Climate-induced migration and displacement: closing the policy gap

Emily Wilkinson, Amy Kirbyshire, Leigh Mayhew, Pandora Batra and Andrea Milan

Key messages

- Climate-induced migration and displacement is falling between the policy gaps. Existing international frameworks and national policies are yet to make the crucial link between climate change impact on the frequency and intensity of extreme climate events, environmental degradation and human mobility.

- This is partly because although migration and climate change have a significant relationship, it is extremely difficult to disentangle and quantify. However, it is clear that the numbers of climate-induced migrants will increase.

- Global agreement to address climate-induced migration and displacement is needed, but the political obstacles are significant. Governments prefer bilateral solutions to cross-border migration and displacement, and tend to discourage internal rural-to-urban migration.

- A global compact on migration could fill in the policy gaps on climate-induced migration and displacement. A comprehensive approach would address the need for assistance, protection and durable solutions for those displaced by climate change, manage climate risks for those remaining and support opportunities for voluntary migrants adapting to climate change.
1. Human mobility in the context of climate change

People move for a variety of reasons, and there are many modes and categories of human mobility. Understanding the characteristics of these movements and how they relate to different climate shocks and stressors is key to developing effective policy responses, adaptation plans and investments. There is a fundamental gap in understanding the connections between climate change and human mobility, particularly migration, and more research on this relationship is needed to support decision making.

There is no universally agreed definition of climate-induced human mobility (Warner, 2010), but broadly, it refers to movement of people driven by sudden or progressive changes in the weather or climate. This can include temporary and permanent, seasonal and singular, as well as voluntary and forced movement.

Climate risk and human mobility

Most commentators adopt a risk-centric approach to the issues in climate-induced migration and displacement. Essentially, this means understanding human mobility as a response to the risks associated with climate change and extreme weather (as opposed to, for example, a human rights issue or adopting a people-centered approach). More attention is therefore paid to the conditions in place of origin (that drive people out) than to the movement itself, or the destination, or to those who are unable to respond.

Climate risk refers to the combination of the likelihood of the occurrence of a weather or climate event, and the consequences of that occurrence (UNISDR, 2009). It can be intensive or extensive in nature. Intensive climate risk is associated with sudden-onset, high severity events such as hurricanes and large scale floods. Extensive climate risk is associated with low severity, high frequency or persistent weather and climate events such as drought and recurrent local flooding. Extensive risk also includes the slow-onset but permanent environmental changes associated with climate change such as changes in rainfall predictability, salt water intrusion, desertification and sea level rise. Climate change increases both kinds of risk, shifts the geography of risk, and creates new environmental risks.

The movement of people in response to climate risk is complex, but the distinction between intensive and extensive risks is a useful starting point in characterising the relationship between climate risk and human mobility. Movements of people in response to intensive risks are very different from those in the context of extensive risks. These different types of movement can be categorised as (1) migration, (2) displacement and (3) planned relocation (Warner et al., 2013) (see figure below).

While forced displacement and voluntary migration are often referred to as two distinct categories, the line between them is difficult to define, particularly when people are moving in response to extensive risk. In reality, these two categories are two poles along a continuum; many migrants are in the grey, middle zone where aspects of choice and coercion come into play (Hugo, 2010). Planned relocation is a distinct category, but the scale is small relative to climate-induced migration and displacement. Planned relocation usually takes place within national borders, but some states, such as small islands predicted to be submerged due to sea level rise, are seeking planned relocation solutions for their citizens abroad (UNHCR, 2014).

The majority of climate-induced migrants and displaced people move to urban centres, though the proportion of rural versus urban destinations varies depending on the context (Mosel and Jackson, 2013). Significantly, in the case of both extensive and intensive risk, climate shocks and stresses typically affect entire communities rather than particular individuals or families. In the context of climate change, people displaced en masse have often been erroneously referred to as ‘climate change refugees’.

Types of human mobility in the context of climate change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Displacement</th>
<th>Migration</th>
<th>Planned relocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Situations where people are forced to leave their home or place of habitual residence. Displacement is usually associated with intensive risk, where the occurrence of a disaster event is the primary driver of movement. It can take place within or across national borders.</td>
<td>Movements which are, to some degree, voluntary. This is usually associated with extensive risk, and can take place within or across national borders. The decision to move is complex and often linked to multiple drivers, including but not limited to climate risk.</td>
<td>An organised relocation, typically instigated, supervised and carried out by the state with the aim of reducing (usually extensive) weather and climate risks. Ideally, planned relocation should be undertaken transparently and with the informed consent of, or upon the request of, the community. It should also be accompanied by resettlement (the restoration of communities and socio-economic conditions) (McAdam and Ferris, 2015).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, 2014.
Why there is no such thing as a ‘climate change refugee’

The terms ‘environmental refugee’ or ‘climate change refugee’ appear frequently in the media and literature, referring to people forced to leave their homes and cross national borders due to the increased frequency of severe weather events or increases in extensive risk due to climate change. However, the term has no basis in international law. Under the Refugee Convention, the term ‘refugee’ is reserved for people who have been forced to move across borders due to fear of persecution (a definition which is generally accepted to include people fleeing armed conflict) (Holzer, 2012). The misuse of this term is increasingly being recognised and corrected by experts and actors in this field, who now refrain from its use (for example, see Renaud et al., 2011). Furthermore, experts caution against the extension of refugee law to include environmentally-displaced people, as this this will not ‘solve’ the humanitarian issue (McAdam, 2011).

2. Moving in response to ‘intensive’ and ‘extensive’ climate risks

Climate change is bringing about more intense and frequent extreme events in some places, as well as gradual changes in average temperatures and sea level rise. These present different kinds of risk — intensive and extensive — and people’s movements in response to these risks tend to be quite different. Intensive risk is a much clearer driver of displacement but the number of people moving in response to extensive risks may arise considerably in the future.

Responding to intensive risks

Displacement associated with intensive risk tends to be sudden, short distance and temporary. Displaced people move because they have no real alternative than to leave their homes to seek safety and protection. Those that are forced to move often lose property and other assets, and these extreme events can push people into poverty while also limiting opportunities to escape from poverty (Shepherd et al., 2013; Wilkinson and Peters, 2015). Compared with extensive risk, movement in response to intensive risk can often be attributed to a particular disaster as the primary trigger. We know that major floods in 2010 in Pakistan, for instance, displaced nine million people but most of these returned home within a year (Brickle and Thomas, 2014).

The scale of disaster-induced displacement is significant: between 2008 and 2015, an average of 25.4 million people per year were internally displaced by disaster events, although most of these for a relatively short period of time (IDMC, 2016). The large majority, or 85%, of these new displacements were linked to extreme weather events (in particular, flooding and storms) rather than geophysical events. The number of disaster displaced people fluctuates significantly year-on-year, because displacement is closely linked to the occurrence of less frequent, very large-scale disasters. Accordingly, between 2008 to 2015, only 9% of disaster displacements were associated with small or medium scale events (defined as fewer than 100,000 people displacement) (IDMC, 2016). Usually, the severity of the hazard itself and the resulting environmental conditions are the primary drivers of displacement, with other socio-economic factors that shape vulnerability a secondary influence (Renaud et al., 2011). Africa and Central and South America saw the most people crossing borders to reach safety and assistance, while most internal displacement due to disasters occurred in South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific (Nansen Initiative, 2015; IDMC, 2016).

While good data exists regarding the numbers of new displacements due to disaster events annually, there is currently no global estimate for protracted displacement following disasters, and it is likely that some people are displaced repeatedly or for longer periods of time (IDMC, 2016). Where there are recurrent disaster events, patterns of movement can become cyclical, pre-emptive and permanent as a result of perceived future risk (Warner, 2010), blurring the line between displacement and migration.

Responding to extensive risks

Migration associated with extensive risk can be seasonal, long term or permanent. Since decision-making processes are often concerned with socio-economic wellbeing, extensive risk and gradual changes in the environment are often not the only factors considered. There are no reliable global estimates of past and current migration flows in response to extensive risks (Gemenne, 2011), but many cases have been documented. Individuals and households in Bangladesh, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Peru, Tanzania, Thailand and Viet Nam have migrated to manage risks related to rainfall variability and livelihood insecurity, for example (Warner and Afifi, 2014).

Migration in the context of extensive risk can be both ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ (Renaud et al., 2011). Forced migrants are those who need to leave their homes to avoid severe deterioration in habitat and resources, such as sea level rise. The urgency for flight is less than that of disaster-induced displacement, and the pace of movement is slower. These people may be unable to return due to the physical loss of land, or may need to alter livelihood practices or other aspects of living in order to return. The line between forced migration and climate-induced displacement is not always clear. Conversely, voluntary migrants make a choice to move in the context of steadily deteriorating conditions and in response to opportunities elsewhere (Renaud et al., 2011).

For any form of climate-induced mobility, there can be a complex relationship between the drivers: conflict, resource scarcity and the extensive risks associated with climate change (such as longer drought periods) often combine...
and can be difficult to unpick (WB and UNHCR, 2015). Determining the extent to which movement is voluntary or forced, or the influence of extensive risk on a decision to migrate, is very challenging (Black et al., 2011).

**The future of climate-induced migration and displacement**

The multiple relationships between climate risks and mobility suggest that the numbers of people moving internally to cities and across borders will likely rise over the coming decades (Milan et al., 2015). Geographical patterns are unlikely to change, however. That is, with the exception of border regions and small island states, most migrants and displaced people will remain within their own country or region, and most are likely to head to urban centres (Findlay, 2011; Black et al., 2011; Bardosley and Hugo, 2010; Milan et al., 2015).

Predictions of future numbers should be handled with care. Estimates vary widely, from between 25 million and 300 million people on the move or permanently displaced due to climate risks by 2050, but none of the existing estimates are considered very reliable (Gemene, 2011). Some of the highest estimates come from environmental actors who predict vast population flows in an effort to galvanise international cooperation on climate change (Castles, 2008; Piguet, 2013). Yet the lowest estimates are likely to be too optimistic given that the current average number of IDPs after disasters (25.4 million annually) already exceeds this figure.

**3. Use of migration as a risk reduction and adaptation strategy**

In some modes and contexts, migration can be an autonomous adaptation strategy and therefore a positive, anticipatory response to climate change. This has important implications for international and national policy on migration, requiring action from authorities to facilitate migration and avoid displacement and forced migration in the future (Renaud et al., 2011). Conversely, not everyone is equally able to act in this way to avoid climate change impacts, or indeed wants to, and care should be taken to avoid overstating the role of migration in adaptation.

Voluntary migration can lessen the risk of displacement by reducing exposure to climate hazards, and is therefore a contribution to individual and societal adaptation (Foresight, 2011; Noble et al, 2014; Piguet, 2013). In addition, when the decision to migrate is planned by the individual or household before the need to move is critical, and if the human and labour rights of all social groups on the move are respected, migration can lead to other positive outcomes. These include better employment opportunities for migrants at destination, and increased income through remittances for those who stay behind (Warner et al., 2013). In this way, migration of some members or whole households can reduce vulnerability to climate risks for migrants and those who remain. Seasonal and circular migration in places with high variability or recurrent extreme rainfall events is also often used as a coping strategy, reducing disaster impacts and displacement (Milan, 2015: 23; New Climate for Peace, 2015).

Structural inequalities, including gender inequality, impede the mobility of some, and force the displacement of others (Bettini and Gioli, 2015; Felli and Castree, 2012). Those who lack the resources and networks to escape deteriorating environmental conditions may be unable to move, and therefore trapped in conditions of vulnerability (Findlay, 2011; Milan and Ruano 2014). Meanwhile, deteriorating environmental conditions may directly undermine the ability to move. In Malawi, for example, climate change has eroded the financial capital of rural farmers, capital that would be needed for them to migrate (Suckalla et al., 2016). Climate change is therefore a barrier, as well as a driver, for increased migration.

Who migrates within the household varies: many rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa are experiencing predominantly male out migration; while in the Philippines it is more common for women to move away (Nelson, 2011). The loss of certain household members can increase the roles, responsibilities and vulnerability of those who remain. Given the needs and vulnerabilities of these different groups, it is important to account for the roles and needs of all women, men and children involved in the migration process (including those who are left behind), rather than just focusing on the situation of migrants themselves.

Moreover, there is a gender perspective when considering the connection between climate risk and migration and displacement, as women are typically more vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change than men (Denton, 2002; Chindarkar, 2012). In many countries, women face social, economic and political barriers that limit their coping capacity when affected by climate shocks and stresses, and may also limit their ability to migrate (Kratzer and le Masson, 2016). Disaggregated migration data by gender and other social groups is needed to better understand these inequalities. In general – not just with regard to climate change – more information is needed on how men, women and children are affected by temporary and permanent migration and displacement, including their individual capacities to manage climate risk and mobility.

Large movements of people from areas affected by climate shocks and stresses into densely populated areas can also create new risks. New arrivals in urban areas often live in informal, marginal settlements prone to landslides or local flooding, with limited access to basic services and infrastructure. They may also have increased exposure to communicable and vector borne diseases (UNHABITAT, 2015). A focus on urban resilience is needed, and decision makers must ensure that policies to
build resilience in urban contexts take into account these dynamic conditions (Wilkinson et al., forthcoming).

Policy making in this area should be based on a full and nuanced account of why people migrate in the context of different types of climate stressors. Not all causes or consequences of migration can be considered negative or problematic, while a focus solely on the migrant groups themselves and not on the environments they are moving to and from would ignore important risks associated with climate change and human mobility. Policies are needed to support vulnerable groups and strengthen the resilience of communities in places of out- and in-migration.

4. International frameworks and national policies addressing human mobility in climate change, disaster and development

Climate-induced mobility has been treated and considered in very different ways in international agreements on development, disasters and climate change. Ambiguity in these frameworks sends out confusing messages to national governments trying to implement them in line with their own development objectives. As relevant national and international policy environments are evolving, there is an important opportunity to address the needs of vulnerable groups on the move.

**International climate policy**

In international climate change agreements, a formal recognition of climate-induced migration and displacement has long been lacking. This is despite widespread understanding that climate change has consequences for migration and displacement, and that changes in migration patterns due to climate change will influence the ability of countries to achieve climate targets and for communities to adapt. Climate-induced migration and displacement was mentioned for the first time in United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) assembly documents in 2008, at the 14th Conference of Parties in Poznán (COP14), but not mentioned in the outcomes of that COP.

Migration next appeared in the UNFCCC agenda in 2010, at the 16th Conference of Parties (COP16) in

Timeline of international frameworks and milestones addressing human mobility in the context of climate change

![Timeline of international frameworks and milestones addressing human mobility in the context of climate change](image)
Cancun, when the Cancun Adaptation Framework became the first agreed upon COP text to formally recognise climate-induced mobility as a technical cooperation issue (Warner, 2012). Parties to the Convention were invited to enhance action on adaptation under the Cancun Adaptation Framework by undertaking ‘Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international levels’ (UNFCCC, 2011). An Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility was set up under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, to promote discussion on human mobility in the climate negotiations and to provide technical support to Parties (Warner, 2011; Gibb and Ford, 2012; UNFCCC, 2011). However, two years later, the Doha Decision lacked assertiveness on climate-induced migration and displacement issues (UNFCCC, 2012).

The lead up to COP21 in Paris, in December 2015, which saw renewed interest in climate-induced migration and displacement. The first draft of the Paris Climate Change Agreement (the Paris Agreement) included text on the creation of a ‘climate change displacement coordination facility’ to help with emergency relief for displaced people and planning relocations (UNFCCC, 2015a: Article 5 Option II Paragraph 3). This reference was removed in the second revision of the text however, removing any clear commitment from COP21 signatories to addressing the needs of climate-induced migrants and people displaced across borders. The main impetus for this omission came from the Australian government, who was keen to avoid the creation of a (multilaterally accepted) status for climate-induced migrants. Australia has refused to accept people from Tuvalu who need to be resettled for purely environmental reasons (Foresight, 2011).

In the final text of the Paris Agreement, migration and displacement are mentioned twice: first, in the preamble, where vulnerability of migrants (but not their capacities) is referred to (UNFCCC, 2015b); and second under the text on Loss and Damage (paragraph 50), with a request to establish ‘a task force […] to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change’ (UNFCCC, 2015b). The text does not specify here what is meant by ‘displacement’: whether people have moved as a result of intensive or extensive risk; whether movement is forced or voluntary; or if within or across national borders. It most likely refers to both displacement from intensive risks and forced migration away from extensive risks (and not voluntary migration), but this ambiguity makes it difficult to identify the group of stakeholders and policy makers that would be influenced by this decision. Critically, there is no mention of the positive effects of migration and therefore no recommendation to Parties on how to harness these.

### National climate policies

Some national climate policies refer to migration and displacement, but suffer from a similar lack of clarity. Two types of ongoing policy processes are reviewed here: National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) (superseded by Nationally Determined contributions, NDCs). The NAP process was established under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, at COP16. Few NAPs have been finalised but the process provides an opportunity for governments — some for the first time — to consider climate risk and the challenges and opportunities of migration in development planning. However, without sufficient technical support, NAPs will look similar to their predecessors, the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs), in their treatment of migration. Two-thirds of NAPAs referred to migration, but in terms of negative impacts, with many seeking to limit rural-to-urban migration and a few identifying planned relocation to avoid future impacts (Warner et al., 2015). They provide insufficient detail on strategies to prevent movement of people or to facilitate migration out of vulnerable areas when needed.

Research conducted for this report found that in countries’ commitments to post-2020 national climate actions (INDCs), only 34 out of 162 refer to any form of human mobility, equating to approximately 20% of national submissions to the UNFCCC. Of these 34 countries, 15 are in Africa, 12 Asia-Pacific, 5 Americas and 2 Arab States. There is no reference to human mobility in the commitments of European or Central Asian countries, suggesting that these countries do not think migration will affect their ability to meet mitigation and adaptation goals. Of those that did refer to human mobility, judgements about the implications were mixed: of the 34, there were 19 references to migration as a negative impact to be averted, minimised and managed; and 25 references to migration as part of an adaptation strategy to be promoted primarily through planned relocation and resettlement. These national commitments are slightly more encouraging than the Paris Agreement, but are by no means universally and unequivocally committed to addressing climate change and migration. As countries develop their NAPs to provide more detail, they should endeavor to align with - and deepen - the views on migration presented in these climate commitments.

### International development and disaster risk management policies

Other normative frameworks that seek to strengthen people’s resilience and reduce climate impacts on development include the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN, 2015), the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (SFDRR) (UNISDR, 2015), and to a lesser degree, the New Urban Agenda (UN-HABITAT, 2016). The SFDRR focuses on displacement in response to extreme events (with little consideration
for people moving due to/in anticipation of gradual changes in climate), while the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and New Urban Agenda largely ignore these phenomena.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development sets Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to achieve by 2030. There are several references to migration in the Declaration (paragraphs 14, 23, 29 and 74), but these do not bring climate and migration together. The Declaration highlights displacement and migration as an ‘adverse consequence of increasing global threats’ but makes no direct connection to climate change. Meanwhile, SDG13 on climate action (UN, 2015) does not mention migration or displacement, or recommend the inclusion of this important phenomenon in climate policies. Other SDG goals, specifically SDGs 8, 10 and 17, point to the need for facilitated, planned and well-managed migration policies but do not make the connection with climate change.

The SFDRR serves as a global blueprint for efforts to build resilience to natural hazards. It represents an evolution in the way human mobility is considered within global policy dialogues. Its predecessor, the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (HFA) (UNISDR, 2005) merely recognised that forced migration and efforts to address it could increase exposure and vulnerability. In contrast to the HFA, the SFDRR addresses a range of topics, including climate and non-climate induced displacement after disasters as well as migrants’ contribution to resilience at their destination, all of which is missing from other global dialogues. The complex relationship between disasters and human mobility is well articulated but the framework, fails to highlight the exacerbating effect of climate change.

The outcome from the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III), the New Urban Agenda, outlines a global strategy around urbanisation for the next two decades. It should be an important framework for addressing issues of climate-induced migration, yet the draft outcome document for adoption (UN-HABITAT, 2016) considers migration and climate change as two separate issues in urban areas, again failing to make the links between them. More droughts will drive rural inhabitants into cities, creating pressures on labour markets and housing, and producing other types of risk as people move into hazardous places. The New Urban Agenda fails to anticipate this trend and encourage planning that accounts for increasing in-migration due to climate change.

**International policy on migration and displacement**

Climate-induced mobility is gaining some attention in international debates on migration and displacement. In particular, an understanding of the protection needs of those forced to move by intensive and extensive risk has increased over the last year, but this has not as yet led to policy change or legislative reform. Support for those moving voluntarily is still not being discussed with any clarity.

The UN Global Commission on International Migration report, Migration in an interconnected world: new directions for action (GCIM, 2005), notes that disasters and environmental degradation are drivers of migration. Following on from the report, a Global Migration Group (GMG) was set up in 2006 to bring together the heads of UN agencies to advance a coherent approach to migration, although the UNFCCC was not included and climate change has not been discussed much to date. In lieu of an international agreement to drive this forward, some UN agencies within the GMG are beginning to integrate work on climate-induced migration into their programmes. UNDP (2016) for example, is active to some degree on the topic. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) formally joined the United Nations system in September 2016, which will help promote action. IOM recognises climate risk as a driver of migration and displacement and the role of migration as an adaptation strategy (IOM, 2014), it has submitted technical inputs to the UNFCCC Secretariat, is a member of the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, and was involved in the UN’s Task Team on the Social Dimensions of Climate Change, which sought to address different types of climate-induced mobility in programming (IOM, 2014).

Those moving in response to intensive and extensive risks are in theory protected by national laws under the UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, international human rights laws and the Refugee Convention. However, there is an important legal gap with regard to those displaced across borders, who are not covered under the Refugee Convention (Nansen Initiative, 2015). Those forced to move in response to extensive risk are not offered the same legal protection as those facing intensive risk; an issue that has both fallen between the gaps (with the UNFCCC paying little attention to protection issues) and been precluded from recognition (high level courts rejecting the idea of climate refugees) (McAdam, 2011; UNHCR, 2015).

The Nansen Initiative and subsequent Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change (the Protection Agenda, and Platform on Disaster Displacement set up to implement it) aim to fill this gap (Nansen Initiative, 2015). The Nansen Initiative aims for a more coherent approach to the protection of people displaced by climate extremes, disasters and extensive risks associated with climate change, and has led to the development and endorsement of the Protection Agenda by 109 countries. The Protection Agenda tackles disaster displacement risk in the country of origin, including through facilitating movement out of at-risk areas and the protection of cross-border disaster displaced people. It is probably the most progressive platform on climate-induced human mobility. The Nansen Initiative and Platform on Disaster Displacement have also
begun to look at the blurred line between those forced to move in response to extreme events and those compelled to move as a result of deteriorating environmental conditions.

The UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants held in September 2016, was billed as a watershed moment for the governance of international migration, with all 193 Member States signing up to the pre-negotiated New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (UN, 2016). This represents a significant step toward a global framework on migration, laying out a two-year timeline for countries to negotiate global compacts on refugees and ‘safe, orderly and regular migration’ (Alfred, 2016). It recognises the positive contribution made by migrants, and the benefits and opportunities of safe, orderly and regular migration. Even so, the emphasis is on reduction and deterrence, with the potential role of migration in climate change adaptation being ignored (Frelick, 2016; Alfred, 2016; Campbell, 2016). Encouragingly, the Declaration recognises the intensive and extensive risks associated with climate change as drivers of migration, but fails to grasp the complexity of the drivers of forced migration (including climate change). Draft provisions to protect and assist vulnerable migrants who do not qualify for refugee status were watered down, and the Declaration has been criticised as abstract and toothless (Frelick, 2016; Howden, 2016).

5. The politics of climate-induced migration and displacement

Some credible recommendations on how to manage climate-induced migration and displacement have emerged in recent years, yet overall, the international policy response is incomplete. In particular, there is no comprehensive international framework or set of national policy instruments for addressing climate-induced migration (whether ‘forced’ or ‘voluntary’) where extensive risk is increasing. This is problematic, as it is likely to be an important driver of migration in the future. An emphasis on the potential benefits of migration as an adaptation strategy is also lacking.

These issues have fallen between the gaps partly because they are so complex; but they are also highly political. Governments are reluctant to address cross-border migration and displacement through a global agreement, preferring to develop their own domestic legislation and negotiate bilateral agreements. This is the case even for conflict-induced displacement across borders, where refugees are protected by the 1951 Refugee Convention, but countries often violate this, both in spirit and in practice (Hargrave and Pantuliano, 2016). Garnering international agreement on climate-induced migration will be significantly more difficult. In addition, movement across international borders, whether in response to conflict or climate change, is increasingly attracting attention in national security agendas where it is framed as a negative issue and a problem for host countries (see for example CSAG, 2014). The European response to the Syrian crisis is a recent high profile example. As such, the commitments laid out by member states in the Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, however toothless, do not match the rhetoric of those same states domestically (Hargrave and Pantuliano, 2016).

Internal climate-induced migration is generally viewed as problematic by governments in the Global North and South, adding to concerns about the volume of new arrivals in urban centres and the decline of rural areas. In 2013, 80% of governments with available data already had policies to lower rural to urban migration, an increase from 38% in 1996 (UNDESA, 2013). This proportion is highest in low- and middle-income nations in Africa and Asia – the regions that are currently undergoing urban transitions and also home to some of the most climate-vulnerable countries. Similarly, most of the NAPAs that noted migration as a response to climate change sought to limit rural-to-urban migration, hence any international policy that promotes opportunities for those migrating to adapt to climate change is unlikely to be well received. Nonetheless, climate-induced migration is becoming more permanent, and national governments less able to address the causes of out-migration, rendering these policies to limit movement less appropriate. Countries will therefore need technical assistance to identify suitable actions to address migration and displacement as they develop their NAPs (Warner et al, 2015).

Agreement around a Loss and Damage Mechanism is making slow progress, but will most likely focus on forced migration and displacement where the climate change drivers are clear. Agreement will be sought around solutions for those forced out permanently due to irreversible environmental degradation. The negotiations are fraught with tension but some kind of compensation will likely be offered to cities and countries receiving these groups.

Given the obstacles, progress is likely to be slow on developing a coherent international approach to climate-induce migration and displacement. A global compact on migration could become a powerful tool for addressing all forms of climate-induced migration and displacement, including where migration is voluntary or more difficult to attribute to climate drivers. However, the issue will need a champion. The formal integration of the IOM within the United Nations system could be significant in this regard. It means that, for the first time, the UN has a dedicated migration agency with a strong interest in climate change and environmental issues, giving migration and displacement an elevated position in UN negotiations (IOM, 2016).

The global compact on migration will need to agree assistance and protection policies that offer the same level of rights and opportunities for those displaced or forced to migrate, regardless of their location, and based on need
rather than status (IOM, 2014; Zetter, 2015). For those forced out permanently due to irreversible environmental change it should promote durable solutions similar to those needed for refugees - principally, resettlement and local integration. In addition, it should promote measures that facilitate voluntary migration as an adaptation strategy. This would include measures to support local integration such as low cost registration and access to public services to the local economy and culture (IOM, 2014). Pulling this all together in one global agreement is a big ask given the political sensitivities identified above; but a global compact on migration could take advantage of the language and commitments already made in climate and disaster policies and in the SDGs, bringing these together under a more coherent approach to climate-induced human mobility.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Arabella Fraser, Justin Ginnetti, Angela Kintominas, Venge Nyirongo, Robert Oakes and Sara Pantuliano for their very helpful comments and suggestions on improving this briefing paper.
References

Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility.(2014) ‘Human mobility in the context of climate change: Recommendations from the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility’. COP 20 Lima, Peru.


Alfred C. (2016) The week that refugees were at the top of the U.N. Agenda, News Deeply. (https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2016/09/22/the-week-that-refugees-were-at-the-top-of-the-u-n-agenda).


GMG. (2010) Mainstreaming migration into development planning: A handbook for policy-makers and practitioners. IOM.


