Evaluation of UN Women’s Contribution to Increasing Women’s Leadership and Participation in Peace and Security and Humanitarian Response

Kosovo case study

Marta Foresti and Adriana Gashi
**Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>Agency for Gender Equality</td>
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<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<td>ICO</td>
<td>International Civilian Office</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>KJI</td>
<td>Kosovo Judicial Institute</td>
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<td>KP</td>
<td>Kosovo Police</td>
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<td>KSF</td>
<td>Kosovo Security Force</td>
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<td>KTC</td>
<td>Kosovo Transitional Council</td>
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<td>KWN</td>
<td>Kosovo Women’s Network</td>
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<td>LGEK</td>
<td>Law on Gender Equality in Kosovo</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>OIC</td>
<td>Officer in Charge</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PISG</td>
<td>Provisional Institutions of Self-Government</td>
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<td>RAE</td>
<td>Roma, Ashkaly, Egyptian</td>
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<td>SGG</td>
<td>Security and Gender Group</td>
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<td>SRGS</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>UN Women</td>
<td>United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
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<td>United Nations Kosovo Office</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
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<td>VAW</td>
<td>Violence Against Women</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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1. Introduction

The Kosovo case study is one of five country case studies for the corporate evaluation of UN Women’s contribution to increasing women’s leadership and participation in peace and security and humanitarian response. This case study examined UN Women’s peace and security work in Kosovo, as well as related programmatic areas such as violence against women (VAW) and broader gender-related work relevant to the peace and security agenda. The evaluation does not give a comprehensive analysis of UN Women’s portfolio of work on peace and security in Kosovo. Rather, analysis focused on a selection of programmatic activities and sought to address the specific questions selected for this global/corporate exercise. This report provides a summary of the key findings and recommendations for UN Women in Kosovo and at a global level.

2. Methodology

The Kosovo case study is one of five country case studies for the corporate evaluation of UN Women’s contribution to Increasing Women’s Leadership and Participation in Peace and Security and Humanitarian Response. Fieldwork for this case study was conducted in Kosovo from 2-8 February 2013 with some follow-up interviews conducted later in February in person or by phone. Preparatory work and consultations were conducted prior to the fieldwork. Some interviews which could not be scheduled during the field mission were conducted by phone or online subsequent to field travel. Fieldwork was carried out by a member of the evaluation team in collaboration with a local researcher, a collaboration which contributed to ensuring triangulation, knowledge of the socio-political context and better coverage of the data. During the fieldwork, country-level programming with a focus on the peace, security and humanitarian response agenda was examined. More detailed observations of project office work in this area involved looking at a selection of interventions, which was decided with the project office, and the evaluation team leader. For this study, it was possible to visit a very small number of stakeholders outside of Pristina, through a field visit to Gjilan. Site selection was based on distance from the capital, accessibility issues and time constraints, as well as advice from the project office in terms of appropriate field sites. The evaluation team met with a selection of relevant stakeholders at the subnational level.

Qualitative analysis was used during the fieldwork which drew on documentary evidence provided by the project office and other stakeholders, and interviews and focus group discussions. The fieldwork ensured that the range of relevant stakeholders identified in the inception phase, and in collaboration with the project office, were interviewed. Interviews and focus group discussions were semi-structured to address the concrete evaluation questions, but also allowed for unstructured questions as appropriate for the interview, the context and in relation to the intervention/activity under observation.

In line with guidelines in the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) handbook, Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation – Towards UNEG Guidance (2011), the Kosovo case evaluation team took measures to ensure the inclusion and participation of relevant stakeholders, taking care to identify issues of power relations. The context analysis and the stakeholder mapping that was developed took account of the specific balance of power between relevant groups. During the fieldwork, the team was mindful of the relationship between implementers and different stakeholders in interventions, including taking into consideration the role of the evaluation team.
3. **Country context**

**Context and conflict analysis**

In 1974, the Yugoslav Federation adopted a new Constitution which upgraded Kosovo’s autonomy and, most importantly, gave it direct representation and connected it with federal institutions (International Crisis Group, 1998). Although it did not become a republic, in practice Kosovo had the same rights and obligations as the other six republics in the Federation, with direct control over the police, territorial defence, education, health, etc.

Following the death of the Yugoslav Federation’s President Tito in 1980, the six republics and two autonomous provinces of the Federation were unable to stay together for long. Slovenia and Croatia were in favour of reform and a kind of confederation, but Serbia was opposed to this position. Serbian leaders, especially Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, started to implement their ideals of a Greater Serbia. The first step to achieving this aim saw the revocation of the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina at the end of the 1980s (CIA, 2013). Kosovo Albanians opposed the new Constitution through a massive boycott and organized a parallel system in Kosovo’s education and health sectors (Murati et al., 2007).

The revocation of autonomy saw a corresponding rise in human rights abuses and harassment of ethnic Albanians. Kosovo Albanians proclaimed the Republic of Kosovo via a referendum in 1991 and elected Mr. Ibrahim Rugova President in 1992. The parallel government catered to the needs of ethnic Albanians and, for the next eight years, attempted to claim independence through a non-violent resistance movement. Kosovar women became active in economic production, with women’s organizations working towards peaceful resolution of the conflict and the provision of support to local women, especially through advocacy on legislation dealing with VAW.

The non-violent resistance did not succeed in gaining independence for Kosovo. Moreover, human rights abuses and violations against Albanians by the Serbian police continued throughout the 1990s. Many young people came to reject the non-violent resistance movement and established the armed Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which was ready to use force to ensure independence for Kosovo.

In 1998, Serbian military, paramilitary and police forces initiated massive attacks in Kosovo against the KLA, using the same tactics as in Bosnia: burning villages and killing and deporting civilians i.e. ‘ethnic cleansing’. The conflict escalated and began to threaten the region as a whole, triggering intervention by the international community. Through international mediation, Serbian–Albanian talks to end the conflict commenced, but failed when Serbia refused to sign the Rambouillet Accords in 1999. Killings and massacres continued in Kosovo, and the fear of ‘another Bosnia’ provoked an international response, culminating in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing campaigns against Serbia in March 1999 (NATO, n.d.).

During the NATO air campaign, Serbian military and paramilitary forces expelled more than one million Albanians from Kosovo and killed thousands of civilians (Human Rights Watch, 2001). On 10 June 1999, after an air campaign lasting 77 days, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana announced that he had told General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to temporarily suspend NATO’s air operations against Serbia. President Milosevic eventually capitulated, with the signing of a ceasefire agreement leading to the withdrawal of Serb forces. Kosovo was placed under international administration with the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244.
Operation Joint Guardian was rapidly deployed, mandated by the United Nations Security Council with the first elements of this force entering Kosovo on 12 June 1999. By 20 June, the Serb withdrawal was complete and Kosovo Force (KFOR) was well established in Kosovo. As authorised by resolution 1244, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established as a transitional administration until 2008, when Kosovo declared its independence. The Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) was created in preparation for the first phase of self-governance. The KTC acted as a consultative forum on policy issues and included representatives from most ethnic groups within Kosovo, but had no female representative.

In December 1999, the Joint Interim Administrative Structure was established, with 17 per cent female representation (UNDG, 2001). By February 2000, it had replaced all previous parallel administrative and security structures. Following this, the Interim Administrative Council (IAC) became the main consultative body for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General’s (SRSG), resulting in a loss of status for the KTC, which once again relegated Kosovo’s women to the outskirts of decision-making processes. Although the IAC was able to discuss regulations and make public statements, the extent of its power was limited in comparison with that of the SRSG (Hall-Martin, 2010).

**Key milestones since 2003**

In accordance with decisions of the United Nations Security Council in 2005, the Secretary-General appointed the former President of Finland, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari as Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo. After 14 months of negotiations with the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo, Mr. Ahtisaari announced that no consensus could be reached given the divisive position between the two parties. In lieu of a negotiated agreement by all sides, Mr. Ahtisaari proposed that Kosovo receive conditional independence supervised by the international community, primarily the European Union (EU) and NATO and provided strong guarantees for Kosovar Serbs to manage their own affairs within a democratic Kosovo. The plan provided for an international presence which would oversee Kosovo’s institutions and monitor the settlement's implementation.

The Ahtisaari plan was accepted by the Kosovar Albanian majority in Kosovo, but the Government of Serbia rejected the plan and called for further negotiations. The Russian Federation opposed the adoption of a Security Council decision to support Mr. Ahtisaari's proposals. Instead, an EU-United States-Russian Federation 'Troika' was set up to lead new talks between Belgrade and Pristina (Deutche Welle, 2007). The negotiations ended on 10 December 2007, again without an agreed solution. On 17 February 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence as the Republic of Kosovo. With the entry into force of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo on 15 June 2008, the Kosovo authorities have continued to take steps to assert Kosovo’s statehood. Kosovo is currently recognized by 96 countries.\(^3\)  

Subsequent to the Declaration of Independence in 2008, UNMIK regulations began to be replaced by Kosovo legislation and ceased to have legal effect, with the EU’s role becoming more prominent.\(^3\) The UNMIK law enforcement and justice pillar was taken over by the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). In March 2008, the EU announced it would do a feasibility study for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo, which constituted the first formal step towards membership.

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\(^3\)According to the Republic of Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs website [http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=1,33](http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=1,33).

The feasibility study was concluded in 2012. It examined whether the political, economic and legal criteria for the Stabilization and Association Agreement had been fulfilled. It was concluded that Kosovo had put in place the institutional and legal framework necessary to start negotiating a Stabilization and Association Agreement. It was also pointed out that Kosovo continued to implement all agreements reached between Belgrade and Pristina to date in good faith and that it engaged constructively on the full range of issues with the facilitation of the EU. The conclusion of the study was that Kosovo was largely ready to open negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement, but that further reforms by Kosovo were necessary in the areas of: rule of law, judiciary, public administration, electoral reform and the Assembly, human and fundamental rights, protection of minorities, trade and internal market issues, and phytosanitary and veterinary issues (European Commission, 2012).

With regard to relations with Serbia, the first achievement in negotiations reached so far was an agreement on the regional representation of Kosovo with the denomination Kosovo* and a footnote which read: [t]his designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with resolution 1244 and the [International Court of Justice] ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence. The new arrangement, which had considerable practical and economic value, allowed Kosovo to sign new regional agreements and participate in all regional organizations and meetings. Until the agreement was reached on 24 February 2012, UNMIK represented Kosovo in both regional and international multilateral meetings (Lehne, 2012).

Technical dialogues launched in March 2011 were facilitated by Mr. Robert Cooper, counsellor to EU foreign policy chief Baroness Catherine Ashton, and proved fairly productive. Understandings were reached on the return of civil registries and cadaster records, on freedom of movement of persons and cars, on mutual recognition of diplomas, on customs stamps and, most significantly, on integrated management of the border crossings and on Kosovo’s regional representation (Lehne, 2012).

The independence of Kosovo was overseen, until September 2012, by a group made up of 23 EU countries, Turkey and the United States. The International Steering Group for Kosovo (ISG), made up of representatives of these States, decided on 2 July 2012 to end the international supervision and close the International Civilian Office (ICO). The end of the supervised independence of Kosovo was celebrated on 10 September 2012. However, because of remaining challenges particularly in northern Kosovo, which borders Serbia, the NATO-led peacekeeping mission, KFOR, was still in charge of security, while EULEX had a certain executive mandate in the country and other international institutions remain, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and United Nations entities (Lehne, 2012).

Prishtina has been unable to establish its authority over the north of its territory, where approximately 40,000 Serbs form the majority of the population. While the greater part of the Kosovo Serb population living in enclaves in the south has adjusted to Kosovo’s statehood, the northern municipality of Mitrovica still remains in the hands of ‘parallel structures’ (Lehne, 2012). However, there were hopes that this situation would change with the new agreement reached on 19 April 2013, where the Prime Ministers of both Kosovo and Serbia, Mr. Hashim Thaci and Mr. Ivica Dacic, signed an agreement in the tenth round of negotiations sponsored by Ms. Catherine Ashton (The Economist, 2013). The negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia had begun earlier in 2011 on technical issues, which had been...
resolved positively. These included free trade, recognizing customs stamps, recognizing university degrees, civil registries, freedom of movement, integrated border management, and how Kosovo was to be referred to in international conferences. The 15-point agreement was considered to have contributed to unlocking the way for both countries to continue on their path to EU integration. The first six points were concerned with an association of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo. These included the four in the north, but others in the south are free to join. They offered a full overview of economic development, education, health, and urban and rural planning. One of the most contentious provisions allowed for a Police Regional Commander for the four northern Serb majority municipalities. The four mayors will submit a list to the Ministry of the Interior, which will choose the Commander from the list. Another point states that existing Serbian security will be offered places in the equivalent Kosovo structures (Cole, 2013). A further point states that judicial authorities will be integrated and operate within the Kosovo legal framework. The Appellate Court in Pristina will establish a panel composed of a majority of Kosovo Serbs judges to deal with all Kosovo Serb majority municipalities (Vogel, 2013).

**Women and conflict in Kosovo**

Between 1998 and 1999, Kosovo saw massacres, murders, rapes and the destruction of entire villages. Women’s groups helped displaced people with food, support, medical care, shelter, living necessities and education.

After the war, the focus was on assessing people’s needs: going door to door to register women’s names, location, number of children, level of education and needs; advocating with aid agencies to prioritize construction of houses for widowed women and households headed by women; and supporting women to cope with the trauma of war. The number of women’s non-governmental organizations (NGOs) mushroomed and the nature of women’s activism began to change, with activities focused on women’s empowerment and participation in decision-making and political life.

The first political initiative undertaken by women in Kosovo involved the Platform for Action on which the Albanian Women’s League and the women’s association of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) were formed in early 1990s. During the years of parallel structures, the LDK was the main political party; thus, its women’s association became a vital factor in women’s political and civic participation. A relatively large number of women’s associations were formed, the most prominent being Motrat Qiriazi, Elena, Norma, Aureola, Legjenda and the Centre for the Protection of Women and Children. Their primary concerns were raising gender awareness, promoting women’s rights and educating women in a traditional and patriarchal society in which women were often poorly educated and seen as second-class citizens (Sterland, 2006).

Despite the many difficulties Kosovo has faced, the country has managed to create a solid legal basis and institutional foundation for achieving gender equality (Kosovar Gender Studies Centre, 2008). Although Kosovo is not party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, the documents served as guides for the development of a legal framework for gender equality in the country. CEDAW was enshrined within the Constitutional Framework - developed by UNMIK and Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISGs), as well as in the current Kosovo Constitution (Kosovar Gender Studies Centre, 2008). In both cases, UN Women supported women’s organizations in their advocacy efforts and itself promoted the inclusion of CEDAW within the highest legal act.
With support from UNIFEM and regional women’s organizations, the national action plan (NAP) for the Achievement of Gender Equality was finalized in 2003 (Maquire, 2008). It contained a detailed analysis of the current situation and made frequent reference to the need to implement national, regional and international standards on gender equality and women’s human rights.

The NAP was closely linked to the Beijing Platform for Action and (less so) to CEDAW. It recommended and laid the foundations for future action, including legislation and policy on gender equality generally, violence against women and children, and women’s participation in the public and economic spheres. Violence against women was identified as an area of concern, although less as a human rights issue than one of social welfare (Maquire, 2008). The Plan was adopted by the Government in 2004 and led to the establishment of the Office for Gender Equality in the Advisory Office for Good Governance, Human Rights, Equal Opportunities and Gender Issues in the Office of the Prime Minister. It led to the Law on Gender Equality in Kosovo (LGEK), promulgated on 7 June 2004, which contains provisions on gender equality with regard to political parties, the economy, property, and employment, and defines monitoring mechanisms and sanctions in case of violations of the law. An important development in terms of women’s representation in politics and decision-making was the introduction of a legislative gender quota reserving 30 per cent of seats on the lists of candidates running for national and local elections and in national and local assemblies. Since the 2010 election, 40 of the 120 members of the Kosovo Assembly are women. Of these, 14 per cent were elected directly, as opposed to entering on the basis of the gender quota. In the Cabinet in 2013, two out of six deputy prime ministers are women, and two out of 19 ministers are women. However, all municipal mayors and most deputy mayors are men and in the latest local elections only 353 out of 1,084 representatives elected were women.

Other important legal and policy documents related to gender and security are the Kosovo Programme for Gender Equality (KPGE) 2008-2013, the Action Plan for the Economic Empowerment of Women, the Law on Protection against Domestic Violence and the Kosovo Programme against Domestic Violence and Action Plan 2011-2014. The most recent document, still in draft form, is the National Plan for the Implementation of resolution 1325. The Plan has three objectives: to increase the participation of women in decision-making as well as peacebuilding processes; to integrate gender perspectives and increase women’s participation in security structures; and to provide and ensure access to functional mechanisms of protection, access to justice, rehabilitation and reintegration of victims of sexual violence, torture and forms of violence associated with war. The Plan also includes the budget for each activity and clearly shows implementation-related costs.

Institutions and actors focused on gender equality at national level include:

- The Agency for Gender Equality in the Office of the Prime Minister, which was initially established as the Office for Gender Equality in 2005 after the Law on Gender Equality was passed in 2004. In September 2006, it was transformed into the Agency for Gender Equality, as an executive agency responsible for promoting the equal participation of men and women in political, economic, social and cultural life, which are important determinants for the democratic functioning of institutions;

- The Advisory Office for Good Governance Division for Gender Issues, Office of the Prime Minister;

- The Unit for Gender Equality within the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo (OIK);
- Officers for gender equality in ministries; and
- The Inter-ministerial Council for Gender Equality.

Institutional mechanisms for gender equality at the local level include:

- Officers for gender equality in municipalities; and
- Municipal committees for gender equality.

Regarding representation of women in the security sector in Kosovo, recruitment of women has increased since the country was established. In 2012, women made up 14.8 per cent of the police force and some were in top decision-making positions, ranging from the ranks of Sergeant to General (UN Women, 2013). The Kosovo Police (KP) has several structures through which it aims to address women’s human rights and gender equality (see below).

Women were employed for the first time by the Kosovo Protection Corps, a civilian emergency service agency, in 1999. In 2009, this was restructured into the Kosovo Security Force (KSF). Representation of women in the KSF is 8.1 per cent, including 32.5 per cent in civilian positions and 6.4 per cent in uniformed positions in the Ministry of the National Security Force (UN Women, 2013). Overall, women’s representation in the security sectors in Kosovo is the highest within the Balkans, but much remains to be done to increase representation of women in leadership and decision-making positions. Technical dialogue with Serbia was headed by a female deputy Prime Minister which was a major achievement and was particularly notable since Kosovar women were excluded from important talks and dialogues during the war, including the final negotiations on Kosovo’s status.

With regard to implementation of resolution 1325, a comprehensive study strongly criticised the progress Kosovo has made, directing a great deal of the blame towards UNMIK (Martin, n.d.). Martin concluded that, by failing to apply resolution 1325, UNMIK and the international community served to delegitimize women’s voices in the political process and that implementation of the resolution occurred predominantly within grassroots civil movements. Poor progress in the implementation of resolution 1325 in government institutions occurred as a result of financial constraints and lack of political will. Martin highlights the vital role played by UNIFEM in the implementation of the resolution, and in raising awareness among civil society through capacity development of local women’s organizations and support to the Agency for Gender Equality (AGE).

**Key stakeholders/aid environment**

After the conflict, Kosovo began to develop legal framework and institutions starting from zero. As outlined above, resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security served as the basis for the development of Kosovo’s key gender legislation, strategies and policies and for the inclusion of civil society, especially women’s organizations, in political processes and decision-making. However, as stated by Leest (2009), there was no clear policy or strategy which practically defined the linkages between gender and security. An overview of the main stakeholders in the field of gender and security is presented in this section. The three key players are: government institutions, international organizations and civil society.

Following the NAP and the Law on Gender Equality in 2005, the AGE was established. Its mandate was to implement and monitor the Law on Gender Equality; draft policies and strategies regarding gender equality; and promote equal opportunities for men and women in all spheres of life. UNIFEM provided assistance to the AGE to draft and monitor the implementation of gender-related legislation, including the preparation of the government’s

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34 [www.abgj.rks-gov.net](http://www.abgj.rks-gov.net)
report to the CEDAW Committee (Leest, 2009). Other government bodies include the Advisory Office on Good Governance (AOOG) established in 2002; the Inter-Ministerial Working Group on Gender Equality and gender offices/officers at each ministry and municipality whose role is in monitoring and reporting on the internal implementation of gender equality legislation, policies and strategies. However, there was no budget line for the gender officers in municipalities, which limited their engagement (UN Women, 2012).

An important body at national level in the security area is the Kosovo Security Council. The Law on the Establishment Kosovo Security Council grants it a ‘strategic planning’ function, particularly with regard to systematically identifying and assessing security threats and risks, with further executive powers in situations of emergency. Working groups of the Council also include women’s NGOs. The Kosovo Security Force, launched on 21 January 2009, is tasked to conduct crisis response operations within and outside Kosovo and civil protection operations, and to support the authorities in responding to natural disasters and other emergencies. About 8 per cent of the Kosovo Protection Force is female. Due to financial and human constraints, the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare was unable to fully implement the law. Instead, it relies on non-governmental organization (NGO) shelter services to provide assistance protection to victims of domestic violence, but provides only 50 per cent of costs.

According to Maquire (2008), the KP was strongest at the regional and international levels in terms of the recruitment of women and its response to VAW. As a result of UN Women’s partnership with the KP, since 2008 gender equality and women’s human security issues have been mainstreamed in the KP academy and training on gender is a mandatory part of the curriculum (Stickings, 2011). Gender focal points have been established in each police station with a responsibility to report to headquarters on emerging or outstanding gender issues (Maquire, 2008).

The Human Rights and Gender Affairs Office within the Ministry of Justice monitors the implementation of human rights and gender-related legislation, including the LGEK. It is also responsible for reporting on human rights and gender issues, including to international agencies and mechanisms. The Ministry of Justice has established a Victims’ Advocacy and Assistance Division (VAAD) within the Department of Civil Affairs/Access to Justice. The VAAD supports access to justice for victims of crimes and promotion of their rights, with a special focus on the rights of victims of domestic violence and human trafficking.

The Kosovo Judicial Institute (KJI) is an independent professional agency responsible for the training of current and candidate judges and prosecutors in Kosovo, as well as related issues. Capacity development is conducted for actual and potential judicial office holders and related professionals on human rights standards and criminal law. In addition, the KJI assesses and organizes the preparatory exam for judges and prosecutors and implements training programmes related to promotion, training of lay judges and practical skills development.

The Ombudsperson Institution, established in 2000, was mandated to support and protect the rights and freedoms of persons according to international standards regarding human rights, including gender equality.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) in Kosovo played an important role in the process of developing laws and national plans, strategies and gender-related advocacy. The main CSO in Kosovo is the Kosovo Women’s Network (KWN), an established and self-managed

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organization with a self-set agenda and a wide range of local members. Programmatically independent from external support, KWN is able through its outreach to collect and analyse information relevant for women’s security, women’s human rights and peacebuilding, which is an important asset for security sector monitoring and public oversight (Stickings, 2011). As part of the advocacy group on the NAP, KWN was able to play a catalytic function in the passing of the Gender Equality law and in the setting up of the AGE. Through the gender mainstreaming they promote, these institutions are the engine driving the implementation of resolution 1325 in Kosovo.

A more research-focused NGO is the Kosovar Centre for Gender Studies (KCGS), established in 2002. The KCGS provided a sound contribution to filling this gaps in data and research in the field of gender and supporting advocacy on women’s issues. The Kosovo-based NGO, NORMA, has provided free legal aid since 1998. NORMA works in close cooperation with local institutions and has organized various trainings for the judiciary as well as seminars, roundtables and workshops for women on their human rights. Medika Kosovo is an NGO providing psychosocial counselling, health services, counselling and legal assistance contributing to the reduction of traumatic symptoms caused by the war - especially to victims of violence - as well as victims’ integration in social and public life. The Kosovo Rehabilitation Centre for Tortured Victims was founded in 1999 to provide treatment and rehabilitation for victims of torture. In 2008, UNIFEM supported the official registration of the RAE Women’s Network.

There are several international organizations in Kosovo active in the field of gender and security. According to Maquire (2008), a central, defining feature of the international community’s achievements in Kosovo is the involvement of women’s civil society, whose engagement led to impressive achievements. Besides UN Women, EULEX OSCE, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), UNMIK are among the most important organizations.

OSCE played a key role in the development of the legal framework on human rights and associated legislation including legislation and policies related to trafficking and gender-based violence. It supported security sector development by providing human rights and advanced training of police, lawyers and judges; specialised courses and outreach programmes to develop community-policing; and established municipal and local safety councils. Police and legal system monitors were active across five regions in Kosovo. The Mission has also supported the AGE in drafting their report on the implementation of CEDAW. In turn, UNFPA’s aim was to enhance the rights of women and young girls by working to eliminate gender-based violence (GBV). UNFPA activities included: building institutional capacity of the health sector; conducting community-based outreach to increase population awareness on the negative and harmful consequences of GBV; cooperating with CSOs working on GBV-related issues and building their capacities; and undertaking advocacy efforts to policymakers on GBV issues.

EULEX became fully operational in 2008 and within the framework of resolution 1244 to support key EU aims with regards to the visa liberalization process, the Feasibility Study for a Stabilization and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo, and the Pristina–Belgrade Dialogue. Since June 2012, EULEX has two main mandates: an advisory mandate to strengthen Kosovo’s institutions and an executive mandate on politically sensitive legal proceedings, such as those related to corruption, crime and war crimes. Gender advisors direct and oversee mechanisms for monitoring, implementation and evaluation of relevant international instruments, including resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security; perform research and analysis in the field of gender and prepare opinions, briefs and reports;
and liaise with other departments within the Mission and with Kosovo Institutions as well as local and international NGOs and civil society to promote gender equality. Furthermore, gender advisors provide assistance where necessary to Kosovo institutions for proper implementation of international and national documents on gender-related issues.

UNDP’s activities have been framed within its Gender Equality Strategy and the Eight Point Agenda (UNSCR, 1325). While advancing gender security and justice remains the principal priority, there has been an emphasis on protecting women’s social, economic, political and cultural rights within a context of sustainable livelihoods. Targeted programmes promote the accountability of government and institutions to implement gender-sensitive laws and ensure that resource mobilization, aid coordination, budgeting and funds allocation are fully gender-responsive. Finally, UNDP Kosovo aims to increase women’s roles in decision-making.

Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008, UNMIK was reconfigured and moved back from an executive role to one of monitoring and support to local institutions. The ICO was active from 2008 to 2012 and assisted in fulfilling the mandate of the International Civilian Representative, Mr. Pieter Feith, who was appointed by the International Steering Group for Kosovo on 28 February 2008. The ICO aimed to ‘ensure full implementation of Kosovo’s status settlement’ and ‘support Kosovo’s European integration’ by providing advisory services to Kosovo’s government and leaders. European Union Special Representative tracking measures focused on: a) the development of a monitoring mechanism to control training attendance on gender issues and assess follow-up (staff willingness to integrate a gender dimension into their work); b) ensuring the integration of the gender perspective in Policy and Security Advisory units in particular; and c) ensuring gender was mainstreamed internally as well as in the external guidance the ICO provided to Kosovar institutions.

As can be noted, there are many institutions and organizations which are active in the gender and security field, which implied that there may be duplication of activities or conflicting activities among stakeholders. However, this issue has been less of a problem since 2007 when the Security and Gender Coordination Group (SGG) was established. The role of the SGG has been to enhance coordination and information sharing between international and local organizations engaged in security issues and promote joint strategic actions aimed at increasing women’s safety and security in Kosovo. The current members of the group include representatives of the EU, EULEX, KFOR, OSCE, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), UNDP, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UNFPA, the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and government representatives appointed by the Deputy Prime Minister, in particular a Political Adviser to the Deputy Prime Minister, the head of AGE, the head of the Police Board for Gender Equality and representatives of women’s organizations such as KWN, Kosovo Gender Study Centre and Kvína till Kvína.

4. UN Women strategy and programming in Kosovo

Background and thematic priorities

UNIFEM was present in the Western Balkans from 1999, when an office was opened in Kosovo, until the creation of UN Women in 2011. Over the years, UNIFEM sought to advance the conditions and capacity for gender equality in Kosovo, with work focused on fostering women’s leadership for civic participation and local governance, later shifting
towards a focus on institutional capacity-building. More recently, emphasis was placed on strengthening the capacity of partners in government and civil society to advocate and network for the implementation of public policies related to gender equality. In parallel, under its South East Europe programme framework, UNIFEM also supported work focused on promoting women’s engagement in peacebuilding processes, guided by resolution 1325. While also rooted in Kosovo, this work included a strong subregional component and focus on inter-ethnic peacebuilding, within Kosovo and across borders.

UNIFEM’s work in Kosovo focused on women, peace and security. Since 2005, Kosovo has been part of and managed the two first phases of the regional project focused on implementing resolution 1325. The project was implemented in three phases: the first, Implementing United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2005–2007) also covered Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The second phase was Women Building Peace and Human Security in the Western Balkans (2008 – 2011). The third phase, Advancing the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in the Western Balkans (2011-2013), was still underway at the time of the evaluation. The Kosovo project office was also involved in two additional projects on women, peace and security: a joint EU, UN Women and UNDP programme on Women, Peace and Security (2012-2013) and a joint United Nations Kosovo team (UNKT) programme (2011- 2013) implemented by OHCHR, UN Women, UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF.

The key features of the three phases of the project in relation to Kosovo, including main activities and objectives, are summarized in the boxes below. However, this evaluation focused only on the period 2008-2012 and, more specifically, the activities analysed as part of the fieldwork mostly relate to the current third phase of the project (see below).

**Box 1: Implementing resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (Phase 1: 2005-2007)**

The overall development aims of the project were to strengthen democratic governance and promote and protect women’s human rights in the Western Balkans by:

- Strengthening the capacity of United Nations, international, regional and national security actors (as duty bearers for the fulfilment of women’s human rights), to integrate gender perspectives within their institutions and agendas (in south-east Europe, with a particular focus on BiH, Kosovo and Serbia); and

- Supporting women as rights holders to claim their rights to participate in peace negotiation and peacebuilding processes, and to influence the agenda of security actors (in SEE, with a particular focus on BiH, Kosovo and Serbia).

Main outcomes:

- Mechanisms, policies, practices strengthened by security actors to ensure women’s participation in peace negotiation processes (focusing on the future status talks on Kosovo);

- Gender equality advocates and women political leaders are positioned to influence peace and security agendas in their countries and the subregion; and

- Women’s regional peace networks are strengthened to contribute to major ongoing

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These two projects were not considered as part of the Kosovo case study, which focused on selected activities, mainly of phase three of the project implementing resolution 1325.
political processes at national and subregional levels.

Phase 1 was supported by the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and development agency.


Box 2: Women Building Peace and Human Security in the Western Balkans (Phase 2: 2008-2011)

The overall development objective of Phase 2 was to contribute to democratic governance and women’s rights in the Western Balkans by advancing the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security.

The expected outcomes of the project were:

- Security sector and relevant government institutions demonstrating increased gender sensitivity in responding to the security needs of women in the Western Balkans; and
- Strengthened capacity of gender equality advocates, including youth, to influence peace and security agendas towards increased democratization at national and regional levels in the Western Balkans.

Phase 2 was supported by the governments of Austria, Iceland and Norway.


Box 3: Advancing the Implementation of resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in the Western Balkans (Phase 3: 2011-2013)

The programme development goal is to contribute to sustainable and democratic state building in the region. The overall aims are improving capacity of key security actors and organizations and building networks of gender equality and human rights advocates to implement and monitor the commitments under resolution 1325 in national laws, policies, strategies and/or plans in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo and in the Western Balkans regionally.

Project activities are grouped under three outputs, two focused at the national level (on key security actors and women’s organizations) and one mainly regional (collaboration among both government agencies and NGOs):

- Output 1: Improved individual and institutional capacities of the key security actors at different levels to formulate, implement and effectively monitor the commitments under resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888 and 1889 (and CEDAW);
- Output 2: Increased capacities of women's organizations to effectively advocate for women's and girls' human rights and needs in conflict and post-conflict situations and monitor commitments under relevant international and national frameworks (CEDAW, Security Council resolutions, national laws, strategies and action plans); and
- Output 3: Enhanced regional cooperation, coordination and networking among
specialized governmental and non-governmental actors towards fulfilment of women's and girls' human rights and security needs in South East Europe/ Western Balkans.

Key partners and primary beneficiaries include security actors such as the ministries of defence, police, judiciary, parliaments (selected committees and women’s caucuses), women’s and human rights organizations and networks working to protect and promote women’s human rights, security and women’s participation in public life and decision-making. Ultimate beneficiaries of the project are women, victims of war (including those who experienced sexual violence), women exposed to interethnic and religious frictions/multiple discrimination and women in the security sector (and in decision-making positions).

Phase 3 is funded by the Government of Norway, together with in-kind contributions provided for the first year of project implementation by the Government of Iceland. Additional funds have been secured from the Government of Hungary and the Austrian Development Agency.


Transition from UNIFEM to UN Women

While the formal transition to UN Women was completed as of 2011, there was still a certain level of confusion and uncertainty both within the UN Women-Kosovo office and amongst national partners (see below). In particular, neither the new staffing arrangements nor the new organization structure vis-à-vis the regional office (likely to be based in Istanbul, though this was not certain at the time of the fieldwork) have been finalized. It was relatively clear, however, that UN Women-Kosovo will not be an independent country office and that the funding environment will not substantially change (if anything, the expectation was that there will be even more need to secure external funding as a result of reduced core funding).

Most external stakeholders were not aware of this transition. From interviews, a range of views were expressed about the risks of ‘moving away’ from the UNIFEM model and experience, which in the main was perceived as very positive and effective. There was confusion as to what the new arrangement would entail and no sense as to what the new mandate would bring in terms of inter-agency dialogue and collaboration. Most respondents lacked a clear understanding of precisely what the changes might be, and of UN Women’s current priorities and planned future work, highlighting a lack of visibility of the transition process itself. These issues are further explored below.

Description of selected programmes/activities

The Kosovo case study focused on some specific activities of the project Advancing the Implementation of resolution 1325 on women, peace and security in the Western Balkans (Phase 3), including:

- Security sector reform (and collaboration with the KP in particular);
- The support and leadership of the Security Gender Co-ordination Group, formed by key national stakeholders as well as international agencies;
- Capacity-building and support of national NGOs and CSOs;
- Training and support for the judiciary (to a limited extent); and
- Support and implementation of NAPs on gender.
Given the integrated nature of the programme, the case study also looked at a number of programme-level issues and priorities and engaged with a variety of stakeholders. However, the case study did not focus at all on issues of regional collaboration, as the focus was on the country experience and UN Women-Kosovo presence. On reflection, this was a limitation, as the regional dimension is a distinctive feature of this project and of UN Women strategy in the Balkans.

5. Findings

Theories of change

Clear theories of change were not explicitly articulated at either the overall programme or activities/project levels, as noted by a number of previous programme evaluations and confirmed by the evaluation team’s analysis of the programme documents. Before the field visit it was hard to get a general picture of what the logic underpinning the programme was, based on documentary analysis only. Yet the interviews with key stakeholders and a few in-depth conversations with the UN Women-Kosovo Officer in Charge (OIC) revealed a fairly distinct, if implicit, approach to the work on women, peace and security.

It was generally agreed that UN Women-Kosovo played a pivotal role on all kinds of gender-related policies and processes on Kosovo, and on peace and security in particular. However, it did not achieve this by ‘leading’ the sector in any particular way. Rather, it focused on:

- Brokering a productive dialogue between different, often divisive, constituencies working on women’s issues in Kosovo, especially between frontline NGOs/activist women’s groups, politicians/policy makers and international agencies (especially UNMIK in the post-war years). An example of this approach in relation to peace and security programming on women’s leadership was the regional dialogue between women’s leaders (and specifically between Kosovo and Serbia representatives), which was actively supported by UN Women-Kosovo;

- Adopting an independent/neutral yet politically savvy approach to engaging in political and policy processes. In practice this meant proactively seeking opportunities to influence not only policy processes, but crucially to identify gender champions and change brokers at different levels. In relation to women’s participation and leadership, longstanding collaborations with women, men, leaders and politicians were developed, initially through intensive training and capacity-building, followed by more direct support and partnerships;

- Adopting a deliberate strategy of supporting and collaborating with local organizations and actors behind the scenes, ensuring local ownership and commitment to reform. As a result a network of influential individuals was developed who have been engaging with UN Women-Kosovo over the years and are now in positions of power or influence, including the Deputy Prime Minister (and regional negotiator), prominent Members of Parliament (MPs) and advisors to the President;

- Maintaining high levels of flexibility and adaptability throughout the programme cycle to be able to respond to the fluid political processes and to seize opportunities when they arose. In Kosovo this was particularly relevant when considering the evolution from the immediate post-war years to the early 2000s, through to the state formation period leading to
independence in 2008, all the way to the current negotiations in the region and beyond to achieve full recognition; and

- ‘Knocking on doors’ which was a persistent strategy of intensive engagement with key players and actors to ensure that change was enforced and embedded in practice. Even if it was not formally recorded in reports, this constituted ongoing monitoring of programme activities.

None of these features were explicitly described or captured by programme documents or previous evaluations. As such, this case study presented an opportunity to put them to the test and for UN Women-Kosovo to build on this analysis and refine it in future strategies/engagement. The diagram below represents the salient features of the UN Women-Kosovo approach and how they related to one another in a potential theory of change underpinning the regional programme on peace and security.
Figure 1. Theory of change for UN Women’s peace and security work in Kosovo

**Inputs**
- Intensive training and training for trainers on women and peace and security, often repeated over time with key constituencies: police, judges, NGOs.
- Technical support for NAPs processes, including budgeting and indicators.
- Technical support to women’s caucuses and other key groups of women in politics.
- Identify and ‘hook’ future leaders and reformers.
- Convene and chair the SGG on a regular basis and carry out some joint initiatives.
- Target male leaders and champions.
- Convene regional meetings to foster dialogue with women groups.
- Initial awareness-raising on war VAW as war crime.

**Outputs**
- Key security institutions (e.g., KP and KSF) have regulations and posts in place to ensure gender mainstreaming.
- Overall increased capacity of NGOs and CSOs to engage in policy processes.
- Greater numbers of women are recruited and retained within national security institutions.
- Future leaders and reform champions are sensitized and make attempts to ensure efforts to address women’s peace and security are mainstreamed/regularly addressed.
- NAP and law on gender equality approved.
- Regional dialogue occurs on a regular basis and is well attended by women leaders across region.
- SGG meets on a regular basis and members are up to date on priorities.

**Underlying assumptions**
- No setbacks in independence process and handover of power/institutions.
- UN Women has sufficient resources and a clear mandate to support peace and security processes.
- Incentives will be in place to take action/implement new policies and laws.
- There is sufficient clarity within United Nations entities and other key players (e.g., the EU) in what UN Women Kosovo is trying to achieve and how that can be complemented.
- Regional women’s lobby will contribute/input to negotiations.

**Outcomes**
- Gender is mainstreamed across different institutions dealing with peace and security.
- SSRs in Kosovo create more secure environments for women
- Different groups are able to negotiate and agree key outputs (e.g., NAP).
Evaluation questions

**Dimension 1: UN Women’s policy and strategic direction**

In what ways did UN Women influence policies and practice (within the United Nations system as well as in key external agencies) in relation to women’s political participation and leadership in peace and security?

**UN Women-Kosovo influence on Kosovo policy development**

UN Women undoubtedly influenced policy development in relation to women’s political participation and leadership in Kosovo, with the clearest example being UN Women-Kosovo’s role in supporting the process for the development and implementation of NAPs and laws. It was widely agreed that UNIFEM played a crucial role in the support, development and negotiations leading up to the adoption of the first Kosovo Action Plan for the Achievement of Gender Equality, which was agreed by the Kosovo Council of Ministers in 2004 and paved the way for subsequent reforms. Of particular note was the adoption of the LGEK in 2004 and, in 2005, the creation of AGE within the Prime Minister’s Office. UN Women Kosovo also supported directly the establishment of the Unit for Gender Equality within the Ombudsman Institution in Kosovo; municipal committees for gender equality; the Inter-ministerial Council for Gender Equality, which in turn supported the establishment of gender equality officers in ministries; and finally, supported UNMIK Office of gender affairs on the establishment of the Officers for gender equality in municipalities. UN Women-Kosovo also supported and provided technical assistance to the working group recently responsible for developing the Kosovo NAP to implement resolution 1325, which was nearing completion.

The adoption of plans and laws, the UN Women-Kosovo role in the negotiating processes leading up to it, and the highly successful participatory approach adopted by UN Women-Kosovo which focused on process as well as intended policy outcomes, were all of interest to the evaluation.

Most respondents agreed that UN Women-Kosovo played a pivotal role in NAP processes in a number of ways, consistent with the theory of change described above. In practice, UN Women played a key role in facilitating the development of the NAP for the implementation of resolution 1325 in Kosovo by ensuring (i) a high level of political support for development of the NAP (the NAP itself was initiated through the Office of the Prime Minister while development was being chaired by AGE; and (ii) the application of a multi-stakeholder approach in the development of the NAP which featured a high level of interministerial and civil society collaboration within the context of the working group appointed by the Deputy Prime Minister of Kosovo. The working group was comprised of 28 members including representatives of the government, the judiciary, CSOs and security actors.

Although assessing the impact of the NAP and other polices and legislations adopted with the support of UN Women-Kosovo was beyond the scope of this evaluation, respondents agreed that the 2004 NAP and law on gender equality represented a critical juncture for policy development in which UN Women-Kosovo had been instrumental in brokering a productive

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38 The LGEK was adopted by the Kosovo Assembly on 19 February 2004 (Law No. 2004/2) and promulgated by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in UNMIK Regulation 2004/18 on 7 June 2004 (UNMIK/REG/2004/18). Among other things, the law specifically mandates the development of a Kosovo Programme for Gender Equality.
39 The approach was replicated in Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia (2005-2007) and the Kosovo OIC was directly involved.
dialogue between women’s activist groups and UNMIK. It was too early to judge the effectiveness of the new NAP on resolution 1325, as it had not yet been approved. It was also difficult to gauge the expectations of the key stakeholders in terms of its potential relevance.

**UN Women-Kosovo influence on United Nations and EU policies and practices in Kosovo**

The main mechanism for engagement with other United Nations entities and key players on women in peace and security is the SGG, which is chaired by UN Women-Kosovo. The SGG was composed of representatives from national institutions (KP, AGE, Ministry for the KSF, Office of the Prime Minister and Office of the Deputy Prime Minister), women’s organizations (KWN, Kosovo Gender Studies Centre and Kvinnna till Kvinnna), international organizations (the EU, EULEX, OSCE, NATO/KFOR, UNMIK) and nine United Nations entities (UN-Habitat, UN Women, UNDP, UNFPA, OHCHR, UNICEF, UNOPS, UNHCR and WHO). The group aims to enhance coordination and information sharing between local and international organizations engaged in security issues and promote joint strategic actions aimed at increasing women’s safety and security in Kosovo.

Overall, the SGG members interviewed agreed that the group was a very useful mechanism for coordination and information exchange, as well as an effective forum to agree joint activities (including joint initiatives for international days and other campaigns) or for compiling joint positions/statements (for example in relation to the Kosovo Security Strategy), despite members having different mandates and levels of engagement.

While very successful in its coordination and information function, in the main the SGG was not meant to be a channel for UN Women-Kosovo to influence the policies and practices of other United Nations entities. Yet according to respondents, it was the only concrete mechanism in place for inter-agency coordination, and in practice it achieved a number of strategic functions related to progressing gender issues in Kosovo way beyond its intended mandate.

UN Women-Kosovo was clearly very effective at building coalitions with national (and regional) organizations and institutions and was considered the lead agency on women and peace and security issues by national stakeholders. Given its limited human and financial resources, this was a particularly impressive achievement for UN Women Kosovo. Some respondents suggested that, with more capacity and resources, the office could be even more influential vis-à-vis other international key players, including United Nations entities, UNKT and especially the EU. In turn, this would allow UN Women (as a whole, not just the Kosovo country office) to have a greater impact on broader political processes (for example, the regional women’s dialogue and negotiations), although a much more joined up approach with other key international agencies in Kosovo and in the region would be required.

**How sustainable were the efforts and results of UN Women policy influencing/engagement?**

Most international agencies have been downsizing or leaving Kosovo since independence in 2008 and there was a clear trend of handing over power and authority to the new national institutions. Against this context, issues of sustainability, downsizing and ‘exit strategies’, including for UN Women-Kosovo, arose. In light of a potential draw-down, there are at least two ways to consider the office’s achievements.

First, it achieved significant results in terms of women’s leadership and participation in peace and security (see below). Much of what has been achieved is now integrated into either law or practice in a manner that no longer, or only partially, requires direct UN Women support. For example, UN Women-supported reforms of the KP included the creation of gender
advisor positions/focal points, rules and regulations and very well embedded practices (e.g. regular monitoring of numbers of female officers and their reasons for leaving the force).

Second, and perhaps the more important consideration, concerned the UN Women’s deliberate strategy to ensure sustainability through strategic identifying and collaborating with key players and organizations who were seen as ‘reform champions’ and committed to sustainable change. In practice, UN Women supported a network of organizations and individuals at the forefront of the reform agenda for women’s leadership in peace and security, including national coalitions and NGOs such as the KWN, and individuals such as the Deputy Prime Minister.

In many ways the key features of this approach, including informed political approach and taking a back seat, were interlinked with ownership and sustainability. Again, this was a remarkable achievement given the small size of the office. From an institutional perspective there were some risks in terms of sustainability, as most of the staffing arrangements appeared to be very short-term and subject to external funding availability.

To what extent did the current policy/strategic direction reflect the lessons learned from policy engagement on peace and security and humanitarian response since 2008 and how fit for purpose was it for the new UN Women mandate?

The current portfolio of UN Women-Kosovo’s work on peace and security has evolved over the years in line with political and security developments in Kosovo. In particular in the lead-up to and aftermath of independence in 2008, a number of opportunities have opened up to engage and shape political processes and institutions, as well as new legislation and ‘rules of the game’ of the newly created state. However, it was important to recognise that the United Nations’ neutral position towards the status of Kosovo also created significant challenges for UN Women-Kosovo, including balancing the instructions from the UN Women headquarters on the one hand and the requests of the newly created Government of Kosovo on the other (for example in relation to what logo and official terminology to use when describing the newly created state). In practice, this situation restricted the work of the country office with several ministries and other state institutions (for example, with the Ministry of Security, KSF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Despite these challenges, UN Women-Kosovo was able to increase and diversify its portfolio of activities, increasingly building on an initial focus on civil society support and training. While the activities of the third phase of the project had certainly evolved and adapted to the fluid political context where it operated, it was not clear whether this was the result of ‘learning lessons’ from policy engagement (or at least, not only), or a natural evolution of the project and the relationships with its various stakeholders. For example, the project is now focusing on issues such as VAW during the war as a result of a certain broadening of interests and a political commitment that only recently developed in Kosovo.

While this ‘adaptive’ approach produced a number of positive results (see below), it may fall short of recognizing and addressing problems/limitations as they arise, as no formal mechanism was in place to monitor and review existing theories of change and related assumptions.

In relation to the new mandate and policy direction of UN Women, the Kosovo regional peace and security programme was firmly grounded in the direction and priorities set out in resolution 1325 (and previously on CEDAW). The strategic role played by UN Women-Kosovo in the processes leading up to the NAP on gender equality and the current efforts to see through the approval on a NAP on the implementation of resolution 1325 were both
examples of UN Women-Kosovo’s capacity to translate global policy direction into national policy engagement.

**Dimension 2: UN Women’s policies, programming and operations**

To what extent did UN Women programmes achieve the expected results? What explained variations?

All three phases of the resolution 1325 regional project (implemented between 2005 and 2013) were monitored or evaluated by independent evaluators and regular reports were submitted to the donors, including the Austrian Development Agency, the Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. A number of these evaluations pointed to the absence of an overarching programme logic and explicit results chain (Hancilova, 2011). For this reason it was difficult to identify clear ‘expected’ results in programme documents or assess the extent to which the observed results were in line with the original objectives. However, it was important to recognise that, although not explicitly, the programme was underpinned by a fairly clear and context specific, relevant theory of change, which helped to ensure that some concrete and sustainable results were achieved.

An assessment of results in all areas of the programme is beyond the scope of this evaluation. What follows is therefore a selection of the most relevant findings in relation to specific activities/interventions of relevance for this exercise, followed by some considerations on limitations/constraints of effectiveness.

With the support of UN Women-Kosovo, a number of results were achieved in terms of mainstreaming gender in the organizational structures of the KP, and more broadly ensuring that the security sector’s activities reflected the needs of women in their communities:

- The KP established a Gender Unit and gender focal points in many provinces. The number of female police officers has been growing for several years. When this trend was changing due to female officers leaving the KP, a monitoring system was developed to better understand the reasons behind this and corrective measures were put in place (for example, by changing the terms of maternity leave).

- Gender training was institutionalized and is now a core component of the Police Academy curriculum which has resulted in an improved capacity of the KP to better address gender issues (for example, it contributed to the drafting of the Domestic Violence Law).

- Establishment of coordination mechanisms for domestic violence in three pilot municipalities. The coordination mechanism includes all institutions that address domestic violence and support domestic violence survivors. For example, the municipality of Gjilan committed to assigning a person to coordinate the range of efforts and processes to address domestic violence.

- Perhaps most significantly, the gender equality training for the KP made a significant impact on key actors’ attitudes to dealing with GBV and improved the prospects for close collaboration between security actors, local authorities, judges, prosecutors and women’s NGOs, helping to
ensure a holistic community response to women’s security needs.

- Identification of key male and female champions in the management and leadership of the KP. Critically, these key individuals continued to champion gender mainstreaming in security policies and institutions beyond their terms with the KP, as lead politicians and parliamentarians, for example.

- UN Women-Kosovo support was phased out from most of these areas as they became institutionalized in the KP. The current focus is on supporting the creation of the first Women’s Police Association, which will be an important next step to ensure the sustainability of what has been achieved to date.

As a result of these changes, the ability of the KP to deliver security as a public service significantly improved and other key security institutions, such as the Kosovo Protection Corps, were also supported by UN Women-Kosovo for mainstreaming gender within their structures and programmes. The KSF, while not directly supported by UN Women-Kosovo, also benefited from the broader lessons and results.

The increased capacity and visibility of some of the main women’s groups/organizations in Kosovo, especially in terms of policy engagement and institutional dialogue, was another concrete result of UN Women-Kosovo support. In practice, it contributed to a much more vibrant and capable sector as a whole, which is today able to contribute and influence the policy agenda in a number of key areas. Examples include:

- Collaboration with *Medica Kosova*, a specialised NGO working on issues of sexual and gender-based violence and VAW. UN Women-Kosovo has supported and contributed to strengthening the capacity of this organization since 1999, in particular on issues of GBV which have been prevalent in Kosovo since before the war. Many years of experience in medical, legal and psychological/social support have given *Medica Kosova* significant credibility, as well as a presence in many parts of the country. As a result, they have raised awareness of VAW, the stigma attached to domestic violence and, together with other key actors, generated a national dialogue/process to recognize and start to address the problem. Also, as a result of the progress made over the years on issues of VAW and GBV, opportunities have arisen recently to start to address the complex issue of wartime sexual violence and redress/reparation for rape survivors which was particularly significant. There is work towards improving access to justice for rape survivors, prosecution of perpetrators, as well as exploring different reparation options (for example, the recognition of rape survivors as civilian victims of war and entitlements to war pensions). This is a key and extremely complex area for the peace process in Kosovo and certainly a priority when it comes to issues of women in peace and security processes.

- UN Women-Kosovo supported important inter-ethnic dialogues within Kosovo and in the region. Of particular note was its collaboration with the Roma, Ashkaly, Egyptian (RAE) Women’s Network. Started in 2006, RAE Women’s Network was a good (and rare) example of a long-term strategy and investment in citizens who were routinely excluded and marginalized, including by education and professional organizations.
Given the time and human resources needed and the relatively low results they are likely to achieve, international organizations rarely focus on building such local structures, characterized by highly informal networks and rules. Through a combination of hands-on support, intensive and tailored training, and especially the brokering of relationships to ensure that RAE women had the capacity and opportunity to engage in policy dialogue and other activities, UN Women-Kosovo helped RAE Women’s Network develop into an autonomous organization able to fundraise with major international organizations and to meaningfully engage in a number of processes/programmes (for example, commenting on and contributing to EU reports). UN Women-Kosovo achieved this by explicitly designing and implementing an exit strategy to ensure the final objective of supporting the development of a self-reliant organization.

In addition to these specific examples of results on the ground, UN Women-Kosovo (and UNIFEM) achieved a strategic and yet often overlooked result. It created and fostered a network of reformers and champions, women and men across the political spectrum, from the highest level of national leadership (e.g. the Deputy Prime Minister, who has been working with UN Women-Kosovo since just after the war), to grassroots activists and women’s groups. UN Women-Kosovo plays a pivotal role in keeping this network alive by convening activities, brokering dialogues and fostering partnerships, mostly behind the scenes. There was consensus amongst the respondents that this was made possible by the relentless hard work, commitment and vision of the very small UN Women-Kosovo staff, and particularly the OIC. The level of trust and credibility that she enjoys amongst all key actors is remarkable and an invaluable asset for UN Women-Kosovo in the country and region. While this is a somewhat intangible result, it was too often overlooked by evaluations and yet was instrumental for more concrete changes to happen in practice.

Despite these results and achievements, there were some constraints and limitations to UN Women-Kosovo’s strategy and approach in Kosovo that prevented the achievement of some key objectives. The two most important were:

- The risk of efforts being spread too thin, probably due to a lack of explicit strategy at the programme level, which on the one hand allowed enough flexibility to adapt to emerging priorities, but on the other did not achieve sufficient focus on the most pressing ones. Going forward, especially in a less predictable funding environment, prioritizing fewer interventions in key strategic areas (for instance, in Serbia negotiations and in war crimes against women) will be important; and

- The somewhat limited capacity of UN Women-Kosovo to influence change at the ‘higher’ level of policy and political engagement. Most of UN Women-Kosovo’s work focused on issues of women and peace and security in relation to policy and practice at the national and local level, with a strong emphasis on building the capacity of local organizations, especially NGOs and women’s groups. There were only a few notable examples of collaboration with key politicians and leaders, yet there was a sense that more could be done to engage with a wider range of actors and individuals (for example, women in academia, but also international networks beyond the regional networks with which UN Women-Kosovo already engages). Engaging with these actors would ensure more direct influence over key political processes (such as peace negotiations at the
regional level and political processes to secure international recognition) which, at present, but also in the more immediate post-war period and negotiations, did not sufficiently focus on gender. In practice, while the regional women’s network and dialogue holds the potential to address some of this and actors involved find it valuable, progress has been slow.

While both of these issues were potentially important to ensure that UN Women-Kosovo had the greatest possible impact in Kosovo peace and security processes, it was important to recognise that the second constraint goes far beyond what UN Women-Kosovo as a project office can achieve on its own with its limited capacity. As such, this is something to be tackled by the international community as a whole, under the leadership of the UN Women at the international (not only regional) level, but with the involvement and backing of key players such as the EU. It was unclear what the mechanisms within Kosovo (or the region) could be for this to happen in the short- and medium-term.

To what extent was UN Women able to translate global policy/strategies into programmatic work?

As noted above, the regional programme on peace and security aimed at implementing resolution 1325, which provides the overall policy framework for the activities. The current phase focuses on the following key dimensions of the resolution 1325/UN Women global strategy:

- Increase women’s leadership and participation;
- Increase women’s leadership in peace, security and humanitarian response; and
- A comprehensive set of global norms, policies and standards on gender equality and women’s empowerment that is dynamic, responds to new and emerging issues, challenges and opportunities, and provides a firm basis for action by governments and stakeholders at all levels.

In practice, the technical support to the working group responsible for developing the NAP on implementing resolution 1325 was perhaps the most tangible example of UN Women-Kosovo effort to translate global strategies in programmatic work. In the past UN Women-Kosovo also played a critical role in supporting CEDAW reporting.

Despite these links with global policies and corporate strategies, the focus of the Kosovo programme was very much responsive to the specific political, security and social context in which it was developed. What was perhaps unique about this programme was its regional dimension, all the more relevant given the regional drivers of the conflict, peace processes and ensuing political processes, especially Kosovo independence in the context of Serbia/Kosovo relations. However, the regional programme and strategies were not the focus of this case study, so it was not possible to assess the results in any more detail here.

To what extent were UN Women programmes tailored to the specific socio-political, cultural and economic context in which they operate? How was this translated into programme design and planning?

Tailoring of the programme was a very clear area of success for UN Women in Kosovo, at least in relation to its engagement with the national context (the case study did not consider the regional component). All programme activities that were observed during this case study revealed a very sound understanding of the political and social context in which UN Women-
Kosovo operates, including realistic approaches on how best to identify opportunities for reform and on how to seize them. Such approaches include the capacity to adopt very politically aware strategies and reasonably calculated risks in terms of programmatic decision-making. In practice, and as noted above, this often translated in UN Women-Kosovo adopting a very specific, often behind the scenes brokering role between key national stakeholders, both within and outside the state, combined with an explicit strategy of directly targeting and engaging the most influential individuals with a strong commitment to reform.

Most respondents confirmed that UN Women-Kosovo was highly effective at tailoring and adapting their programmes to the actual needs, priorities and opportunities that were most relevant and pressing in Kosovo, as well as to the rapidly changing institutional environment of the post-war years. Such flexibility should not be interpreted as short termism, however, as the programme relied on well-established collaborations, often in place since the early 2000s. Long-term commitment is a key ingredient of being able to respond to context and work politically, as it forms the basis of trustworthy relationships with local actors.

The same strategy of behind the scenes support and profile was, to some extent, also adopted vis-à-vis the international community in Kosovo, although here the results in terms of capacity to influence policies and practice were more mixed (see comments under Dimension 1).

It was worth noting that, while much of this ‘political economy analysis’ informs programmes and activities, it was not clearly laid out in programmatic documents. Rather, it tended to remain implicit in the minds of UN Women-Kosovo key staff (and partners). However, the logic (and the history) behind current programmatic approaches and choices were revealed during the interviews and are certainly an area worth documenting in more detail in future research and evaluation efforts, as it would provide useful lessons across different UN Women-Kosovo programmes.

How effective was UN Women at identifying and using key opportunities and partnerships at country level?

AND

How effective were UN Women programmes at fostering/strengthening national ownership through country engagement of intended outcomes regarding improved leadership and participation of women in relevant peace and security and humanitarian response intervention/process?

In stark contrast to the feedback on international agencies which have been active in Kosovo in significant capacity since the war, UN Women-Kosovo enjoyed a very high degree of credibility and trust with all local and national stakeholders at different levels. This was a direct result of the implicit theory of change underpinning much of UN Women-Kosovo activities: a combination of (i) long-term meaningful partnerships and collaboration with key organizations and (ii) vision and deliberate strategy of targeting influential individuals and future leaders (including male champions). Some respondents reported that UN Women-Kosovo very effectively used the array of roles available to international actors to engage with partners and shape the relationships.

Existing partnerships included at least three types of organizations/institutions:

- Women’s NGOs and CSOs (including KWN, KGSC, Norma, Medica Kosova, RAE Women’s Network, etc.);
Issue specific institutions (e.g. KP, KJI, AGE); and

Networks and coalitions (e.g. the SGG, caucuses of women Members of Parliament, Regional Women’s Lobby, etc.).

In relation to individuals, as mentioned above, UN Women-Kosovo had longstanding collaborations with influential decision-makers who were able to progress the women’s peace and security agenda in different institutions. They included the Deputy Prime Minister and lead negotiator with Serbia, the former head of the police (now a Member of Parliament) and some of the advisors in the inner circle of the President, as well in the Prime Minister’s office. These relationships were not surprising as such, as most international agencies in Kosovo were likely to have contacts at the highest institutional and political level. What is striking, however, was how these relationships were deeply rooted. Since none of these individuals were in such positions of power was testament to UN Women-Kosovo’s ability to spot leadership skills and potential change-makers in the very early days of their engagement in the country.

All these relationships were underpinned by very strong ownership on the partner side of all activities and interventions. As noted above, UN Women-Kosovo adopted a fairly low key/behind the scenes role with partners setting the directions.

Improvement here can be made, especially in relation to broadening collaborations with other key groups/actors (e.g. academia and stronger links with international groups) to ensure greater reach of UN Women-Kosovo activities and to gain better support for increasing UN Women-Kosovo effectiveness. It was also worth noting that, until recently, there was very little in terms of formal screening and selection of partners. Recent attempts to scrutinise proposals more closely and select partners/project proposals on the basis of competitive tendering were not welcomed by all existing partners, but were a necessary correction to existing practices.

Assessing the regional component of UN Women-Kosovo work was beyond the scope of this exercise, even though it was almost certainly a significant factor in UN Women-Kosovo’s ability to achieve its objectives on women in peace and security across the region.

In what ways did the new mandate/reorganization provide opportunities to improve programme effectiveness and coherence between UN Women policies and operational engagement?

The transition to UN Women was not complete at the time of the evaluation and the confusion (and some apprehensions) around it made it difficult to assess at this stage whether or not it will provide opportunities. Partners lacked information and/or understanding (some NGOs associated the transition to UN Women with tighter regulations on funding processes, for example), together with some expectations about what the new entity would be able to achieve, (for example, in terms of greater influencing capacity with the United Nations and vis-à-vis other United Nations entities). One respondent expressed concern that the transition to UN Women would not address the substantial lack of strategic vision at leadership level of the entity, mainly in New York, reflected down to all other levels. There was an urgent need to communicate with partners the details of the transition process and what it would entail in practice at the country level due, in part, to UNIFEM being considered ‘trusted’ brand in Kosovo. The change therefore carried some risks in terms of reputation and perceptions amongst national stakeholders.

Uncertainties within the UN Women-Kosovo office about the employment arrangements of key staff, their status within the United Nations system, their relationship with the new
regional office (as Kosovo will not be a country office and it is likely to be managed by a different regional office) etc., were also evident. These issues were not explored in any detail during the case study, partly because changes were taking place during the team visit. The evaluation team noted the commitment of an overworked team going through what appeared to be substantial changes.

The office will need to continue fundraising in order to implement its activities and the transition to UN Women will not bring about significant changes on this front.

How innovative was UN Women in its programmatic approaches and what lessons were learned that can be replicated in different contexts?

As mentioned above, the distinctive feature of UN Women-Kosovo is the ‘trusted broker’ approach, combined with a vision and determination to identify future leaders and reform champions able to embed changes at the heart of institutions, behaviour and practices. UN Women-Kosovo demonstrated an ability to spot and seize opportunities for change very early on, for example, in their lobbying strategy for the gender equality law. Combined, these features suggested an innovative approach that was quite rare to see working effectively in practice, even though it was often recognized as a potentially good strategy for success. However, in reality, the approach was difficult to operationalize because it required long-term commitment in the country and in-depth knowledge of its structures, institutions and history. It also required being able to develop and nurture relationships at different levels, which required trust and legitimacy, neither of which were easy to find in the relationship between international agencies and national institutions or actors.

The experiences and achievements in Kosovo in this respect were certainly worth documenting more thoroughly, with a view to sharing lessons in different contexts. However, some caution is needed in terms of ‘exporting or replicating the model’, for at least two reasons:

- UN Women-Kosovo project office enjoys very high levels of trust and profile among the Kosovo institutions due to the strong leadership of an OIC who was supported by a very small group of project personnel with high turnover. In practice, it was the profile, credibility, political skills, knowledge of the context and, above all, personal commitment of the office staff that made the difference, not the model as such, which in itself carries some considerable risks (staff turnover, uncertainty of resources and morale, overwork, etc.); and

- However generic the features of the model may have been (brokering, credibility, etc.) the way it worked in practice was very context specific and not necessarily easy to replicate in other contexts/countries. The combination of leadership, knowledge and the ensuing level of trust and profile in the countries were unique features of the Kosovo case.

Finally, the potential trade-off between the adaptive and flexible model adopted by UN Women in Kosovo and the need to establish clear strategic priorities and directions was worth reemphasizing. It was certainly made more difficult by the challenges of reconciling global and subregional strategies with a volatile political environment, uncertainty of funds, and the unclear institutional and staffing arrangements of the project office.

Dimension 3: UN Women’s organizational capacities, resources and structures
UN Women-Kosovo has always been a project office, with an uncertain staffing structure and funding. For years the office was not allocated any United Nations staff and was entirely run by service contractors, including the OIC, often supported by UN Volunteers (UNVs), experts on mission and/or interns. The office is programmatically and operationally supported by the regional office in Bratislava (Slovakia), which closed in 2013. The OIC represented UN Women in the UNKT and other personnel actively contributed to United Nations country team work. The ‘quasi country office’ status was a significant challenge to the day-to-day operations of the team, as well as to any realistic chance to scale up the impressive results achieved thus far and achieve greater and more sustainable impact in terms of women’s leadership and participation in peace and security policies and practices across the country.

Staff were overstretched and there was an overall sense of urgency underpinning most activities. Most respondents recognized the commitment and hard work of the team and how much it was able to achieve with such limited resources.

In terms of financial resources, the Bratislava regional office played a critical role in securing the funding for the three phases of the regional resolution 1325 project and, more generally, it played a critical support role for the Kosovo project office. There were concerns among the UN Women-Kosovo staff that they will be under even more pressure to fundraise for all activities.

UN Women-Kosovo successfully engaged a number of different donors. However, these relationships were somewhat ad hoc and short-term, with different agencies funding different phases of the programme (Austria, Norway and Sweden). Even though Norway has funded UN Women-Kosovo since the second phase (2007), there was little sense of this being a key partnership or a long-term engagement.

How fit for purpose was UN Women in terms of the technical skills of its staff and its broader capacity to fulfil its mandate?

All UN Women-Kosovo service contractors, UNVs, interns and secondees appeared to have very sound technical and administrative skills and were all very committed. As mentioned above, the OIC possessed fairly unique political and negotiating skills, as well as many years of experience of grassroots engagement and training. Perhaps what was most lacking were additional research and analytical skills to ensure that some of the ideas underpinning the programmes were adequately captured and reflected upon throughout programme design and implementation.

Finally, in order to fully implement and make the most of the new mandate, additional skills and knowledge of the United Nations and international system, ideally at the higher level, would be extremely beneficial.
level, even more crucial strategic coordination could be achieved, especially in terms of the peace process and key negotiations with Serbia. Collaboration with UNDP existed, but it was mainly at the project/operational level.

| How effectively did UN Women manage risks in its operations? What strategies worked best? |
| How fit for purpose were UN Women M&E and reporting systems? Did they adequately capture lessons learned on results and impact? |

Formal mechanisms to assess risks, other than the traditional logframe, did not exist. However, the politically shrewd approach adopted by UN Women-Kosovo entailed a certain amount of risk taking, especially in terms of brokering ‘deals’ between very divisive groupings or engaging with politicized processes.

Regular reporting was submitted to donors, but was not structured to facilitate internal learning or sharing lessons with partners. There were plenty of publications which described different components of the programme and to some extent results and achievements, but again they did not offer much reflection on lessons learned, what worked well and why, and what could be done about it. Improvements in this area would help strengthen and build on the current work.

**Overall analysis, and implications for policy, programming and practice**

Overall, UN Women-Kosovo had a sound approach on women’s leadership and participation programming in peace and security. Some of the most salient features of the underlying (and mostly implicit) theory of change included being able to broker a productive dialogue between different, often divisive, constituencies working on women’s issues in Kosovo and adopting a politically informed approach to building long-standing relationships with leaders and decision-makers. To ensure local ownership and commitment, UN Women-Kosovo adopted a deliberate strategy of operating behind the scenes, whilst still clearly maintaining its role as lead organization in the field. Above all, UN Women-Kosovo staff enjoyed significant trust and credibility amongst all key national stakeholders which, combined with fairly out of the ordinary commitment and motivation, positioned UN Women-Kosovo in a unique role as a pivotal ‘deal broker’ in many legislative, policy and operational changes.

Significant results were achieved in a number of programmatic areas, including SSR and addressing GBV, as well as meaningful policy development and implementation in relation to gender equality, both in general and on peace and security, through the process of development of the NAPs. In the future, it will be important to focus on key priorities such as gender-based war crimes and the political talks and negotiations with Serbia and others to finalize the independence process. At the time of the evaluation these negotiations and political processes did not appear to be tackling women’s issues in any significant way and the role and presence of women in the process itself was still very marginal.

While the results outlined in this report form the basis for greater strategic engagement not only at national but also at regional and global levels, in order to achieve this some of the constraints and limitations identified by this case study need to be addressed. These include:

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40 With the exception of the 2011 publication *Networking and network-building in support of women, peace and security: Experiences from the Western Balkans UN Women Subregional Office for Central and Eastern Europe* (Martha Stickings). The publication focused on lessons learned, but was mostly confined to issues of partnership and networking.
- The lack of an overall, explicit strategy and direction for the project on implementing resolution 1325 in the medium and long-term.
- Related to this is the risk of addressing too many issues with too scarce human and financial resources. There was a pressing need to identify and select key thematic, political and operational priorities to maximize the efforts that were needed to support them.
- The need to better coordinate, but also influence and shape, the agenda of other key international actors working on women in peace and security in Kosovo, mainly other United Nations entities and the EU. This clearly cannot be achieved with the current level of human and financial resources. In addition, the ‘project office’ status of UN Women-Kosovo represents a real blockage to step up the influencing agenda on the issue of women’s leadership in peace and security, as it formally lacks the necessary authority and independence.
- The need to scale up efforts to engage more effectively in regional, and later global, policy debates on women’s leadership in peace and security contexts. In particular, there is a need to specifically address issues of gender in relation to peace negotiations, and Kosovo/Serbia talks. While the current focus on supporting the process of regional dialogue was certainly valuable, there is a need to ensure that it can be better integrated into the main negotiations.
- The need to diversify the skills and knowledge of UN Women-Kosovo staff and partners, to ensure that the programme is supported by sufficient analytical capacity and expertise and that it reaches out to all key constituencies working on peace and security (for example, women in academia).
- The urgent need to finalize the new arrangements emerging from the transition to UN Women; reassure and motivate UN Women-Kosovo staff; ensure key stakeholders and partners are aware of the transition and what it entails; minimize risks associated with losing out on the trusted UNIFEM brand; and initiate a new and different dialogue between UN Women-Kosovo and other United Nations entities and international bodies in light of the new mandate.

6. Recommendations

In light of the analysis above, the evaluation team made the following recommendations:

**Dimension 1: UN Women’s policy and strategic direction**

**For UN Women at the global level**

There is a need to better articulate global, regional and country strategies and a long-term vision for engaging in peace and security programming and processes in the Balkans, and to communicate these effectively to key partners and stakeholders.

More investment in the Kosovo office is needed if it is to be more effective at engaging and influencing international agencies such as the United Nations and the EU (which was not collaborating with the United Nations a great deal even though it was the major player in the country).
The current engagement in regional dialogue and talks with Serbia need to be strengthened by a broader commitment by UN Women at the regional and international level to ensure that women’s issues are adequately addressed; women are engaged in the process; and their views are represented. There is a limit to what can be expected of such a small project office with limited authority and resources.

For UN Women-Kosovo

UN Women-Kosovo needs to better articulate and make explicit the underlying theories of change currently in use, to ensure that the linkages envisaged between different activities and dimensions to realise long-lasting change are explicit and shared within UN Women-Kosovo and with partners.

There is the scope and need to invest in and further develop the work on war gender crimes and support of rape survivors, building on the experience and achievements of many years of engagement on domestic violence and broader VAW issues.

In terms of national policy development, the support for the NAP process should be followed up with concrete plans to collaborate with key national actors to monitor and ensure implementation.

A review of current partnerships, collaborations and level of influence within them would help to identify strengths, weakenss and current gaps. In particular, there should be a review of the strategy for engaging with other United Nations entities, the EU and other international bodies, and opinion makers and women’s leaders in different arenas, such as academia.

Dimension 2: UN Women’s policies, programming and operations

For UN Women at the global level

The key milestones and implications for the transition to UN Women need to be better articulated, first and foremost within UN Women-Kosovo, to address the current lack of clarity and to provide staff with a clear sense of direction and the changes ahead. There is also a need to communicate clearly the terms of the transition to national and international partners and to relaunch the dialogue with other United Nations entities in light of the new mandate.

For UN Women-Kosovo

There is an urgent need to review the current portfolio of activities, partners and themes to minimize the risk of doing too much on too many fronts with too limited resources. A limited number of priorities should be identified. While maintaining a flexible and adaptive approach to programming has its benefits, this should not be at the expense of a clear articulation of priorities rather than a focus on general outcomes.

These priorities should be part of an overall strategy for the medium- and long-term. Crucially, this strategy should not be formulated for donor/funding purposes only, but should also be targeted at national partners and stakeholders as well as the broader international community.

Related to this, there is a need to better document and communicate the programme strategy as well as its key results and achievements. The document Networking and network-building in support of women, peace and security: Experiences from the western Balkans (2011) was a good start, but shorter and more analytical outputs are needed. It would also be useful to document the overall strategies, decision logics and underlying political analysis that have been successful in the Kosovo context, with a view to sharing the experiences more widely.
and learning lessons from them. This might be particularly relevant as part of UN Women-Kosovo regional engagement.

Once the key priorities for the current programme have been reviewed and established, the current partnerships and collaborations should be reviewed to ensure they are fit for purpose. In particular, there is a need to strengthen partnerships and collaborations in key areas such as war crimes and rape survivors and political talks and negotiations with Serbia (here collaboration with the Deputy Prime Minister is key, but more strategic collaborations like these are needed), as well as inter-agency collaboration.

**Dimension 3: UN Women’s organizational capacities, resources and structures**

**For UN Women at the global level**

The current level of financial and human resources should be reviewed in light of the identification of priorities and overall strategy outlined above. Rather than fundraising to ensure the survival of the programme, the financing strategy should switch to a more targeted approach, ideally with some dedicated resources. UN Women-Kosovo needs more support and direction from the regional office and headquarters to achieve this.

As the programme becomes more focused specifically on security and peace and state-building challenges, it will be important to ensure that staff, collaborators and partners have the relevant operational and analytical skills.

There may be scope for greater higher-level coordination and proactive engagement within the United Nations system in Kosovo to ensure that issues of women’s leadership and participation in peace and security are sufficiently profiled and taken seriously as part of the broader policy engagement on the newly formed institutions and, crucially, in the regional and international negotiations on independence.
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## Interviews

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