Evaluation of UN Women’s Contribution to Increasing Women’s Leadership and Participation in Peace and Security and Humanitarian Response

Haiti case study

Irina Mosel
Acronyms

APROSIFA Association for the Promotion of Integral Family Healthcare
CBO Community-Based Organization
CSO Civil Society Organization
DFID Department for International Development
EVAW Ending Violence Against Women
GBV Gender-Based Violence
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IOM International Organization for Migration
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MCFDF Ministry for Gender and Women’s Affairs
MICT Ministry of the Interior and Collective Territories
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MPCE Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation
MUDHA Movement of Dominican Haitian Women
NGO Non-governmental Organization
PNH Haitian National Police
SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SSR Security Sector Reform
START Support for Security Accompaniment in Response to the Issue of GBV in Temporary Shelters
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNPOL United Nations Police
VAW Violence Against Women
1. Introduction

The Haiti case study is one of five country case studies for the corporate evaluation of UN Women’s contribution to increasing women’s leadership and participation in peace and security and humanitarian response. This case study examines UN Women’s peace and security and humanitarian response work in Haiti since 2008. It includes an examination of interventions in sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and policy and programmatic work related to the peace and security and humanitarian response agenda.

2. Methodology

Fieldwork was conducted by a member of the evaluation team in collaboration with a local researcher. Preparatory work and consultations with UN Women were conducted prior to fieldwork in Haiti in late February and early March 2013. The fieldwork involved examining country-level strategy and programming, with a focus on peace and security and humanitarian response. More detailed observation of country office work in this area looked at a selection of interventions decided by the country office and the evaluation team leader. Logistical and time constraints meant that interviews were only conducted in Port-au-Prince, subsequently subnational perspectives are under-represented. However, interviews with a sufficiently broad range of relevant stakeholders sought to compensate for this. A full list of interviewees is included below.

The qualitative analysis used during the fieldwork drew on a combination of documentary evidence provided by the country and other stakeholders, as well as interviews and focus group discussions involving stakeholders identified during the evaluation’s inception phase. Interviews and focus group discussions were semi-structured to address the concrete evaluation questions, but also allowed for unstructured questions as appropriate. Context analysis and stakeholder mapping were developed so as to take account of power relations between relevant groups. During the fieldwork, the team was mindful of the relationship between implementers and different stakeholders in interventions, including taking into consideration the role of the evaluation team.

3. Country context

Context analysis

Over the past century, Haiti has endured dictatorships, political repression, military coups, foreign occupation, weak and corrupt justice and law enforcement, and endemic levels of poverty and underdevelopment. A form of democracy existed in Haiti until 1957 when François Duvalier seized power. Duvalier died in 1971 and was succeeded by his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, who ruled the country until 1986 when he was forced into exile. Following his departure, Haiti went through a turbulent and often violent period marked by military rule, coups and counter-coups, and fraudulent and abortive elections. Haiti’s first democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was ousted in a military coup in 1991. In 1994, the coup regime collapsed under international pressure and the threat of military intervention by the United States. Aristide was reinstalled, though his mandate came to an end in 1996. He became president once again in 2001, but the elections that brought him back to power were boycotted by the opposition.

Aristide’s final term in office came to an end on 29 February 2004, when he resigned and left the country. His departure was followed by the installation of an interim government led by Prime Minister Gérard Latortue. Thousands of pro-Aristide militants and sympathisers were killed, imprisoned or lost their jobs during Latortue’s tenure, but the regime was unable to
control rising violence in pro-Aristide strongholds such as the slums of Bel Air and Cité Soleil, and armed gangs, former soldiers and police gradually took control of most of the north of the country.

In response to growing political and criminal violence, including drug-trafficking, the United Nations Security Council authorised a Multinational Interim Force in Haiti (MIF) for a three-month period from 29 February 2004. The MIF was succeeded by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which was established on 1 June 2004 by United Nations Security Council resolution 1542. MINUSTAH’s principal objective is ‘to restore a secure and stable environment, to promote the political process, to strengthen Haiti’s Government institutions and rule-of-law-structures, as well as to promote and to protect human rights’. This includes providing support to reform the Haitian National Police (PNH); action to restore and maintain rule of law and public safety; assistance in the organization of free and fair elections; the promotion and protection of human rights; and monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation in the country.

Since MINUSTAH’s deployment, violence has abated and democratic elections in 2010 and 2012 were relatively trouble-free. However, the mission has not been without controversy.

Haiti’s manifold political, social and economic problems were exacerbated in January 2010 when a devastating earthquake struck the capital, Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas including Leogane and Jacmel. Some 220,000 people were killed, 300,000 injured and over 2 million (about a quarter of the population) made homeless. There was massive damage to the country’s already precarious infrastructure. The earthquake had a particularly devastating impact on the Haitian government, with 30 per cent of its civil servants killed and all but one ministry building destroyed. The international community pledged $9.9 billion in assistance, but disbursement of these funds has been slow due to fears of corruption and misuse. Three years on, despite a flood of aid agencies into the country in the wake of the earthquake, hundreds of thousands of Haitians are still living in camps. According to an Oxfam GB (2010) survey of 3,600 camp residents in Port-au-Prince, most families want to leave but many do not have the assets to secure alternative accommodation.

Women and conflict/fragility in Haiti

Key milestones in Haiti regarding gender equality include the following policy and legislative changes:

- The Ministry for Gender and Women’s Affairs was established on 8 November 1994.
- A government decree making rape a crime was passed in 2005.
- The National Development Plan 2010-2030 (Plan Stratégique de Développement d’Haïti) includes commitments to develop and strengthen public policies with regards to women and gender issues.

\[28\] Unless otherwise indicated, figures refer to United States dollars.
In 2012, national legislation was passed, approving a 30 per cent quota for women’s participation in government.

Measures have been taken to increase the participation of women in key positions in government. The Government of Haiti has increased the proportion of women in governmental posts to 44 per cent of ministers and 30.3 per cent of the government as whole (including State Secretaries).

The Ministry for Gender and Women’s Affairs is currently working on draft legislation aimed at prohibiting violence against women and girls.

Key stakeholders

Haiti hosts a large United Nations presence and has one of the highest numbers of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) per capita in the world. Although international donors have a significant presence in the country, they tend to be reluctant to fund government departments directly given concerns about corruption and capacity.

UN Women (and UNIFEM) have worked with a number of actors in government, international governmental agencies, NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs) in Haiti, in particular on the area of peace and security and humanitarian response. It has particularly strong links with the Ministry for Gender and Women’s Affairs (MCFDF), and collaborates with the Ministry of Human Rights, the PNH, the Civil Protection Directorate, the Ministry of the Interior and Collective Territories (MICT) and the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE). UN Women is also involved in providing training to the PNH (Haiti has no national army) and CSOs on issues of SGBV.

CSOs with which UN Women has worked include the Association for the Promotion of Integral Family Healthcare (APROSIFA), the women’s organization Kay Fanm, the Haitian Women’s Movement for Education and Development, the Movement of Dominican Haitian Women (MUDHA) and Solidarité Fanm Ayisyen. Other key actors with which UN Women collaborates include the Gender Unit of MINUSTAH, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), as well as several international donors that support its work, including the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Spanish Agency for Development Cooperation (AECID), who have a presence in the country.

UN Women is not a formal member of the United Nations Cluster system in Haiti, though it does work with cluster actors. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, UN Women was initially involved in all the clusters and, once it was activated, UN Women focused most of its attention on the protection cluster, notably the protection sub-cluster on gender-based violence (GBV), country office-led by UNFPA and the MCFDF. UNFPA’s mandate involves significant work in the area of SGBV, as well as a focus on reproductive health and support for the collection of demographic data. UNFPA and UN Women have worked together on a number of projects in Haiti, and the two organizations also collaborate with some of the same state bodies and CSOs although on different issues – in particular the PNH, the Concertation Nationale and several CSOs. The Concertation Nationale, or national dialogue against violence against women (VAW), is a coordination mechanism comprising government actors, CSOs and international agencies. After the earthquake, most of UN Women’s collaboration with other agencies revolved around work on SGBV coordinated by the protection sub-cluster.
4. UN Women strategy and activities in Haiti

Background

UN Women and UNIFEM before it have been working in Haiti since 2004, with a country office established in 2007. Currently the country office comprises the UN Women representative, four Programme Officers, one Project Officer, one Programme Specialist, a Programme Assistant, an Administrative Assistant, an Information and Communication Technology Specialist and a Finance Associate. Staff numbers have grown since the transition from UNIFEM to UN Women, and there are plans to increase the number of personnel in the future.

Thematic priorities and programme work

The country office’s National Programme 2012–2013 is guided by UN Women’s global strategy, and is informed by national development priorities and ongoing consultations with key partners. In particular, the objectives of the country office Strategy 2012–2013 reflect engagements with Goals 1 and 4 of UN Women’s Global Strategic Plan. As in previous years, the overall country office strategy for 2012–2013 focuses on supporting the activities of state partners at the policy level and addressing the priority needs of women. The strategy also clearly reflects UN Women’s engagement in the humanitarian response in Haiti.

Activities are organized under the following broad categories:

- Increasing women’s participation in political processes and in leadership roles. This includes the joint programme on ‘Conflict Prevention and Social Cohesion through Local Community Empowerment and Institutional Capacity-Building’ (2009–2011) implemented by five agencies: IOM, the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UNFPA and MINUSTAH.

- Reducing VAW, including support to implementation of the ‘Safe Cities’ programme, a global programme which is being implemented in Haiti. It also includes the Support for Security Accompaniment in Response to the Issue of GBV in Temporary Shelters (START) project, which was instituted as a contribution to Outcome 2 of the pilot project ‘Security and Empowerment for Women and their families: Ensuring a gender-responsive humanitarian and early recovery response’.

- Fostering stronger accountability to the gender equality commitments in national planning and budgeting processes. This includes the ‘Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment’ programme which falls under the strategic priorities of governance and ending VAW.

- Enhancing awareness of a gender-responsive humanitarian response which takes into account gender differentials in needs, responsibilities, vulnerabilities and strengths.

With respect to peace and security and humanitarian response, the strategy also focuses on technical support to incorporate gender dimensions into the United Nations’ consolidated funding appeal for Haiti, technical assistance to United Nations personnel on addressing

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29 Goal 1 of the global UN Women Strategic Plan is ‘to increase women’s leadership and participation in all areas that affect their lives’. Goal 4 is ‘to increase women’s leadership in peace and security and humanitarian response’ (UNW/2011/09).
violence against women and girls, and advocacy on gender equality within the humanitarian response.

A significant strategic shift with the transition to UN Women was the increased focus on consistency and synergies across the different programmes underway in issues related to peace and security, as well as the particular attention given to consolidating and strengthening the response side to SGBV at the institutional level, especially through work with the PNH. Previously, under UNIFEM, there was a lack of an integrated strategy for gender mainstreaming in peace and security issues, in particular with regards to the reform of the security sector.

Since the transition to UN Women there has been a concerted effort to focus more on consolidation of work with institutional partners, including work with more/new partners both at the community and at the state/institutional level. This has included for example work with stakeholders other than the MCFDF, such as the police and the judicial sector. Equally, at the community level, new partners were chosen for their existing contacts and influence with state institutions in their respective regions, rather than because of their outreach and place in the community.

**Transition from UNIFEM to UN Women**

The process of transition from UNIFEM to UN Women was, for practical purposes, still underway in Haiti at the time of the evaluation. A key priority was completing the relocation of management responsibility from the Barbados subregional office to the Panama regional office. During the early transition period, which coincided with the earthquake, there was some consistency as some former UNIFEM staff remained in the country office until 2012. This provided for important institutional memory and ensured continuity in partner relations during a time when most other United Nations entities and partners experienced high staff turnover. According to interviewees this was highly valuable for the work of the clusters. For example, UN Women advocated that tools on gender mainstreaming developed previously during the 2008 cyclone be reused during the earthquake, rather than starting again.

However, while existing staff provided continuity during the initial transition phase, UN Women did not have the capacity to increase the number of staff quickly during the humanitarian emergency and step up to its new mandate. Interviewees highlighted that UN Women initially had only one GenCap Adviser who took over the work on all the clusters, but this was clearly not enough. Hence during the transition period which coincided with a significant humanitarian emergency in Haiti, UN Women was significantly understaffed, affecting its ability to meet expectations reflected in the new mandate. In 2009, UN Women reportedly had six to seven people working on programmes, whereas after the earthquake there was only four to five staff members working in the country office. Interviewees highlighted that the lack of staffing and resources on the ground has been a persistent problem for UN Women and affects its ability to execute programmes.

Since 2012, however, representation at the country level was strengthened with the appointment of a new country representative and the recruitment of a new country team, including senior Haitian nationals, along with increased levels of funding.

UN Women funding was not flexible enough to adapt to the humanitarian response and the emergency needs arising from the earthquake. After the earthquake, UN Women came under increasing pressure from its existing partners in Haiti to seek emergency funding from other sources in order to help partner organizations re-establish themselves and assist their respective communities.
UN Women gradually expanded the reach of its programmes in Haiti and is now working with more partners in two departments across the north and the south east. New partnerships include community-based organizations (CBOs) with different geographical focus and stronger linkages with state structures, including for example the police and justice sectors in their respective regions. This was part of a deliberate strategy to increase the impact of work at the community level, and at the policy and institutional level.

At the policy level, UN Women also expanded its partnerships with state institutions to include other ministries, such as the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation and the Ministry of Finance and of Human Rights, in order to ensure that gender mainstreaming at the national level was institutionalized across state structures, and included in national budgeting processes. There was a deliberate shift in focus at the strategic level towards supporting change and change actors at the institutional level. This was particularly accentuated in programmes related to SGBV, where there was increased attention on work among response partners such as the national police and the justice system on improving referral systems and the introduction of standard operating procedures to address and respond to VAW (see section on programmes below).

While at the strategic level there was an increased focus on institutional capacity-building and strengthening of institutional partnerships in order to consolidate policy changes at the national level, there was no major programmatic shift with the transition from former UNIFEM to UN Women in Haiti. Most existing partnerships with state entities and CSOs continued and were consolidated, while new partners were added.

With the transition to UN Women focus on ensuring consistency within programmes and harnessing potential synergies between programmes, both within UN Women and across the wider United Nations system, has increased. Evidence of this was found, for example, in attempts to rationalize resources or use already existing resources, and efforts to ensure partners continued to benefit from trainings under different UN Women programmes. Previously, under UNIFEM, an integrated strategy for gender mainstreaming in peace and security issues did not exist, in particular with regard to the reform of the security sector. A programme officer was then appointed internally as focal point for programmes engaging with peace and security work.

The transition to UN Women has also seen a concerted effort to focus more on consolidation of work with institutional partners, including work with more/new partners both at the community and at the state/institutional level. This included, for example, work with stakeholders other than the MCFDF, such as the police and the judicial sector. Equally, at the community level, new partners were chosen for their existing contacts and influence with state institutions in their respective regions, rather than simply because of their outreach and rootedness in the community.

All UN Women’s partners seemed to be aware of the transition and most seemed positive about it, though there was still some way to go to clarify UN Women’s mandate and strategic objectives in Haiti. Country Office staff noted that initially there were high expectations from partners with regards to UN Women’s new role and mandate, in particular expectations that UN Women would now work on gender mainstreaming with all agencies and across programmes and clusters – an expectation still to be met due to staff and resource constraints. Several partner agencies also seemed to have misunderstood the nature of the new UN Women mandate, assuming that UN Women would take over certain operational areas of work from other agencies, rather than support ongoing activities through coordination, catalytic and technical support. Initial coordination and communication problems with regard to the new mandate were aggravated by the fact that, after the earthquake, many agencies
started to engage in GBV work in Haiti, and there was competition for funding and lack of coordination among United Nations entities and their partners. Overall, this study concludes that the transition from former UNIFEM to UN Women does not seem to have affected relations with partners.

Selection of programmes/activities

Within its peace and security activities UN Women, and UNIFEM before it, worked according to a two-fold strategy of intervening both at the community level and at the national/institutional level to achieve gender mainstreaming in peace and security issues. On peace and security and humanitarian response work, the evaluation team examined three programmes in some depth, one global programme and two country-specific programmes: From Communities to Global Security Institutions: Engaging Women in Building Peace and Security and Security and Empowerment for Women and Their Families’ and ‘Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment. All three programmes were nearing completion at the time of the evaluation.

The global programme was a flagship programme of UN Women globally in the peace and security sector and Haiti was one of the pilot countries for community-level work. The programme started under former UNIFEM and continued under UN Women. It was ongoing during the earthquake and experienced serious setbacks during this time. Key partners included government ministries in the justice and security sector, the PNH and a number of women’s organizations.

The two country programmes were selected on the basis that they comprised projects that were clearly related to the global and national strategic themes of peace and security and humanitarian response, and in particular the latter component. Both were ongoing during the earthquake, and both involved the collaboration of a range of actors, including government ministries, the PNH, CSOs, MINUSTAH and UNFPA.

From Communities to Global Security Institutions: Engaging Women in Building Peace and Security

UN Woman’s global programme From Communities to Global Security Institutions: Engaging Women in Building Peace and Security (2010–2013) fell under UN Women’s strategic area of peace and security. The programme was part of a global programme within which there were four pilot countries (Haiti, Liberia, Timor-Leste and Uganda). The purpose of the programme was to ensure women were able to contribute to and benefit from security measures, and peacebuilding and peacemaking processes at the community, national, regional and global levels. It targeted actions and results in three key areas: women’s engagement in decision-making on peacebuilding; gender-responsive reform of the security sector; and accountability for Security Council resolutions 1325 and 1820. It was funded globally by the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID).

In Haiti the programme focused on supporting the capacity of local women’s organizations and strengthening the links between women’s organizations and service providers (health system, judicial system, the Haitian National Police, the courts) to improve support for abused women. For example, local security committees were established in communities with the help of women’s CBOs to improve links with the police and identify and speed up the referral of GBV cases. UN Women has also worked closely with state actors, such as the Ministry of Justice or the PNH, to institutionalize referral mechanisms and scale up initiatives to the national level, including through the design of standard operating procedures. Key partners include the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the MCFDF, the State Secretary
Security and Empowerment for Women and their Families

The programme Security and Empowerment for Women and their Families: Ensuring a Gender-Responsive Humanitarian and early Recovery Response (2010–2012, extended until June 2013) sat under the UN Women Strategic Areas of Peace and Security and Violence Against Women. UN Women provided administrative support in the implementation of the programme and capacity-building for partners, including security-sector reform (SSR). The evaluation team looked at the START (START) programme which was in its the final phase.

START aimed to provide secure conditions for women and girls living in temporary shelters. Its objectives were to reduce the incidence of sexual violence against women and girls, enhance the referral and response chain to deal with cases of violence and strengthen links between actors involved in the security sector. START was established following a temporary pilot project in 2010 which, very soon after the earthquake, aimed to restore community-led referral systems related to GBV, strengthen the response capacity of the PNH and strengthen the capacity of the police and military of peacekeeping missions in order to better fulfil their mandate. The main beneficiaries were women living in Port-au-Prince and Leogane. The principal partners in the programme were the MCFDF, Kay Fanm, APROSIFA, MUDHA, the PNH, Concertation Nationale and the United Nations Police (UNPOL) (UN Women, 2012).

Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment

The programme Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (2008–2012) fell under the UN Women Strategic Area of Governance and End Violence Against Women (EVAW). Following the earthquake, components of the programme were adapted to incorporate a humanitarian response focus. UN Women’s contribution to the programme was twofold: the provision of technical assistance in the areas of GBV and the political participation of women; and institutional capacity-building for state and CSO partners.

Principal national counterparts at the state level were the MCFDF, the Ministry of Justice, the PNH, the Ministry of Finance, the MPCE, the Ministry of Communication and the National Museum. Non-state counterparts included women’s organizations and human rights actors. United Nations system counterparts included UNFPA, the Gender Unit of MINUSTAH and UNDP.

The programme had three main objectives:

- Promoting gender-responsive governance and providing institutional support for gender mainstreaming;
- Providing technical support to the United Nations Gender Theme Group including gender training for staff within the United Nations system; and
- Strengthening institutional, legal and policy mechanisms for promoting gender justice, peace and security, in particular through support to the implementation of the national action plan (NAP) on VAW.

Other programmes, such as the global ‘Safe Cities’ programme funded by AECID in Haiti as well as a number of smaller or joint programmes with other agencies also had important contributions to work under the peace and security cluster, but could not be examined in depth during the evaluation. However, where there were linkages to the programmes for Public Security and the PNH, as well as a number of women’s organizations in the north and the south-east of the country.
evaluated these will be highlighted, as is the case, for example, in one of the programmes discussed for the humanitarian response.

5. Findings

Theory of change

Despite no explicit theory of change in the country offices policy and programmatic work, the country office strategy had a clear transformative agenda. With respect to peace and security and humanitarian response, this was evident through its efforts to make the government’s response to humanitarian disasters more gender-sensitive (efforts which predated the earthquake). An objective of the evaluation was to elucidate the implicit theories of change underpinning UN Women’s action and interventions, even where these were not evident from programming documents.

The country office played a significant role in increasing women’s participation in national and local politics and the number of women appointed to senior government positions. While much of this work was undertaken under the ‘Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment’ project, which technically falls within the strategic area of governance and EVAW rather than peace and security, these activities played an important role in enhancing women’s participation and leadership in peace and security and humanitarian response. However, given the importance of SGBV in the Haitian context the main focus of the work was gender justice and security.

While there was a limited explicit results chain to explain support to enhancing women’s leadership and participation, the nature of UN Women’s interventions demonstrated innovative modes of engagement which contributed to building enabling conditions for improved voice and agency, and to addressing specific objectives of the peace and security and humanitarian response agenda. These included, first, recognition of the need to work with a wider range of government and public-sector stakeholders at different national and subnational levels that the entity supports, both to enhance outreach and compensate for challenges of a changing political environment. Second, the role of building and brokering grassroots networks to connect the local with the national-level engagement was important for ensuring better outreach, and better scale up of local initiatives. Investing in research was effective. Third, UN Women contributed to a study which examined SGBV among displaced persons. Many actors (donors, UN Women headquarters and other United Nations entities and NGOs) assumed that this would be a widespread problem after the earthquake. However, the findings did not match these expectations. While rates of ‘transactional’ sex increased, there was no evidence of an increase in sexual violence as such. Country programme documents and progress reports reflected an increasing focus on institutional actors at the national level and the institutionalization of instruments for gender mainstreaming, in particular referral systems for SGBV. Interviews with country office staff similarly reflected an increase in concern over maximising gains from engagement at the institutional level, and refocusing efforts at engagement with civil society towards this wider goal.

Despite these more sound modes of engagement more can be done to ensure first, that sound practices are better reported, and second, that more strategic engagement to support women’s leadership and participation is developed.
Figure 1: Theory of change underpinning UN Women programming

**Inputs:**
- Technical assistance & capacity-building to MCFDF to strengthen gender sensitization in disaster response.
- Promoting participation of women in electoral system; and being more politically active nationally and locally.
- Set up psychosocial support teams after the earthquake.
- Prevention and response training in SGBV to police and displacement camp managers.
- Capacity-building for restoring livelihoods lost in disaster.
- Research on SGBV in post-earthquake camps/shelters.
- Provided training to humanitarian actors on SGBV prevention, response and on national SGBV database.
- Participated in working groups addressing the risk of SGBV in the aftermath of the earthquake.

**Outputs**
- Government National Development Plan 2010-2030 includes commitments to develop gender-responsive public policies.
- Significant increase in the number of women in government, including at senior levels to enhance women’s voice.
- Restoration of support services to victims of violence provided by MCDF and women’s organization a few months after the earthquake.
- SGBV prevention and referral services for victims in camps.
- Greater understanding of SGBV prevention and response obligations by police, camp workers, CSOs & humanitarians.
- Quantitative & qualitative data on SGBV in camps/shelters, with findings counter to expectations.
- Improved capacity of women’s organizations at all levels to exercise voice and agency.

**Outcomes**
1. Significant increase in the number of women in decision-making in national and local government.
2. Enhanced security in the displacement camps and higher levels of SGBV crimes being reported.
3. National and international partnerships are strengthened.

**Strategic Plan Goals:**
UN Women Global Strategic Plan Development Results Framework:
- Goal 1: Women’s increased leadership and participation in the decisions that affect their lives.
- Goal 4: Women’s leadership in peace and security.

**Underlying assumptions:**
- The Government of Haiti will be more supportive of gender responsiveness and the prevention of VAW.
- The country remains politically stable enough for continued governmental engagement.
- The Ministry of Women will be more stable than it has been in the past.
- UN Women has the capacity, credibility and expertise to support women’s engagement in these processes.
- Working with stakeholders at different levels of government at the national and subnational levels will improve awareness, and buy-in from relevant actors to make a difference to women’s experience of dealing with GBV.
- Investing in capacity development of grassroots organizations enables awareness-raising, and the possibility of scale up of local initiatives.
Evaluation questions

**Dimension 1: UN Women’s policy and strategic direction**

In what ways did UN Women influence policies and practice (within the United Nations system and key external agencies) in relation to women’s political participation and leadership in peace and security?

UN Women influenced several policy development processes at the national level. The MCFDF is working on draft legislation specifically prohibiting violence against women and girls, and UN Women has advised the Ministry in this work. UN Women’s support to and advocacy with the MPCE resulted in the inclusion of commitments to develop and strengthen government policies with regards to women and gender issues in the National Development Plan 2010–2030. UN Women also provided input to the MCFDF’s draft legislation on GBV. With respect to humanitarian response, the country office worked with the government in an attempt to improve gender sensitivity in its disaster preparedness and response policies. UN Women also provided capacity-building for MCFDF staff in terms of know-how (report-writing skills, preparation of laws) which facilitated the production of reports related to the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women (the Belem do Pará Convention).

UN Women also increased the technical and coordination capacity within the MCFDF to support the draft gender equality policy, and worked with the MCFDF, the MPCE and the Ministry of Finance on gender-responsive budgeting. During the electoral period of 2009–2011, UN Women supported initiatives to enhance women’s participation and leadership in politics, such as supporting women candidates in holding public debates and enhancing women’s participation in public spaces. UN Women also advocated for the institutionalization of a 30 per cent quota for women representatives and supported women’s organizations to put pressure on law-makers to implement this quota.

While many of these activities focused on building institutional capacity on gender mainstreaming and were undertaken through programmes officially within the strategic priorities of governance and EVAW, it was important to note the policy objective of enhancing women’s participation in security and justice mechanisms at the national level through the development of relevant legislation on SGBV.

The country office also focused on gender justice and security, and ensuring adequate response mechanisms at the institutional level for women survivors of violence (including the police, health systems and the justice system). UN Women played an active role in discussions on security, including enhancing women’s security in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) after the earthquake. However, as noted, most interventions, especially at the policy level, were concerned more with response mechanisms and support to institutional actors to assist women who were victims of violence, rather than focusing on the women as agents of change.

Progress has been uneven, to a large extent as a result of political instability and high staff turnover in the MCFDF, which made it difficult to maintain momentum in the policy-making process. Partners acknowledged the significant impact the earthquake had on the capacity of the MCFDF and severely disrupted ongoing policy work. The Ministry lost key civil servants during the earthquake, including the Chef de Cabinet, and focused all efforts on addressing the humanitarian emergency. It took months for
the Ministry to reconstitute itself and re-engage with previous work on policy reform. Delays in institutionalizing policy reform were exacerbated by the lack of priority afforded to these issues by senior government members. In terms of enhancing women’s leadership in peace and security, UN Women built strategic partnerships with a variety of local women’s organizations at the national and subnational level. Much of UN Women’s efforts focused on building the capacity of these organizations to influence policy and enhancing their linkages with key national and subnational state institutions. With the transition to UN Women, there was also a strategic shift in focus towards working more with institutional response actors and linking these to CSOs, rather than focusing solely on building the capacity of women’s organizations.

How sustainable were the efforts and results of UN Women’s policy influencing/engagement?

A key focus across all UN Women’s programmes was building the capacity of its partners to effect and influence policy changes, and to take ownership of these processes. For example, in its work with the PNH there was sustained engagement to ensure police ownership of standard operating procedures and their integration into the police academy’s training materials and curricula. As interviews and reports consulted by the evaluation team highlighted, this partnership with the police worked well and as a result a good, sustainable relationship was established not just with the gender unit but throughout the PNH, including the investigations unit, laying the foundations for future work. However, such processes often take a long time and are not always sustainable once funding priorities of donors change. For example, Spain, one of the donors to UN Women’s Safe Cities programme, closed or scaled down many of its programmes in Haiti in the wake of its own economic crisis. At the policy level, much focus was on sustaining cooperation with the MCFDF to the detriment of collaborations with other key ministries (although this changed more recently). Cooperation with the MCFDF suffered serious setbacks due to loss of key staff and many of its civil servants who died in the earthquake. Reform processes already underway, such as the gender equality policy and plan, were seriously derailed as ministries and their international partners were overwhelmed by the demands of the humanitarian response. Similarly, the existence of the MCFDF is challenged each time a new government comes into power and support to the Ministry from senior members of the administration is not consistent.

In response to these challenges, UN Women started to engage in broader partnerships at the policy level in a deliberate attempt to further institutionalize gender mainstreaming within other key ministries beyond the MCFDF. The country office has started to institutionalize its agreements and cooperation with a range of other ministries, so that institutional partnerships can more easily survive staff turnover. Such a strategy seems more likely to ensure the sustainability of UN Women’s efforts at the policy level in the future.

With regards to the sustainability of the community-level partnerships, UN Women invested a great deal of in building the capacity of women’s organizations. However, while partners acknowledged that capacity-building activities were beneficial and of high quality, follow-up was not been ensured. For example, one partner organization reported having never received the training material developed for awareness-raising
activities from UNIFEM, despite urgently needing the material for their own training activities. Although the organization in question acknowledged that this occurred soon after the earthquake, they lamented that there had not been adequate follow-up in terms of project inputs.

How effective was UN Women in its policy engagement at different levels, including global regional and national?

UN Women developed strategic and effective partnerships both at the community and public institutional level. While no actual institutional reforms and/or policies have been passed into law yet (mainly due to the huge disruption caused to these reform processes by the 2010 earthquake) there was continuous engagement with national counterparts to continue the reform process throughout and beyond the transition to UN Women (and beyond the earthquake).

Moreover, UN Women was acknowledged by partners to possess solid institutional contacts and good knowledge of the policy context in Haiti. This knowledge and continuous commitment to its institutional partners have been particularly beneficial in the context of the earthquake and the ensuing humanitarian emergency, where UN Women’s institutional contacts and knowledge were recognized as an important asset in the protection cluster, with other agencies relying on UN Women as the entity with the strongest institutional memory and solid understanding of the context.

With the transition to UN Women, there was a consolidation of partnerships with Ministries other than the MCFDF, as noted above, in an attempt to ensure effective and broader engagement in gender mainstreaming at the policy level, including in national budgeting processes. The partnership with the PNH was noted as being particularly successful in project reports and during interviews conducted by the evaluation team. However, work with the judicial system remained underdeveloped.

Partners also credited UN Women’s engagement with policymakers at the subnational level, which they said had been neglected by many other organizations. For example, UN Women attends meetings of the regional representation of the MCFDF, and engages with the police at the regional and local levels. It also engages with the local authorities, such as mayors and departments for urban planning (in the Safe Cities project) and encourages linkages and better networking between CBOs and local authorities. These regional partnerships helped strengthen capacity and build up institutional momentum to scale up activities. For instance, consistent engagement between women’s organizations, communities and the police at the local level resulted in the formation of local security committees – which the DFID Annual Review (2012) of the global project acknowledged as a major achievement of Phase I. The work on localised referral and response systems involving the local security committees then served as the basis for an agreement with the PNH to scale up these efforts at the national level.

In terms of partnerships at the community level, UN Women and UNIFEM were acknowledged to have established strong partnerships with solid organizations from different backgrounds and across a wide range of geographic constituencies. CBOs are rooted in communities and have strong local ownership, which proved effective for outreach, awareness-raising and sustainability. Many of these CBOs are also well connected locally, with good links to Ministries and the police, which proved important in the scale up and institutionalization of local initiatives. Partners interviewed valued UN Women’s support to CBOs from a wide geographical spread
across the north and the south-east of the country and acknowledged that both UNIFEM and subsequently UN Women had generally identified the right organizations to support. Project reports highlighted that while capacity-building of women’s organizations was important, there needed to be more emphasis on building the capacities of institutions to respond effectively to incidents of SGBV and ensure appropriate follow-up.

Partnerships at the inter-agency level were less consistent and coordination with other United Nations entities could be improved. UNIFEM collaborated with UNFPA on a number of projects, notably on the development of standard operating procedures (together with women CBOs and the Concertation Nationale) and on SGBV in camps for IDPs in the aftermath of the earthquake. However, project reports (for both the START project and the DFID-funded global programme) highlighted that inter-agency coordination between those supporting the PNH, or working on issues related to GBV more generally, could be improved to create better synergies. Interviewees highlighted that after the earthquake in particular, many agencies tried to intervene in the area of GBV and there was a persistent lack of coordination of their efforts.

UN Women also developed a strong relationship with the Gender Unit at MINUSTAH and provided training for military officers on GBV. However, some local partners expressed concerns over UN Women’s this partnership, as MINUSTAH soldiers are allegedly involved in sexual abuse of women in Haiti, and even cases of rape. As a result several key women’s organizations reportedly refused to attend meetings convened by MINUSTAH.

With the transition, UN Women has focused more on creating synergies and consistency among its various programmes, in particular those concerning peace and security. A programme officer was appointed internally as focal point for programmes falling under the peace and security themes and was tasked to ensure that resources, such as training materials, were rationalised and consistently used across programmes. The programme officer was also supposed to ensure consistency among partners benefitting from various trainings and make sure that trainings did not overlap.

To what extent did the current policy/strategic direction reflect the lessons learned from policy engagement on peace and security and humanitarian response since 2008, and how fit for purpose was it for the new UN Women mandate?

It was evident from this review that policy-related work in UN Women’s programmes was grounded in experience and lessons learned from policy engagement in peace and security and humanitarian response work since 2008.

One of the major challenges identified by interviewees for the pre-2010 period was the lack of an integrated strategy for gender mainstreaming in peace and security issues, in particular concerning the reform of PNH. The 2010 baseline for the ‘From Communities to Global Security Institutions’ programme, for example, highlighted the absence of an overall framework for SSR in Haiti, which resulted in fragmentation among national and international actors. While there have been increased efforts by UN Women and MINUSTAH to train the police on issues relating to violence against women, the baseline noted that there was no official gender policy or training curriculum, nor a specific strategy to recruit women. As much of the focus of the programme was on community-led initiatives and the processes of establishing partnerships, the DFID Annual Review recommended ‘greater attention should be given to the policy level to ensure national reforms are responding to women’s
security needs’ (DFID, 2012).

Interviewees also highlighted the absence of coordination among different actors supporting the police, not only among national actors and CSOs, but also the different agencies within the United Nations system. UNIFEM operated on a project-based approach, rather than an integrated strategy building on synergies and collaboration between its different projects and programmes at the country level.

With the transition to UN Women, the country office made a deliberate effort to engage more strategically with institutional stakeholders, such as the police and the justice system, and work on standardising and scaling up community-level achievements to effect policy changes at the national level. For example, in its work with the PNH, UN Women focused increasingly on designing standard operating procedures that would be used nationally to assist women who had experienced violence. There were also more attempts to include institutional actors, such as the police, in referral systems and networks that were successfully operating at the community level, and to scale up these initiatives to be operational and institutionalised at the national level. While previously there was greater focus on supporting the work of women’s organizations in terms of sensitisation and capacity-building, focus has now shifted to supporting women’s organizations to engage better with response actors and building linkages between CBOs and the institutional level.

Similarly in its partnerships with CBOs, UN Women increasingly focused on more strategic partnerships with organizations that already have good linkages with institutional actors at the subnational level, in order to maximise impact at the institutional level from ongoing community-based work.

As noted above, there had been attempts within UN Women to increase consistency across programmes, in particular those started before the earthquake and since the transition to UN Women. Emphasis has been on ensuring consistency among different initiatives of the country office, for instance by ensuring the same types of training materials were used across programmes, ensuring more strategic selection of partners’ geographic and thematic distribution, as well as strengthening networks and linkages between partners.

The country office planned to develop a new national strategy document for 2013–2017 (its release was expected in late 2013 or early 2014). Given that the country office was preoccupied with completing ongoing programmes and delivering overdue reports, planning and developing a national strategy had been a challenge. The country office envisaged that the programmes and policies in the strategy will be a continuation of the current approach, rather than marking a radical new departure.

**Dimension 2: UN Women’s policies, programming and operations**

To what extent did UN Women’s programmes achieve the expected results? What explained variations?

As noted, the evaluation team examined two UN Women country-specific programmes and one global programme, the main achievements of which are highlighted below.

From Communities to Global Security:

a) Partner CSOs set up local security committees bringing together state
representatives (e.g. the police), representatives of ministries at the subnational level (e.g. the Ministry of Health) and civil society actors involved in supporting victims of violence. The committees developed prevention strategies and handled cases of violence, including accompanying victims to the hospitals and courts. The creation of the Security Committee is highlighted as one of the major successes of Phase I in the DFID Annual Review (2012).

b) Fora were active at the local level in ten communities in Haiti. Exact figures on the percentage of women participating are not available, but across different pilot countries women represent 30 per cent to 70 per cent of participants. The DFID Annual Review 2012, however, suggested that very limited information was provided by country offices regarding the precise number of GBV cases they had managed.

c) In total, eight community-led interventions began in 2011 to address SGBV in target communities in Haiti, through which a total of 100 survivors received direct services with many more benefiting from information, awareness-raising and community reconciliation in these communities.

d) UN Women’s implementing partners were aware of available referral services in all ten of the community-based forum locations.

Overall, the programme in Haiti was more or less on track (DFID, 2012). According to interviewees, there have been good results particularly by organizations which had used the project to extend their activities into different communities and enhanced their leadership capacities. This was particularly the case in Borgne and Limbe in the north, as well as in Jacmel. It was, however, suggested that capacity-building measures could be improved, as could the synergy among all the institutions involved in the project.

Through its capacity-building measures for women’s organizations, the programme contributed to the increased ability of women to participate in addressing peace and security issues that concern them. However, as the project report noted, the next phase needs to place more emphasis on working with national and subnational institutional actors and strengthening national ownership of these issues.

START’s project objectives were to reduce the incidence of violence against women and girls, enhance the referral and response chain to deal with cases of violence and strengthen links between actors involved in the security sector. The main results of the project included:

- MCFDF and women’s organizations restored support services to victims of sexual violence within a few months of the earthquake;
- Over a six-week period UN Women distributed food supplies to about 400 people living in 50 temporary shelters run by women;
- Information updates on service availability were disseminated in the shelters and in communities more broadly;
- Psychosocial support teams were established immediately after the earthquake. The programme also provided referral services to victims of sexual violence through centres and organizations
assisting abused women;

- Approximately 95 university students were trained to act as first-line responders for the prevention of GBV in the camps;
- Across approximately 100 locations, mobile psychosocial teams deployed by the MCFDF and women’s organizations assisted some 144,000 people. Psychosocial support continues to be offered in Port-au-Prince and Leogane;
- Since the earthquake, UN Women and its local partners have provided technical assistance and support to over 1,900 cases of GBV, including support in prosecuting perpetrators. The majority of cases related to domestic violence;
- Support was provided to programmes seeking to improve women’s socioeconomic status, including financial help and coaching. Preliminary findings indicate the programme helped 85 women start their own micro-enterprises;
- A study in temporary shelters to provide quantitative and qualitative data on GBV was undertaken;
- Efforts were undertaken to improve understanding of gender equality and women’s safety within the PNH; and
- The programme strengthened the prevention and response to GBV capacity of the PNH through training sessions for police officers deployed near the camps.

According to interviewees, and the final START project report provided by the country office, the key achievement of the START programme was the institutionalization of collaboration with the PNH at multiple levels. This was particularly relevant as 45 per cent of the 76.8 per cent of women living in the camps and feeling insecure reported they would go to the police in a first instance to report cases of violence or aggression (START Final report). Training the police in appropriate response mechanisms was therefore a key achievement. The report highlighted that, overall, the police had become much more aware of the importance of according particular attention to the different ways in which security problems affect women and men. The final project report also noted that the strategic choice of partner institutions at the community level enabled the programme to achieve its results in the areas of intervention, as these organizations were often well connected and grounded in local communities and hence could best support victims when they sought support.

Key weaknesses of the project included a lack of attention to and engagement with the judicial system, and failure to collect data on SGBV in the camps.

The overall theory of change for the project contributed to strengthening security and peace in Haiti by enhancing the capacity of key response actors (police) to assist victims of violence. It also helped re-establish the support structure for women and girl victims of violence. Prevention strategies were put in place by the local population and committees in some of the areas of intervention. However, much of the focus was on responding to, rather than pre-empting, violence.

The Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment programme was adapted
significantly in response to the earthquake, which occurred midway through the programme. Key results in terms of humanitarian response included:

- An increased visibility of the gender dimensions of the humanitarian crisis through participation in the clusters, including the Protection Cluster SGBV subgroup, and the provision of training to actors involved in this area of work.

- Training camp managers on SGBV response, UNPOL and MINUSTAH military on SGBV, and responding to cases among IDPs in camps and spontaneous settlements in Port-au-Prince.

- Training given to new humanitarian actors on the use of national data on SGBV, in order to improve the evidence base of its incidence.

- Increased national leadership and ownership of the SGBV sub-cluster.

- Participation in working groups to address SGBV in the aftermath of the earthquake.

UN Women also played an active role in discussions on women’s security in displacement in Port-au-Prince, and initiated discussions with the PNH to develop a module on SGBV to be included in its national training curriculum.

The final report for the project had not been completed at the time of the evaluation. However, based on a summary of the findings and discussions with UN Women, the programme seemed to have broadly achieved its objectives as outlined in the proposal. One significant departure from the proposal was the adaptation of numerous facets of the planned programme in response to the earthquake, but this took place at the behest of the government of Haiti and donors, and was clearly appropriate.

Overall, the country office made good use of its network of partners at the community level to strengthen capacity, and promote initiative and innovation, using local knowledge and other resources and fostering sustainability. Evaluation of this work would be valuable in informing future strategies and partnership choices. CSOs interviewed by the evaluation team demonstrated high levels of knowledge and commitment, and were appreciative of the country office’s support. There is the potential for a greater humanitarian response focus in these activities in the future.

A key challenge lies in enhancing gender sensitivity within government discourse, programming, legislation and policies. Addressing this requires a multi-actor approach, including donors and United Nations entities, which has ramifications for stability and security in the wake of a humanitarian crisis. In the long-term, greater effort should go into disaster preparedness.

The effectiveness of UN Women and UNIFEM’s engagement closely related to their modes of engagement, including strategic capacity to adapt to fluid and volatile conditions, to build and broker national and subnational relations and networks with relevant stakeholders, and to harness existing structures, programmes and local institutions to achieve results.

The question of UN Women’s experience in the area of humanitarian response was especially noteworthy, especially since this was an area in which the country office had limited capacity. There was much discussion among partners about whether UN
Women should or could work as a humanitarian agency given that it is essentially concerned with development. However, UNIFEM was engaged in humanitarian response during the cyclone of 2008, despite not having an explicit mandate for this at the time.

Most interviewees argued that UN Women has a role to play in humanitarian response – not as a first responder in the emergency but as an advocate and provider of support to other organizations to ensure that women’s concerns are mainstreamed across their humanitarian programmes. UN Women’s engagement in the cluster was deemed positive by partners, in particular because UN Women provided much-needed analysis, context knowledge and support through its existing partnerships. UN Women also ensured that tools and guidelines for gender mainstreaming developed in response to the 2008 cyclone were used in the humanitarian response. Country office staff interviewed highlighted, however, that UN Women at the time lacked sufficient resources to engage effectively. Lack of funding limited the kind of engagement and the role UN Women could play, as partners demanded to see ideas backed up by funds. Furthermore, UN Women did not have any capacity to quickly increase staff levels to respond to the humanitarian emergency. Instead, for a long time UN Women only had one GenCap adviser who coordinated the work across all clusters.

In terms of programmes and the kinds of engagement in humanitarian response which UN Women could replicate elsewhere, there were some interesting lessons learned from Haiti. Through a food distribution programme, UN Women supported local CSOs reorganize the way food was distributed as initial assessments showed that women were being assaulted after receiving food. UN Women then supported street vendors supply food to a certain number of vulnerable families within the community, hence ensuring regeneration of women’s livelihoods opportunities whilst addressing the basic needs of the most vulnerable and ensuring protection against violence as a result of large-scale food distributions. Country office staff characterised these efforts as a more sustainable and efficient way to support livelihoods while at the same time helping to rebuild community dynamics. CSO partners acknowledged the innovative approach of this project which worked well in the local context and could provide future direction for UN Women’s engagement in humanitarian response.

Another project piloted in Haiti with regards to humanitarian response, which presented an innovative approach to creating synergies between ongoing projects and adapting them to the local context, was a project aimed at making IDP sites in Port-au-Prince safer using the principles used in the ‘Safe Cities’ programme. UN Women engaged with international and national partners managing the IDP camps to ensure basic principles regarding the safety of public spaces from women’s perspectives were adhered to (e.g. women’s toilets were not too remote and sufficient lighting was provided). The results were mixed. Country office staff interviewed said that, while there was considerable positive feedback and interest at the point of discussion, when it came to implementation camp managers did not apply the agreed principles. Although the Safe Cities principles were relevant, the process was too time-consuming, in particular because of the participatory planning exercise envisaged for identifying the location of IDP sites and services. One lesson from this project highlighted by staff was that it would be much easier to lobby other organizations to integrate these principles before a humanitarian crisis rather than during or after. One potential avenue to explore, therefore, would be increased engagement in early-warning and preparedness, as well as working with entities before the onset of
humanitarian crises.

While not equipped to respond to humanitarian crises as such, UN Women can have important inputs in terms of coordination and advocacy for the inclusion of women’s issues and protection in other entities humanitarian response programmes.

To what extent was UN Women able to translate global policy/strategies in programmatic work?

With regard to the implementation of global policies at the national level, interviewees commented that, within the Peace and Security Cluster, work on increased awareness of Security Council resolutions was not easily adapted to the Haitian context. The resolutions were viewed as being tailored for a post-conflict context, and in interviews some national partners did not think they really applied to the Haitian context. However, as part of its mandate, UN Women has pursued innovative approaches to making Security Council resolutions more applicable to the local context by, for example, adapting language to reflect context-specific conditions of fragility. Similarly, in the context of the global programme ‘From Communities to Global Security Institutions’, it was not evident that global policies could always be adapted to the local context. For instance, while the global programme emphasises women’s participation in peace and security processes, Haitian women’s organizations viewed their programme as being about handling cases of violence.

To what extent were UN Women’s programmes tailored to the specific socio-political and cultural and economic context in which they operate? How was this translated into programme design and planning?

The country office programmes looked at in this evaluation were sensitive to the high level of violence (including GBV) in Haiti, as well as women’s economic and political marginalisation (partly expressed in the lack of appropriate responses to gender-specific needs) and cultural taboos about discussing rape, sexual abuse and domestic violence. Programmes sought to strengthen weak national and local institutions in the government and security sector, and to enhance gender sensitivity in government programmes and legislation. Programmes were tailored to specific, widely identified needs, such as training people to provide psychosocial support to residents of displacement camps and collecting up-to-date information about GBV in temporary housing shelters and camps. UN Women demonstrated some openness to changes and adaptation to the local context during the execution of projects. For example, a local partner organization commented that UN Women showed flexibility by including the acquisition of land in one of its projects (to establish a school farm during a project working on the links between health, poverty and violence) even though this was not part of the official UN Women policy.

Furthermore, some of UN Women’s programmes were adapted to humanitarian response midway through implementation, as discussed above, although this was at times more due to donor pressure and change of priorities rather than the initiative of the country office in response to local demands.

Most interviewees argued that UN Women has a role to play in humanitarian response, although not as an emergency first responder, but as an advocate and provider of support to other organizations to ensure women’s concerns are mainstreamed across their humanitarian programmes. As noted above, UN Women
was seen to have the necessary skills and ability to base decisions – including for rapid response and for humanitarian response purposes – on a deep understanding of context.

How effective was UN Women at identifying and using key opportunities and partnerships at country level?

As noted, UN Women worked with numerous partners in Haiti. The ability to identify strategic partners, and adapt to changing conditions, was especially commendable. Most respondents from CSOs said they enjoyed good relations with UN Women and felt that they were treated as equal partners, though most of the effort that went into maintaining these partnerships seemed to come from the CSOs rather than from UN Women. That said, the country office is becoming more proactive in this area.

While most partnerships remained consistent throughout the transition of the country office, the discontinuation of programmes due to changes in strategy or lack of funding has often been poorly communicated to partners. Some partner CBOs reported not understanding why their projects had been discontinued and why funding that had been promised for additional project phases had not been forthcoming. Others mentioned that geographic re-orientation of projects was not well communicated in advance leaving the CBO to deal with the fall-out from the cancellation of the project, in particular managing the disappointment of the local authorities initially involved.

UNFPA and UN Women closely cooperated in their work with CSOs at the local level, including work with the same partners but on different aspects. While UNFPA generally works more at the operational level, for example by providing rape kits, UN Women engages more in capacity-building of these organizations and establishing linkages and networks between CBOs and institutional actors at the policy level.

Following the earthquake, coordination became more challenging as number of agencies started intervening in SGBV work and there was overlap in programmes. There were high expectations among other United Nations entities that UN Women would provide support and intervene in programmes across all clusters. However, this was challenging for the country office as it did not coordinate a particular cluster, nor did it have the human resources or the capacity to intervene across all of them.

Interviewees mentioned being initially confused with regards to UN Women’s new mandate and the lack of clarity concerning the division of labour among United Nations entities. Even partner agencies such as UNFPA exhibited a fundamental lack of understanding as to what the new UN Women mandate meant in terms of agency cooperation. Although UN Women was not meant to replace other the programmes of other entities, interviewees acknowledged that there was much competition among entities for influence and funding, especially for work relating to SGBV. Local partner organizations reported finding themselves ‘stuck in the middle’ between UNFPA and UN Women, who were both funding their programmes but were not coordinating effectively.

After the earthquake, much coordination with partners took place at the cluster level. As previously mentioned, after initially participating them all UN Women eventually focused on the protection cluster, and in particular on the SGBV sub-cluster. UN Women positioned itself well, providing advice and leadership to others given its rich institutional and context knowledge. Given the high turnover of agency staff at the cluster level, interviewees noted that UN Women became the cluster’s ‘institutional
memory”. For example, UN Women advocated for tools for gender mainstreaming which had already been developed during the 2008 cyclone to be used during the humanitarian emergency, rather than starting from scratch.

How effective were UN Women’s programmes at fostering/strengthening national ownership through country engagement of intended outcomes regarding improved leadership and participation of women in relevant peace and security and humanitarian response intervention/process?

The country office placed a great deal of emphasis on outreach, capacity-building, awareness-raising and technical support at national and subnational levels with state and non-state actors. It also supported actors in the security sector by providing training for the PNH. Given that all of these programmes involve the participation of national partners, there appeared to be a clear policy within the entity to foster and strengthen national capacity and ownership. While some training of trainers was being conducted, it could be expanded. CSOs and government representatives felt they had benefited from UN Women’s capacity-building activities. In relation to peace and security and humanitarian response, capacity was enhanced in terms of the provision of psychosocial support, for example.

In what ways did the new mandate/reorganization provide opportunities to improve programme effectiveness and coherence between UN Women policies and operational engagement?

UN Women is likely to get more core funding and more resources with the adoption of the new mandate, enabling the country office to be less donor-dependent, and develop longer-term strategic plans and priorities that are backed up by funds. Currently, strategic priorities are a compromise between UN Women’s global strategy and donors’ priorities for in-country support and funding. Interviewees noted that some donors could be very rigid in their prioritization and did not necessarily base their programme design on evidence. With more consistent core funding and less donor dependency there could be a more consistent and strategic application of UN Women’s policies at the operational level.

Similarly, in terms of its new mandate for humanitarian response, it is expected that UN Women will increase both its human and financial response capacities to engage in this area of work, which would in turn increase consistency of application of UN Women’s global policies. After the earthquake, UN Women came under increasing pressure from local partners to support their re-establishment but UN Women’s funding at the time was not sufficiently flexible and the country office had to look for additional donor funding.

How innovative was UN Women in its programmatic approaches and what lessons were learned that can be replicated in different contexts?

UN Women and many of its partners stated that programming innovations often came from partners and not the country office. NGOs and one ministry reported that collaboration was a consequence of an initiative they, and not the country office, had led. This is not necessarily a negative verdict on UN Women: innovation can lie precisely in supporting local initiatives rather than imposing an external agenda. Partners were generally positive about their working relationship with the country
office, finding it supportive and transparent. However, in some areas such as humanitarian response and adapting global projects to the local context (e.g. the Safe Cities programme), UN Women demonstrated a considerably innovative approach.

Other local partners suggested that UN Women was innovative in its approach to working with subnational government actors, rather than just working at the national level. In particular, engaging with and advocating for subnational and local authorities, such as mayors and urban planners, to take up more responsibility regarding GBV and the creation of safer public spaces for women, was seen as innovative by local partners interviewed.

**Dimension 3: UN Women’s organizational capacities, resources and structures**

How adequate were UN Women’s human and financial resources to effectively engage in conflict-affected countries?

Challenges remain for the country office to complete programmes in a timely fashion, partly due to a lack of human and financial resources and reportedly slow disbursement rates as a result of limited capacity among the community-level partners. Country office staff highlighted that in Haiti even strong partners with solid accounting and finance systems were finding it difficult to comply with disbursement schedules. As a result, programme completion was often delayed. The decentralization process currently underway in the country office has also lead to delays.

The country office struggled to cope with its workload due to insufficient human resources, and some relevant skills remain weak. For example, the country office would benefit from greater capacity in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of capacity and disaster response, and partner organizations noted that the country office’s capacity for M&E and follow-up of programmes was weak. One CSO described having prepared everything for a visit from UN Women, but the person supposed to monitor the programme could not travel due to lack of resources. Similarly, an evaluation could not be conducted due to UN Women’s limited capacity. It was noted, however, that between 2011-2012 the country office had recruited more senior national staff, which was having a positive effect.

The country office’s local staff capacity (security and car drivers) was adequate to meet the security and logistical needs of Port-au-Prince.

How fit for purpose was UN Women in terms of the technical skills of its staff and its broader capacity to fulfil its mandate?

Country office personnel were highly educated and skilled. They were committed, gender-sensitive and had a good knowledge of issues of concern to the office. Many staff contracts were linked to the duration of programmes or projects as such, apart from the Representative, there were no ‘permanent’ staff which is source of some instability, and staff members do not plan to make a career with the United Nations. Recruitment announcements to the country office are made on the United Nations websites and through local advertising.

A brief look at the educational and professional profile of some officers demonstrates a high level of formal education. One staff member had a doctorate in gender sociology, and three had masters degrees in social sciences. Other staff members had taken or were following courses in gender studies, and one was a former university
academic. As they were locally recruited, staff have valuable knowledge and experience of the Haitian context. Skills were generally in the area of GBV, violence prevention, community work, broader gender issues (such as gender sensitisation and mainstreaming) and advocacy, rather than specifically related to working in peace and security and humanitarian response.

**How effective was UN Women at coordinating gender-related work across United Nations entities and other key partners?**

UN Women in Haiti started to coordinate gender-related work across United Nations entities in collaboration with its partners, in accordance with its new mandate and the global strategic objectives of the organization. However, a number of challenges remain. In the aftermath of the earthquake, UN Women participated in the Protection Cluster and the SGBV sub-cluster country office-coordinated by UNFPA and the MCFDF, despite not being a formal member of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. As such, its role was effectively limited, while demands from actors across the spectrum increased and expectations were high. As noted, UN Women only had one GenCap adviser at the time, who initially attended to all the clusters but eventually focused more on the protection sub-cluster on SGBV. While UN Women’s exact role in humanitarian response is yet to be defined, there may be a more active role for UN Women in the cluster system in the future. Apart from humanitarian response, the country office played a key role in discussions and initiating the coordination of activities on improved response to GBV (in particular with the police, judiciary and health service providers). It also played an active role in initiating gender training for staff within the United Nations system by, for example, conducting training in GBV prevention and response with UNPOL and the military component of MINUSTAH.

**How effectively did UN Women manage risks in its operations? What strategies worked best?**

The extent to which programmes considered risk in the planning, inception, implementation and reporting phases varied. Where programme reports were available, risk tended not to have been assessed and documented. At least one proposal (funded by DFID) identified three risks, namely: lack of stability in beneficiary communities; lack of continuity within the state apparatus to ensure that reforms would be institutionalised; and lack of continuity in security-sector personnel (police and justice officials) at the community level (UNIFEM, 2010). There was, however, no analysis of how these risks might be managed. While country office staff were aware of ‘do no harm’ principles, these did not seem to have been incorporated into programme planning.

**How fit for purpose were UN Women’s M&E and reporting systems? Did they adequately capture lessons learnt on results and impact?**

The limited number of reports to which the evaluation team had access showed a lack of quantitative and qualitative indicators by which to assess the impact and effectiveness of projects. Differences between objectives and outcomes were not assessed, or if they were, were not publicly documented. Key stakeholders complained of delays in the submission of reports.

It was important to recognise that, in the emergency phase of the earthquake response,
it would have been very challenging for the country office to conduct M&E assessments, and UN Women was not alone in having weak M&E systems in the midst of an emergency response. UN Women was hoping to increase the resources it devotes to M&E in the future.

Overall analysis and implications for policy, programming and practice

Policy work

UN Women is the lead agency on gender issues in Haiti, and has been involved in elaborating key elements of the United Nations’ strategy on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment. The country office also works with United Nations leadership in Haiti in developing a rights-based and gender-sensitive integrated strategic framework. It is also the key international partner of the Ministry of Gender and Women Affairs and has prioritized strengthening the capacity of the Ministry to engage with local municipal authorities on gender mainstreaming at the local level. It also supports the Ministry develop policies, provides inputs into draft legislation and works to strengthen gender sensitivity in programmatic work. It has also worked with the Ministry in developing legislation to protect women and girls against violence and sexual exploitation. These efforts have been hampered by changes in personnel at the Ministry, and by the Ministry’s lack of influence within the government. The country office played a key role in supporting women’s leadership and political participation during the electoral period from April 2009 to April 2011.

There was limited success achieved in the area of women’s leadership in peace and security and humanitarian response. Within humanitarian response, gender issues were overlooked in the rush to provide assistance. UN Women’s policy work was inevitably curtailed following the earthquake, and it was some time before government ministries became functional again. Once they were, they understandably focused on the emergency response.

The country office evidently needs support to develop its next five-year national strategic plan which is overdue, and as ongoing programmes come to an end the country office will be left with a limited portfolio.

Programmatic work

UN Women’s programme work in humanitarian response largely centred on providing training and capacity-building to partners at national and community levels by reorienting its ongoing programmes to address humanitarian needs in the wake of the earthquake. The focus of its work has subsequently been around its core areas of expertise, largely in accordance with UN Women’s mandate and the global strategy. These activities have mainly been concerned with GBV awareness-raising, violence prevention, data collection about women and violence and supporting the provision of assistance to victims of violence (psychosocial counselling and legal advice). The country office demonstrated flexibility and adaptability in its programmatic approach to humanitarian response.

Operational capacity

UN Women is clearly still in a process of transition. It has grown in terms of human resources and has ambitions to expand further. The country office struggled to complete several projects and deadlines have been missed. Nonetheless, there was a sense of commitment and reinvigoration following recent staff changes, although more assistance and support from headquarters (and from the Panama regional office once the relocation of management authority is complete) would certainly help to address concerns about staff turnover and instability within the country office. The country office did not have sufficient
technical capacity or human resources to complete its work in a timely manner, or to produce reports to the standards required.

UN Women is becoming more collaborative and more certain of its mandate and of the value of its work in Haiti. The country office had made greater efforts to increase transparency and share experiences with other interested actors, and there was greater willingness to engage with other United Nations entities, such as UNFPA. In general, UN Women (and UNIFEM before it) tended to be reactive rather than proactive, although this more passive stance may have helped to foster local initiatives and innovation. There was a greater level of delegation and sharing of responsibility within the country office than in the past which should be commended and encouraged. It is likely that the country office will need greater financial and technical support if these positive developments are to continue. Improved management, greater delegation of responsibility and enhanced job stability would all serve to address the problem of high staff turnover.

6. Recommendations

Dimension 1: UN Women’s policy and strategic direction

UN Women should be more strategic in the way it develops partnerships, in particular at the institutional level. Female decision-makers in Haiti are not necessarily gender-sensitive.

UN Women struggles to influence national government policy due to political instability and high staff turnover in the wake of the earthquake, which also affected its key partner, the Ministry of Gender and Women’s Affairs. With the collaboration of strategic partners UN Women should seek ways to encourage the government to strengthen the ministry.

Policy and programmatic engagement with other parts of the United Nations system in Haiti should be expanded. While UN Women has often participated in programmes alongside other United Nations entities, constructive collaboration has been less common.

More strategic planning by UN Women, with support from headquarters (or the regional office) and extensive consultations with in-country partners, would go a long way towards mitigating inter-agency competition for funding and duplication of effort.

Dimension 2: UN Women’s policies, programming and operations

The ongoing transition from UNIFEM to UN Women does not appear to have raised significant concerns, though UN Women’s mandate and strategic objectives, and how they relate to the specific context in Haiti still need to be clarified. Given the limited funding available, it is crucial that UN Women highlights its specific mandate among United Nations entities working in Haiti.

Generating an accurate analysis of the ways in which violence affects communities, households and individuals is critical for effective policy-making and programming. There are little reliable data on SGBV in Haiti (especially in the post-earthquake IDP camps) and under-reporting is widespread given the cultural taboos regarding sexual violence. UN Women has successfully collaborated in this type of research, and the findings were contrary to the expectations of many actors involved in this area. UN Women could make an important contribution to further research and data-gathering. Several staff members have strong academic backgrounds and a good understanding of research methods.

UN Women should consider ways to link its programmatic and policy work more closely to the specific areas of democratic participation and violence-reduction. The country office could do more in terms of pre-disaster preparedness, and should enhance its capacity in
relation to humanitarian response. Again, this will require collaborative work with partners (in-country and externally), and the development of new partnerships with actors more closely associated with humanitarian relief.

There is a widespread perception in the country office and among partners that the contribution of the UN Women office in humanitarian response should be in sharing its technical expertise, capacity-building and training. This could usefully be extended to training of trainers to enhance local capacity in the long-term. In this way, UN Women could build upon its particular areas of specialisation and expertise to support the humanitarian response activities of partners, both nationally and in communities across the country. The country office has good partnerships with CSOs, and these should be exploited to facilitate these types of activities.

**Dimension 3: UN Women’s organizational capacities, resources and structures**

UN Women could play a more prominent role in voicing concerns about women’s issues in Haiti and externally. Country office personnel have extensive knowledge of the issues and experience in addressing them which will help UN Women in its policy and programmatic work, as well as augmenting resources and attracting more talent to the team.

The country office could be usefully supported and advised in developing a medium-term strategy and strengthening programme proposals. In particular, it should be assisted in developing and implementing risk assessments and M&E indicators, and applying ‘do no harm’ principles in programme/project proposals and reports.

Given that several reports have missed their deadlines in recent years, it would be helpful if the country office examined more thoroughly how this came about and what needs to be done to avoid this in the future. A more efficient approach to report-writing would enhance UN Women’s credibility in the eyes of donors.
References


UN Women (2013). Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Data Sheet.


## Interviews

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<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Function/ Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>National Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry for Women’s Affairs and the Rights of Women (MCFDF)</td>
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<td>Solidarité Fanm Ayisyen</td>
<td>Coordination member</td>
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