and has supported the development of a range of women’s CSOs that can participate in policy debates. Critically, it also appears that women can take on leadership roles and promote gender equality in FCAS through civil society activism without facing the hostility and obstruction they confront in political parties or formal electoral processes. This may be because civil society is a relatively new space with fewer links to traditional power and patronage relations, and one in which female activists have been prominent from the very beginning. In effect, civil society activism provides an alternative platform for women to enter formal politics without having to come up through political parties (Castillejo, 2011; 2013; Tripp, 2012).

On the other hand, the literature also suggests a decrease in such mobilisation and activism following the consolidation of peace, with far less mobilisation of women around statebuilding to influence post-governance processes. In Kosovo, for example, while women activists, politicians and academics had lobbied together to demand inclusion in the negotiations on Kosovo’s status, such collaboration has become far more rare, and the
relationship among these different groups has become increasingly characterised by mistrust. This seems to be a common pattern in post-conflict contexts (International Alert, 2007).

Part of the issue lies in the loss of an important motivation: the end the conflict and the achievement of peace. However, another source of concern is the growing instrumentalisation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as they inevitably become more formal and bureaucratic in seeking international funding and the need to meet donor standards and criteria (Castillejo, 2011; Rocha Menocal and Sharma, 2008).

3.2.4 What, according to the literature, are the challenges to and opportunities for the integration and consideration of gender perspectives in FCAS?

Opportunities
There has been a dramatic increase in the number of women participating in formal political processes over the past two decades (Castillejo, 2011; O’Connell, 2011; Tripp, 2012; UN Women, 2012). The reasons include:

- The opening-up of political space following conflict, with the negotiation of peace agreements and new constitutions: in post-conflict countries in Africa, according to the baseline survey by Tripp (2012), women have almost doubled their rates of legislative representation, in contrast with countries that have not gone through recent conflict;
- High levels of male casualties and women needing to step in, often beyond their more circumscribed traditional gender roles;
- Changing gender relations that have led a stronger push by peace/women’s movements for greater gender equality (Tripp, 2012);
- Democratisation reforms, including free and fair elections, media and voter education and the adoption of more equitable electoral systems and quotas;
- Donor support for such reforms;
- Changing international norms regarding women’s rights: countries that are the most aid-dependent tend to be most likely to comply with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and UNSCR 1325 (the US has not ratified CEDAW). It is not gender-related aid that makes the difference, but the overall amount of aid and the relationship of the particular country with the international community (Bush, 2011; Tripp, 2012);
- Economic factors may also play a part, as countries with higher levels of growth tend to do better in terms of women’s rights (Tripp, 2012).

Challenges
Despite these positives, numerous challenges and barriers remain to the substantive participation of women in post-conflict governance processes. These include customary rules, negative cultural attitudes, male- and elite-dominated political parties and structures, violence and insecurity, illiteracy and political inexperience and lack of support for capacity building (see O’Connell, 2011). In addition, women in post-conflict contexts may lack the capacity to operate politically and may face severe stigma if they take on public roles (Castillejo, 2011).

As already emphasised in this review, the central challenge of building more peaceful and effective states and societies and more inclusive, participatory and equitable governance processes in post-conflict settings is not purely technical or financial. At its root, the challenge is profoundly political, involving the redefinition of values and behaviour and the reshaping of underlying power relations. In the case of women, this redefinition spans every level, from the household to the wider society. One key message that emerges from most of the literature is that gender hierarchies are resilient. Formal mechanisms to foster greater inclusion and participation are without doubt essential, such as electoral quotas, but these should be seen as only the first step in a broader process to dismantle such hierarchical practices (Byrne and McCulloch, 2012; Castillejo, 2011; 2013; Tripp, 2012; Waylen, 2006).

Despite increasing awareness among donors of the importance of politics, international support for peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts has remained focused on the more ‘technical’ aspects of political governance, and has shied away from grappling with the sensitive power relations that exclude women from the ‘high politics’ of the political settlement (Castillejo, 2011). Women’s participation in post-conflict governance
processes needs to go beyond formal mechanisms and numbers. There is a need for gender-responsive governance reforms to ensure institutions respond more effectively to women’s needs and priorities (UN Women, 2012).

It is important to assess whether women’s greater participation (in electoral processes, political parties and government itself) is making a substantive difference, and, if so, how and why. It may still be too early to make such assessments in many FCAS, given that transition processes and democratisation reforms are still relatively recent. However, the emerging literature indicates that much work remains to be done if women are to be empowered in practice and if governance processes are to be gendered in a meaningful way (Castillejo, 2011; 2013; International Alert, 2007; O’Connell, 2011; Tripp, 2012). In Burundi, for instance, female MPs have not contributed to pressuring for reform in women’s access to land and property rights, which remains a deeply exclusionary fissure in the country (Domingo and Bihirabake, 2012).

The involvement in politics, political parties and electoral processes requires considerable resources for a candidate to compete effectively, and this often places women at a disadvantage. Evidence suggests that parties, customary leaders and constituents often need to be bribed to take on female candidates (as has happened in Sierra Leone), and women rarely have good access to financial or patronage resources (Castillejo, 2011; 2013; Tripp, 2012).

In addition, if parties operate on the basis of party lists (rather than candidates presenting themselves directly to the electorate), women candidates must rely entirely on party patronage to be elected. As such, they are often liable to the perception that they made it onto the party list on the basis of clientelism or favouritism rather than merit. There is the additional challenge that, if women MPs become more accountable to party leaders than to the electorate because their political future lies with the party (Castillejo, 2011), they are unlikely to champion any agenda for women’s empowerment that puts them at odds with their party leadership. This can have serious implications for government responsiveness, especially in terms of gender-responsive governance.

The literature also notes that it has been difficult to maintain unity and solidarity among women in post-conflict governance processes, with rifts increasing in particular between women in government and women in civil society. This may be because the need to overcome conflict and foster peace loses its momentum as a rallying point as attention shifts to post-conflict issues, and women occupying very different places may have very different views of what is needed (Byrne and McCulloch, 2012; International Alert, 2007).

3.2.5 Concrete examples of positive experiences, approaches, interventions and policies that can contribute to lessons for peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and agendas

Positive experiences
While there are positive experiences, much of the evidence is limited in terms of what these mean for the substantive advancement of gender equality goals and a real impact on women’s lives; and what are the implications for peacebuilding and statebuilding.

Burundi (Falch, 2010). A Women’s Peace Conference one month before the signing of the peace agreement in 2000 declared the need for negotiating parties to adopt a gender perspective in the talks and to guarantee women 30% representation in the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government and all public bodies. The 2005 Constitution guaranteed this 30% and also included provisions regarding party lists for elections, requiring that at least 25% of candidates be women. Women participated in the 2005 election process on a relatively large scale, as polling station agents, election monitors, voters, campaigners and candidates. As the required minimum of women was not reached, additional women candidates were co-opted to the National Assembly and the Senate.

Although this quota has been upheld since 2005, women’s numerical representation has not meant women can participate effectively in politics. This owes to several factors. First, cultural norms still prevail whereby women are not expected to express their opinions or speak in public. Second, women continue to be excluded from decision-making positions and forums. Third, the leadership of the major political parties is still almost exclusively male. Most women MPs’ activities are limited to their parties’ women’s wings. Fourth, much of women’s role in politics is regarded as tokenistic, particularly for those women who were co-opted rather than
elected. Finally, other factors include lack of economic independence, time constraints owing to domestic responsibilities and limited education and training. For instance, candidates are supposed to pay for their own campaigns.

Women continue to play a large role in civil society in Burundi, raising awareness of women’s rights and encouraging women to get involved in politics, both as voters and as candidates. Their advocacy efforts were instrumental in the 30% quota as well as in the adoption of a law to punish perpetrators of violence against women (VAW). However, their efforts have been more fragmented since the peace process – a result, in part, of the election of some of the movement’s members to formal political institutions.

**Rwanda.** In the country’s first post-genocide elections in 2003, women achieved nearly 50% representation in parliament. The country now has the world’s highest percentage of women in a lower house of parliament (56%) (UN Women, 2012). The gains in women’s participation are, for the most part, the result of the quota system established in Rwanda’s Constitution and innovative electoral structures. Interestingly (see also Section 3.1), women did not participate in the formal peace negotiations in Rwanda, but women’s groups mobilised successfully around the peace negotiations to demand their increased representation in the political system. In addition, the Rwandan Patriotic Front government has some commitment to the promotion of women’s rights, albeit in a political context that has illiberal features. The progress achieved has included the following (see Ballington and Karam, 2005):

- Women’s councils have been established at the grassroots level in parallel with the formal political parties and general local councils, to raise awareness of women’s rights and organise skills training. The head of the women’s council holds a reserved seat on the general local council, ensuring official representation of women’s concerns.
- The Senate reserves 30% of seats for women as mandated by the constitution.
- The Chamber of Deputies has 24 seats reserved for women and contested in elections in which only women may vote.

However, the impressive progress in the formal representation of women in Rwanda’s parliament, which is nearing gender parity, has not necessarily translated into fundamental changes and improvements in the lives of ordinary Rwandan women (International Alert, 2007), and these numerical gains need also to be considered in the light of the wider context of the country’s political process.

**Uganda.** The number of women national legislators increased from 1% in 1980 to 18% in 1989 after the introduction of quotas, and reached 37.2% in 2012. Women’s representation in the cabinet increased from 10% in 2001 to 28% in 2012. These changes are largely the result of Uganda’s women’s movement. However, once again, a key question is whether this results in increased political influence and leverage (Tripp, 2012). Moreover, the wider political economy conditions of regime type and party systems need more consideration in explaining the level of women’s voice and influence.

### 3.2.6 Lessons learnt

This review of the literature has revealed the deeply political nature of the endeavour to advance gender equality goals in FCAS, precisely because it involves changing formal – and informal – norms about the allocation of power and resources. As with other areas covered in this review, the challenge to participation lies in giving it substance beyond formal provisions and ensuring the presence of women, such as through quota systems. Participation does not ensure either women’s influence in decision making or that women in politics will give priority to a gender equality agenda.

Quotas are doubtless important in giving women greater voice and changing perceptions about their role in politics, rather than engineering particular policy outcomes (Castillejo, 2011). In order to enhance the quality of women’s political participation, working with the process aspect of electoral moments is important in order to address context-specific barriers for women and challenges in overcoming these. This includes support in the electoral process itself, such as involving women in voter registration to ensure their participation in elections, and to ensure their equal representation as election administration officials and polling officers so they are included in decision making, build confidence and reinforce the importance of including women in all aspects of public life (UN Women, 2012). Moreover, the wider political economy of regime type, the degree to which
inclusiveness – or continuing exclusion – feature in the political system, the nature of party politics and whether there is dominant party rule are important features in shaping the opportunity structures for women’s effective access to and voice in formal politics.

It is important to note that it cannot be assumed that the interests and agendas will be championed by women solely on the basis of gender. As different examples emerging from FCAS (as well as elsewhere) illustrate, women elected to public office do not necessarily have a shared political agenda or prioritise gender issues, even if they have the opportunity to do so. In addition, quota systems are very new and their policy effects may take time to have an impact.

Another key lesson is the need to develop women’s capacities and skills to engage in politics, and become more active and effective members of political parties so they can get elected in the first place.

Beyond this, it is also essential to promote coalition building among women politicians, linking them with women’s civil society movements, and to support high-level dialogue on the inclusion of women in the executive (Castillejo, 2011; 2013). Coalitions with key male political brokers who are supportive of gender equality goals and networking and dialogue with ‘resistors’ in the political sphere are both important in patriarchal settings to contribute to mind changing and socialisation processes regarding women’s access to politics and decision making.

Donor support can be more strategic in statebuilding processes to ensure gender-responsive approaches feature more coherently across the policy process. It is not enough to build strong and politically effective gender equality institutions, or support women’s presence in parliament. This should be combined with more forceful engagement on gender equality with the most powerful ministries (usually the president’s office and ministries of finance and planning). This requires moving away from the ‘siloed’ forms of engagement that characterise donors’ support to gender equality agendas. Finally, donors also have a key role in supporting women’s CSOs to build a strong gender equality agenda, and forging links between state and civil society institutions on gender equality (Castillejo, 2011).

3.2.7 Key analytical points
The attempt to build peaceful states and societies after conflict often entails the re-articulation of political settlements. This is formalised (but not always implemented in substantive terms) through peace agreements and/or new or reformed constitutions. Issues of inclusion and increased participation are advanced through content that calls for democratisation, increased formal participation, for instance among groups that were previously excluded and marginalised, and new terms for political, social and economic engagement (sometimes referred to as the social contract) through new rights commitments, or principles of equality, inclusion, consultation and responsiveness. As such, post-conflict settings offer, at least in principle, an opportunity for the greater engagement of women in governance processes. There tends to be general agreement in the emerging literature on FCAS that women’s participation has increased in post-conflict settings (Castillejo, 2011; 2013; Tripp, 2012), at least through formal mechanisms, such as quotas, participation in political parties, women’s mobilisation and civil society. This seems to be the case even when women and gender concerns have not been incorporated fully into formal peace processes.

The literature also identifies numerous challenges and barriers that hinder the substantive participation of women in post-conflict governance processes. These include customary rules, negative cultural attitudes, male- and elite-dominated political parties and structures, violence and insecurity, illiteracy and political inexperience and lack of support for capacity building (see O’Connell, 2011; UN Women, 2012). The literature also points to correlations between inclusive formal politics from a gender equality perspective and a lowered risk of return to conflict, which is relevant to peacebuilding. Overall, however, the evidence base on the inter-linkages between women in office and improved presence of gender equality goals in policy is weak as regards FCAS. Moreover, there is very limited evidence of how this affects concrete areas of policy that shape service delivery, or economic empowerment, for women.

3.2.8 Key gaps in the literature
The review of literature has demonstrated that the gendered dimensions of peacebuilding and statebuilding merit much closer attention, especially in terms of the kinds of tensions that may ensue as a result of different
ongoing monitoring of such processes of inclusion inevitably issues. Finally, little is known about how other political economy dynamics of regime types, electoral systems and political loyalties that are generated and secured – and how these issues shape the prospects for women’s participation in peacebuilding and statebuilding. The specificities of how these questions feature in each context are important in order to understand the real opportunities and constraints that women and gender advocates face in FCAS, but both the analytical and the empirical work remain underdeveloped in the literature. Moreover, there is a need for more knowledge about how patronage politics affect the opportunities and constraints women face in participating in formal politics – and how these intersect with these wider issues. Finally, little is known about how other cleavages based on class, ethnicity, religion and ideology intersect to shape the direction of gender-responsive agendas, including those espoused (or not) by women in politics.

Going beyond the numbers, more research work is needed to explore ways in which donors can support women more effectively to influence the policy agenda and promote women’s interests. There is also a need for further and more strategic donor engagement with political parties to promote a gender equality agenda and to explore how parties can support their women members to become more effective vehicles for women’s participation and representation, while finding ways to encourage party leaders to include women in decision-making positions and to make party structures and culture more democratic (Castillejo, 2011).

3.3 Women and transitional justice

3.3.1 What is the evidence, knowledge and analytical base on approaches to peacebuilding and statebuilding that integrate a gender perspective and/or address gender equality goals in FCAS?

General overview

Transitional justice (TJ) is, increasingly, a feature of the political processes that are associated with peacebuilding and statebuilding in transition settings. It involves the array of processes and mechanisms to address past human rights violations following periods of conflict, political turmoil or state repression (Olsen et al., 2010). It aims to secure some form of accountability for acts of violence by holding perpetrators to account in order to deter similar crimes in the future; rebuild the rule of law; establish the facts of the past and enable justice, including through reparations; and give voice to the victims of crimes (Lutz, 2006; Roht-Arriaza, 2006). Its relevance for peacebuilding and statebuilding in FCAS lies in what it contributes to addressing conflict-related grievances, and to the renewal of trust in the credibility and legitimacy of the state’s capacity to protect citizens from violence and other harmful acts experienced by significant parts of the population in the recent past. Denying the past, it is premised, undermines the chances of victims owning and being included in peacebuilding and statebuilding projects. Whether or not TJ processes deliver, or even occur, and the direction they take, all depends on the outcome of post-conflict political economy conditions, the balance of power among relevant stakeholders and the nature of the political settlement that results from the particular dynamics of the peacebuilding process or statebuilding evolution (Sriram, 2009). Thus, the impact for peacebuilding and statebuilding is an empirical question relating to the political features of these processes, and not a normative truth (Gloppen, 2005). The scope for gender-responsive TJ is in itself inevitably enmeshed in this political process. In addition, there are particular dynamics about how gender relations intersect with the narratives of violence and conflict that prevail in TJ processes that need to be taken into account.

TJ can take various forms. These include mechanisms that focus on truth telling (through truth commissions), which establish a historical record of past violations and give victims the opportunity to bear witness to their
experience of conflict. It may include addressing the past through the application of judicial accountability for the crimes committed, whether through international criminal justice mechanisms or domestic trials, and with an emphasis on criminal (retributive) justice to address legacies of impunity. Other mechanisms include a range of restorative justice measures and goals, such as reparations and the restitution of property to victims. More recently, the TJ remit has been expanded to include ways it may address the root causes of conflict and violence, such as through truth commissions and reparations programmes.

Overall, however, the scholarship on the impact of TJ on peacebuilding and statebuilding is in its infancy. Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003/04), for instance, signal the limited impact of trials in terms of preventing further violence, whereas truth-telling exercises can potentially be more strategic. Olsen et al. (2010) are more forthcoming in establishing correlations between TJ and democratisation, as well as on experiences of renewed high levels of repressive state action. But the evidence base on the impact of TJ remains hugely underdeveloped, not least because of the strong normative and prescriptive focus that has prevailed in the body of knowledge until only recently (Domingo, 2012). Increasingly, the research focus is providing more nuanced findings that confirm the need to move away from binary ‘truths’ (justice versus peace) and from normative assessments to empirical analysis of the experience of TJ (e.g. Sriram and Pillay, 2009).

The evidence base on how TJ relates to other political and development objectives is thus still a relatively young area (de Greiff and Duthie, 2009). Within this, a gendered approach to TJ has emerged as the focus of recent research and analysis. The literature on gendered approaches to TJ falls into several categories. There are analytical pieces that explore why the integration of gender perspectives into TJ is important in order to ensure women’s particular experiences of violence are reflected and considered in emerging processes of reconstruction and resettlement of the political and social order. These include feminist critiques of TJ agendas that focus too narrowly on redress and compensation at the individual level, and on public forms of violence, but which insufficiently address structural causes related to gender-based and other inequalities. These inequalities risk being overlooked and remaining unaltered in post-conflict reconstruction in the degree to which they remain invisible (Bell and O'Rourke, 2007; Campbell, 2007; Ní Aoláin, 2012; Tickner, 2005; and essays in Buckley-Zistel and Stanley, 2011). There are legal analyses of the evolution and impact of TJ processes on women (such as Campbell, 2007; Ní Aoláin, 2012); socio-political analyses that assess the gender impact of TJ in relation to the political economy of peacebuilding efforts (Davis, 2013 on DRC); more general pieces that describe and explain how women’s experiences of TJ have unfolded (e.g. Valji, 2012); and empirical country-level studies, many of which emphasise certain types of crimes related to sexually based violence (SBV), as well as historical and memory work. With some exceptions (such as, but not only, Bell and O’Rourke, 2007; Ní Aoláin, 2012; Ní Aoláin et al., 2011; O’Rourke, 2013; Davis, 2013), the literature on gender and TJ (as with TJ literature generally) includes limited assessment of the linkages to peacebuilding, and even less so to statebuilding.

Finally, Ní Aoláin (2012) distinguishes two levels of women’s experience that are useful in disaggregating what is meant by gender-responsive TJ: women as victims (where gender-responsive TJ addresses their particular experience of conflict-related violence); and women as agents of change (where gender-responsive TJ is about the degree to which women participate in decisions about TJ design and objectives in particular contexts).

**Quality of the literature**

This is a young but analytically and theoretically rich field. However, empirical evidence on the peacebuilding and statebuilding impact of women’s specific experience of TJ remains hugely underdeveloped. Overall, the academic literature on gender and TJ is theoretically robust, but the empirical findings are small in size. In part, this relates also to the fact that gender-responsive TJ is very young (see O’Rourke, 2013 for a clear synthesis of the gender analyses of TJ). Academic studies vary in terms of the TJ objectives that are considered, and how TJ is connected to feminist agendas or the achievement of wider gender equality goals. The policy literature has tended to be more normative and prescriptive, with some exceptions, such as Valji (2012), which distinguishes between TJ as a normative field and TJ as a political process that reflects the particular power dynamics of context. This is important in terms of how TJ fits into the wider political economy dynamics of peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts, and the evidence base here remains in its infancy.
3.3.2 What, according to the literature, are the challenges and barriers to and opportunities for the way in which gender perspectives are integrated and considered in FCAS?

There are widely recognised challenges in the literature that are considered to constrain the options for women to participate in shaping TJ processes, or to have their experiences of conflict reflected and addressed in these processes and their outcomes (Bell et al., 2004; Ní Aoláin, 2009; 2012).

These relate to, first, the prevalence of wider social norms of patriarchy in which women’s experience of conflict and violence finds limited outlet for expression – and this is reproduced in how TJ mechanisms have been constructed (Ní Aoláin, 2009; 2012). Second, and relatedly, the gender-blind political dynamics of peacebuilding and conflict resolution – reviewed above – mean women, as in other spheres of peacebuilding, have not, until recently, had the opportunity to shape TJ options, and their scope and mandate, precisely because they are negotiated in the context of these peace processes (Ní Aoláin et al., 2011; Pankhurst, 2007). Third, given this historical reality, the predominantly masculine account of conflict that prevails in peacebuilding processes and how they unfold has reinforced an over-simplistic ‘before and after’ narrative of conflict that does not take sufficient account of the ongoing conflict-related violence experienced by women (and that may escalate) in the post-conflict environment (Ní Aoláin et al., 2011; Valji, 2012). Fourth, the invisibility of women’s experience of conflict-related violence is reinforced by the psychological difficulties of sharing such experiences in what are seen as – and often are – environments where stigmatisation remains a real concern. This is reinforced by the more private and less public ways in which women may experience conflict-related violence and, in particular, the ‘continuity’ in how these forms of violence remain and may be exacerbated after the formal end of violence.

The possibility of trust in the system in particular is undermined though continuing realities of insecure environments for women (Ní Aoláin, 2009). In many FCAS contexts, there is still a risk of reprisal, either because conflict is still latent, the structural causes of VAW remain unaltered, impunity has mostly prevailed and/or the perpetrators of violence are at large in the community or sharing common spaces with their victims.

One emerging concern in the literature is that gender-responsive approaches to TJ are often oriented to SBV issues in relation to the particular ways in which women experience conflict, and because such crimes are more likely to affect women. The worry is that focusing mostly on acts of SBV in TJ risks only or primarily invoking the dependent, sexualised female, resulting in a distorting essentialism that marginalises the issues of class, ethnicity, race and culture that can multiply discrimination and violence for many women in FCAS (Ní Aoláin, 2012). This perhaps narrow (notwithstanding the importance of the issues) construction of women’s experience of conflict limits the possibility, therefore, of embedding more transformative intent in TJ processes regarding the structural root causes of conflict.

3.3.3 Are there concrete examples of positive experiences, approaches, interventions and policies that can contribute lessons for peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and agendas?

Findings are organised according to what the literature says about the experience of women in relation to different TJ mechanisms.

Retributive justice and prosecutions

At the international level, there have been significant developments in international jurisprudence to advance justice for conflict-related SBV. For example, the founding document of the International Criminal Court, created in 2002, includes special reference to SBV as a possible war crime. Various tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda established the precedent for the listing of rape as a crime against humanity. A landmark judgement by the latter in 1998 led to the first sentence that punished SBV and defined rape as an act of genocide. Ní Aoláin (2012) makes the point that, despite advances, the international community is less than consistent in how justice for conflict-related violence against women sits within internationally supported efforts at peacebuilding. Afghanistan in particular illustrates the point of competing international objectives in peacebuilding, which have played out to the detriment of women’s rights. These have been sacrificed through international decisions to build alliances with regional armed elites in the fight against the Taliban, who are equally inimical to any advances in gender equality, or in addressing conflict-related VAW (ibid.).
Some domestically located, but internationally funded, TJ justice experiments, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, have begun in the past decade to explicitly address women’s experience of conflict. The processes in Sierra Leone, however, have had mixed assessments in terms of impacts for women. On the one hand, its mandate has extended beyond that of the other international tribunals, as it includes explicit recognition of a range of forms of sexual violence, including slavery, enforced prostitution and forced pregnancy, and has offered support to survivors so they can share their experiences (Valji, 2012). However, Kelsall and Stepakoff (2009) note that such innovations have not in practice played out effectively. These crimes were not, for example, included in the indictments against the three political leaders charged. Failure to effect justice for women carries the risk of reinforcing the habit of silencing women and perpetuating patterns of stigmatisation in cases of VAW within the ordinary justice system. Such unintended consequences of poorly conducted, but well-intended, gender-responsive processes are deeply problematic, therefore. Internationally supported TJ processes need to be assessed in terms of their impact on women’s experience of justice and security provision more generally.

Domestic trials dealing with past acts of violence tend in practice to happen rarely as a TJ option. To the extent that they do, they constitute opportunities to connect TJ with efforts to rebuild the rule of law, and bring such processes of accountability closer to the population. The challenges in domestic criminal justice are often linked to the unreliable nature of domestic rule-of-law institutions – in some cases because of continued complicity, or because the political capture of justice and security institutions is part of the legacy of violence and war. Indeed, the social norms associated with patriarchy are likely to be deeply embedded in security and justice institutions – to such an extent that these are seen as hostile settings. The protection of victims and witnesses from the risk of backlash is, therefore, a challenge, and is not helped by the adversarial aspect of criminal justice (Valji, 2012).

In practice, there have been few domestic trials associated with TJ. In a number of post-conflict settings the political choice has been to administer some TJ through traditional or customary justice institutions, such as through gacaca in Rwanda. The assumption, however, is that such processes are likely to be challenging in terms of both the risk of backlash and the prevalence of social norms that discriminate against women. Nevertheless, there is some evidence of engagement to transform such traditional systems of justice systems (see Section 4.1), less as part of any TJ strategy and more as part of rebuilding justice institutions that respect gender equality principles.

**Truth telling**

There has been progress in introducing gender-sensitive approaches to truth-seeking exercises, even though women’s reporting of sexual violence remains a challenge. Such approaches include the provision of safe spaces where women can share their testimonies. The South African Truth Commission (1995-2000) was the first to include hearings where women could express their demands for justice and share their experiences. In Peru, the Truth Commission that reported on the violence associated with the conflict between 1980 and 2000 was the first to fully mainstream gender into the proceedings, and a gender unit was established. This was the outcome of effective mobilisation by gender-sensitive human rights organisations and vocal women’s groups as well as the ability of the commission to absorb lessons from other countries, such as Guatemala and South Africa.

A key lesson from the Peruvian Truth Commission was that the gender unit was supported by process-driven initiatives on how, in practice, to address the difficulties of reporting cases of conflict-related and sexually based violence (dal Secco, 2007). This included, for example, training the commission staff in gender issues and coaching them on statement-taking procedures. In Sierra Leone, the support given to women victims enabled many to break their silence. Here, the truth-telling process linked gendered violations to pre-conflict gender inequalities. Overall, however, women’s testimony tended to centre on male family members (Kelsall and Stepakoff, 2007).

Positive practices are emerging, such as equal representation of testimony (Liberia) and in-depth oral histories (Timor-Leste) (Valji, 2012). Of special note is the experience in Timor-Leste, where women’s experiences of conflict have been considered broadly, including violations of their socioeconomic rights (Valji, 2012). Ní Aoláin et al. (2011) signal the critical importance of ensuring women are meaningfully consulted in the design of truth-telling exercises and processes to ensure their voices can be heard.
There is a sense that truth-telling exercises provide wider scope for voice on the structural and gender-based inequalities related to conflict, and that the mandate for recommendations can be designed to include consideration of such issues. However, as feminist critiques have noted, how this can result (or has resulted) in a transformative agenda of substance is unclear.

Reparations
Reparations come in different forms and have different perceived benefits. They aim to ‘repair’ the damage caused by conflict. Programmes have included restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition, but there is little documentation or evidence on the impact on – or purposeful consideration of – gender inequalities. In some cases, restitution for women can mean returning to a context of injustice and inequality unless specific measures are taken to prevent this. In general, reparations programmes have omitted reparations for reproductive violence, including forced pregnancy, abortion or sterilisation. The data on gender-disaggregated reparations remain very limited (Valji, 2012). Ní Aoláin et al. (2011) especially note the risks of unintended bias embedded in reparations programmes, which are deeply problematic for women. For instance, reparations programmes can be under-inclusive in their design to the extent that they are based on a hierarchy of wrongs, in which acts of VAW may come last, thus diminishing access to reparations for women. In the Peruvian Truth Commission, rape appeared last on the list of potential harms done in conflict, as it did not end the survivor’s life or diminish her capacity to generate income. Reparations also, in many cases, can only follow acts of public testimony. Given the disincentives for women to give public testimony in the face of stigma and fear of reprisals, this is problematic. In Timor-Leste, this was somewhat addressed by introducing a time lag of two years in the reparations programme, allowing more time for potential claimants to come forward (ibid.).

Overall, it is in reparations where there has been interesting innovation, including in relation to the transformative intent of TJ processes. Thus, for instance, in Peru, reparations programmes were reframed to include access to health, housing and education (Valji, 2012). In Morocco, specific harm done to women was recognised, but the Truth Commission recommended that women heads of household receive compensation directly, in that way bypassing Shar’ia.

Land restitution is an additional of the transformative potential of reparations programmes. Rather than reinstating an unjust system, the process can provide measures to address the social and economic injustices of the past, and the ways these intersected with gender-based inequalities to deny equal land title and inheritance rights to women. This is one aim of the current Colombian TJ legislation (Meertens, 2012). But Meertens indicates that such legal processes cannot be judged in isolation from the political economy of the conflict in which they are embedded, and the particular configuration of existing gender relations.

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DDR is intricately associated with but separate from TJ, and yet has important implications for how the legacies of conflict-related violence as they affect women are dealt with in a post-conflict setting. DDR has traditionally been focused on resolving military and security objectives, and targeting a limited group in the population considered to be a risk to stabilisation (armed, mostly men) (Bastick et al., 2008). Women have mostly been excluded from qualifying from DDR programmes (for not being formally categorised as ex-combatants, or not bearing weapons). In DRC, one of four qualifying criteria was to possess a weapon (Ní Aoláin et al., 2011). Moreover, the pressure to build up security institutions through DDR often leaves gender issues aside as a minor priority (Valasek, 2008).

In recent years, there have been more gender-responsive approaches to DDR, including, as recommended by the UN, Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards. For instance, the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme in the Great Lakes puts in place measures to advance gender equality in how DDR is applied (Bastick et al., 2007). Despite these advances, however, DDR remains in many cases an early missed opportunity. Gender responsive DDR could be better integrated into post-conflict security and justice programmes, and that it is in alignment and not in tension with TJ efforts (Bastick et al., 2007; Valasek, 2008).
3.3.4 Key gaps in the literature

Overall, this is a young, if vibrant, field of emerging knowledge, but the evidence on the gendered impact of TJ remains very limited – including because of the recent nature of some of these processes and mechanisms. The existing literature signals the need for a much more politically informed analysis of how TJ affects (and reflects) the balance of power, and is situated in wider post-conflict processes of renegotiating the political settlement. What this means in concrete terms of statebuilding remains underdeveloped.

From the perspective of women’s voice in peacebuilding and statebuilding, poorly conducted or gender-blind TJ can reinforce norms and legacies of ‘silencing’ women’s experience and needs. More research is needed on how this can be addressed, and, concretely, how positive TJ outcomes can contribute to energising women’s agency in other areas of peacebuilding and statebuilding.

Most concretely, TJ outcomes are relevant for how justice and security provision unfolds – discussed below. An important gap in the TJ literature generally, and in gender-responsive TJ research specifically, is that of understanding better how TJ is (and could be better) integrated with other areas of programming that are seen as essential to statecraft and securing peace. This includes especially security and justice provision, but also the more transitional efforts of DDR. Finally, the differential experience and political positioning of women regarding conflict and transitional politics, and the impact this has in terms of shaping attitudes towards gender-responsive TJ or TJ generally, features very little in the literature reviewed.

3.3.5 Key analytical points

Recurrent issues in the TJ-related literature include first, that the poor integration of gender perspectives in TJ reflects the exclusion of women from peace agreements and from political negotiations in transitional processes. Second, this translates into the fact that women have limited opportunities to frame the questions and concerns that guide decisions on how TJ mechanisms should be designed. Third, the effect of gender-blind TJ is that women’s experience of conflict – and indeed post-conflict – is silenced, which reinforces patterns of exclusion that can be replicated in statebuilding, particularly in such sectors as justice and security, and with serious consequences for statebuilding itself. It is also important to reiterate that the wider knowledge base on how TJ intersects with peacebuilding and statebuilding – and especially the latter – is a young field of enquiry.
4 Statebuilding: gender-responsive support to build core state functions, services and responses

4.1 Justice and security

4.1.1 What is the evidence, knowledge and analytical base on approaches to peacebuilding and statebuilding to integrate a gender perspective in justice and security provision?

The general findings on gender-sensitive approaches to reform of the justice and security sector have a number of key features.

First, before 2000 and the landmark UNSCR 1325, there appears to have been very limited consideration of gender perspective approaches to (and studies of) justice reforms and security sector reform (SSR) more widely. This is the case in both the academic and the policy literature. The literature also reflects the relative infancy of social and political analyses of justice and SSR in general (Domingo and Sieder, 2001).

UNSCR 1325 was a key moment in the international agenda on gender, security and conflict. It gave the UN an explicit mandate to take a serious look at the particular ways in which women experience conflict and post-conflict situations and the importance of ensuring their participation in all aspects of peace and security policy and practice. Since then, and in the international commitments passed since 2008 (such as later UNSCRs that relate to this theme – notably UNSCRs 1820, 1888, 1889 and 1960), there has been increased visibility of the global agenda on women, peace and security, and the UNSCRs have alluded explicitly to the importance of justice and security provision, and of women having the voice to express their needs and shape policy outcomes. However, this is a normative agenda, and the evidence on its practical progress is still in its infancy. Essays in Olonisakin et al. (2010), Swaine (2010) and Bell and O’Rourke (2010) are key texts on progress on UNSCR 1325, but mostly do not focus on the provision of justice and security.

Second, the body of knowledge that has begun to emerge in the past decade to fill some of the knowledge gaps on justice and SSR has tended to be prescriptive and normatively oriented. Meanwhile, the evidence base on what actually works for improved justice and security that address women’s needs remains patchy. Where there is evidence, the policy research relies on country case studies, some of which result from donor-funded studies; and some academic studies that have developed mostly qualitative analysis in the fields of socio-legal and socio-political analysis and legal anthropology (see essays in Jacob et al., 2009; Nyanu-Musembi, 2007; Sieder and Sierra, 2010). This paucity of evidence is connected, in part, to the relatively recent nature of more deliberate approaches to the integration of gender perspectives in the justice and security sectors (Myrttinen, 2009).

Third, much of the emerging body of work on justice and security provision that deals with FCAS has little, if any, reference to how it might intersect with the international statebuilding agenda. There is somewhat more reference to peacebuilding and gender-responsive security and justice provision, but that is because the international agenda on statebuilding is much more recent (Castillejo, 2011; Ni Aolain et al., 2011).

Fourth, and especially in relation to FCAS, there is an emphasis on the purpose of gender-sensitive approaches to justice and security being seen, with some exceptions, as a policy response to VAW in terms of prevention,
protection and redress. There is far less work on justice and SSR that addresses other reasons why women might need to use the justice system – such as to resolve disputes over land rights or divorce laws. Nyamu-Musembi (2007) tracks this general dearth in policy trends. In this wider perspective, which goes beyond VAW, the policy literature is more explicit on the relevance of women’s improved access to justice, but this is not specific to the conditions of FCAS, nor does it tend to address the connection to peacebuilding and statebuilding (Douglas, 2006; UN Women, 2011).

Finally, the peacebuilding and statebuilding literature is quite explicit in stating that justice and security provision matter for (re)building trust in the state’s capacity to protect citizens from the threat of violence or to resolve disputes (OECD-DAC, 2011; World Bank, 2011). It fails, however, to go much further than mentioning the importance of including gender perspectives, and it does not address what applying a gender focus might look like in practice (as noted in Castillejo, 2011 and El-Bushra, 2012). Indeed, even within peacebuilding and statebuilding analysis more generally, the justice and security sectors are treated fairly superficially in terms of their relevance to the enforcement of the reigning political settlement – including what that means for gender equality. There is, therefore, an overly technical and ‘apolitical’ approach to the justice and security sectors in much of the grey literature – an approach that is somewhat replicated in relation to gender-responsive perspectives in this area (noted in Denney and Domingo, 2013; Ní Aoláin et al., 2011).

4.1.2 The quality of the evidence
The quality of the knowledge base is uneven. There are robust scholarly pieces, mostly deriving findings and conclusions from qualitative methods that draw attention to interesting and informative country-specific experiences. But it cannot be said that there is a large body of evidence that provides empirical grounds to support robust policy recommendations. There is little or no mention of statebuilding in relation to gender perspectives in justice and security. There are some very good qualitative analyses on country-specific questions, such as Sieder and Sierra (2010) or Chopra and Isser (2011) – both examples of nuanced analyses on how to improve women’s access to justice and security in contexts of legal pluralism. In part, this is because the research in this field is so recent. The policy literature is a source of valuable information and in some cases provides useful insights into where to look for further information on what has worked (e.g., Bastick et al., 2007; DCAF, 2011; UN Women, 2011). Much of it is descriptive, but begins to provide a knowledge base to inform policy, and records efforts to take gender-sensitive perspectives into account. Overall, this evidence tends to be less detailed on the specifics of how change was achieved, with what impact for women and whether examples are limited to micro-level change (again, this reflects the relatively new presence of this issue on the policy agenda).

It is worth drawing particular attention to the pioneering work supported (and produced) by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE)/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UN-INSTRAW). These are early efforts to document what gender-sensitive SSR can look like, and have been fundamental in advancing the policy, knowledge and research agenda (Bastick et al., 2007; Bastick, 2008; DCAF, 2011; Valasek, 2008; essays in Jacob et al., 2009). The research, documentation and analytical thinking behind this work reflect the beginnings of a more nuanced approach to addressing the complexities of gender-based violence (GBV) in SSR. The history of the Gender Toolkit itself in SSR reveals a strategic approach to engaging with the wider community of SSR practitioners – a community that remains largely male-dominated – and the challenges of influencing the international community in its post-conflict interventions.

4.1.3 What, according to the literature, are the challenges and barriers to and opportunities for the integration and consideration of gender perspectives in justice and security programmes?
There are challenges associated with the fields of justice and SSR, and specific challenges to the integration of gender perspectives into justice and security programmes, and with what objective.

Multiple actors, multiple levels, multiple objectives in justice and security sector provision for women
In the past decade, UK support for justice and security sector reforms has been gathered under one ‘sector-wide’ approach, recast with guidance from DFID as a service covering the provision of both justice and security.
While this approach was intended to consolidate earlier work on the rule of law, security and police reform into a more cohesive whole, united by a normative commitment to advance the ‘goals of human security’, it has possibly confused the large range of issues, processes and purposes that are served by justice provision and SSR and the many actors involved in these processes (Hendricks, 2011). In practice, the actual interventions are far less integrated than was hoped. At the country level, justice and security programmes tend to be very ‘siliced’, partly because the practitioners come from different disciplinary backgrounds (either the justice sector or the security sector) and have different areas of expertise and knowledge (Horn et al., 2006).

Given such siloes, gender approaches are especially susceptible to remaining stuck at the edges of mainstream justice and security sector reform (Mobekk, 2010). For example, the 2007 edition of the OECD-DAC Handbook on SSR did not include a chapter on gender – this was added in 2009 (ibid.). As mentioned, SSR, in particular, is still a male-dominated world where issues of gender equality have limited traction – and both this and the justice sector have been characterised as having an over-technical profile.

The multidimensional nature of justice and security provision means there are, in practice, many relevant actors to be taken into account, each operating under very different incentives and institutional structures and responding to different interests. In FCAS they are further fragmented and affected by the dynamics of conflict and fragility. The range of actors includes the police (including dedicated gender units), the military, intelligence services, judges, courts and legal aid. There has also been more recent recognition of other non-state or informal actors, such as community elders. Programmes tend to focus on one of these actors, and there is no evidence of programmes in one area taking account of their impact on or connection to another area. So, for example, creating women’s shelters or improving incentives for women to report cases of violence through police sector reform without addressing the weaknesses or lack of courts may lead to incoherent programmes (Denney and Domingo, 2013).

There are, in addition, multiple institutional and organisational levels, with the picture further complicated by the realities of institutional hybridity. This is discussed in more detail below. The key point to note here is that there is limited evidence on how women seek access to and experience justice and security provision in contexts of institutional hybridity, where formal state provision is either absent or deeply problematic because of (for example) the complicity of state actors such as police officers in abusive and discriminatory practices, or collusion with discriminatory social norms. Institutional hybridity takes multiple forms and the importance of context cannot be overstated. The donor agenda has moved quite significantly in the direction of acknowledging the need to work with informal norms in justice and security provision, including (and especially) to take account of the implications for women (Albrecht et al., 2011; Isser and Chopra, 2011). However, the evidence base on what this means for women remains underdeveloped. Overall, there is a (warranted) concern that informal systems of justice and security provision are more likely to discriminate against women and be more susceptible to social norms of patriarchy. At the same time, they reflect the dominant social norms in many contexts.

Chopra and Isser (2011) provide an especially compelling analysis of the importance of working with informal norms from a gender perspective in response to donor perceptions that they should avoid non-state actors because they do not comply with international norms and standards. The authors signal that state institutions are also culpable in failings on human rights standards. To the extent that non-state norms and actors are dominant in the justice and security sectors, they argue, it makes sense to work to transform their approaches. Traditional norms also evolve (as do formal legal systems) and this transformation, it is suggested, is the result of contestation and renegotiation of the norm system over time.

For peacebuilding and statebuilding, where there are likely to be high levels of institutional hybridity, these questions are important for justice and security programmes. There are multiple objectives to be addressed through gender-sensitive justice and security reform. These may not be in tension with each other from the perspective of women’s needs, but they do raise issues of prioritisation.

There is a long list of objectives.
• Addressing legacies of conflict-related violence in relation to GBV and VAW, which connects with approaches to TJ (Ní Aoláin, 2008, highlights the connections between TJ and the provision of security and justice). This is strongly associated with addressing impunity, including as a deterrent and to foster a change in conduct;
• Awareness raising about women’s rights and mechanisms of protection and redress that need to be strengthened and supported, which includes the creation of spaces for women to share experiences and address issues of stigma and victimisation, and enhancing women’s voice and agency;
• Prevention of violence, including a wide range of interventions associated with changing attitudes towards justice outcomes for women. Typically, prevention interventions can include capacity development and training of justice and security personnel in women’s rights and GBV/VAW (see Jacob, 2008; Salahub, 2011); and increasing the number of women in security and justice provision organisations (Bastick et al., 2007; Jacob, 2008).
• Protection interventions that provide means to limit the risks of backlash and protect women from further harm. This may include supporting the provision of specific security measures (such as dedicated gender units within the police) and supporting the establishment of institutions to provide shelter or refuge;
• Legal change to eliminate discriminatory norms in security and justice provision, and to criminalise different forms of VAW as a necessary if insufficient measure (Manjoo et al., 2011);
• Justice remedies that include support to the relevant actors and institutions of the (criminal) justice and security systems at national and subnational level; the creation of special institutions (such as women’s police units or women’s courts) to deal with cases of VAW; the modification of process aspects (such as the reporting and processing of cases); tracking convictions; and working with community-level or non-state actors who may be mediating cases of VAW in areas where the state has a limited or weak presence. This involves working alongside – or being mindful of – the entire security and justice system (Denney, 2012, analyses the justice and security map in Sierra Leone);
• (Legal) empowerment of women to enable their legal voice and agency so they can use the law to support their interests.

These are some of the objectives of justice and security sector reform, but how they connect to peacebuilding and statebuilding is not addressed specifically in the literature.

Reform of the justice and security sectors is fundamentally political
Approaches to reform in these sectors to address women’s needs are often prescriptive and normative. They risk becoming ‘blueprint’ approaches for issues that are deeply political, not least because justice and security outcomes contribute to defining the distribution of power and resources in society. It is important, therefore, that programme design takes account of how justice and security institutions are embedded in and reflect a particular constellation of the power relations that underpin the wider socio-political order. Some of the recent literature on gender, justice and security highlights the importance of this, including Hendricks (2011), Jacob et al. (2009) and Ní Aoláin et al. (2011). In particular, it highlights the formidable barriers associated with social norms based on gendered understandings of how justice should be dispensed and that discriminate against women, and prevalent attitudes that consider forms of VAW as acceptable or that disregard principles of gender equality in the resolution of disputes on, for example, property rights.

Overall, there remains much to be learned about how SSR actually works on the ground, to say nothing of how it is integrated (or not) in peacebuilding and statebuilding projects. The evidence base also remains very weak on the dynamics of post-conflict GBV/VAW, and the role of international interventions in supporting both relevant institutional reforms and wider structural processes of socio-cultural and political change.
4.1.4 Are there concrete examples of positive experiences, approaches, interventions and policies that provide lessons for peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and agendas in justice and security programmes?

Security sector reform
SSR has tended to focus on efforts in peacekeeping operations (to raise the awareness of peacekeeping bodies of the need for and merit of treating women’s security needs as a security matter); promoting gender awareness training for different security sector bodies and outside security sector providers; and participation of women, including through increasing their number in the security forces.

Peacekeeping experiences. Taking account of peacekeeping experiences is relevant, as peacekeeping missions have engaged with the protection and prevention aspects of security provision for women in immediate post-conflict settings. Drawing on research regarding lessons learnt, and engaging with the relevant peacekeeping, military and security sector providers, UNIFEM and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (2008) developed a toolkit for peacekeeping bodies on how to integrate gender-sensitive approaches to provide greater security for women in peacekeeping settings. Critically, a key message of this toolkit was that effective results are mostly likely if women are consulted or involved in outlining the context-specific risks and threats they face. For example, female UN police officers have hosted women’s forums in IDP camps, where women exchange views on how best to support their safety in the community. In cases where community elders are reluctant to allow officers to meet exclusively with women, there has been investment in sustained dialogue with them to obtain the necessary consent. These efforts are resource-intensive, but effective in ensuring more responsive approaches that are sensitive to women’s specific and immediate security needs. These peacekeeping experiences are relevant not least because ongoing situations include similar levels and types of threat in peacebuilding and statebuilding contexts, where conflict may be latent, or may still affect parts of the national territory and population, as noted in the case of Colombia (Meertens, 2012).

Promoting gender awareness in SSR provision. This includes approaches that aim to change norms and conduct within SSR organisations through gender awareness training; sexual harassment training; changes to the codes of conduct; appointment of gender advisors in security sectors; and investment in toolkits and manuals on how to integrate gender into policing. Related reforms about gender awareness that are external to SSR organisations include initiatives to prevent and respond to GBV; training in interviewing the survivors of rape and human trafficking; and training on gender for CSOs involved in the oversight of security institutions (Bastick and Valasek, 2008).

Gender awareness training is common in many police reform programmes. Some training is instituted by the police service itself, following the introduction of new legislation. This approach was used in South Africa, for example, following the introduction of the 1998 Domestic Violence Act (Bott et al., 2005). In other settings, training is undertaken by NGOs or by the UN on issues related to GBV and VAW, as seen in the Dominican Republic and in the Musasa Project in Zimbabwe (ibid.). Such training aims to make officers aware of the particular challenges faced by women and provide them with guidance on handling cases involving women in a manner that respects their rights. It remains difficult to measure the effectiveness of training, but it ‘appears to be most effective when all levels of personnel (especially high-level officials) participate, and when training is backed up with changes throughout the institution, such as policies, procedures, adequate resources, and continual monitoring and evaluation’ (ibid.).

In addition, reorganising policing to address the particular security needs of women in relation to VAW is a recurrent theme in gender-responsive police sector reform. This includes, as in South Africa, developing special operating procedures to address GBV, with a greater focus on the survivor (not just the defendant). In a number of cases, this has included the creation of women’s police stations that are tailored to the target population and the type of crimes they face. The use of specialised approaches to VAW in policing and justice programming was recognised as valuable in UN General Assembly Resolution 52/56 on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Measures to Eliminate Violence against Women. The Resolution aims to build an environment in which female victims of violence feel safer in registering their complaints and taking steps to seek prosecution (UNIFEM, 2007).
The evidence on what works is, however, mixed. For example, assessment of family units in Sierra Leone points to the context-specific constraints that limit their effectiveness in protecting women from violence, including the difficulties of access to any formal justice mechanisms that can deal with reporting, and the resistance of customary norms. Therefore, the weakness of other parts of the justice chain severely undermines the effectiveness of such family support units in this case (Barnes, 2007; Denney, 2011).

In contrast, engaging in more holistic SSR, as in Liberia, results in a more integrated approach to gender-sensitive reform by working with a number of stakeholders and at multiple levels. Here, the Liberian National Police established the Women and Child Protection Unit with support from the UN Mission in Liberia and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). The unit works in collaboration with a number of governmental and non-governmental entities, supported by the Gender-based Violence Inter-agency Task Force, which coordinates the efforts of the UN and other donors (UNIFEM, 2007).

**Promotion of the participation of women in SSR.** Such promotion is based on the premise that women’s voice and representation in shaping justice and security provision makes a difference to women’s experience of justice and security. It includes measures to increase the number of women in security sector bodies through recruitment, retention and advancement. An especially popular strategy in security programming is to increase the number of women in the national police force, recruiting women either into dedicated gender units or to the service more broadly. This, in turn, is based on the premise that women will be more likely to report crimes to female police officers, and that the presence of more women within the police will lead to improved gender awareness and sensitivity within the service by countering male-dominated police cultures (Chandler, 2010; Salahub, 2011). This premise seems to be confirmed by the evidence, for example, from DRC and India, and, more broadly, from studies on US policing (Bastick, 2008).

There is, however, variation depending on how women are integrated into the police force, and what additional measures are undertaken to counter a masculine culture in the security sector (Ní Aoláin et al., 2011). In Sierra Leone, for example, the career possibilities for women in the police are so limited that they are relegated to the tasks of cooking and cleaning rather than actual policing (Bastick, 2008). In Liberia, on the other hand, career incentives have been built into the system to attract skilled women, which might lead to more gender-friendly attitudes (UNIFEM, 2007).

Participation is a question not only of recruitment but also of the enhanced voice of women in policy design or the oversight of security and justice provision. Examples include appointing more women to leadership positions in policymaking. Overall, women have tended to be marginalised from high-level positions in security and defence bodies – which remains a worldwide trend (Bastick, 2008). But there are women politicians who are taking a lead on gender-sensitive security sector policy. In South Africa, for example, and at the insistence of women parliamentarians, a national review of defence was conducted in 1996-1998 that involved a consultation with a wide range of government and social organisations. This included, but was not limited to, women’s CSOs, and resulted in improved security policy based on non-discrimination. In Rwanda, women parliamentarians established a caucus that works across party and ethnic lines to address women’s rights and security (ibid.).

Participation also involves efforts to engage women’s CSOs at national and community level in contributing to the shaping of policy and practice. In Liberia, women activists have worked with government officials in what has come to constitute a shared platform for vertical cooperation between government, political parties and local levels. Here, women’s networks help to operationalise the linkages between local concerns about security, justice and SSR. This includes facilitating dialogue between local communities and SSR policymakers and practitioners. The participation of women is intended to give SSR real legitimacy (Salahub, 2011).

**Justice sector reform**

There are three key aspects of justice sector reform: legal reform that seeks to eliminate gender-based discrimination; justice sector reform that focuses on judicial and dispute resolution mechanisms; and improving access to justice measures for women.

**Legal reform.** Legal reform is an important part of how the formal rules of the game are redefined. As noted, the rules are already in flux in some FCAS, and there are opportunities to rewrite legal codes, including the
codes on what constitutes a criminal offence. New criminal and legal codes that criminalise rape or female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C), for example, are important to alter the formal rules of the game. In Sierra Leone, according to Saferworld (2010), DFID support for the International Rescue Committee contributed to the development of new legislation on GBV and the provision of medical and psychosocial services for survivors. Key achievements include the establishment of 40 family support units (ibid.). According to UNIFEM (2007), legal change in Liberia and Sierra Leone led to new and stronger laws to criminalise rape and are seen as an important effort to alter police conduct and responsiveness to such abuses.

However, legislation in many FCAS is not in line with international norms on VAW, and there is, in some cases, a consolidation of patriarchal norms. For example, Sudan’s criminal justice law is based on Shari’a, and has a strong focus on ‘honour’, which can deny women protection from abuse. Specifically, according to Halim (2011), rape features as an ‘honour, reputation and public morality offence, rather than as an offence affecting persons’. In other cases, the recognition of customary law creates ambivalence in formal law as to which system prevails at the community level when addressing VAW. The literature stresses the distinction between de jure advances through codification and de facto realities on the ground (Manjoo et al., 2011; Ñi Aoláin et al., 2011).

**Justice sector reform.** As with SSR, justice sector reform includes an emphasis on the capacity development of women and their recruitment to judicial positions. This includes direct support to training and capacity development in the justice sector (Quast, 2008), or support to national and international organisations that contribute to this training. UN Women (2011) notes the examples of the International Association of Women Judges and Sakshi, an Indian NGO, which has provided male and female judges with specialised training and space to discuss the challenges they face. As with the security sector, there are also efforts to create specialised judicial units to deal with, for example, crimes related to VAW. One such unit has been established to provide judicial assistance to women in Eastern Congo, and mobile courts in DRC have taken the justice system to rural areas, in some areas for the first time (Saferworld, 2010). There are also efforts to increase female representation in judicial posts. In Afghanistan, the Afghan Women Judges Association is working with the International Association of Women Judges to promote the access of Afghan women to justice and the appointment of female judges. Women constitute only 62 of Afghanistan’s 1,547 sitting judges, and no women sit on the Supreme Court (Quast, 2008).

**Access to justice mechanisms.** These are measures that aim to make the law and judicial system more accessible to ordinary citizens (women in this case), but do, to some extent, assume that accessing formal justice is the best option for women. Efforts in this area include programmes to increase awareness on the law and women’s rights. In Pakistan, for example, DFID has provided £2 million to support a Gender Justice and Protection Fund that has helped an estimated 23,000 women – and a similar number of men – take part in training, awareness raising and capacity building on such issues as honour killings, legislation on VAW, women’s rights in marriage and under-age marriage (Saferworld, 2010). Other efforts include improving women’s access to redress and legal aid, not only through the courts but also through the use of paralegals and support to legal advocacy centres. Examples cited in Quast (2008) include support in Tajikistan to a local NGO that runs women’s legal advocacy centres, as well as providing consultations to women through a network of existing crisis centres, shelters, health care facilities and community and women’s centres; and a women’s rights advocacy centre in Georgia that provides legal counselling and court representation to women on labour law, family law, domestic violence and bride kidnapping, as well as anonymous counselling.

There is, however, very limited robust evidence on how improving access to formal justice mechanisms has contributed to better outcomes for women or to statebuilding in FCAS.

**Informal justice**

Noting the relevance of institutional hybridity in FCAS, there is now clear recognition of the need to take this into account in justice and security sector programmes. This is critical since, in reality, protection or redress for women in these settings will have to be negotiated with alternative security provision or dispute resolution mechanisms, precisely because of the difficulties of access to state-provided or formal justice and security bodies, or the prevalence of other norm systems and dispute resolution mechanisms. This means developing an understanding of how women navigate and make decisions about the different mechanisms that are (or are not) available to them. The evidence is especially sparse about what works here.
Measures that have been documented include attempts to work with the fact that customary justice can be reformed to become gender-sensitive where it is not. Other measures seek to provide citizens with more information and options, including through paralegal groups. Examples that have had some success are found in Burundi, Sierra Leone and Sudan, where paralegals are trained in navigating customary and formal legal codes and can help advise women on their options for redress. Given the prevalence of VAW in these contexts, crimes of this nature are often dealt with by such paralegal programmes. In Sudan in 2007, an additional 550 cases were taken on by paralegals and legal aid workers. A third of these cases related to GBV (UNDP, 2010). In Sierra Leone, for instance, Timap for Justice has over 70 paralegals working in 19 locations across the country to help citizens achieve justice through either customary or formal legal systems. Similar groups work to raise awareness in communities – and with women – about the legal avenues open to them and the legislative changes that affect them. This includes, for example, awareness-raising campaigns carried out with section and village chiefs to promote knowledge and discussion of three Gender Acts passed in 2007, dealing with (respectively) domestic violence, marriage and inheritance laws (ibid.). In Burundi, UN Women has supported an initiative to integrate women into the bashingantaha (a system of traditional elders who are responsible for conflict resolution at the community level), which has been a strictly male domain. Through sensitisation of leaders on women’s rights and amendment of the bashingantaha charter, women now take part in decision making and account for 40% of bashingantaha committee members. This has improved awareness of SBV and other violations of women’s rights (UN Women, 2011).

One particularly interesting approach is using political economy analysis methods to identify relevant and context-specific entry points where change is both relevant and viable. Looking at Ecuador and Guatemala, Sieder and Sierra (2010) examine innovative ways to transform gendered power relations in dispute resolution mechanisms. These include strategic support to women’s leadership roles at the community level, and working with community authorities to change community norms on VAW. Their study examines the merits of supporting women at the community level to work with, but contest, patriarchal power structures, including by invoking national and international norms whenever these are helpful. In addition, Denney and Domingo (2013) develop a political economy problem-focused framework (laying emphasis primarily on VAW) to track how women perceive and use different norm systems in these institutional ‘layered’ contexts.

4.1.5 Key analytical points
Gender-responsive approaches to justice and SSR are now norms with an international mandate, signed and sealed by the international community. Recent years, particularly since the adoption of UNSCR 1325, have seen a noticeable change in the international discourse on the need to address women’s security and justice needs in FCAS. This has translated, to some degree, into programmes backed by international funding in both sectors, and funding that targets both the demand and the supply side – interventions that focus not only on the relevant bodies but also on improving voice and access for women to justice and security mechanisms.

However, mainstream programmes in the justice and security sectors have, for the most part, remained overly technical and legalistic, and gender has been absent (Nyambu-Musembi, 2007). And the communities of practice within these sectors seem particularly masculine (most notably in relation to SSR). Within this context, gender-focused interventions have increased in scope and ambition, but remain at the periphery of mainstream justice and security programmes, although this may be changing with greater resources and international commitment.

Peacebuilding and statebuilding moments and processes appear to present opportunities to change the formal norms (through legal change) of how security and justice functions are positioned within the state–society compact. Security and justice sectors are deeply political, in that they enforce the rules of the underlying political settlement (or protect the interests of powerful groups) and adjudicate in the resolution of disputes on how resources and power are allocated, or conflicts resolved. This is certainly the case in relation to gender-responsive approaches in these sectors. However, the political nature of justice and security provision is often underplayed, even though this is where the toughest barriers and resistance to change are found. This is especially relevant to peacebuilding and statebuilding processes, where what is at stake is the renegotiation of power relations that are relevant to conflict and fragility issues.

The best examples of change are found when interventions work to alter incentive structures and social norms within the organisations and institutions that are charged with justice and service delivery – whether provided by state or non-state actors. Holistic approaches that consider the complete chain of delivery of justice and security

Assessment of the evidence of links between gender equality, peacebuilding and statebuilding 39
(as seen in Liberia), and that engage multiple relevant actors – including at the community level – to ensure their engagement seem to be the most effective. In addition, working with existing institutions – including informal justice and security actors and mechanisms wherever necessary – is important, as these institutions shape the ways women can seek protection or redress. It seems also that increasing women’s participation – in policing or judicial positions, or by having voice on justice and security reform policy – appears to make a difference. It appears to increase their levels of trust in how they view or experience these processes and mechanisms; and the effectiveness of such institutions in ensuring women’s perspectives are taken into account in the provision of justice and security.

Finally, legal change is hugely important as a means to eliminate the formal barriers of gender-based discrimination, but implementation remains the key challenge. In settings of institutional hybridity, this means findings ways to reconcile multiple norm systems on justice and security in ways that contribute to changing such norms in favour of improved women’s rights and gender equality.

From the perspective of peacebuilding and statebuilding, a gender-sensitive approach to justice and security reform has intrinsic value in terms of addressing legacies of gender-based exclusion and discrimination. From an instrumental perspective, however, addressing women’s needs – both to take account of their experience of conflict and to enable their participation in shaping justice and security outcomes – contributes to peacebuilding and statebuilding projects that are inclusive from the start.

4.1.6 Key gaps in the literature

Overall, this is an area that remains either theoretically rich or normative and prescriptive, but where robust evidence on what actually works is fragmented and underdeveloped, despite some emerging ‘stories of change’ that are beginning to build a body of knowledge that is useful for policy and programming.

In addition to the relative youth of this thematic area, the evidence is limited by its sheer breadth, as well as a wider history of justice and security reform sectors that has tended to be top-down and technical, rather than embedded in more socio-political analysis of how security, law and justice provision are enmeshed in the histories of state and political development (including in relation to whose interests are best served by these sectors).

Mostly, it is fair to say that the evidence on the inter-linkages between justice and security provision from a statebuilding and gender perspective is almost non-existent. Finally, as with other sectors, justice and security sectors tend to be studied in isolation from the wider political economy of peacebuilding and statebuilding, and from other sectors. Very little is known about how developments in the provision of justice and security affect developments in basic services or economic empowerment.

4.2 Service delivery

4.2.1 What is the evidence, knowledge and analytical base on approaches to peacebuilding and statebuilding that integrate a gender perspective, and/or address gender-equality goals, in FCAS in relation to gender-sensitive service delivery?

Service delivery can be an important mechanism for restoring or strengthening both state legitimacy (DFID 2010; OECD-DAC, 2011) and social cohesion, both of which are weakened during times of violence and conflict. However, two key challenges relating to the effectiveness of service delivery in FCAS are: achieving effective local service delivery, e.g. prioritising interventions and making sure they are well aligned with and build on existing institutional capacity; and ensuring equitable distribution between different regions and groups to reduce sources of conflict.

Gender issues cut across these issues in service delivery in three main ways. First, women and men have different needs in relation to service delivery. Second, non-state actors play important roles in service delivery, with women’s organisations often the key providers of frontline social services. Third, there are specific challenges that create barriers to access by women and girls to services and to the provision of services that address their needs in FCAS. This is particularly important, given that women are often the main users of public services as a result of their domestic and care responsibilities.
The international community has given relatively high priority to the delivery of gender-responsive basic services in terms of aid disbursements by OECD-DAC donors. Over half of donor-funded interventions in the education and health sectors in FCAS, and one-third in the water sector, target gender equality, and more than 80% in areas of population policy and reproductive health (OECD, 2010c, cited in Carpenter et al., 2012). However, one serious concern is that, despite this renewed effort, data on health and education in FCAS consistently demonstrate that women’s health needs are poorly covered, and that female enrolment ratios in both primary and secondary education lag behind those of their male counterparts (Carpenter et al., 2012).

A more detailed review of the specific literature on gender and service delivery in FCAS reveals some of the challenges that contribute to persistent problems in realising gender-responsive service delivery. It is also important to note that, while there is a relatively significant body of literature on gender and reproductive health services in FCAS, far less attention is given to the sectors of health, education, water and sanitation and social protection (Carpenter et al., 2012; Mason, 2012; Pavanello and Darcy, 2008; Ranson et al., 2007). In addition, while the general body of literature looks at the gender dimensions of issues related to service delivery, it does not link this back to roles in statebuilding, such as restoring state legitimacy and strengthening social cohesion.

4.2.2 Quality of the evidence
The literature on the linkages between gender-responsive service delivery and contributions to peacebuilding and statebuilding is very limited. In the general body of literature on service delivery and statebuilding, gender is often discussed in passing, with relatively few examples of good practice relating to the collection and analysis of high-quality data on gender, or how services have been designed and implemented from a gender perspective. As Carpenter et al. (2012) state, ‘the paucity of evidence available in relation to the complexities of this issue [gender relations] is a concern. This may be particularly so in fragile and conflict-affected situations, where short field visits to insecure locations may prevent taking the significant time necessary to ensure truly gender-sensitive research, for example using methodological techniques such as life histories to uncover hidden intra-household power relations and gender-based violence’ and ‘on the whole, the gendered impacts of social funds and CDD [community-driven development] have not been evaluated sufficiently to date, with the vast majority of studies deeming it sufficient merely to disaggregate survey, interview and focus group data by gender, or looking at practical gender needs (e.g. shorter distances to fetch water) rather than at gendered power relations and strategic gender needs’. Few programmes build gender analysis and gender-sensitive monitoring and evaluation (M&E) into programme design, but a number of the academic journal articles, particularly on health and education, which form the greater part of this review, have taken a more rigorous approach to data collection and analysis using a gender lens, applying quantitative or qualitative research methods, or a mixture of both.

What, according to the literature, are the challenges and barriers to and opportunities for the integration and consideration of gender perspectives in FCAS?
There are three main thematic areas of discussion in relation to gender and service delivery in FCAS in the literature: the different needs of men and women, boys and girls, in relation to basic services; the difference in access to services; and the differential outcomes between men and women and (to a lesser extent) gender equality.

Different needs in relation to service delivery
The literature has a predominant focus on how women’s health is affected in FCAS. Ranson et al. (2007) state that there are three main underlying causes of gender-related health inequity in FCAS: differential exposure, differential vulnerability and differential consequences of disease. These broader issues are reflected in a number of specific studies relating to health across the literature (e.g. Maclean, 2004), which demonstrate that specific aspects of challenges to women’s (and children’s) health are exacerbated in the context of conflict. For example, Bell et al. (2012) find that exposure to the recent Kenyan crisis was associated with lower birthweight among the Kikuyu population; a number of studies highlight the increased vulnerability to poor health in refugee camps in relation to maternal mortality rates (Howard et al., 2011; Hynes et al., 2012; Jambai and MacCormack, 1996); higher prevalence of HIV in DRC refugee camps and host communities is discussed by Kim et al. (2009), and a number of studies from DRC also demonstrate high rates of violence against women as a result of conflict (e.g. d’Odorico and Holvoet, 2009; Errico et al., 2013; Hanlon, 2008). Ranson et al. (2007) also argue that differential exposure to sexual violence can lead to higher rates of sexually transmitted infections including HIV and AIDS, with the post-conflict HIV infection rate for adolescent girls reported to be up to four times that for adolescent girls.
boys. On the other hand, it is also important to consider gender disparities from the male perspective: men are more likely to suffer and die as a result of the violence linked to conflict (ibid.).

The literature on education in FCAS also discusses key gender inequalities. Koch (2008, cited in Carpenter et al., 2012) suggests that the discrepancy in educational enrolment is a result of girls being kept at home to help their mothers, and Bouta et al. (2005, cited in Carpenter et al., 2012) suggest that girls are kept at home to protect them from sexual abuse and early pregnancy. There is also evidence, however, to suggest that boys are negatively affected. In Colombia, for example, boys have worse dropout, repetition and completion rates than girls, and in Burundi the gender gap has narrowed as a result of a drop in the enrolment rate for boys (Koch, 2008, cited in Carpenter et al., 2012).

In the water and sanitation literature, disruptions to water supplies and inadequate water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services in FCAS can increase the vulnerability of women and girls to violence and insecurity, increase the burdens on their time and disrupt schooling (Mason, 2012; Welle, 2008).

Women and men’s different access to services
A large part of the literature discusses differential access to services, with two main and often overlapping barriers identified. The first are socio-cultural norms that restrict women’s access to services (often crosscutting with other dimensions such as ethnicity and age) (Cueva-Beteta et al., 2012; Sørensen, 1998); the second is actual provision of services (and institutional issues), which creates barriers to women’s use of services.

With regard to socio-cultural norms, much of the literature focuses on the barriers facing women in obtaining access to a range of sexual and reproductive health (SRH) services. Evidence from urban and peri-urban Mozambique shows that women delay seeking antenatal care because of perceptions that they and their unborn infants will be the targets of witchcraft or sorcery by jealous neighbours and relatives – perceptions that are exacerbated by poverty and increasing social conflict and inequality (Chapman, 2003). Issues that highlight the importance of social relationships and empowerment are discussed in relation to Papua New Guinea (although not specific to SRH) in a study that reveals perceptions among adult and older women that health is strongly connected to the social, cultural and spiritual dimensions of their daily existence (Hinton and Earnest, 2011). In Northern Uganda, socio-cultural factors are identified as a barrier for youth, which affects access to SRH services – and socioeconomic, religious and cultural factors contribute to a failure to deal with SRH problems among young people or the specific vulnerability of young women (Kiapi-Iwa and Hart, 2004).

In a study on schooling in Afghanistan, Changezi and Biseth (2011) note that the marginalisation of people of Hazara ethnicity and of girls restricts access to education.

In relation to the provision of services, a recurring theme relating to unequal access is the institutional failure to deliver appropriate basic services in FCAS, particularly to women. This stems from such factors as the attitudes of staff and the lack of capacity and resources. Abou-Habib (2011) identifies the failure of institutions in the Middle East and North Africa to deliver services to which women are entitled. The attitudes and lack of capacity of health workers influence the delivery of appropriate services (particularly in relation to SRH), as demonstrated by a study in Northern Uganda that found that many SRH workers held conservative attitudes towards adolescent sexuality and revealed a lack of training in, and guidelines for, working with adolescents (Kiapi-Iwa and Hart, 2004). Similar results were found in a study in Kenya, where family planning services failed to enable women to make an informed choice (Kim, 1998). The literature also discusses the failure of institutions to respond adequately to cultural or ethnic discrimination. One study in Lebanon found that Bedouin women’s perceptions of, and engagement with, the health system were hindered by the inconsistencies and shortcomings of the health system, while their access to and use of health services were undermined by institutional discrimination against ethnic groups of women at various levels of health provision (Mansour, 2011).

Some of the literature reviewed examines the effect of conflict on delivering services to women. McGinn (2011) finds that populations affected by conflict and its aftermath face major barriers to obtaining access to reproductive health services as a result of insecurity, inadequate numbers of trained personnel and lack of supplies. Family planning, in particular, is often neglected (ibid.). Chandrasekhar et al. (2010) find that maternal health worsened as a result of conflict in Rwanda, and there was no significant increase in the proportion of
women seeking antenatal care in the post-conflict period. In a study on the provision of obstetric services and patients’ access to these during Shia–Sunni hostilities in Gilgit Town (in 2005) in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, Varley (2010) finds that the lack of services resulted in ‘profoundly diminished clinic access, reduced physician coverage and a higher observed incidence of maternal morbidity and mortality’. Palmer et al. (1999) also note that a key challenge in conflict settings is the lack of priority given to SRH. Other barriers to the full and effective implementation of reproductive health services include the hesitation of some field workers to prioritise it and the number and diversity of the organisations involved in implementation. Similar challenges are identified in DRC in relation to services that respond to SBV. D’Odorico and Holvoet (2009), Errico et al. (2013) and Hanlon (2008) all identify limited institutional provision and response, and find that survivors of GBV face problems in gaining access to health services, including distance, cost, lack of trained health workers and fear of stigma (Kohli, 2012). While most of the literature focuses on health, Moyi (2012) states that, in Somalia, the civil war was the ‘final blow’ to an already collapsed education system and that children, especially girls, are very vulnerable during times of conflict.

The differential impact of service provision on men and women (and gender relations)
Few studies look at the outcomes and impacts of service delivery on women and men, and fewer still use indicators to measure outcomes in terms of gender equality, empowerment or statebuilding. Carpenter et al. (2012) note that many studies on social protection perform only a ‘surface-level analysis of gender, failing to get at gendered power relations, specifically intra-household dynamics’. Some evidence from the social protection literature, however, suggests that women tend to benefit very little from cash payments for the reinsertion of ex-combatants since, as in Angola, demobilised men do not necessarily feel obliged to use their pay in the best interests of their dependants (Ozerdem, 2008, cited in Carpenter et al., 2012). Conversely, in a World Food Programme (WFP) pilot project in Sri Lanka, it was found that, in households where women already had greater control over resources, assistance in the form of cash, as opposed to in-kind transfers, led to improved and diversified household diet and reduced expenditure on alcohol (Sharma, in Harvey, 2007, cited in Carpenter et al., 2012). A recent study on cash transfers in Somalia found women’s control over the household transfer resulted in increased spending on education, and some indication that the programme may result in changing gender relations (Wasilkowska, 2012).

Similarly, evidence is mixed in the education sector. While a UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) study states that education systems can be found to reinforce historical divisions of gender, reinforcing social inequalities, gender discrimination and unequal gender relations (IIIEP, 2011), the same study finds that, in Liberia, education aims to enhance national unity and civic awareness by emphasising the concept of ‘one Liberia’ through the curriculum, and that successful educational strategies against GBV seem to have had a direct impact on fragility by challenging and tackling widespread practices of gender discrimination and violence.

4.2.3 Are there concrete examples of positive experiences, approaches, interventions and policies that provide lessons for peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and agendas?

The literature identifies a number of mechanisms that can overcome some of the challenges identified above, to ensure service delivery responds to women’s needs (primarily in health and, to some extent, education; there is very little literature on WASH and social protection), and service delivery reaches (ensures equal access by) women as well as men. The literature includes some evaluations of programmes (mainly in ‘fragile contexts’ rather than conflict) as well as recommendations (e.g. policy implications from programme evaluations). However, there is limited attribution in relation to what has worked and, therefore, to possible best practices.

The main recommendations from the literature can be grouped under the following thematic headings, ranging from the macro to the micro, acknowledging that most of the literature focuses on micro-level interventions.

A supportive (and coordinated) policy environment (which allows a transition to national processes)

At the national (and international) level, many authors argue for the need for a supportive macro policy environment that promotes gender equality and women’s empowerment (e.g. Cueva-Beteta et al., 2012). This includes the potential use of gender-sensitive budgeting to support and monitor gender-sensitive service delivery (Budlender, 2008; El-Bushra, 2012), involving women in the planning and delivery of services (Castillejo, 2011;
Palmer and Zwi, 1998) and, in some cases, creating strong public–private partnerships (Jacobstein, 2013). Indeed, leadership and coordination of actors in planning and delivering services are also seen as essential (Landegger et al., 2011), as is a multifaceted approach to providing quality services (Landegger et al., 2011; Mohammad-Alizadeh et al., 2009) to reduce the gap between women's needs and rights and the quality of services. In addition, non-governmental service provision needs to be forward-looking to allow for transition to national processes during the recovery stages (Landegger et al., 2011). The need to prioritise specific services is also highlighted in the case of the response to SBV and GBV in DRC, where Hanlon (2008) argues for better policies in relation to greater humanitarian aid, medical assistance and social support.

**Tailored, gender-sensitive (and culturally sensitive) service delivery that promotes women’s empowerment**

The literature emphasises the need to respond appropriately with programme design that is gender- and culture-sensitive, mostly in relation to the delivery of SRH services. This is of particular importance in view of the socio-cultural obstacles – in addition to the income barriers – that prevent women from seeking access to services (e.g. Chapman, 2003). Studies argue that a more nuanced understanding of what women most value can yield service delivery models that are responsive and effective in reducing maternal deaths and disabilities as a result of unsafe abortion (Mitchell et al., 2010) and that health and development practitioners must ensure their programmes respond to the complexity of women's social relationships and to the context of women's empowerment (Hinton and Earnest, 2011). Similarly, the shortcomings identified in the delivery of specific SRH programmes include the need for more privacy, a wider choice of contraceptive methods, accurate and more comprehensive information and marital counselling (Mohammad-Alizadeh et al., 2009, in relation to family planning in Iran, and similarly in Kim, 1998, in Kenya).

**Attention to specific vulnerabilities (or opportunities) created in conflict and post-conflict contexts**

UNIFEM emphasises the need to consider social relations and gender issues in post-conflict planning (Cueva-Beteta et al., 2012). More specific examples include the need to pay particular attention to pregnant women and vulnerable ethnic groups following conflict in the case of Kenya, noting the impact on birthweight (Bell et al., 2012). Others highlight the need for focused prevention, care and treatment services for IDP populations and their host communities during displacement and resettlement (e.g. the high prevalence of HIV in DRC cited in Kim et al., 2009) and the need to take advantage of the potential opportunities that might arise in the diaspora community. Changezi and Biseth (2011), for example, find that, as a result of conflict and war in Afghanistan, the move to Pakistan offers opportunities for marginalised Hazara girls, with the change of locality altering the kind of marginalisation they experience (in this case making their education more accessible). Conversely, failing to consider specific vulnerabilities in relation to, for example, SBV can explain inadequacies in the response (d'Odorico and Holvoet, 2009, in relation to DRC).

**The role of non-governmental actors in delivering services (but the need for transparency, accountability and participation)**

The literature discusses, for the most part, the positive role of NGOs in delivering health services in FCAS. For example, one programme evaluation found that the Basic Package of Health Services in Afghanistan increased the access of vulnerable groups to health care, including female-headed households (who visited health centres more often during the year preceding the survey interview). However, it also found that these groups faced more difficulties when using health care centres, hospitals and private providers and their out-of-pocket expenditure was higher than among other groups (Trani et al., 2010). The study suggests the need to reinforce processes of transparency, accountability and participation in service delivery. A study by Kohli et al. (2012) also reveals the positive effects of a Congolese health and social NGO – the Foundation RamaLevina – in delivering services to survivors of GBV. The NGO’s mobile health programme for vulnerable women and men aims to address the barriers to access identified by GBV survivors and their families in rural South Kivu province in Eastern DRC. The Kohli et al. study found that the programme improved access to health care by survivors and their male partners, enhanced the quality of health education and facilitated regular monitoring, follow-up care and referrals. However, it also identified the need to provide health services to young, unmarried women in a way that reduces the possibility of future stigma, to engage male partners in health education and clinical care and to strengthen linkages for the referral of survivors and their partners to psychosocial support and mental health services.
Provision of local female service providers (in relation to the health sector, the need for sufficient training and remuneration and employment in a ‘gender-equitable’ institutional environment) and the opportunities for change education

A study in Pakistan found evidence that employing female workers in local health care delivery improved both delivery and health outcomes, particularly in relation to maternal mortality, and resulted in positive perceptions of family planning (Barzgar et al., 1997). This local, community-based approach was identified as an appropriate model to deliver health care services (ibid.). However, shortcomings in relation to female health service providers were also identified, and it is suggested that government intervention is needed (Khan, 2011) and that the institutional inequalities and constraints faced by workers need to be overcome (such as abusive hierarchical management structures; lack of respect shown by male colleagues; lack of sensitivity to women’s gender-based cultural constraints; conflicts between domestic and work responsibilities; and poor infrastructural support) (Mumtaz, 2003). Importantly, the literature also finds that women’s role in delivering services is often seen as an extension of their domestic role, and that they receive no remuneration or training (Sørensen, 1998).

In contrast with the focus on women’s delivery of health services, female teachers or women’s organisations that deliver education services are explicitly seen as potential agents of change for gender equality. A study by Kirk (2004; see also Kirk and Winthrop, 2008) draws on examples from different contexts, particularly Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Southern Sudan, and discusses the personal and professional development of women teachers, including strategies to support them as agents of change in their societies. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, Maclure and Denov (2009) argue that, while much of the emphasis on post-war educational reconstruction is unlikely to rectify gender inequalities that remain entrenched within mainstream schooling and in the broader social context, there is the potential to challenge the hegemony of patriarchy and gendered violence through women’s associations that support girls’ education as integral to economic and political actions. Burt and Keiru (2011) also make an important contribution, with case studies from Afghanistan, DRC and Liberia showing the role women have played in establishing security for themselves and their communities by taking a lead role in water management structures (cited in Mason, 2012).

‘Traditional’ service providers (integrated or complementary to formal health care provision)

Three studies refer to the use of, or combination of, traditional service providers to provide local/contextual responses. In Sierra Leone, a study by Jambai and MacCormack (1996) suggests that overcoming challenges to ensuring maternal health requires a primary health care approach that includes collaboration with traditional midwives. The authors argue that midwives are ‘authoritative figures embedded within local political structures and a powerful women's religion. Traditional midwives provide vital services in the [refugee] camp, are respected for their social status, and learn additional skills’. In Northern Uganda, the need for informal and traditional health care providers is also identified. A study by Kiapi-Iwa and Hart (2004) argues that young people visit informal and traditional health care providers, even though they have to pay them, as a result of institutional and other failures to meet their SRH needs. The authors recommend that the confidentiality and privacy these providers offer could be a lesson for formal health care providers. Further training and integration of traditional health care providers is essential, as they already play a major part in SRH service delivery to young people; in DRC, Errico et al. (2013) argue that women’s informal organisations, using culturally rooted and indigenous solutions to address their own vulnerabilities (going beyond exposure to SBV), should be evaluated as ‘worthy recipients of development funding, which is often exclusively offered to international organisations’.

Community-based services (which are participatory, support community ownership and include training for providers)

Community-based services, particularly in relation to the provision of SRH services, are seen to have positive effects on both access and outcomes. In the context of urban Nepal, Bolam et al. (1998), for example, argue that community-based midwife-run delivery units could reduce the incidence of unplanned home deliveries. In Uganda, a study by Krueger et al. (2011) found that provision by community health workers (CHWs) appeared to be the preferred method of delivery for new contraceptive users, and suggests that lessons from scaling-up in Uganda's public sector include the need to recognise the importance of ongoing assessment of support, processes to gain community ‘ownership’ and spontaneous innovations to supplement CHW supervision. In relation to water supply, Welle (2008) states that there is ample evidence that including both women and men in the planning and management of water schemes increases their sustainability: a study from 88 community-managed
schemes in 15 countries showed that gender-sensitive and demand-responsive approaches resulted in more reliable water supply, better resource protection, higher coverage of recurrent costs and higher levels of access for the poor (Gross et al., 2001, in Krueger et al., 2011). In situations of armed conflict, female involvement in scheme planning and management is particularly important, as men may be absent from their communities for extended periods of time (as seen in Southern Sudan) (Welle, 2008). However, there are also challenges to ensuring women’s quality participation. In a study on community development councils in Timor-Leste, which require 50/50 gender representation, gender inequalities have arisen because women council members are often represented, and therefore effectively replaced, by their husbands (Bouta et al., 2005, cited in Carpenter et al., 2012).

**Involvement of men in SRH services**

A study on SRH services in urban Iran showed that one important crosscutting theme identified by women was their wish for their husbands to be more strongly involved in family planning and marital counselling and education (Mohammad-Alizadeh et al., 2009). In Nigeria, fertility and family planning research and programmes have largely ignored men’s roles in the past, focusing only on the behaviour of women (Oyediran et al., 2002). The 2002 study by Oyediran et al. showed that the level of contraceptive use among married men was such that men could participate in family planning activities if there were adequate programmes to involve them, and recommended that, to increase participation of men, programmes must be designed to educate men on the need to limit the size of their family and involve them in service delivery.

**4.2.4 Key analytical points**

Despite the numerous mechanisms whereby gender-responsive service delivery can contribute to peacebuilding and statebuilding foundations and processes, these links are rarely made explicit in the wider literature. A predominant focus at the micro level of service delivery shows that both gender-responsive service delivery and the role women play in delivering services have the potential to contribute to restoring state legitimacy and strengthening social cohesion. Positive examples from the literature discuss approaches such as the role of education in addressing gender inequalities and reducing GBV; addressing specific gendered vulnerabilities as a result of conflict, such as GBV; strengthening and supporting women’s roles in delivering services through training and remuneration; sensitising service providers to deliver gender-sensitive SRH programmes; flexible service delivery (e.g. mobile services) to address women’s needs; and involving both women and men in the planning and delivery of services. The literature also demonstrates, however, that gender inequalities can be exacerbated as a result of failing to take a gender-responsive approach, reinforcing inequalities in access to services through institutional failures, such as a lack of capacity and resources and uncoordinated and unplanned delivery of services, and reinforcing barriers as a result of discrimination and socio-cultural norms.

**4.2.5 Key gaps in the literature**

It is well established in the literature on FCAS that non-state, civil society structures in post-conflict reconstruction and fragile states can provide an entry point for mobilisation and involvement in statebuilding (Castillejo, 2011). However, while there is evidence at the micro level that women play an important role (both informally and formally) in the planning and delivery of basic services, especially in health and education, the link to gender-responsive service delivery is rarely made in relation to broader peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives or discussions (Carpenter, 2012; Scott, 2007, cited in Mason, 2012).

Not only does the literature largely ignore the wider implications of gender-responsive service delivery for progress towards social integration and social cohesion in FCAS, but also there is little literature that draws out, explicitly and comprehensively, how services can be delivered in a way that contributes to gender equality and women’s empowerment in FCAS. Failure to recognise the wider implications can lead to missed opportunities to use service delivery as a mechanism to address social exclusion and inequality. There is, therefore, an urgent need to research in more detail the complexity of community-level gender relations in FCAS and assess the extent to which they differ from those in developing countries more broadly (Carpenter et al., 2012).
4.3 Women’s economic empowerment: economic recovery, livelihoods and job creation in FCAS

4.3.1 What is the evidence, knowledge and analytical base on approaches to peacebuilding and statebuilding that integrate a gender perspective, and/or address gender equality goals in FCAS in relation to women’s economic empowerment through economic recovery, livelihood support and job creation?

Economic empowerment through economic recovery, livelihood support and job creation can be a critical pillar in buttressing peacebuilding and statebuilding in FCAS. Buvinic et al. (2012) argue that conflict is, essentially, development in reverse, with major losses to infrastructure and transport, services, trade, agricultural and pastoral production systems, private assets and more. These losses can impoverish societies and create or entrench household poverty, leading to persistent cycles of war and poverty (Justino, 2006). Economic recovery is time-consuming and requires massive investments, including material resources, skilled labour and social and economic organisation (Justino, 2006), but is critical in order to break the interlinked cycles of war or state fragility and poverty.

Gender dynamics play a key role in the economic recovery process because men and women have different types and patterns of economic participation in FCAS; have different access to assets and endowments on which to build their economic coping strategies; and are also targeted or integrated differently into programme and policy responses, both during and after conflict.

Gendered types and patterns of economic participation

Generally speaking, women are more likely to experience greater economic participation during times of conflict and in the immediate post-conflict period, albeit in poorly paid, insecure, informal economy occupations (Justino, 2006), while men are more likely to face unemployment and the loss of their role in being the sole or main provider for their family (Petesch, 2011). The evidence on what happens as the end of the conflict recedes into the past is more mixed – some analysts argue that women are expected to (and do, to varying degrees) revert to more traditional gender roles (El-Bushra and Sahl, 2005; Justino, 2006; Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2004); others argue that, as women become more empowered economically, their bargaining power within the household and community shifts, opening up an important opportunity to renegotiate gender roles in a more progressive direction (Justino, 2006; Petesch, 2011).

Differential access to assets and endowments on which to build coping strategies

The literature highlights that women are, overall, disadvantaged in relation to men in terms of access to productive assets and skills, and that this renders them highly vulnerable, especially female-headed households and widows in FCAS (Buvinic et al., 2012; Justino, 2006). A considerable part of the literature focuses on gaps between formal land law reforms and discriminatory practice in terms of land inheritance patterns in FCAS (Crook, 2013; Daley et al., 2010; Doss et al., 2012; Kunreuther, 2009; Richards, 2006). There is also a considerable literature on the challenges women face in obtaining microcredit in FCAS (Abdullah et al., 2010; Friedemann-Sánchez, 2006), compounded by a lack of land for collateral. Furthermore, as is discussed below in more detail, there is an important strand in the literature on the limitations in access to and the quality of vocational training for women (Abdo and Kerbage, 2012; Knudsen and Harvorsen, 1997), which hinder their opportunities for economic empowerment. Finally, literature from Bangladesh and Colombia highlights that, even when women are able to secure higher-paying jobs, their families often make heavy claims on that income, and they are, therefore, constrained in their ability to save for the future (Friedemann-Sánchez, 2006; Khosla, 2009).

Gender-specific and gender-blind policy and programme approaches to conflict mitigation and post-conflict recovery

The literature highlights that, with few exceptions (see discussion below), current policy and programming approaches tend to either reinforce traditional gender relations through inadequate attention to the differences between the economic participation and coping repertoires of men and women, or simply ignore gender dynamics altogether. Vocational training and entrepreneurship development programmes often reinforce stereotypical labour market gender segmentation (Abdo and Kerbage, 2012; Abdullah et al., 2010); DDR programmes that include economic recovery and livelihood support components sometimes completely ignore...
women (Bannon and Correia, 2006). There also seems to be a particular dearth of policy and programme approaches in such contexts to support women who may be stigmatised as a result of sexual abuse, engagement in sex work or participation as combatants, which is often seen to contravene traditional gender norms (Abdullah et al., 2010; Richards, 2006; Richardson et al., 2009). Finally, analysis of refugee populations also comprises a somewhat separate strand of the literature that highlights the particular vulnerability of women in the context of displacement (e.g. vulnerability to transactional sex) including heightened male surveillance and the reinforcement of traditional gender norms (Ager et al., 1995; Buvinic et al., 2012; Petesch, 2011).

4.3.2 Quality of the evidence

The body of work that directly addresses our research question about the linkages between women’s economic empowerment and contributions to peacebuilding and statebuilding is very limited, but there is a small number of high-quality and even seminal papers that should be widely read and discussed. These include Petesch (2011; 2013); Buvinic et al. (2012); El-Bushra and Sahl (2005); Justino (2006); and Bannon and Correia (2006). The Petesch, Buvinic, Bannon and Correia and Justino studies are based on multi-country assessments and, through their comparative analyses, they are able to draw out interesting complexities, including the circumstances in which conflict and post-conflict settings are likely to provide opportunities for meaningful changes in the gendered division of labour and related social norms and values. The literature beyond these studies is quite disparate and, while the geographical range is impressive, articles and reports rarely pay attention to the macro-level economic and political context. Indeed, it often seems that the study could be about women or gender relations in any low-income country. There is also the need to be cautious in arriving at meaningful conclusions for the full range of countries that potentially fall within the FCAS category.

4.3.3 What, according to the literature, are the challenges and barriers to and opportunities for the integration and consideration of gender perspectives in FCAS?

Opportunities to integrate a gender perspective into economic empowerment and economic recovery as a pillar of peacebuilding and statebuilding

While recognising the horrors and destruction of war and conflict, a substantial part of the literature aims to identify a silver lining for women’s economic empowerment and the drivers of progressive shifts in gender norms regarding women’s economic empowerment and their use and control of productive assets (Friedemann-Sánchez, 2006; Justino, 2006; Petesch, 2011). As Turshen (1998, cited in Abdullah et al., 2010) notes, ‘In the very break down of morals, traditions, customs and community, war also opens up and creates new beginnings’. This review of the literature has identified three key potential opportunities:

- Increased access to and control of assets;
- Improved income-generating opportunities;
- Formal policy and legal reforms.

It is worth noting, however, that a number of the sub-themes discussed as opportunities also feature as challenges.

Access to and control of assets

Provision of microcredit is recognised as an important asset for women in post-conflict contexts (Abdullah et al., 2010; Justino, 2006; Richards, 2006), but there is relatively limited evidence of its prevalence as a tool for economic recovery programmes. Petesch’s (2011) study of four countries (Colombia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka), however, highlights the positive spillover effects of participation on women’s income-generating opportunities and, especially, their livelihood diversification options. Interestingly, she highlights that it is not just new credit groups set up by NGOs, governments or donors in post-conflict settings that have proved critical for women’s economic empowerment in such settings, but also informal and rotating credit schemes. Similarly, in the context of Sierra Leone, Abdullah et al. (2010) argue that post-war market opportunities have expanded as a result of the increased availability of microcredit, with positive spillover effects for female petty traders. They note that revolving microcredit loan schemes developed by the government, donors and NGOs are seen as a way to achieve women’s empowerment through increased self-sufficiency and better living standards. They further argue that this has a spillover effect on women’s political empowerment because it increases
participation in local organisations, awakening their sense of involvement in the economic reconstruction of society.

Land rights are identified in the literature as another key economic asset for women in FCAS. The work on Colombia by Friedemann-Sánchez (2006) highlights that women with property are better able to negotiate their freedom of movement and their right to work for pay and live free from domestic violence, while the 2010 study by Daley et al. (2010) on Rwanda argues that the new legal framework governing land rights ‘has created a clear break from past practices, radically altering social norms by granting women clear legal rights to land’. This is facilitating behavioural change, especially for women who know about the law and for legally married women (see discussion below for caveats). Similarly, Petesch (2011) concludes that women’s access to land through dowry practices in the Philippines and through inheritance practices in both Indonesia and the Philippines makes for a significant difference in their economic empowerment potential when compared with women from Colombia and Sri Lanka, saying, ‘Women in both these countries reported that such assets provided them with security, independence, productive capital and resilience in the face of conflict and other shocks in their lives.’

Access to social capital emerged as a third key asset facilitating women’s economic empowerment in FCAS. Buvinic et al. (2012) note that experiences of conflict and war are highly correlated with greater levels of social capital and community engagement for women and other groups who tend to be socially excluded from civic and political life during peacetime. Social capital can help compensate for deficits in assets and earnings and increase women’s bargaining power (Friedemann-Sánchez, 2006), while also providing women with more psychological security to conduct their livelihood activities in the knowledge that their social networks will protect their assets (Hossain and Matin, 2007). Petesch (2011) further argues that social capital in post-conflict environments can help compensate for the weakness of formal institutions by providing opportunities for the inclusion of women in economic and social recovery. That said, she notes that, because women’s networks are typically small, informal and oriented towards daily and voluntary community activities, they seldom serve as leverage to access new opportunities beyond their communities. To borrow the language of social capital specialists, the dominant approach relies on ‘bonding’ rather than ‘bridging’ social capital, although, as is discussed below, more could be done to enhance the latter.

Enhanced income-generating opportunities
A number of sources emphasise that women have been able to take advantage of expanded market opportunities during conflict and during the immediate post-conflict period (Justino 2006; Petesch, 2011). Justino (2006) found violent conflict saw an increase in the participation of women in labour markets and in income-generating activities across her six country cases as a result of changes in household composition, and as a livelihood coping strategy in harsh economic conditions. Justino (2006) and Petesch (2011) highlight that, although these jobs are often low skilled, poorly paid and risky, they often have important effects on household welfare. In Sierra Leone, for example, women working as petty traders were able to make a good profit on the parallel market (e.g. for sales related to arms and petroleum), although clearly the work had serious risks, including of ambush, dispossession and death (Abdullah et al., 2010). Others, as we discuss in the challenges section below, emphasise the growing opportunities for sex work and transactional sex practices in such contexts, which often provide an important economic lifeline to households (Abdullah et al., 2010; Richardson et al., 2009).

Culturally sensitive vocational training
This is a second important theme identified by analysts as being critical to the facilitation of women’s economic empowerment in FCAS. While quality vocational training is somewhat limited, its effects have been highly positive wherever it has been provided. In Colombia’s Jovenes en Acción vocational training programme for urban youth, participants received cash plus six months of training, and the impact on young women was very positive (with chances for paid employment and higher wages improved by approximately 30%) and relatively more so than the effect on young men (Attanasio et al., 2011). The authors highlight the importance of links between the private sector and labour market opportunities, the opportunity for extension of in-service training and assessment and having financial support to undertake the training in the first place. Other sensitively designed and managed programmes sought to engage with male relatives and partners to reduce cultural and religious sensitivities, and to work through female staff in home-based activities (e.g. in the case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan) (Knudsen and Halvorsen, 1997). In Colombia, flower farms offered workshops on self-
esteem, family violence and conflict resolution, stressing gender equality, to increase women’s feelings of self-worth (Friedemann-Sánchez, 2006).

In other contexts (e.g. Bangladesh and Colombia), export-oriented factory work provides opportunities for women to earn higher wages and to increase their bargaining position within the family (Friedemann-Sánchez, 2006) and their ability to provide for rural family members (Khosla, 2009). Women are able to delay marriage and childbearing because their income is a valued contribution to their families and there is a greater incentive for families to invest in the health and education of girls to prepare them for work in the industry (ibid.).

**Policy and legal changes**

A third key area for potential change in women’s economic empowerment that emerged in a limited number of contexts was improved opportunities for bargaining with authorities during the peace process. El-Bushra and Sahl (2005) point out that women in Southern Sudan have had to negotiate with male elders in the traditional system, rather than the state, as laws are not codified, but that the peace agreement has opened up space for dialogue with the state and elite women are demanding the ratification of key international gender rights conventions, such as CEDAW, which includes women’s rights to economic participation and independence. The passage of flagship national policies in Sierra Leone, such as the National Policy for the Advancement of Women and the Policy on Gender Mainstreaming, has included an increase in microcredit facilities for women, and improved access to education, training and capital (Abdullah and Fofana-Ibrahim, 2010; Abdullah et al., 2010).

4.3.4 Challenges in integrating a gender perspective into economic empowerment and economic recovery as a pillar of peacebuilding and statebuilding

Not surprisingly, the literature identifies a sobering range and depth of challenges to be tackled in order to support women’s economic empowerment within livelihood support and economic recovery initiatives linked to peacebuilding and statebuilding processes. Here, we identify four key clusters of challenges:

- Conservative social norms;
- Barriers faced by especially vulnerable groups;
- Limited access to productive assets;
- Limited income-generating opportunities.

At a macro level, these challenges are often exacerbated by a broader disconnect between legal and policy reforms and implementation practice – echoing challenges identified in other sectors and spheres of women’s social and political engagement. Overall, there seems to be a general consensus that programmes to support gender empowerment in post-conflict reconstruction processes are poorly resourced. In Sierra Leone, for example, gender programming received just 0.1% of the 2009 national budget, and only 2% of UN funding in the 2009-2012 budget, with programmes fitting into what Cornwall (2007) has dubbed ‘empowerment lite’ (cited in Abdullah et al., 2010). Legal barriers have also been slow to change (especially the differences between traditional or customary and formal law).

**Conservative social norms**

Despite the turmoil that state fragility and conflict can bring about, a number of studies highlight the fact that this may not uproot many aspects of traditional gender relations. As El-Bushra and Sahl (2005) note, ‘War has not led to fundamental change in gender relations in Juba. Patriarchal relations are still dominant, though rearranged and adapted.’ Changes tend to remain at the level of everyday practice rather than implying a radical shift of values. Men are still expected to be the lead providers and women are still expected to ensure care and provisioning. What changes is the ways these aspirations can be fulfilled. Others note – as highlighted before – that there may be a backlash against women’s changing roles within the household and community in post-conflict contexts that is manifested as VAW, as seen in northern Sri Lanka (Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2004) or as stigma and social rejection, especially in the case of women who have taken on risky or non-conventional occupations. Women working in the export industry processing zones in South Asia are often stigmatised as

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1 It sounds like the real thing, borrowing words from the feminist lexicon, although often in combinations that deprive them of their bit. And it seems to be doing just what feminists have been doing and demanding for decades: from organising women into groups to providing training, resources and rules that get more women into work and politics’ (Cornwall, 2007, cited in Abdullah et al., 2010).
having loose morals (Khosla, 2009; Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2004), and are seen in the context of growing militarisation in Sri Lanka as more likely to carry out ‘patriotic mothering’ for soldiers on leave, becoming easy targets for soldiers who want short-term relationships (Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2004). Female ex-combatants are often stigmatised for having offended local taboos on women fighting and killing and, in Liberia, risk drifting into highly disadvantageous marriages with village polygamists or into sex work (Bannon and Correia, 2006).

**Male disempowerment equates to women’s vulnerability**

A related strand in the literature emphasises that male disempowerment in the context of state fragility and conflict-affected contexts often exacerbates women’s vulnerability. Men’s economic dependence can exacerbate VAW in their homes (Petesch, 2013), and some women engage in desperate and risky activities to generate income to avoid such violence from their spouses (including commercial sex work). ‘The sense of irrelevance that men feel, coupled with poverty, undermines their self-esteem leading to disruptive behaviour intended to “put women in her rightful place”, with better educated women and those engaged in income-generating activities more susceptible to physical abuse in some contexts’ (Amuyunzu-Nyamongo and Francis, n.d.). Bannon and Correia (2006) explain the problem in terms of threats to hegemonic masculinity and the fact that, for many men, especially those on low incomes, there is a huge gap between this dominant model and the reality of what they can achieve. As El-Bushra and Sahl (2006) point out, men in such circumstances experience deep psychological distress: ‘While some men reluctantly – tearfully, even – accepted the role of house-husbands, taking on child care and other domestic tasks while their wives work, others could not bring themselves to do this, preferring idleness to this emasculation.’

**Especially vulnerable groups**

Certain groups of women are especially vulnerable in conflict and post-conflict contexts. One category discussed in several sources is war widows who, as a result of excess male casualties, live either in female-headed households or in sub-families within larger male-headed households. Women in such circumstances are often severely asset- and land-constrained, making it difficult for them to manage farms and households in the absence or death of male household members, and are often compelled to take on additional economic activities in low-paying and insecure sectors (Justino, 2006). Research on post-genocide Rwanda found a higher incidence of poverty and extreme poverty among widow-headed households, but a less pronounced gender division of labour (Das et al., 2008). A second category that emerged was women affected by forced displacement and distress migration. Typically, displaced people face significant asset losses and major economic and social difficulties in the resettlement process. By cutting off large numbers of people from economic opportunities, internal conflict can lead to a vicious cycle of displacement and poverty from which it is difficult to escape. Exacerbated by the destruction of social networks and the consequent depletion of important elements of people’s social, economic and political capital, displacement leads to dependence on the informal economy and on a variety of risky survival strategies that include transactional sex (Buvinic et al., 2012).

**Limited control over assets**

A crosscutting theme in many of the studies was women’s limited access to, and control of, capital, land, education/skills and financial institutions, rendering their economic situation precarious (Abdullah et al., 2010; Doss et al., 2012). Doss et al. (2012) further highlight that, even where there are laws and formal protections regarding women’s assets, women’s rights in practice often depend on the stability of the marriage, as seen in Uganda. Under most customary systems, a widow can claim land that belonged to her husband only if she has a son (ibid.). Similarly, in Rwanda, while there have been important legal reforms, since new laws do not apply retroactively, a large proportion of women do not benefit from them, although younger women inheriting land are gaining financially, with positive spillover effects on bargaining power in their marital and natal families (Daley et al., 2010). Other limitations in practice include social stigma associated with separation and divorce, which is preventing married women from taking full advantage of their bargaining power, as they are reluctant to take legal action against their husbands. In addition, the law applies only to legally married women, leaving non-legally married ‘wives’ in polygamous unions in a weaker position. In addition, sibling rivalry with brothers has resulted in family conflict as a result of the increased division of land, meaning the plots to be shared are smaller.
Some studies suggest that, where microcredit is available, it is generally sufficient only for petty trading, which barely allows women to break even. In Sierra Leone, for example, this has resulted in negative behaviours, such as enlistment in the rebel movement and engaging in ‘sugar-daddysim’ – taking older male lovers for economic support (Abdullah et al., 2010). In Lebanon, while donors paid considerable attention to women’s post-reconstruction economic empowerment in the 2000s, the share of women-owned businesses has remained low and women remain confined to marginalised and low-productivity sectors (Abdo et al., 2012). ‘[Many women] are trapped in traditional feminine survivalist businesses [sewing, handicrafts, hairdressing, make-up] that have very low added value and are carrying the burdens of economic and domestic work as well […]’ [In the current “women entrepreneurial” logic, the problem is neither structural nor systemic but in the women themselves as they lack confidence, business skills and credit’ (ibid.). Too often, there is duplication of efforts by donors and NGOs, while the usefulness of credit can be constrained by the tiny amounts available, as well as demands by programme implementers for participation, documentation and collateral, not to mention weak local security and economies (Petesch, 2011).

**Limited income-generating opportunities**

While access to income-generating opportunities was identified as a prerequisite for women’s economic and broader empowerment in FCAS, several authors underscore that the empowering effect of women’s incomes should not be overestimated. Women’s earnings tend to be viewed as secondary to those of men, and are often handed over to male household members, who exercise control over the household’s collective resources (Friedemann-Sánchez, 2006; Khosla, 2009). Even better-paying industries are characterised by gender discrimination. Despite the increase in strikes and in workers’ mobilisation, trade unions continue to be dominated by men and do not necessarily address women’s concerns, such as child care, sexual harassment and personal safety (especially when women are compelled to work overtime and travel alone at night). Women are also paid less than men for the same jobs (Khosla, 2009), and rarely have job security. In Sri Lanka, women workers in free trade zones are often expected to leave the factories after five years, when they are given a bonus payment to be used as dowry (Hewamanne, 2009).

A number of other papers have focused on the flawed design of vocational training programmes offered to women, and the constraints this places on their meaningful income-generating opportunities. Too often, women are offered training in gender-stereotypical occupations, such as hairdressing or tailoring, which are not linked to viable market opportunities and rarely advance women’s positions in, or access to, employment in the formal economy (Abdullah et al., 2010; Knudsen and Halvorsen, 1997; Petesch, 2011). In other cases, where efforts have been made to provide training for women in occupations usually reserved for men, women’s ability to break into these male-dominated areas has been hindered by the limited quality of their training, inadequate consultation with participants in programme design (e.g. to explore ways to overcome their time constraints and their lack of capital to set up as independent artisans) and a lack of outreach to men and the wider community about the rationale for such vocational training programmes. This was especially the case where programmes aimed to help refugees but failed to engage with host communities.

**4.3.5 Are there concrete examples of positive experiences, approaches, interventions and policies that provide lessons for peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and agendas?**

**Examples of positive deviance**

From a historical perspective, Buvinic et al. (2012) argue that there can be rapid post-war recovery if institutions are repaired quickly after a conflict to ensure political stability and facilitate the resumption of normal economic activity. In post-war Germany and Japan, for example, the Allied Powers helped build strong institutions of governance, including participatory political institutions. In Viet Nam, a commitment to maintain primary health and education during the war, especially in the North, combined with intensive investment in repairing infrastructure in damaged areas, mitigated the impact of the war. But such conditions are rarely present in many modern FCAS.

Petesch (2011) highlights more current examples. She identifies what she terms ‘superstar communities’ in four middle-income post-conflict contexts (Colombia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka), drawing on the World Bank’s empowerment ‘Voices of the Poor’ and ‘Moving Out of Poverty’ research programmes. The superstar communities are those with opportunity structures that support inclusive and rapid recovery, including
for women. Petesch emphasises that, ‘Communities with more empowered women also enjoyed more rapid recovery and poverty reduction in the wake of the conflict. For contexts with deeply exclusionary opportunity structures, women require more extensive investments and external partners who will stand by them, because shifting power structures is difficult to do in the best of circumstances.’ It is interesting to note that these ‘superstar communities’ did not have a uniform set of features. In Indonesia, community-driven development programmes that supported local recovery initiatives chosen and managed by grassroots groups included women as the key to success. In the Philippines, however, extensive new infrastructure and diverse economic opportunities, including many for women, were the most important factors. In Colombia, what made the difference was proximity to jobs in the formal urban economy and numerous assistance programmes aimed at women. In Sri Lanka, it was factory jobs for women, combined with a nearby army base, that helped to reinforce security.

4.3.6 Key analytical points

Economic recovery is a vital part of sustainable peace processes and statebuilding. Without the stronger and more strategic engagement of women in these processes, societies will be unable to capitalise on important unrealised dividends in the DDR process. While conflict and post-conflict environments can shake up gender relations and provide opportunities for women’s economic empowerment, the evidence base suggests the impacts of conflict and fragility are heterogeneous and can, depending on the context, either increase or diminish pre-existing gender inequalities. Meaningful income-generating opportunities for women, including gender- and market-sensitive vocational training and support in accessing productive assets, are vital preconditions for economic and broader empowerment, but too often is tackling men’s disempowerment and threats to their masculinity. Working with traditional elites and men to shift discriminatory and gendered social norms and secure their commitment to women’s economic empowerment efforts can be fruitful but must not be at the cost of women’s broader empowerment by reinforcing traditional gendered divisions of labour. Accordingly, there appears to be a growing consensus that economic empowerment should focus on both women and men in an effort to facilitate common grounds for development and that it should be underpinned by a more household-oriented approach, while being careful to ensure interventions are contextually relevant and do not inadvertently create new kinds of vulnerabilities for women, children and young people.

4.3.7 Key gaps in the literature

As mentioned above, there is only a limited number of sources, albeit high-quality and mainly cross-country studies, looking at the specific links between women’s economic empowerment and peacebuilding and statebuilding. Beyond these, however, there is only a limited discussion of links between enhancing women’s livelihoods and ownership and control of assets in FCAS and peacebuilding and statebuilding processes. The literature tends to be focused on a more micro level and pays limited attention to the dynamics of institutional change. The findings often remain largely decontextualised, that is, the discussion of implications of the governance context for women’s economic empowerment is generally quite shallow, especially in relation to FCAS. The problem is less acute in conflict and post-conflict environments, but there is little discussion of explicit links to statebuilding.

Another key research challenge is the frequent lack of baseline data on variables of interest in conflict research— including in relation to gender and especially at individual and intra-household levels. More routine data collection, for example adding a generic violence module to standard household surveys, is vital if this relationship is to be better understood in all its complexity. Buvinic et al. (2012) note that too little is known about, ‘What happens to families in terms of loss of land, physical and financial capital, and livelihood when conflict occurs? How are those losses distributed within the family? How do gender roles and inequalities affect families’ coping responses to those losses? How do these responses differ by gender from the poor and non-poor?’ Justino (2006) highlights that not enough is known about the impact of women in decision-making community roles in peacebuilding processes, although data from non-conflict contexts point to a strong role model effect.
5 Concluding comments

5.1 Key analytical findings

Overall, the evidence base on the linkages between the inclusivity and sustainability of peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and outcomes and the adoption of gender-sensitive approaches to achieving gender equality outcomes, is, as expected, relatively weak, despite some significant contributions to the literature from, for example Castillejo (2011; 2013), El-Bushra (2012), Justino et al. (2012), Tripp (2012) and Petesch (2013). A review across academic and grey literature for strong empirical evidence on these linkages, however, demonstrates significant knowledge gaps across all the thematic areas discussed in this review.

We find that, while there are pockets of knowledge and some stories of progress in various aspects of gender inequality in FCAS (in terms of women’s roles, contributions and participation, as well as effects on gender inequality and discrimination), there is rarely a strong analytical focus on the linkages to statebuilding processes. In looking more closely at sector-specific literature across the different themes addressed, including literature that does not necessarily make explicit reference to peacebuilding and statebuilding, there was some evidence that is relevant to the objectives of enhancing inclusiveness, participation, accountability and legitimacy in the quality of state–society relations from a gender perspective. But while this is important in terms of what constitutes the relevant knowledge base, the analytical linkages to the politics of peacebuilding, and particularly to statebuilding, are not always (or even often) established; the analytical linkages across sectors are even rarer.

This literature review has highlighted a number of important issues and recurring themes in relation to the different dimensions of gender and peacebuilding and statebuilding, which are summarised below.

5.1.1 Inclusiveness: participation and influence

First, the literature on peacebuilding and statebuilding emphasises the fact that, as part of these processes in FCAS, new ‘rules of the game’ regarding social, political and economic engagement are frequently subject to redefinition and renegotiation. Often, it is precisely the contestation of these rules that is at the root of conflict, including because these were discriminatory or exclusionary in character. As such, peacebuilding and statebuilding (in connected but different ways) are seen as historic opportunities to establish and/or strengthen arrangements and institutions that mediate state–society relations that are more inclusive, representative and responsive, and that incorporate stakeholders who have traditionally not had voice or access to decision making – such as women. Despite these intentions in the international agenda, overall the extent to which women are included in the politics of peacebuilding and statebuilding processes has been marginal. This limits the degree to which the substance of emerging political settlements can be effectively gender-sensitive.

The review found that gender-blind peacebuilding processes remain the norm, despite other improvements at the international level, with provisions such as UNSCR 1325 that articulate a (political and normative) commitment by all relevant actors (states, donors, international organisations) to ensure that all efforts to support peace processes are gender-responsive, and to support the participation of women in all key aspects of this. Progress on this has been limited.

The evidence on how, and if, this commitment has translated into action on the ground remains underdeveloped. To varying levels, in some cases civil society lobbying and advocacy (including through transnational efforts) has resulted in women having some degree of voice that has generated concrete outcomes in the terms, if not the process, of the peace agreements (Castillejo, 2011). There appears to be somewhat more evidence on formal constitution-writing processes that are gender-sensitive, including thanks to the activism of women’s movements. These processes have, in a number of cases, improved the formal ‘rules of the game’ from the perspective of gender equality (through women’s rights, and equality clauses being enshrined in foundational
texts). In addition, the increased participation and/or mobilisation of women and advocates for gender equality seem to make a difference (Haynes et al., 2011). In addition, this is then translated in very different ways into an increased role for women in certain governance structures in post-conflict settings, particularly through formal mechanisms (some in constitutions, some in additional legislation), such as assuring minimum quotas for women and their participation in political parties or in public office. In a number of post-conflict situations, this has led to more women being represented formally in the political system (UN Women, 2012). But the mantra of needing to go ‘beyond numbers’ is well established, and reflects the recognition that such formal and numerical representation does not necessarily translate into women’s effective influence and access to decision-making in politics. Nor does it mean that women in such positions will, inevitably, support gender-responsive policy. Formal participation needs to be supported through additional measures, such as enhancing the voice of gender equality advocates, including through working with women in society and at the subnational level.

The formal participation of women in politics potentially affects the gender responsiveness of policy in delivering services in FCAS, but the participation and representation of women in service provision is uneven. Reforms of the justice and security sectors have seen positive progress in terms of inclusivity, such as the provision of measures that increase the number of women providing services (e.g. women police officers) or that engage CSOs to inform reform processes on women’s security and justice needs, some of which may be issue-specific (such as in relation to VAW), or to exercise oversight over their quality. Nevertheless, the overall evidence remains limited on how a greater number of women translates into improved outcomes for women’s experiences of security and justice. The evidence is particularly limited on basic services and economic opportunities, and how women’s voice and participation are manifested, either in defining women’s needs or in translating this knowledge into decision-making processes to ensure women are actively involved in making service delivery – and social and economic policy more widely – more gender-responsive. Indeed, the evidence focuses far more on what these needs are, and what might be done to meet them in a gender-responsive manner.

In contrast, the evidence on women’s access to economic engagement and assets suggests that the dynamics of conflict and post-conflict can, under some conditions, alter the gender balance – both at the domestic level and in the community – in ways that enhance prospects for women’s economic empowerment (Petesch, 2011). This can have positive spillover effects within the private and public spheres in terms of redefining the gender power balance in favour of women. But, for the most part, the evidence and analyses fall short of considering either what this means for women’s voice in other spheres of social and political life, or how it relates to wider statebuilding objectives.

To summarise: there is evidence that the political and social developments afoot in FCAS can lead to change processes that improve women’s actual participation and representation, or enable conditions for their more effective voice across the different themes of peacebuilding and statebuilding. But an equally recurrent finding in the literature is that gender hierarchies are resilient, particularly in transitional societies, so gains made during periods of adjustment and change are susceptible to reversals. Overall, however, there is limited evidence on how the increased participation and formal inclusion and representation of women lead to a more empowered politics of influence by women (that is, women having a more effective say in decision making), or translate into gender-responsive policy. Similarly, there is limited empirical or analytical work that considers the synergies across the thematic areas addressed in this review in relation to inclusiveness and participation, which are key components of international support to peacebuilding and statebuilding agendas.

5.1.2 State responsiveness
The second key issue is the level of state responsiveness in delivering gender-sensitive or gender-responsive services or reforms. There is limited evidence in the literature of efforts to approach service delivery in statebuilding in ways that are responsive to gender, or that explicitly address a gender equality agenda. The statebuilding literature highlights the importance of state responsiveness in FCAS in terms of building the foundations for legitimate and enduring state–society relations, based on reciprocity and trust, and where social cohesion is nurtured. Peace is reinforced in the degree to which states respond to the needs of all social groups. In this vein, states that provide gender-responsive services and an environment for inclusive economic recovery can help build women’s capabilities for agency and participation in public life, including as a result of a rebalancing of power relations in the private sphere and addressing legacies of gender-based exclusion and discrimination. However, the literature on the specifics of improved service delivery and access to livelihoods and assets for women is less concrete on what gender-responsive statebuilding should look like in practice.
Gender-responsive international commitments have to some extent translated into internationally funded service delivery programmes in FCAS – particularly in the justice and security sectors as well as in basic services. For example, over half of all donor-funded interventions in the education and health sectors in FCAS, and one-third in the water sector, target gender equality, as does more than 80% of aid to population policy and reproductive health (OECD, 2010c, cited in Carpenter et al., 2012).

This has resulted in programmes that address both supply and demand – that is, interventions focused on the relevant systems of service delivery to improve effectiveness, coverage and gender responsiveness, and those that focus on improving voice and access for women, particularly in relation to justice and security mechanisms, and to some extent opportunities for women’s empowerment through access to livelihoods and income-generating opportunities.

However, while recognising progress towards better gender-responsive service delivery, serious challenges remain and continue to marginalise the integration of gender into the state apparatus to deliver gender-responsive services in FCAS. The mainstream security and justice programmes appear to remain gender-blind, and there are neither important efforts underway nor a strong international commitment to strengthening the representation of women in these sectors (Bastick, 2007; Bott et al., 2005; UN Women, 2011; Valasek, 2008).

One of the key limitations identified is that mainstreaming gender has remained overly technical, formal and legalistic, without due attention given to the deeply political nature of the different sectors with which donors engage. For instance, the political nature of justice and security provision is often underplayed. Yet it is this political nature that explains the toughest barriers and resistances to change. In the delivery of basic services (health, education, WASH, social protection), two key challenges limit efforts to meet the basic needs of women, and hinder the potential for state legitimacy and social cohesion as the foundations for peacebuilding and statebuilding. These are the prevailing socio-cultural norms that restrict women’s access to services (and that are often crosscutting with other dimensions such as ethnicity and age) and institutional dynamics (and failures) that challenge the provision of gender-sensitive services, effectively creating barriers to women’s use of services.

Other challenges are identified for gender-responsive economic recovery. With few exceptions, current policy and programming approaches in this sector tend to either reinforce traditional gender relations, through inadequate attention to the differences between the economic participation and coping strategies of men and women (despite the opportunities to strengthen opportunities that are often created for women during conflict), or simply ignore gender dynamics altogether. Importantly, a key constraint identified here, and echoed across the thematic areas in this review, is the lack of attention to the relational nature of gender – and the need to tackle men’s disempowerment and threats to their masculinity in tandem with efforts that focus on women and women’s empowerment.

Despite these significant challenges, the literature does identify a number of entry points for starting to overcome these barriers. These include interventions to alter incentive structures and social norms in existing organisations and institutions that are charged with justice and service delivery – whether or not provided by the state; tailoring gender-sensitive (and culturally sensitive) service delivery that promotes women’s empowerment; and creating meaningful income-generating opportunities for women, including gender- and market-sensitive vocational training and support in obtaining access to productive assets.

**To summarise:** The literature on service delivery and economic engagement does not, for the most part, engage sufficiently or directly with how gender-responsive support in these areas contributes to statebuilding, although there is somewhat more on gender-responsive security and justice, and TJ in relation to peacebuilding. A closer look at the sector-specific literature does provide some insights on what gender-responsive approaches might look like in terms of the improved quality of services, gender equality and addressing the needs of women. But such literature is often ‘siloed’, with limited reflection on the implications for enhancing wider gender equality goals, and inclusive and legitimate statebuilding. In addition, while the body of knowledge emerging in the past decade has begun to fill some of the knowledge gaps on state responsiveness, the evidence base on what actually works remains patchy and fragmented. This means there is no coherent and robust body of evidence on what works in terms of state responsiveness to gender or the links between gender-responsive service delivery and empowerment and broader peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives.
5.1.3 Informal institutions, non-state actors and formal legal change

A third important issue emerging from across the literature review is the question of how to engage with informal institutions, non-state actors and institutional hybridity. This is an issue that is mostly under-researched – if increasingly acknowledged – in mainstream peacebuilding and statebuilding literature, and that plays a significant role when looking at these processes through a gender lens.

The literature confirms that formal norms matter in how the terms of an emerging political settlement are integrated into a formal norms structure (the body of constitutional, legislative or reigning customary norms that govern how power and resources are allocated). They cannot, therefore, be disregarded or undervalued.

Legal and constitutional change that formalises gender equality and women’s rights is important. So are social contracts that harness state commitment to deliver or regulate basic services and economic activities in ways that ensure these are gender-sensitive and inclusive – they can connect national-level development projects to subnational and community dynamics. Formally agreed norms structures are important because they articulate a political project and vision of state–society relations that can be assessed in terms of their inclusiveness and gender responsiveness, and provide a benchmark against which to measure the conduct of different actors and hold them accountable. Formalised norms on women’s rights constitute a measure (for accountability purposes) against which to judge the different modes of social, political and economic activities that feature at all levels (national and subnational).

It is also clear in the literature that what dictates conduct in many FCAS is the range of informal institutions that prevail, including customary practices, social norms regarding patriarchy or more transitory and ad hoc rules of engagement where the state is either absent or is being contested through conflict. Formal norms in these contexts, even when they are gender-responsive and inclusive, may not make much difference to how the vast majority of women experience the state or other structures of authority and service provision. The literature also signals that, in many cases, formal norms remain ambivalent or discriminatory in gender terms. The high levels of institutional hybridity in FCAS therefore have important implications for peacebuilding and statebuilding processes, and gender-responsive programming needs to address what this means in practice.

The range of informal institutions and non-state systems that shape how societies interact with national or subnational systems of authority and service provision present both opportunities and challenges for the inclusion of women in peacebuilding and statebuilding processes. The informal networks and spaces where political brokering defines policy outcomes in post-conflict settings tend to exclude women from access to decision making and influence. This is the case in many political systems and parties. The literature also suggests informal systems of justice and security provision are likely to be highly discriminatory towards women and susceptible to social norms of patriarchy. But, as Isser and Chopra (2011) note, they may be no more discriminatory than how, in practice, formal justice and security bodies apply formal norms.

By contrast, the literature also finds that informal institutions in health provision or those found in rotating credit societies can be a source of culturally rooted and indigenous solutions to women’s vulnerabilities and needs, and an opportunity to create an avenue for women’s empowerment (albeit small-scale) in FCAS. Indeed, informal institutions should be the object of transformation, given the degree to which they are likely to feature indefinitely, and as part of the state–society compact, alongside formal institutions. Gender equality objectives can be integrated into support for the renegotiation and redefinition of customary norms of security and justice provision by working with relevant women and men at the subnational level to change social norms, belief systems and incentives on such issues as VAW or access to property and inheritance.

Women’s CSOs are another, often informal, mechanism for promoting the inclusion of women and creating opportunities for gender-equitable outcomes at all stages of peacebuilding and statebuilding processes. Evidence suggests that the mobilisation of women’s organisations has contributed to gains on gender issues during peace negotiations and constitution-making processes, even when women have been left out of formal processes, and that civil society creates a space where women can develop leadership roles and promote gender equality, bypassing the obstructions they face within political parties or formal electoral processes (Castillejo, 2011; 2013). Women’s organisations and women themselves have also played important roles in delivering services in FCAS (including health services that are responsive to women’s needs and vulnerabilities) and have become agents of change in communities through delivering education services. However, the evidence also emphasises
the specific need to support women’s organisations following the consolidation of peace, when mobilisation and activism tends to decline, reducing the presence of women in statebuilding processes and limiting their access to decision making and positions of influence in post-conflict governance. Another key recommendation from the literature is the need to promote coalition building among women politicians, linking them with women’s movements, and high-level dialogue on the inclusion of women in the executive (Castillejo, 2011; 2013). This also entails the development of the capacities and skills of women to engage in political life at the national and subnational level.

**To summarise:** There is a an emerging consensus on the need to work with the realities of institutional hybridity and non-state actors and institutions to confront, renegotiate and alter social norms and belief systems regarding gender roles and norms. There is also a very incipient but emerging body of work on what this might look like in relation to specific sectors and activities. But there is limited cross-reference or cross-fertilisation of analytical reflection on what this means in terms of supporting change in gender inequalities in other areas, enhancing women’s agency more broadly or contributing to inclusive statebuilding.

### 5.1.4 National and subnational dynamics

Finally, while the linkages between national and subnational dynamics of change are critical in understanding how state–society relations are (re)built in FCAS, there is a general dearth in the statebuilding literature of research that connects the two levels. Indeed, there is limited evidence in the literature that addresses the interaction between national and subnational dynamics from a gender perspective, with the exception of micro-level interventions on gender-sensitive service delivery and economic activities that focus on community-level inclusion and participation. Even these analyses, however, rarely link back to peacebuilding and statebuilding processes. These linkages merit attention for the following reasons. First, the literature reviewed here focuses on examples either at the national or at the very local level, but there is limited analysis of the implications of change at the subnational level that is so crucial to enhancing national gender equality goals for statebuilding projects. Equally, the literature on national-level change (such as through constitutional reform or social protection policies) often notes the implementation challenges, given the precarious state presence across the territory and institutional hybridity, but does not delve further into how these challenges might be addressed, specifically, through a gender lens to have impact at the subnational level. Rather, the focus is either on action at the community level (but with limited consideration of wider implications) or on action at the national level. An important gap in the literature, therefore, remains that of addressing the synergies and tensions between national and subnational processes of change.

**To summarise:** The literature focuses mostly on national or subnational change processes. Connecting the two is important from a gender perspective to assess how positive changes at different levels can affect each other, and what action can be taken to amplify positive synergies across levels. This is important to ensure change processes, where positive, do not remain localised. Moreover, this is important in order to diminish the scope for local power structures to remain immune from change processes aimed at gender equality being promoted at other levels.

### 5.2 Evidence gaps; priorities for further research

The literature review thus confirmed findings in El-Bushra (2012), Castillejo (2011; 2013) and Tripp (2012) about the paucity of the evidence base on the connections between gender-responsive approaches to different aspects of peacebuilding and statebuilding, and advances in achieving peacebuilding and statebuilding goals. In part, this reflects the challenges associated with the breadth of the relevant thematic fields and the fact that, even in the non-gender literature, ‘how to do’ inclusive, participative and accountable statebuilding that will be enduring and resilient, constitutes a formidably complex agenda. Statecrafting, as noted in the OECD Policy Note (OECD-DAC, 2011) is a deeply political, contested and long-term process. This is no less true of gender-responsive approaches to supporting the different components of this process and how they contribute to defining the texture and quality of state–society relations from the perspective of gender equality goals, and other agendas of inclusion, participation and empowerment.

The review process revealed the following gaps in the literature (see also Annex 1 for a summary).
5.2.1 Political voice and governance
The literature on women’s access to the political processes of peacebuilding and constitutional reform and on women’s access to political participation has tended to focus on the presence of women in these spaces. There are several important gaps.

First, while there are research findings that go some way towards assessing the factors that shape the opportunities and challenges of women’s voice and agency in these spheres, overall there is very little about how this affects peacebuilding and statebuilding processes more generally. In other words, existing research tells us very little, in those cases where there has been formal progress on embedding gender equality goals in formal political and constitutional projects, about how this translates into addressing wider peacebuilding and statebuilding goals. Does including women in peace agreements significantly reduce the prospects of renewed conflict and violence? Where gender advocates have been able to influence constitution writing, what are the political and social factors that enable or constrain how this meaningfully translates into reshaping state–society interactions? Concretely in relation to specific components of state–society relations, how do these foundational processes (peace agreements and new constitutions) affect what in practice unfolds in service delivery, or in the reform of security and justice provision? To date, the literature in this regard remains fragmented and overly specialist. Thus, the linkages to processes and outcomes in other components of statebuilding remain underdeveloped.

Second, in terms of women’s access to political voice, the focus has tended to be on how to get women into formal politics, but with little further exploration of how other institutional and political aspects shape the prospects for women’s influence in decision making, or how such presence might translate into more gender-responsive politics. More research is required on the process of access to politics (that is, a better understanding of the institutional mechanisms that shape voice, like electoral regimes, or the wider political economy of political systems and party systems). Moreover, there is a need for a better understanding of how the politics of patrimonialism and the particular characteristics of this in FCAS shape the prospects and quality of women’s access to decision making.

Third, even when women (and/or gender advocates) do obtain positions of power, there is little research on how this results in gender-responsive policy agendas, and how the political economies of ‘resistance’, either to the design or to the implementation of policy, interact in the different statebuilding components of service delivery and security and justice provision.

5.2.2 Transitional justice, and security and justice sector reform
It is evident that there is a recent interest in both the academic and policy literature on gendered analysis and research of TJ and justice and SSR issues in FCAS. However, while the theoretical discussion and analytical debates are important in terms of the transformative potential of different approaches to these issues, the empirical evidence base remains very underdeveloped. Although there is more analysis in relation to how TJ, for instance, relates to peacebuilding, there is negligible reference to the impact of gender-responsive approaches on statebuilding.

The empirical base on SSR is more important, and increasingly addresses VAW issues. But gender-responsive approaches to reform of the justice sector are poorly researched. Moreover, these continue to constitute areas of analysis that have been overly technical, legalistic and normative. The political analysis of how these sectors shape state–society relations is generally underdeveloped from a gender perspective, and there remain very important gaps.

The distinction between formal and informal systems of security and justice provision from a gender perspective are now on the research agenda. However, there is little indication of ongoing research that distinguishes across issues of class, ethnicity, religion and ideology – and that has an impact on how gender-responsive approaches are politically conceived.

Finally, the relationship between these issues and other aspects of peacebuilding and statebuilding is rarely explored generally and specifically in relation to FCAS. For instance, it is important to have a better understanding of how women’s property rights issues are resolved through courts or other dispute resolution
mechanisms, or as a result of civil society legal mobilisation strategies, to elicit a better understanding of the linkages between women’s economic empowerment potential and women’s access to justice.

5.2.3 Service delivery and women’s economic empowerment

In the areas of both service delivery and women’s economic empowerment, a key gap in the literature is the de-contextualisation of research in relation to peacebuilding and statebuilding processes. The specific contextual issues in FCAS are rarely explicitly brought out in terms of influencing service delivery or economic empowerment outcomes. For instance, there is little connection between service delivery and economic programmes and outcomes and the role of women in politics, or civil society movements, or the way that women’s inclusion in the justice and security sector influences outcomes in these areas. Conducting primary research on these linkages in the context of the challenges and opportunities in FCAS would greatly strengthen the knowledge base on the interconnectedness of these thematic areas and help strengthen the rationale for the inclusion of women at all stages of peacebuilding and statebuilding processes.

A second key gap is in understanding the complexity of gender relations at the individual, intra-household and community level in FCAS and how these influence outcomes in wellbeing and empowerment. For instance, Buvinic et al. (2012) note that we know too little about, ‘What happens to families in terms of loss of land, physical and financial capital, and livelihood when conflict occurs? How are those losses distributed within the family? How do gender roles and inequalities affect families’ coping responses to those losses? How do these responses differ by gender from the poor and non-poor?’ More routine sex-disaggregated data collection and analysis are vital in order to examine this relationship in all its complexities.

A third key knowledge gap is evidence on the key factors that work in delivering inclusive quality services and economic or income-earning opportunities for women in FCAS. While there is certainly an increasing body of evidence that seeks to examine the impacts of service delivery (especially in the area of SRH) and economic empowerment at micro and local levels, this (i) rarely includes gender equality indicators beyond ‘counting’ the number of women beneficiaries; (ii) rarely draws out how services and programmes can be delivered in a way that contributes to gender equality and women's empowerment in FCAS; and (iii) often draws policy implications based on what hasn’t worked. While there is value in these approaches, building a stronger evidence base on understanding what works and why in specific contexts, to support gender equality and women’s empowerment in a broader sense (for instance, including measurements of women’s decision-making autonomy, women’s participation and influence in the household and community, changes in men and women’s divisions of labour, ability to access and control assets, changes in men and women’s vulnerability to violence), and in turn linking this to wellbeing and economic empowerment outcomes, will support the argument for allocating resources to specific interventions towards achieving gender equality and empowerment, and more broadly for addressing social exclusion and inequality in FCAS.
References

Introduction


1 Gender, peacebuilding and statebuilding


2 Gender-based discrimination, exclusion and violence


3.1 Peacebuilding processes, peace agreements and first constitutions


3.2 Post conflict-governance, first elections and women’s political participation


Domingo, P and Bihirabake, A., 2012, ‘Case Study: Burundi.’ Joint evaluation: UN Women/UNDP support to women’s political participation in sub-Saharan Africa, New York: UN Women


### 3.3 Women and transitional justice


4.1 Justice and Security


Assessment of the evidence of links between gender equality, peacebuilding and statebuilding 67


4.2 Service delivery


4.3 State support to women’s economic empowerment, through economic recovery, livelihoods and job creation


Appendix

Summary of key gaps in the literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic area</th>
<th>Key gaps in the literature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Peace agreements and first constitutions | Insufficient attention is paid to the gendered effects of power-sharing institutions during peace negotiations and post-conflict transitions. While concrete mechanisms to promote the descriptive representation of women have helped improve women’s overall representation within ethno-national parties, they do not go far enough to transform unequal gender relations (Byrne and McCulloch, 2012).  

There is an overarching assumption in the literature that the greater empowerment and participation of women’s groups during peace making will enhance their engagement during the implementation and peacebuilding phase; this needs to be further tested (UN Women, 2012).  

There is a lack of knowledge about the implementation of the gender provisions of peace agreements and why this so often remains a challenge (UN Women, 2012), and additional work (both quantitative and qualitative) is also needed to assess the impact, if any, of constitutional change on women’s status and experiences in post-conflict societies (Haynes et al., 2011).  

‘Add women and stir’ strategies assume that women are willing and able to influence peace agreements with regard to gender. There is little existing analysis of the extent to which gender provisions are excluded in trade-offs with other provisions, or fears they may destabilise a settlement (Bell and O’Rourke, 2010).  

Further thinking on how UNSCR 1325 is being taken forward by organisations other than the UN is required, particularly as their role is increasing and there is still little guidance on how to frame demands in the context of peace agreement texts, or to marry the demands of UNSCR 1325 and CEDAW.  

More research is needed on what a gender perspective for peace agreements would ideally involve (adopting a gender perspective is not the same as adopting provisions that mention women). |
| Post conflict-governance, first elections and women’s | The gendered dimensions of peacebuilding and statebuilding merit much closer attention, especially in terms of the kinds of tensions that may arise as a result of different priorities such as power sharing, and the hierarchical thinking and practice that may be embedded in it; and the need for pragmatic approaches to promote peace and stability rather than normative commitments to increase the participation of women in post-conflict processes in |
Whether the increased number of women entering politics in FCAS can make a substantive difference to policy and broader development outcomes remains unknown, largely because of the very limited evidence on this question. Ongoing monitoring of such processes of inclusion may be needed while the evidence is built up.

It is important to explore whether findings that gender quotas have a significant effect on women’s representation, public policies and political attitudes across the developed world hold up when quotas are adopted mainly to respond to international pressures and incentives (Bush, 2011).

Greater research/work is needed to explore ways in which donors can support women to influence the policy agenda and promote women’s interests more effectively, and there is a need for further and more strategic donor engagement with political parties to examine how they can support women party members to become more effective vehicles for women’s participation and representation and promote a gender equality agenda within parties, while also looking at how they can incentivise party leaders to include women in decision-making positions and make party structures and culture more democratic (Castillejo, 2011).

More research is needed on the specific political economy dynamics of regime type, on electoral systems, on political party systems, on their impact on quotas and generally on voice and influence potential of women participating in politics.

More research is required on the differential experience of political voice for women, taking account of class, ethnicity, religion, urban/rural divide and ideology.

| Women and transitional justice | There is an emerging body of research on gendered approaches to TJ, but much of it remains theoretical. The evidence base of how different TJ processes shape the experience of women in addressing legacies of violence and conflict remains underdeveloped. |
| -- | The transformative potential of TJ, looking forward and in relation to peacebuilding and statebuilding goals, remains under-researched – this mirrors the reality of the wider TJ literature on wider connections to these agendas. |
| -- | Specifically in relation to concrete outcomes, such as how recommendations resulting from TJ processes affect concrete reform process in the security and justice sectors, or how they connect to addressing more structural inequalities in access to services and public goods, the literature remains more normative than evidence-based. |

| Justice and security | Existing literature on justice and security remains either theoretically rich or normative and prescriptive, but the evidence on what works is fragmented. There are some emerging ‘stories of change’ that begin to constitute a body of knowledge, but robust evidence on what works remains underdeveloped. |
| -- | There has been limited socio-political analysis to answer questions of how security, law and justice provision are enmeshed in histories of state and political development from the perspective of gender relations, and how women experience these ‘services’ (including in relation to whose interests are best served by these sectors). |
| -- | There is an important gap in the literature on what works to renegotiate and redefine local and community-level dynamics of security provision and dispute resolution to alter gender relations in the experience and outcomes of these processes. |
| -- | There is very little evidence of how progress on gender-responsive approaches to security and justice provision (both formal and informal) contribute |
While there is evidence at the micro level that women play an important role (both informally and formally) in the planning and delivery of basic services, especially in health and education, the link to gender-responsive service delivery is rarely made in relation to broader peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives or discussions (Carpenter et al., 2012; Scott, 2007, cited in Mason, 2012). There is only limited literature that explicitly and comprehensively draws out how services can be delivered in a way that contributes to gender equality and women’s empowerment in FCAS. Failure to recognise this can mean missing opportunities to use service delivery as a mechanism for addressing social exclusion and inequality. There is therefore an urgent need to research in more detail the complexity of community-level gender relations in FCAS and assess the extent to which they differ from those in developing countries more broadly (Carpenter et al., 2012).

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<td>State support to economic empowerment</td>
<td>There is only a small number of sources looking at the specific links between women’s economic empowerment and peacebuilding and statebuilding. There is only a limited discussion of links between enhancing women’s livelihoods and ownership and control of assets in FCAS and peacebuilding and statebuilding processes. The findings remain largely de-contextualised, i.e. the discussion of implications of the governance context for women’s economic empowerment is generally quite shallow, especially in fragile state contexts. In conflict and post-conflict environments the problem is less acute, but explicit links to statebuilding remain under-discussed. There is a frequent lack of baseline data on variables of interest in conflict research – including in relation to gender and especially at the individual and intra-household levels. More routine data collection is vital in order to explore this relationship in all its complexities. Buvinic et al. (2012) also note that too little is known about, ‘What happens to families in terms of loss of land, physical and financial capital, and livelihood when conflict occurs? How are those losses distributed within the family? How do gender roles and inequalities affect families’ coping responses to those losses? How do these responses differ by gender from the poor and non-poor?’ Justino (2006) highlights that we know too little about effects of women in decision-making community roles in peacebuilding processes, although data from non-conflict contexts point to a strong role model effect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall gaps</td>
<td>More analytical and empirical research is necessary to understand the political economy of how conflict and fragility shapes prospects for gender-responsive agendas. There is insufficient understanding of the inter-linkages across different thematic components of peacebuilding and statebuilding. There is a need to move beyond normative and prescriptive approaches to research on gender-responsive approaches to research that is founded on evidence that addresses concrete research questions on the linkages to peacebuilding and statebuilding. More research is needed on the political economy of donors’ approaches to peacebuilding and statebuilding, and their own internal capabilities to integrate gender perspectives more meaningfully in peacebuilding and statebuilding. This includes addressing the internal tensions and contradictions that characterise donor priorities and hierarchies of objectives.</td>
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