Evaluation of UN Women’s Contribution to Increasing Women’s Leadership and Participation in Peace and Security and Humanitarian Response

Colombia case study

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**Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AECID</td>
<td>Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (Spanish Development Agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DRF</td>
<td>Development results framework</td>
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<td>FARC</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces)</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MDG-F</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal Fund</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
<td>Mujeres, Paz y Seguridad (Women, Peace and Security)</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>SAT</td>
<td>Sistema de Alerta Temprana (Early Warning System)</td>
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<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
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<td>VAW</td>
<td>Violence against Women</td>
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<td>VJR</td>
<td>Verdad, Justicia y Reparación (Truth, Justice and Reparation)</td>
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<td>WEF</td>
<td>World Economic Forum</td>
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1. Introduction

The Colombia case study was the first of five country case studies of the corporate evaluation of UN Women’s contribution to increasing women’s leadership and participation in peace and security and humanitarian response. It was conducted between 20-30 January 2013.

2. Methodology

The fieldwork was carried out by a member of the evaluation team in collaboration with a local researcher. In the case of Colombia, the fieldwork team included a member of the UN Women Evaluation Office who collaborated with the local researcher to ensure better triangulation, improved knowledge of the socio-political context and broadened data coverage.

During the fieldwork country-level strategy and programming, with a focus on the peace and security and humanitarian response agenda, was examined. More detailed observation of country office work in this area involved looking at a selection of interventions decided between the country office and the evaluation team leader. In this case, it was possible to visit stakeholders outside of Bogota, in a trip to Neiva in the department of Huila. The country evaluation team met stakeholders from across the group of relevant stakeholders at the subnational level.

The case study’s qualitative analysis drew on both documentary evidence provided by the country office and other stakeholders and interviews. It was conducted to ensure that the range of relevant stakeholders identified in the inception phase and with the country office were interviewed. Interviews were semi-structured to address the concrete evaluation questions, but also allowed for unstructured questions as appropriate to the interview and the context, and in relation to the intervention/activity under observation. Interviews included both focus group and one-to-one interviews.

In line with United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) handbook, Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation – Towards UNEG Guidance (UNEG, 2011), the country evaluation team took measures to ensure the inclusion and participation of relevant stakeholders, taking care to identify issues of power relations. The context analysis and stakeholder mapping took account of the context-specific balance of power between relevant groups. During the fieldwork, the team was mindful of the relationship between implementers and different stakeholders in interventions, including taking into consideration the role of the evaluation team.

3. Country context

Context analysis

Colombia has been in conflict for over 50 years. The origins and particular evolution of the conflict are complex, and reflect longstanding grievances associated with the concentration of wealth and power, the absence of substantive land reform and entrenched patterns of inequalities exacerbated by the nature and historical legacies of subnational power relations and elite interest structures. During the cycle of conflict of the past 50 years, Colombia has experienced very high levels of casualties.

The 1991 Constitution, the outcome of an earlier peace process, represented an important moment of political restructuring. It was intended to resolve the conflict and dismantle the legacy of the power-sharing arrangement of the liberal and conservative parties of the past (an arrangement dating from 1958 which had, in its time, served to pacify an earlier cycle of
violence in the country). Crucially, the 1991 Constitution put in place a number of oversight mechanisms which have constituted key institutional mechanisms to limit the scope for arbitrary state action. Notably, this included a new Constitutional Court with extensive review powers, a more competitive political party system (in principle), an expanded Bill of Rights and the *tutela* writ (which gives standing to all citizens to initiate constitutional review on rights in the new Constitutional Court).

However, the new political order was not fully able to address the root causes of violence, nor could it create the conditions to dismantle the range of armed actors who had acquired prominence since the 1980s. Instead of ending, conflict has undergone different dynamics of transformation, including in terms of the forms of violence wielded and the alliances which have surfaced between different armed groups. A complex array of armed groups and interests and modes of violent engagement have featured in the conflict and insecurity of the 1990s and into the 2000s. Key actors have included armed guerrilla movements, notably through the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* [FARC]); paramilitary groups, including an assortment of self-defence groups; and different levels of organized crime groups associated with production and trade of narcotics. In the 1990s, the paramilitary war gained ground and levels of conflict escalated. FARC and drug-related crime also remained active. Between 1998 and 2006 there were an estimated 40,000 conflict-related deaths, most of which occurred in isolated rural areas, and mostly a result of paramilitary activity (Restrepo and Muggah, 2009). The United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (*Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* [AUC]) surfaced at the end of the 1990s as an umbrella organization bringing together different paramilitary organizations.

In addition, there have been mass displacements through illegal land and property takeovers. These are a tactic of both war and terror, and have created one of the largest displaced populations in the world. Internal displacement in Colombia reached its peak between 2000 and 2002. Acción Social, a government office, estimated that over a period of 15 years (1985-2010) the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) amounted to 3,623,961 (Meertens, 2012).

The *Santa Fe de Ralito* Accord in 2003, an agreement between the President Uribe government (2002-2010) and the paramilitary groups, led to a new dynamic in the conflict with the initiation of a demobilization and disarmament of sorts. However, although the paramilitary groups were officially dismantled, this led to a transformation of the conflict rather than to its resolution. There was initially a positive impact in terms of reduced levels of insecurity and homicide rates. However, new types of violence have surfaced in the form of the *bacrim*, or criminal bands which bring together elements of demobilised paramilitary and other criminal groups, and this has led to a renewed escalation of violence and intimidation (Restrepo and Muggah, 2009). This transformed violence is more dispersed and less captured through the more politically oriented identities that featured in the past, but are no less destabilising for that reason. At the same time, FARC has remained active. Under President Uribe’s administration there was no official recognition of the conflict situation. This has changed under President Santos’ administration.

Policy on conflict since the Uribe administration and into the administration of Juan Manuel Santos (in office since 2010) included the establishment of different transitional justice mechanisms, with different modalities, and varying levels of legitimacy and acceptance.

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24 Notably, these new manifestations of violence were not captured in the transitional justice legislation in place since 2005, which is especially problematic from the perspective of victims, as it has implications in terms of the legal redress mechanisms they can invoke – whether in terms of the protection measures, reparations or land restitution claims that are available.
among a range of stakeholders. Notably, however, and paradoxically, these mechanisms are in place in a context in which the armed conflict remains unresolved. There is thus a situation in place where victims have a range of redress mechanisms to hand but an environment of threat and violence remains in many respects.

Under the Santos administration there has been a new direction in addressing conflict-related issues. Notable milestones include Law 1448 on Victims and Land Restitution, which addresses some of the legacies of the conflict situation and, current peace talks between the government and FARC. These measures have contributed to bringing issues related to the legacy of violence and conflict onto the public agenda, and to creating new spaces for state–society dialogue on post-conflict processes aimed at sustainable peace-building.

Of note is that the different dynamics and cycles of conflict are experienced differentially in the different regions of the country, and across different cleavages, including gender, class and ethnicity as well as the urban/rural divide.

Finally, it is important to underline that the Colombian conflict coexists within a polity of fairly stable state institutions, an established tradition of democratic representation, a sophisticated legal tradition and a recently activated judicial apparatus. Notably, the Constitutional Court has played an important role in tempering the worst excesses of impunity, and has conditioned the legislative and political process to set up transitional justice mechanisms to keep these within the spirit of the 1991 Constitution.25 Although power alternates, Colombia is considered one of the most stable democracies in the region.

**Key political and legal milestones related to the conflict since 2000**

A number of key political and legal milestones altered the tempo and trajectory of the conflict and contributed to the emerging peace process including:

- 2002-2010: The Democratic Security Policy (under Uribe) and Plan Colombia;
- 2003: The *Santa Fe de Ralito* Accord between the Uribe government and the paramilitary groups to initiate a demobilization and disarmament process;
- 2004: Decision T-025 of the Constitutional Court, which called on the state to address the structural causes of the situation of unconstitutional conditions facing the displaced population in the country;
- 2005: Law 975 on Justice and Peace (passed under Uribe, and intended as the first transitional justice effort) which brought together the agreements of the *Santa Fe de Ralito* Accord. It put in place a range of measures and judicial incentives to achieve the demobilization of mainly members of paramilitary groups (numbering about 30,000) and to recognize the victimization of the civilian population and their right to reparation, truth and historical memory. To date, only three individuals have been convicted (interview);
- 2006: Decision C-370, a Constitutional Court ruling which modified Law 975 on Justice and Peace to create more space for victims’ voice and participation, and strengthened the right to reparation. The new legislation put in place special units in the Prosecutor’s Office, the Office of the Attorney General and the Ombudsperson (*Defensoria del Pueblo*);
- 2008: Ruling 092, following up on Decision T-025, to address the issue of the historical vulnerabilities of women, the disproportionate impact of the armed

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25 Some recent constitutional reforms, finalised in 2012, contribute to shaping the rules of transitional justice.
conflict on women and the particular experience of women as IDPs. It is important to note that the Constitutional Court has continued to monitor the situation of IDPs since 2004. It has also introduced the concept of the ‘extraordinary impact’ of conflict on women, and ordered the establishment of a special commission, the Comisión de Seguimiento, tasked with conducting national inquiries on the situation of IDPs, including losses incurred (of land, property, assets, future profits);

- 2010: Law 1424, which provides incentives for demobilized paramilitaries found not responsible of grave crimes and who engage in a process of truth and memory with the Centre of Historical Memory, in exchange for judicial leniency regarding their crimes;

- 2011: Law 1448 on Victims and Land Restitution, which acknowledged the armed conflict in the country. The law aims at providing reparation to four million victims, as well as land restitution to those who have suffered displacement. A number of institutions have been created under the law;

- 2012: The Legal Framework for Peace (Marco legal para la paz), a constitutional reform which created ground rules for peacebuilding and transitional justice; and

- 2012: Initiation of a peace dialogue between the government and FARC (27 August).

In 2012, a new stage in the conflict developed with the initiation of peace talks between the current Santos government and FARC regarding the peace process. The ceasefire was a unilateral initiative by the FARC and came to an end in January 2013.

**Women and conflict in Colombia**

Colombia ranks 91st on the human development index. The World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Gender Gap Report pointed to a deterioration in gender equality in the country. In 2012, Colombia ranked 63rd compared to 22nd in 2006, signalling either that gender inequality had worsened or that other countries were progressing at a faster rate. The weak points, according to WEF, relate to limited progress on women’s political and economic empowerment (WEF, 2012).

The gendered impact of conflict in Colombia has been increasingly documented and the objective of research (Global Network of Women Peacebuilders [GNWP], 2011; Meertens, 2012; UNDP, 2011). Conflict has affected women in a number of ways and their experience of conflict-related sexual violence has not diminished with demobilization (GNWP, 2011). The Early Warning System (Sistema de Alerta Temprana [SAT]) found that the threat of conflict-related violence against organized women’s groups has increased since 2008. It is reported that the aim of intimidation and violence, in addition to instilling fear, is to dissuade reporting on conflict-related crimes and to demobilise women leaders. Women represent 46.8 per cent of cases of forced disappearance. Women are also the main victims of displacement, and make up 51 per cent of IDPs. From 1995 to 2011, violence associated with this conflict has generated over 3.7 million IDPs (nearly 8 per cent of the country’s total population), 49 per cent of whom are women.²⁶ Meertens (2012) reported three ways in which sexual violence and displacement are connected: sexual violence as part of violent acts which led to

²⁶ See also UN Women (2012b), which cites data from the Victim Register and from the SAT.
displacement; the threat of sexual violence as a cause of displacement; and sexual violence as a particular form of vulnerability experienced by women during and after displacement.

Gender discrimination means women have faced barriers to accessing decision-making processes, especially as related to the conflict. In the recent peace process, there has been an increased presence of women in the regional forums of discussion, but women were underrepresented in the peace talks during the ceasefire.

Women are not seen as agents of change in the conflict. Moreover, they are represented primarily as victims. Ruling 092 of 2008 issued by the Constitutional Court was a major step in highlighting the particular vulnerabilities of women resulting from the context of conflict. Despite increased support for participation, women’s voice remains marginal in the peace process. There is an ongoing risk not just that discriminatory gender relations in the post-conflict process will persist, but also of an escalation in the risk and experience of post-conflict sexual violence.

Wider context of gender politics in Colombia

Key milestones in Colombia regarding gender equality include the following policy and legislative changes:

- 1982: Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW);
- 1995: Ratification of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Sanction and Elimination of Violence against Women (Convención de Belem do Pará);
- 2000: Law 581, which put in place a 30 per cent quota for women’s participation in policy, although implementation remains a challenge. The proportion of women in elected office currently stands at: 9.4 per cent of governorships; 9.8 per cent of mayoral positions; 17.9 per cent in departmental legislatures; 16.1 per cent in municipal councils; 12.6 per cent of congressional seats in the Chamber of Representatives; and 16.6 per cent of seats in the Senate; (UN Women, 2012d)
- 2006: Establishment of the Observatory of Gender Affairs;
- 2008: Law 1257 on Visibility, Prevention and Punishment of All Forms of Violence and Discrimination against Women, which increased sanctions and sentencing for violence and discrimination against women;
- 2010: Establishment of the Alta Consejería para la Mujer, an executive branch body in charge of advancing gender equality policies;
- Inclusion in the National Development Plan (2010-2014, Articles 177 and 179) of a commitment to develop public policy on gender equality for women;
- 2011: Law 1475, which regulates gender equality in the organization and functioning of political movements, parties and election processes; and
- 2012: Approval of the National Policy on Gender Equality and Women’s Rights (Lineamientos de Política Pública Nacional para la Equidad de Género y los Derechos de las Mujeres) which is budgeted for in 2013 (see also the Conpes 161).
The National Policy on Gender Equality and Women’s Rights was led by the executive branch and was the result of a process of consultation with societal actors at national and regional levels. It represents public recognition of ongoing structures of gender inequality and discrimination and includes seven axis points, one of which addresses peacebuilding. It involves putting in place a number of strategic actions which support women’s rights and address structures of discrimination, through sectoral and multi-sectoral interventions, institutional reform and the transformation of social norms that perpetuate gender inequalities. If this is to be achieved the government will require a range of public policy measures.

While there is no national action plan (NAP) for implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, through the axis on peacebuilding there is recognition of the need to undertake a range of measures to address legacies of conflict-related gender-based violence (GBV), and to create the space for women’s voice in peace building. These are a potential entry points to mobilise efforts in support of the objectives of resolution 1325.

Key stakeholders

UN Women, and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) before it, engaged with a number of actors, including government and societal actors, and international development partners. The evaluation team interviewed people from across these stakeholder groups, to ensure that relevant and affected rights holders and duty bearers were consulted on UN Women’s peace and security work.

The evaluation team interviewed key stakeholders for advancing gender equality goals, including in relation to the peace and security and humanitarian response agenda, across a number of groups as detailed below.

Government actors, public officials and elected officials

UN Women and UNIFEM’s engagement with government actors, including elected officials and public officials in relevant bodies tasked with different components of the peace process or transitional justice mechanisms, was relevant to support normative and policy work which advances the peace and security and humanitarian response agenda. Key actors with whom UN Women and UNIFEM has worked include:

- In the executive branch, the Ministries of the Interior and Agriculture, and the Public Prosecution Office (the evaluation team was not able to interview stakeholders from the Alta Consejería para la Mujer);
- Elected representatives from the legislative branch;
- Offices in the judiciary, and in the wider justice and security system;
- New ‘transitional justice’ bodies, such as the Protection Unit, the Victims Unit and the Land Unit;
- The Defensoría del Pueblo (Human Rights Ombudsperson); and
- Regional and municipal officials (UN Women has focused efforts on having territorial presence where it can use the presence and networks of the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] to achieve more effective outreach in its work).
Civil society actors

Among the beneficiaries of UN Women and UNIFEM support are different women’s organizations:

- National-level women’s organizations, which are diverse and do not necessarily all agree on different aspects of the peace process and transitional justice mechanisms which have emerged in recent legislation. Organizations at the national level with whom UN Women engages include: Corporación Sisma Mujer, Red Nacional de Mujeres; Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres; Iniciativa de Mujeres por la Paz; Mesa de Trabajo Mujer y Conflicto Armado;

- Subnational and grassroots women’s groups. These have come to constitute important networks in those regions where UN Women has projects to ensure outreach and presence on some of the peace and security and humanitarian response agenda.

International development actors

- UN Women works with other United Nations entities. Key here is work with UNDP, not least through UN Women’s work using UNDP’s territorial presence to ensure more outreach beyond Bogota, and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA);

- Bilateral and multilateral agencies, most notably the Spanish Development Agency (Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo [AECID]) and Sweden.

Other national organizations

These have also been relevant stakeholders for UNIFEM and UN Women and include organizations which have engaged in collaborative work with UN Women, or as beneficiaries of UN Women support, such as research think-tanks. Notable examples are DeJusticia and regional universities with which UN Women has developed diplomas on transitional justice.

The different ways in which UN Women and UNIFEM engaged with these stakeholders are detailed in the evaluation questions below.

The following features should be noted in terms of how these actors are positioned in relation to one another, and the nature of power relations between them:

- Colombia hosts a relatively large United Nations presence which is not unrelated to the security issues of the country. However, it was noted in interviews that United Nations entities were reminded about the limits of their actions to ensure principles of sovereignty were not violated. The United Nations system has not had a key presence in the high-level peace talks between the government and the FARC. However, it has contributed to facilitating some of the spaces for citizen and wider political participation, for instance with the Universidad Nacional, specifically the Foro Agrario and the Foro de Participación Política, and through support to nine congressional regional working groups in 2012.

- International donors have significant presence in the country. At the same time, Columbia is a middle-income country which is not aid-dependent, and the government dictates the terms of its development agenda and sets
clear boundaries for what constitutes international interventions which are considered acceptable.

- Women’s civil society organizations (CSOs) have a strong historical presence in the country. From interviews, it was clear that such organizations are wary of UN Women or any other international actor representing their interests/perspectives.

- At the same time, the CSOs recognized the importance of international actors, and notably of UN Women in terms of providing a space to facilitate dialogue with the government, including in relation to giving public protection to leading figures. Grassroots organizations in particular work at the harder edge of some of the conflict issues. A clear distinction should also be made between national-level women’s organizations and feminist voices (mostly academics), located in Bogota, and regional organizations, including community-level organizations, which may not always feel well represented by the national organizations. For national women’s organizations the ‘protective’ presence of UN Women was less important. The value of UN Women is in giving visibility to (but not representing) their views and positions, and in providing them with technical assistance (TA) and expertise, as well as organizational support. For grassroots organizations at subnational level, the ‘protective’ role of UN Women remains important in conflict-affected areas. Organizational support and TA is also important, while UN Women’s role in facilitating dialogue with government and state officials is important for both grassroots and CSOs.

4. UN Women strategy and activities in Colombia

Country office overview

UN Women, formerly UNIFEM, has been working in Colombia since 2004 as a programme office. An early objective in opening the country office was to focus on the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (Mujeres Paz y Seguridad [MPS]) programme. At the time, this corresponded with UNIFEM’s governance thematic area, and was supported chiefly through AECID funding. More recently, other donors have supported UN Women and UNIFEM, notably Sweden and, in smaller proportions, Canada, Norway and the Netherlands.

Under UNIFEM, the Colombia country office reported to the subregional office in Quito (Ecuador). Sub-regional strategic documents (UNIFEM, 2005; 2006; 2008a; 2008b) and regional documents indicated that Colombia was a priority country in the region and subregion, and the focus of UNIFEM work was identified in relation to women peace and security. Country strategic plans for the corresponding period speak to this subregional agenda.

For the purposes of this evaluation, the MPS programme provided the umbrella framework under which country office peace and security and humanitarian response work was undertaken. In practice, funding came from different sources, mostly through bilateral funds. However, reporting was managed through Quito, which added a layer of bureaucratic complexity and difficulty.
Thematic priorities of UN Women and programme work

The country office Strategic Plan 2010-2013 responded to UNIFEM’s strategic plan of the time. The Strategic Annual Workplan 2012-2013 reflected engagement with Goals 1, 3 and 4 of the global UN Women Strategic Plan, and activities were presented accordingly. In practice, activities were guided by funding realities in country. In addition, it was important to note that the country office Strategic Plan was nested formally in that of the sub-region. For the period 2008-2009, the specific point noted for Colombia in the Andean Strategic Plan was ‘[t]he effective implementation of resolution 1325 in Colombia and the reinforcement of the democratic governance and peace with gender justice in conflict prevention’.

The thematic priorities of UN Women’s work were organized in the following programmatic areas:

- **MPS:** Included support to the implementation of resolution 1325, and associated resolutions (1820, 1888, 1889 and 1612); and the Truth, Justice and Reparation (Verdad, Justicia y Reparación [VJR]) programme which focused on women victims of the armed conflict through different activities aimed at institutional and organizational support to women’s CSOs which was the focus of this evaluation.

- **Political participation of women:** As part of the International Donor Working Group on Gender in Colombia (Mesa de Género de la Cooperación Internacional), and developed in conjunction with the Ministry of the Interior, a strategy for working with women in elected positions from different parts of the country was put in place. Work has included engaging with approximately 500 women councillors, legislative deputies, mayors and representatives of local administrative bodies to develop a work agenda including lectures and capacity development on party caucuses, political control, development plans and participatory budgeting. Particular emphasis was placed on women’s participation and on challenges in implementing the Law on Victims. UN Women continues to monitor gender-sensitive legislation and provide technical support to Congress in processing laws which have a particular impact on women's rights. In addition, there was support to legislation to ensure alignment with international commitments to women’s rights; the development of the Gender Equality Policy (Política Pública de Equidad de Género para las Mujeres); recent quotas legislation; and legislation associated with transitional justice, notably, the Law on Victims and Law 1257 on Violence against Women (VAW).

- **Support to addressing VAW:** Included UN Women’s leadership of the Millennium Development Goal Fund (MDG-F) on gender 2008-2011; the Safe Cities (regional/global) programme 2007-2011; UN Women’s support to the national government’s decision to sign up to the Secretary-General’s Joint Campaign to End VAW; the Safe Cities Regional Programme’s contribution to the establishment of a protocol of attention for the national police; support to the Integral Plan aimed at guaranteeing women a life free of violence, which was part of the Gender Equality Policy, and collection of related data and lessons learnt on the progress and results of the MDG-F gender programme; and technical support to Law 1542, which removed the character of complaint for crimes of domestic violence.
UNIFEM, it was noted in interviews, did not receive any core funding other than through the global programme of Safe Cities (which was not within the peace and security agenda). Since 2005, most funding has come from AECID, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Dutch Cooperation, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. Spain was a key funder from 2005-2009 and Sweden has progressively become a key source of funding. In addition, the country office was involved in a number of joint programmes, principally in relation to the MDG-F. Thus, thematic priorities also responded in some degree to bilateral donor priorities. Country office strategic documents and plans, therefore, constituted a balancing act of speaking to UN Women and UNIFEM global Strategic Plans, and presenting what actually constituted country-level interventions and activities.

Most of UN Women country office’s work on peace and security and humanitarian response was captured in MPS programmatic work to date which does not feature in joint programmes (shared with other entities) or global programmes (such as the Safe Cities programme). A key objective of the programme was to support gender-sensitive peace and democracy work in Colombia, ensure the integration of a gender-sensitive approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding and support women’s rights.

Currently, the UN Women Colombia office has also been involved in the following joint programmes:

- Joint Programme on VAW/MDG funding (ended in December 2011, led by UN Women in collaboration with UNFPA and the International Organization for Migration [IOM]);
- Peacebuilding and Development in Nariño/MDG-F (led by UNDP with UN Women, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], the United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF] and the Food and Agricultural Organization [FAO]); and
- Programme for the Improvement of Human Security of Vulnerable Groups in Soacha, (funded by the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security [UNTFHHS] and seven United Nations entities led by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA]).

UNIFEM’s participation in the joint programme for Soacha focused mostly on capacity development on gender perspectives, but not specifically as regards humanitarian work. Humanitarian work in Colombia (as is true of UN Women globally) remains an underdeveloped sub-thematic area of the peace and security and humanitarian response agenda. The demand and need for UN Women in Colombia to be able to provide technical support on gender-responsive humanitarian work was noted during the interviews.

**Transition from former UNIFEM to UN Women**

The transition to UN Women was underway at the time of the evaluation. Under the new regional architecture, Colombia became a country office headed by a Country Representative and dependent on the Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean in Panama. An operations Director will not be assigned to Bogotá which, as noted during interviews, has implications for operational decision-making.

The regional reorganization resulting from the transition from UNIFEM to UN Women means that country office reporting has shifted from Quito (UNIFEM regional office) to Panama (the new regional office) (UN Women, 2012c).
The perceived slowness of the transition had a wearing effect on country office staff, and generated a heightened sense of uncertainty regarding human resources. At the same time, there was a sense of strong commitment to and engagement with ongoing programmes and activities by country staff. In part, this was due to funding having always been non-core. It was also clear that there were limited expectations regarding increased funding in the short-to medium-term.

**Selection of programmes/activities**

A key objective of the MPS programme was to support gender-sensitive peace and democracy work in Colombia, to ensure the integration of gender-sensitive approaches into conflict prevention and peacebuilding and to support women’s rights.

The country office selected the programme for the evaluation because it represented some of its most relevant work in the area of peace and security and humanitarian response but also because, from the perspective of the wider evaluation process, it provided an opportunity to focus on transitional justice as a relevant and emerging sub-theme in UN Women’s global agenda in this work area.

In this regard, the fieldwork concentrated mostly on activities and interventions included under the MPS, with a special focus on the VJR programme funded by Sweden. In practice, this included mostly activities related to different processes and objectives of transitional justice mechanisms as they evolved in Colombia. An evaluation of the 2012 programme (Hayek-Weinmann, 2012) which assessed activities in the current VJR programme noted that, in two years of execution, 34 lines of action were undertaken. The activities this evaluation exercise considered were mostly in relation to transitional justice work which included:

**Strategic results (1) relating to truth:**

- Selection of knowledge outputs on truth supported by UN Women, including through work with the National Commission of Reparation and Reconciliation (*Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación* [CNRR]) and subnational commissions; and
- Support to memory work in the regions.

**Strategic results (2) relating to justice:**

- Selection of strategic publications and toolkits developed with different beneficiaries, including the CNRR, the Human Rights Ombudsperson and the Land Unit. Notable outputs included a toolkit to identify, characterize and prevent situations of risk for the SAT in the Human Rights Ombudsperson, as well as the Report on Land (*Informe de Tierras*);
- Support to and involvement in the Diploma on Transitional Justice, which was developed in different regions, notably Oriente Antioqueño and Neiva in Huila;
- Technical support to the development of the Law on Victims to various entities, including the Victims Unit, the Public Prosecution Office and the judicial branch, including on the systematization of jurisprudence. Research and training (through the Diploma on Transitional Justice) was provided in collaboration with *DeJusticia* and departmental universities; and
Support to new units and other relevant offices (notably the Victims Unit, the Human Rights Ombudsperson, the Protection Unit, the Public Prosecution Office and the judiciary).

Strategic results (3) in relation to reparations:

- Support to the Land Unit (*Unidad de Tierras*).

Strategic results (4) in relation to coordination of international donor action on gender:

- Support to the Technical Secretariat of the International Donor Working Group on Gender.

In addition, a number of other activities relevant to the work of UN Women were considered for the evaluation which addressed all the questions in the evaluation matrix. Some were not specific to the peace and security and humanitarian response agenda, but understanding the wider evolution of UN Women in country through these activities was necessary, in particular to capture a more contextualized understanding of UN Women’s work on this agenda.

These included:

- Support to resolution 1325 (with funding from the Netherlands);
- The MDG Programme on Gender and Women’s Rights (from the *Ventana, Paz y Seguridad* programme);
- Legislative work (support to public policy work to advance gender equality polices), specifically on contributing to the recent Gender Equality Policy (*Conpes* 161);
- Accompaniment and support to women’s movements at the national and subnational level (including through interviews with Huila-based women’s organizations), and to regional peacebuilding forums; and
- Coordination work with other United Nations entities, and other partners, including through gender forums such as the Interagency Gender Group and the International Donor Working Group on Gender.

Types and range of activities included:

- Direct TA to government and public offices on recent developments in public policy initiatives on gender equality, or on introducing gender awareness into the implementation of national policy in relation to the peace process, such as the Laws on Justice and Peace, Victims and Land Restitution;
- Direct TA to Congress on legislative processes, such as the development of the Laws on Victims and Land Restitution;
- Direct TA to other United Nations entities in the form of providing gender expertise;
- Direct TA to CSOs, in the form of either workshops and training or support in publication outputs;
TA in the form of subcontracted consultants with gender and thematic expertise placed in other offices, such as the Human Rights Ombudsperson, the Land Unit and the Victims Unit (which varied in form and effectiveness);

Capacity development and training of different stakeholders (but not much evidence of training of trainers), including in the form of university diplomas;

Accompaniment of CSOs to:
  - Support organizational and technical strengthening of CSO capabilities in relation to different peacebuilding and transitional justice activities;
  - Facilitate and broker dialogue i) between women CSOs at the national and local levels; and ii) between women CSOs and government or public officials (at the national and local level); and
  - Give visibility to women CSOs’ voice plus protection and recognition in the relationship with government at national and subnational level;

Preparation (sometimes through subcontracted consultants) of toolkits and information on research publications which were relevant to different components of the transitional justice and peacebuilding agenda;

Funding of research outputs;

Coordination of working groups on gender, notably the inter-agency and international donor groups; and

Advocacy work.

5. Findings

Theory of change

The key question in observing these activities was to consider the extent to which support to women’s leadership and participation featured as a clear objective and intended outcome in UN Women and UNIFEM’s peace and security and humanitarian response work.

Country office documentation over time showed a more rigorous development of the results chain, and therefore to the explicit theory of change (UNIFEM, 2009; UN Women, 2012b). This was most evident in the Annual Workplan 2012-2013 (UN Women, 2012b), where the development results framework (DRF) was clearer about the connection between outcomes, indicators, outputs and inputs/activities relating to country-level United Nations country team (UNCT) priorities than in earlier strategic documents. Overall, a review of the country office’s strategic documentation revealed an improvement over time in the presentation of expected causal connections between programme activities and objectives. It is worth noting that the 2008-2009 subregional Strategic Plan (UNIFEM, 2007) did not reflect a detailed representation of UNIFEM’s work but rather presented brushstrokes of a general peace and security agenda more or less focused on resolution 1325 and support to women victims of the conflict, which generally matched the country office plan. Overall, theories of change did not explicitly identify how particular interventions contributed to intended outcomes which reflected two points for consideration.

First, as noted in interviews, the UNIFEM country office tended to operate with a focus on project-based activities, and less in ways which reflected more strategic long-term planning with a medium- and long-term vision of change and impact of its work. Second, the absence
of core funding meant that the country office had to engage in a creative balancing act of drafting strategic documentation which addressed UNIFEM (and then UN Women) global strategic directions, while having to report to bilateral donors, with reporting mediated by the regional office.

Overall, strategic documentation matched country office activities with the global strategic direction of UN Women and UNIFEM, and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). Context analysis within documents was generally reflected in the choice of interventions. However, a closer consideration of how participation and leadership feature in strategic thinking about activities in related themes within the peace and security and humanitarian response agenda presented a mixed picture, notably:

- In the Strategic Plan 2010-2013 (UNIFEM, 2009a), while participation of women (and support to leadership) in peace and security work were noted as intended objectives, including advancing resolution 1325, there was no clear narrative about how participation and leadership of women in peace and security would be supported.

- The Concept Note for the MPS Programme Document 2009-2010 (UNIFEM, 2009b) explicitly mentioned the objectives of strengthening women’s participation through building capabilities of state and civil society; strengthening social mobilization and networks; awareness-raising, sensitization and knowledge production; and the role of coordination of the international community in this area. The importance of support to participation of women was noted most clearly in relation to peacebuilding and building capacities for women to strategically position gender issues on peacebuilding agendas.

- The Annual Workplan 2012-2013 (UN Women, 2012b) most explicitly developed a results chain which connected outputs to outcomes, and set out clear output and outcome indicators. Inputs and concrete activities were noted in a separate annex as DRF activities per output. Support to women’s participation and leadership here was noted in the following respects:
  
  o Women’s organizations participating in local and national planning processes in the implementation of the Laws on Victims and Land Restitution;
  
  o Women having voice in ‘truth telling’ and memory work through the relevant institutions of memory and truth at the national and subnational levels; and
  
  o Women’s organizations participating in peacebuilding, and specifically in peace talks as these take shape (noting the limited role the United Nations had in shaping this).

- Finally, the VJR programme with Sweden set out its own results chain, which spoke to the particular activities, inputs, outputs and intended outcomes and related indicators and means of verification for the programme. In this case, underlying hypotheses and risks were identified. Here, participation and leadership support related especially to visibility and voice of women in truth and memory work, giving visibility to the experience of conflict-related violence and supporting victims’ access to protection, redress and reparations.
Overall, a review of country office documentation revealed a stronger theory of change in relation to supporting women’s participation and leadership in formal political processes. However, a strong strategic narrative about support to participation and leadership in relation to peace and security and humanitarian response activities and outcomes was less clear.

Specifically, in practice, the emphasis of the VJR programme was more on work with victims (or on victims when working with government or official bodies) as victims and less as agents of change. In other words, the emphasis was to support victims and women’s organizations’ gain access to the relevant transitional justice mechanisms (on truth, justice and reparation), and relevant official bodies’ capacity in and awareness of women’s experiences and needs as regards transitional justice mechanisms and the wider conflict context in which these were located.

There was also an emphasis on sensitisation, awareness-raising and knowledge transfer on rights and transitional justice mechanisms for redress, truth and reparation, as well as on building up institutional capabilities for better voice and visibility on these issues from the perspective of women’s experience of conflict. The implication was that this had an empowering impact for women victims. However, this was not clearly captured in the documentation.

In part, this also reflected that the global guidance on participation and leadership work in peace and security was not clearly articulated at the country office level. The programme and strategic plan documents did not clearly elaborate on how more effective participation and leadership of women in transitional justice should develop. Where there was explicit mention of improved participation and leadership skills – which was important – it was in relation to UN Women’s support to women’s presence in the regional roundtable on peace talks (UN Women, 2013).

More importantly for this evaluation, the implicit theories of change in how concrete activities were effectuated – which were not captured in the logframes – were more revealing about strategic practices which had positive impact in terms of enhanced participation (although less so leadership) in the country office’s peace and security work. UN Women’s needs to more effectively capture lessons learned from practices that remain undocumented and were typically not reflected by results oriented logframes. More concrete examples of the findings against the specific evaluation questions are outlined below.

The figure below draws on both strategic plan documents and documents for the VJR programme, as well as interviews to elicit, and summarize the underlying theory of change that characterised country office work in this area. It was important also to note that the very fragmented activities that were part of this programme reflected a summary of expected causal connections between inputs, outputs, outcomes and strategic global goals.
Fig 1. Theory of change

Inputs
- TA for legislation, and policy implementation with government, representatives and state officials at the national and subnational level.
- TA for awareness-raising and expertise on key transitional justice processes among women’s organizations, and making these gender-responsive.
- Capacity development of women’s organizations and state officials in different relevant state entities.
- Supporting organizational strengthening of women’s organizations.
- Facilitating dialogue between civil society and government/state officials.
- Accompaniment and providing visibility to women’s organizations to enable more effective voice.
- UN Women’s lead of inter-agency and donor work on gender to facilitate progress on resolutions 1325 and 1820.

Outputs
- Better evidence of women’s experiences of violence and conflict; and of their access to mechanisms of reparation and redress.
- Women’s voice features in truth telling.
- On justice, more effective tracking of gender-sensitive implementation of transitional justice mechanisms.
- Women victims and policy implementers are better equipped to understand the gendered impact of conflict and mechanisms of redress and reparations.
- Systematisation of jurisprudence and laws for better alignment with gender equality and a gender-responsive approach.
- Facilitation of dialogue and trust building among stakeholders in opposition.
- Providing visibility and protection to women’s organizations. (grassroots and national level)

Outcomes
- Women are actively engaged in peacebuilding initiatives at a subnational and national level.
- Women are more equipped to access transitional justice as victims and as agents of change.
- Peacebuilding and transitional justice processes are gender-responsive.
- Relevant state bodies are better equipped and have engaged in the necessary attitudinal change - to integrate a gender perspective in all peacebuilding and transitional justice processes.

Underlying assumptions:
- Government of Colombia and relevant state bodies are increasingly committed to, or supportive of, gender-sensitive approaches to transitional justice and peacebuilding processes.
- The conflict context has sufficiently changed to reduce risk to women victims seeking to access transitional justice mechanisms (either for reparations or for land restitution).
- Knowledge transfer through TA and capacity development to different strategic stakeholders in transitional justice and the peace process, in the way it is delivered, contributes to both enhanced knowledge and attitudinal change.
- In the case of women’s organizations especially, knowledge transfer and capacity development enhance capabilities for voice, participation and leadership (but the detail of this is underdeveloped).
- UN Women has the resources, expertise and strategy in place to facilitate progress on resolutions 1325 and 1820.

Strategic Plan goals
UN Women Global Strategic Plan DRF 2011-2013:
- Goal 1: Women’s increased leadership and participation in the decisions that affect their lives.
- Goal 4: Women’s leadership in peace and security.
Evaluation questions

**Dimension 1: UN Women’s policy and strategic direction**

In what ways did UN Women influence policies and practice (within the United Nations system, as well as in key external agencies) in relation to women’s political participation and leadership in peace and security?

UN Women and UNIFEM in Colombia played an important role in contributing to shaping policy and practice on gender equality in the political process generally, and specifically in relation to the peace process.

Achievements for the evaluation period included:

- UN Women contributed to heightened public visibility of and sensitization to women’s experience of the conflict among public and political officials in different relevant institutions – notably with regard to the transitional justice machinery, in particular at the national level, but also with important impact at the subnational level (including the legislative branch and individuals in key state bodies involved in the implementation of transitional justice);

- UN Women contributed to normative work through legislative change through TA to Congress and support to CSOs to contribute to change. The Law on Victims is a primary example of where UN Women’s engagement resulted in concrete changes to the legislative bill to make it more gender-sensitive;

- UN Women contributed to raising awareness and sensitization on resolution 1325 in policy discussions, although this remains limited;

- UN Women contributed to making resolution 1820 more visible. However, accounts in interviews were mixed about UN Women’s role. Some interviewees were more vocal in their recognition of UN Women’s value-added; others felt UN Women had not strategically positioned itself in relation to other stakeholders and United Nations entities to make a difference; and

- Policy impact at subnational regional level is now seen as important – less in terms of real change and more in beginning to shift the terms of the discourse among subnational actors. Given political resistance to change, and the particular features of power and gender relations at the subnational level, UN Women was effective through its accompanying role in two respects. First, it was noted in interviews that the presence of UN Women (as that of other United Nations entities) provided some protection to women’s grassroots organizations, which was relevant given conditions of ongoing risk. Second, the UN Women’s brokering role was important in creating an enabling environment, and for building trust and spaces for dialogue among political and social actors where there was a strong legacy of mistrust. These efforts were especially important in facilitating contact and dialogue between women’s grassroots organizations and subnational government and state officials.

Weaknesses identified included:

- A sense of weak medium- and long-term strategic planning in the peace agenda was felt. Political work was observed to be reactive and ad hoc, even if
well attuned to political context and to changing conditions; and

- Progress on resolution 1325 was not especially visible. To a large extent, UN Women’s role here was somewhat limited by the official position of the government. However, interviewees noted that it was not evident that the country office had considered a medium- or long-term strategy on how to support progress. Rather, action seemed more ad hoc and punctual than strategic, for instance in the form of organizing events on the resolution. The evaluation team was not made aware of any more systemically targeted work.

Factors which explained success included:

- Strategic positioning by country office staff in relevant political forums at the national and subregional level resulted in catapulting UN Women’s presence in public and political debates on the conflict, and on the need to integrate gender analysis and gender equality objectives better into transitional justice policy and into the peace process;

- Strategic recruitment of staff with thematic expertise (albeit some of it through consultancy contracts rather than staff contracts) and/or strong connections to relevant national political and/or CSO networks in relation to different thematic areas extended expertise in the office on peace and security issues. In this respect, special mention was made during interviews of the high level of expertise on transitional justice within UN Women contributing to the office’s impact, and on the country office’s role of effective outreach through subnational work, notwithstanding resource constraints; and

- There was effective use of subnational networks through collaborative work with UNDP, and a cumulative effect of developing relations with relevant networks of grassroots women’s organizations in the areas where UN Women has worked.

Factors which explained limitations included:

- In the context of Colombia, there were clear limitations on what UN Women – and other international partners – could do regarding intergovernmental work. The dynamics of conflict and the peace process were predominantly country-level political processes on which international actors had limited influence. The Colombian government has limited the United Nations’ role in the peace talks. Thus, for instance, it was unrealistic to expect that UN Women – or the United Nations in general – could effectively push for women’s presence in the peace talks on the government side. However, it was realistic to expect the country office to support advocacy more effectively on women’s participation in the peace process and on resolution 1325.

- There were challenges related to the balancing act of needing to be a neutral actor that can hold credibility with the government and CSOs, while at the same time needing to promote a normative agenda of gender equality which has transformative goals and therefore political implications. In contrast with UNIFEM, UN Women found this increasingly challenging and it was reported that it acted more as a non-governmental organization with an advocacy agenda.

- Interviewees noted the challenges which arose from the incomplete transition
from UNIFEM to UN Women and its limited resources. The country office was perceived to be operating with uncertain funding prospects, while simultaneously fielding heightened expectations about its role. With the arrival of a new country director, the country office is now receiving core funding, which represents a major improvement in terms of funding.

- It was also noted that, prior to the recent arrival of the country director, UN Women had evidently not overcome UNIFEM modes of operation, focusing more on project-specific activities than on developing strategic normative and policy objectives which substantively informed its mode of engagement with political actors. Changes were expected with the new country office status, core funding and annual workplan.

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<tr>
<th>How sustainable were the effort and results of UN Women’s policy influencing/engagement?</th>
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<td>Repeated mention of policy documents and recent legislation (such as the Law on Victims) in interviews confirmed the progressive shift towards gender awareness in the peace process; in the application and implementation of transitional justice mechanisms and processes; and towards taking account of the specific needs and experiences of women in this respect. Interviewees acknowledged that UN Women and UNIFEM played a role in contributing to this process of legal and policy change which included facilitating the contribution of views and inputs of women’s organizations to the Laws on Victims and Land Restitution; UN Women’s own TA contribution to this; and the TA and capacity development provided to implementing state bodies.</td>
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<td>Sustainability was acknowledged as having been achieved through UN Women’s role in providing TA on the implementation of gender legislation and policy. This is relevant in ongoing support to policy-implementing agencies, such as the different public offices which are leading on different transitional justice and protection measures, and in the role of UN Women accompanying judicial officials to check the consistency of court rulings with new legislative measures.</td>
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<td>Follow-up work through TA and the accompaniment of legislators and policy implementation is important, and should be strategically incorporated in country office planning. The evaluation team was not able to gain a full measure of the scale of this work and influence during the fieldwork.</td>
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<td>The sustainability of UN Women’s work was inevitably conditioned by the wider context of conflict. The political uncertainty of the peace process and the contradictions inherent that transitional justice is underway while conflict remains ongoing, is a distinctive feature of the context and signals the need for realistic achievements.</td>
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<th>How effective was UN Women in its policy engagement at different levels, including global regional and national?</th>
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<td>UN Women developed some strategic partnerships which facilitated country office effectiveness and coverage in policy influence and normative impact and examples of such partnerships identified by the evaluation team are outlined below.</td>
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<td>The partnership with UNDP was noted as especially effective at the subnational level. Given UN Women’s limited territorial presence, it enabled the country office to engage with grassroots movements outside Bogota using UNDP’s more established networks in</td>
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regions where it had a presence including the departments of Meta, Nariño, Huila, Antioquia, Atlántico, Montes de María, Barranquilla and Villavicencio. These networks were built up and used not only for work on transitional justice (through organizational strengthening, capacity development, including the Diplomas on Transitional Justice in the departments) but also to facilitate political participation and leadership work in electoral processes at the local level. As UN Women is unlikely to be in a position to have the kind of territorial presence that other United Nations entities (such as UNFPA and UNICEF) have, this type of partnership is critical to enhancing the effectiveness of its catalytic role, and should therefore be nurtured.

UN Women developed relationships with universities and influential think-tanks, such as DeJusticia and the PAVIP (a space which facilitates exchange among a network of universities, relevant state bodies and CSOs on transitional justice and support to victims of the conflict), which contributed to making outreach and coverage on awareness-raising, capacity development and knowledge outputs more effective.

Partnership with women’s CSOs was perceived as being overall positive by beneficiary groups. National-level CSOs recognized the importance of the role of UN Women in supporting change in gender policy and practice, and gave due credit to UN Women’s supporting role for civil society at the national and subnational level. However, they were concerned that UN Women attribute to itself the role of speaking on their behalf on policy issues. Rather, they see UN Women’s role as focusing on brokering relations with government and accompanying national actors; supporting CSO institutional development and capacity development on specific issues; and providing technical guidance and thematic expertise. UN Women should not aspire to being a protagonist, but rather a facilitator of change.

Supporting networks of women’s organizations at subnational level was recognized as crucial to ensuring outreach and awareness among beneficiary groups about policy change; access to the various transitional justice mechanisms; and the importance of women participating in the peace process. Grassroots organizations interviewed during the Neiva visit highlighted the positive impact of UN Women’s work on enhancing voice and agency at the subnational level. It was not possible to get a sense of the levels of change in voice or in attitudes in state agencies which could be attributed to UN Women’s work. The context was not especially conducive, and resistance to change was especially strong at the subnational level.

Finally, on some policy issues, UN Women was effective in identifying reform leaders in different policy and implementation spaces whose support was critical in relaying sensitization and knowledge more effectively into policy processes. The work with specific MPs here was noted as especially relevant in relation to legislative change on transitional justice.

However, effectiveness of engagement was undermined by the absence of a more strategic medium- and long-term planning and prioritization.

To what extent did the current policy/strategic direction reflect the lessons learned from policy engagement on peace and security and humanitarian response since 2008, and how fit for purpose was it for the new UN Women mandate?

It was not clear that there was a purposeful process of taking on lessons from earlier modes of engagement due, in part, to the ad hoc nature of country office operations, and the weakness of monitoring systems in place to track process of programme implementation
Dimension 2: UN Women’s policies, programming and operations

To what extent did UN Women’s programmes achieve the expected results? What explained variations?

Through the fieldwork important results within the VJR programme were ascertained including:

- There was better awareness among beneficiary groups and other stakeholders about transitional justice mechanisms, the differential impact of conflict on women and the need for gender-sensitive policies and practices. This was important for the official bodies implementing or administering truth, justice and reparations processes, as well as protection measures (noted in the Land Unit and in Neiva). It was also important in terms of the different relevant CSOs at the national and subnational levels.

- There was improved institutional and organizational capabilities and knowledge among relevant transitional justice-related institutions, and among CSOs at the national and subnational level on transitional justice. This was especially noted in the Human Rights Ombudsperson in its work to support victims, and in the work with organizations in Neiva such as the Corporación de la Memoria and the legal aid group Corporación de Abogados y Profesionales Sur Colombianos, and with grassroots organizations in Neiva.

- A number of interviewees underlined the importance of UN Women and UNIFEM’s role in accompanying CSOs in key policy processes, specifically the Laws on Victims and Land Restitution, transitional justice processes and advocacy spaces. UN Women played an effective role of brokering and facilitating relationships and dialogue among stakeholders who otherwise may have found it difficult to interrelate. In the context of conflict, this contributed to several processes. First, it contributed to building trust between parties on opposite sides of the political and social spectrum. Second, UN Women in some cases, by its presence through accompanying activities to CSOs, contributed to creating a safer environment for them in their advocacy activities. At the grassroots level especially, this was noted as contributing to their empowerment in local political economies and self-confidence. Third, UN Women contributed to facilitating space for women’s movements voice to have an impact on policy (e.g. the Law on Victims) which was especially valued by CSOs.

- The accompaniment role was also important in fostering an enabling environment for the consolidation of transitional justice mechanisms which were created. The support of UN Women to these public institutions (the different units created around transitional justice) gave them some legitimacy.

- UN Women was acknowledged as having contributed to changing attitudes in relation to conflict-related sexual violence (although the level of change was also noted as limited, especially at subnational level, as confirmed in the Neiva visit). This was especially noted in relation to the public institutions UN Women works with on transitional justice. Within the Public Prosecution...
Office there was some indication of changing mind-sets resulting from the increased visibility of gender-sensitive approaches and discourse.

- Importantly, it was acknowledged that UN Women contributed to changing the public discourse on gender equality, and on the need for gender-sensitive approaches in the peace process and transitional justice mechanisms. Interviewees mentioned that gender-insensitive approaches or discourses were more likely to be met with disapproval or criticism than in the past (although this was of course difficult to measure and attribute to UN Women). In the context of Colombia specifically, the *enfoque diferencial* principle (the principle of difference), which acknowledges the importance of a differential approach to addressing horizontal inequalities, was used to promote gender awareness as well as awareness about other differences on which discrimination is based, such as ethnic and cultural pluralism.

- There were results on participation of women at regional and national level to which UN Women’s support was relevant, such as enhanced numbers of women in regional peace talk forums. It was also important to bear in mind the caveat that the relevance of the regional peace talks features only marginally in the *realpolitik* of the high-level peace process. Support for women to participate in local elections in conflict zones was noted as effective.

- There were results on the development of toolkits, including regarding the protection measures and early warning systems in place, for instance in the Ombudsperson, and knowledge products such as the toolkit on steps in order to activate the early warning system on conflict-related GBV (*Herramienta para identificar, caracterizar y prevenir riesgos de violencia de género en el marco del conflicto*). Impact was noted through the recognition of the value of some of the outputs among different stakeholders. This was not true of all the knowledge outputs UN Women funds or supports, however, so more careful selection about which knowledge products to support would improve effectiveness.

Other points for consideration included:

- Within the VJR programme, results on women’s participation focus on being able to access transitional justice mechanisms were weak. However, while there is an intention to move beyond support to women as victims to women as agents of change, within the context of support to transitional justice it was unclear what this actually meant or should mean. Also, while the discourse on the importance of women’s participation in the peace process is ongoing, it was less clear what support to leadership should look like. Women at the grassroots level noted that capacity development was effective in raising awareness and contributing to sensitization on gender relations, but they also pointed to the limited gains in terms of real empowerment of rural women and women living in conflict-affected areas.

- Some activities, while well intended, would benefit from more strategic planning to ensure sustainability. For instance, while UN Women staff may be delivering high-quality training and capacity development, it was not clear that

27 Produced by the Human Rights Ombudsperson, with support from UN Women and Unite to End Violence Against Women funds.
there was a strategy to ‘train trainers’ within the organizations receiving capacity development. Such a strong a dependence on UN Women staff also limited enhancing ownership of the peace and security agenda among national stakeholders, and limited the sustainability and effectiveness of knowledge transfer approaches. Sustainability may be advanced by ensuring that knowledge transfer and capacity development on relevant peace and security and humanitarian response occurs first among more country office staff. Also, training trainers within beneficiary organizations can have a multiplier effect over time, and reduce dependency on UN Women. Moreover, it should be particularly noted that, transitional justice training focused not only on the legal forms but also on the socio-cultural and socio-political challenges in effectuating gender-sensitive approaches to women which, it was suggested, enhanced the implementation prospects of the law.

- UN Women was perceived as trying to cover too much, resulting in small ad hoc project-type activities.

- On content issues relating to peace work and transitional justice, there were recommendations for UN Women to focus resources on disarmament, demobilization and reconciliation (DDR) and security sector issues which were absent from current programming. DDR was especially relevant for the current context in Colombia as the peace process advances. It should be noted that earlier decisions not to engage with DDR reflected concerns about the legitimacy of working with DDR in the country. As the conflict conditions have changed, it will be important for UN Women to engage more on these issues.

- The country office appeared to have the flexibility to adapt to changing conditions and make the most of opportunities for engagement as they arose, in part because of the reactive way of working.

Factors which contributed to success included:

- The high level of competence among key country office staff in terms of thematic expertise (e.g. on transitional justice and political participation) and deep understanding of context, including subnational politics, conflict dynamics, socio-cultural norm systems and multi-ethnic and multicultural settings.

- The strategic use of personal relationships and building-up of informal networks by key country office staff in CSOs and in relevant public offices.

- Key country office staff were nationals, which contributed to ensuring good contacts and networks with relevant strategic national partners and stakeholders.

- The deep commitment of country office staff members to their work.

Some of these factors were not easily captured by the kind of results agendas that feature in logframes, but could be better documented in reporting which applies to both United Nations entities and international development actors.

Challenges/factors which explained limitations were:
In the endeavour to meet expectations about the new role of UN Women, there was a sense that the country office was trying to cover all themes. It was therefore working on too many (small) activities which undermined the effectiveness and sustainability of its work. There was limited sense of a strategy for prioritizing issues which was reflected in the absence of a focused long-term vision of strategic engagement with the issues.

UN Women had not been effective in defining its new role. Nor was the new role of the country office clear in particular as to whether it should continue to play mostly a catalytic role in facilitating change through different forms of expertise and technical support and associated forms of accompaniment for this.

To what extent was UN Women able to translate global policy/strategies in programmatic work?

The country office developed its peace work in response to context-specific conditions and funding opportunities. While the general objectives of the Strategic Plan and programme documents were, to varying degrees, in line with the global agenda on peace and security and humanitarian response, it was both context specific and working with country-level funding dynamics which defined interventions.

Some strategic objectives emphasized as important in the subregional strategy have not, in practice, really featured as core areas of engagement, in particular vis-à-vis work on resolution 1325. It was noted that the country context was not amenable to this, and there was also a sense of frustration among other stakeholders surrounding the high levels of international alignment to support the implementation of resolution 1335.

It was noted that country office work in peace and security was somewhat disconnected from headquarter dynamics and policy which could be explained by the insufficient communications with headquarter on policy and programme content felt by county office staff. In addition, the relationship with the subregional office was dominated by reporting and bureaucratic logics, instead of reflecting more strategic organizational work to translate global policy into programming. Finally, it was not evident that in the past country office resources and capabilities had been directed at more effective engagement with global strategic planning. It is expected that this will change with the transition, but how was unclear.

Country office staff also perceived insufficient support from headquarters on capacity development and on access to knowledge platforms which source policy and practice guidance tools, or documented experiences from other country offices.

As the regional architecture is being rolled out, providing better support to country offices will be important both from headquarters and from the new regional office in Panama.

To what extent were UN Women programmes tailored to the specific socio-political and cultural and economic context in which they operate? How was this translated into programme design and planning?

The country office was effective in adapting its peace and security work to the country context.

Factors already mentioned which contributed to this included: the presence of national country office staff, which meant that local knowledge informed choices about
interventions and activities; and recruitment in the period under review was characterised by strategic appointment of staff who either had strategic expertise in thematic areas or strong networks and contacts among key stakeholders.

Context analysis duly featured in programme documents and informed choices of activities and interventions.

More importantly, it was the manner in which this analysis and understanding of political context and prevailing socio-cultural norms in practice informed the way country office staff interacted with key stakeholders and institutions which contributed to making activities especially relevant and effective.

Logframes and programme reporting documents did not readily capture these more informal ways of navigating complex political processes. A challenge for UN Women – and the wider international community – was finding ways of documenting more imaginative and strategic forms of engagement that were taking place.

There were some sustainability challenges in terms of the country office work on the peace and security agenda. For instance, expertise in transitional justice was focused in one individual who was not even country office staff but a consultant. It was difficult therefore to gauge what the knowledge transfer of that expertise to other (including more junior) staff had been. Furthermore, country office mechanisms to facilitate capacity development for staff were not evident and, prior to current country office during the fieldwork, it seemed staffing had been funded by project/programme funding.

How effective was UN Women at identifying and using key opportunities and partnerships at country level?

There was significant evidence that country office staff had been effective in mobilizing key partnerships to enhance sensitization, develop capacity and give better visibility of women’s experience of conflict.

Key partnerships included: the alliance forged with UNDP at the subnational level, which was fundamental in enabling UN Women to have outreach in rural areas and build up networks with grassroots organizations in the regions; alliances with some think-tanks (DeJusticia) and subnational universities (in Neiva), as well as networks such as the PAVIP, were instrumental in improving outreach; partnerships with national CSOs and subnational grassroots organizations; and partnerships with key political actors. Joint programing, and concretely the MDG programme, was signalled as especially effective, for instance in Nariño. Here, UN Women’s work seemed to have focused particularly on enhanced voice and participation, including in relation to projects working on early recovery.

The country office’s role in brokering spaces for dialogue between other stakeholders was especially valued in the context of conflict.

Some of the partnerships were nurtured through the use of UN Women subcontracted consultants who sat in offices, providing TA. In some cases, this was been especially effective (e.g. the Ombudsperson or Land Unit) while in others there was concern that such use of consultancies could result in a ‘silo-ised’ and peripheral presence of gender-responsive approaches. Concern for issues of ownership (relevant for the next question) were also raised.

UN Women was sometimes perceived as taking an overly protagonist role in its interaction with partners and relevant stakeholders. UN Women needs to be more mindful of women
How effective were UN Women programmes at fostering/strengthening national ownership through country engagement of intended outcomes regarding improved leadership and participation of women in relevant peace and security and humanitarian response intervention/process?

Effectiveness on strengthening ownership was mixed although some achievements were made. First, women’s organizations, especially at the grassroots level, had greater capacity to engage with transitional justice mechanisms (despite the fact that these processes are still very young), and that there was greater awareness about women’s rights among affected groups. Second, public institutions were beginning to undergo changes in the public discourse at least, but also in attitudes towards the need for gender-sensitive approaches.

Providing TA in the form of subcontracted consultancy work had mixed results in terms of ownership. In some cases, such as the Human Rights Ombudsperson and the Land Unit, the role of subcontracted consultants contributed to providing effective and – it was claimed – sustainable knowledge transfer. In others, potential confusion over line management and reporting was noted as problematic. Moreover, it could limit the effectiveness of knowledge transfer and appropriation by the host organization, which may simply delegate responsibility for gender-responsive work to the consultant.

In what ways did the new mandate/reorganization provide opportunities to improve programme effectiveness and coherence between UN Women policies and operational engagement?

The transition from UNIFEM to UN Women had already begun to have a positive impact in terms of providing UN Women with more leverage and voice in both intergovernmental and inter-agency terms. Although a country office director with full authority is only now beginning to operate in country, the change itself created space for UN Women to engage on different terms with key stakeholders. At the same time, though, as the transition was still incomplete, there was the sense that expectations about what UN Women could do were very high, while country office systems were not in place for programming to reflect the new mandate.

Important opportunities include:

- Strengthening the coordination role at the inter-agency and international donor level. Interviewees suggested that this was still not being used as effectively as possible, in terms of planning and strategic agenda setting. It will be important for UN Women to assure a level of seniority in terms of office leadership, to galvanise equivalent levels of seniority in the attendance of other United Nations and donor entities (as appropriate). UN Women should use this space to be more strategic in setting the agenda and in its catalytic role which requires a more proactive approach to its chairing function.

- Creating more effective planning and strategy systems for the political/policy space created by the new mandate means the country office, which is now more strategically positioned to bridge its normative and policy goals with programming activities.
How innovative was UN Women in its programmatic approaches and what lessons can be learned which can be replicated in different contexts?

There were number of ways in which the country office had been engaging in innovative practices:

- Country office staff made strategic and innovative use of informal networks at national and local levels to mobilise resources and achieve outreach;
- Some capacity development modalities were described as innovative in some aspects of transitional justice. For instance, how judges were trained to move beyond more legalistic approaches to working with the new legal and institutional context, to considering the practical and socio-political challenges of addressing real cases and to engaging with affected groups was cited as a shift from more tradition forms of capacity development; and
- Working strategically through existing networks of national actors at the national and subnational level was critical in enabling UN Women’s presence and outreach for its catalytic role. Nurturing and sustaining this will be important and in some cases, will require effective partnerships with other United Nations entities (some of which are already working well).

Dimension 3: UN Women’s organizational capacities, resources and structures

How adequate were UN Women’s human and financial resources to effectively engage in conflict-affected countries?

The country office had limited financial resources and did not receive core funds. Since funding was sourced from bilateral funds and joint programming, the country office needed to balance its strategic planning across different reporting and financial cycles, and different programmatic agendas. The transition is unlikely to lead to a significant increase in resources.

Management of human resources was challenged by the uncertainty of the future of contracts after the transition process which had a wearing effect on staff motivation. It was also noted that there was potentially a staff retention problem over time – although in some cases staff members have gone on to occupy key positions in the public administration where the knowledge transfer from UN Women could have impact.

There was a demand among country office staff for more opportunities to access capacity development and to be trained up across different thematic areas. They felt there was insufficient support on career progression; access to a knowledge platform that was either globally or regionally managed and which could provide staff members with thematic guidance; or access to documents on experiences in other countries. To overcome this issue, more strategic headquarter and/or regional support on staff skills and on knowledge management is required.

It was worth noting that the flexible approach to interventions (also made possible by the nature of the relationship with donors) was especially appropriate in a constantly changing conflict situation where unpredictable windows of opportunity arose and which allowed the country office to capitalize on strategic and rapid engagement.

How fit for purpose was UN Women in terms of the technical skills of its staff and its
broader capacity to fulfil its mandate?

Whilst there were high-quality senior members of staff, it was difficult to judge more junior staff members. Specialist knowledge among key members of staff in relation to a number of areas were seen to be well covered in the peace and security agenda, notably in relation to different aspects of transitional justice, political participation and recovery of livelihoods. As noted, some of the specialist personnel were not full-time staff members but consultants. There are implications for fulfilling UN Women’s mandate, as the bulk of work and focus of peace and security was transitional justice was managed by a consultant. It will be important for the country office to build up technical expertise among staff members to ensure sustainable quality across the relevant peace and security and humanitarian response agenda.

Some areas of expertise which remained underdeveloped or absent:

- Humanitarian response remains underdeveloped, although this reflected a wider UN Women challenge.
- Building leadership capacity among grassroots organizations was noted as important, but it was not clear what this involved in terms of concrete activities. At the subnational level, it was noted in interviews that women felt more aware of their rights, but not necessarily more empowered to contribute to changing their environment.
- Security sector reform, including DDR, was a critical area of engagement moving forward, but it was not evident that the thematic expertise was available in the country office.

It will be important for the country office to find ways of ensuring that expertise does not remain only in certain country office staff members. Headquarters and the regional office can facilitate this by focusing on improving the knowledge platforms to which country office staff have access.

As previously noted, organizational challenges, weak management/strategy systems and overly bureaucratic modes of engagement weakened the effectiveness of the country office which had consequences on how the country office engaged with its partners. For instance, work with partners funded by UN Women funds was undermined by the bureaucratic difficulties of engaging with the country office. Some CSOs would prefer to avoid support from UN Women for this reason.

How effective was UN Women at coordinating gender-related work across United Nations entities and other key partners?

UN Women chairs both inter-agency and international donor working groups on gender. It was also invited to attend other groups with civil society (such as the group chaired by Organization of American States’ Support Mission to the Peace Process in Colombia), although its attendance was sporadic. However, reports on the effectiveness of its coordination role were mixed.

On the one hand, the importance of this role was recognized. From a United Nations perspective, there were demands and expectations (noted in a meeting with the inter-agency group, and additional interviews) that UN Women could contribute to leading more strategically on VAW, including conflict-related VAW; on resolution 1325; and provide leadership for other entities to mainstream gender more effectively in their work.
Concretely, it was noted that it would be important for the country office to step up its humanitarian response capacity, as this continues to be an important issue in Colombia.

It was also noted in interviews that, to date, UN Women had been more reactive than proactive in setting or guiding the agendas of the gender working groups it led. There was a perception by other members of limited effectiveness in using these groups more strategically to advance normative work.

Finally, it was noted that ensuring the presence of senior country office staff (including the director) would enhance the profile and presence of the working groups, including in contributing to the wider international involvement of peace and security work in Colombia. As noted, this is an important role for the country office as it provides an important space for agenda setting.

**How effectively did UN Women manage risks in its operations? What strategies worked best?**

It was not evident from the fieldwork how risk was managed. Given the nature of the work and the context of conflict and ongoing threats to vulnerable groups, UN Women needs to define a clear position on ‘do no harm’ strategies, in particular to minimize risk for affected groups. It was not obvious from interviews or documents that this was in place or substantively informed programming.

**How fit for purpose were UN Women monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and reporting systems? Did they adequately capture lessons learned on results and impact?**

Although there are evaluations for most programmes, their quality is quite uneven.

Monitoring of programmes over time was weak and limited. While there were mid-term reviews and annual reports, it was not clear how programming was adapted to respond to changes that were suggested. Annual reports were donor-driven and did not always respond to the office programme logics. In addition, donors noted the weak capacity and culture in the country office regarding results-based management.

Monitoring and evaluation across the work of international development actors is often jointly presented, despite their different purposes. Monitoring should involve appraising the effectiveness and relevance of interventions as they are implemented, and documenting what works and what is not working. However, in the case of the country office, there were no baselines against which to measure progress.

The country office reportedly had an effective communication strategy, which came to an end when funding stopped. Going forward, it will be important for the country office to develop a new communication strategy.

**Overall analysis and implications for policy, programming and practice**

**Policy/normative: intergovernmental role of UN Women**

The policy impact of the country office was important in the period under review, and drew attention to useful lessons for UN Women. UN Women and UNIFEM positioned themselves to have a strategic presence in policy debates and some decision-making circles so as to be able to affect legislation and contribute somewhat to agenda setting and altering the terms of the debate. Developing a more strategic approach to working with government and political actors and making themselves a visible international actor in national politics, required acting opportunistically to identify political allies willing to champion a gender focus in policy
issues relating to the peace and security agenda. For this, it was necessary to invest time and effort in developing networks and relations with relevant political actors. The specific results, in terms of legislative and policy impact, signalled the importance of this approach to working with government.

In scaling up its relationship with government, there is a risk of the country office distancing itself from beneficiary actors, in particular CSOs. At the same time, the policy gains were acknowledged as important. It will be important to achieve a balance between engaging with government and continuing to nurture capabilities for women’s voice and representation in shaping policy outcomes. National CSOs expressed the need for UN Women to focus on its role of brokering and facilitating space for dialogue and exchange, in keeping with the objective of supporting women’s participation and leadership roles in peace and security work, rather than acting as their voice. The role of facilitating space for dialogue between government and civil society was valued, moreover, in the degree to which it contributed to breaking down a legacy of conflict-related mistrust between national stakeholders.

The accompanying role was highly valued among many national stakeholders, for different reasons. For grassroots organizations, it gave them added protection and visibility in the context of ongoing conflict. For all CSOs, it enhanced women’s voice. For public and government institutions, UN Women support to reforms was a politically useful signal of approval and legitimacy. It was important to stress the value of this accompanying role, including as a lesson learned for work in other conflict-affected situations.

At the grassroots level, the political work of UN Women was especially valued as giving subnational CSOs both added protection and voice in spaces that were normally closed to them.

Overall, the policy impact of UN Women and UNIFEM was important. However, ways on how support to women’s leadership and participation in relation to peace and security should be articulated to improve transformative impact beyond numbers, need to be clearer. There was an insufficiently developed narrative and strategic vision of how to support women becoming empowered to become agents of change in some of the sub-thematic areas of the peace and security and humanitarian response agenda.

**Programmatic work**

The programme observed for the evaluation, which focused on transitional justice activities, had some important achievements, which were perceived as such by a wide range of government and CSO actors.

Reasons behind the effectiveness of programmatic work included the capacity of the country office to use country-specific knowledge to inform activities *in practice* (even when context analysis in programme documentation is more descriptive than embedded in the results chain). There was overall strong relevance to country-specific context, which informed how the country office engaged, in particular because key staff (some through consultancy contracts) were strategically recruited because of their thematic expertise and/or because they were well connected in relevant local networks, and had skills to operate strategically and politically. The importance of such considerations in recruitment strategies cannot be overemphasized in terms of the impact on achieving results.

In turn, strategic partnerships at the national and subnational level were developed which were facilitated by effective inter-agency relations (notably with UNDP). At the same time, UN Women was not always seen to award due credit to other actors for coordinated efforts.
The sustainability of country office work was observed in some outputs, notably with regards to capacity development and training (but with some concern about reducing dependence on individual staff members or consultants), some transitional justice-related toolkits, and guidance and knowledge products. In this regard, ownership of the gender-sensitive agenda on peace and security among some key national actors was enhanced. For this, it was important to highlight the investment in working closely with relevant stakeholders, to build capabilities and knowledge on key issues related to transitional justice (women’s CSOs and relevant government bodies whose buy-in was crucial), to collaborate with local expertise (e.g. with universities, think-tanks and well-placed opinion leaders) or to seek to change mind-sets (within government and public bodies).

However, despite the rhetoric on participation and leadership in peace and security work, and the intention to enhance agency, it will be important to develop more clarity on how concrete activities and modes of engagement can contribute to more transformative impact in this regard. In some cases, this will involve documenting better what works to achieve results but is more the outcome of intuitive if strategic action.

Given the ongoing conditions of conflict-related violence, it is important to be realistic about what is possible.

Finally, programming remains reactive and insufficiently strategic which was reflected in the perception that UN Women was less influential in setting the agenda. At the level of inter-agency coordination, this will be an important role to build up.

**Operational capacity**

The ongoing transition process from UNIFEM to UN Women continued to be a relevant factor to operational capacity, and funding limitations remain a challenge.

Bearing this in mind, the country office was found to have weak systems in place to ensure more strategic planning and prioritization of issues. The expectation was that this will improve with the new structures coming into play.

It will be important not to lose in this process the fact that the country office has strong individual capacity in terms of thematic expertise and country knowledge; strong but uneven connections to relevant networks; and is overly dependent on key persons. However, the demand for better communications with headquarters on thematic guidance which could support the development of programmatic work was noted.

Furthermore, the inconsistent and uneven integration of risk management should be considered, in particular vis-à-vis the principle of ‘do no harm’ which was especially weak in programmatic design. Do no harm required risk to be acknowledged and the existence of a strategy to mitigate against the possibility of unintended consequences, both for country office staff and beneficiary groups. This was especially relevant in conflict-affected situations where the risk of backlash (including as a consequence of international interventions) was important.

Finally, the role of inter-agency and donor coordination work remained underdeveloped, especially as regards the potential for UN Women’s agenda-setting capacity.

6. **Recommendations**

The Colombian peace process provides a particularly interesting example of transition (still uncertain and challenging) from a conflict situation that is still ongoing in different parts of the country to the beginnings of a peace process where transitional justice mechanisms are already in place. It will be important to watch and document this process, including to obtain
lessons for similar contexts elsewhere. For this reason, the findings of this case study are relevant not only for Colombia, but also for UN Women’s global strategy on peace and security and humanitarian response.

**Normative and policy-level: Intergovernmental role**

The UN Women country office needs to develop a more strategic medium- and long-term vision for its normative and intergovernmental work in country. It will require developing the capacity for strategic prioritization, and ensuring the country office evolves from being more reactive and ad hoc, to being more effective at agenda setting. A more forward-looking perspective in support of the global normative objectives of UN Women will be needed.

It will be important for UN Women, not only at country office level, to reflect strategically on different approaches to its intergovernmental work, and decide whether it should mostly support policy processes as a neutral actor or whether, in view of the resistance likely to be generated by the transformative goals in the peace and security agenda, it should engage more proactively in political and advocacy work. Normative work cannot be politically neutral because intended outcomes involve a redefinition of power relations. However, UN Women needs to operate strategically to facilitate the effective appropriation of normative goals (in alignment with internationally agreed objectives) by national government actors.

Objectives should be realistic and guide how to adapt normative work to the political realities of conflict and post-conflict situations. Politically informed modes of engagement, in which the political economy conditions of context are considered to inform strategy and programming, will be required. In the case of Colombia, such analysis is present *de facto* to varying degrees, if not reflected in documents and theories of change.

There is a need for better strategic clarity on how to embed support to women’s participation and leadership more effectively in the peace and security and humanitarian response agenda. To date, as this focused on transitional justice at country office level, the emphasis was more on women as victims (which is important) and less on women as agents of change (which remained underdeveloped in relation to transitional justice). However, the deeper issue at stake concerns the substantive theory of change regarding change in voice and agency for women in conflict situations. In the Colombian context, more work is required on this in relation to peacebuilding and resolution 1325.

At country office level, there are three areas which could potentially support staff capacity to develop more robust theories of change on enhancing women’s voice and agency in peace and security work generally, and transitional justice specifically:

- More purposeful collaborative work between the peace and security and the political participation expertise at country office level to facilitate a cross-fertilisation of ideas, expertise and resources and access to relevant political and societal networks which will enable moving beyond what remains somewhat thematically siloised areas of UN Women’s interventions;

- Capacity development of country office staff in relevant peace and security work – including transitional justice but also wider security and justice work, DDR and humanitarian response; and

- The country office drawing more effectively on the emerging body of knowledge outputs at headquarter level.
Shortcomings in the participation and leadership vision in peace and security and humanitarian response work can also be addressed through improved knowledge management, including from headquarters.

**Programming**

The UN Women country office needs to develop more effective planning and strategy. In practice, there were politically strategic approaches in place, in terms of how some staff members engage with key political and social stakeholders. However, more work is needed to ensure political economy analysis approaches are more embedded in programming documents. Context and conflict analysis will need to be undertaken, which can be used as the basis for guiding and identifying better what should be the entry points to advance peace and security outcomes.

In relation to this, there is a need for more critical consideration of what types of interventions are relevant (e.g. TA or capacity development), and also, concretely, how these should be delivered, paying attention to content and the mode of delivery. For instance, on capacity development, lessons can be drawn from the Colombian case on the modes of delivery of the transitional justice modules, which focused more on practical and political challenges of implementing transitional justice than legalistic approaches.

More clarity and better guidance on UN Women’s role and mandate is needed and is important in terms of how partnerships and alliances are formed, and the expectations on UN Women’s work.

**Organizational capacities**

It will be important to integrate monitoring more effectively into the programme life so it informs programme work as it evolves.

There is a need for more effective capacity development for country office staff in key areas of the peace and security agenda that are relevant for the context. Currently, this includes more expertise on DDR, security sector reform and humanitarian response, which are crucially relevant but where the office has limited capacity.

Do no harm and better risk analysis need to be integrated more meaningfully into UN Women’s peace and security and humanitarian response work. There was very limited evidence that this featured significantly in how interventions were designed and implemented.

There is a need for more strategic engagement in the gender working groups that UN Women coordinates, in terms of inter-agency work and international donor presence in Colombia. In practice, this will involve ensuring more proactive agenda setting, prioritization of issues and senior-level leadership.

Importantly, other United Nations entities and international donors also need to step up in terms of integrating gender perspectives in their work in a less ‘silo-ised’ way and UN Women can be more effective in galvanising this by investing more resources in its inter-agency work.

There is an important need for more effective communications between the country office, the regional office and headquarters. It remains to be seen how the new regional architecture will resolve this.
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