Doing development differently

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What is doing development differently?

The *doing development differently manifesto* grew out of a meeting at Harvard University in October 2014. It sought to capture a set of ideas about what really successful development interventions look like.

Just a few years ago, it felt like few of these ideas had much purchase on the policies and practices of large international development agencies or developing country governments. Today, it feels like there are almost daily discussions on these themes. As this newspaper shows, there is a growing body of lived experience of putting these ideas into practice. Crucially, efforts are underway to change the rules and processes, people and systems in some big donor and development organisations.

But progress is not guaranteed. Looking ahead, we need to do more to recognise that these ways of working are hard – we need to be honest about what we are learning, including where we are not getting things right. While two years ago in Harvard we focused on successes, today we can do more to reflect on our struggles too.
While we should be optimistic that internal reforms are now on the agenda for a number of organisations, it is not yet clear where these reforms will end up. A pressing concern is that, despite progress in simplifying internal rules, these efforts remain fragmented unless change is embedded through supportive leadership and management cultures. The changing political winds in the US and Europe may not bode well.

Finally, though there is an aid reform agenda here, it is about so much more than that. Donors don’t actually ‘do’ development and this paper, and related outputs, help to showcase how country governments and other key players are getting on board with these ideas. We want to focus on this more in the future.
What could be stopping you from doing development differently?

Our community is broader than aid. It’s broader than donors. It’s about all organisations delivering change, producing real solutions to real problems that have real impact. It’s about building trust, empowering people and promoting sustainability.

Across our community, many organisations are putting these principles into practice. But they have encountered resistance. Some people don’t want to work in this way, while others just don’t know how. Here are some of the main issues we found:

You are constrained by technicalities and rules. The way that procurement, contracts and HR are set up can encourage rigidity. It can be hard to find people with the ‘special sauce’ and enable them to be innovative in a bureaucratic environment. You may have good intentions, but be constrained in your implementation.

“Large development institutions are not set up to mainstream [flexible] approaches at scale since they are wired to produce a simplistic narrative around aid budgets”

– Katherine Bain (Independent, former World Bank)

“Internal factors are vital to a programme’s ability to innovate, adapt and take small bets to solve local problems”

– Emma Proud (Mercy Corps)
You have strict reporting requirements

You are held accountable for results, and are bound to a strict reporting structure. But you also want to deliver real results that have a measurable impact on people’s lives. How can you make sure your projects are locally defined and led, adaptive and flexible when you’re accountable for how you spend resources?

“We found that results based management and its reporting requirements were influencing the programme direction, and not always in an effective or desirable way”

– Alix Tiernen (Christian Aid Ireland)

“Rigidity [in reporting requirements] lies not in the rules but in the culture that past years’ strong focus on control of funds has brought about”

– Lena Ingelstam (Sida)

People aren’t sold on the idea

It’s hard to get buy-in for these ideas within your organisation. You may have one good person, or one good initiative, but these isolated pockets may not spread or scale. They’re merely ‘swimming against the tide’. You need people within your organisation, your stakeholders, and within the wider community, to understand the ideas and why what you’re doing is valuable.

“But these [programmes] operated in insolation. Their success was more the result of committed and highly effective individuals and teams rather than a deeper corporate capacity or ethos”

– Taylor Brown (Palladium)

“It’s been a somewhat lonely journey internally to try to lead reform on this agenda”

– Steadman Noble (Plan UK)
It’s easier to do things the way you’ve always done it

Innovation takes time and energy. When there’s no incentive to innovate, and no freedom to do so, it’s easier to do what you’ve always done. You can become ‘stuck in a rut’ without scope to really reflect on whether projects are delivering real results.

“It’s easy to say you’re ‘pro’ doing development differently, but it’s hard to implement the principles in practice. It takes persistence – overcoming ‘political hurdles’, securing political and bureaucratic buy-in, fighting the box-ticking. You may be in an organisation which is ‘talking the talk but struggles to walk the walk’.

“It is hard to promote problem- and context-driven approaches in the face of dominant solution-driven narratives”

– Helen Derbyshire (Independent)

“It’s difficult to do it in practice

Designing, contracting and implementing programmes to work in this way is time consuming and challenging”

– Panthea Lee (Reboot)

“Some of the barriers to this kind of work need a much stronger acknowledgement and challenge. For example, [...] if we are making up results in London and asking people in Dhaka to deliver them, haven’t we already lost?”

– Craig Valters (Overseas Development Institute)

“We have had a very steep learning curve in the process. What we thought we knew in the beginning has changed considerably”

– Vanessa Parker (National Treasury, South Africa)
Where can you start?

Recently, our community of practice got together for a workshop in London to identify some key actions and constraints that we need to tackle if we are to do development differently.

Not all of these will be relevant to your organisation. And this list is not exhaustive. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to doing development differently.

However, the lessons imparted by the participants on these issues are a good place to start.
Swimming against the tide
From 2013-2016, I led several pilots to mainstream doing development differently (DDD) principles across the country strategy and individual operations in the Nigeria portfolio of the World Bank.

The approach has required a dose of luck, ‘workarounds’ of existing systems, trust fund financing to support the innovation, and risk-taking (arguably, irrational behaviour) by management and staff. We were able to ‘crowd in’ the necessary skills through flexible drawdown contracts with consultants and build in specific instruments to sustain feedback and adaption locally on the ground. However, this required creative work arounds of bureaucratic processes and systems. The experience illustrates that large development institutions are not set up to mainstream such approaches at scale since they are wired to produce a simplistic narrative around aid budgets. If DDD is to be mainstreamed at scale in such institutions, a concerted campaign to change the aid narrative is needed.

In my paper with ODI, *Updating the Plumbing to Fit the Architecture*, I suggest three shifts large development institutions might consider:

1. Abandon the perfect in favour of the ‘good enough’.
2. Encourage flexibility and transformational engagements across country portfolios.
3. Focus squarely on HR Incentives for management and staff.

From 2012-2016 I worked for the UK Department for International Development-funded SAVI (State Accountability and Voice Initiative) programme in Nigeria, supporting citizen engagement in state-level governance. I now work for SAVI’s successor programme, the “Engaged Citizens Pillar” of PERL, a wider governance reform programme. Partly building on experience from Nigeria including SAVI and influenced by international debates, doing development differently (DDD) principles are at the heart of PERL design, management and implementation.

In SAVI, championed by the core technical team, initial systems and processes associated with a conventional “blue print” approach transitioned during the programme to those resonating strongly with DDD principles – politically smart, locally led, and focused on learning by doing and adaptation.

Our experience suggests that DDD approaches are effective in achieving institutional reform results in complex environments. However, designing, contracting and implementing programmes to work in this way is time consuming and challenging – often involving swimming against the tide of conventional practice and expectations.

The key practical challenge is reconciling the need for flexible plans which respond to complex and changing contexts with delivering accountability to the donor. All management systems and processes – including monitoring and evaluation, financial and human resources management, and delivery of value for money - need to be adapted to enable flexibility and adaptation, whilst also meeting donor requirements.
The Doing Development Differently principles of focusing on real needs, taking small bets, and collaboration are core to what we do. For example, we’re supporting partners in São Paulo to create a more open system of health innovation that responds to real unmet needs and solves problems more quickly.

Practically, in running this project we are working with local partners and have tried to get a wide range of local stakeholders involved through consultation and workshops. In another example, we’re working with the UNDP in Moldova to employ some of the tools and techniques of ‘collective intelligence’ to tackle local challenges, for example around understanding citizens’ priorities and mapping multi-dimensional poverty.

However, we see a couple of challenges when thinking about how we can apply the DDD principles in our work. We work with actors in the development field, but we’re not implementing development programmes directly. It would be good to have more of a sense of what good looks like for an intermediary organisation like ours. For example, what could/should we do to ensure that our projects are genuinely driven by local needs when our direct ‘clients’ are usually multilaterals, governments or large NGOs?

When I arrived as Christian Aid’s country director in Colombia in 2007, I discovered a team that had built relationships with national and regional civil society in general as well as particular partners which we funded. These partnerships tended to last well over a decade. Many I spoke to described our political support as more important than our financial support. In some cases, when other donors had pulled out because of financial or political problems, Christian Aid stayed in partnership to help resolve things gradually.

Our attitude was not that we knew best, although we did share our advice and experience. Our attitude was one of trust in partners to know the context and to do the right thing. Our job was to manage the bureaucracy of aid and to add value with expertise and advocacy support where possible. Audits money and impact are necessary but cannot substitute, in my experience, for relationships of trust between people and between organisations. Those take time to build, a lot of listening and a lot of patience.
Implementing the doing development differently principles in Plan UK has for the most part been challenging. Organisational incentives and ways of working are not immediately aligned to support this agenda. The organisation has often had to prioritise income growth in an increasingly competitive environment. The organisation has therefore been largely reactive to tenders and many proposals are increasingly written based on donor specifications, TORs and business cases and are not sufficiently locally driven. It’s been a somewhat lonely journey internally to try to lead reform on this agenda.

However, we have made two changes to our programme design process:

- Our programme quality criteria now include a focus on rigorous, locally-driven context analysis that takes account of political factors and we are building this into inception phase of programmes (applied participatory problem-driven political economy analyses).
- We have inserted a “design-implementation options analysis” into the programme development process that allows the organisation to pause and consider alternative design and implementation options that might be different from the prescriptions of donor terms of reference and proposed logframes.

These are slowly chipping away at our approach to programming but we are largely up against the incentives of the donors, particularly DFID, that appear to prioritise a results agenda that is more short-term, service delivery focused and technocratic rather than long term and transformational.

Putting the doing development differently (DDD) principles into practice can be rather challenging at ODI. We rarely implement programmes – and as a London-based think tank there is a challenge around the first three ‘local’ principles.

But we’ve done a lot to encourage DDD. We’ve not just published papers but spent much more time engaging with donors and practitioners. What I’ve learned over the last two years is that this kind of engagement and approach is essential.

However, I also think some of the barriers to this kind of work need a much stronger acknowledgement and challenge. For example, how does the way we think about ‘results’ in development shape our ability to do effective DDD? If we are making up results in London and asking people in Dhaka to deliver them, haven’t we already lost?

To truly do things differently, space needs to be opened for local knowledge and leadership in development processes. From our side, that means rethinking how ‘we’ design, manage and implement development programmes. For ODI, it also means considering how we can leverage our domestic relationships to support emergent DDD initiatives in other countries.
Working in and with government
The New Climate Economy (NCE) provides independent and authoritative evidence on the relationship between actions which can strengthen economic performance and those which reduce the risk of dangerous climate change. Doing development differently, for the work NCE, is about three things. First, bringing together quality evidence drawing on a range of disciplines. Second, communicating that evidence to governments clearly and with tangible policy implications. Third, ensuring that in both producing and communicating that evidence it has involved participatory engagement with those that have a mandate to deal with the issues, those that will be impacted, and those that know the context best. This is also not about a quick fix, and the NCE have tried to take some responsibility in terms of delivering outcomes and contributing to a process to help support policy experimentation. This means taking personal responsibility and not putting the blame on the lack of government capacity, donors, or the consultants. Our work in Ethiopia and Uganda has given us many insights into being effective. We have taken months in early project design to ensure we have a clear and concrete policy reform window. This has meant working ‘with the grain’ of local policy processes, rather than be seen to be imposing an external agenda on an already heavily burdened government.

The Budget Strengthening Initiative has been providing flexible and adaptive support to Ministries of Finance in fragile states since 2010. Lessons learnt have been documented in the publication *Change in Challenging Contexts*. Since 2014, the programme has expanded beyond the initial three countries of South Sudan, Liberia and DRC to undertake innovative forms of support in both Uganda and Sierra Leone. PDIA style workshops have been undertaken in both DRC and Liberia and a problem driven approach has led to an exciting programme of work in Sierra Leone which has resulted in direct funding by the Government.

Work in Uganda has involved a range of innovative partnerships to drive important reforms in transparency and in making transfers to local Government increasingly objective, equitable, transparent and performance based. The programme has continued to attract funding from diverse agencies with core funding currently provided by Sida and is currently operating with a turnover of £5 million per year. The programme both illustrates and demonstrates the complementary nature of Problem driven approaches to other more conventional programmes which was clearly shown in an ODI research report on PFM reform in Uganda.

While Doing Development Differently has value in its own right it can also assist in the design, delivery and effectiveness of more traditional programming.
In Sierra Leone, the Budget Strengthening Initiative (BSI) is providing support to cash management and public investment management. Key characteristics of the approach are:

1. Solving a topical local problem: Cash management had been an item on the government’s agenda since 2013 and was identified as a priority during an initial diagnostic visit.

2. Working through local conveners and legitimised at all levels: Local counterpart staff jointly carry out the work. The project is endorsed by the head of the Accountant General Department, Financial Secretary and Minister. BSI staff meet with the first two on every mission to provide feedback and discuss progress. Their input is built into subsequent activities.

3. Managing risks by making ‘small bets’: The intervention in cash management has been developed as a simple excel forecast. This ‘small bet’ had high returns given existing systems. Too grand an intervention may not have worked. Another small bet was providing remote support when no BSI staff are in-country.

4. Real results: Public investment management has started, using a concept note that was partially designed by BSI. The cash forecast is now a routine item on the cash management meeting agenda and local staff prepare the forecast weekly. While gains remain precarious, the importance placed on the work is shown by the provision of direct Government funding.

In recent years, I have provided technical support to DFID-funded programmes in Myanmar and Vietnam funding issue-based policy advocacy coalitions. This technical support encouraged an adaptive and flexible approach to coalition building and policy influencing. In a similar vein, I am presently supporting the Engaged Citizen Pillar of DFID’s Partnership to Engage, Reform and Learn (PERL) programme in Nigeria in its inception phase to develop and implement a Learning and Adaptive Management Processes and Systems (LAMPS) approach. LAMPS will support the programme in rapid cycles of ‘learning by doing’ that facilitate adaptive programming at operational and programme management levels. The knowledge generated through LAMPS will feed interventions that support citizen engagement for improved service delivery, support reporting for external accountability and contribute to higher level learning about how change happens.

Emerging challenges for learning and adaptive programming in support of coalitions centre on the tensions between external and local processes and raise the following questions:

- How do you provide a process support role without creating dependency and undermining coalition dynamism?
- How do you fund coalition activities without creating a project mindset?
- How do you achieve a trade-off between contextual measurement of change and the pressure to standardise, aggregate and report programme progress upwards?
Here are some ways we work politically at UNDP in Europe and Central Asia:

1. **Innovation and new tech**: enable novel ways of interaction between the citizen and the state that can foster change in outcomes, such as in the co-design of public service delivery or citizen driven and generated solutions to problems.

2. **Go local**: Where national political dynamics might make tangible improvements unlikely, local governments and communities are often open and ready for change. We see this as an avenue for improved public service delivery, decreasing corruption and increasing gender equality in decision-making.

3. **Focus on data and evidence**: while not problem solvers in themselves, they can help drive new forms of openness and access, decision-making, media and accountability.

UNDP’s work on illegal waste in Kosovo is an example of the impact of an adaptive, locally owned project. We work towards more democratic governance and peace in middle income countries which are located between the geo-political powers of Russia, the European Union and the Republic of Turkey. Considered to have relatively high capacity, economic stability and a legacy of good public service provision and low inequalities from previous communist regimes, these countries’ governance styles range from newly democratic to authoritarian.

Within Fiscus, we try to focus on helping our partners to solve real problems and make a difference to the quality and reach of public services. Within the ‘development game’, this is not always easy but recently development agencies have been more willing to experiment and allow us, their consultants, to improvise. Long may this continue!

How has our work changed?

- Firstly, we listen more and think more carefully about what is ‘the problem’. Before, problems would be more vaguely defined and, unconsciously, this often meant that our proposed solutions looked the same.

- Secondly, we have been more adaptable in the type of solutions we propose and have thought more carefully about how to sequence solutions to the problem.

In Nicaragua, the government wanted an early warning system to track delivery of key programmes so we helped them to develop a ‘fast evaluation’ methodology, based on three-person teams visiting problem programmes for two weeks. This happened for school feeding, rural electrification and smallholder supplies: in all cases, local teams could diagnose problems and introduce positive changes.

Two big lessons:

1. Identifying the real problem is much more difficult than it sounds.

2. Many government beneficiaries of development aid don’t really want to solve problems: one needs to cajole, and find ways of appealing to their nobler instincts – not always easy!
The Law & Development Partnership (LDP) is a technically-led supplier with a strong focus on institutional reform and building state capacity, particularly in relation to economic and security and justice reform. We believe that, to achieve sustainable impact, our role is to work with partners in local organisations to assist them to identify and address problems they care about, at a pace they are comfortable with.

Delivering Legal Assistance for Economic Reform (LASER), a £4.3 million centrally-managed technical assistance programme for DFID since 2014, has allowed LDP to put these principles into practice in the context of implementing a donor-funded programme with its pressures to spend, deliver results and show value for money. Our results framework sets a high level of ambition, requiring us to deliver ‘stories of change’ at outcome level, and achieve ‘major’ and ‘moderate’ results at output level. This flexibility has enabled us to support real change in places such as Sierra Leone and Kenya. ‘Doing project management differently’ has enabled us to manage risks, decentralise decision-making, predict spending as funding follows success, and support ongoing adaptation informed by discovery and learning.

LASER’s experience is that a small, flexible technical assistance programme can be an effective precursor to and leverage more effective spending in larger more conventional donor programming, while achieving results in its own right.

It all started with some senior managers in the Budget Group of the National Treasury attending a training session hosted by the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI) on the use of the Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) method of problem identification, definition and resolution.

As part of the training, we put forward, among others, ‘data gaps’ as one of our persistent issues in the Budget Office. This was evidenced by missing fields, misalignment in time series information and data inconsistencies.

We set up a focus group consisting of officials within the various national and provincial departments to tackle this problem. So far we have connected with all the stakeholders that were identified as the group that should move. We have had a very steep learning curve in the process. What we thought we knew in the beginning has changed considerably. We are also building new collegial relationships with departments through this process. The participation has been very encouraging and we are set to meet our first six-month targets of the project.

The National Treasury team’s journey in implementing the PDIA principals in our data gaps project has been guided by the supportive and encouraging advice of Professor Matt Andrews and the CABRI team.
Housing is one of the strategic priorities of the Government of Albania. It is a basic need. It affects the physical and psychological well-being of an individual, public health, employment policies, and public order and security, and therefore is essential in creating sustainable communities.

In June 2016, the Ministry of Urban Development (MUD) adopted, for the first time, a National Housing Strategy: a political and strategic document on social housing. In order to accomplish this governmental priority, the MUD has strongly cooperated with the Harvard University Launchpad Program. The aim of this project is to construct 515 residential dwellings at “Rrapi i Treshit”, in Tirana, offering optimal housing conditions for citizens with low and middle incomes.

The cooperation among the two institutions has been very fruitful. Together we completed the first phase of the project by tackling many issues such as legislation gaps, team building, working in groups, sharing the work load equally, sustaining each member of the group in the work done and sharing information. It is important to discuss the problems that arise so these issues can take form, or find an alternative solution. We cooperated with other line ministries, analysed data, marketed, found investors and searched for new ways to develop and implement, concretely, the project such as public private partnership (PPP) schemes.

GPG provides direct support to politicians, officials and ministers in managing political and institutional change in fragile, developing and conflict affected states. It also provides strategic advice and political analysis for a variety of international organisations and funding agencies.

From working in some of the most complex and sensitive political environments over the last decade it has developed its own politically agile approach to designing, delivering and measuring change under the acronym KAPE (knowledge-application-practice-effect).

The central principles of KAPE are:

1. Lasting change comes from altering institutional behaviour more than structure, so that new ways of working create a ‘new normal’;
2. Start with the individual, not the institution: programmes should ultimately help people do their jobs better, and;
3. Act small: create pockets of good practice and aim for a ripple effect rather than trying to change everything at once.

KAPE draws on the insights and expertise from other fields, not least from change management literature in the business world, political science and behavioural economics. But it principally reflects the logic GPG has applied over the last decade working with parliaments, political parties and government ministries. In places such as Iraq or Jordan, GPG has worked closely with politicians and officials to establish new ways of working, increase institutional resilience and improve oversight, policy and service delivery.
The BSI Uganda programme has been closely tailored to local demand and capacity from the start. The collaboration on the fiscal-transfer reform that the BSI team in Uganda is working on is the fruit of long-term relationships between the team and the Ministry of Finance. Without the trust that had been built up, the Ministry wouldn’t have accepted the type of support offered, and the reform likely wouldn’t have made the progress it has.

Throughout the course of the project, the BSI team closely involves the Ministry’s staff in preparing analysis that is fed through the hierarchy to enable senior management to take evidence-based decisions. Oftentimes this can be slow and cumbersome, but it is the only way to create the necessary backing for the reform to last beyond the life of the BSI project.
Feedback loops and data
There’s nothing neutral about data. For centuries, governments have used statistics as a tool for control, appropriation and manipulation, reducing complexity to only those aspects of the ensemble that are of official interest (Scott). Despite layers of ‘state simplifications,’ society is still as complex, messy and uncertain as ever. Trying to see order in this chaos takes understanding and data science can help.

Using a problem-driven iterative approach, UNICEF is trying to match problems affecting children around the world (demand) with (big) data that might help (supply). These wicked problems have been formatted into case studies that range from understanding the gendered and age-specific ways people move around in urban centres to whether corporations have any influence on child labour policies in their supply chain across countries.

Data science is uniquely poised to help navigate these complex problems at scale. It’s fluid, messy and works in real time. Working through networks, UNICEF and GovLab are creating data collaboratives to leverage data, especially from the private sector, for child rights. The initiative also builds on the dispersed expertise of many to help construct meaning and solutions to these difficult problems.

The change space is somewhat limited. Resistance is all but certain. And the journey is nothing short of rewarding.

RTI implements flexible and responsive approaches on all projects to continuously learn, adapt and maximise impact. We employ real-time monitoring systems, grounded assessment and evaluation tools and targeted operation activities to respond to the local context;

1. Developmental Evaluations: Whereas traditional evaluations often provide summative results to validate programs and practices, developmental evaluation allows for real-time feedback, supporting ongoing adaption and improvement. This approach is implemented in coordination with key stakeholders to support a reflective culture and inform intentional change by providing data in real time to complement the innovation process and create a solid foundation of reliable information with which to make future decisions.

2. Real time monitoring systems: Real time monitoring systems (open source, SMS, customised dashboards) are used to collect data to track activities, indicators, and targets. This enables data to be reviewed and activities adjusted as needed to meet project objectives.

3. Political Economy Analysis (PEA): Our PEA approach provides an analytical framework to better understand how political, institutional social, cultural and economic factors may positively or negatively impact a project’s theory of change and its ability to achieve desired outcomes. PEA is integrated with work planning activities and learning activities including Annual Reflections Sessions.
Feedback Labs is a network of organisations dedicated to operationalising and mainstreaming citizen feedback in aid, governance and philanthropy. The Doing Development Differently principles are core to the work we do, helping our members and others in our networks figure out how to put local people front and centre of development efforts.

We help practitioners connect with the tools, advice, and supporting community they need to not just collect and analyse citizen feedback, but actually close feedback loops - i.e. make decisions and adapt in line with what they hear. We work with feedback champions within aid institutions and foundations to adapt their procedures and guidelines to allow for more flexibility and adaptability. We work with funders more broadly to incentivise feedback loops. We work with researchers to examine under what conditions feedback is the “right” (ethically) and “smart” (in terms of measurable impact) thing to do.

We consider feedback loops as key to a rich, iterative conversation between governments, experts, and citizens that generates new perspectives, insights, and evidence. Our hypothesis is that such an ongoing conversation leads to greater and more inclusive impact.

We use real-time, at scale, disaggregated data to deliver disaggregated programming. For example, cash transfers and school grants are disbursed based on the South Sudan Schools Attendance Monitoring System which tracks daily pupil attendance at individual level, and get disaggregated results and feedback.

We are adaptive and agile in our program implementation processes and technology development; systems are built to be adapted over time based on user feedback and learning. Having an in-house tech team, using open-source systems and non-proprietary software provides the flexibility for our agile approach to technology development. Working mostly in Fragile and Conflict-affected States (FCAS) makes agility a necessity.

We engage teams and coalitions for country ownership: in South Sudan we support the Education Transfers Monitoring Committee within the Ministry of Education—which makes technical and operational decisions around disbursements of government and partner funds.

Our South Sudan Electronic Payroll System (SSEPS) was cited by Larson, Pritchett and Ajak (HKS 2013) for effective use of Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation to “design a custom payroll form that was more suitable to civil servants’ needs...roll-out was significantly expedited and [they] now use Goldsmith’s custom-and-indigenously-designed form to electronically submit payroll data.”
Doing development differently (DDD) principles are at the heart of Reboot’s approach to program design and implementation, especially in our open government, civil society strengthening and media development portfolios.

We’ve been championing and modelling DDD ways of working in several communities of practice including the Open Government Partnership and the Civil Society Innovation. In both, Reboot serves as a systems integrator, facilitating collaboration between governments, civil society, communities and donors to implement programs that build on existing capacities, initiatives and windows of political opportunity. DDD practices also inform our media development work with partners like Omidyar, Internews, and MacArthur. We are launching a program to help Nigerian media actors strengthen their editorial and operational capabilities and define locally viable paths to sustainability.

To help scale DDD, we’ve conducted an institutional ethnography of a major bilateral agency. We’ve mapped the human, institutional and contextual factors that enable or hinder DDD, and are sharing findings with donors and practitioners to inform policy and practice.

We’ve learned that it is hard to promote problem- and context-driven approaches in the face of dominant solution-driven narratives, that we must overcome psychological and institutional barriers that lead our partners to let ‘international best practice’ trump local experience, and that institutional intrapreneurs at donor agencies can have an outsize impact on our collective ability to DDD.

At the joined-up data standards project, run jointly by Development Initiatives and Publish What You Fund, we work to contextualise data within the development sector by seeking ways to make data standards interoperable with each other. It’s always been an underlying assumption within the project that interoperability challenges are political as well as technical in nature. The Doing Development Differently Manifesto acknowledges that “those who would benefit most lack power, those who can make a difference are disengaged and political barriers are too often overlooked.” I believe that this applies to the process of how data standards used in the development sector are set.

We need more critical analysis of the policies and processes that lie behind data standard development to examine whether they benefit those who ‘lack power’. At the very least, we need to understand the biases and politics that exist in the information systems that we increasingly rely on for the data and information we use as ‘evidence’. Firstly, ‘data silos’ don’t build themselves, humans construct them. Secondly, data standards reflect the biases of the institutions that develop them. Finally, people who set data standards are not the people who publish data.
Organisational change
During the last few years I’ve contributed to doing humanitarianism differently in the following ways:

- Established an organisational change process and introduced tools and standards to support a transition from monitoring of action to Monitoring for Action (MfA). The intent behind the MfA initiative is to improve effectiveness by encouraging data driven programming that better enables course corrections and iterations in programme implementation.

- Launched Context Adaptability, an initiative to enhance the organisation’s ability to better understand, anticipate, and adapt to changes in context and needs.

- Worked with IRC staff, clients and other stakeholders in Africa, Asia, Middle East and North America to employ social network analysis to map and analyse important relationships and network structures, and design interventions based on local contextual dynamics.

- Drawing on sector best practice, I’ve supported the development of a toolkit of Conflict Sensitivity Analysis approaches to better understand conflict contexts and encourage impactful programs that avoid doing harm.

- Together with Mercy Corps, launched the ADAPT (Analysis Driven Agile Programming Techniques) collaboration and researched the enablers and inhibitors of adaptive management in six contexts.

- Designed and piloted a range of adaptive donor-implementing agency arrangements with Sida in five complex contexts.
Over the past two years, Palladium has worked systematically to integrate doing development differently (DDD) principles into our people, programmes and processes. Before then, our portfolio included DDD-type programmes that were politically smart, locally-led and adaptive—e.g. the Enabling State Programme in Nepal and Pyoe Pin in Myanmar (with the British Council) - but these operated in isolation. Their success was more the result of committed and highly effective individuals and teams rather than a deeper corporate capacity or ethos.

Recently, however, we have worked to systematise the DDD principles. This is a long-term process and many internal and external obstacles remain. But, among other things, we have developed and piloted a range of decision-making, management and financial frameworks that allow us to be more responsive and flexible in programme delivery. We are rolling out political economy analysis and adaptive programming training for all our teams—not only for those working in technical areas, but also for those working in operations and business development. We have started to use recruitment criteria that emphasise not just technical experience, but also analytical potential, networking and collaborative competency and entrepreneurial zeal. We are also making much more systematic use of micro-theories of change to help us to better identify and test pathways of change and to make better informed small bets.

In DFID, I worked as a Governance Adviser in Nigeria, Burma/Myanmar and Bangladesh. From 2007 to 2011 I was the Lead Adviser on Pyoe Pin in Burma, an innovative programme that used locally led, iterative approaches to support local civil society actors to organise around and pursue issues that mattered to them. In Bangladesh, I led a gradual shift in DFID’s governance portfolio from large, traditional capacity building programmes to smaller, more iterative and adaptive technical assistance programmes.

I recently moved to London to join DFID’s Better Delivery Department. This department champions a set of reforms in DFID’s operating framework, capability and culture designed to create space to understand and engage with local context, and give teams closest to that context the freedom (and capability) to design flexible and adaptive programmes, take well managed risks and learn fast when things are not working as expected. Over the last two years, I have championed different ways to measure (and vocabulary to describe) the work that DFID and others do to promote “Big Changes” in development, to complement the standard narratives on results and delivery.
A few interesting things we’ve done and learned related to doing development differently (DDD) recently are:

- Ebola: We ended up working extensively on the Ebola response in the three main Ebola-affected countries; a big shift since we don’t focus on health and hadn’t worked in a crisis before. Turns out, DDD principles at the core of AGI’s approach – being locally led, working within the politics and learning and adapting in fast-shifting circumstances – were at least as important to working in a crisis.

- CraftWork: We’ve codified and put an increasing emphasis on ‘CraftWork’, which aims to improve AGI staff’s ability to understand and navigate political environments through activities ranging from coaching to team-based problem solving sessions. We discuss this in our fourth paper in our ‘art of delivery’ series.

- Pushing our own boundaries: DDD principles have spurred us to work on things outside of our comfort zone. We’ve worked with the Industrial Parks Development Corporation in Ethiopia and the Development Bank of Nigeria – far from our typical focus on core government ministries and agencies. We’ve chosen to do this for a combination of DDD-related reasons: we’re following the lead of our partner governments and their priorities as well as reacting to domestic political contexts.

Eighteen months ago, Sida started a process looking at what Doing Development Differently (DDD) would mean for its processes and routines. The work was initiated by a small group of individuals who went about it in a ‘PDIA’ manner, identifying the problems, obtaining authorisation by Heads of Departments, finding positive deviants and discussing the solutions.

Two areas for improvements stand out. One relates to Sida’s relationship with its partners, in particular its requirements on Results Based Management (RBM), results matrices and indicators which many partners and desk officers perceived were too rigid. This ‘rigidity’ lies not in the rules but in the culture that past years’ strong focus on control of funds has brought about. Changes in the guidance notes now underway can be described as going from focus on form (does the partner have a proper logical results matrix?) to a focus on function (does the partner know where it is going and have a credible system to find out whether it is on the right track?).

The other important change identified is the organisational practice of “frontloading” poverty analysis, project appraisal and quality assurance prior to funding decisions. Instead, Sida needs a culture that accepts that future is uncertain, that plans can only be tentative and allocates much more time to continuous analysis and partner dialogue.
I see three broad approaches to how doing development differently (DDD) is being put into practice:

1. Look for places where teams are intuitively using these principles, and find opportunities to recognise and deepen their efforts;

2. Look for opportunities to implement these principles within existing project development and implementation cycles; and

3. Changing or working around existing project development and implementation cycles.

As concrete examples of these three:

1. I work with a water resources management team that has been following these principles in their engagement with clients for many years. We developed political economy analysis which demonstrated the importance of working in this way which was used to justify a more flexible approach during project review meetings with management.

2. For a social safety nets project, I worked with the task team to ensure the Project Implementation Manual includes space for feedback loops and learning from ‘small bets.’

3. Seeking additional budgetary resources (especially Trust Funds) to facilitate better in-depth knowledge of the local context up front; provide local coaches and delivery facilitators during implementation; and foster learning and adaptation from data throughout the project cycle. This is ongoing in Nigeria, and being initiated for a transboundary water resources management project in West Africa.
At Mercy Corps we are trying to put adaptive management at the heart of our organisation. By doing so, our programmes can be more attuned to the structures, resources and potential of the societies we work among, and better able to deliver development and humanitarian results. Our bid to increase organisational agility has driven us to create a Centre of Excellence for adaptive management that works with teams across the agency to hone our internal systems, processes and tools to enable and incentivise teams to do development differently.

Recognising that internal factors are vital to programme’s ability to innovate, adapt and take small bets, we have worked specifically on a number of key areas. Examples include our work to strengthen dynamic and collaborative teams:

- Core competencies: we are working with corporate psychologists to revisit the core competencies we hire and promote, to ensure we encourage and incentivise an adaptive mindset.

- Culture: recognising the importance of culture on our ability to do development differently (and following the lead of large corporates) we have developed a ‘culture deck’ to entrench our commitment to using data driven decision making to experiment, innovate and adapt.

Our understanding of doing development differently (DDD) is that it encourages work in problem driven, politically informed ways, and fosters an adaptive, entrepreneurial, locally led approach. We have used these principles in various programmes and made good experiences with them.

For a start, political economy analysis is now a standard component of OPM’s approach to programmes. An in-depth understanding of the current situation typically provides the basis for the design of interventions. For example, one five-year programme (on female economic empowerment in Mozambique) is set up as a ‘test-lab’. We carried out scoping studies in close collaboration with local partners. The partners then developed problem-driven interventions with programme support. A monitoring, evaluation and learning system is set up to provide frequent feedback, based on theory of change work. It allows local implementers to reflect and adapt their interventions. In this way, it is possible to test a variety of locally-led approaches in an adaptive manner, responding quickly to a changing context.

Other OPM programmes use similar approaches to varying degrees. The problem driven, adaptive nature, with an in-depth understanding of the political context and strong local buy-in (if not leadership) appear to be key elements of success.
Our work at ODI has made an important shift from the production of politically informed analysis to documenting practical examples and insights into what politically smart, adaptive programming looks like, and what sorts of programme design, models and monitoring help facilitate this. A key output has been *Adapting development: improving services to the poor*, which argues that if we are to avoid reproducing the pattern of uneven progress that characterised the MDG period, we need to pursue innovative and adaptive ways to tackle the most intractable problems. It documents a set of examples of what adaptive programming looks like and what will need to change for development assistance.

As part of an Accountable Grant, ODI staff have spent the last year providing direct support to the delivery and innovation of DFID adaptive programmes, through engagement and collaboration with the Better Delivery department, Policy Division, Evaluation Department and more. This has included: developing a set of case studies of adaptive programming and a set of ‘top tips’ for the design, delivery and monitoring and evaluation of these programmes; developing and delivering training modules on adaptive programming; and working with country offices to test out guidance and capture country office perspectives on the opportunities and constraints for flexible and adaptive programming.

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**Alix Tiernan**  
Christian Aid Ireland

Christian Aid Ireland has been implementing a Governance and Human Rights programme through civil society partnerships in seven countries, co-funded by Irish Aid. We have found it a challenge to manage the governance programme, which is often unpredictable with a long-term results timeline, within a standard Results Based Management (RBM) approach. This is not because we had difficulty reporting on results, but because we found that the reporting requirements were influencing the programme direction - not always in an effective or desirable way – and found that it hindered us from fully adapting to complex country contexts.

Learning from our experience, we are designing the next phase of the programme to be based on Adaptive Programming, instead of RBM. While we are clear about our expected outcomes, we are committing to reviewing our Theories of Change at partner level and country level annually, and, using a process called Strategy Testing, we are asking ourselves whether our strategies seem to be leading to the change we want to see: in other words, whether our strategies are working.

We will be using Outcome Harvesting as a monitoring tool to provide us with knowledge about where our programmes are leading to social change, and we will be adapting our strategies annually to ensure we take advantage of changes and opportunities.
Diffusion
Over the past two years, the Building State Capability Program at Harvard has been experimenting with putting Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) principles into practice through direct projects on the ground, and with diffusing these ideas to others on a wider scale online.

On the ground so far we have worked with 17 government teams in Albania and five in Sri Lanka on a wide variety of problems related to manufacturing, agriculture, industrial development, energy, urban development and tourism. We convened special implementation teams who work iteratively and autonomously to solve problems chosen by the government, with support from Harvard. Working in this way recognises the complexity of the problems, and the fact that solutions often cannot be known and planned out ex ante. It also places the learning and empowerment of the teams at the centre of the process.

Online, we have produced 60 short videos highlighting key PDIA concepts and tools. We then developed a PDIA online course using these videos as teaching tools. In the last year we offered four free PDIA online courses which engaged 365 development practitioners in 56 countries. We have also taught PDIA in six executive education courses for public leaders at the Harvard Kennedy School. We have published 10 working papers and finally, the PDIA book entitled, “Building State Capability: Evidence, Analysis, Action” will be published by Oxford University Press in January 2017.

Matt Andrews, Peter Harrington and Salimah Samji
Building State Capability program, Harvard University

To address the conflict in West and South Kordofan, Peace Direct’s partner, the Collaborative for Peace Sudan, seeks to strengthen local capacities for conflict resolution and support coordination between key stakeholders. The organisation supports eleven cost-effective, independent and locally-led Peace Committees, which build on existing local structures and community solidarity and voluntarism, making the network sustainable. This peacebuilding approach involves accommodating perspectives of multiple stakeholders across conflict divides, being inclusive and encouraging participation – including that of women.

Through this, they have achieved high social legitimacy, which has contributed to the network being very effective in preventing and addressing local, sometimes large-scale conflicts, with most reviewed cases resulting in durable peace. Although conflicts with political dimensions remain challenging for Peace Committees to intervene in, their interventions have contributed to addressing underlying causes of conflict such as attitudes, historic antagonisms between groups, the normalisation of violence, and competition over resources.

This work has been achieved through small grants to the Peace Committees of $3,000. This has enabled an environment where ‘failures’ – in this case the inability to prevent conflict escalating – are seen as acceptable risk. The perseverance and small steps approach has over a long period of time gradually developed the programme and the stakeholders to be strong and durable, continuing to operate even in the midst of hot conflict.

Tom Gillhespy
Peace Direct
My main contribution is at the popular end of research and communications, capturing and echoing doing development differently (DDD) thinking in books, blogs and papers. Most recently, *How Change Happens* (2016) shows how systems thinking and power analysis transform development practice. I am currently finishing a paper on donor Theories of Change on Empowerment and Accountability in Fragile and Conflict Settings which draws heavily on the thinking behind DDD.

In *Fit for the Future* (2015) I discuss the organisational implications of DDD for large international NGOs such as Oxfam. I suggest that this means relinquishing a command-and-control approach in favour of embracing a systems approach. This leads to questions about how this work can be funded, how to change human resources practices to encourage ‘searchers’, and whether INGOs are both too big to be agile and too small to take things to scale.

Nonetheless, Oxfam and other INGOs are doing lots of interesting things in this area, though they are not branded them as DDD. These include multi-stakeholder initiatives, convening and brokering, trying to encourage innovation, redefining success by learning to ‘count what counts’ and making more use of real-time evaluation.

Over the past two years Bond has supported shared learning on adaptive management across its network with a focus on:

1. Convoking civil society organisations (CSOs) for peer learning on the practical implications of designing, delivering and evaluating programmes to enable adaptation;

2. Working with CSO leaders on the organisational implications of adaptive management, and

3. Brokering engagement between CSOs and funders on how funders can best enable learning and adaption amongst their partners.

Bond’s 2016-2021 strategy outlines a commitment to embedding a number of the principles of adaptive management, including diversifying Bond’s network to support new alliances and building internal capabilities to identify and respond more effectively to changing member needs.
As a researcher working with a range of donor and implementing organisations I’ve recently been involved in multiple attempts to incorporate doing development differently (DDD) thinking into practice, in large part aimed at design processes that prioritise the use of good political insight as the basis for continued adaptation. Recent published work includes a series of case studies on Working Politically in Practice in Bangladesh, Cambodia and Mongolia.

Ongoing examples include linking a bilateral donor to local providers of baseline political economy analysis to inform new revenue mobilisation programming in Ghana (and support to that analysis); joint analytical efforts with public service sector (WASH) specialists and governance cadres in major multilateral organisations; and direct support to the design process for a new phase of bilateral development partner investments in technical and vocational education and training (TVET) in the Pacific that aims to shift from a supply-driven direct service delivery approach to more sustainable forms of institutional change (including contracting, M&E, etc.).

As an academic researcher I am increasingly aware of just how adaptive (good) research is and, despite many complaints about the shrinking intellectual space inside universities (which is true), just how much of a privilege and pleasure this is. It can also be a risk as many academic researchers end up working on irrelevant topics on impractical timelines with unreadable work and inactionable results.

Over the past two years I’ve tried to work more closely with organisations and staff on the frontline using their insights to guide the research, reported back more frequently (orally and slide decks), and work out which bits are interesting and matter to their work.

One example is a short note on everyday political analysis, which is currently used with DFID, DFAT, and WaterAid.

Ongoing or future examples are, working with a coalition in the Pacific using network analysis to evaluate their effectiveness, and designing a research budget that explicitly sets aside 20% for unforeseen or opportunistic research - i.e. to be flexible.
The Digital and Technology research group at IDS approaches the Doing Development Differently (DDD) principles as a research subject rather than something we can apply ourselves, although the principles certainly inspire and influence how we work.

We look at the DDD principles, and adaptive management more generally, from three research perspectives:

- The first is more theoretical, reflecting on the relationships of adaptive management with other “complexity handling” proposals that emerged in more technical and arguably less complex domains (like the Agile Methodologies, Design Thinking, Lean approaches, etc.). We are trying to identify essential categories and learnings from these domains which could inform, complement and deepen the adaptive development theory.

- Our second research stream is more practical, and looks at the artefacts, methods and processes used in those domains, aiming to adapt them (via exaptation) to the more complex development contexts.

- Our third research stream relates to the empirical analysis of adaptive projects in the Tech for Transparency and Accountability domain. We collect the learnings, frustrations and adaptation stories from initiatives working on the ground.

The combination of these three research approaches should contribute to identify “blind-spots” in the adaptive management discussion, and increase our capacity to design workable feedback loops that promote learning, adaptation and even evolution, within development initiatives and organisations.

I initiated an SDC-wide learning process on the institution’s justice sector reform work. While not specifically designed as a process to implement DDD, this learning process has in fact led to the identification of challenges and lessons learnt of working in a highly political sector that are excellent examples of what it means to be doing development differently (dealing with legal pluralism, starting with the reality on the ground, adapting to changing environments, dealing with ownership, integrating political economy considerations, etc.).

The process, still ongoing, has been designed in a participatory manner and colleagues themselves identified the factors that acted as stumbling blocks with regards to achieving results (e.g. lack of in-depth analyses or failure to translate analyses into program design; institutional risk-aversion; comfort with and over-reliance on technical approaches etc.) and those that enabled programs to deliver and be scaled-up (identifying and seizing political opportunities; role and expertise of national staff; limited pressures to disburse funds; flexibility with regards to implementation modalities, etc.).

The process will result in operational guidance on justice sector reform for SDC staff and offices that are already engaged in justice sector reform or that are planning to get engaged. Several case studies have been identified that would serve as good examples of doing development differently.
Want to know more?
A small selection of outputs from the workshop participants

**Introducing doing development differently (DDD)**
The Doing Development Differently Manifesto (2014)
Wild, L. et al. (2015) *Adapting development: improving services to the poor*

**Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)**

**Overviews and synthesis**
Byrne, K., Sparkman, T., and Fowler, B. (2016) *Getting there from here: Knowledge, leadership, culture, and rules toward adaptive management in market systems programmes*
Green, D. (2016) *How change happens*
Hudson, D. et al (2016) *Everyday political analysis*
Hymowitz, D. (2016) *Shoulder to shoulder: three lessons on supporting governance delivery, Tony Blair Africa Governance Initiative*

**Monitoring, evaluation and learning**
Feedback Labs (2016) *A curated collection of actionable resources to help you improve your feedback loop – resource library*
Peace Direct (2016) *Putting the local first: learning to adapt when measuring change*
Ramalingam, B. Bound, K. (2016) *Innovation for international development: navigating the paths and pitfalls*
Reboot (2015) *Implementing innovation: a user’s manual for open government programs*
Valters, C. (2016) *Theories of Change: time for a radical approach to learning in development*

**Case studies**
Mercy Corps (2016) *ADAPting Aid: Lessons from six case studies*
Bain, K. (2016) *Doing Development Differently at the World Bank: updating the plumbing to fit the architecture*
Christian Aid (2016) *Partnership, power and adaptive programming: learning from Christian Aid’s governance service contracts*
SAVI and LASER (2016) *Adaptive programming in practice: shared lessons from the DFID-funded LASER and SAVI programmes*
Managing complexity: adaptive management at Mercy Corps (2016)
Asia Foundation & ODI (2014-) *Working Politically in Practice series*
Williamson, T. (2015) *Change in challenging contexts*
For more information, visit ODI’s page on doing development differently.
odi.org/doing-development-differently
#adaptdev

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