Mass displacement and the challenge for urban resilience

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About this paper

People displaced by conflict and disasters increasingly end up in urban areas, as opposed to refugee camps. The challenge of mass displacement is global. It requires governments, national and local, to build the resilience of urban systems so they are able to absorb migration flows and transform in response to these pressures, now and in the future.

This paper examines all forms of migration: forced and voluntary, domestic and cross-border, and in response to different pressures (particularly disasters and conflict). It focuses on the very large numbers of people moving out of conflict-affected places, across international borders, into urban areas of neighbouring or nearby countries. The paper assesses the impact of mass displacement on the wellbeing of all urban residents, using an urban resilience framework to explore how different parts of the system respond to large influxes of people moving into areas often already suffering from inadequate housing, a lack of basic services and insecurity. Mass displacement adds to these existing challenges and deepens inequalities in urban areas.

More research is needed to establish how different parts of the urban system can be strengthened to anticipate, absorb and adapt to changing patterns of migration and displacement. In addition, city and national governments may be failing to take full advantage of the capacities and skills of the new arrivals, and to learn from recent experience to stimulate improvements in urban resilience over the long term, promoting wellbeing for all residents.
1. Introduction

The concept of urban resilience is increasingly being used to describe the attributes of the urban system that are needed to deal with environmental disasters, conflict and financial crises (Leichenko, 2011; Meerow et al., 2016). There is a well-established literature on urban resilience, but little exploration of how urban systems respond to the rapid influx of new and often long-term residents, displaced by conflict and disasters elsewhere.

Cities have grown and developed thanks to rural–urban migration and internal population growth, with new arrivals gradually becoming incorporated into the formal economy and accessing better-quality services in some cases (IOM, 2014a). In the past, in-migration from rural areas and across borders was an important driver of economic growth and cultural and social diversity. Even so, many urban governments are reluctant to support integration, hoping to deter further rural-to-urban migration, due to common, long-held views that rural-urban migration transfers poverty to cities, among other reasons (IOM, 2014b).

Meanwhile, large-scale, sudden population movements, prompted by both rapid-onset ‘natural’ disasters such as floods and ‘man-made’ disasters like conflict are on the rise, seeing increasing numbers of displaced people moving into urban areas (UNHCR, 2016). This represents a significant stress factor, in particular for towns and cities with already weak formal institutions that face difficulties in delivering adequate basic services to growing populations. Changes in patterns of human mobility, including increases in mass displacement into urban centres, may also strengthen capacities in ways that are not well understood; for example by bringing new skills and knowledge of dealing with climate change risk. Today, more proactive responses are needed to integrate those driven out of their homes by disasters and conflict and into urban areas.

With many cities experiencing this kind of population growth, strengthening resilience to mass displacement is becoming a more pressing concern. In many cases, national and subnational governance systems are failing to respond adequately, because governments often do not anticipate or fully understand the phenomenon and do not have the required resources or capacities to manage it. There are also significant political sensitivities and perceived costs of accepting and integrating large numbers of new arrivals. Indeed, some cities receiving large numbers of displaced people are situated within countries experiencing conflict or intense political change, and existing communities within those cities may already be living in situations of chronic stress. This paper draws on sparse literature, modifying an existing urban resilience framework to identify key issues and develop a progressive agenda to build the resilience of cities to mass displacement.

The paper considers resilience to mass displacement in urban areas, focussing on the social and economic sub-systems – namely, shelter, health care and protection; basic service provision; economic development and employment; and social and political inclusion and community cohesion. It focuses on how well the urban system responds to new challenges and provides solutions for all residents. In particular, the paper finds that the resilience of an urban system cannot be understood without attention to the diverse experiences and needs of different groups within it: longer-term residents, new arrivals, temporary residents and, particularly, vulnerable groups.
2. Mass displacement to urban areas

In recent decades, the scale and pace of migration and displacement has accelerated, leading to an increasing number of people arriving in cities. These new arrivals, coupled with natural population growth, led the global urban population to grow from 746m in 1950 to 3.9bn in 2014. Today, over half of the global population now lives in cities and many of the fastest-growing cities are relatively small urban settlements (UNDESA, 2014). Most migrants from rural areas are poorly educated or unskilled for urban life; as a result, many end up working in the informal sector.

In Africa, for example, the informal sector accounts for 61% of all urban employment, and 65% of Africa’s urban population lives in informal settlements (AfDB, 2012). While the bulk of urban growth owes to voluntary migration and natural population rise, mass displacement to urban centres can cause a city’s population to rise rapidly. Mass displacement is not a new phenomenon, but, with protracted conflict situations and increasingly intense and frequent climate extremes, as well as slower-onset stresses linked to climate change, displacement is

Figure 1. Numbers of internally displaced people owing to conflict and disasters in 2015

![Map showing numbers of internally displaced people in various countries](image)

Source: IDMC (2016).

1 Definitions of ‘city’ based on physical size, population and other factors vary considerably across the globe. We use the term ‘city’ to refer to any urban agglomeration, and as such we use the terms ‘urban areas’ and ‘cities’ interchangeably in this paper.
on the rise (UNHCR, 2016). The majority of displaced people move to cities: in 2015, approximately 60% of IDPs and refugees globally were living in urban areas, up from 50% in 2010, and IDPs are more likely to live in urban environments than refugees (UNHCR, 2016). In some places, the figure is much higher: 93% of IDPs in Colombia reside in cities, for example (Albuja and Ceballos, 2010).

In 2015, 65.3m people globally were displaced from their homes by conflict and persecution, of whom 12.4m were newly displaced in 2015 alone. The majority moved within national borders: IDPs totalled 40.8m, the highest figure on record, of whom 8.6m were newly displaced in 2015. The remainder were refugees or asylum-seekers. To put these figures into perspective, if all the 65.3m people were brought together as one nation they would become the 21st most populous country in the world, just ahead of the UK (UNHCR, 2015).

Displacement is concentrated in particular regions, as Figure 1 shows. For those fleeing conflict and persecution, the largest numbers are in the Middle East and North Africa, where displacement has been going up steadily since the Arab Spring in 2010 and the rise of the so-called Islamic State. Numbers of people displaced by disasters each year, on the other hand, fluctuate significantly: in 2015, there were 19.2m disaster-driven IDPs, compared with 16.7m in 2009 and 42.3m in 2010 (IDMC, 2016). South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific routinely dominate these statistics (IDMC, 2016). As most disaster-induced displacements are weather-related, it is very likely numbers will go up in the future as a result of climate change and the rise in exposure and vulnerability of human assets (IPCC, 2012).

The World Economic Forum’s 2016 Global Risk Report recognises large-scale forced migration and displacement (induced by conflict, disasters, environmental or economic reasons) as the first most likely, and the fourth most impactful, current risk for humanity.

Box 1. Key terms on the movement of people

Migration: The movement of a person or group of people that is, to some degree, voluntary. The decision to move is complex and associated with multiple drivers, including economic incentives and family ties, in addition to shocks and stresses such as conflict and disasters. Migration can take place either within or across national borders.

Displacement: Situations where people are forced to leave their homes owing to sudden shocks or stresses, including armed conflict, civil unrest or natural or man-made disasters. Displacement can take place either within or across national borders.

Migration can be relatively ‘voluntary’ or ‘forced’, with the latter blurring the line with displacement; in reality, voluntary migration and displacement are two poles along a continuum of choice and coercion.

Mass displacement: The sudden displacement of a large number of people.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs): While there is no official definition, an IDP is understood to be someone who is forced to flee their home due to conflict, disasters or other shocks or stresses, but who remains within their country’s borders.

Refugee: A person who has been forced to move across national borders for fear of persecution. This a legal term defined under the 1951 Refugee Convention, which obliges countries not to return refugees to the country from which they have fled persecution. Refugees come under the mandate of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the host country; a person who has applied for protection as a refugee but is still awaiting determination of his or her status is known as an asylum seeker. The definition is generally accepted to include people fleeing armed conflict, but does not include people fleeing disasters, environmental change or other shocks or stresses.

In this paper, mass displacement to urban areas includes IDPs, refugees and people displaced across borders as a result of disasters or other shocks or stresses.
The map in Figure 1 shows the number of people newly internally displaced in 2015 by both conflict and disasters, and the total number of people who are currently internally displaced by conflict at the end of 2015 (no data is available on total disaster displacements). As a result of protracted crises, the total number of conflict-driven IDPs has risen significantly, doubling over the past 15 years. The map shows only the top 10 countries for each category, and includes the full displacement picture across the three categories for those countries. Numbers are rounded, and only figures exceeding 100,000 people are included; for full figures, see the data source (IDMC, 2016).

The geography of displacement shown in this figure is significant as it shapes the character of displacement around the globe. IDPs fleeing disaster zones tend to travel shorter distances than those affected by conflict and persecution, and generally return to their homes more quickly (IDMC, 2016). Conflict in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, for example, has driven millions of people into neighbouring countries, the majority of whom have been displaced for over a year (UNHCR, 2016). Conversely, the 2010 flash floods in Pakistan left 9m people homeless, but most returned within a year, albeit to homes and belongings that were severely damaged and often unsafe (Brickle and Thomas, 2014).

As Figure 2 shows, in 2015 more than half of all refugees globally came from just three countries. The fact that most refugees stay within their region is demonstrated by the geography of the top host countries (UNHCR, 2016).

People forced out of areas affected by conflict and disasters are in some cases offered temporary shelter in refugee camps set up by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and governments as (initial) temporary responses to displacement, but many more end up in cities (Betts et al., 2014). There is increasing recognition that formal camps for displaced people have significant negative long-term impacts for both displaced and host communities. This has led agencies like the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) to avoid setting up new camps wherever possible – a policy that was formalised in 2014 in the UNHCR Policy on Alternatives to Camps (UNHCR, 2014). For example, camps limit the ability of displaced people to make choices about their lives, lead to dependency, and distort local economies. The significant investment needed to set up and maintain a camp is also lost when refugees go home (UNHCR, 2014).

Figure 2. Major source and host countries of refugees worldwide in 2015 (top 3 and top 6, respectively)

Source: UNHCR (2016).
Despite this, some countries still have policies and practices requiring displaced people to reside in camps. The reasons include concerns about public order, control over movement, tension between displaced and local communities, competition over limited economic opportunities or scarce resources, or fears that displaced people will be less likely to return home if they establish a life in an urban centre (UNHCR, 2014). As a result, refugees and IDPs living in urban areas have limited rights and face discriminatory policies in some countries. For example, many countries do not allow refugees to take part in lawful employment, which leads to underemployment and can be demoralising (Arnold-Fernandez and Pollock, 2013).

The overwhelming majority of displaced people in urban areas live in individual accommodation, rather than planned or managed camps (UNHCR, 2016). Living outside of camps provides displaced people with the possibility of living with greater dignity, independence and normality within a host community, while contributing to the community and promoting social cohesion (UNHCR, 2014). However, the dispersal of displaced people within an urban area also creates challenges, including impacts on the host community and in meeting the housing and basic service needs of the displaced population (UNHCR, 2009). In Lebanon, for example, most Syrian refugees (81%) have to pay for their own accommodation. Many reside in cities, and the dispersal of refugees across 1,750 different locations makes distributing vital aid and services challenging. The poorest refugees often lack suitable housing and over 40% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon live in informal and insecure buildings (Rainey, 2015).

In the Global South, political and institutional challenges lead many urban displaced people to live in informal settlements, as with the urban poor (JIPS, 2014; Zetter and Deikun, 203). Informal settlements are characterised by low tenure security and include informal rental housing and squats. In many cases, informal settlements are already under chronic stresses, and the arrival of large numbers of displaced people adds an extra layer of stress to an already fragile system (Tacoli et al., 2015). Housing often fails to comply with planning and building regulations and is more likely to be located in hazardous areas, and basic services and infrastructure are lacking or provided irregularly (UN-Habitat, 2015a).
3. Resilience of urban systems

Urban areas face a range of shocks (acute, intensive, sudden events) and stresses (extensive, chronic or cyclical challenges), which can affect economic prosperity, competitiveness, livelihoods and well-being. In some circumstances, a rapid influx of people can become a stressor in itself, imparting pressures on a city and its services (including food, transport, water, housing, education, health and emergency services).

Numerous frameworks seek to characterise and interpret urban resilience, drawing on concepts and definitions from ecology, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. There is no singular framework for operationalising the concept, but many identify the qualities of urban systems that help them respond to a variety of disturbances (Meerow et al., 2016).

Cities are often characterised as complex interrelated systems constructed of individuals, communities, businesses and institutions, where economic, social, governance and environmental characteristics are intrinsically connected within the built environment and across rural–urban dimensions. For the purposes of this paper, resilience refers to the ability of this urban system to anticipate, absorb and adapt to shocks and stresses (Bahadur et al., 2015), and to respond in ways that preserve, restore or improve its essential functions, structures and identity, while also maintaining the capacity for adaptation and transformation (IPCC, 2014; IOM, 2016). The concept is therefore concerned with the ability of all citizens, including the poor and vulnerable, both to survive and thrive in the face of these shocks and stresses (Arup International Development, 2015). Resilience is multifaceted, with people's well-being reliant on the functioning -and in some cases transformation- of the system.

Urban resilience frameworks differ in their scope and structure. Some, consider the whole city system's resilience to the full spectrum of shocks and stresses. A notable example is the City Resilience Framework (Arup International Development, 2015), which outlines 52 ‘indicators’ of resilience under four dimensions of urban resilience: leadership & strategy (knowledge); health & well-being (people); infrastructure & ecosystems (place); and economy & society (organisation) (Figure 3). According to the City Resilience Framework, resilient systems should be flexible, robust, resourceful, reflective, inclusive, integrated, and should maintain a degree of redundancy. Similarly, the Rockefeller Foundation (2015) identifies five broad characteristics of resilience: awareness, diversity, self-regulation, integration and adaptiveness.

Others are concerned with particular shocks and stresses, or with certain populations. For instance, Tyler and Moench’s (2012) urban climate resilience framework characterises the resilient ‘systems’, ‘agents’ and ‘institutions’; while Woolf et al. (2016) focus on informal settlements, highlighting ‘external resources’, ‘assets’, ‘capacities’ and ‘qualities’, as multidimensional aspects of resilience.

Although none of the frameworks explicitly consider mass displacement as a disturbance to the urban system, they could be modified to do so. We adapt and simplify the City Resilience Framework, identifying aspects of the system that are most affected by a rapid influx of displaced people: 1) adequate shelter, health care and protection; 2) basic service provision; 3) economic development and employment; and 4) social and political inclusion and community cohesion. By understanding failures in the system and how these affect displaced people and host communities alike, we can begin to identify areas of focus for building urban resilience.
Figure 3. The City Resilience Framework

Source: adapted from Arup International Development (2015)
4. What do we know about the impacts of mass displacement on urban resilience?

In the *Global Risk Report* (World Economic Forum, 2016), large-scale forced migration and displacement ranks first as the most likely, and fourth as the most impactful, current ‘risk for humanity’. Yet the international response (when there is one) is usually short term and based around humanitarian assistance, ignoring those settling in urban areas and requiring more durable solutions.

The literature on mass displacement documents the experiences of those living in refugee camps and the effects of these settlements on host nations and regions (see Maystadt and Verwimp, 2014). To a lesser degree, it addresses the urban context (see Kok, 1989) where both forcibly displaced people and voluntary migrants adjust to life in a new city. Studies describe the higher levels of deprivation of newcomers (compared with other urban dwellers), and their confrontation with destitution, exploitation, discrimination and unemployment.

However, the impact on host cities, and in particular on the resilience of the urban system, is not well explored. This section reviews the limited studies available, highlighting the opportunities presented by new arrivals, as well as the institutional and policy weaknesses that need addressing. The analysis is relevant to urban areas that are now – and may be in the future – host to large numbers of people displaced across borders and internally.

### 4.1. Shelter, healthcare and protection

The conditions in which many forced and voluntary migrants travel, live and work make them particularly vulnerable to physical and mental health risks (IOM, 2015). Forced and prolonged displacement in particular can result in problems of malnutrition, inadequate hygiene and sanitation, and lack of shelter; and migrants may already be ill or more vulnerable to illness on arrival in cities (Deola and Patel, 2014). With the majority of newcomers ending up in deprived areas with poor water and sanitation provision (WHO and UN-Habitat, 2010), the increase in numbers is likely to have a negative impact on the well-being and health of all residents in these areas.

**Overcrowding and worsening health conditions**

The literature does not distinguish between worsening conditions in urban settlements owing to general population growth, or growth due to voluntary rural-to-urban migration, cross-border migration or forced migration. However, high population density on what is often unsafe land, without proper water and sanitation infrastructure (Mosello et al., 2016), coupled with high levels of poverty and limited awareness of health risks, aggravates the risk of infectious diseases (like HIV/AIDS, cholera and malaria) of all dwellers (Vearey, 2011; Deola and Patel, 2014). It also increases the risk to non-communicable diseases (e.g. cancer, diabetes, asthma, hypertension) and injuries (e.g. resulting from dangerous road traffic or exposure to hazardous sites) (WHO and UN-Habitat, 2010).

Conflict, disasters and resulting displacement also affect the mental well-being of migrants. Following the tsunami and the nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan, a 2015 survey of evacuees revealed that many were suffering from anxiety, loneliness and depression, with a significant number of suicides (IDMC, 2016). In Colombia, forced displacement as a result of five decades of internal conflict has also had an emotional and psychological impact on migrants. According to an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and World Food Programme (WFP) survey conducted in eight Colombian cities, approximately 67% of displaced households reported experiencing psychosocial problems, but only 2% received help (Carrillo, 2009). Marked health problems will likely reduce the capacity of new arrivals to integrate, learn new skills and become self-reliant. Overall, prevailing inequalities in access to health care between migrants and host community members affect the public health conditions of urban areas (IOM, 2015).
Insecurity and risk of violence

Displaced populations are often affected by urban violence, including violence within the displaced community, between host and displaced communities and with the authorities (Pavanello et al., 2012). The risk of violence is associated with family separation, overcrowded living spaces, poor social cohesion (see section 5.4 below), unsafe shelter, gender-based discrimination, limited rights and protection services, among other factors. Displaced youth can be particularly affected (Pavanello et al., 2012).

In addition, women displaced to cities face a heightened risk of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) (Calderón et al., 2011). Changes in traditional gender roles that often accompany displacement can also cause intra-household conflicts (IFRC, 2012). SGBV, including harassment and intimidation, is a reality for at least one third of women in all contexts (WHO, 2013), with urban women refugees being particularly at risk (Crisp et al., 2012). While the humanitarian sector has paid considerable attention to SGBV faced by women in camps, there is much lower understanding and evidence on displaced people in urban areas and the increased risk of SGBV for women and girls among the displaced and host populations (Crisp et al., 2012).

Domestic violence undermines the resilience of the community as a whole: it impacts individual health and well-being as well as on longer-term development (IFRC, 2012); loss of wages and lower productivity; and has social costs such as insecurity, early marriage and school and work absenteeism (Waters et al., 2004; Wu and Ahmed, 2012). Policies are therefore needed to address domestic violence (including effective justice systems, social protection, shelters, security measures and supportive policing) and avoid levels rising, with consequences for the health and well-being of all residents.

4.2. Basic service provision

Although there are few studies looking at the impact of mass displacement and voluntary migration on service quality in urban areas, a commonly held assumption is that large numbers of displaced people put strain on the already inadequate provision of shelter and basic services, in many cities, particularly in the Global South. In 2014, 86% of refugees were living in developing countries (of which about 12% were in least developed countries), where urban governance systems are often already weak (World Economic Forum, 2016). In Lebanon, for example, the substantial population increase as a result of the Syria refugee crisis has resulted in a greater demand for water, electricity and waste management – all basic services that cities struggle to provide. Nearly 71% of the surveyed host communities perceived that conditions had worsened in their municipalities (Mercy Corps, 2014).

Displaced populations moving into cities could also, however, have a positive effect on service provision in the same way as rural–urban migrants are found to. Meng and Zhang (2013) note that migrant inflows have had positive impacts on services in Chinese cities. The increasing number of potential consumers, and change in the consumption composition of the city population, has led to improvements in public services. Also, new arrivals, by paying taxes, contribute to local government fiscal revenues so long as they have the right to work as part of the formal economy. If municipalities use additional tax income to invest in public services, all residents can benefit from improved public services. In advanced, ageing economies, large inflows of people can contribute to keeping the aggregate demand high and the workforce stable (World Economic Forum, 2016).

In addition, hosting large numbers of displaced people can bring in welcome investment to cities with weak infrastructure and public services. Coming back to the Lebanese example, the country’s hosting of Syrian refugees has led to more than $92m of UN investment for host communities, including new electricity generators and water reservoirs (Rainey, 2015).

In many Asian cities, the informal economy is large and the local revenue base weak so the majority of local governments are dependent on tax revenue allocations, grants and other forms of financial assistance from central or provincial governments. Public agencies provide urban services like water, sanitation and transport, but insufficient user charges and fees do not cover costs (Laquian, 2011). Those displaced by disasters and conflict are even less likely to be able to pay for these services and contribute to the local tax base, at least initially, so the positive contribution to services is less clear.
In Colombia, where over 6m people are displaced as a result of the long-standing civil war, IDPs usually stay with family or friends when they first arrive in cities such as Bogotá and Medellín (Carrillo, 2009). However, for many, when they eventually have to find their own place to live, their lack of resources or credit history forces them to settle on ‘invaded land’ (privately or publicly owned land or waste ground), building shacks with waste materials (Albuja and Ceballos, 2010). Resulting shanty towns are characterised by a lack of sewers, drinking water and waste disposal, and are prone to a multitude of hazards such as landsides, floods or fires. In 2007, a fire swept throughout settlements built on a former waste disposal site in Medellín, destroying hundreds of houses (Carrillo, 2009).

4.3. Economic development and employment

As with service provision, an influx of displaced people into an urban area can put pressure on the availability of income-generating opportunities in the short term, with potentially long-lasting negative effects on the well-being of all residents (IOM, 2015).

New arrivals can, however, also make a positive contribution to the local economy, as demonstrated in the case of Uganda, where refugees in Kampala have increased demand for goods and services, using remittances and engaging in international trade. One common economic activity among refugees is brokerage between their country of origin and Uganda (Botts et al., 2014). In one survey of refugee households in Kampala, 97% of respondents reported buying their daily necessities, such as food, charcoal, candles, stationery and mobile phone credit, from Ugandan businesses (Botts et al., 2014).

Throughout the 1990s, successive political crises in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan led to a large-scale influx of refugees; particularly Somalis into Kenya. The state response was characterised by an ‘encampment policy’: Kenyan authorities insisted refugees reside in designated camps far from the urban centres. Despite this, several thousand refugees, asylum-seekers and voluntary migrants moved permanently into Eastleigh, a densely populated low-income area of Nairobi, by reason of security threats (including sexual violence), lack of education and medical services and limited independence and livelihood opportunities in the camps (Pavanello et al., 2010).

The refugees now run businesses, engage in small-scale trade, live off remittances or earn money through casual labour in order to survive (Campbell, 2006). Somali refugee businessmen have transformed the suburb into a commercial hub (Zetter, 2014).

The benefits for the city as a whole have included the integration of larger commercial enterprises into the formal urban economy, a general lower cost of goods and the creation of employment for Kenyans by Somali businesses. Part of the explanation for this economic integration lies in the characteristics of some of the refugees: many had entrepreneurial knowledge, as well as capital, and pro-actively engaged in the informal economy, taking advantage of trade liberalisation and links to diasporic networks (Zetter, 2014). However, this is a fragile arrangement, given the limited rights of refugees residing in Eastleigh and the violence and harassment directed toward them by authorities.

Displaced people often struggle more than locals to find work and may be excluded from the formal economy (Lucci et al., 2016). In Colombia, IDPs have to compete with the resident population for job opportunities and, with the disadvantage of being less well educated, they find their farming skills are not easily transferable to an urban environment already characterised by high levels of unemployment (Carillo, 2009). However, refugees also demonstrate their capabilities to integrate into local markets, as is the case with Eritreans in the Kassala region, Sudan, in spite of inadequate development aid and a lack of legal recognition (Kok, 1989). In other countries, migrants can actually enter the workforce very easily, as in Dhaka, Bangladesh (Afsar, 2003), as they constitute a cheap labour force that fills labour gaps in fast-growing economies and in particular sectors such as garment manufacturing or construction (IOM, 2015). Where they have the necessary rights, refugees are more likely than nationals to start new businesses, thereby increasing, rather than reducing, the number of available jobs (Arnold-Fernandez and Pollock, 2013).

In Europe, where 1.3m men, women and children claimed asylum in 2015 (tripling in just two years),

Box 2. The impacts of aid on food and labour markets in affected urban areas

Poorer members of the host community tend to lose out when aid is distributed, owing to increased competition for food, work, services and common property resources. For example, the mass movement of Burundian and Rwandese refugees to Tanzania in 1993 and 1994 resulted in 700,000 refugees settling in Kagera, a poor urban area of 1.5m inhabitants. Maystadt and Verwimp (2010) describe an initial hike in the price of goods as a result of increased demand from refugees and aid workers, the latter characterised by significantly higher purchasing power. However, a large influx of cheap labour in the form of refugees meant wages paid to casual and unskilled labourers dropped by about 50% in the same area. Meanwhile, an opposite trend was occurring in wages for the more educated members of the host community as they were taking up employment with aid organisations paying higher than local wages (Maystadt and Verwimp, 2010).
refugees face serious obstacles to accessing the labour market (Martin et al., 2016). Language barriers, unfamiliarity with the recruitment and job search system, discrimination, lack of a fixed abode and other administrative obstacles all constrain asylum-seekers’ access to formal employment. This not only forces large numbers of refugees to engage in unregulated work sectors and occupations with limited protection (World Bank, 2011), but also creates an important constraint to local economic development (e.g. Carrillo, 2009). Unlike in camps, those arriving in cities are less likely to receive humanitarian assistance, although some populations are forced to rely on permanent assistance from the government (Jacobsen, 2006), and the lack of support to displaced populations in urban areas often creates chronic vulnerabilities (IFRC, 2012).

4.4. Social and political inclusion and community cohesion

Dimensions of social cohesion – including, social interaction, social networks, sense of place, trust and reciprocity, perceived safety and sense of community (Dempsey et al., 2009) – are highly sensitive to large numbers of new arrivals. Relations between host communities and displaced persons are context-specific and develop over time. For instance, there is often a manifestation of solidarity towards IDPs from friends and family members when they first arrive in order to help them settle, but IDPs are also treated with hostility by the public, particularly in protracted crises (e.g. Lopez et al., 2011).

New arrivals can contribute to the social, economic and cultural fabric of their host communities, and become key players in city development and growth. In Gaziantep, Turkey, the city authorities have supported the integration of 225,000 displaced Syrians. This support includes the distribution of food and essential household items, protection of vulnerable groups such as children and provision of free consultations and medicines. It also includes longer-term access to the formal labour market, services such as tailored education programmes for Syrian children and other opportunities (IOM, 2015).

Voluntary and forced migrants can also aid in building bilateral relationships and cross-border community cohesion, providing bridges between host and origin cities (UN-Habitat, 2015b). For example, the generosity of host communities in the Shire area in northern Ethiopia has led to better relations between Ethiopian and Eritrean communities at the local level, which was previously divided (by the 1998–2000 Ethiopian–Eritrean War and events before). Trade links and marriages between host and refugee communities in refugee camps like Turkana have reportedly strengthened social bonds between government and among diverse ethnic groups (World Bank and UNHCR, 2015). In cities, this does not appear to have been well documented, but these ties could be important in building resilience.

Social tensions between migrant and host communities are often due to existing socioeconomic conditions predating the arrival of new groups and inadequate policies to support social integration. High levels of inequality and the marginalisation of certain groups are common to most major cities, but mass displacement can create further inequalities. In Kabul and Karachi, for example, IDPs voiced their frustration over differences between their water access and that of hosts (Crisp et al., 2012). In Lebanon and Jordan, Guay (2015) highlights how high levels of poverty, resource scarcity and a lack of effective governing institutions have exacerbated social tensions in host communities receiving Syrian refugees. Other sources of tension include differences in religious, cultural and social norms, competition for jobs and access to basic education and public goods services. The role of international aid as well as social, local and international media in framing current issues has also caused tensions (Guay, 2015).

Mass displacement to urban areas can exacerbate tensions and xenophobia when residents believe this is the cause of increased competition over employment opportunities and worsening living conditions. In Lebanon, which has a large number of refugees as a proportion of the total population, longer-term residents were concerned about becoming victims of crime, falling into poverty and experiencing service shortages, and felt threatened by the radicalisation of refugees and increasing terrorism (IDMC, 2016).

In some cases, these concerns manifested in tensions, resentment, animosity and ultimately physical forms of violence toward refugees. In Colombia, for example, tensions have been observed between host communities and IDPs (Carrillo, 2009). Registered urban IDPs, entitled to emergency humanitarian assistance from the government for a three-month period, have fallen victim to common crimes, such as being robbed when receiving

Box 3. The impacts of mass displacement with a gender lens

Access to labour markets has an important gender dimension. When forced displacement causes large asset losses, displaced women’s participation in labour markets can increase significantly in order to compensate for the reduction of income. Yet the increased participation of women in labour markets and their greater economic contributions to household earnings have not automatically led to the improvement of their position and bargaining power. In Colombia, a study found that, in displaced households, women faced longer working hours without increased wages, with a rise in domestic violence against women and children (Calderón et al., 2011).
aid in the form of cash. The perception that displaced persons are receiving disproportionate assistance and that they monopolise social benefits appears to be a source of tension (Carrillo, 2009).

The media, in all its different faculties, plays a strong role in creating tension when issues are framed in ways that blame or target migrant communities. For example, International Alert (2015) found that, in Lebanon, political affiliation determined media coverage of the Syrian humanitarian crisis, which contributed to an exaggeration of the connection between the Syrian refugee influx and rising crime incidents. Overall reporting on the refugee crisis in the Middle East and Europe is dominated by an emphasis on either the consequences of large influxes of refugees for ‘hosting’ nations and communities or the challenges facing people on the move. There are very few studies documenting how migrants and non-migrants work and socialise together, sharing urban spaces.

Displacement may have intensified inequality and resource scarcity and enhanced social conflict in some places, but in others the impacts are less negative (e.g. World Bank, 2011). In China, one report on the impact of rural–urban migration on host communities’ access to social services found that rural migrants did not impose significant pressures on urban residents’ access to education and health services, but had a modest negative effect on urban public transportation. The study also revealed that rural–urban migration did not cause an increase in the city crime rate and that city governments and the urban public tended to overemphasise the adverse effects of rural–urban migration on social outcomes (Meng and Zhang, 2013). More broadly, Mabiso et al. (2014) found that large-scale influxes of refugees on host communities were more likely to benefit locals with better ex-ante access to resources, education and political connections, while the disadvantaged become increasingly vulnerable and food insecure.

Overall, the impacts of a large influx of migrants and displaced people are context-specific. It is not so much the sudden influx of people that undermines urban development, but rather the combination of population dynamics and socioeconomic inequalities (Donner and Rodríguez, 2008). According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2015), ‘it is only when population pressures on urban labour and housing markets, health and education systems as well as water supply, sanitation and waste management infrastructures are unmanaged, that conditions of marginalization, exclusion and risk are produced’ (p.79). Examples from IDP resettlements in Medellín and Bogotá, Colombia, are a stark example of this.
5. The politics of resilience to mass displacement into cities

Effective policies to address the issues described above are rare or not well documented. Yet the negative pressures that result from rapid population growth are much more severe when urban expansion is poorly planned and urban governance is inequitable or ineffectual (IOM, 2014a). This is largely because these groups are invisible to policy-makers and because authorities often (mistakenly) assume that displaced populations are only temporary and will return home in the near future. Fear of large numbers of people arriving in a city and moving into particular neighbourhoods also constrains the development of suitable integration policies.

When urban governments respond to migration fears by trying to be less accommodating to low-income new arrivals, the results tend to be counterproductive, forcing low-income residents, and not just migrants and displaced people, into the very sort of overcrowded and underserviced informal settlements that they fear result from overly rapid urbanisation (IOM, 2014a). Thus, negative attitudes and discriminatory regulations towards migrants – and in particular, displaced populations when the numbers are large - limit the possibility of these groups thriving in the city and contributing positively to their community and the urban economy.

Displaced populations may want to keep a low profile when they face discrimination on arrival. This leads to ‘bureaucratic invisibility’ and challenges for city governments in reaching out and providing new arrivals with adequate services (Vearey, 2011). A more complex set of support measures are needed for these populations than for refugees in camps, who require the traditional tasks of feeding, protecting and sheltering (Crisp et al., 2012).

Those who move to urban areas for security frequently choose not to return home, even when security seems to have improved (Crisp et al., 2012). In Afghanistan, a survey of IDPs living in informal urban settlements in Kabul, Kandahar and Herat reveals a preference for ‘non-temporary’ settlement patterns: 70% of households had lived in current informal sites for more than two years, while more than 90% reported plans to settle permanently in the city irrespective of the continuation of conflict.

About 80% were unwilling to return to their communities of origin for reasons related to the lack of livelihood opportunities, unemployment, lack of land and food insecurity (World Bank and UNHCR, 2011).

Lack of policies to address housing, services, employment and social exclusion exacerbate inequalities between new and older residents, although the negative impacts on local residents seems to depend on their pre-existing access and control over strong and secure resources (Mabiso et al., 2014). Moreover, bureaucratic procedures, lack of information and language barriers often combine to make it difficult for newcomers to access these rights, services and opportunities and, in turn, contribute to the sustainable development of host cities (UN-Habitat, 2015a).

Even where refugees have been granted asylum, however, lack of effective integration contributes to the isolation and/or segregation of communities, which drives the frustration and disenchantment of the displaced and can even trigger radicalisation, as has been seen in European cities since 2015 (World Economic Forum, 2016). Reflecting on the development and impact of the UNHCR Urban Refugee Policy in the Middle East, Patricia Ward (2014) explains that advocating for any policy change that suggests integration as a solution is usually ‘off the table’, as in the case in Jordan.

Overall, the lack of an effective governance system to encourage the integration and participation of displaced groups in the urban economy partly explains why displacement to urban areas is often characterised by negative coping strategies such as crime, the use of violence and prostitution (de Vriese, 2006; Crisp et al., 2012). In mega-urban regions in Asia, obstacles to effective governance include the fragmentation of administrative and political units, jurisdictional conflicts and the scale of metropoles (Laquian, 2011).
6. Towards a more progressive policy and research agenda on mass displacement to urban areas

A resilient urban system preserves the overall wellbeing of its inhabitants in the face of shocks and stresses. The disturbances most often written about are environmental, health-related and financial, but the mass displacement of people from conflict and disaster zones to urban areas also puts pressure on shelter, security, service provision, the local economy and social relations. Yet, unlike other types of stresses, mass displacement requires host cities and governments to consider not only the response capacity and needs of the existing population, but also that of new populations. In this sense, the disturbance cannot be considered something ‘external’ to the urban system, as some climate shocks are. This presents a challenge for urban resilience frameworks: most only focus on the characteristics and capacities of the current system; while resilience to mass displacement requires frameworks to consider what these would – or could – look like when incorporating a new population. Urban resilience therefore has to ensure wellbeing outcomes for the whole population.

The challenges of mass displacement underscore the importance of ‘integration’ and ‘adaptiveness’ (Rockefeller Foundation, 2015). In particular, urban governance should support integration, affording rights and opportunities to new arrivals. Municipal authorities need to see their hosting role as permanent, given that many new arrivals are unable or unwilling to return to their place of origin. The arrival and presence of displaced populations are less likely to be perceived as a threat if these groups are recognised and plans are made to anticipate and respond to the potential pressures on security, services, the economy and community relations described above.

Security of tenure and a ‘right to the city’ is a key issue for integration: this needs to be extended to all urban residents regardless of how long they have lived there or the circumstances under which they arrived. This is important for new arrivals to be able to pay for and access basic services (Texier, 2009). Legal recognition helps new arrivals protect themselves or receive protection from the state, and is vital to promoting positive social and economic behaviour. For example, they are less likely to obtain water and electricity illegally and more likely to pay utility bills, generating revenue for municipal governments, if not constrained by discriminatory regulations.

The literature repeatedly emphasises the engagement and inclusion of both migrants and host community members to overcome tensions. Tackling the violence and discrimination experienced by refugees and IDPs will require both trust in public authorities and inclusive planning processes, whereby settlements provide equal opportunities and safety (IOM, 2015). Urban social movements can play a role in improving knowledge and empowering new arrivals to the city (Mitlin, 2014).

A study of over 500 urban refugees in Beirut, Delhi, Quito and Kampala, found that newcomers accessed community-based protection by building links with their host community. They identified these people as being most relevant for their protection (as opposed to members of their own displaced group) (Rosenberg, 2016). Governments and donors should therefore work with relevant host community organisations to overcome barriers to engage with refugees, and with community-based organisations that are led by or involving refugees (Rosenberg, 2016).

Newcomers can bring a range of assets to urban economies, stimulating consumption and innovation and offering employment to local people (Crips et al., 2012). By issuing work permits, recognising skills and helping people access jobs and training, it will be possible to recognise the potential contribution of displaced populations and reduce the damaging impact of higher levels of unemployment and sub-employment.

International policies and the development community could focus more explicitly on helping refugees and displaced people transition into self-reliance. This is even more important in light of the slow and unstable growth the world is currently experiencing, which may further limit countries’ absorptive capacities (World Economic Forum, 2016).
Local law enforcement has a strong interest in establishing a stable society – one that is able to absorb new arrivals, avoiding potential counter-productive tensions and conflicts. Effective, transparent and equitable law enforcement and crime prevention are required to prevent and/or deal with potential conflict and tensions between migrant and host communities. An established and efficient as well as transparent justice, law and emergency service system provides the social stability needed to take advantage of the positive impacts of the arrival of displaced people (Jacobsen, 2006).

Urban development planning that incorporates some redundancy, would respond better to the challenge of mass displacement. Measures such as the creation of land banks, land use zoning, city monitoring and data management, efficient planning approval processes and upgrading of informal settlements can be adapted to account for changes in population dynamics and the specific needs of long-term, more established, residents and new arrivals. A European Bank for Reconstruction and Development project in Jordan and Turkey, for example, has invested in upgrades to the water, wastewater, solid waste management and urban transport systems within main the refugee-hosting urban areas. These investments are accompanied by technical assistance and cooperation with utilities providers in order to facilitate and promote the adoption of best practices and ensure community engagement (Multilateral Development Banks, 2014).

Overall, there are few examples of urban resilience plans and policies addressing the challenges of mass displacement and migration to urban areas. While future patterns of displacement are difficult to predict, cities that are already home to several hundred thousand displaced by conflict, from Khartoum to Beirut and Bogotá, can do more to support these populations in ways that are beneficial to all urban residents and to the development of the city. What’s more, other cities experiencing new inflows can learn from these experiences.

The current literature on the impacts of displacement on urban areas is very limited and more research is needed to document both the challenges and the opportunities of increased interaction between host communities and displaced people. Little is known, for example, about the impact of displaced communities on the cost and availability of food, housing and jobs (Crisp et al., 2012). Reports that advocate on behalf of urban IDPs/refugees do not do so on the basis of a deep understanding of the survival and livelihood strategies of these populations; and they fail to consider their effects on settled populations and municipal and national authorities. Meanwhile, policies and interventions to date have been informed largely by the better-documented experience of refugees in rural areas and in camps. Hence, a better understanding of the challenges facing both migrants and host communities in urban settings is needed to develop more effective, durable solutions.

As authors of one of the very few empirical studies examining the economic situation and impacts of displaced populations in an urban case study in Uganda, Betts et al. (2014) stress the need for comparative research. In particular, case studies on different regulatory environments (restrictive versus open), different phases of a displacement crisis (e.g. emergency, protracted, return) and categories of displacement (e.g. refugees, IDPs and people displaced in the context of a natural disaster) are needed.

Finally, there is very little research on the more positive impacts of those forced to flee and move into cities. In particular, there may be opportunities for urban poor communities to become more organised and advance their collective needs and interests (Mitlin, 2014).


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