A common platform for education in emergencies and protracted crises

Evidence paper

May 2016
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project team</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms and abbreviations</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Background</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Overview of work</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Structure of the paper</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Architectural issues</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Complementarity vs. duplication</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Coherence of assessment and planning</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 National ownership</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Capacity-strengthening</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Workforce capacity</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Information systems</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Emergency preparedness capacity</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Learning and innovation</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Financing landscape</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Global costs, funding and gaps</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Sources of finance</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Disbursement of funds</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Country-level funding mechanisms</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Institutional arrangements</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Overview of institutional models</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Choosing a host</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Considerations for governance</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Better information systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Emergency preparedness capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Learning and innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Global costs, funding and gaps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sources of finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Allocation criteria set by existing global funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Innovative disbursement mechanisms - cash transfers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Disbursement of funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Country level fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Examples of incubated funds - Gavi and the global fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Example of co-hosting - the Global Education Cluster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Example of co-hosting - INEE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Hosting/establishing a common platform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Possible selection criteria for platform host</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Choosing a host</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Project team

This report has been prepared of an ODI-led project team comprised of the following:

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### Acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACAPS</td>
<td>Assessment Capacities Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIR</td>
<td>American Institutes for Research</td>
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<td>ALNAP</td>
<td>Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CBE</td>
<td>Community Based Education</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-Based Organisation</td>
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<td>CHF</td>
<td>Common Humanitarian Fund</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Country Team</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECB</td>
<td>Emergency Capacity Building Project</td>
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<td>ECD</td>
<td>Early Childhood Development</td>
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<td>ECG</td>
<td>Education Coordination Group</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>EC Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>Education Development Fund</td>
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<td>EDOG</td>
<td>Education Donor Partner Group</td>
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<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education for All</td>
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<td>ELRHA</td>
<td>Enhancing Learning and Research for Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>EMIS</td>
<td>Education Management Information Systems</td>
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<td>EPF</td>
<td>Liberia Education Pooled Fund</td>
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<td>ERF</td>
<td>Emergency Response Fund</td>
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<td>ESA</td>
<td>Education Sector Analysis</td>
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<td>ESP</td>
<td>Education Sector Plan</td>
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<td>ETF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Transition Fund</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EWG</td>
<td>Education Working Group</td>
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<td>FTS</td>
<td>Financial Tracking Service</td>
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<td>GCE</td>
<td>Global Campaign for Education</td>
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<td>GEFI</td>
<td>Global Education First Initiative</td>
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<td>GFF</td>
<td>Global Finance Facility</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>GOL</td>
<td>Government of Lebanon</td>
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<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of South Sudan</td>
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<td>GPE</td>
<td>Global Partnership for Education</td>
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<td>HC</td>
<td>Human Coordinator</td>
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<td>HCT</td>
<td>Humanitarian Country Team</td>
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<td>HLP</td>
<td>Health and Life Sciences Partnership</td>
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<td>HRP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Response Plan</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Steering Committee</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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IDP  Internally Displaced Person
IFFm  International Finance Facility for Immunisation
IIEP  International Institute for Educational Planning
INEE  Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
INGO  International Non-Governmental Organisation
IT   Information Technology
JICA  Japan International Cooperation Agency
LEG  Local Education Group
MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MEHE Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MGF  Multilateral Global Fund
MoESAC  Ministry of Education, Sports, Arts and Culture
MoEST  Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
MPTFOG Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office Gateway
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC  Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA  UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA  Official Development Assistance
ODI  Overseas Development Institute
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PEG  Partners’ Education Group
PMU  Project Management Unit
R4D  Research for Development
RACE Reach all Children in Education
RBA Results-Based Aid
RC  Resident Coordinator
REC  RACE Executive Committee
RRT  Rapid Response Team
SDG  Sustainable Development Goal
SIB  Social Impact Bond
SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
SPLM-IO Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – In Opposition
SRP  Strategic Response Plan
SWAp  Sector-Wide Approach
UIS  UNESCO Institute of Statistics
UK  United Kingdom
UN  United Nations
UNESCO  UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF UN Children’s Fund
US  United States
USAID  US Agency for International Development
WFP  World Food Programme
WHS  World Humanitarian Summit
WHO  World Health Organization
1. Introduction

Conflict, natural disasters, epidemics and other crises clearly pose a serious threat to the prospects of achieving the new Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) for education (SDG4). Among some 462 million children aged 3-18 years living in 35 crisis affected countries, 75 million are in the most desperate need of educational support. While education for these children has long been neglected, there is growing recognition of its central importance.

As part of global efforts to strengthen the response to education in crises, this paper provides background evidence to inform the proposed creation of a common platform for education in emergencies and protracted crises. Its analysis is based on extensive review of key source material, nearly 50 expert interviews and feedback on an earlier inception paper. This work has been conducted by a project team led by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), and was commissioned by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) on behalf of the UN Special Envoy for Education, the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), a number of key donors, affected governments and other stakeholders.

This paper was largely prepared November-December 2015, and served as background research to inform the development of a proposal on the creation of the education crisis platform, prepared January-February 2016. While some limited updates were made in early 2016 to this paper, it largely reflects investigative work prior to design decisions made for the platform, and thus does not always align with final recommendations as presented in ‘Education Cannot Wait: proposing a fund for education in emergencies’ (Nicolai et al., 2016).

1.1 Background

At the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2015, UN Special Envoy for Global Education Gordon Brown called for the establishment of a global emergency education fund. Following numerous bilateral conversations, several high level meetings of ‘champions were convened throughout the year’, including at the World Bank Spring Meetings and the World Education Forum in Incheon.

The Oslo Summit on Education for Development in July 2015 made a high-level commitment to address the disruption of education and learning in emergencies and protracted crises. The background paper Education in emergencies and protracted crises: Toward a strengthened response (Nicolai et al., 2015) informed these discussions in Oslo. Key gaps the paper identified were as follows:

- **Financing:** There is a global finance gap of at least $8.5 billion per year – an average of just $113 per child – to provide educational support to an estimated 75 million children affected by crises.1
- **Capacity and number of capable partners:** Efforts are needed to strengthen capacity to deliver education in crises both for national governments and among humanitarian and development actors.
- **Coherence across assessment and planning:** There is a need for more clearly agreed on mechanisms, tools and approaches to align education assessments, plans and budgets across the full spectrum of crises.
- **Adequate data collection and use:** Improved information would allow stakeholders to better plan, respond and collaborate when crises occur, and to better cope with the vulnerabilities and potential disruptions to education they continue to face.

Four recommendations resulted from this analysis:

- creation of a ‘champions group’ to advance global action on education in emergencies and protracted crisis
- elaboration of a set of consolidated principles for the sector
- scoping of a common platform to address humanitarian and development architectural issues for education, ensuring a more seamless transition and
- bringing urgent attention to the finance gap for education in crisis, starting with an assessment of options and followed by the creation of a dedicated fund or new modalities.

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1 These figures have been updated from those put forward in the Oslo Summit paper (Nicolai, et.al., 2015) as part of research for this Platform, with the global finance gap now estimated at $8.5 billion per year, which averages to $113 per child to support 75 million affected children aged 3-18. The original figures identified a gap of $4.8 billion per year, averaging $74 per child, to support 63 million children aged 3-15. The changes from these figures are due to extending the relevant age group from 3-15 up to age 18, using 2015 UNDP figures, and adding a ‘crisis premium’ to the cost of response. See more details on this update in Section 4.1.
1.2 Overview of work

A clear mandate, backed by strong political will, emerged from the Oslo Summit to identify bold solutions to the challenges for education in emergencies and protracted crises. A Technical Strategy Group was established to take this work forward; this comprised representatives of affected countries, multilateral agencies, UN agencies, donors, international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the private sector. Responsibilities of the Technical Strategy Group include the following:

- provide technical oversight to a consultancy producing a situation analysis and recommended next steps
- facilitate information-sharing
- prepare recommendations for the high-level champions group, including recommendations on announcements at the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS)

With Norway, the UK and US agreeing to fund the technical work, UNICEF acted as the fund-holder for these donor agencies’ contribution and managed the contracting process. A call for proposals was issued and a consortium of experts led by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) was selected to undertake the work.

Deliverables of this technical work include a series of specific research outputs, comprising:

1. an inception paper defining an overall proposition and approach
2. an ‘evidence paper’ exploring a series of key questions, which inform ways forward:
   - architectural issues (humanitarian, development, government)
   - capacity-strengthening (workforce, information, preparedness)
   - financing landscape (potential sources, delivery mechanisms, lessons learnt)
   - institutional arrangements (hosting and governance)
3. case studies based on two country application visits to Lebanon and South Sudan, exploring how a new platform might be operationalised in each of these two contexts
4. a proposal detailing the overall shape of a common platform, based on extensive input and design work from the Technical Strategy Group, incorporating outcomes of consultation and building off findings from the country application visits

INEE was separately contracted to manage a global consultation process linked to this work.

1.3 Structure of this paper

Following this introduction, Sections 2 through 5 of this evidence paper go on to explore a series of questions centred around the themes of architecture, capacity-strengthening, financing and institutional arrangements as they relate to education in crises response and the possible creation of a common platform. Table 1 presents an overview of these questions. Sections 6 and 7 present case studies outlining the findings from country application visits to South Sudan and Lebanon. A number of annexes to the report provide further detail on issues across this body of work.

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2 The TSG was co-chaired by Canada and the UK, with Save the Children serving as secretariat and membership including the governments of Lebanon and South Sudan, UNICEF, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), GPE, the Office of the UN Special Envoy for Education, the World Bank, the US, Norway, the European Commission (EC), Dubai Cares, the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), the Global Compact on Learning Donor Network and the Global Business Coalition for Education.
### Table 1: Options paper key questions for analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Architecture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity-strengthening</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financing flows</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional arrangements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IA1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA3</td>
</tr>
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<td>IA4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
2. Architectural issues

This section focuses on the architecture for education in emergencies and protracted crises, coordination failures between humanitarian and development organisations and ways to address global and country-level coordination and leadership.

Focus questions are as follows:
A1: How could a new common platform sit across and strengthen existing coordination structures in a complementary way?
A2: In what ways can separate needs assessments and education planning processes be coherently brought together through a common platform?
A3: How might a common platform actively engage with domestic education leadership, spanning both humanitarian and development aid architectures?

Key findings:

• There are a range of coordination challenges across the existing structures, rooted in differing priorities, mandates, cultures and risk tolerance levels across humanitarian and development agencies, and with limited incentives for individuals to resolve them.
• High level agreements have tried to address these challenges and a number of existing bodies could play a stronger coordination role, but progress remains limited. Moreover, the ability and incentives to implement these can be particularly lacking at the country level.
• National governments tend to give education a relatively low priority in emergency situations, generally do not have clear plans for emergency response and lack the capacity for strong engagement with humanitarian agencies and the cluster system.
• There is a strong desire among all actors for any common platform to avoid duplicating the work of existing organisations; instead, priority should be given to building on and strengthening existing mechanisms and processes.
• High priority should be given to political leadership and convening power, both globally and at the country level, to enable better bringing together of actors that are often disconnected in practice.

2.1 Complementarity vs. duplication

A1: How could a new common platform sit across and strengthen existing coordination structures in a complementary way?

A wide range of organisations, structures and agreements make up international coordination structures for education and for education in emergencies and protracted crises. These often differ not only from crisis to crisis but also between humanitarian and development actors and national and international authorities. While these organisations may have shared interests in education and emergencies, and there is recognition of the importance of coordination at different levels, consultation for this paper highlights that barriers still remain. These include:

 Mandates and cultures: Humanitarian organisations are necessarily focused on immediate support to meet needs associated with the current crisis. There is also a strong culture of impartiality, which can mean less investment in engagement with national or local governments, particularly in conflict settings. Development agencies, on the other hand, tend to work closely with national governments and focus on supporting longer-term national plans – although this can tend to focus upstream rather than on downstream implementation of such plans. Both approaches are needed in responding to and moving out of crisis, but where there is a lack of coordination it can mean poor transition planning for the end of immediate humanitarian crises, or a lack of planning for crises and humanitarian considerations in national education plans. Development agencies are more likely to withdraw staff and suspend programmes in response to a crisis, at the precise times when humanitarian agencies are moving in to respond. Lower financial risk tolerance and stricter reporting requirements may also mean development organisations are slower to disburse funds or may not be willing to co-finance programmes with humanitarian agencies, who generally have fewer restrictions to facilitate immediate response.

 Networks and knowledge: At the country level are a range of formal coordination structures, including the Education Cluster, local education groups (LEGs) and education working groups, which aim to improve efficiency and efficacy through joint needs assessments, shared response planning and sector strategies. However, these generally concentrate on coordination within humanitarian or development groups, and lack specific mandates or strong capacity to bridge these groups. In practice, humanitarian and development actors may be largely unaware of each other’s efforts and networks, and so may operate in parallel – in some cases even within the
same development agency. While the national government is often considered a natural bridging point, in practice it can lack capacity to engage in practical coordination. There are also specific challenges in coordination within the humanitarian sector – particularly in settings where there is a mix of refugee, internally displaced person (IDP) and other crisis needs that draw in a range of agencies, and in all settings where knowledge of the INEE Minimum Standards and the cluster system, as well as adherence, is more limited.

**Funding modalities and risk aversion:** Development agencies generally support education through long-term funding, often channelled through government agencies and systems to support the development of education systems. However, in fragile or humanitarian contexts, lower tolerance for financial risk and strict reporting requirements often mean they are slower to disburse funds and less willing to finance particular types of project. This limits the extent to which they can easily partner or jointly finance programmes with humanitarian agencies, which generally have fewer technical restrictions on funding to facilitate rapid response but whose reliance on appeals structures means they cannot commit to multiyear funding and can suffer from under-funding. These gaps are beginning to be narrowed by organisations such as GPE, which is now channelling considerable funds through partners (UNICEF and the World Bank) into fragile and conflict-affected states, and mechanisms such as multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs), although the latter are often constrained by the requirements of donors contributing to them. Despite these efforts, agile funding for education in emergencies remains low and is often used inefficiently, with opportunities to take advantage of synergies missed and funds that could be usefully redeployed locked into their current purposes.

Despite these differences and challenges, interviews and a review of available literature suggest there is a strong appetite for improved coordination in the education sector at the global level – though somewhat less interest in major changes at the country level. In terms of the role of the common platform, priority should be given at the global level to supporting changes in working practices to realise greater coordination within humanitarian organisations and development agencies, and at the national level around each individual crisis, to facilitate connections between otherwise disconnected actors.

**Coordination in the global humanitarian and development architecture**

On the humanitarian side, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is charged with facilitating coordination, with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) mandated to take the lead in refugee situations. The head of OCHA is also the emergency relief coordinator, and chairs the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), comprising UN agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engaged in humanitarian work. The IASC established the cluster system to promote humanitarian coordination, as well as the Transformative Agenda, a more recent policy that aims to strengthen humanitarian coordination and sectoral leadership. Within the scope of the IASC cluster system, the Global Education Cluster is co-led by UNICEF and Save the Children. At the global level, the cluster aims to strengthen system-wide preparedness and the coordination of the technical capacity needed to respond to humanitarian emergencies. It works closely with the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). The GCE also provides guidance and human resource support – through its Rapid Response Team (RRT) and partners – to country-level Education Clusters.

On the development side, a range of organisations are active in education in fragile states and in humanitarian or protracted crisis contexts, but there is an absence of a global coordination mechanism analogous to the IASC. The SDGs provide a new, broad focus for these efforts, and it is significant that these goals include a target that can be interpreted as focusing more efforts on education in emergencies and protracted crises. GPE provides education financing to developing countries, as well as technical assistance and information. While its role is broader than education in crises, it has adopted a stronger focus on these issues in recent years. A number of bilateral donor agencies are also an important part of this architecture.

**Country architecture**

At the country level, coordination mechanisms across and within the humanitarian and development sectors become increasingly complicated, and the operation of these mechanisms varies considerably across contexts. On the humanitarian side, national Education Clusters operate as part of humanitarian country teams (HCTs) and with guidance from, where applicable, humanitarian coordinators (HCs) and/or resident coordinators (RCs). National and subnational governments tend to either

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3 Target 4.5 ‘By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations.’

4 While fragile and conflict affected states have historically accounted for only a relatively small proportion of total external aid to education allocated to fragile states, making up only 6% over 2010-2012, this has recently changed. Currently, over 50% of GPE disbursements are made through partners (e.g. UNICEF and the World Bank) to fragile or conflict-affected states. However, a recent independent evaluation found that “the Partnership… focused GPE resources more strategically on geographic areas most in need and least well-funded through other sources, including on fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS)” (R4D 2015).
operate distinct coordination mechanisms or play a leading (or co-leading) role in a relatively small number of Education Clusters (e.g. Kenya, Indonesia) or in comparable structures such as EWGs. However, the resources governments can invest in these processes can be limited. For EWGs in refugee contexts, UNHCR has the mandate to coordinate education provision for those affected. In mixed settings (i.e. both refugees and IDPs), the mandate for leading coordination varies: UNHCR may act as the co-lead with UNICEF or Save the Children, but not always.

The form and quality of coordination vary widely based on a range of factors, including the duration of the crisis, the level of government involvement, the size of Education Clusters, the involvement of national NGOs in Education Clusters, the capability of cluster coordinators and other relevant personnel and the cohesion and effectiveness of the HCT and HC (or the country team (CT) and RC/HC) (Knox Clarke and Campbell, 2015). Given this complexity, interviewed stakeholders articulated concern at the prospect of additional forms or layers of institutional coordination and coordination meetings or reporting procedures, which would require added time and human resources from operational agencies, and felt any new coordination mechanism/initiative could lead to frustration and resentment rather than a renewed sense of collaboration.

On the development side, at the country level there is no fixed institutional mechanism for coordination, but two main actors can be identified – the national government and the LEGs that bring together major education stakeholders in a country. In addition, structures such as MDTFs and pooled funds, as well as national education plans, sector-wide approaches (SWAps) and education sector plans (ESPs), can help focus coordination and planning.

National governments are crucial actors for coordinating emergency response and for linking the worlds of humanitarian and development actors. However, the extent to their capacity, interest and influence varies widely across contexts. There are strong examples, such as in Lebanon, with the creation of the Reaching All Children with Education (RACE) strategy. Nevertheless, interviews highlighted that national governments can often struggle to assert themselves and establish leadership over the diverse international actors involved in the education sector. This will particularly be the case for more fragile states and those involved in protracted, low-profile crises where there is likely to be a combination of low state capacity, limited leverage over international actors and a lack of immediate urgency to encourage cooperation.

National education plans are a major source of policy and guidance at the country level and so have significant influence on crisis response and long-term coordination too. They are usually led by the ministry of education in coordination with other ministries, and development actors or major donors may be involved in certain contexts. These plans tend to reflect broad national priorities and others have a technical focus, with limited attention to crisis planning and adapting to changing contexts (Winthrop and Matsui, 2013).

Supporting national coordination are LEGs. These are coordination platforms that can comprise governments, donors, multilateral agencies, civil society organisations (CSOs), the private sector and other actors working in support of the education sector. Partners develop, implement, monitor and evaluate ESPs at country level, while ensuring all parties are kept fully informed of progress and challenges. A significant part of the LEG is

Box 1: Strengthening coordination mechanisms

One potential role of the common platform is to provide high-profile support for these efforts and to increase the emphasis put on them in practice at lower levels of development and humanitarian organisations. Stakeholders also recommended providing technical inputs around which multiple stakeholders could rally, with the INEE Minimum Standards a useful example, given that these – developed in a collaborative manner – had led to some technical harmonisation among agencies. The common platform could play a number of specific roles:

- Formalisation of the current group of global political champions, or creation of a new group with additional high-profile political and media personalities, to continue to advocate for greater priority to be given to education in emergencies and protracted crises, including
  - raising of funds in close cooperation with GPE, GEC, UNICEF and UNHCR
  - working with development and humanitarian agencies to encourage joint working and implementation of agreed commitments in coordination with INEE
  - engaging with country leadership on particular crises
- Development of a common platform secretariat to undertake more technical collaborative work alongside relevant agencies:
  - improve knowledge of the cluster system and implementation of good joint working practices among development and humanitarian agencies (with INEE and the Global Education Cluster)
  - facilitate the involvement of humanitarian organisations and experts in the development of country education plans, SWAps and GPE ESPs

Coordination challenges at the country level could also be responded to through the creation of country or regional level political champion groups to broker improved funding and greater coordination for specific crises.
its involvement in policy dialogue and harmonisation of donor support in education, in monitoring and promoting progress towards increased aid effectiveness and in the mobilisation of financial support. Although the specific composition, title and working arrangements of a LEG vary from country to country, it has become a key governance function at national level, a common feature of emergency response and a main space for dialogue around education sector plans and GPE funding applications (GCE, 2015; GPE, 2016).

2.2 Coherence of assessment and planning

A2: In what ways could separate needs assessments and education planning processes be coherently brought together through a common platform?

Needs assessments and planning are central processes for turning high-level political action and enhanced global and country-level coordination into field-level progress. Yet approaches to assessments and planning often take place separately among humanitarian and development actors as well as between national governmental and international actors. The incentives needed to promote joint assessments and planning – or disincentives for non-cooperative approaches – remain largely absent.

Needs assessments

Recent years have witnessed a great deal of attention to joint needs assessments, both cross-sectorally and within the education sector. In the humanitarian community, tools for joint education needs assessments have been established by the Global Education Cluster (Global Education Cluster, 2010a, 2010b, 2013); the Save the Children Needs Assessment Task Force; and the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS); the US Agency for International Development (USAID) (which recently developed a rapid needs assessment guide for crisis settings); and others. Furthermore, the Global Education Cluster supports crisis-level Education Clusters in preparing for and undertaking joint needs assessments by providing training and relevant personnel. Despite this, education has struggled to be included in broader emergency assessment tools. Winthrop and Matsui (2013) note in an OCHA analysis that, of 27 emergency needs assessment initiatives, none covered education in any depth. Similarly, analysis of conflict assessments, conflict mitigation strategies and early warning tools shows an absence or superficial coverage of education (Kirk and Winthrop, 2013). Formal education needs assessment tools remain somewhat less common within the development community. UN agencies, NGOs, national authorities (e.g. education ministries) and multilateral development banks frequently conduct development-focused education assessments, although these are more ad hoc in design. The lack of symmetry between education sector needs assessments in the humanitarian and development communities is one challenge the platform should address.

Other challenges exist. For example, those tasked with conducting assessments are often under immense pressure in humanitarian contexts and have to balance assessment efforts with other demands on their time and attention. The available literature, including assessment reports themselves, indicates that needs assessments tend to be rapid in nature, focused heavily on education access and protection issues (rather than quality), and are particularly suited for sudden-onset emergencies or the initial phases of protracted crises. Tools to assess medium-to-long-term needs are all but absent, as are needs assessments (related to crises) that address education quality (e.g. learning outcomes and psychosocial well-being). Furthermore, global evidence from the humanitarian field (not just the education sector) indicates that needs assessments are rarely used to inform strategies; instead, programme designs, especially at the outset of a crisis, tend to reflect what agencies on the ground are already doing or have the general capacity to do (Knox Clarke and Darcy, 2014).

Interviewees noted that needs assessments often lose credibility, even if they are multi-stakeholder in nature, where they are seen to be led too much by one particular agency. Donors and implementing agencies shared a perception that needs assessments concerning education were primarily public relations materials and that figures included in such documents were, at best, very rough approximations. The accuracy of needs assessments is called into question given the fact that assessment teams often face limited access to affected areas and perhaps also those imposed by national governments or armed groups. Moreover, needs assessments are often one-off exercises, reflecting problems at a given point in time – they have not yet been used to support ongoing adaptive and iterative efforts to track needs and how well these are being met over time.

Stakeholders noted that a platform could help in working with others, including the Global Education Cluster and INEE, in driving forward progress on assessment methods. For instance, it could recruit leading assessment specialists able to develop toolkits and guidance on education sector needs assessments that reflect both humanitarian and development objectives and that are linked to different types of crises. Furthermore, stakeholders felt donors must enhance their ability to assess the degree to which various programme designs are or are not rooted in credible, high-quality needs assessments. By penalising those agencies (e.g. through loss of funding or reputation) that do not do this, implementing agencies will have incentives to make rapid progress in this area.

Education planning

Governments and development partners have increasingly collaborated, in non-humanitarian settings, to develop
education sector strategies that set out long-term priorities, targets and financing needs. Most countries will have a national education plan that has been the subject of consultation with a range of national and international actors. In many cases, these will align with SWAps, or with education sector plans. These are intended to improve donor coordination and develop a clear financial strategy for meeting identified financing gaps. In the humanitarian community, needs and financial requirements have increasingly been identified and captured in tools such as strategic response plans (SRPs). SRPs identify the scale of need, a series of activities and the intended numbers of beneficiaries to benefit from educational or protection activities, as well as which organisations will engage in the education sector in a particular area. A review of SRPs for 2015 for contexts like Syria, Iraq, the Sahel, the Central African Republic (CAR) and the West Bank and Gaza shows they focus primarily on coverage/quantity rather than on education quality or structural weaknesses in the sector. This focus is logical, but it is increasingly insufficient given that protracted crises call not only for stopgap measures to keep children in a safe learning environment but also for more durable solutions that can prepare affected youth for adulthood and livelihoods.

Stakeholders similarly felt that plans and strategies for education in emergencies tended to be predominantly supply-driven, rather than emerging sufficiently from the available data. This reflects both organizations’ propensity to propose activities with which they are closely familiar – as well as the fact that personnel developing strategies in emergency settings face intensive time pressures and competing demands on their time.

Another major challenge in coordinating emergency responses is that national education plans have historically not focused on issues of resilience or crisis response. This is explored further in the following section, but essentially means national governments often lack a clear plan on how they will respond to and engage with humanitarian agencies, and that data collection does not prioritise aspects that would be useful in an immediate crisis response. However, recent progress has been made in education sector planning by GCE (2015), GPE (2015a, 2015b), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2010a, 2010b, 2010c) and others that can be built on, as can the range of other development-focused education planning tools. The challenge will be to combine the short-term humanitarian planning frameworks for education service delivery with the more structural concerns (e.g. financing, 

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**Box 2: Strengthening needs assessments**

The platform could help address many of the challenges above, through a number of options:

- Work with existing assessments to ensure all those engaging in the sector are aware of the full range of data collected on needs. This would help consolidate existing analytical work conducted by aid agencies, academics and others in one place (either at the outside of a crisis or once several actors have conducted education-related needs assessments).
- Create a cadre of standby assessment experts who could be deployed to support multi-stakeholder assessments conducted by existing institutions. These experts could bring both technical and financial support.
- Establish itself as the lead agency on needs assessments, conducting assessments independently but also in close consultation with exiting institutions:
  - These could be conducted by a combination of outside experts and platform personnel, using data collection capacity from operational agencies.
  - A rapid-but-comprehensive needs assessment could be conducted as early as possible during a crisis, refreshed and deepened on a regular basis.
- Existing groups, particularly Education Clusters and LEGs, would essentially need to delegate their assessment functions to the platform.

**Strengthening education planning**

The platform could help support greater joint planning, through a number of options:

- Collate and consolidate existing plans developed by different stakeholders in the education sector (e.g. ministry and provincial plans, international agency plans and specific plans). This could include greater synthesis of information, as well as geocoding or making plans available online.
- Provide technical support and financial and human resources to existing institutions (e.g. Education Clusters, LEGs or national governments) to develop multi-stakeholder strategies.
- Leverage existing information, needs assessments and key stakeholder consultations to independently (but consultatively) develop an education plan. This could serve as a template for stakeholders on the ground as they develop separate or joint strategies, or, if backed up by adequate resources, could serve as the core of the international response.
- On a technical level, consider developing an education planning toolkit, and related training, that spans the humanitarian–development and national–international divides.
decentralisation, capacity building and system-wide reforms) reflected in development-oriented sector planning tools and to find a way to generate the incentives for both types of agencies to prioritise such plans.

2.3 National ownership

A3: How might a common platform actively engage with domestic education leadership, spanning both humanitarian and development aid architectures?

A major challenge for engaging with national actors is that of prioritisation. During emergency response, competing pressures often mean low government priority for education, and most ministries of education remain focused primarily on long-term development plans rather than on emergency planning and preparedness (aside from contingency planning in some instances). A review of 10 ESPs in conflict-affected states, for example, found only half had specific guidance or strategies on conflict preparedness, and few had more than a single strategy outlined (Kirk and Winthrop, 2013). However, it is important to bear in mind that incorporation of these issues into national education plans is not a guarantee that they will be a priority, or that they will have resources channelled to them. Their presence on official documents, however, makes this more likely than if they were left out.

Beyond the question of national planning and preparedness for crises, there is a considerable challenge regarding the capacity of ministries of education. Interviews highlighted that they generally do not have dedicated staff with crisis or disaster management skills: personnel lack the institutional knowledge to make adequate plans and then can struggle to respond when disasters and crises emerge. Interviewees noted that, in many crisis contexts, they are under-resourced – with only a small number of staff acting as the contact point while balancing other priorities. Therefore, there is a real need to better integrate contingency planning for crises in national education planning, to ensure there is domestic leadership and capacity to respond. However, the level of political will to respond to a crisis, and to prioritise education as part of that, will be heavily shaped by the nature of the context too.

Domestic leadership and political will

In some contexts, moments of transition or crisis can support a more prominent focus on education. Following the end of Taliban rule, for example, Afghanistan’s leaders prioritised primary education, especially for girls, in part to garner support from the international community; in both Ethiopia and Rwanda, the government prioritised education as part of post-conflict nation-building projects (Nicolai et al., 2014). The country case study of Lebanon conducted for this report demonstrated the crucial importance of political leadership in the Lebanese Ministry of Education and Higher Education in securing breakthroughs in provision of education for Syrian refugees (see chapter 7, below). In many other contexts, other sectors have been identified as more pressing priorities – whether this is consolidating security (e.g. South Sudan) or effective health response (e.g. Liberia, Sierra Leone). This reinforces the call for high-level political engagement at an early stage in a crisis, to make the case for prioritising education as part of any response – and more guidance on how to prioritise education given the particular constraints crises and conflict can pose for standard delivery mechanisms.

Any notion of ‘domestic leadership’ will likely need to encompass a range of state and non-state actors too. In Haiti, for example, the 2010 earthquake damaged half of the country’s schools and three major universities, contributing to real collapse within the education system and a significant loss of life of education personnel (Nicolai and Hine, 2015). Many non-state actors, including civil society, were important in providing immediate assistance, often in coordination with government. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), citizens see the state largely as ‘predatory’, and the Catholic Church is the primary provider of education services (TriBeCA and de Herdt, 2011). This reinforces the importance of an agile platform, which can identify which networks of domestic actors need to be engaged in any given context, including those outside the government where relevant.

External engagement with domestic authorities

Humanitarian actors tend to be less engaged than their development counterparts with national governments and ministries of education. This is particularly the case where states are parties to a conflict and where coordination with the national government could inhibit humanitarian access to those in need. Furthermore, humanitarian actors tend to emphasise rapid responses and non-formal education approaches that states may be unable or unwilling to facilitate. Engagement with national governments is an element of the cluster system and needs assessments, but in practice action is strongly driven by humanitarian actors – in part because of challenges with government capacity (Zyck, 2015).

Development actors tend to be more engaged with ministries of education and are closely engaged in their long-term and strategic planning, with sector plans being a key focus of donor funding and also necessary for accessing funding from GPE. Opportunities therefore exist for closer cooperation between humanitarian and development actors at the pre-crisis stage – ensuring there are adequate plans in place that will make emergency response easier and embedding crisis planning in education management information systems (EMIS) to make needs assessment easier and to allow country plans to respond dynamically to real conditions. Interviewees noted that UNHCR was active in providing support for country ESPs
to incorporate contingencies for refugee education and was examining opportunities to work with GPE to make this a necessary component of plans submitted for GPE funding. These would also need to identify what political and institutional bottlenecks lie in the way of delivering on education plans in crisis settings to and incorporate serious attempts to unblock these through targeted technical support or brokering reform processes.

Box 3: Engaging domestic leadership
Improving engagement with domestic leadership requires a particular set of ways of working that align with the broader recommendations for improving coordination, including the following:

- The common platform should prioritise engagement with national governments and raising the profile of the need for response plans and dedicated resources within ministries of education:
  - The global political champions group can advocate to and work with domestic political leadership – particularly on establishing dedicated emergency response teams.
  - The secretariat can link humanitarian organisations to national planning processes to ensure crisis preparation and data collection are integrated.
- The creation of country- or regional-level political champions groups in response to particular crises could act in a number of ways to ensure national leadership:
  - working directly with the national government, using their convening power and influence to ensure country ownership over both post-crisis plans and immediate response coordination, drawing on experience in Lebanon
  - working with national and regional stakeholders to advocate for national governments to prioritise education in their immediate emergency response and dedicate adequate resources and personnel to these efforts
  - requiring that all crisis response and recovery plans financed or supported by the common platform to be nationally driven and owned in order to receive funding (with greater guidance on how to do this effectively)
This section looks at questions of capacity-strengthening, including the education workforce, information systems, emergency preparedness and learning and innovation efforts. Identifying best practices for addressing these areas will ensure a common platform provides the most efficient intervention.

Focus questions are as follows:

C1: What types of capacity gaps exist in terms of workforce, at both the national and the global levels?
C2: What more is needed in terms of information systems in order to support education in crisis response?
C3: How could emergency preparedness be strengthened in order to both mitigate and reduce crisis-related risks?
C4: What capacity needs are there in relation to learning and innovation for education in crisis efforts?

Key findings:

- There is a clear message that the common platform should prioritise capacity-strengthening at the national level by supporting existing entities and making use of existing tools and frameworks for capacity building, such as the INEE Education in Emergencies Minimum Standards.
- In terms of workforce development, there is a need to ensure teachers are paid, with teacher salary systems rapidly restored and functioning, as well as to increase overall quantity and quality of education in crises professionals both at a national level and globally.
- For information systems, gaps include fit-for-purpose emergency response data collection tools, joined-up data collation and analysis across government, humanitarian and development efforts and EMIS that include crises-related education information.
- The common platform could play an important role in addressing government preparedness capacity gaps, by circulating technical advice sourced from the Global Education Cluster, UNHCR, UNESCO and the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP); encouraging partner governments to plan for contingencies as a normal part of financing; and strengthening capacity-building for preparedness at the level of humanitarian actors and other service-level providers.
- Existing reports on what works to promote children’s educational access, quality of learning and well-being in crisis suggest the common platform could support a valuable learning and innovation work stream that focuses on building an actionable evidence base to strengthen existing research and address current research gaps.

While there is no universally agreed definition of capacity-strengthening, for the purposes of this paper we use the INEE definition, as follows: ‘the strengthening of knowledge, ability, skills and behavior to help people and organizations achieve their goals’ (INEE, 2010: 115).

A review of comparable initiatives in the global health, development, environment and human rights sectors suggests a platform has a wide range of options for its capacity-strengthening priorities and focus. At one end of the spectrum, some funds, such as the World Bank/World Health Organization (WHO) Pandemic Emergency Facility, explicitly do not fund any capacity-building, and instead support only direct project implementation (World Bank, 2015). On the other end of the spectrum, some initiatives are focused purely on capacity-strengthening, such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) proposed global fund to support capacity-building on business and human rights (OHCHR, 2015).

However, a clear and consistent message from interviews, collective standards and principles suggests the common platform should prioritise capacity-building at the national level by supporting existing entities. The common platform would benefit from using an agreed framework to guide capacity-strengthening efforts for education systems in emergencies and protracted crises. Potential education building blocks could follow the INEE Education in Emergencies Minimum Standards, which outline Foundational Standards, Access and Learning Environment, Teaching and Learning, Teachers and Other Education Personnel and the Education Policy needed to deliver quality education in an emergency environment (INEE, 2010).

Any common platform should complement and support existing actors that have the highest impact. Accordingly, a common platform’s role in capacity-strengthening would be to support implementing partners’ efforts to strengthen capacity in the education in emergencies and protracted crises sector at the national, regional and global levels. The platform, as a high-level partnership, could act as a broker, ensuring complementarity by providing funds and incentives for good practices/initiatives that strengthen capacities at all levels. Additionally, the platform could focus on bringing actors together for coordination purposes and provide incentives to implement action.
Four areas seem to emerge as priority capacity gaps in the education in emergencies architecture: 1) workforce-strengthening; (2) information systems; (3) emergency preparedness; and (4) learning and information building.

3.1 Workforce capacity

C1: What types of capacity gaps exist in terms of workforce, at both the national and the global levels?

In response to this question, we look at both national and global workforce needs in relation to education in crisis, as well as providing an overview of existing efforts.

National workforce needs

Teachers deliver the vast majority of education in crises as part of national government systems, with national civil society actors, private sector, community members, families and children either supporting existing government systems or providing services in parallel. Yet the national teaching workforce is currently facing acute shortfalls in at least 74 countries worldwide (UNESCO-UIS, 2015). While some countries should succeed in closing this gap by 2030, it is likely the remaining countries with the greatest shortfalls will be those most affected by emergencies and protracted crises (Nicolai and Hine, 2015).

Workforce shortages in these crisis contexts owe to a combination of interrelated factors. This array of complex challenges requires a range of context-specific solutions. Education workforce-strengthening should include workforce salaries, continuity and support; skills-building (pre- and in-service training); and supervision. Capacity-strengthening in crises must also include ensuring a protective environment for children. In practical terms, this means ensuring the workforce at a minimum encompasses a ‘do no harm’ policy for children, and actively integrates principles of gender equality, human rights protection, non-discrimination, trauma resilience and peace-building into the learning environment.

Each of these components is critically important, however, ensuring teachers are paid and teacher salary systems are rapidly restored and functioning is perhaps the first vitally important capacity-strengthening response during a crisis. While core to ensuring a high-quality, effective response to provision of education in crises, teacher compensation policies in these contexts can present complex challenges (such as in the case of national government suspension of teacher salaries because they live in opposition areas, etc.). But building national capacity to deliver basic education services in emergencies and to strengthen education systems is consistent with best practices for reducing state fragility and promoting resilience. It is also consistent with the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States agreed at Busan (2011) and basic humanitarian principals.

Global workforce-strengthening

While the global education in crises workforce (education in emergencies practitioners) represents a small proportion of the overall workforce (primarily composed of national actors), it is particularly important in its supporting role of providing technical assistance, resource mobilisation, coordination and surge capacity to ministries of education and national civil society actors. There is a need for a strong emphasis on strengthening the capacity of the current system (including the Education Cluster, OCHA) rather than setting up parallel systems. While establishing a platform, continued advocacy with the current global humanitarian structure (including HCs, OCHA, pooled funds) is necessary to ensure momentum for education in emergencies is not lost at that level.

For nearly two decades, donor governments have made available to UN agencies and major INGOs surge capacity staffing arrangements for rapid deployment to emergencies, typically with salaries and initial and final travel of specialists paid for by the donor. Education specialists have been among such deployments for many years. Prominent among the agencies offering such surge capacity services have been the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the Danish Refugee Council, drawing on funding from their respective national ministries of foreign affairs. While both began exclusively with deployments of their own citizens, they quickly opened up to include specialists drawn from almost any country, with strong encouragement to the deployment of specialists from developing countries. These and other standby arrangements have given invaluable experience to hundreds of education in crises workers, many of whom are now employed full-time by agencies active in the field of work.

The Global Education Cluster has made progress over the past two years in increasing recruitment and retention of coordination staff in emergencies. These efforts have expanded the practitioner pool and increased interest in the sector. This is particularly noticeable in crises with internal displacement, which is the major focus of the Global Education Cluster. As a result, the Global Education Cluster estimates it can cover about 75% of coordination needs, particularly in large-scale, Level 3 emergencies such as Iraq, Nepal and South Sudan. Despite these efforts, Global Education Cluster workforce capacity gaps are still found in:

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5 Acknowledging that educational systems include a range of areas including financial management, human resource management and infrastructure management.

6 We use INEE’s definition of a teacher, as follows: the term ‘teacher’ is used to cover all persons in schools who are responsible for the education of pupils (INEE, 2009). This includes professionals and para-professionals.
Box 4: Improving workforce capacity

To address these shortfalls, a common platform could seek to support national capacity for rapid response, as well as longer-term system analysis, planning and coordinated policy dialogue. In addition, the INEE Minimum Standards should be seen as an essential tool for capacity-building. It is also important to remember that, in many contexts, protracted crises are cross-border, so there may be a need to address capacities across a region or in several national contexts. As such, the platform could seek to support the following options:

- addressing workforce shortages within ministries of education, by:
  - increasing quantity and quality of training for new teachers in workforce and for retention of existing workforce
  - providing national-level incentive infusion support to building the workforce (salaries, vouchers, accommodation, potential for m-payments)
  - strengthening national-level enabling environment support to building the workforce by addressing structural barriers (safety), particularly for women teachers and for young women aspiring to complete education
  - support existing capacity-strengthening initiatives to reach national and subnational education responders by providing funding necessary to current providers to offer capacity-building services, including those that seek to increase coverage and access through blended learning tools, using mobile or e-learning programmes
  - increase the overall quantity and quality of education in crises professional trainings by funding efforts through existing implementing partners, such as ALNAP, the ECB, ELRHA, BIOFORCE Institute, the Humanitarian Leadership Academy, NRC, UNICEF and others, to map and assess existing trainings and create new offerings where there are gaps
  - increase support for workforces deployed through the Global Education Cluster, UNHCR and other key actors with shortfalls by providing funding to strengthen the deployable workforce
  - provide continued advocacy with the current global humanitarian structure (including HCs, OCHA, pooled funds) to ensure momentum for education in emergencies is not lost at that level
  - coordinate efforts to assess information about comprehensive needs to obtain a clearer sense of workforce capacity, similar to triangulation efforts completed in a recent assessment of the child protection in emergencies sector (Save the Children and Linksbridge SPC, 2015)

- forgotten emergencies, such as in Chad, DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya or Niger, where there is an absolute shortfall of coordination workforce numbers, primarily because of lack of funding for these positions, but also partly because of a lack of available practitioners
- funding for longer-term posts
- recruitment of dedicated education staff in refugee crises
- recruitment for Francophone countries

Existing capacity-building efforts

During the past 20 years, humanitarians have designed and launched hundreds of learning and capacity-building initiatives aimed at building the sector. These include, among others, the Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), the Emergency Capacity Building Project (ECB), Enhancing Learning and Research for Humanitarian Assistance (ELRHA), BIOFORCE Institute and, most recently, the Humanitarian Leadership Academy. In addition, NRC and UNICEF provide education in emergencies trainings through NorCap. The Start Network also provides an innovative approach to community response capacity development in the humanitarian sector (Save the Children and Linksbridge SPC, 2015).7

While there is a growing array of humanitarian training options, specific education in emergencies trainings may be more limited. INEE is among the most targeted providers, creating curriculum for training modules based on the Minimum Standards, as part of the INEE-Education Cluster Training Package on human rights and accountability, inclusive education, adolescent and youth programming, conflict-sensitive education and gender-responsive education. Additionally, INEE has supported education in emergencies and INEE Minimum Standards workshops, trainings and capacity development opportunities in over 20 countries since its launch in 2001 (INEE, 2015).

The Education Cluster, formally endorsed by the IASC in 2006, also aims to address global and country-level gaps in the emergency education sector related to capacity through a number of means, with a primary aim of supporting coordination, not programme management. The cluster maps gaps and capacities at global and country levels to target improvements in education preparedness and response capacity. It also conducts

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7 The Joint Standards Initiative, a collaboration of the Human Accountability Partnership International, People in Aid and the Sphere Project, mapped out 71 significant quality and accountability initiatives by 2012, offering a snapshot of initiatives developed over time (Schofield and Cragg, 2013).
training programmes to support humanitarian personnel and government educational programme management and planning in emergencies, as well as providing guidance on core coordination functions (e.g. coordination, information management, needs assessment). Furthermore, it evaluates education responses in selected countries to provide lessons learnt and facilitates peer-to-peer knowledge and information-sharing among country clusters and partners through online communities of practices (Global Education Cluster, 2015; INEE, 2015).

At an aggregated global level, interviews have indicated that there are likely enough existing or potential trainings and university degree programmes available to build national and global expertise and workforce numbers needed for provision of education in emergencies in protracted crises. However, critical gaps remain in the ability of these training providers to:

- reach front-line responders, at national and subnational levels – that is, civil society actors and civil servants
- provide consistent, multiyear capacity-strengthening services
- provide training and technical assistance in Francophone contexts, and in multiple languages

3.2 Information systems

C2: What more is needed in terms of information systems in order to support education in crisis response?

The humanitarian and development sectors urgently need to review their information systems, including better-quality data to achieve goals across all sectors. Quality data collection, analysis and translation capacity could be greatly improved with dedicated funding and advocacy support. Were a new common platform to prioritise this, it would improve response quality, speed and effectiveness. Additionally, it would improve the sector’s ability to understand the scale and scope of the system needs and gaps.

In an increasingly interconnected, data-driven world, the development and humanitarian sectors continue to struggle with what the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data (2015b) describes as a ‘crisis at the heart of solving many of the world’s most pressing issues – a crisis of poor use, accessibility and production of high quality data that is stunting the fight to overcome global challenges in every area — from health to gender equality, human rights to economics, and education to agriculture’. This gap is particularly severe in emergencies and protracted crises in general, and around education needs in particular, given the overall resource constraints limiting the sector. Interviews and literature reviews identified priority needs as:

- consistent access to EMIS data in crises
- fit-for-purpose emergency response data collection tools
- information about community-level provision of education in emergencies response
- improving emergency assessment methods
- rebuilding EMIS systems during transition phases

There is likely enough collective knowledge and experience in the sector to develop the right tools, but not the time and resources needed to develop, test and scale them. UNICEF has recently launched a new project called e-tools, which could be adapted to the existing software platform, Activity Info (Tremblay, 2015). This is an initiative that could produce a potential solution in future.

During this phase, governments may require technical assistance to conduct an audit of their information systems to assess capacity gaps and priority needs. Once assessed and costed, rebuilding information systems (or in some cases starting anew) would likely require a
period of further technical assistance as well as support to information infrastructure (transport and technology required for data collection and analysis), which the common fund could focus.

The common platform could support the development of tools (and the sector norms) necessary to work jointly with traditional providers to systematically collect data and coordinate activities. This could mean appointing a focal point within the Education Clusters, and investing in tracking efforts at subnational levels. The platform could also support efforts to disseminate common standards and ensure quality by funding initiatives that focus on the inclusion of these actors in coordination efforts and common standards training.

3.3 Emergency preparedness capacity

C3: How could emergency preparedness be strengthened in order to both mitigate and reduce crisis-related risks?

Bridging the humanitarian development divide has been a common goal for the humanitarian and development sectors for decades. As such, it is a central aspect of the Global Education Cluster’s Strategic Plan for 2015-2019, which calls for ‘consideration of measures to bridge the humanitarian development divide in terms of planning, coordination and financing’ (Global Education Cluster, 2015b). Preparedness is central to these efforts and is a central focus of the WHS, which highlights the need for government investment and increased capacity to address current and future crises, and to develop preparedness plans (WHS Consultation Process, 2015). As such, emergency preparedness, response and prevention planning should be seen as a key part of capacity-strengthening for the common platform.

Emergencies and protracted crises rapidly deplete affected government and civil society capacity to provide essential education services, and typically force trade-offs between response and planning functions. This leaves the capacity to plan emergency response, preparedness, risk reduction and resilience activities consistently weak and under-resourced.

As a comparator, there is a growing body of evidence that suggests disaster preparedness planning saves lives, time and money. For example, a recent review of 49 emergency preparedness investments by UNICEF and the World Food Programme (WFP) in Chad, Madagascar and Pakistan suggests an average return on investment ratio of 2:1, with initial $5.6 million investments in interventions resulting in $6.4 million in net savings (Boston Consulting Group, 2015).

Government ministry staff and civil society responders may also lack some of the experience and technical skills necessary to shift from planning stable, steady services to responding to unanticipated crises that are often characterised by rapidly changing needs. In other instances, they may have the technical expertise and experience necessary, but not the financial resources required to create and execute emergency response and preparedness plans.

Agencies with education in emergencies expertise have been working to build these response capacities in crises contexts through a number of initiatives – including the Global Education Cluster’s work with ministries, LEGs and in-country partners. GPE (in collaboration with IIEP and UNICEF) has also played a role in supporting the development of increased linkages between early crisis and transitions – through provision of accelerated funding, mechanisms for the rapid restructuring of existing grants, support to resilience and readiness in sector planning and assistance with ‘transitional ESPs’.

On the development side, GPE holds a mandate to support the development of conflict-sensitive ESPs and transitional ESPs under its focal area on fragile and conflict-affected states (GPE, 2013). GPE also maintains a crisis response funding mechanism that can release up to 20% of allocated GPE funds to countries that have launched an appeal through the humanitarian response plan (HRP), which can be transferred within approximately eight weeks from request (GPE, 2015). This mechanism has been triggered in CAR, Somalia and Yemen (Kim, 2015). Since the collaboration in CAR, the Global Education Cluster and GPE have been discussing options to work more closely in supporting emergency education response and preparedness planning in countries affected by crises.

Globally, individual mandates are in place to provide technical assistance and resources to enable national governments to develop and implement emergency education response and preparedness plans. However, there are not yet mechanisms to enable humanitarian and development actors to jointly offer that assistance in acute and protracted crises. Equally, it is not clear if there is other humanitarian and development funding currently available to provide dedicated resources for preparedness planning and for plan implementation.

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8 One of the Global Education Cluster’s six main functions is ‘to build national capacity in [education] preparedness and contingency planning’ (Global Education Cluster, 2015b).

9 Interviews suggest that the CAR example offers strong lessons learnt for this model.
3.4 Learning and innovation

C4: What capacity needs are there in relation to learning and innovation for education in crisis efforts?

Interviews and a literature review confirm that a priority capacity gap is understanding what works well in education interventions in complex crises, particularly in some of the most challenging contexts. This is likely a result, in large part, of a combination of underfunding to the sector and the need to focus resources and efforts on emergency response in a context of ever-increasing humanitarian need. Many of the most experienced, talented and innovative responders in the sector simply do not have time to breathe, much less develop new strategies. However, new strategies are desperately needed to solve access to education barriers for children living in some of the toughest crisis contexts like Syria, with extremely low humanitarian access, or South Sudan, with poor education delivery capacity. As such, there is a real opportunity to build a substantive research and evaluation focus into the platform.

This will require time and resources to understand what works for capacity-building in these contexts, and to innovate out of the old ‘school-in-a-box’ solutions, specifically to:

- pilot new approaches
- learn from existing innovative response approaches and solutions
- take to scale, adapting in additional contexts

Box 6: Emergency preparedness capacity

The common platform could play an important role in addressing these gaps. Investments in strengthening government capacity to better respond to and prepare for the impacts of crises on education systems are likely to prove high value for money.

- The Global Education Cluster, UNHCR, UNESCO and IIEP could provide technical support to that process, by making commitments, should there be a crisis, as to how they would support crisis planning and response. This could be articulated through a memorandum of understanding between agencies, which could include a clear outcome of strengthening national ministry planning capacity.
- The platform could also play a further capacity-strengthening role by encouraging partner governments to plan for contingencies as a normal part of financing, ensuring that, in the future, domestic resources take emergencies into account and costs are incorporated into long-term budgets.
- Finally, it could also play a key role in ensuring capacity-building for preparedness at the level of humanitarian actors and other service-level providers (depending on context), who often have limited capacity to address such needs and develop plans in advance of a crisis. Incentives could be given to specific initiatives such as the involvement of humanitarian actors (e.g. Education Clusters) in the development of national (transitional) ESPs.
Box 7: Learning and innovation

INEE’s recent report on what works to promote children’s educational access, quality of learning and well-being in crisis offers a good example of leaning and innovation research (Burde et al., 2015). The platform could have a learning and innovation work stream that focuses on building an actionable evidence base, using INEE’s recommendations as a starting point. This would include potential investments as described below.

Invest in conducting a systematic review of existing education in emergencies programme interventions in countries and regions affected by crises in order to:

• identify the most commonly implemented type of programme in a given context
• map where there is a dearth or preponderance of programme data and
• (continue to) fund practitioners and academics to work together to conduct rigorous research in these locations

Invest in rigorous research to learn more about:

• access for the most marginalised children: focusing on the best interventions for supporting educational access, quality of learning and well-being for refugee children and youth, for girls and for children with disabilities
• distance learning innovations: highlighting mobile phone teaching and learning platforms and other distance learning innovations that show promise and are likely to be particularly important to highly mobile, hard-to-reach populations affected by conflict and crisis
• need-based financing: assess the quality of information on which appeals are made to better target approaches and avoid over-estimating needs and budgets
• cross-sector linkages: assess connections to other sectors with strong education linkages (nutrition, health, protection, etc.) to determine areas for potential stronger collaboration and joint programming
• existing capacity and gaps: support comprehensive education assessments should be supported globally, potentially through the data efforts already undertaken by GPE, the World Bank and others, to enable rapid response and targeted approaches

Invest in:

• disaster risk reduction: programming and rigorous research on reducing disaster risk in middle- and low-income and conflict-affected countries
• early childhood development (ECD) and community-based education (CBE): ECD and CBE programmes that are well structured and managed; continue to conduct research on these programmes to understand variations among ECD programming and the long-term effects of CBE
• global/cross-national capacity development: training of experts to work in emergency settings and the creation of global public goods or a platform for cross-national knowledge exchange
• a serious testing ground or innovation lab to assess different approaches, including innovations, and wide-ranging comparative research across a range of questions; the UK Department for International Development (DFID) Humanitarian Innovations Hub can assist in design if helpful; a significant budget may be needed to undertake this approach.
This section examines the financing landscape surrounding education in emergencies and protracted crises in order to understand how a common platform can meet its aim to generate additional funds and a strong financial commitment to meeting the educational needs of children and young people affected by crisis.

Focus questions are as follows:
F1: What are the finance gaps and current funding for education in emergencies?
F2: What are other potential sources of finance for the sub-sector and how could they be scaled up?
F3: How might new funds be disbursed to those countries, organisations and people that need them?
F4: What do existing country-level funding mechanisms teach us about the effectiveness of different disbursement processes and channels?

Key findings:

- It takes an average of $156 per child per year to provide education across 35 crisis-affected countries. ODI’s analysis of the likely contribution of domestic governments suggests a global finance gap of $8.5 billion, or $113 per child.

- Education in emergencies remains under-funded, with education receiving low, and sometimes declining, shares of both government and donor expenditure, while humanitarian aid donors allocate less to education than the – itself insufficient – 4% target.

- The most promising additional sources for the common platform to help leverage, in descending order of size, are (1) developing country governments, especially via incentives to sustain teacher deployment and budget redistribution to hard-to-reach areas; (2) official development assistance (ODA), especially by accelerating the sequencing and articulation from humanitarian to development; (3) social enterprises in education, directly and in connection with international remittances and crowd-funding; and (4) the private sector.

- There is a real risk of substitution between funding sources and channels. Humanitarian support could rise while development aid falls (or vice versa), or government spending could be curtailed while external support rises.

4.1 Global costs, funding and gaps

F1: What are the finance gaps and current funding for education in crises?

Finance gap

ODI have estimated that approximately $11.6 billion per year is needed to provide educational support to the 75 million children aged 3-18 who are most directly affected by crisis. ODI arrived at these estimates through analysis and estimation of low and high costs for classroom construction, teacher stipends, teacher training and student equipment in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In order to account for some of the complexities of crises, a crisis premium was then added, calculated by drawing on the EFA GMR (UNESCO, 2015b) mark-up of per student costs to attract marginalised children, which shares the common objective of trying to reflect a combination of greater numbers of students and higher per-student expenditure to improve quality. This resulted in an average cost of $156 per child per year. ODI’s analysis of the likely contribution of domestic governments suggests this leaves a total global finance gap of $8.5 billion, or $113 per child.10

The absolute size of the finance gap for crisis contexts is relatively small compared with global growth in education spending, but represents a larger relative gap for countries facing emergencies and protracted crises. These figures are also likely underestimates, as they do entirely factor in challenges governments may face in prioritising education and allocating funds effectively in these contexts (Nicolai et al., 2015).

Current sources of funding

Existing funding for education in crisis contexts currently comes primarily from domestic sources, development aid and humanitarian aid.

Domestic sources include government spending and private household expenditure, which together comprise the largest source of funding for education across all types of countries. Households are spending significant amounts on education, particularly in low-income countries. Rough estimates suggest almost half of total domestic public expenditures on education in 15 low-income countries in Africa derive from household spending (Steer and Smith,

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10 See Appendix 1 for additional detail
A UNESCO survey data study using 15 African countries in fragile and non-fragile contexts found that an average household spent 4.3% of total household expenditure on education.

National taxation is another key source of finance for education. However, while overall education spending has risen in the past 15 years in many developing countries, education as a share of government expenditure in fragile and least developed states has dropped from 14.5% to 13.4% (Steer and Smith, 2015).

**Development aid.** Overall ODA has increased over the past decade. However, the share allocated to education has fallen. ODA to all types of education has been increasing at a much slower rate than total ODA, with support to primary education showing signs of decline. Moreover, low- and lower-middle-income countries in protracted crises receive less development aid, on average, than countries not experiencing such crises. Through 2012, aid to education remained below historical highs; according to the Global Monitoring Report (UNESCO, 2015a), in 2012:

- Total bilateral and multilateral aid to education fell from $13 billion in 2011 to $12.6 billion.
- Aid to basic education similarly fell from $5.7 billion in 2011 to $5.1 billion.
- Direct aid to secondary education increased from $1.1 billion in 2011 to $1.3 billion.

**Humanitarian aid:** Since the Global Education Cluster’s formation in 2006, humanitarian funding for education has increased considerably in absolute terms (Wilson et al., 2015). However, the sector remains systemically underfunded.

In 2012, the Global Education First Initiative (GEFI) called for doubling the share of total humanitarian aid earmarked for education, to at least 4% of humanitarian appeals, a doubling of levels at the start of the decade (UN, 2012). However, the literature suggests the 4% target is too low, and has yet to be reached in the three years since it was set. According to OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS) data, between 2006 and 2015 humanitarian consolidated appeals for education received $1.4 billion in funding, an average of $143 million annually over the 10-year period. As a percentage of all humanitarian funding, education ranged from 1.4% (2012) to 3.4% (2010), with a 10-year average of 2.1% (OCHA, 2015a). This is well below GEFI’s recommended 4% target and emblematic of what EFA refers to as education’s ‘double disadvantage’, whereby the sector’s insufficient requests for resources are compounded by their taking the smallest portion of what is actually funded.

### 4.2 Sources of finance

**F2: What are other potential sources of finance for the sub-sector and how could they be scaled up?**

In this section we examine existing or new sources of finance that could be scaled up to support education in crises. Scaling up from several different sources can help both increase overall funding available to countries in need and spread risks through diversification and the ability to match funding to the risk appetite of different providers. We also consider how some improvements in delivery mechanisms (such as results-based aid (RBA)) may both improve the effectiveness of existing assistance and thereby indirectly encourage additional support. This effect also applies to improving the allocation of public education spending towards more vulnerable areas and households.

**Promising sources**

We find the most promising additional sources for the platform to help leverage to be, in descending size order, (1) developing country governments, especially via incentives to sustain teacher deployment and budget redistribution to hard-to-reach areas; (2) ODA, especially by accelerating the sequencing and articulation from humanitarian to development; (3) social enterprises in education, directly and in connection with international remittances and crowd-funding; and (4) the private sector.

There is further scope for adapting some innovative mechanisms, such as disaster risk insurance, front-loading education aid through bond sales and RBA techniques, for education in crisis contexts. At this stage deployment

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**Box 8: Global costs, funding and gaps**

Education in emergencies remains under-funded. Education is receiving low, and sometimes declining, shares of both government and donor expenditure. Governments in fragile least developed countries are allocating declining shares of their budgets to education; development aid donors are allocating less both to education and to countries in crises, and humanitarian aid donors allocate less to education than the – itself insufficient – 4% target.

This suggests that some of the core purposes of the common platform should be as follows:

- Given the low level of funding, establish targets regarding the share of funding to cover for the $8.5 billion gap by each of the main sources (including revisiting 4%).
- To have more accurate figures, customise a financial tracking system to be used at country level that encompasses a range of sources.

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of the platform to leverage additional direct funding by INGO or wider for-profit private sources or South–South cooperation should not be ruled out either. There are some promising potential niches to be investigated further in each of these areas, but we feel they are probably not today of sufficient scale/impact to justify the likely operational and governance design complications involved, especially if limited pooled ‘facility’ funding and staff resources have to be rationed across multiple complex schemes.

We assume roughly one third of Items 2-5 above would actually flow through the global finance facility –that is, $130 million. Most of this will be sourced from (2) and (3). We would expect public expenditure by governments to be direct (i.e. not channelled through the MDTF) but leveraged and supported by the crisis-specific MDTFs.

**Issues of additionality**

As evidenced in the recent evaluation of GPE (R4D, 2015), in a global context of static ODA and eroding government expenditures, there is a possible risk of substitution between sources and channels; between bilateral funders and the GPE, for example, and between GPE and the International Development Association (IDA). In the education in crises context, humanitarian support could also rise while development aid falls (or vice versa), government spend could be curtailed while external support rises or other components of the platform could fall while others, for example a pooled facility, rise, but not enough to compensate. This would at best dampen the platform’s ultimate effect, and at worst merely increase fragmentation within an inadequate resource envelope. Only through strict agreed mutual monitoring of all components of platform-pledged spending can the partnership ensure true additionality or ‘crowding-in’ – that is, rising allocations from separate and joint sources, within a steadily rising overall education resource pool. Tracking of such simultaneous commitments is never simple, but it is essential.

Annex 2 provides details of the potential to leverage resources from each of the relevant financing sources (including indicating where we do not assess there to be significant potential, and why). Here, we briefly outline our rationale for including the sources indicated above, which are presented in descending order of potential size.

**Public education expenditure by governments ($800m):**

Governments are the largest single source of financing for education, even in many emergency contexts. Given the high share of public sector salaries in education costs, there is considerable momentum to this expenditure. The political mobilisation function of the platform would seek to encourage governments to allocate a greater proportion of their budgets to education and reverse the declining trend (see above). More concretely, where governments do prioritise such spending, the platform could also help them protect the continuity and needs-based allocation of their own funding to education in emergencies and it is likely others will join them.

**Table 2: Illustrative additional annual disbursements (based on a ‘moderate ambition’ scenario of total platform size of $1.2 billion a year, including a pooled facility of $130 million)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Prospective fund</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Developing country governments</td>
<td>Governments are the largest single source of financing for education, even in many emergency contexts. $800m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ODA – both development and humanitarian</td>
<td>A large share of financing education in emergencies is likely to continue to come from ODA donors, using both development and humanitarian aid channels. $300m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Philanthropy/social enterprise</td>
<td>Much lower share of funding, as few philanthropic organisations are engaged in the sector directly; where they are, this is primarily in middle-income countries. $35m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Private sector</td>
<td>Private sector contribution beyond and in addition to financing and fund matching (support workforce challenges, youth training, certification and other aspects of informal education). $30m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Innovative financing mechanisms</td>
<td>Promising potential elements include disaster risk insurance, bond issuance linked to education outcomes and RBA. $25m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Emerging donors</td>
<td>Some emerging donors already contribute to the sector, but for the majority education, and basic education, is not a priority. For that reason, this could be a potential source of financing for a few specific ‘non-traditional’ actors. $10m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. INGO contributions</td>
<td>Some large INGOs, including faith-based and secular ones, already provide significant amounts of their own funding to education in emergencies and it is likely others will join them. Uncounted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 However, current reanalysis of the OECD DAC data suggests that the assessment of substitution in the GPE evaluation may partially be the result of problems in OECD DAC coding.
the facility, could also assist with special allowances for teaching in hardship conditions, and help build accounting and IT systems for education payrolls. National budget funds would flow in parallel, however, not through the facility.

**Donor education aid – both development and humanitarian ($300m):** A large share of financing education in emergencies is likely to continue to come from ODA donors, using both development and humanitarian aid channels. The platform could help raise awareness of the needs of education in crises and advocate for a reversal of the current declining trend. It is also important to better integrate development and humanitarian spending, including by providing greater flexibility for emergencies within education development programmes, as well as bringing the latter forward and supporting capacity to formulate national plans earlier in the transition. Members of the platform could commit to full integration of humanitarian and development aid budgets for education, including via systematic contingent provision for emergencies within the latter. Standards of evidence for learning outcomes in emergencies should be made no less flexible than in stable contexts, and capacity support for producing education plans in emergency contexts (e.g. through GPE) should be boosted. While front-loading development aid in emergency contexts does not automatically guarantee additionality, earlier positive implementation experience tends to lead to long-term stability in programming, so development partners will not necessarily withdraw earlier if they engage earlier.

**Philanthropy/social enterprise/remittances ($35m):** We are envisaging a much lower share of funding for education in crises from this source. This is because few philanthropic organisations are engaged in the (development) education sector directly; where they are, this is primarily in middle-income countries. However, there is a small but rapidly growing category of ‘social enterprises’, which receive major support at various stages from so-called impact investors as well as some official donors. International philanthropies joining the education in crises platform should be encouraged to offer challenge funding to leverage other actors, including donor governments, as well as pursuing parallel investments of their own, and particularly capitalising social enterprises focused on education.

**Private sector ($30m):** Private sector investments in formal education emergency contexts are almost non-existent, although they can make valuable complementary contributions to non-formal and vocational education and training. In some fragile countries, such as Nigeria, private (fee-based) provision of education is large and growing, despite political opposition, motivated by legitimate fears that fees deter or cause hardship for poor families. Governments or external funders could seek to overcome such fears by offering subsidies and/or vouchers to promote private provision and ensure fees do not represent a barrier for poor households. The platform could also offer match-funding and partial guarantees of payment to accredited providers. The private sector could also be encouraged to contribute through corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives: an estimated 13% of CSR is dedicated to the education sector (Dattani et al., 2015).

**Innovative financing mechanisms ($25m; potentially more but with unpredictable lead times):** The health sector can offer some successful examples of innovative financing mechanisms that could be developed in the education in emergencies sector. Promising potential elements include disaster risk insurance, bond issuance linked to education outcomes and RBA. The platform could encourage participating donor governments to earmark new or enhanced taxes for education in crises, perhaps by offering to match part of the resulting revenue. This may not by itself overcome political reluctance to create such new taxes, or direct them away from more obvious global public goods like health and climate change. RBA approaches deserve policy and capacity support by the platform, as they indirectly contribute to increasing confidence in education assistance. It is doubtful whether the platform, or indeed the facility should engage in the complexity of RBA design directly, except perhaps to co-fund experimental and demonstration programmes.

**South–South cooperation/new donors ($10m):** Some emerging donors already contribute to the education sector and could leverage/redirect their support into emergency contexts. However, for the majority, education, and basic education in particular, is not a priority sector. For that reason, this source could be a potential source of financing for just a few specific ‘non-traditional’ actors. The platform would do well to include non-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) sources of official finance for education, especially those (such as Arab donors, the Islamic Bank, Turkey and Brazil) with both substantial experience in education investments and several education in crises focus countries. Even if their preferred projects are in the tertiary and vocational sub-sectors, such engagement potentially in turn releases resources at the national level for basic education. The platform might also be able to facilitate South–South knowledge exchanges, which can involve prohibitive transaction costs if left entirely to bilateral initiative.

**INGO own contributions (uncounted):** NGOs play a prominent role in education in emergencies. Some large NGOs, including faith-based and secular ones, already provide significant amounts of their own funding to education in emergencies, in addition to larger programmes they undertake with ODA or emergency appeals funding, and it is likely that others will join them. The scope for
additional such resources at scale is hard to quantify. Donors could encourage NGOs to bridge humanitarian and development work even more, for example by matching their appeals for education in crises.

4.3 Disbursement of funds

**F3: How might new funds be disbursed to those countries, organisations and people that need them?**

During the early phase of research for this work, a finance mechanism structure was explored that could include a global finance facility (GFF) linked to country-specific MDTFs. Alternatively, a GFF could stand alone and distribute funds via managing entities in country. While the direction of work on the common platform pursued a GFF, working through MDTFs has not so far been pursued, although we have kept the background research here as part of the evidence paper.

While it may not be the case that all countries will have a MDTF, if this structure were pursued countries could set one up where applicable. Some countries may already have established MDTFs, in which case the platform will work through existing architecture rather than duplicating efforts. An overview of the fund structure is included in Figure 1.

This multi-tiered financing mechanism will provide a diversity of options for fund disbursement that is needed when working in dynamic environments in emergencies and protracted crises. Figure 1 provides three potential country case studies to demonstrate how the financing mechanism could operate. These examples are not exhaustive, but illustrate what three situations could look like with a new financing mechanism as proposed.

**Country 1:** In this situation, the multilateral global fund (MGF) would distribute regular funding to a country-specific MDTF. Holding funds in this country-level MDTF would be disbursed to the government to fund education services and would provide timely reliable funding. One could envision this being a situation where reliable long-term funding could enable governments to put together infrastructure and capacity-building plans with some level of certainty looking forward.

**Country 2:** Another situation would include a country MDTF that also receives regular funding from the MGF. But in this example the MDTF would distribute funding...
to national and international NGOs working in country. Distributing to NGOs would give the funding mechanism the ability to fund organisations that are typically on the front-lines of education service provision in an emergency situation.

Country 3: A final situation may be one where the MGF distributes funds directly to the institutions working in country rather than through the MDTF. An example might be funding an INGO directly for a specific project in the short term or UN agency directly that is working in country. This situation is intended to capture scenarios where setting up an MDTF is not advantageous and an MGF disburses directly to actors in country.

Global finance facility
The proposed GFF would pool funding from the sources outlined in Section 2 above and disburse them based on need, or other criteria set by the GFF and platform (see below). The GFF would raise resources periodically, perhaps through IDA or Global Fund-style replenishment rounds, which would then be immediately available to fund acute responses, as well as to support protracted crises.

Potential strengths: A number of MGFs currently exist: the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Gavi, GPE and the Global Environmental Facility. While the GFF proposed would not be a standalone institution on the form of the Global Fund or Gavi, these funds do offer some lessons for education in crises. The evidence suggests that, given their focus on a particular issue, these funds are often able to raise additional funds outside of the typical funding streams of that issue. They can also act as a repository for philanthropic funding, which tends not to be spent directly at the country level, potentially increasing the level of funding dedicated to certain causes (Greenhill et al., 2013). Especially in their early stages, MGFs have tended to be nimble, operationally lean and flexible organisations (expert interviews). From inception, they have typically built in learning mechanisms that have allowed them to move fast and learn from doing, which has enabled donor trust and contributed to faster scale-up. Recently published research suggests MGFs such as Gavi and the Global Fund are some of the most effective donors in terms of their helpfulness in reform, agenda-setting influence and usefulness of advice as ranked by receiving countries (Custer et al., 2015). Moreover, they can provide helpful mechanisms to include non-DAC donors: replenishment data from the Global Fund show developing countries such as China, India, Malawi and Vietnam have contributed to the most recent replenishment efforts (Global Fund, 2015b).

Gaps: A potential risk of MGFs is they may overlap with existing institutions in the sector they are entering. Unless the scope and mandate of the MGF is made clear relative to other organisations, it can be challenging to add yet another agency to the mix of existing ones in a given sector (Heimans, 2002).

GPE has at times faced challenges that are helpful to consider when thinking about new MGFs. Given that MGFs are structured to rely heavily on partnerships with other organisations, when those roles and responsibilities are not defined, it can be challenging to leverage each partner’s strengths. A recent evaluation of GPE suggests it has not yet clearly defined roles and responsibilities with each of its partners. Additionally, partners do not have incentives to ensure they are fulfilling those roles and responsibilities that have been defined. Both of these challenges lead to inefficiencies when trying to achieve GPE’s goals. Lastly, GPE has also faced challenges filling the financing gap in education. Some of the additional

Figure 1: Potential global financing mechanism for education in crisis
funding for GPE has been a moved over from other financing mechanisms for education, rather than being new funding. Any new MGF will need to take these gaps into consideration (Universalia and Results for Development, 2015)

Key characteristics
Allocation methodology: We would primarily envisage the GFF disbursing to country-specific MDTFs, although, as noted above, direct disbursement to INGOs in some countries could be possible. Creating an allocation methodology for who receives funding, how much funding should be received and how long that funding should cover is an important and often complex process. A review of the funding allocation methodology of major funds such as GPE, Gavi and the Global Fund highlights some criteria that could be included in allocation criteria for a new fund, as outlined in Box 1.

Box 10: Allocation criteria set by existing global funds

**GPE**
- poverty
- education vulnerability
- country fragility

**Gavi**
- *health impact* – could be an important metric for an education fund
- *value for money* – cost per unit of impact achieved
- *co-financing history* – looks at country commitment to the issue by reviewing previous co-financing efforts
- *gross national income* (GNI) – could be used as a proxy for need

**Global Fund**
*Disease burden and GNI* – eligibility for funding is determined primarily by official disease burden data for each of the three diseases as well as GNI (similar to Gavi). Primary allocations are based on these two criteria, but are then adjusted based on the following five criteria:
- previous grant performance
- impact
- increasing rates of infection
- absorptive capacity
- risk

12 This said, recent sources of evidence such as the DFID Annual Review (which rated GPE highly) and the forthcoming Multilateral Aid Review have found that GPE has taken significant steps towards improving partnership issues identified in the Independent Evaluation at both the global and the country levels.

Country-specific multi-donor trust funds

**Overview:** Country-level MDTFs are usually managed by either the World Bank or the UN. Recently, the EU has also developed capacity to host an MDTF (EU, 2016). They are often set up in post-crisis situations where government capacity is uncertain (Thomson and Karachiwalla, 2009). MDTFs typically work directly with partner governments to help redevelop capacity. Funds are often disbursed in the form of general or sector budget support. However, MDTFs can distribute funding directly to implementing organisations such as INGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) (Mattholie et al., 2013), and could use more innovative disbursement mechanisms (see below). They are often set up for long-term use and tend to provide stable and reliable funding as governments work to rebuild capacity (Barakat et al., 2012).

In the proposed education in crises financing model, MDTFs would receive funding directly from the GFF, but could also receive funding directly at the country level from interested donors (including philanthropists, the private sector and so on). Governments would be receiving funding from, rather than committing funding to, the MDTFs, but there are ways in which the MDTFs could also support additional government contributions, for example by match-funding teacher salaries in hard-to-reach areas (see Section 2 above.)

**Strengths:** An attractive characteristic of MDTFs is the trust they garner based on management bodies – that is, the UN and the World Bank. For donors who want to provide funding to post-crisis situations where government capacity is lacking, they often look to MDTFs for the confidence that they are well managed (Thomson and Karachiwalla, 2009). The reliable and stable rhythm of MDTF funding is also attractive for donors who wish to see regular investments made in an effective manner. There are also some examples of funds attracting funds from non-traditional donors, such as the Open Society Foundations in the case of the Liberia Education Pooled Fund, discussed in the next section. Non-DAC donors may also have incentives to contribute: of the MDTFs managed by the UN, more than 30 non-DAC countries contributed to more than 10 different MDTFs in 2014 (UNDP, 2015).

**Gaps:** The trust from donors that MDTFs gain by being managed by the UN and World Bank can also become a challenge as the start-up expenses and administrative costs can be high. By often distributing directly to governments, MDTFs can exhibit less inclusion of non-governmental voices as part of the disbursement prioritisation process and may end up with less flexibility in the use of funds (Thomson and Karachiwalla, 2009). However, this is a matter of design, and education in crises-related MDTFs
could include a specific provision to disburse to NGOs and other non-governmental stakeholders.

**Potential for education in crises:** MDTFs would be a useful financing mechanism for education in crises contexts given their ability to build longer-term, stable and reliable funding streams that would be needed to rebuild education infrastructure. It is notable, however, that a 2012 systematic review of MDTFs found they were most effective in transferring ownership of development programmes only when the partner government was firmly established (but needing extra capacity). They reference the difficulty of transferring ownership where there is no government or government authorities are weak, which is often the case in protracted crises (Barakat et al., 2012).

So, while MDTFs could potentially play a role in education financing in places of natural disaster with under-resourced but strong governments, the current evidence should be taken into account when considering their role in protracted crises.

**Disbursement mechanisms from the MDTFs**

We would envisage the MDTFs disbursing primarily to governments, but they could also disburse to UN agencies, INGOs or national organisations/CBOs:

- Disbursements to governments could be in the form of sector or general budget support where country systems are strong enough. In other contexts, it could be in the form of project aid, although it will be important to do this in ways that support government ownership and alignment wherever possible. Specific funding could be provided to target hard-to-reach groups, for example by offering matched funding to support teachers’ salaries in crisis-affected areas (see above).
- Where INGOs are involved significantly in service delivery, the MDTF could also disburse directly to these organisations. NGOs have the potential of increasingly working with bilateral and multilateral agencies as managing entities in places where government capacity is weak, which is particularly the case in conflict and emergency situations.
- In cases in which governments are unable or unwilling to manage funds owing to the nature of the crisis, UN agencies could be tasked with directly providing education services and could also receive MDTF funding. Where this occurs, there would need to be a clear plan to build government capacity to take over services over time.
- Finally, the MDTF could disburse to national and subnational NGOs, which are increasingly important players in emergency situations, and play a key role in promoting sustainability when humanitarian actors depart and development actors take the lead. This includes religious organisations in some countries (e.g. Haiti and DRC).

However, again there would need to be a clear plan for government coordination and leadership over time, once capacity has been built.

**Box 11: Innovative disbursement mechanisms – cash transfers**

One option for rapid disbursement of funds from either the government or an MDTF would be provision of cash transfers. Cash transfers typically involve a transfer of cash directly to individual recipients (rather than organisations or governments) and allow the recipient to choose which goods and services they want to purchase rather than them being provided with in-kind aid. Recent evidence suggests that, even in the midst of an emergency situation, education is a top priority for affected populations (Nicolai and Hine, 2015). This implies cash transfers could be used to stimulate greater spending by households on education, which could be provided by the private sector or government.

Cash transfers provide choice and agency to those affected by emergencies and protracted crises. Relative to traditional aid, they shift decision-making power from donors to beneficiaries, allowing the latter to choose what good or service best fits their needs (Bailey et al., 2008). Evidence suggests cash transfers are an extremely effective aid instrument, and, when used well, are high value for money (ODI, 2015). Cash transfers may also be effective in contexts in which the government is unable or unwilling to provide education services, and so traditional budget or sector support approaches may not be as effective.

However, cash transfers will be effective in emergencies only when goods, services and resources are available or can be quickly scaled up. In acute emergencies, there is often an immediate shortfall of available education resources (e.g. teachers, education materials, infrastructure) and this may not be easily resolved by cash infusion at a household level.
4.4 Country-level funding mechanisms

F4: What do existing country-level funding mechanisms teach us about the effectiveness of different disbursement processes and channels?

These country funds have operated under the status quo on education financing – namely, the absence of a GFF to pool funding at global level and coordinate allocation across crises. We also therefore discuss how such a GFF could have helped improve the effectiveness of such funds.

- MTDFs can help bridge the gap between humanitarian and development financing and offer benefits in terms of pooling risk and funding even when governments systems are not strong enough to be utilised. We noted in Section 2 that one of the key constraints in financing education in crises is the separation of humanitarian and development financing. There have been clashes between development and humanitarian actors (clashing cultures, different cost effectiveness priorities – e.g. costs of building schools with or without walls, different funding arrangements). Lebanon provides a recent example of a government being able to set up coordination structures and exert influence over the humanitarian response working with different sets of actors. A high-profile common platform with strong representation from global political actors might therefore be able to play a similar convening role on an ad hoc basis around major crises, representing a body to work with national governments to link actors and generate dialogue at key points, without creating an additional layer of permanent education in emergencies bureaucracy.

- It is important to ensure country-level funding mechanisms are better resourced and monitored. Lack of financing has been a critical constraint in the country case studies examined. In Lebanon, for example, total financing support for refugee education has consistently fallen short. One of the key purposes of the GFF would be to mobilise additional funding for education in crises, which would enable more financing to be channelled to each crisis.

- Speed and predictability of financing are key. Humanitarian crises in particular require rapid financing. At present, it takes time for funds to be disbursed, often because of donors’ reporting and accountability requirements. A standing GFF would be able to disburse funds to the country/crisis level as soon as an emergency is declared. The GFF would also be able to make long-term financing commitments and/or back-stop or underwrite support donors provide in country to ensure more predictable financing for the government. Lack of speed and predictability has been a key challenge in existing funds. In Zimbabwe, sustainability of programming financing was found to be a key weakness. In Lebanon, a key lesson learnt was that it was important for donors to make multiyear commitments that match the school cycle and enable the government and donors to plan properly.

- Spreading risk and involving partners able to bear different degrees of risk are also important. Investing in education in crises by its nature involves some risk. Crises can be unpredictable, and not all investments will be successful and demonstrate tangible results. The GFF and MTDFs can themselves help spread risks, by pooling funding. The kind of MDTF proposed here, involving potentially new partnerships, can go even further, by allowing partners to take on different degrees of risk. In Liberia’s EPF, for example, the Open Society Foundation was able to trigger fit-for-purpose financing.

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Box 12: Disbursement of funds

The platform would have a number of disbursal options relevant to each category of crisis. The choice of disbursal, however, should be contextualised to identify the most suitable disbursal mechanism:

- **Acute response:**
  - Develop an NGO-led, rapid response, humanitarian pooled fund, e.g., similar to the Start Network, focused on immediate response.
  - Within current UN-led pooled funds, e.g. emergency response funds (ERFs) and common humanitarian funds (CHFs), provide added advocacy for education (e.g. encourage countries to request greater than 4%). Also could explore option of specific UN-led emergency in crises and protracted emergencies window of pooled funding.

- **Protracted crises:**
  - Develop an MGF, similar to the Global Fund or Gavi, that distributes funds for more regular, protracted crisis-related funding.
  - Develop an MDTF hosted by the UN or World Bank that focuses primarily on long-term funding for education in protracted crises.

- **Non-traditional crises:**
  - The fund would have an ‘innovation’ window that pilots both social impact bonds (SIBs) and cash transfer programming, with potential scale-up if successful.

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A common platform for education in emergencies and protracted crises: evidence paper 35
by taking the lead with offers of ‘matching funds’ to the government, as it had a greater risk appetite than the traditional donors.

**Provide a vehicle for coordination, even if not all donors fund the MDTF.** In Lebanon and Liberia, a few donors continued to fund their own initiatives, channelling funding away from the government. While a common platform would not completely avoid this – there would be no intention to prohibit bilateral initiatives or proscribe individual donor initiatives in country – it would help improve coordination, even for those whose systems prevent them from supporting MDTFs.

**Support government leadership and ownership and promote sector budgeting.** National responsibility, mutual accountability and alignment with country plans and systems have been identified as key principles guiding the common platform. The country experiences suggest MDTFs can help promote these principles. In Liberia, the availability of flexible funds to the government was an empowering act in itself. The Zimbabwe ETF helped increase alignment with government priorities, promote ownership and coordination and reduce fragmentation.

**Promote learning.** Strengthening learning and accountability is another key function of the common platform. The GFF could monitor performance across the crises and MDTFs, and share good practice lessons.

**Box 13: Country level fund**

Existing country-level funding mechanisms teach us there are a number of effective disbursement processes and channels that create suitable options for a common platform:

- Use MTDFs to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development financing.
- Put country funds in place as an incremental step towards sector budgeting and coordination.
- Create MTDFs built off of willing actors (not all in sector) and focused on priority sub-sectors.
- Set ambitions for sufficient funding and length of donor support.
- Set out strategies for risk management.
- Design the MTDF based on context.
- Explore multi-modal mechanism that could go through client country governments; if blocked, they could be executed by donors.
5. Institutional arrangements

This section reviews options for the institutional arrangements of the common platform in terms of the potential hosting and governance mechanisms. These will, however, be dependent on high-level decisions regarding the precise mandate, scope and scale of the common platform. Since this section was drafted, the Champions’ Group has determined that the new education crisis platform will initially be hosted by UNICEF, with a Secretariat based in New York.

Focus questions are as follows:

IA1: What models for hosting / establishing a common platform could be considered?

IA2: What should be the selection criteria for an effective common platform host?

IA3: Which agencies could serve as host of a common platform, both globally and in crisis contexts? How well do those agencies match the selection criteria of an effective common platform host?

IA4: What are the options for governance of a common platform?

Key findings:

- Research to date indicates the common platform may be best placed to begin its life hosted by a single agency acting as an incubator for several years, after which time, depending on the initial choice of incubator host, it might remain with or transition to becoming a permanent host, or become an independent entity.
- UNICEF and GPE emerge as the two most likely hosts, with other options to consider being either a private sector actor or foundation.
- The core governance structure for a common platform should include a board and a secretariat (titles on these could change) with respective accountabilities clearly specified:
  - The board is responsible for the strategic direction of the platform. Responsibilities include management oversight, resource mobilisation, stakeholder participation and high-level advocacy.
  - The secretariat is responsible for management of the platform and is accountable to the board. Key responsibilities would include programme implementation, stakeholder communication, regulatory compliance and performance assessment.
- It is vital that the platform has clear accountability structures and channels, and that the structure reflects the needs and functions identified in this report.

5.1 Overview of institutional models

IA1: What models for hosting/establishing a common platform could be considered?

Experience of many global partnerships has shown that both hosting and independent institutional arrangements have advantages and disadvantages (Bezanson and Isenman, 2012). This analysis examines the advantages and disadvantages of hosting and independence of a new education in crises platform.

A hosting agency would be required to take on full responsibility for hosting the functioning of the platform, including provision of:

- human resources functions, including contractual matters, such as recruitment and separation; workplace safety; employee relations; compensation and benefits; compliance with labour and employment laws; and training and development
- accounting, audit and fiduciary functions
- working space and facilities for the secretariat
- access to requisite technology and support services, such as IT, travel, meeting and procurement services

If the platform were hosted, this could take one of three forms: (1) a single institution to host indefinitely; (2) a single host institution acting as incubator; and (3) two or more institutions hosting different platform functions. Additionally, a new entity could be set up to deliver on the platform.

Single host institution

Under this model, a single institution would be designated as the host of the platform indefinitely, or until the expiration (‘sunset’) of the platform’s mandate, if the constituting parties decide to set such a time limit.

A common platform for education in emergencies and protracted crises: evidence paper 37
Advantages of this model include administrative simplicity and clarity, as one institution would conduct all human resources and financial transactions. The open-ended commitment would allow for forward planning and predictability. The main risk of this model is that a partnership may be dominated by a single organisation, while conflicts of interest can arise and be harmful if not carefully handled (Steven, 2015). There is a risk of the perception of ‘capture’ of the new platform by the hosting agency. A guaranteed long-term or open-ended commitment could induce complacency in the senior management of the host. If the arrangement were found not to be working, with an indefinite mandate it would be very hard to change.

**Single host institution acting as incubator**

Under this model, a single institution would be designated as the host of the platform for a limited time, ideally up to five years. During that period, the platform’s board and secretariat would be appointed; a vision, a mission, policies and procedures defined; partnerships built, strengthened and leveraged at country and global levels; a theory of change, a results framework, measures of success and an accountability framework articulated; and means of monitoring and evaluating performance established. The hosting institution would assist and support the new platform to undertake those tasks, hence the notion of ‘incubation’ of the young platform. Among the responsibilities of the board would be a rigorous, objective assessment of options for the platform’s future identity, including the benefits and costs associated with remaining with the original hosting agency, moving to another, moving to shared hosting or incorporation as an independent entity. Such a transition requires careful planning (Bezanson and Isenman, 2012).

This model would give all stakeholders involved time to sort out internal and partnership issues objectively, leaving options open before making a final decision about hosting or setting up an independent entity later. It would avoid giving the impression of one agency ‘capturing’ the new platform.

Disadvantages of the incubator model include the short planning horizon, the risk of further fragmentation of the aid architecture, the perception that the new platform is a tentative exercise and the possibility of secretariat staff feeling insecure about their contractual status, generating unnecessary churn. The setting up of a hosting arrangement can be lengthy. Gavi began as a hosted partnership with UNICEF; it took almost a year to put the hosting agreement in place. The process of delinking the platform from its original host to another host, or to its new status as an independent entity, would be arduous and time-consuming, causing a loss of momentum during a vital period, four to five years into the existence of the platform.

**Two or more institutions sharing the hosting of different functions**

This model could allow for a decentralised secretariat. It brings the advantage of sharing both the burdens and the prestige of hosting. There could be sharing of functions among partners that are not the principal host.

**Box 14: Examples of incubated funds – Gavi and the Global Fund**

There are examples of important global partnerships passing through an incubation phase. The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (now the Gavi Alliance) was founded as a public–private partnership in 2000. It was initially hosted and housed by UNICEF in Geneva. In 2010, it became an independent legal entity, a non-profit foundation based in Switzerland, partly because of a large increase in its funding base (KPMG, 2014). In 2002, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was constituted as a private Swiss foundation hosted by WHO. Its secretariat was established in Geneva. In 2008, the Global Fund ended its administrative services agreement with WHO and became an autonomous organisation (Global Fund, 2015).

**Box 15: Example of co-hosting – the Global Education Cluster**

The IASC Global Education Cluster provides an example of co-leadership, shared by UNICEF and Save the Children. The impact of that co-leadership has on the whole been very positive, although securing agreement on the terms of the partnership took more than a year of intense negotiation to achieve. The Education Cluster Steering Group, made up of senior representatives of each organisation, governs the partnership, while an Education Cluster Unit, staffed by experienced education in crises professionals from both agencies, coordinates its response to crises. At country level, UNICEF and Save the Children often share leadership, although there have been many examples of other agencies sharing that role, depending on specific needs and capacities in each country (Lattimer, 2012).

Lessons from the early years of the Global Education Cluster co-leadership arrangement provide warnings for those establishing the new education in crises platform. If co-hosting is envisaged, the agencies selected to co-host must approach the relationship as a true partnership of equals and not allow lesser considerations of prestige, visibility and personalities to impede or delay the fulfilment of the platform’s purposes.
For example, research or policy dialogue work might be entrusted to a partner that was not the host. Negotiating crystal-clear legal agreements defining respective responsibilities at the inception of the new platform would be very time-consuming and may delay the launch of platform activities, which, given the political imperative for rapid action soon, raises doubts about the appropriateness of shared hosting. Human resource arrangements for the secretariat could be very difficult with two or more hosting agencies.

A new independent entity

Under this model there would be no hosting agency but rather a new entity designed as fit for purpose from the outset. The platform would be spared the difficulties associated with any hosting arrangement, such as integration within the priorities and culture of an existing institution. There would be no perception of bias or favouritism towards a hosting agency. The Sustainable Development Solutions Network Secretariat (SDSN, 2015) asserts that design criteria for effective global funds include ‘an independent multilateral organization with a diverse, high-profile, multi-stakeholder board’. A new entity could bring together creative people with expertise from northern and southern agencies, focused on maximising learning outcomes in local, conflict-affected contexts.

On the downside, creating a new institution also risks complicating an already complex architecture. Compared with hosting, a new, independent platform would face considerably higher start-up costs and time-consuming establishment of administrative processes, such as those necessary for creation of a legal entity, opening an office, human resource management, receipt and disbursement of funds, accounting, audit, information technology, travel and procurement. A totally new entity might struggle to gain legitimacy and build momentum. Independence ‘can leave a partnership isolated from its main backers at a time when it is not yet strong enough to thrive on its own’ (Steven, 2015: 16). If an initial single-agency host transitions to independent institutional arrangements there is inevitably a ‘temporary reduction in efficiency’ (Bezanson and Isenman, 2012: 26).

Summary and recommendation on hosting models

The trade-off between hosting and independence can be managed if there is sufficient trust between the partnership’s main sponsors. From an early stage, a core group must be in place that has the legitimacy and time to work on partnership design.

Table 3 summarises the pros and cons of each model. Weighing up the evidence from the literature and interviews for this project, and the arguments for and
against each model, summarised above, the best options seems that the platform should begin its life hosted by a single agency acting as an incubator for up to five years, after which time, depending on the initial choice of incubator-host, it might remain with the initial choice of incubator-host, or transition to another host, or become an independent entity. The Champions’ Group has determined that UNICEF will be the initial incubator-host.

### Table 3: Pros and cons of institutional models for the platform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Advantages and opportunities</th>
<th>Disadvantages and risks</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| Single host institution indefinitely | • administrative simplicity and clarity  
• predictability for planning | • domination by a single organization  
• potential conflicts of interest  
• difficult to change if not working well |
| Single host institution acting as incubator | • gives stakeholders time to sort out internal and partnership issues  
• leaves options open before making a final decision  
• avoids impression of the new platform being ‘captured’ by one agency | • short planning horizon  
• churn owing to secretariat staff feeling insecure about contractual status  
• delinking from its original host to another host or newly independent status would be arduous and time-consuming, causing a loss of momentum for a time |
| Two or more institutions sharing the hosting of different functions | • allows for a decentralised secretariat  
• allows sharing of both the burdens and the prestige of hosting  
• allows sharing of functions among partners that are not the principal host | • over-complication of an already complex architecture  
• secretariat human resources arrangements could be very difficult  
• negotiating clear legal agreements defining respective responsibilities may delay launch of platform activities  
• risk of partners’ prestige, visibility and personalities impeding or delaying fulfilment of the platform’s purposes |
| A new independent entity | • new entity could be designed as fit for purpose for the platform  
• no hosting agency so no hosting difficulties  
• no perception of bias or favouritism towards a hosting agency. | • high start-up costs and possible delays in operationalising platform activity  
• time-consuming establishment of administrative processes  
• isolation from main backers |

### Box 17: Hosting/establishing a common platform

There are a number of options for the institutional arrangements of the common platform in terms of potential hosting and governance mechanisms. They will be dependent on high-level decisions regarding the precise mandate, scope and scale of the common platform, but the key options are as follows:

- **Single host institution indefinitely**: A single institution would be designated as the host of the platform indefinitely, or until the expiration (‘sunset’) of the platform’s mandate, if the constituting parties decide to set such a time limit.

- **Single host institution acting as an incubator**: Under this model, a single institution would be designated as the host of the platform for a limited time, ideally up to five years. Among the responsibilities of the designated host would be to perform a rigorous, objective assessment of options for the platform’s future identity, including the benefits and costs associated with remaining with the original hosting agency, moving to another, moving to shared hosting or incorporation as an independent entity.

- **Two or more institutions sharing the hosting of different functions**: This model could allow for a decentralised secretariat. It brings the advantage of sharing both the burdens and the prestige of hosting the platform. There could be sharing of functions among partners that are not the principal host.

- **A new independent entity**: Under this model there would be no hosting agency but rather a new entity designed as fit for purpose from the outset. The platform would be spared the difficulties associated with any hosting arrangement, such as integration of a new platform within the priorities and culture of an existing institution, and there would be no perception of bias or favouritism towards a hosting agency.
5.2 Choosing a host

IA2: What should be the selection criteria for an effective common platform host?

IA3: Which agencies could serve as host of a common platform, both globally and in crisis contexts? How well do those agencies match the selection criteria of an effective common platform host?

Potential hosts should be assessed according to the following criteria:

Box 18: Possible selection criteria for platform host

- scope of work and in-country capacity
- capacity to manage funding
- interaction with wider system
- education competence
- strategic management and performance
- cost and value consciousness and efficiency
- partnership behaviour
- transparency and accountability
- location

Those interviewed all agreed there were four realistic options for institutions that could host the new education in crises platform under one of the models outlined above. They confirmed the strong impression that we gained from listening to Technical Strategy Group participants present at the project’s Phase 2 Inception Meeting, held in London on 28 October 2015. ODI agrees that the four options are (1) GPE; (2) UNICEF; (3) a foundation under the model of a fiscal sponsor; or (4) a private company, in the form of a private sector fund.

Annex 3 compares the four potential hosts. As yet, no foundations or private sector companies have publicly expressed interest in being host of the new common platform. Our analysis is thus based on understandings of the generic capacities of major foundations and companies.

Given time, GPE might be able to modify its mandate and become an appropriate host for the education in crises platform, with the latter be incubated at UNICEF for its first few years. GPE staff interviewed stated that they worked effectively with UNICEF in many different ways (e.g. UNICEF is a major grant agent and is an active member of GPE’s board). UNICEF staff interviewed acknowledged this. UNICEF’s own position is that it is willing to host the new platform if it is perceived to be the best fit, but is not fighting for that role. UNICEF is also willing to act as incubator of the new platform, while other possible hosts, notably GPE, ready themselves. UNICEF staff interviewed stated that ‘UNICEF, if asked, is willing to host the platform on an interim basis, but is interested in seeing how the role of GPE could be expanded in order to cater to a broader range of education issues and crises.’

If the foundation and private company hosting options are to be considered, the Technical Strategy Group must indicate very soon which institutions it would consider suitable candidates and commission further work urgently to analyse those specific institutions’ strengths and weaknesses against the above criteria.

5.3 Considerations for governance

IA4: What are the options for governance of a common platform?

Once governance structures for global platforms and funds are in place they can be very difficult to change. Given the need to capitalise on existing political momentum in the education in crises space and for any platform to be highly responsive to crises, it is imperative to get the governance structures right first time.

The core governance structure for a common platform should include a board and a secretariat, with respective accountabilities clearly specified:

- The board is responsible for the strategic direction of the platform. Responsibilities include management oversight, resource mobilisation, stakeholder participation and high-level advocacy.
- The secretariat is responsible for the management of the platform and is accountable to the board. Key responsibilities would include programme implementation, stakeholder communication, regulatory compliance and performance assessment.
- Any successful platform must have clear accountability structures and channels that facilitate the transparent functioning of the platform.
Above is a summary of the most important considerations around governance.

There are, however, risks involved in such an approach. Lack of trust between the board and secretariat can severely undermine the ability of a platform and fund to function effectively. Two-way trust between secretariat and board is vital; even exemplary by-laws will be undermined without it. This is difficult to promote through formal structures but can be encouraged through the appointment of the right individuals to both groups. Encouraging the board and secretariat to share the same values will also aid this process.

Internal conflicts of interest are a significant, but not insurmountable, risk. Members of the board and secretariat will have their own organisational responsibilities, but must put these aside when acting on behalf of the platform. There is a risk that donors, through the power of the purse-string, gain too much power.

Effective board–secretariat partnerships need explicit planning; it cannot be assumed this will just happen. Lack of agreement on strategic direction can undermine a board and frustrate a secretariat. A board lacking strategic direction will fall into operational micro-management. For this reason, a board must be accountable to a group of high-level political champions for the education in crises cause, in addition to individual members’ own institutions.

There is near unanimity among those consulted for this paper that the new structures (board, secretariat and hosting arrangements) must be kept ‘lean’ – a euphemism for small and cheap. ODI agrees in principle but warns that the structure should reflect the needs and functions identified. If, however, budgetary or political constraints absolutely dictate a small board and secretariat, the new platform’s functions must also be limited to avoid publicly taking on responsibilities that simply cannot be fulfilled.
Box 20: Governance

Given the need to capitalise on existing political momentum in the education in crises space and the need for any platform to be highly responsive to crises, getting the governance structures right first time round is imperative. The core governance structure for a common platform should include a board and a secretariat, with respective accountabilities clearly specified. There is near unanimity among those consulted for this paper that the new structures (board, secretariat and hosting arrangements) must be kept ‘lean’, a euphemism for small and cheap.

Questions and options remain around:
- **board:**
  - composition and profile of board members
  - trade-offs between inclusiveness of board and ability to make decisions rapidly
  - how to incentivise board members to act in interests of platform rather than organisations or constituencies they represent
  - need to get structure right first time but also allow for change in mechanisms further down the line
- **secretariat:**
  - balance of technical expertise from range of actors (development, humanitarian, ECD, primary, post-primary, acute, protracted)
  - how to interact with the board
- **accountability:**
  - depends on hosting arrangements
  - need for clear statements on what constitutes success and failure and metrics to measure these
  - accountability between secretariat and board
  - accountability of members and board as a whole
This case study highlights the challenges posed for the education response where the education system is initially underdeveloped, there is significant instability and the national government lacks the capacity, and to some extent the will, to engage strongly with coordinating the response. It demonstrates both the challenges that exist for coordinating across humanitarian and development phases in these circumstances, but also how particular initiatives and mechanisms – such as the Education Cluster, Education Donor Partner Group (EDOG), Education Sector Analysis (ESA), Education Sector Plan (ESP) and Partners’ Education Group (PEG) – can begin to narrow some of these gaps. The case study also highlights some of the challenges around donor fatigue in protracted crises and the political challenges of working across both government- and opposition-controlled areas in conflict settings. It shows how the platform could make a difference on these issues going forward.

This case study involved a country visit and draws on 36 interviews with individuals from 22 INGOs, national NGOs, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST), coordination bodies and donors, conducted in South Sudan between 15 and 19 February 2016.

6.1 Overview of the crisis

South Sudan is a complex humanitarian emergency with large swathes of the country controlled by opposition groups and in active conflict since 2013. The region has a long history of conflict and instability, including two civil wars within Sudan before the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 paved the way to independence in 2011. The CPA was followed by a considerable and long-term humanitarian intervention, including in education. In the recent conflict, instability and violence have continued in many parts of South Sudan despite the signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the SPLM – In Opposition (SPLM-IO) in August 2015. Decades of war have resulted in some of the worst human development indicators in the world, particularly for education, where a young girl is more likely to die in childbirth than to complete secondary school (OCHA, 2015e).

Estimates suggest that since 2013 more than 2.3 million people (one in five of those living in South Sudan) have been forced to leave their homes, with 1.6 million becoming IDPs, while 646,000 have fled to neighbouring countries as refugees. South Sudan is also home to an estimated 304,000 foreign refugees. The country is also suffering from an economic crisis owing to high inflation and the global collapse in oil prices, which has had a major impact given South Sudan’s heavy oil dependency. An estimated 6.1 million people in South Sudan will need humanitarian assistance in 2016 (OCHA, 2015e).

Evolution of education needs

The on-going conflict and displacement have had a major impact on education provision in South Sudan, with estimates suggesting that 967,000 children aged 3-18 have had their education disrupted, the majority in Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei, Central Equatoria and Lakes states (OCHA, 2015e). This disruption needs to be understood in the context of an education system that was already underdeveloped before the current crisis. The majority of out-of-school children were not enrolled before the most recent crisis, with figures from 2011 showing a net enrolment rate\(^\text{14}\) of 44% at the primary level and a gross enrolment rate\(^\text{15}\) of 4% at the secondary level (UNESCO, 2011). Following the crisis, these national figures stagnated – with equivalent figures for 2015 standing at 43% and 3%, respectively (MoEST, 2015b).\(^\text{16}\) The education system also suffers from high dropout and repetition rates, lack of a skilled teaching workforce, high pupil–teacher ratios and poor school infrastructure.

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14 The primary net enrolment rate is the ratio of the number of children of primary school age enrolled in primary school to the whole population of primary school age children, as a percentage.

15 The gross enrolment rate for secondary education is the ratio of the number of children enrolled in secondary education, regardless of age, to the whole population of children of secondary school age, as a percentage.

16 On-going conflict and insecurity meant data were collected in only seven out of 10 states in 2015.
Gender inequalities in enrolment, completion and teacher recruitment are a major challenge at all levels of education, with notably higher female dropout rates linked to early marriage and pregnancy. Protection needs are also considerable. Over 10,000 children have been registered as unaccompanied, separated or missing; an estimated 15,000-16,000 children have been recruited by armed actors; and one million children suffer from psychosocial distress (OCHA, 2015e).

**Headlines of education response**
The humanitarian education response has concentrated on establishing temporary safe and secure learning facilities, as well as recruiting and training of teachers to serve the displaced populations with an emphasis on psychosocial support and core skills for life-saving education. Considerable numbers of children are now accessing these mechanisms, with EC-coordinated actors accounting for 415,308, including some 263,332 supported by UNICEF (UNICEF, 2015a). The education system has continued to grow in non-conflict areas, largely because of considerable donor support, and this has helped mitigate the overall impact of the crisis on the education system. Over 2013-2015, school numbers in non-conflict increased substantially – rising by 10% at the primary level and 39% at the secondary level (MoEST, 2013b). Pre-primary coverage has increased and, despite the crisis, primary enrolment rates fell only slightly over 2011-2015. Donor-led initiatives have kept schools open by establishing financial support through capitation grant mechanisms and the provision of teacher incentives where the government has stopped providing a salary, particularly in opposition-held areas.

**Potential role of the platform**
The new platform could play a major role in improving the response by bringing in resources; allowing greater bridging across humanitarian and development phases; having the flexibility of funding to adapt to on-going instability; and a strong, medium-term role in raising the profile of the crisis and improving the capacity of government, local agencies and coordination mechanisms. South Sudan is a highly challenging environment and could benefit from the implementation of a common platform.

**6.2 Key actors and sources of finance**

**Government of South Sudan**
In the immediate aftermath of the 2013 crisis, MoEST was not strongly involved in the coordination of the response, because of low capacity, disruption arising from the conflict, a lack of government engagement in opposition-held areas where many humanitarian partners operate and the low priority given to education by the Government of South Sudan (GoSS). However, MoEST has begun to play a much more active role over the past year – reflecting a desire for more influence in the sector. It faces continued challenges with capacity – compounded by many donors boycotting support to central government – and is frustrated by a lack of donor transparency around funding and programming. It is also concerned by the humanitarian response prioritising conflict-affected areas – which opposition groups generally control – over government-controlled areas – which are not conflict-affected but have significant needs. One outcome of this is the continued non-payment of teacher salaries in opposition-held areas.

**Inter-agency humanitarian coordination**
In the absence of a strong government lead, the Education Cluster, co-led by UNICEF and Save the Children, continues to play a major role in organising the education in emergencies response throughout South Sudan. The initial response to the 2013 crisis was high profile and well funded, and there is general consensus that the Education Cluster has continued to gain strength in both operational coordination and fundraising. The Education Cluster and its partners have benefited particularly from investment in experienced cluster coordination staff, including coordinators from both Save the Children and UNICEF as well as an information management officer. While the success of the Education Cluster is evident in humanitarian response planning, the large-scale emergency in 2013 and the continued humanitarian focus have led to a narrow focus on immediate life-saving needs, as articulated in the OCHA-led HRP. This has created challenges for all education actors, as they have had to develop programmes that fit these narrow criteria without allowing for a focus on the innate benefits of education in emergencies. Functionally, it has created a division in the South Sudanese education sector, with humanitarians focused on IDPs and conflict-affected areas whereas development actors have had to fight for space for systems-building and maintenance in government-controlled states. Lack of coordination across these areas has led to an inability to sustain programming or transition emergency activities into development, which results in waste, inefficiencies and missed opportunities for collaboration.

**Role of development actors – GPE, EDOG and PEG**
A number of other coordination bodies have been established to bring together different donors and development actors in education in recent years. GPE coordinates by drawing actors together to formulate an Education Sector Plan (ESP), which is then used to disburse GPE funds and act as a framework to guide other donors. UNICEF has a major role here as the holding organisation for GPE funds in South Sudan, but it should be noted that oversight also includes GoSS as well as a range of other actors. The current ESP is not aligned with the HRP, but donor agencies have undertaken programmes
with education in emergencies characteristics to support education for IDPs.

The Education Donor Group (EDOG) provides a platform for the major donors to coordinate and share information, with the Education Cluster also participating in the body. Broader education actors are represented by the Partners for Education Group (PEG), including a range of national and international NGOs. There is also a mechanism through which the heads of the four largest education programmes in South Sudan meet on a regular basis. However, there is a general weakness – that these platforms are largely used for after-the-fact information-sharing, rather than genuine and real-time consultation and coordination. Development actors are also engaged in joint projects independently of these mechanisms, such as an upcoming DFID–USAID–Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) programme on teacher training and management.

There are concerns that international agencies are contributing to poor government prioritisation and capacity by taking over functions that would usually fall to MoEST. These include the payment of teacher incentives and directly implementing a programme of capitation grants for schools.

**Recent developments – the ESP**

A major recent development in coordination has been the process around applying for renewed funding from GPE. UNESCO has led the process for an Education Sector Analysis (ESA) over the past year that has incorporated all the major actors on both the development and the humanitarian side of education provision. The next stage – planning for the ESP – will follow a similar strategy and should produce a final plan that is better integrated than the previous ESP and HRPs. Humanitarian actors in particular feel it has given them an good opportunity to ensure emergency planning issues are taken into account in the process of formulating the plan and allowed them to highlight elements of education in emergencies and resilience in donor plans. However, the ESP process is still at an early stage and it is unclear how well GPE modalities will fit development and humanitarian coordination.

**Financing sources and mechanisms**

GoSS is currently experiencing severe difficulties in revenue raising owing to the decline of oil prices and a high inflation rate, but it has also not given education a proportional priority in budget allocations. Despite the target of 10% of the annual budget of the government (MoEST, 2015a), public expenditure on education is currently at just 0.6% and has rarely risen above 1%. External aid is therefore crucial to the response and the continued operation of the South Sudanese education system.

Humanitarian flows have been strong since the initial post-emergency appeal in 2014, but it is anticipated that these will decrease considering global trends and priorities. Fundraising for 2016 has proceeded slowly so far and there is an expectation of a significant shortfall both this year and for future appeals. To this point, the Education Cluster has been quite successful in raising funds for South Sudan, having achieved 91% funding of needs in 2015 after strong support from the Global Education Cluster during the HRP process, but this is in the context of a reduction in the amount allowed in the appeal by OCHA, with priority given to issues of severe food insecurity and malnutrition in conflict-affected areas of the country. The 2015 HRP identified 1.7 million people in need, but only $20,000 were able to be targeted – leaving significant unmet needs (OCHA, 2014b).

In terms of bilateral donors, DFID and USAID have been major contributors to the development side of the education sector, largely because of mandates from London and Washington. DFID has operated mainly through its own large development programmes. USAID has worked closely with GPE – jointly funding the GPE programme over 2013-2016 to support the ESP. USAID is slowed in its ability to fund in emergencies as all programmes must operate on the longer-term funding cycles associated with development projects. However, USAID has the advantage of making all education-related decisions within one team, as the US Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance does not provide education funding. This benefits the emergency–development linkage as the USAID education branch looks jointly at short-, medium- and long-term education projects.

EU support varies because of the demarcation between development and humanitarian funding. While the European Commission (EC) has contributed to education systems development, the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO) began education in emergency funding in 2012. Smaller funding countries such as Norway and Japan operate in similar terms with a division between humanitarian (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japanese Embassy) and development (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, JICA). The renewal process for GPE funding is currently underway, led by UNESCO and GoSS.

A MDTF was operating in South Sudan in the years before the most recent crisis and attracted strong pledges of support. However, it faced difficulties in disbursing funds and has since been closed down. A pooled fund for both humanitarian and development funds has been established in the health sector and is cited as a strong example of facilitating cooperation across humanitarian and development phases and organisations. The education sector could emulate this.
Figure 2: HRP funding for education in South Sudan

Note: Figures for 2016 show requirements and funding pledges made as of 26 February 2016. Source: HRPs (2011-2016). Figures are original, not adjusted.
### Table 5: Obstacles and actions to date in South Sudan’s education response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacle</th>
<th>South Sudan response gap</th>
<th>Actions taken to date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low priority and uneven attention to education across crises</td>
<td>1. low GoSS prioritisation of education.</td>
<td>1. increased engagement from MoEST but unclear if this will result in future GoSS priority and greater funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. initially strong global response followed by donor fatigue as crisis becomes protracted.</td>
<td>2. this is still an issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrupted education owing to the impact of crises and poor links across different actors</td>
<td>3. volatile political situation and continuing instability, including context of stable states alongside conflict-affected regions under different leadership, both with considerable needs</td>
<td>3. signing of the Peace Agreement in 2015 and shift to transitional government may improve situation, but geographic division between humanitarian and development actors remains a challenge for coordination creation of EDOG and PEG, as well as Education Cluster, has improved after-the-fact data-sharing and elements of coordination. ESA and ESP processes have brought humanitarian and development actors together to discuss priorities, needs and plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. no strong coordinating actor who can bring together humanitarian and development actors, lack of alignment between current ESP and HRP and tendency of agencies to focus on their own mandates and priorities and not prioritise cooperation</td>
<td>4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. inflexibility of programming and lack of joint planning creates missed opportunities and waste, e.g. returning IDP communities</td>
<td>5. agencies incorporating scenario planning and conflict sensitive lenses in programme design, but gap remains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough money to cover all education needs across all crises</td>
<td>6. lack of national government financing owing to revenue crisis and low prioritisation</td>
<td>6. there is a perception that GoSS is now more focused on education, but this is yet to translate into improved funding for the sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. declining humanitarian funding</td>
<td>7. this is still an issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. bifurcated funding across humanitarian and development actors, contributing to a lack of (1) short-term funding with a learning focus and (2) reliable medium-term funding to facilitate transition and planning</td>
<td>8. attempts to resolve this in the health sector through use of a pooled fund and the next round of GPE funding may also improve the situation for education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate capacity to lead and deliver education and recovery efforts, both nationally and internationally</td>
<td>9. low capacity at both national and state level of MoEST and GoSS likely to be stretched further by expansion to 28 states, as well as a lack of a skilled teaching workforce</td>
<td>9. some donor programmes to improve management at MoEST and capacity-building at the state level. Strong focus on teacher training, upskilling and retention — still major challenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. low technical capacity of national NGOs linked to limited funding for institutional development</td>
<td>10. attempts at capacity-building (e.g. Education Cluster), but lack necessary flexible funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. high turnover of international staff and lack of formal education in emergency training resulting in misconceptions and a lack of institutional memory</td>
<td>11. ESA and ESP processes have acted as venues to discuss these issues and processes, and the Education Cluster intends to use existing joint platforms to improve knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of data and analysis to inform decisions on education prioritisation</td>
<td>12. challenges with establishing a consistent and reliable EMIS that incorporates all areas of the country and includes data usable for emergency response</td>
<td>12. EMIS considered to have been improved, but performance has varied and data collection in opposition states is challenging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. lack of transparency and data-sharing, particularly around financial flows.</td>
<td>13. operation of EDOG and ESP process should improve this, but still considered a gap by GoSS and MoEST</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6.3 Operationalising the platform in South Sudan

#### Challenges and actions to build on

The proposal for an education crisis platform sets out five major obstacles that impede children’s access to high-quality education in crises. Table 5 lists the most important gaps relevant to each obstacle in the context of the South Sudan response in the education sector and actions taken to fill those gaps, which could be further built on by the global platform.

#### Potential focus areas and activities

In reviewing the obstacles and actions to date, one can begin to identify areas of potential support that could be provided through a global platform, both through the Acceleration Facility, which is in place to support the creation of global goods, and via the Breakthrough Fund and either its rapid or multiyear windows, which will provide more direct in-country support for response activities.

#### Acceleration Facility support

As the platform in South Sudan looks to invest in public goods and support efforts, the Sudanese response could use some of these outputs in the following ways. High-level advocacy to humanitarian leadership and government to regain focus on forgotten emergencies, including those within affected countries on a subnational basis, could be used to seek solutions for education beyond areas of government control. Additional dedicated expert support
could be provided to develop and improve needs analysis, response strategies and local contextualisation of the results framework. In addition, in terms of finance, (i) identification of innovative, additional and new sources of funding that could be shared with field-level practitioners; and (ii) a procurement facility or procedures set up globally to ensure and support CBO access to funds could be applied in the country. South Sudan could benefit from a human resources strategy developed for the provision and retention of high-capacity education staff in challenging operating environments. Finally, it would be useful on the ground to have (1) harmonisation of indicators between the platform results matrix, GPE guidance and Education Cluster monitoring tools, as well as donor frameworks, and (2) regularised documentation of successful cooperation and transition between humanitarian and development projects.

Breakthrough Fund

Two of the main proposed funding mechanisms have a strong fit with the South Sudan response needs.

Rapid response mechanism: While the initial response to the 2013 crisis in South Sudan was high profile, rapid and well funded, the decline in global focus on the crisis and continuing instability in many regions of the country creates a need for rapid access to funds in the event of an upsurge and continuing displacement. Some of this gap can be covered by traditional humanitarian mechanisms, but these may not be adequate and their characteristics – short in term and with a strict focus on immediate life-saving needs – can prevent the response from taking a longer-term perspective that allows more focus on learning and planning for transition into system development. The provision of rapid funds with a broader remit would allow this form of programming to develop and assist in bridging humanitarian and development phases and organisations, possibly secured by subsequent funding under the multiyear support window. Funds could also be utilised against funding secured by donors or GPE, backfilling for resources that cannot be released in the short term.

Multiyear support window: The absence of reliable multiyear funding has emerged as a clear gap in the existing architecture and a major barrier to bridging humanitarian and development programming. The ability of the Breakthrough Fund to provide these kinds of resources could be transformative. Funding priorities could be set using a national plan developed to bridge the HRP and the new ESP, assuming responsibility for areas where bridging funds could have the highest impact – such as funding programmes across the mix of conflict and non-conflict areas or ensuring continuous access to education for returning IDPs. Allowing national partners and civil society direct access to funding could also lengthen their time horizons and improve institutional capacity, including support to GoSS at the national and state level, particularly for improved data collection systems.

Table 6: Breakthrough Fund potential areas of support in South Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of work</th>
<th>Potential activities for the future platform in South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political will</td>
<td>- coordination formalised to regularly bring together humanitarian and development practitioners to build linkages, establish and review joint planning (i.e. through EDOG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- with support from global champions, advocate with GoSS as well as the HCT to establish and maintain the prioritisation of education through all phases of the emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and response</td>
<td>- planning process to establish costed, multiyear strategy that links existing plans including the HRP and ESP. The strategy will cover all phases of emergency from immediate humanitarian response to systems development while also considering geographic areas neglected by both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing</td>
<td>- flexible disbursement mechanism established to bridge humanitarian programming and medium- and long-term systems development. Should utilise project sheets from the HRP to build sustainability into existing, needs-based humanitarian planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- entry points established for national partners and civil society to access funding directly from the platform for both response (6-12 months) and the building of institutional capacity (2-3 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity-building</td>
<td>- mandate for international partners to implement multiyear plans with and through local agencies recognising that implementation represents capacity-building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- training on sector planning extended to Education Cluster/Education in Emergencies Working Group leads to establish synergy between humanitarian and sector strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>- further establishment and reporting on expenditure benchmarks for government commitment to education using GPE 10% as a target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- sustained funding and capacity support for EMIS to ensure data collection is regular, conflict-sensitive and equitable across all states</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What would success involve in this context?

- High-level and sustained political support: The South Sudan experience demonstrates the challenges of retaining donor attention and funding when crises become protracted and new emergencies emerge elsewhere. For the platform to have a strong impact in South Sudan it will need to have sustained support to ensure equitable access to platform funds and political support that can raise the profile of education in South Sudan and facilitate cooperation across agencies and the national government.

- Additional, reliable and flexible funding: The platform would need to bring additional funds into the South Sudan response, going beyond the repackaging of existing resources and reducing additional transaction costs as much as possible. Given the lack of reliable funding and continuing instability in South Sudan, there is also a clear need to broaden the donor base and for funding to be disbursed in a timely, reliable way with the flexibility to adjust to changing situations.

- Two windows of funding: The education response in South Sudan requires both a rapid response mechanism that facilitates a longer-term focus on learning and transition, as well as a long-term financing mechanism covering over three to five years that can bridge humanitarian and development phases and organisations.

- Flexibility to adapt priorities and results to context: South Sudan has a complex mix of education needs in both conflict-affected and relatively stable contexts, with highly marginalised groups present in both areas. For the response to be effective it will need to be able to define needs and set priorities based on country-level planning processes such as the HRP, Joint Sector Analysis or national ESPs.

What factors may limit the platform’s impact?

- Two important factors were identified as risks to the impact of the platform in South Sudan: With an already strong humanitarian coordination mechanism in place, it was confirmed by decision-making bodies, agencies and donors that the establishment of another education funding mechanism would be taken into consideration during funding envelope decisions. This could serve to deprioritise education within the inter-sectoral humanitarian response, thus limiting the impact of the platform.

- There exist significant processes for accessing and advocating for resources, particularly for national partners. If not implemented in recognition of these already onerous processes, the platform could serve as another barrier for national and civil society agencies. It could also divert resources from implementation, as agencies must focus further attention on process.

6.4 Implications for design of the platform

The response from interviewees to the global platform during the country visit to South Sudan was generally positive. There was consensus that, if done correctly, the platform has considerable potential to improve the operation of the education sector in South Sudan and cooperation within it. However, a number of concerns were raised relating to the global design and direction of the platform:

- The platform must have a strong mechanism to ensure long-term focus on crises in the event that they become protracted and donor focus declines.

- It must have a broad enough focus to include funding for system development and resilience activities, as well as emergency response, to allow it to operate successfully in complex conflict and post-conflict contexts.

- The proposed hosting of the platform at UNICEF raises concerns given the potential for conflicts of interest arising from being both the host and an organisation seeking considerable funding from the platform as an implementer.

- A major effort must be made to educate actors regarding (1) how the platform and its functions will fit into the existing architecture without duplication and (2) the fact that the existence of the fund, however substantial, does not mean education in emergencies is now well financed or does not need funding from donors or the appeals process of the CHF.
The Lebanese case highlights the importance of domestic political leadership to a successful education response. The leadership demonstrated by the minister of education and the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) has opened possibilities for donors and multilaterals to contribute to the enrolment of 158,500 non-Lebanese students in the public sector, around 50,000 Syrian students in private and semi-private schools, and 197,000 Lebanese students. This case study also illustrates the principle that coping with a crisis that originates outside a country may provide an opportunity for reform and strengthening of the domestic education system.

This case study involved a country visit and draws on 21 interviews with individuals from 14 organisations, including MEHE, UN agencies and donors, conducted in Lebanon between 8 and 11 February 2016.

7.1 Overview of the crisis

Syria’s civil war is the worst humanitarian crisis of our time. More than 250,000 people have been killed, over 1 million injured and 6.6 million people displaced within Syria (OCHA, 2016). As of 29 February 2016 there were almost 4.8 million registered refugees in five neighbouring countries, with large numbers also arriving in Europe (UNHCR, 2016).

Since its inception in March 2011, the crisis in Syria has had a significant impact on the Lebanese population. Of the estimated 5.9 million people currently living in Lebanon, approximately 3.3 million are people in need. This includes nearly 1.5 million vulnerable Lebanese people, 1.5 million Syrian refugees and more than 320,000 Palestinian refugees. This means that, given the recent crisis, more than 55% of the population are vulnerable and in need of services. Economic growth has collapsed from about 8.5% in 2010 to zero in 2015 (GoL and UN, 2015). Cumulative economic losses during 2011-2014 are estimated at $17.1 billion. Since January 2016, Lebanon has formally closed its borders to more Syrian refugees (Fanack Chronicle, 2016).

Evolution of education needs

The refugee influx has had a destabilising impact on the Lebanese population and has brought particular stress to the country’s education sector. Prior to the crisis, MEHE was entering a phase of reform and further development of the education sector, seeking to address long-standing weaknesses, such as a bloated teaching force, uneven geographical distribution of schools, lack of a dedicated professional Educational Planning Directorate, lack of a comprehensive EMIS and low public sector enrolment (only 30% of Lebanese children attend public schools; the rest are educated in private establishments). This reform phase included pillars of equitable access, quality education, education that contributes to social integration, education that contributes to economic development and strengthening the governance of education (Yarak, 2015). MEHE felt unprepared for the magnitude and complexity of the crisis.

Headlines of education response

However, when the Syrian crisis began, MEHE was forced to revisit its goals and enter a phase focused primarily on access, to the detriment of quality, according to senior ministry officials. By the end of 2015, MEHE was providing formal schooling to 158,500 non-Lebanese students (mostly Syrian, some Iraqi, and a few Palestinian refugees who had been living in Syria), around 50,000 Syrian students in private and semi-private schools, and 197,000 Lebanese students (Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, 2015b). Through the crisis response, some progress is being made with institutional strengthening in the Lebanese education system. A great deal of this success is attributable to strong political leadership and a comprehensive national education planning process led by MEHE, supported by all multilaterals and donors: Reaching All Children with Education in Lebanon (RACE) (for more detail see the next section).

Despite these successes, this response has covered only a fraction of the estimated 488,000 to 550,000 Syrian school-aged children now living in Lebanon (MEHE, 2016) Many out-of-school children are from some of the poorest families fleeing Syria. Large numbers of children work informally to help provide their families an income and many families cannot afford the indirect costs of school (e.g. transportation, clothing and food). The out-of-school rate is even higher for those secondary school-aged youth impacted by the crisis (Jalbout, 2015).
Potential role of the platform

The RACE plan provides a strong foundation for education response over the next five years. However, as acknowledged by both MEHE and its partners, additional support will be needed for this plan to be successful in reaching its programmatic goals and providing education to the most vulnerable children in Lebanon. There are a number of ways a new platform could play a valuable role in providing this additional support to MEHE and the RACE II framework.

The greatest added value of the platform would be in the provision of substantial, additional, long-term, timely, flexible and cost-effective funding. It could contribute to better assessment methods of the costs of education and help strengthen the overall aid architecture in education in Lebanon. The pooling of expertise and funding the platform will facilitate would contribute to cost savings, harmonisation and streamlining of assistance.

7.2 Key actors and sources of finance

MEHE coordination, RACE and development of the RACE Executive Committee

A major change of strategy for the overall Lebanese response coordination came in February 2014, with the formation of a new national unity government including a new minister of education and higher education, Elias Bou Saab. The new political leadership recognised that huge numbers of Syrian refugees would remain in Lebanon for many years to come, seeing their presence as an opportunity to meet the educational needs of vulnerable Lebanese while supporting the education of Syrians, and to strengthen MEHE’s capacities and systems.

While this process was perhaps slower than was desired by some operating in country, by mid-2014 MEHE had adopted a first full education sector response plan to the crisis, RACE, developed together with significant leadership from UNICEF, UNHCR, donors and other partners. RACE aimed to ensure that, by 2016, 470,000 vulnerable school-aged children – Syrian refugees as well as underprivileged Lebanese children – would be able to access quality formal and non-formal educational opportunities (Jalbout, 2015). Despite significant political risk, MEHE fully endorsed RACE and began using it as its official response to the crisis. A RACE Executive Committee (REC) was formed to help with coordinating the response. Housed within MEHE, the REC comprises key senior MEHE staff, the major donors and multilaterals. It meets regularly to plan strategic adjustments, to respond to funding challenges and to report. Its members on the whole appreciate the coordination forum it provides. With encouragement from donors, MEHE developed a dedicated Project Management Unit (PMU) to be responsible for leading the management, implementation and coordination of the education response. The PMU reports directly to the minister. In some respects, it is a parallel structure to the main body of civil servants headed by the director general, although coordination between it and the main body of MEHE is growing stronger. The RACE plan, and the subsequent structures developed around it, specifically the PMU, have been vital in reinforcing coordination around the provision of education in Lebanon.

UN coordination: UNHCR and UNICEF

The education response to the early stage of the crisis was coordinated principally by UNHCR, which disbursed the initial emergency funding, much of which the EU provided to pay for fees for integrating Syrian refugees directly into the Lebanese public school system. UNHCR also organised community outreach to inform Syrians of educational opportunities and homework support, as well as support to language acquisition in English and French for Syrian children, largely through INGO implementing partners and tertiary education scholarships for young refugees. However, in the early stages of the crisis, there was little focus on sustainability as the Syrian refugee communities and MEHE hoped the Syrian conflict would soon be resolved and refugees would soon return home.

By 2014, the international community was reinforcing its operations in Lebanon. While UNHCR continued to provide leadership and support in the education response, UNICEF had scaled up its operations and, working closely with UNHCR and major donors, strongly supported MEHE to develop strategic direction and planning for an overall country-wide education response.

Since the beginning of 2016, formal leadership of UN coordination in the education sector has passed from UNHCR to UNICEF. This has taken place as an acknowledgement of UNICEF’s growing role, staffing and capacity in Lebanon and of its global weight and experience in education in emergencies and protracted crises. UNICEF and UNHCR co-lead an education sector coordination body that brings together many NGOs, particularly focusing on non-formal education and provision of quality improvements.

Role of development actors

A range of other actors are active in education response, with focus areas outlined in Table 7.
Financing sources and mechanisms

Partly for political reasons and partly because Lebanon’s fiduciary mechanisms are not compatible with the requirements of most international donors, most donors are financing RACE through UNICEF (Figure 3). UNICEF and MEHE have reactivated a previously used joint financing account, which the PMU now manages. Among other functions, UNICEF serves as a financial agent, providing donors and MEHE with transparent and accountable transfer of funds, liquidation and reporting. MEHE appreciates UNICEF’s comparative speed and flexibility in disbursement. Most donor support comes from development funds, with some also from humanitarian sources. Much of the funding pays for the costs normally covered by local school administrations and by parents, which refugees and vulnerable Lebanese families and communities are unable to provide.

Table 7: Focus areas of key education response actors in Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of actor</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Activity focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEHE</td>
<td>Director-General’s Office</td>
<td>political leadership, strategic support, education system strengthening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMU</td>
<td>Implementation of formal school, Management of RACE response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilaterals</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>access to school (early response), outreach and community engagement (current response), tertiary education scholarships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>access to school (current response), education system strengthening, non-formal education support (RACE II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>non-formal education accreditation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>education system strengthening, school financing, rehabilitation and textbooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>access to school (via RACE), skills and vocational education, tertiary scholarships (via UNHCR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>access to school (early response to UNHCR), access to school (continued response to MEHE via UNICEF), outreach and community engagement (via UNHCR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US</td>
<td>access to school (to MEHE via UNICEF), teacher quality (to World Learning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>textbooks (direct to MEHE), access to school (to MEHE via UNICEF), education system strengthening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>non-formal education programmes (as approved by MEHE)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some funds were also allocated to an already existing World Bank-run MDTF. This has raised almost $80 million across all sectors for the response, with $32 million of that allotted for the Lebanon Emergency Education System Stabilization Project in support of the RACE plan. Despite challenges faced in spending this money in a timely manner, by the end of February 2016, $7 million had been disbursed (World Bank, 2016a).

On 4 February 2016, at the London Conference ‘Supporting Syria and the Region’, governments pledged over $11 billion for those affected by the Syrian crisis: $5.8 billion for 2016 and a further $5.4 billion for 2017-2020. In addition, multilateral development banks and donors announced $40.8 billion in loans including $1.6 billion on concessional terms. Specifically on education, conference participants committed that, ‘by the end of the 2016/17 school year 1.7 million children – all refugee children and vulnerable children in host communities – will be in quality education with equal access for girls and boys [...] [and increase] access to learning for the 2.1 million children-out-of-school in Syria itself. Participants noted that funding of at least $1.4bn a year will need to be met from pledges to the UN appeal and additional bilateral and multilateral commitments. Participants also agreed the need to prepare young people for work, by increasing access to vocational training’ (Supporting Syria, 2016). The plan for RACE II was presented to participants. The share of new funding between different Syrian refugee-hosting nations is yet to be announced.

7.3 Operationalising the platform in Lebanon

Challenges and actions to build on

The proposal for the global platform sets out five major obstacles that impede children’s access to high-quality education in crises. Table 8 lists the most important gaps relevant to each obstacle in the context of the Lebanese response in the education sector to the Syrian crisis and actions taken to fill those gaps, which the platform could further build on.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacle</th>
<th>Lebanon response gap</th>
<th>Actions taken to date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low priority and uneven attention to education across crises</td>
<td>1. low prioritisation and uneven attention were problems until early 2014. Since then, relative to other sectors, education has had a strong response to the crisis.</td>
<td>1. since the start of the mandate of Minister Elias Bou Saab, education has had high priority in the Lebanese response to the crisis. Political leadership has been instrumental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interrupted education owing to the impact of crises and poor links across different actors</td>
<td>2. challenges of integrating different cultures and educational experiences into one school system (e.g., languages of instruction; learning years)</td>
<td>2. MEHE decided, in 2014, to open a second, afternoon shift of classes in public primary schools for Syrian children. Language-of-instruction and age-appropriate adjustments can now be made without affecting the learning of their Lebanese counterparts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. under-enrolment, and low retention and completion, owing to poverty and livelihood issues among Syrian children and families</td>
<td>3. conditional cash transfer programmes have been tested and UNHCR continues community outreach, though poverty is still a major barrier to enrolment and retention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. initially, a lack of coordination among donors and implementing organisations</td>
<td>4. REC was formed to help with coordinating the response. Housed within MEHE, the REC comprises key senior MEHE staff, the major donors and multilaterals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough money to cover all education needs across all crises</td>
<td>5. World Bank MDTF raised almost $80m, including $32m for the education sector, but until recently has faced challenges disbursing in a timely manner</td>
<td>5. exceptional approval by prime minister allowed for some disbursement, but slow disbursement is still a challenge. World Bank is looking at moving away from MDTF towards concessional financing model (World Bank, 2016b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. moving into protracted response, long-term financial commitments could prove a major challenge to the success of the response</td>
<td>6. some donors have made two-year commitments; the London Conference included pledges to the region through 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. original RACE I 3-year budget suggested there was a nearly $552m gap between actual education need and requested programmatic budget, prior to growth in number of Syrian refugees, suggesting actual gap may be much higher (MEHE, 2016). Further, the Inter-Agency Coordination dashboard for Sept/Oct 2015 reported only $149m had been received of a required $248m for the year (Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon 2015a)</td>
<td>7. the funds and concessional loans pledged at the London Conference will go some way towards filling these gaps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate capacity to lead and deliver education and recovery efforts, both nationally and internationally</td>
<td>8. multiplicity of INGO/NGO ‘schools’ opening without government of Lebanon authorisation and very high overhead costs</td>
<td>8. MEHE and the REC asked some INGO/NGOs to cease certain operations and defunding has followed by some major donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Lebanese public finance system is currently not suited to manage the high levels of aid made available for RACE (Lievens et al., 2016)</td>
<td>9. this is a priority focus of RACE II Outcome 6 ‘Strengthening national education systems’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. lack of strong planning capacity (domestic and international) as moving into protracted crisis planning</td>
<td>10. enhancing planning capacity of major stakeholders in MEHE including PMU initiated in 2014 and will continue under RACE II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. focus on formal education in the response under-prioritised non-formal education response with accreditation for non-formal education not yet in place</td>
<td>11. with support from donors and the UN, MEHE has authorised the development of a Framework for Regularisation of Non-Formal Education in Lebanon (MEHE, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of data and analysis to inform decisions on education prioritisation</td>
<td>12. challenges agreeing upon the framework for cost estimates of providing formal schooling for one child</td>
<td>12. World Bank and PMU both completed cost assessments. A costing framework has been agreed and is being used. However, there are still concerns around the accuracy of the cost estimates.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Potential focus areas and activities

In reviewing the obstacles and actions to date, one can begin to identify areas of potential support that could be provided through the global platform, both through the Acceleration Facility, which is in place to support the creation of global goods, and via the Breakthrough Fund and either its rapid or multiyear windows, which will provide more direct in-country support for response activities.

Acceleration Facility support

As the global platform in Lebanon looks to invest in public goods and support efforts, the Lebanese response could use some of these outputs in the following ways. For instance, high-level advocacy to raise education needs of Syrian refugees in Lebanon on the global stage could continue. In addition, global analysis on good practice during transition could be applied as the country moves from emergency to protracted crisis, including adaptation of assessment and planning tools. Global efforts to develop evidence base on ‘demand-side’ issues that cause children to be out-of-school (e.g. lack of school transport, opportunity cost of school versus work), including research, for instance, on conditional cash transfer programmes, could be used and applied in Lebanon. Furthermore, surge capacity to help further develop the RACE II education response plan and advice on making aid architecture more efficient would be useful. Finally, efforts to develop and apply a global methodology for costing of plans and their implementation could be beneficially applied in the country.

Breakthrough Fund

The three funding mechanisms of the new platform fit in the context of the Lebanese response.

Rapid response mechanism: Early in the crisis, the platform’s rapid response funding to an accredited institution would have allowed for more of the initial wave of Syrian refugees to be placed in formal schooling. Since UNHCR was playing a leading role in this initial response, the financing could have been channelled directly to UNHCR to facilitate enrolment of more Syrian students. While there was significant initial funding from the EU for this phase of the response, a rapid response funding mechanism would have helped. Such rapid and substantial funding might have focused political support to provision of education to refugees earlier than actually occurred. With many Syrian refugees now unable to re-enrol in formal schooling owing to missed years of education, this early action could have had a dramatic impact on the education landscape in Lebanon today.

Multiyear support window: This mechanism of the new platform would be the most beneficial for the current situation and the foreseeable future in Lebanon. Donors and MEHE have aligned around the RACE II plan, but there has yet to be a long-term commitment to fund RACE II over the next three to five years. A commitment from a new Breakthrough Fund not only would provide the foundational long-term commitment needed but also could catalyse investment from other donors.

Pop-up fund: There are several specific areas in the Lebanese context that could benefit from earmarked ‘pop-up’ funding from a non-traditional source: (1) if there were a private sector company that had expertise in logistics or transportation and willing to work on school transport, it could be a boon as this has been a big obstacle to Syrians and region; (2) non-formal education programmes that help bridge Syrian and vulnerable Lebanese students back to the formal sector have thus far been relatively neglected and could benefit from specific funding; and (3) demand-side financing could provide livelihood support to Syrian families that otherwise have incentives for their children to work.

Table 9: Breakthrough Fund potential areas of support in Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Activity area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political will</td>
<td>• support MEHE leadership in management of the crisis response through longer-term funding of the PMU and other capacity-strengthening initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• support coordination of education implementers and groups, expanding commitment to and fulfilment of the objectives of RACE II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and response</td>
<td>• support MEHE to further develop RACE II strategic plan, ensuring this engages and supports a range of education actors working towards commonly agreed approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing</td>
<td>• provide longer-term, predictable financing commitment for RACE II plan to ensure continuity in response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• pursue entry points for private sector actors to support gaps in Lebanese response (e.g. school transport services for Syrian refugees)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity-building</td>
<td>• enable MEHE and donors to invest in reforming existing Lebanese teacher management systems and to strengthen teachers’ capacity with professional development and continuous quality improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• support accreditation processes for non-formal education programmes that can be used across regional crises (e.g. Syria and region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>• provide funding for further development of EMIS to provide more up-to-date data and cover both refugee and development contexts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What would success involve in this context?

- **Timely and flexible funding**: Disbursing funds in a timely, reliable way is vital in Lebanon, as is flexibility to allow adjustment to emerging needs.
- **Two windows of funding**: The Lebanese situation would have benefited from a rapid response mechanism and sorely needs long-term financing (at least three years, preferably five).
- **Aid effectiveness**: The Lebanese experience shows the platform will need to ensure provision of financing is done in an effective manner, avoiding excessive overheads and pass-through charges, thus meeting recognised international standards on the percentage of aid that goes directly to service delivery.
- **Common costing assessment**: Lebanon would benefit from the platform’s contributions to a common assessment framework for costing education response programmes in emergencies and protracted crises. Outcome-based costing may be part of this.
- **Aid architecture support**: Lebanon would benefit from the platform’s provision of assistance, conditions and clear guidance around how to set up proper aid architecture to ensure the coordination and neutrality of financing flows for the response and to limit competition and rivalry between implementing agencies for the platform’s attention.

What factors may limit the platform’s impact?

Three important factors were identified as risks to the impact of the platform in Lebanon:

- failure to address the five points about funding listed in Section 7.3.
- failure to coordinate effectively with government, implementers and other donors
- lack of specificity about what would constitute success for the platform in Lebanon, and lack of clarity about how to measure that success

7.4 Implications for design of the platform

During the course of the country visit to Lebanon, most of the feedback on the platform was positive. In general, counterparts were excited about the prospect of having this additional support to their efforts for education response. This is perceived as an optimal time for the platform to be launched, given the high-level leadership commitment and visibility education is currently enjoying within the whole response to the Syrian crisis in Lebanon. Lebanon is viewed as a good country for the platform to start working with, given the strong foundational work already in place in the country.

Four global-level concerns arose during discussions with stakeholders in Lebanon:

1. that the initial level of ambition targets is not high enough and that ultimately the platform should have the ambition to reach all children who are missing out on high-quality education owing to emergencies and protracted crises
2. that there could be conflict of interest if the platform were hosted by a large organisation that would also be receiving major funding from the platform as an implementer
3. that a risk of the new platform is further complication of an already overly complex aid architecture and
4. that global average cost estimates of providing education might be applied inappropriately in Lebanon, whose costs are high relative to other countries.
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Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data (2015a) ‘Request for expressions of interest to host a Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data’.


Save the Children and Linksbridge SPC (2015) Child protection in emergencies capacity building mapping and market analysis. CPWG.
Theunynck, S (2002) School Construction in Developing Countries. What do we know?
PowerPoint presentation of a discussion paper. New York: UNICEF
Annex 1: Counting and costing methodology

Introduction

Estimating the global funding needed to provide education for children affected by emergencies and protracted crises is important for helping to set strategic planning and fundraising goals. The estimation process described below was initially conducted between May and June 2015, in advance of the Oslo Summit on Education in Development, looking at funding needs for children affected by crisis aged 3-15 years. Estimates were then updated for use in the research for developing the education crisis platform in April 2016 to further include (a) ‘crisis premium’ factoring in additional costs of delivering responses in these contexts (b) to extend the age range to cover 3-18 year olds and (c) to utilise UNDP 2015 population data.

Approach to estimating costs

Two different approaches to estimating costs were considered, labelled here as ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ estimates.

The ‘top-down’ estimation involved using the number of out-of-school children in crises and the cost of educating a student in each affected country (as provided by UIS) to estimate the total funding levels needed. However, it was felt that this method would not capture the cost associated with providing supplemental support to children in formal school, but rather would essentially be estimating the full costs of moving children from an out-of-school situation to formal schooling. This was a particular issue given a significant number of crisis-affected children are not ‘out-of-school, but rather have had their schooling disrupted (although without support, there is much greater potential that they may indeed drop out longer-term). Further, the top-down method did not allow disaggregation by different types of cost drivers.

The other option, labelled as ‘bottom up’ in our shorthand, allowed space for data points that could be disaggregated by level of education and in some cases, geography. Further future efforts to estimate cost at country level could look more carefully at cost drivers for education response, with these estimates for each driver providing an initial framework for doing so. This approach is further detailed below.

In order to get a high level understanding of what this global funding need might be, a pilot costing model was built. This model had two major components – 1) estimates of the number of children affected by emergencies or protracted crises at the time of the analysis and 2) estimates of the key drivers of the cost of educating a student. These two estimates were used to construct a model of the funding required for providing education for affected children. Due to the rapid nature of the exercise, there are inevitably limitations to the analysis which are important to consider when reviewing the results and as well as for future research considerations.

Number of children affected

Country List

During the initial costing exercise in May-June 2015, UNICEF’s humanitarian appeals were identified as a strong data source for estimating children affected by emergencies and protracted crises, given global footprint and mandate. At the time of the analysis, these appeals (UNICEF’s Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) Appeal 201518 and Nepal Flash Appeal) covered 35 countries with humanitarian crises.19

Estimating children affected

A total of 462 million school-aged children age 3-18 live in these 35 crisis affected countries, according to the most recent UN population data from 2015. UNICEF’s appeals have two categories of child populations:

- numbers of children affected by a crisis, and
- numbers of children to be reached through the appeal

The estimated total number of children affected by crises in the 35 countries was chosen as the most appropriate proxy for children in need of education support.

Age Segmentation

UNICEF’s appeals did not segment child populations by age, so age segmentation estimates were derived through the following process:

---

• Assuming the total number of children affected by crises population are age 0-18.
• Pulling parallel population distributions from UN Population Division 2015, and assumed the number of children affected by age group was the same proportion of the number of children overall at each age group.20

Our analysis has found that just under 75 million children ages 3-18 can be considered the “affected population” of school age children and youth in 35 crisis-affected countries.

### Table 10: 35 Countries included in UNICEF HAC 2015 Appeals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>South Asia Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>West and Central Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>West and Central Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>West and Central Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
<td>East Asia and Pacific Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>West and Central Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Eastern and Southern Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Eastern and Southern Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>West and Central Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Eastern and Southern Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>West and Central Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Eastern and Southern Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>West and Central Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>East Asia and Pacific Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>South-East Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>West and Central Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>West and Central Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>East Asia and Pacific Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>West and Central Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Eastern and Southern Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Eastern and Southern Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Eastern and Southern Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa Region</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20 As the 2015 HAC combined countries affected by the Ebola crisis into one category, an average of the population distribution across Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone was used. Similarly, due to the combining of the countries affected by the Syrian crisis, the population distribution of the Syrian Arab Republic was used for Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan
Cost drivers of education

Based on a preliminary literature review of previous costing studies, as well as consultation with several education in crisis experts, four major drivers of cost for education in emergencies were identified: classroom infrastructure, teacher payments (either salaries or stipends), teacher training (especially in emergency response context) and education supplies. The following steps then determined the unit costs of each of these drivers and how many children could be served for each unit.

For each of these drivers prior research and available data provided high and low estimates, and where available these estimates were collected across three geographical contexts – Asia, Africa and Latin America (Theunynck 2002; Department for International Development 2011).

In order to estimate the unit costs of each driver, the following assumptions were made:

Learning space
Learning space support was assumed to be temporary for those children who are enrolled in school but whose education has been disrupted by crises. Construction of full new buildings was assumed to be necessary only for those children who were systemically out-of-school, thus for support to schooling temporary costs were seen as more appropriate. In order to estimate these costs, the cost of the construction of temporary shelter was used as listed on the UNICEF Supply Catalogue (UNICEF 2015e). The same costs were used across each country and low and high estimates were not used.

Teacher stipend
Teacher salaries were estimated using data from a 2002 study across 15 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Theunynck 2002). Five countries were reported for each region and the highest and lowest country data points were used as the high and low estimates for the respective region. Further, as support to salaries is often given as a stipend, or sits alongside domestic funding, in a crisis, 50% of the reported costs was used as the estimate for the teacher stipend (Table 11).

Teacher training
Assuming that prior to providing teaching services, teachers would go through some level of short-term training, training costs were included. A 2011 DFID report outlined training costs associated with some of their education programs.

Table 11 – Cost of teacher stipend used for the model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Teacher Stipend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Situation</td>
<td>Teacher Stipend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Formal School</td>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$1,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Formal School</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Formal School</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$893</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data was disaggregated by available countries, however the low ($150) and high ($4000) reported costs from any country were used and applied across all countries of interest (Department for International Development, 2011). The reported costs were annual training estimates and for the purposes of this model, teachers in emergency or protracted crises were assumed to likely receive a shorter training, so 50% of reported costs were used.

Classroom supplies
The cost of a ‘school in a box’ was used as the baseline for classroom supplies. One school in a box kit provides enough supplies for 40 students, a cost per student of approximately $4 across all education levels and geographic areas was assumed (UNICEF, 2015d).

Cost estimates and their range
Using the above affected population and cost driver estimates, the total funding required to support affected children with education was calculated. Three steps were involved (figure 4):

1. Total Number of Classrooms Needed
   - Using the data in section three, the number of affected children for each country and age group in that country were calculated.
   - The number of affected children for each age group were then divided by the estimated classroom size for that age group (Table 11) (UNESCO, 2015b).
   - This produced the total number of classrooms needed for each age group and country

2. Using the cost driver data as described above in section four, the cost per classroom per year was then calculated in each country and age group.

3. The number of classrooms needed were then multiplied by the cost per classroom for each country and age group for a total country cost. These total country costs were then added to determine the total funding costs for the 35 countries.

4. Finally, the total annual costs for all the 35 countries were then divided by the total affected population for all 35 countries in order to come up with a $122.57 (and rounded up to $125) per student cost (before a crisis premium was added).
Due to the uncertain nature of the cost estimates used, it is important to report the range of possible funding need levels. As outlined below, there are limitations to the method, time, and available data used for this research which made capturing the uncertainty important. While a medium estimate was used as a headline figure, there is actually significant variability in this number, suggesting the total funding needed could vary by as much as $5 million in either direction. Based on this analysis, supporting the education of 75 million crisis affected children across pre-primary, primary, lower and upper secondary levels would cost $9 billion annually (before a crisis premium is added in).

Variables of costs in different crisis-affected countries mean that global figure may range between $4 billion and $14 billion in any given year. Note as well that the $9 billion figure used here is an update from the figure used for analysis in May 2015. This figure includes cost estimations for upper secondary and 2015 UNDP population data, which was not previously included.

### Establishing a crisis premium

During the initial period of a crisis, the cost of supporting education is expected to be higher due to issues of security, availability of goods, etc. As the base costs used above includes regions of relative stability, a crisis premium has been added to the headline $9 billion overall cost needed. In the absence of any research in to the estimated costs of education in crisis specifically, the EFA GMR report’s proposed mark-up of per student costs to attract marginalised children was utilised to guide education costs in crisis (Table 13).
While recognising the difficulties in conflating crisis affected children with marginalised children, the estimates share the common objective of trying to reflect a combination of greater numbers of students and higher per-student expenditure to improve quality. By applying these mark-ups to the estimated cost of educating a child ($125), an estimate was established of the cost of educating a child in a crisis context (Table 14).

By applying these estimates to the total population of each age group, a funding gap of $11.6B was established, or $156 per child (Table 15). This in turn begins to reflect some of the greater costs of delivering education in crises.

### Table 13: EFA GMR Mark-up of per student costs to attract marginalised children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mark-up of per student costs to attract marginalised children (living on &lt;US$2/day)</th>
<th>Pre-primary/primary</th>
<th>Lower secondary</th>
<th>Upper secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 14: Cost of educating a child in crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Groups</th>
<th>3 to 12</th>
<th>13 to 15</th>
<th>16 to 18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Cost Per Child Estimate</td>
<td>$125</td>
<td>$125</td>
<td>$125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Premium %</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cost Per Child Full Estimate with Crisis Premium</td>
<td>$150</td>
<td>$162.5</td>
<td>$175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 15: Total cost of educating children in crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Affected Population</th>
<th>% of Targeted Population in age group</th>
<th>Cost per Child Total with Premium</th>
<th>Total Funding Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>74,195,938</td>
<td>3-12 (pre-primary/primary) 66%</td>
<td>$150.00</td>
<td>$7,345,397,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-15 (lower secondary) 18%</td>
<td>$162.50</td>
<td>$2,170,231,190</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-18 (upper primary) 16%</td>
<td>$175.00</td>
<td>$2,077,486,267</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Funding Required</td>
<td>$11,593,115,332</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost Per Child</td>
<td>$156.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Addressing domestic costs

In order to estimate required funding, there is also a need to consider domestic contributions to education during crises, as national governments are ultimately responsible for fulfilling the right to education. Precise figures and estimates are currently lacking, but an approach was developed for this work that draws on data from EFA GMR (UNESCO, 2015b) and Steer (2015).

The EFA GMR (UNESCO, 2015b) examines how total education costs will need to increase in low and lower-middle income countries over 2015-2030 if they are to meet EFA goals. They produce an estimate of the average annual cost of education over 2015-2030 and how much of an increase this represents over spending in 2012. Then, using a series of assumptions regarding increasing domestic capacity for revenue raising and a rising percentage of funds being channelled into education, they estimate how much domestic revenue will contribute to meeting this cost increase and the remaining annual funding gap. The figures for LICs can be seen in Table 16 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of average annual cost of education, 2015-2030 (average)</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in total cost</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic contribution to increased total education costs, 2015-2030 (average)</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance gap, 2015-2030 (average)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The assumption was made that a similar ratio of domestic spending can be expected when educating children in crisis. However, fragile states – where crises are particularly prevalent – are likely to have challenges in revenue raising and public spending. Drawing on data from Steer (2015), one finds that tax to GDP ratios in fragile states are approximately one-third lower in fragile states than in non-fragile states at similar levels of economic development. Applying this to the estimate of domestic contribution from the GMR allows one to calculate a rough estimate for the likely contribution from states in crisis contexts. This can be seen in Table 17.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EFA GMR (UNESCO, 2015b) estimate for LICs</th>
<th>Estimate assuming 1/3 lower domestic revenue raising/spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of additional education costs covered by domestic sources</td>
<td>41.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated funding gap (%)</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Applying these figures to the estimated total cost of educating children in crisis produces an estimated funding gap of around $8.5 billion, or just over $113 per child.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Cost of Education in Crisis Affected Regions</th>
<th>$11,593,115,332</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding Gap</td>
<td>$8,358,636,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost Per Child</td>
<td>$156.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding Gap Per Child</td>
<td>$112.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Limitations and recommended further research

Global level data on the scale and scope of education needs, gaps and costs for children affected by humanitarian crises is sparse and of limited quality. This is partly due to the nature of crises, where government capacity to assess and cost needs is low, populations may be on the move, and complex situations are typically in flux. In many fragile states experiencing humanitarian crises, baseline demographic and education data is also often of poor quality and out of date. Finally, given the low levels of overall financing to the education sector in humanitarian response, quality data collection on education in these contexts is typically under-resourced.

Given this lack of globally available data, the rapid estimation process described above is inevitably limited. Observations from this rapid research and modelling suggest a wide range of opportunities for further development and work in improving education data quality and access. Some of these are listed below as initial examples, many more will likely be identified during the Platform’s operational phase:

• **Agreed list of countries in crisis** – For this process, a list of the 35 countries where UNICEF had launched a humanitarian appeal as of May 2015 was used. The number of children affected was collected from the UNICEF appeals process as available from reports online. This group of 35 countries with humanitarian crises likely represents the *minimum* number of countries experiencing humanitarian emergencies in 2015. For example, an ACAPS list accessed and cross-referenced in May 2015 indicated at least an additional 11 countries ranging from a ‘watch list’ to ‘humanitarian crisis.” This list of countries and the number of children affected are both dynamic pieces of information, changing regularly. A future exercise should incorporate methodology for estimating these costs over a period of time and will likely include a different list of countries than included here.

• **Key cost drivers** – For this analysis, building costs, teacher salary, teacher training and supplies were assumed to be the key cost drivers. However, there are further drivers that could be included on this list as well as further nuance to each of the categories above, particularly as one begins to look at specific country contexts.

• **Availability of cost data** – Cost data on each of the drivers was limited and the major source used was from 2002. The lack of data from is a key limitation on the above research and it is likely that the estimates used in this research could be improved by further research to collect more up to date cost information. Updated cost figures would likely demonstrate an increased cost (at minimum for inflation) across each of the drivers.

• **Regional differences** – Some of the available research found was disaggregated by region or country. Even from an incomplete data source, it was clear that there are significant variances in the cost of key drivers between regions and even between countries in a region. Understanding these regional and country differences would be important for any additional development of the costing estimates.

• **Unpredictability of crises** – Data utilised for identifying the gap estimates drew largely from cost estimates in non-crises affected regions. In addition to the caveats highlighted by these cost estimates referenced above, the gap estimates also made a range of assumptions about (i) how domestic spending will evolve; (ii) the capacity of crises affected states; (iii) the relationship between revenue raising and public spending in the sector.

• **Detailed methodology** – In order to provide a timely response and estimate, this methodology made high level assumptions as described above. However, developing a more robust methodology of estimating delivery costs that could be used at the country level and aggregated where necessary would benefit strategic planning moving forward at multiple geographic levels.
Annex 2: Assessment of potential of different financing sources

Developing country governments

Governments are the largest single source of financing for education, even in many emergency and protracted crisis contexts. Given the high share of public sector salaries in education costs, there is also considerable momentum to this expenditure. The platform could help governments protect the continuity and needs-based allocation of education budgets, especially teacher remuneration for remote areas, at relatively low marginal cost, providing platform country governments themselves prioritise such spending.

As noted above, domestic resources through national taxation are a key source of funding for education in crises, and trends in funding for education as a share of government expenditure appear to be going in the wrong direction across fragile states. Governments could commit to increasing their own contributions, and also channel more of them towards disadvantaged groups or parts of the country that have been affected by crisis. Some examples of (non-emergency) redistribution strategies include India’s Sarva Shiksha Abhiya programme (which provides additional funding to the out-of-school population and to districts with poor infrastructure conditions) and Brazil’s redistribution strategy to poorer and marginalised groups (UNESCO, 2014).

In most country contexts, teachers are the single largest civil service cadre on the government payroll, and as such are a politically strong constituency. Salaries may be paid late but there is substantial momentum to continue to do so, absent a complete breakdown in public finances. This means efforts by donors to help implement and partially underwrite this wage bill can be crucial in maintaining continuity of education. For example, in South Sudan until recently, a majority of qualified teachers eligible for the government payroll were not yet set up to be paid through it, not so much because of underlying tax revenue shortfalls but rather because of defective accounting and IT systems, which could be corrected at relatively modest additional cost.

Governments could also generate lower-cost teacher capacity by developing contract teacher cadres whose progression to the regular civil service is deferred and/or restricted, as in the National Youth Civic Service scheme proposed by Kausik Mullinandaram for India. Again, this may need catalytic external support in its launch phase, but it generates overall cost savings in the medium term.

Incentives: To help ‘crowd in’ government funding for education in crises, both platform members and its facility could offer selective match funding for enhanced budget allocations, especially teacher salaries, to vulnerable groups/areas for limited periods. National budget funds would flow in parallel, however, not through the facility. The platform, and possibly the facility, could also assist with special allowances for teaching in hardship conditions, and to help build accounting and IT systems for education payrolls.

Households and remittances

Households already facing major income and consumption stresses are unlikely to be major direct new sources of financing. Remittances may be a significant complementary household financing mechanism, and targeted appeals to diasporas to focus efforts on education, coupled with direct payment mechanisms to providers, could improve the response significantly.

In the education sector, households in many parts of the world have historically contributed to the education of their children through user fees (Greenhill and Ali, 2013). Since 2000, increasing numbers of countries have abolished user fees, seeing them as a ‘pervasive obstacle to primary school enrolment and completion for millions of children worldwide’ (Bentaouet Kattan, 2006) However, data analysis of household surveys in eight countries shows that the financial burden of education remains the most important factor for parents deciding whether to send their child to school, even when these countries have abolished school fees (UNESCO, 2012). Households continue to pay other direct and informal costs such as expenditure on uniforms, books and transport (Greenhill and Ali, 2013). These costs constitute a higher share of the incomes of the poor and are therefore not a potential source that could readily be scaled up for emergencies.

An additional source is remittances. They are associated with increased household resources that are often devoted at the margin to investment, including in improved housing, education and health outcomes (Ratha and Mohapatra, 2011). Barriers to larger support by migrants may involve, as with other actors, scepticism that the money will reach the end purpose of learning progress. In this case, providing direct and robust links between remitters and providers (Bridge Academies, for example, see below, allows direct web-based sponsorship of named children) could perhaps generate more support. More research is needed on the impact of remittances in education in emergency contexts.

Incentives: The platform could consider match-funding of remittances and/or crowdsourcing coming from
developed country non-government actors to nationally recognised education providers for priority countries. This could be done by platform partners individually, or be operated in a pool by the facility. Key prerequisites would be explicit national regulatory acceptance and robust audit trails by participating crowdsourcing platforms.

**Traditional development and humanitarian aid donors**

A large share of financing education in emergencies is likely to continue to come from ODA donors, using both development and humanitarian aid channels. It is important to ensure these two strands are better integrated, including by providing greater flexibility for emergencies within education development programmes as well as bringing the latter forward and supporting capacity to formulate national plans earlier in the transition.

Despite growing recognition of the role of education in humanitarian response, it remains systematically underfunded, and still receives less than 2% of humanitarian aid (with the largest share coming from development aid donors). Moreover, only 3.19% of the $12.9 billion requested for humanitarian appeals in 2013 was for the education sector, so there is a problem of effective demand as well as supply priorities.

One of the main barriers to increasing funding for education in crises within humanitarian budgets is the difficulty of demonstrating the attribution of education outcomes, especially learning, to additional spending, as compared, for example, with life-saving infectious disease control interventions. This problem is not limited to emergency and protracted crisis countries, but standards of proof may be disproportionately harder to meet there. Producing a credible plan linking inputs to outcomes is harder, especially for institutionally weak administrations.

One way to mobilise additional humanitarian and development aid would be to better integrate the two sets of budgets. A majority of donors split policy and operational responsibility between development programmes and humanitarian relief activities (Rognerud, 2005). Many development practitioners argue for ending this distinction, because the goal of building a functioning state is a cross-cutting priority in both stable and emergency contexts, and longer-term humanitarian aid is increasingly becoming the norm. Donors are also increasingly emphasising the importance of flexibility and adaptive responses. The inclusion of contingency plans and/or funds in development education projects would allow for a reallocation of funding in the event of an emergency (INEE, 2010).

There are a number of cases in which development aid has been successfully invoked in the early stages of the transition process from humanitarian to long-term development. In Sierra Leone, aid increased by 70% between 2001/02 and 2003/04 as donors made huge commitments to reconstruction, much of this provided through sector budget support to finance subsidies to schools and provide textbooks (UNESCO, 2011). Other cases, such as RACE in Lebanon, the ETF in Zimbabwe, the MDTF in South Sudan and the Liberian EPF are reviewed in more detail.

Incentives: Members of the platform could commit to full integration of humanitarian and development aid budgets for education, including via systematic contingent provision for emergencies within the latter. Standards of evidence for learning outcomes in emergency and protracted crises should be made no less flexible than in stable contexts, and capacity support for producing education plans (for example through GPE) should be boosted. While front-loading development aid in such contexts does not automatically guarantee additionality, earlier positive implementation experience tends to lead to long-term stability in programming, so development partners will not necessarily withdraw earlier if they engage earlier.

**Non-governmental organisations (NGOs)**

NGOs play a prominent role in education in emergencies. Some large INGOs, including faith-based and secular ones, already provide significant amounts of their own funding to education in emergencies, in addition to larger programmes they undertake with ODA or emergency appeals funding, and it is likely others will join them. The scope for additional such resources at scale for emergency and protracted crises is hard to quantify.

NGOs (international, national and subnational, faith-based or secular) have a key role both in advocacy and provision of services. The NGO sector plays a significant and increasing role in the funding of basic education (Naylor and Ndaruhtse, 2014). A significant part of NGO activities, including in emergencies, is itself funded by ODA, so it can be difficult to disentangle funding by ultimate source at the country level. In some donor countries, emergency appeals are also match-funded by tax deductions.

INGOs with large education portfolios include Plan International, Save the Children and BRAC International. Plan spent $9.5 million on education in emergencies in 2013 (in addition to its development education expenditure of $122 million). Plan’s expenditure on the proportion that goes for education varies year to year depending on the emergencies taking place in the countries where it works. Likewise, Save the Children UK has committed to achieving different ‘change for children breakthroughs’, with one of them being directed to providing education for children caught up in conflict (Naylor and Ndaruhtse, 2014). Finally, BRAC International has been playing an especially important role on education spending in places like Afghanistan and South Sudan.
Education forms a core part of the programming of these three NGOs and therefore it is expected that their spending in emergencies will continue. Equally, with the growth in NGO income, it is likely the NGO sector more generally will become an increasingly significant player in providing financial and programmatic support to basic education post-2015 and in particular in emergency contexts, using both own resources and those provided directly and indirectly by bilateral aid. In addition to financial spending, NGOs have the potential to increasingly work with bilateral and multilateral agencies as managing entities in places where government capacity is weak, which is particularly the case in conflict and emergency situations.

Finally, national and subnational NGOs are increasingly important partners in emergency situations and play a key role on promoting sustainability when humanitarian actors depart and development actors take the lead. In some countries (e.g. DRC and Haiti), religious organisations are key actors in delivering education. For instance, in the early 2000s, about 90% of schools in Haiti were private and run by various religious organisations, NGOs or for-profit institutions. Most of the religious NGOs (e.g. Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, etc.) have poured in the country with a focus on emergency relief activities but have now grown to include long-term development work in education. Their main education activities include training for teachers and education officials, supervision of staffing and administrative needs of schools, providing school materials, supporting students through scholarships and improving school infrastructure including construction and renovation (AIR, 2010).

Incentives: Donors could encourage NGOs even more to bridge humanitarian and development work, for example by match-funding their appeals for education in emergencies and protracted crises.

**Philanthropists and social enterprises**

Few philanthropic organisations are engaged in the (development) education sector directly. There is a small but rapidly growing category of ‘social enterprise’, which receives major support at various stages from so-called impact investors as well as some official donors. There is potential for increasing their involvement in emergency and protracted crisis countries, especially as the regulatory barriers to their expansion may not be as binding there, but a minimum of stability is required for such investments.

Globally and in general, philanthropic assistance is estimated to be the second largest source of development finance beyond ODA at the global level, although the aggregate reported figures have been stable since 2009. At the country level, philanthropic funding is nowhere near comparable to the global estimates (Greenhill et al., 2013). Philanthropists are also likely to channel their funding at country level through other agencies such as global funds or NGOs, which separately report as sources, potentially causing double-counting.

While philanthropic organisations are heavily involved in the health sector, the same does not happen with education, especially in emergency contexts. Information on foundation provision of education in crises is limited. From the data available, it is estimated that US foundations give around 8% of their grants to education compared with 53% to health (UNESCO, 2012). Similarly, evidence suggests philanthropic flows are more heavily concentrated in middle-income countries or spent on global public goods rather than reaching low-income countries and in particular fragile contexts (Watkins, 2012).

Examples of foundations that have contributed to the education sector more generally include the Hewlett Foundation (improving the quality of education in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asian countries), the Nike Foundation (focus on girl’s education), the Master Card Foundation (supports skills for disadvantaged youth), the Open Society Institute and the Bernard van Leer Foundation (focus on early childhood including in poorer countries) (UNESCO, 2012). The Open Society Institute has been engaged in Liberia in a multi-stakeholder funding partnership for education with the government of Liberia and UNICEF. The Liberian case offers a good example of donor and foundation complementarity within a post-conflict situation (Talbot and Taylor, 2015).

Incentives: International philanthropies joining the education in crises platform should be encouraged to offer challenge funding to leverage other actors, including donor governments, as well as pursuing parallel investments of their own, and particularly capitalising social enterprises focused on education.

**Private sources**

Private/corporate sector investments in a narrow sense in formal education in emergency contexts are almost non-existent, although they can make valuable complementary contributions to non-formal and vocational education and training. Private (fee-based) provision is a large and growing fraction, especially in urban areas in some fragile countries, like Nigeria, despite political opposition, motivated in part by legitimate fears that fees deter poor families. Major corporate initiatives in support of education for long-term growth and prosperity require a strategic, preferably regional or sub-regional approach, going well beyond emergency and protracted crisis contexts.

Although general private sector financing for education is gaining some attention (the Global Business Coalition for Education is a prime example), there is lack of quantitative information on this source, especially in emergency contexts, and it remains much less prominent than in health. A report from the Global Fortune 500 estimates that just 13% of CSR is dedicated to the
Contributions from private (non-education) corporations are generally not aligned with broader global education goals, and few have an explicit equity focus. In addition, corporations quite rationally tend to spend more in regions of strategic market interest, which are more likely to be emerging economies or stable middle-income countries than fragile low-income ones (UNESCO, 2012). However, while the amounts of financing are probably small, the indirect influence of the private sector in catalysing innovation (such as through appropriate use of information and communication technology and their role in workplace-based vocational technical education) is potentially large. Major private employers in developing countries already have to make a virtue out of necessity, by providing remedial education and skills upgrading to employees the formal education system has failed, and apprenticeship-based partnerships between businesses and schools or colleges are also expanding (especially where tax incentives are appropriate).

Private for-fee (and often for-profit) provision of education is already a major force in many fragile developing country contexts, such as Nigeria and Pakistan, particularly in urban areas. This offers the potential option to both governments and external funders of contributing indirectly via subsidies and/or vouchers, as against investing directly and longer-term in infrastructure and staff, or setting up new social structures themselves. However, regulatory capacity for such mixed schemes is often inadequate (for example to ensure subsidies reach the poorest and/or fees are not an insurmountable deterrent for them). The potential for externally supported contracting-out on a larger scale in emergency and protracted crisis contexts needs to be investigated further nonetheless.

One striking feature of the growth of new non-public but so far non-profit providers like Bridge International (whose declared aim is ultimately to reach 10 million children worldwide) is their ability to tap household incomes for their fees, despite competition from nominally free public sector schools in countries like Kenya. Clearly parents in some socioeconomic groups are persuaded by their claimed, and in a few cases rigorously evaluated, improvements in achievement scores, which are seen to justify that expense. Nonetheless, the poorest groups may be excluded by fees, even at an average bill of $5 per child per month. Private providers also have different degrees of tolerance for non-payment of fees, suggesting household and school debt-carrying capacity is an issue that should be investigated further (and possibly amenable to interventions such as third-party guarantees of payment). However, the relevance of such models to emergency and protracted crisis settings is debatable, given the extent and severity of poverty and the fact that a minimum of stability is essential to encourage investments by both providers and families.

Incentives: The education in crises partnership needs to encourage open policy dialogue on private sector delivery of basic education, and government support to it by appropriate national regulation. Where the regulatory context permits, platform members and perhaps also the facility could assist via match-funding and possibly partial guarantees of payment to accredited providers.

More broadly, major efforts to mobilise the non-education private sector at full scale will need to be developed in a regional or sub-regional context, within a strategic long-term vision of the payoffs for these economies at large and with long-term corporate leadership. This challenge extends well beyond emergency contexts.

Innovative financing mechanisms

The health sector can offer some successful examples of innovative financing mechanisms that could be developed in the education in emergencies sector. Promising potential elements include disaster risk insurance, bond issuance linked to education outcomes and RBA.

Of over 300 innovative financing mechanisms focusing on development outcomes, only 1% support education (as against 44% focusing on financial inclusion and 7% in health) (Dalberg, 2014). However, there is no compelling reason why instruments designed in other contexts should not also be applicable to education.

Thus, for example, disaster risk insurance (such as the Africa Drought Insurance Facility, based on measured rainfall variations) covers crop damage and indirect costs generated by catastrophes, and interruption of schooling access could become one of those negative effects so covered. New facilities are being considered, for example to permit a more rapid response to future epidemic outbreaks such as Ebola. Paradoxically, one of the intermediate effects of the Ebola crisis was to lose effectively a whole school year in many districts, for which a possible mitigating response would be accelerated remedial schooling partly underwritten by an insurance facility.

The health sector is a prime example of recent international attempts to create innovative financing mechanisms. UNITAID is a global initiative financed in great part by a solidarity levy on airline tickets. It was established by Brazil, Chile, France, Norway and the UK as a funding mechanism to tackle inefficiencies in markets for medicines and HIV/malaria and tuberculosis diagnostics and prevention in developing countries. Its strength is the negotiation of low prices for drugs and diagnostics. Note, however, that some founder members of UNITAID, such as the UK, do not support ‘hypothecation’ of taxes to particular spends as a matter of policy, and contribute instead from their regular aid budgets. Note also (private communication) that the French government at one point considered the air levy scheme in connection with
education, but rejected it in favour of health, considering it to have greater political appeal.

Another example is the IFFIm, which sells bonds on the capital markets to raise funds for Gavi. Since its beginning in 2006, IFFIm has allowed Gavi to double its expenditures in health programmes. A consultation from the Health and Life Sciences Partnership (HLSP) (2011) by Pearson et al. (2011) strongly recommends this financial model and its health care results. A similar financing mechanism could be created for the education sector, and/or developing country governments could take on more loans for education directly. However, the case for public borrowing from future generations is somewhat weaker for education, as it depends on a three-stage argument, that education spending lifts productivity; productivity improves incomes; and rising incomes generate sufficient additional taxes to service the debt. All three are subject to challenge, both in emergencies and protracted crises and more generally. Alternative loan constructs are being considered part of the work of the Education Commission (on-going), including buying down harder loan terms with grants, in an effort to address the likely concerns of national finance authorities. It is too early to say how much scope there is for increasing public borrowing for education, especially in contexts with weaker public finances.

There are several on-going pilots of RBA, both in health and in education, notably the DFID Ethiopia ‘cash on delivery’ project, disbursing against increases in primary education completion (the World Bank has similar activities, for example Tanzania’s Big Results Now). While these are strictly speaking uses, not sources, of funds, they have the potential to engage new donors, or additional amounts for existing donors, primarily by removing much of the uncertainty about whether additional funds are indeed associated with improved outcomes. The track record and evaluation evidence of these instruments is still relatively thin. However, RBA advocates counter that traditional (input-based) education aid is at least equally questionable in terms of demonstrating improved learning outcomes, so RBAs may become the best way of retaining or increasing the confidence of some donors. In terms of social impact investing, there is only one SIB with a focus on education underway in a developing country (UBS Optimus Foundation and the Children’s Investment Fund Foundation, with focus on girls’ education in India) (Dalberg, 2014). This can be seen as a variant of RBA, coupled with the potential to draw in new classes of investors.

Incentives and funding options: The platform, and the facility within it, could partly or wholly deflate the (actuarially fair) premium cost of multi-country disaster insurance schemes offering contingent education pay-outs for platform members (the insurance schemes would remain outside of the platform). The platform could encourage participating donor governments to earmark new or enhanced taxes for education in crises, perhaps by offering to match part of the resulting revenue. This may not by itself overcome political reluctance to create such new taxes, or direct them away from more obvious global public goods like health and climate change. RBA approaches deserve policy and capacity support by the platform, as they indirectly contribute to increasing confidence in education assistance. It is doubtful whether the platform, or indeed the facility, should engage in the complexity of RBA design directly, except perhaps to co-fund experimental and demonstration programmes.

New donors

Some emerging donors already contribute to the education sector and could leverage/redirect their support into emergency contexts. However, for the majority, education, and basic education in particular, is not a priority sector. For that reason, this source could be a potential source of financing just for a few specific ‘non-traditional’ actors.

While there is some evidence that South–South cooperation is growing mainly from the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), there are no comprehensive data on their funding flows. Attempts to map South–South cooperation have been made (see Greenhill and Prizzon, 2012 for a review) with latest estimates provided from UN (2014) pointing to a range of between $16.1 billion and $19 billion in 2011 and Development Initiatives (2015) estimating a great increase from $6.4 billion to $24.4 billion between 2004 and 2013 (in Prizzon et al. 2015, forthcoming). Among the most prominent actors, India allocated only 2% of its funding to education (as opposed to 25% for energy or 15% to transport infrastructure) and China’s funding focuses mainly on infrastructure (which also includes social infrastructure) (UNESCO, 2012).

The actors that have been more dedicated to the education sector in general include Brazil (currently the third largest sector after agriculture and health) (Costa Leite et al., 2014). Cuba and Venezuela are also very prominent in the provision of teachers to other developing countries. In Turkey, education is the most important aid sector (ECOSOC, 2008).

Aid to education from Arab donors has also been growing, with latest estimates referring to a commitment from bilateral and multilateral agencies of $1.9 billion allocated to global education between 2010 and 2012. This is equivalent to around 5% of the total of aid to education from DAC donors over that period with one third being spent in Asia (notably China and Indonesia), another third in Sub-Saharan Africa and approximately one-fifth allocated to Arab states. However, this funding has been mainly in the form of loans and technical assistance used to fund post-secondary and tertiary education, and therefore it is less likely that this benefits global education goals and countries in emergency contexts. However, the Islamic Development Bank has also contributed funds to
the construction of schools that are prone to flooding and cyclones (e.g. in Bangladesh) and it is likely it will continue investing in educational infrastructure (Jalbout, 2014).

Incentives: The platform would do well to include non-DAC sources of official finance for education, especially those (such as Arab donors, the Islamic Bank, Turkey and Brazil) with both substantial experience in education investments and several education in crises focus countries. Even if their preferred projects are in the tertiary and vocational sub-sectors, such engagement potentially in turn releases resources at the national level for basic education. The platform might also be able to facilitate South–South knowledge exchanges that can involve prohibitive transaction costs if left entirely to bilateral initiative.
Annex 3: Country-level funding mechanisms

In this section, we review the lessons learnt from a financing perspective in four different country-level education funds: the Liberian EPF, Lebanon’s RACE, Zimbabwe’s ETF and the MDTF in South Sudan.

Overview
The Liberian EPF presents an innovative example of a non-traditional source’s engagement in the development of an education pooled fund as an argument for multi-stakeholder partnerships and private foundation engagement in post-conflict education recovery. A key message for the design of the platform is that pooled funding mechanisms should involve multiple partners able to bear different degrees of risk. Securing funding from non-traditional sources (including corporations, foundations and non-traditional actors such as the Arab states’ donors) is what is missing in RACE in Lebanon, which attracted only the more traditional donors. Although RACE in Lebanon presents an interesting case involving different agencies and the government in a programme that bridges the emergency context and the long-term development, financing support for refugee education in Lebanon has consistently fallen and the scenario is not clear in terms of future financing. Zimbabwe’s ETF is a good example of a harmonised and un-earmarked pooled fund mechanism that helped increase alignment with government priorities, promote ownership, coordination and reduce fragmentation. Particularly critical in this process was the role of UNICEF as a fund manager, which guaranteed close coordination and consultation with key stakeholders including the government. When designing a platform, it is crucial to appoint a fund manager that maintains close links with all development partners and the government. The advantages of the MDTF in South Sudan go beyond the financial aspect since the main goal was to provide capacity-building support to the newly formed government. The MDTF-SS illustrates a unique case of a low-income country in a post-conflict situation, with few available domestic resources and where technical assistance to ministries was critical in helping establish robust systems and programmes. When designing a platform, the choice of execution modalities should therefore be carefully selected and appropriate to the context.

Liberia’s EPF

At a glance
The EPF was created in May 2008 as a multi-stakeholder partnership between the Government of Liberia, UNICEF and the Open Society Institute (a private foundation). Initial funding consisted of a $16.25 million ($12 million from UNICEF using a grant from the Government of the Netherlands and $4.25 million from the Open Society Foundation). Between 2008 and 2009, most of this funding was allocated to three large-scale activities: (1) construction of 40 new primary schools; (2) reestablishment of three rural teacher training institutes; and (3) a materials procurement project. In March 2010, UNICEF contributed an additional $3.2 million to the fund, enabling the Open Society Institute to release its remaining $0.75 million and complete the foundation’s $5 million commitment. The fund was managed and implemented by the government through the Ministries of Education and Finance. Its purpose was to bridge the gap from emergency-type interventions to long-term sector development.

The EPF was created as a transitional funding mechanism and a novel approach to deliver aid in a post-civil war context, with support from traditional and non-traditional development organisations. The 2010 UNESCO EFA Global Monitoring Report acknowledges the EPF as an ‘innovative private-public partnership being one of the first cases of a private foundation, and multilateral and bilateral donors pooling resources in support of a national education program’ (UNESCO, 2010d: 232). While its main goal was to be a financing mechanism critical for the Liberian Education Recovery Plan, it also sought to govern the sector and coordinate the resources and activities of donor partners in the country.

While some authors question its ‘success story’ from an institutional arrangement perspective, they all agree the Liberian EPF has impacted the global aid architecture and provides a good example of donor engagement in country in a post-conflict situation.

Lessons learnt from a financing perspective
We focus here on the main lessons learnt from a financing perspective only, taken from the recently published book by Talbot and Taylor (2015) and divided in two parts: (1) lessons learnt on ‘fit-for-purpose’ financing; and (2) leveraging resources for education through partnerships.

Fit-for-purpose financing

• On leveraging resources for shared goals in difficult contexts, the lesson is that some partners will be more willing than others to take risks with investing their financial resources in the partnership. Equally, some partners will be more adept than others at taking calculated risks in using partnership resources to achieve results. Financing education in post-crisis did not happen by chance; rather, it was a culmination of coincidences and some innovative decisions. The Netherlands was willing to risk funding education in
Leveraging resources to support shared goals depends on the insight, capacity, autonomy and orientation of participating individuals as much as on the mandates, resources and culture of the organisations in the partnership (Fukuyama, 2013). As individuals act on behalf of donor organisations, their orientation influences their tendency to be innovative and risk-takers or to be gatekeepers and risk-averse.

- 'Fit-for-purpose' financing in fragile states should involve multiple partners willing to provide funds to the government, in order to 'spread' and manage the risks involved. Also, a less-encumbered partner like Open Society can trigger fit-for-purpose financing by taking the lead with offers of 'matching funds' to the government. Open Society’s classic hedge fund investment strategy in the EPF (pledging $5 million as matching funds not exceeding 25% of total investment from all partners) was extremely helpful for Liberia’s risky post-conflict context.
- Mobilising resources from education development partners is not easy but if one is confident, insistent and committed to the project, partners could be persuaded to commit funds.

Leveraging resources for education through partnerships

- The design of the fund utilisation should facilitate continuous monitoring, especially when government procedures are used. This gap in the EPF design limited effective fund monitoring by the fund custodian. It also revealed the temptation for financial mismanagement, which is often labelled as corruption but is, in fact, based on misunderstanding of procedures.
- An effective EPF should fund the whole sector so as to facilitate the accompanying educational processes and prevent the excessive focus of government activity on already funded sub-sectors. If this is not possible, government should commit to increased spending on unfunded sub-sectors. The EPF’s impact was limited to the funded primary school level.
- The availability of flexible funds to the government is an empowering act in itself. This was obvious in the ministry’s confidence in its ability to deliver education services, although it tended to lead to over-commitments, resulting in unresolved tensions at the national level. For example, promises to high-level politicians to construct schools in all counties led to inequitable distribution of school sites, including in areas where schools were not initially planned but where vocal elected officials lobbied for the service. This further delayed construction beyond the planned period as changes had to be effected prior to construction and budgets had to be revised to accommodate new sites.

RACE Lebanon

At a glance

RACE is a strategy led by GoL, more specifically by MEHE, developed with UN agencies, international donors and NGOs, aiming to ensure 470,000 school-aged refugee children (3-18 years) affected by the Syria crisis whom Lebanon hosts, and deprived Lebanese children, are able to access formal and informal quality education. The overall budget for the programme is $599.9 million ($177.2 million, $191.3 million and $231.4 million for Years 1, 2 and 3, respectively) (MEHE, 2014).

It started in 2014 as a three-year programme (2014-2017) aiming to bridge the immediate emergency with long-term development efforts together. As such, the programme aims to (1) ensure equitable access to education, (2) improve the quality of teaching and learning and (3) strengthen the Lebanese education system, policies and monitoring (Jalbout, 2015).

In terms of programme financing, funds are channelled through multiple modalities and mechanisms, including direct budget support, contributions to multi-partner funding mechanisms and bilateral and multilateral funding. While combining those depended on the preference of donors for different channels, attention was given to cost-effectiveness (MEHE, 2014).

While some progress has been made – in particular a greater number of children have gained access to formal education – far too many children remain out-of-school and progress in formal education has been limited mainly to the primary level. There has also been uneven access to education across Lebanon.

Lessons learnt from a financing perspective

We focus on the financing lessons learnt and opportunities for accelerating progress based on the latest report from the UK charity Their World by Jalbout (2015), which is based on consultations with MEHE and its partners.

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21 If other partners find it too risky to finance the government, then Open Society funds do not have to be invested but the organisation retains the credibility of having made the offer. However, if other partners take the risk of financing the government, then Open Society funds benefit from the resulting ‘spread’ of the risks involved (Talbot and Taylor, 2015).

22 Specific programme components include school rehabilitation and equipment, enrolment support for formal basic education, textbooks: teaching and learning material for basic education, teaching workforce capacity-strengthening, school readiness and learning for adolescents, support to institutional development, learning outcomes assessments and monitoring and evaluation strengthening and school-based management and monitoring school grants (MEHE, 2014).
in Lebanon. We also include some key messages from Watkins and Zyck (2014).

- **In addition to secure funds from traditional donors, RACE should seek financial support from non-traditional donors.** Despite substantial support from a small number of donors, total financing for refugee education in Lebanon has consistently fallen short and there is uncertainty over the future. Corporations and foundations have been minimally involved in supporting refugee education in Lebanon and region as they are often dissuaded from investing in situations where they are not well positioned to manage. Likewise, Arab donors had modest involvement in this funding. Only Kuwait has provided funding (through UNICEF) to the wider UN education initiatives.

- **Creating a pooled financing mechanism for education as part of the RACE strategy is important.** This would help attract financing from existing donors, Arab agencies, philanthropists and private businesses. Such a facility could reduce the transaction costs for new entrants (Watkins and Zyck, 2014).

- **It is important for donors to make multiyear commitments that match the school year cycle and enable MEHE and partners to plan properly.** Despite the flexibility of having multiple mechanisms in place to attract funds, a few donors continue to prefer funding for their own initiatives, channelling funding away from GoL.

- **Donors should increase their support to eliminating financial barriers for particularly vulnerable children by allocating funding for transportation and educational supplies.** This implies that, rather than focusing on only reducing the cost per child in public schools, RACE should adopt a programme-based budget approach.

- **The funding mechanism should be appropriate to the context.** If you get the mechanism wrong, the fund can be worse than useless, with high opportunity costs. The financing mechanism has to be considered alongside aid delivery mechanisms. In particular, RACE funds going through the government are time-consuming and challenging and may delay the process (Watkins and Zyck, 2014).

- **There should be a consolidated account that reports on donor commitments against the RACE financing mechanism.** GoL with implementing partners such as NGOs should move to a school-year financial reporting system (Watkins and Zyck, 2014).

### Zimbabwe’s ETF

#### At a glance

The ETF was launched in 2009 as an innovative donor funding mechanism aiming to bridge the funding gap in the education sector during the transition period, from emergency to recovery. It was launched by the Ministry of Education, Sports, Arts and Culture (MoESAC) in partnership with UNICEF and a generous number of donors. The EC allocated €7.5 million to UNICEF in Zimbabwe to finance the ETF. This was enhanced by pledges from five EU member states and five other countries to a total of over $53 million (EC, 2010). It consisted essentially of the provision of core subject textbooks for children in primary school and proved the basis for wider recovery in the education sector.

ETF I (2009-2011) focused on emergency restructuring of the sector, distribution of core textbooks for primary and secondary school and essential school stationery. The ETF has now moved to a phase of long-term recovery (ETF II, or the Education Development Fund (EDF): 2012-2015), with a main goal to support the continued revitalisation of the sector, focusing on the systems and structures that provide education while promoting universal and equitable access to quality and relevant basic information.

The EDF now pools $115 million in un-earmarked funds from seven donors and focuses on three thematic areas guided by MoESAC’s Education Medium-Term Plan (2011-2015): school and system governance; teaching and learning; and second chance education. The EDF is now the predominant volume of external financing in the sector and is managed by UNICEF, guided by a steering committee chaired by the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education (Fölscher and Hodson, 2015).

### Lessons learnt from a financing perspective

Important financing lessons emerged from ETF I and were identified by UNICEF (2013b) as follow:

- **Recovery financing mechanisms can support the development of an inclusive partnership.** A strong network of partners including government and development partners working to improve education in Zimbabwe emerged.

- **An ETF can be an affective incremental step towards sector budgeting.** Given the current funding environment, funds could not be channelled through government. UNICEF and other partners focused on building the capacity of government at different levels to take on sector budget support.

- **Pooled education can be a step towards establishing more formal sector coordination.** The ETF contributed to strengthening MoESAC’s operational mechanisms and structures, including technical working groups and aid coordination and planning. The Education Coordination Group (ECG) emerged as a way to support policy and strategy issues in education and coordinate support to the education sector with different stakeholders and bodies. The ECG was essential to assist in key priorities to be funded in the
ETF II and ensure ETF funds were harmonised with MoESAC’s own planning process.

- **The ETF as a pooled fund mechanism assured consistency of funding level during the transition period but also helped increase alignment with government priorities, promoting ownership, coordination and reducing fragmentation** (UNICEF, 2013b).
- Investing in school governance structures is a priority in order to improve transparency and accountability. Cluster arrangements could support this and ensure the involvement of NGOs.

Additional lessons from ETF I and II identified by Fölscher and Hodson (2015) include the following:

- **The notion of a harmonised and un-earmarked pooled fund aligned with the governments should be continued and expanded.** This expansion could be accomplished by bringing more of the high number of small-volume donors into the funds.
- **There are significant advantages to having UNICEF as fund manager and its central role should continue.** In particular, UNICEF maintains close links with key stakeholders, including government structures and development partners, ensuring close coordination and consultation.
- **The ETF and UNICEF should rethink the fundamental mode of operation of the funds and fund exit strategies given that Zimbabwe’s context has now changed and more normalised development relations are expected, with changes expected from an externally managed pooled fund to sector programmes managed through government.**
- Furthermore, for donors not yet willing to shift to general or sector-based budget support, who prefer the pooled risk represented by a pooled fund, it would still be in the long-term development interest of Zimbabwe to shift more of the financial management burden for pooled funds from UNICEF to government, provided capacity is built for financial management in the sectors.
- **The key weakness to address in future pooled types of funds is the sustainability of programme financing.** This requires a rethink on what the pooled funds support, and higher involvement of the finance ministry in fund governance.

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**The MDTF in South Sudan**

**At a glance**

The MDTF in South Sudan operated from 2005 till December 2012\(^{23}\) and was considered an innovative approach for responding to large-scale needs in post-conflict situations. It was funded by donor countries and administered by the World Bank, which worked together with UN partners, donors, civil society and government. Total receipts at closure stood at $728 million, of which GoSS contributed 25%. During its seven years of operation, the MDTF-SS delivered a portfolio of 21 projects in five Strategic Priority areas. Project activities were implemented over the full geographic territory of South Sudan, primarily through state institutions, and with implementation support from UN agencies and national and international NGOs (FAFO, 2013).

It focused on rebuilding the southern states of Sudan and providing capacity-building support to the newly formed GoSS. In particular, its aim was to advance the provisions of the CPA by supporting reconstruction and development needs across all 10 states as well as institutional strengthening and quick start programmes leading to independence (FAFO, 2013).

South Sudan is considered a unique experience of a low-income country in post-conflict situation with available domestic resources. Therefore, the advantages of the MDTF lie not only in the financial aspect but also in helping establishing robust systems and programmes through technical assistance to ministries, provided by the World Bank.

**Lessons learnt from a financing perspective**

There is a large body of documentation assessing MDTF experiences and lessons learnt, including reports, internal and external evaluations as well as strategy documents. While most of the documents focus on institutional, operational and management lessons, here we review the lessons learnt mostly from the financing side, compiled in FAFO (2013):

- **Expectation management is critical, from the first moment a fund is being established.** Expectations of what an MDTF can and cannot deliver must be clearly articulated within the scope of a fund’s mandate (based on consensus between the principal stakeholders) and communicated to stakeholder constituencies in national and international society. Expectations must be realistic, given the context, and must avoid burdening a fund with aspirations and responsibilities that are beyond its scope and means.
- **The design of an MDTF modality, including the choice of administrator and managing agent, must...**

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\(^{23}\) The MDTF-SS was operationally closed on 31 December 2012, and financially closed at the end of June 2013.
be requirement-based. Fragile state and post-crisis situations will often call for a variety of implementation arrangements, which a single organisation cannot deliver.

- **The recipient execution modality depends on government leadership and capacity.** While this modality has made an important contribution in South Sudan, strengthening institutions, ownership and delivering services, it has faced some capacity issues at the level of government.
- **There is no global consensus on the most effective MDTF model for achieving these objectives** simultaneously. However, a ‘two-window common governance’ model would have allowed different organisations to deliver through their institutional advantages. This effectively occurred in South Sudan after 2008, as new pooled modalities were established with different managers.
- **Also, the pace of disbursement should not be at the expense of quality of delivery.** A limited number of activities can be done ‘quick and well’; other projects can only be done well with time.

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24 Two-window common governance models allow for the use of different implementation arrangements and organisational capacities within a single modality that provides strategic coherence.
## Annex 4: Potential platform hosts considered against selection criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selection criteria</th>
<th>GPE</th>
<th>UNICEF</th>
<th>Generic foundation</th>
<th>Generic private sector company</th>
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<tr>
<td>Scope of work and in-country capacity</td>
<td>GPE’s mandate covers support to education in low- and lower-middle income countries. Its current strategic plan’s first objective covers planning for fragile and conflict-affected states. Policies and operational frameworks allow support in emergencies and early recovery. Almost no experience of working with education of refugees. No permanent staff members posted in developing countries. A small percentage of GPE funds are used to support Sector Plan Development. More than 90% are spent funding large-scale program implementation grants that fund key needs at the country level. GPE well suited to funding role.</td>
<td>Mandate is global, covering advocacy for and support to children’s rights multi-sectorally, including education. Has a specific mandate for emergency relief and covers the full spectrum: prevention, planning, preparedness, relief response, recovery, reconstruction, transition. Large numbers of staff in 190 countries, including almost all low- and middle-income countries, and strong national committees in donor countries and including specific education in emergencies officers. Strong record of partnership with national governments and CSOs.</td>
<td>Selected foundation would need specific mandate for education and humanitarian work, and staff presence in many conflict- and disaster-affected countries.</td>
<td>Selected private company would need specific mandate for education and humanitarian work and staff presence in many conflict- and disaster-affected countries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity to manage funding</td>
<td>Good at channelling donor money to governments and a variety of other organisations. Good at quality control and legal agreements to safeguard funds. Has policy for and some experience of funding ministries of education and partners in conflict-affected fragile states particularly but not exclusively for plan development. Able to redirect development funds to emergency needs. Some concerns about track record on speed of disbursement. Capable of attracting new funding but has struggled in the past to meet core obligations in education for development, i.e. without education in crises. Independent evaluation found GPE would require ‘sizable’ financing to be able to expand into humanitarian crisis situations. It should be noted that this is a problem not unique to GPE but common across a number of multilaterals.</td>
<td>UNICEF has internal systems and mechanisms to fund governments and other organisations rapidly. Long experience of doing so. Some concerns about track record on speed of disbursement. UNICEF is one of few agencies active in education in crises work that raises significant amounts of money from private sector.</td>
<td>Selected foundation would provide financing facility and administrative, legal, risk/liability, accounting and human resources functions. The platform should be able to negotiate a low cost for those services. A foundation could communicate the needs of education in crises to new audiences and potential donors. A foundation may be unfamiliar with the funding strategies and mechanisms of major bilateral donors. The amounts of money needed and that would flow through the platform could be too large for a foundation to absorb. Major government donors might find it awkward to be channelling large sums through a private foundation.</td>
<td>Capacity should be high. A company could communicate the needs of education in crises to new audiences and potential donors. Potential conflict of interest as private sector donors would expect benefits to flow to their companies; this could lead to pressure on platform to distort priorities. A private company may be unfamiliar with the funding strategies and mechanisms of major bilateral donors. Major government donors might find it awkward to be channelling large sums through a private company.</td>
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<td>Interaction with wider system</td>
<td>Enjoy broad political support. Could be strong in urging governments to address crises as part of education sector planning. Increasingly operating in fragile situations. Limited engagement to date with the key humanitarian coordination bodies: IASC Global Education Cluster and UNHCR, although GPE and UNHCR are currently establishing a formal working arrangement.</td>
<td>Enjoy broad political support. Strong in coordination and leveraging the capacity of education sector partners in humanitarian operations, protracted crises and development settings. Capable of good-quality rapid needs assessments and rapid deployment of appropriately qualified and experienced response staff. UNICEF is also strong in both development and humanitarian work in the education sector. UNICEF has hosted several important global platforms and initiatives, including Gav and the UN Girls’ Education Initiative UNGEI, and co-hosted the Global Education Cluster and some INEE secretariat members. UNICEF has experience in working with refugee education and has memoranda of understanding with UNHCR and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.</td>
<td>Selected foundation would need strong links with governments and humanitarian and development coordination mechanisms.</td>
<td>Selected company would need strong links with governments and humanitarian and development coordination mechanisms.</td>
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<td>Education competence</td>
<td>Strong in designing quality programmes in education for development. Lacks specific technical capacity for education in crises, i.e. qualified and experienced personnel needed to make informed decisions about humanitarian issues.</td>
<td>Deep, long and strong experience in education in development and education in crises settings. Has strong technical staff with specialisations in vital sub-disciplines, such as ECD, curriculum development, education assessments, teacher management, conflict-sensitive education planning, education for peace-building and education for disaster risk reduction.</td>
<td>Likely candidates may have some experience in education in development, much less so in education in crises.</td>
<td>Likely to be relatively weak.</td>
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<td>Strategic management and performance</td>
<td>Theoretically capable of integrating new platform into its operations, but historically the GPE board has struggled to reach rapid agreement on major changes to its mandates and internal functioning. These processes are said to have improved of late; for instance, GPE has recently (December 2015) articulated a theory of change and a results framework.</td>
<td>UNICEF has a strong, decades-long reputation for education service delivery before, during and after multiple crises. Yet there is some concern that UNICEF does not share data about and evaluations of its own work widely, so there is not much objective, independent evidence of how well UNICEF is actually working in education in crises contexts. Some concern about UNICEF being too disparate, i.e. too thinly spread in its work with children.</td>
<td>Foundations should bring very high standards of planning, management, monitoring and evaluation to the platform’s work. A major advantage of a foundation as host would be political independence and flexibility.</td>
<td>Private companies should bring very high standards of planning, management, monitoring and evaluation to the platform’s work. A major advantage of a company as host would be political independence and flexibility.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cost and value consciousness and efficiency</td>
<td>Generally high, although there are concerns about capacity to disburse funds quickly and efficiently during an acute crisis.</td>
<td>Generally high, although there are concerns about capacity to disburse funds quickly and efficiently during an acute crisis.</td>
<td>Likely to be high.</td>
<td>Likely to be high although also likely to be more costly than other hosting options.</td>
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<td>Partnership behaviour</td>
<td>GPE is itself a partnership hosted by the World Bank. Independent evaluation expressed concerns about GPE’s “ability to systematically leverage the strengths of its partners”. However, recent evidence also suggests that, as the only multi-stakeholder partnership in education bringing together developing country partners, civil society, donors and multilaterals, this is a major asset and one that is not available in any other organization.</td>
<td>Generally strong. UNICEF highly values donor and implementing partner relationships. UNICEF’s co-leadership of the IASC Global Education Cluster is now very collaborative. However, there is a perception of risk of UNICEF domination over partners.</td>
<td>Some foundations already have good partnerships with operational actors in the sector, including governments, UN agencies and INGOs.</td>
<td>Very few companies already have good partnerships with operational actors in the sector, including governments, UN agencies and INGOs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transparency and accountability</td>
<td>GPE would not be an implementer of education in crises programmes, so risk of conflict of interest is small. GPE has recently strengthened its accountability framework.</td>
<td>Concerns about potential conflicts of interest for UNICEF as platform and fund host and as potential major spender of platform funds. UNICEF would welcome ‘transparent processes and firewall arrangements’ between its own and the new platform’s funds, and its disbursement mechanisms.</td>
<td>Likely to be very high.</td>
<td>Risk of conflict of interest distorting priorities.</td>
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