• The commitments made from the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement and the World Humanitarian Summit hold the potential to remake and modernise the way conflict, climate resilience, fragility and poverty are tackled on a global scale.

• Implementing these global agendas will need new governance structures at all levels, and to look beyond states in favour of networked approaches to governance that strengthen civil society and business involvement.

• Institutional fragmentation undermines all three agendas. There is a priority to reduce fragmentation and improve coherence across the international development system through leaving institutional divides behind.

• Financing is a key point of intersection. Finance institutions and private sector actors must continue to engage in mobilising and programming effective finance, while these and domestic actors alike must work to establish better finance tracking mechanisms and ultimately toward transforming and greening all financial flows.

• Data gaps exist for achieving all three agendas. Coordinating existing and new data efforts to fill in the gaps, will help to facilitate informed debate about where progress is being made and how progress can be accelerated.
Our shared future

The Our Shared Future series considers the practical implications of delivering on the major global summits of 2015 and 2016, particularly the Sustainable Development Summit, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and the World Humanitarian Summit. Each briefing focuses on a cross-cutting theme – governance, finance and data – identifying areas of convergence, overlaps and tensions across the development, humanitarian and sustainability agendas. The briefings make recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of implementation of these intertwined agendas, with a view to deliver a more coherent global cooperation framework.
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Executive summary

Introduction
Every day, the international community is confronted with multiple, intertwined crises involving displaced people, chronic poverty, conflicts or natural disasters. These crises are complicated to understand and even harder to solve. To address these global challenges, the past 18 months has seen the international community come together to adopt three sets of developmental, humanitarian and environmental commitments: the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) and the Paris Agreement on climate change.

For those charged with steering these agendas in 2017 and beyond, including the UN system and its new Secretary-General, the formidable obstacles to implementation shared by all three agendas will need to be deftly navigated.

The research
This working paper aims to identify ways in which these three major global agendas can come together to create a more effective and coherent global framework for development. It looks at synergies and tensions, and reflects on common challenges and opportunities, focusing on the key themes of governance, financing and data that sit at the heart of implementing these sets of commitments. It concludes with a series of recommendations to the UN and governments around the world on addressing these three key themes to deliver on the ambitious programme of change, set out in the post-2015 policy agendas.

The nature of today’s crises and the overlapping and interlinked nature of their consequences speak to the need for developing a shared understanding of the issues and, in some cases, common approaches for tackling them. In this regard, the three global agendas considered in this working paper have the potential to be highly complementary. The table on page 6 provides a summary of the main features of each of these agendas.

The holistic SDG agenda presents a docking station for some aspects of the climate agreement, and can serve as a basis for those aspects of the WHS commitments related to protracted crises. Goal 13 refers explicitly to the global climate change policy process, while other goals are framed to capture linkages with the environmental and climate change agenda, including Goal 7 on clean energy, Goal 11 on sustainable cities, Goal 12 on responsible consumption and production, and Goals 14 and 15 on life below water and on land. Furthermore, several of the targets apply to both the climate and humanitarian agendas: for example, Target 1.1 on building the resilience of the poor to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters. While Goal 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions makes critical linkages between state fragility and conflict and may compel development actors to engage in specific crisis settings.

Despite these interlinkages, there are tensions between the three sets of agreements and within them that may yet prove problematic as implementation proceeds. In the case of the WHS, there is a tension around the importance of operating on the basis of humanitarian principles and the distinct ways of working they envision, while also operating more coherently with development and peacebuilding actors, particularly in fragile states and in contexts of high levels of displacement. While in the case of the SDGs and the climate agenda, there are tensions between the ambitious economic and infrastructure SDG targets (e.g. 7% average annual growth for low-income countries) and the overarching goals of the Paris Agreement.

Implementing these global agendas will require shifts in the way the international system operates, the way it is resourced and approaches to assessing progress, with significant implications for governance structures, the sources and uses of funds and the nature and level of data. We present an initial set of common opportunities and challenges on the three interrelated issues of governance, finance and data. Each of these themes will be explored further in a series of three forthcoming ODI working papers to be published in December 2016.

Governance
Realising the full ambition of commitments across all three global agendas requires looking outside traditional systems of global governance and programming to new players, new partners and different ways of working.

- **Implementation beyond states**: whether it is implementing Agenda 2030, monitoring the voluntary commitments made during the WHS or ratcheting up the commitments made in Paris to combat climate change, the ambitions of these new global frameworks require widespread engagement from non-state actors to implement critical parts of these agreements, and to hold their governments to account, including in monitoring and advocating for policy change.

- **Devolution of decision-making and action**: sub-national and municipal governance systems have largely untapped resources and knowledge essential for implementing the agendas in an appropriate and locally-focused way. They should be engaged as new and an increasingly influential actors in decision-making and implementation.

- **Reducing fragmentation and improving coherence**: all three agendas acknowledge that fragmentation and incoherence across the UN development system limits progress on issues that require ‘leaving institutional divides behind’. This will involve consideration of how
<table>
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<th>Table 1. The post-2015 policy agenda at a glance</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainable Development Goals</strong></td>
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to bridge humanitarian, development and peacebuilding initiatives where longer-term approaches to crisis response are needed.

- **Managing interests and values**: ‘national interests’ are increasingly cited as being in opposition to, rather than supportive of, global ‘common goods’ around humanitarian principles, and the values of universality and collective outcomes that inform the SDGs and the Paris Agreement.

**Finance**

The question of where the money for implementing the post-2015 agendas will come from has been particularly politically contentious. Yet, equally important is the issue of ensuring that existing finance is appropriate targeting interventions that can make a real difference, and support delivery of the ambitious agendas ahead.

- **Uncertain scale and concessionality of finance**: none of the agendas delivered commitments for international support that were explicit at developed-country level. In confronting a resistance to increased international spending as a result of economic and political conditions in the richest countries, we are likely to see an increase in less-concessional finance across the agendas.
- **New sources and actors**: emerging economies are scaling up their investments for global development, climate change and humanitarian action. While this does not reduce the need for developed countries to provide finance of the scale and concessionality needed, it suggests a shifting politics of finance.
- **Navigating the role of the private sector**: the private sector brings finance and expertise for all three agendas, although its engagement to date has been more prominent in the climate change agenda. The articulation of why the private sector in its many forms should engage in the WHS and SDGs agenda, and the enabling environment to unlock these flows in the countries, sectors and contexts of relevance is improving.
- **Spending the money well**: UN agencies have played a central role in channelling humanitarian finance, but efficiency of this spending must be improved. Confronting difficult questions about where and how to spend a potentially shrinking pot of available concessional resources highlights the importance of spending money effectively to deliver impact and, where possible, to reduce competition between agendas.

**Data**

Only through the ability to follow up on the commitments made, can we learn how much progress is made to inform interventions and hold actors with implementation responsibilities to account. Some of the common challenges and opportunities to monitor progress across these major agendas include:

- **Filling in major data gaps**: only 81 of the 230 global indicators of the SDGs are fully defined with available data; many of the indicators with missing data are also related to the climate and humanitarian agendas. Data gaps impede both the means and will to measure and improve the development, humanitarian and environmental indicators that form the basis for the agendas.

- **Leaving no one behind and the need for disaggregated data**: what data is available is often not disaggregated for social groups and geographical breakdowns needed to monitor progress by marginalised groups, including migrants, refugees and IDPs, also relevant to the climate and WHS agendas.
- **Tapping into new technologies**: new technology, including spatial mapping, big data and mobile phones present opportunities and challenges, but offer crucial ways to fill data gaps.
- **Dealing with fragmented data producers and sources**: perhaps most importantly, data is fragmented and governed by different formats and capacities that will need to be standardised to be effectively used.

**Recommendations: enabling success**

The commitments made as part of the SDGs, the Paris Agreement and the WHS, when taken together, have the potential to significantly remake and modernise the way conflict, climate resilience, fragility and poverty are addressed globally. However, maintaining political commitment, mobilising adequate financial resources and applying them to good effect and bringing the full weight of international, regional, national and local capacity and capabilities will be critical to the success.

To achieve the ambitious programme of change set out in all three global agendas, the UN and governments around the world must address these three cross-cutting issues:

**Governance**

- Improve the mechanisms for the implementation of the agreements themselves, including analysing and addressing the gaps and inconsistencies within and between the three agendas and identifying the trade-offs these present.
- Address institutional fragmentation, particularly of the UN Development System. ‘Leaving institutional divides behind’ and prioritising a more horizontal way of working will be crucial for making use of the comparative strengths of individual development organisations.
- Strengthen global governance through the careful management of the increasing interdependence among countries on interlinked issues.

**Finance**

- Developed countries must at least, meet their pre-existing and collective financial commitments. They must also provide appropriate finance for the most vulnerable countries e.g. low-income countries, fragile states and small island developing states.
- Continue to develop consistent, transparent methods, approaches and capacity to deploy and track finance, but work to ensure coordination between tracking systems for each agenda. This will allow progress and accountability for sustainable development to be monitored and implemented effectively.
- Work to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of available finance, including through building collective
understanding of how this can be achieved across the agendas, while critically working towards transformation in all financial flows.

Data

- Invest in good data and open data portals in order to allow an informed debate on where we are making progress on these major agendas, and how it can be accelerated, particularly in countries with weak statistical capacity.
- Encourage coordination between relevant actors (for example, international financial institutions and UN agencies that act as ‘custodians’ of particular datasets), and data capacity building initiatives across these three major agendas.
- Take advantage of specific opportunities for synergies between monitoring frameworks. In 2018, there will be specific windows to do so as there will be both a stock-taking opportunity on the Paris Agreement and a review of climate related SDGs.

As the steward of these global agendas, it will also be the responsibility of the incoming UN Secretary-General to provide strong, unwavering leadership and a sharp focus in achieving the commitments further detailed in the main paper. It will require bringing to bear the full weight and support of the departments of the UN Secretariat as well as the UN agencies, funds and programmes to exploit the points of convergence across all three agendas for success. Where crucial political and financial support of major powers is lacking, it will be up to Mr. Guterres to rally the UN membership and look beyond the UN’s traditional power-holders, to business, finance and civil society leaders in promoting these agendas in political and practical terms.
1. Introduction

High-profile summits in 2015 and 2016 resulted in the adoption of commitments relating to sustainable development, climate change and humanitarian issues. Yet questions remain over how these issues and final agreements will intersect and interact to present a new, coherent global framework. The Paris Agreement on climate change emphasises the links between environment and development outcomes, and unabated climate change may create conflicts and disasters triggering new humanitarian crises. The Istanbul World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) recognises that conflict threatens development, and that it is essential to find new ways to meet the needs of the poorest living in fragile states. While many of these linkages are already made explicit in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in September 2015 in New York, which includes specific goals on climate change, and on peace and security. Though these agendas are inextricably linked and complementary, it is also necessary for these agendas to have distinct goals and areas of focus.

The new Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) will have a vital role to play in galvanising efforts across international organisations, governments, business and civil society to deliver the more holistic approach to global policy and development envisaged in the agendas adopted in New York, Paris and Istanbul. Success will require dealing with complex prioritisation decisions and trade-offs as well as deftly navigating enduring global challenges. Global economic growth has been slowing, driven in part by contraction in Asia (IMF, 2016), while income inequalities in some advanced and emerging economies are on the rise (World Bank, 2016). In many places, security and terrorist threats continue to put livelihoods under stress while fuelling migration, humanitarian and refugee crises, with consequences now being felt in Europe. These intertwined developments can be linked to the rise of inward-looking political movements with a much less internationalist outlook in the US and Europe. Furthermore, geopolitical tensions, including between Russia and countries in the west are increasing – with serious implications for the UN system.

This paper aims to take stock of the emerging normative and policy frameworks for the future of global cooperation across the development, humanitarian and climate change agendas in this new and challenging context. It starts by reviewing each of the agendas, emphasising areas of ‘unfinished business’ that will need to be addressed to allow meaningful implementation. It then goes on to reflect on the key cross-cutting issues – governance, financing and data – which are at the heart of the implementation challenge. We conclude by considering opportunities and putting forward recommendations to create a more effective global framework for development.
2. An overview of the three major global agendas

2.1 The Sustainable Development Goals

The SDGs were agreed in September 2015, setting an ambitious agenda that will shape development efforts for the next 15 years. The 17 goals and 169 targets to be achieved by 2030 by countries of all income levels reflect a new consensus on fundamental development challenges that require action at national and global levels. These actions include eradicating poverty and tackling extreme inequalities, to finding more environmentally sustainable routes to growth, creating decent jobs, and building peaceful societies (UN, 2015).

Unlike their predecessor, the MDGs, the SDGs were a result of an inclusive process with a high level of ownership from governments. The goals were drafted by member states in a UN Open Working Group (OWG) and then agreed by the General Assembly. Alongside the OWG, the UN embarked on a huge consultation exercise. National and thematic consultations and a global survey asking people about their own priorities all fed the OWG’s discussions (UN, 2015), which means that the views of a wide range of stakeholders, including citizens, civil society, the private sector and local governments were taken into account.

Now in their implementation phase, success in the delivery of the goals hinges on countries embracing this global agenda, and embedding it in their national development plans, local plans and sectoral programmes. At global level, a High Level Political Forum (HLPF) has been set up as a global platform to monitor and encourage progress on the SDGs, with over 20 countries presenting voluntary national reviews at the first HLPF meeting in July 2016.

This complex and ambitious new development agenda presents a number of real opportunities. First, the goals place an emphasis on climate and sustainability, and integrating this dimension with economic and social development. At global level, a High Level Political Forum (HLPF) has been set up as a global platform to monitor and encourage progress on the SDGs, with over 20 countries presenting voluntary national reviews at the first HLPF meeting in July 2016.

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Second, the SDGs are universal – they apply to countries of all income levels. The discontent with the impact of globalisation felt by low-income workers in western countries like the UK and the US, has been highlighted by the Brexit referendum and Donald Trump’s US election victory. With child poverty and homelessness on the rise in a rich country like the UK (McGuiness, 2016; 10 and DCLG, 2016), the universality and relevance of the SDGs in addressing inequality applies to high-income as well as developing countries. While another dimension of this universality is in the need for global action to address the challenges. Efforts are required by developing countries too, especially around climate change mitigation and supporting adaptation in least developed countries (LDCs).

Third, the principle of ‘Leaving no one behind’ means that targets cannot be achieved unless they are met by the most vulnerable groups in society while offering an opportunity to expose and tackle deep inequalities. This approach emerged in response to concerns with the MDGs. While impressive progress was seen in reducing overall poverty, the MDGs’ efforts did not benefit the poorest and most marginalised at all, or enough (Bhatkal et al., 2015).

‘Leaving no one behind’ was the first focal issue for the HLPF follow-up process, indicating a priority commitment to this agenda. However, political focus on this principle will need to be maintained as countries start to engage with the specificities of what this means in their national contexts. Sheer ambition and breadth of the SDGs presents real opportunities for change but the agenda’s inherent vastness and all-encompassing nature may be in danger of losing political traction, and becoming too complex to implement. Below, we turn to some of these implementation challenges.

Unfinished business

Ensuring traction in national processes, prioritising and delivering on an ‘integrated’ agenda

Delivery of the SDGs requires the goals to be incorporated by governments into development plans and budgeting processes. However, delivering on 169 targets poses operational challenges, widely discussed during the negotiation phase (Kenny, 2015). Prioritisation and phasing of targets over the 15-year period will be inevitable, and many governments have started mapping and prioritisation exercises assessing how the targets compare to existing areas of focus in their development plans.

The other key difficulty is at the heart of the analysis of this paper: the question of how to practically bring together the growth, poverty and environmental agendas. Some of the goals and targets have been formulated to recognise interdependencies between the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. For example, the goal of healthy lives and promotion of

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1 This group meets every year under the auspices of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and every four years at head of states level. It is recommended that each country presents a national review of SDG progress at the HLPF at least twice in 15 years.
well-being for all – Goal 3 – depends on people and health services having access to clean water and air that has not been polluted by the production of energy. This goal contains targets related to water-borne disease and pollution, which also link to the water and energy goals – Goals 6 and 7 (Lucci and Lally, 2016).

While in some cases (such as the examples above) there are reinforcing relationships between different targets, there can also be trade-offs. For instance, it remains to be seen how the target to achieve high-growth rates in low-income countries (LICs) (7% year-on-year GDP growth) can be delivered in a way that is compatible with nurturing the environment (Stuart, 2016). Further still, accounting for these interactions between different policy areas poses institutional challenges, requiring strategies and plans to bridge traditional policy domains and include multiple sectors (Bengtsson and Hoiberg, 2015). While implementation experiences are very recent, some countries are setting up inter-sectoral commissions or working groups to address this very issue.

Finally, implementing the principle of ‘Leaving no one behind’ – focusing on the most marginalised groups – adds another layer of complexity. These are groups often suffering entrenched, intersecting inequalities and in some cases discrimination that can be politically motivated. Moreover, the application of this principle, in practice, poses difficult decisions and can create tensions as governments attempt to prioritise the funding allocations of finite budgets. For example, countries trying to prioritise economic growth (and the revenues that come with it that can be spent on other interventions) to ensure remote rural populations will have access to roads, will represent an opportunity cost.

Raising awareness among citizens, public officials and other stakeholders

Despite the impressive consultation efforts made through the formulation of the SDGs and their intended universal application, in many countries, particularly developed countries and countries less dependent on aid, there is still a lack of awareness of this agenda beyond a core group of interested parties. In the UK, a review on the SDGs conducted by the International Development Parliamentary Committee highlighted the UK’s lack of engagement with this agenda (IDC, 2016). In a recent meeting on SDG implementation in Latin America, participants were concerned about the wider public’s lack of knowledge of the agenda, and low engagement from government officials in a number of countries (Development Progress et al., 2016).

As the SDGs are a voluntary agreement, only by keeping up public awareness, can citizens and civil society organisations scrutinise their governments’ performance and demand that they fulfil their commitments. Initiatives such as Project Everyone have been introduced to address this issue and help raise awareness of this agenda among the public (for example, the ‘World’s Largest Lesson’ was shared in over 160 countries, translated into 30 languages, with hundreds of millions of children learning that they have a key role in achieving Global Goals; texts about the goals were sent by mobile operators reaching 5.2 billion customers; #globalgoals trended across the world and had 1.3 million shares on social media; and over 250 million people engaged via Radio Everyone in 75 countries with 600 radio partners).2

With the excitement around the launch of the goals now fading away, a key implementation challenge will be keeping key state (including local governments recognised in the preamble of the SDGs as having key implementation responsibilities) and non-state actors within countries engaged. Further still, there are questions about whether the implementation process, which necessarily takes places within countries, will remain as inclusive of non-state actors as the process that conceived the SDGs. This depends on the provisions made and channels available in different countries for citizens and civil society organisations’ participation in the planning and implementation of the goals.

Financing an ambitious agenda

The SDGs are an incredibly ambitious agenda, which will require an uplift in resources, from billions to trillions. Estimates suggest that meeting the SDGs could cost at least an additional $1.4 trillion per year for all low- and lower-middle income countries (2013 US$, Schmidt-Traub, 2015). Yet the failure of the Addis Ababa Financing for Development Conference (FFD) of July 2015 to reach specific financing commitments has raised concerns over the feasibility of in scaling up finance to this level, or indeed in implementing this agenda.

While delivering the SDG agenda will require more resources at both national and global levels, there is an increasing emphasis on the need to strengthen domestic resource mobilisation in a context of flattening foreign aid (in absolute terms). For example, in the case of middle-income countries, governments are generating enough public revenues to meet the costs of ensuring no one is left behind in health, education and social protection – the problem is that these countries are not allocating enough to these basic services (Stuart et al., 2016).

The case of LICs is very different. The tax capacity of the world’s poorest countries falls far short of the scale of public investments required, with an estimated $84 billion annual financing gap for social services (health and education) and social protection alone (Greenhill et al., 2015). If high-income countries are serious about the SDGs, they also have to get serious about delivering 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) as ODA, a proposition that appears increasingly more challenging given the political trends in Europe and the US. Spending an additional $84 billion annually on the social sectors would be possible if DAC donors delivered on their 0.7% promise, and emerging economies scaled-up their development assistance programmes (Ibid.).

Another area where there are huge funding gaps is in infrastructure for growth: transport, communications, and energy. The world is expected to invest around $90 trillion in infrastructure over the next 15 years, to replace ageing infrastructure in advanced economies and to accommodate higher growth and structural change in emerging markets and developing countries. This will require a significant increase globally, from the current estimated $3.4 trillion per year invested in infrastructure, to about $6 trillion per year (New Climate Economy, 2016). In the case of sub-Saharan Africa

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2 https://www.project-everyone.org/
alone, the infrastructure gap was estimated at an annual $93 billion in 2009 (Foster and Briceno-Garmendia, 2009). Since then, there has been an increase in financing for sub-Saharan Africa’s infrastructure from almost all sources—traditional and non-traditional bilateral and multilateral institutions, the private sector, and the public sector. However, there are concerns about the emphasis on individual projects/transactions and that it is happening in place of strategic planning and broader governance, with consequences for the quality of investment outcomes. The challenge is for policymakers to strengthen their efforts at strategic coordination, oversight, and support beyond the focus on project-level finance (Gutman et al., 2015).

Finally, cracking down on illicit flows is often suggested as a possible source of funds for the SDGs. Indeed, the idea of introducing an international tax body was an area of heated debate at the FfD Conference. However, this is more likely to benefit middle-income economies, such as China and Mexico, than LICs (Forstatere, 2015).

Filling data gaps

The SDGs have strongly recognised the importance of data in delivering on the agenda. However, the measurement agenda for the SDGs is vast and potentially overwhelming, with more than 200 individual indicators relevant for the 17 goals. Current assessments show that data is readily available for only over a third of the indicators (IAEG-SDGs, 2016). In particular, disaggregation by different social groups and location fundamental to tracking progress on ‘Leaving no one behind’, is often missing as household samples are not big enough to be representative for these groups.

With initiatives like the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data launched to improve the data available, there is now political momentum around filling some of these gaps. This includes drawing on untapped sources of data produced by different sectors, such as the private sector and civil society organisations, and using new technologies and big data (IAEG-SDGs, 2014). Furthermore, the World Bank Group pledged to work with developing countries and international partners to ensure that the 78 poorest nations have household-level surveys every three years, with the first round to be completed by 2020 (World Bank, 2015).

2.2 The World Humanitarian Summit

The WHS, held on 23–24 May 2016 in Istanbul, brought together 9,000 participants from across the aid sector, including 55 heads of state and government, UN agencies, regional groupings, international NGOs, and a large range of civil society and private sector organisations. Convened by the UN Secretary-General as one of the last global summits of his tenure, the WHS was seen as an important opportunity to highlight the critical links between war, poverty, inequality, climate change and disaster impacts, risk reduction, crisis management and response. The summit was convened in 2016 thereby allowing it to explicitly reflect the SDGs and the Paris Agreement outcomes.

The summit took place at a time of significant shifts in who funds, organises and delivers humanitarian aid. Countries including China and the Gulf states are becoming more proactive and prominent humanitarian actors. Indeed, Turkey’s status as both a major donor and recipient of humanitarian aid was a deciding factor in the choice for Istanbul to host the summit. Regional organisations and middle-income governments are themselves becoming more capable responders, as is the private sector. Remittances from diaspora groups are also becoming more significant, consistent and reliable than international aid (Bennett et al., 2016). Long overdue, national and local non-governmental organisations are increasingly recognised as proactive and vocal responders in their own right, rather than as sub-contractors of large international relief organisations, and are demanding more autonomy and direct access to resources.

Table 2. World Humanitarian Summit – Secretary-General Core Commitments

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<tr>
<th>I. Political Leadership to Prevent and End Conflict</th>
<th>Commitments: 288</th>
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<td>The principles of ending conflict and building peace in the UN Charter, require timely, coherent and decisive political leadership that acts early and remains engaged and invested in stability.</td>
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<td>E.g. Mercy Corps commits to conduct and share the learning from at least three major studies on countering violent extremism in complex crises by 2018.</td>
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<th>II. Uphold the Norms that Safeguard Humanity</th>
<th>Commitments: 796</th>
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<tr>
<td>Calls on member states to recommit to protect civilians and human rights through respecting the rules of war, including ensuring humanitarian access and speaking out against violations.</td>
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<td>E.g. The Government of Eritrea will adopt clear, simple and expedited procedures to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief by 2017.</td>
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<th>III. Leave No-One Behind</th>
<th>Commitments: 1035</th>
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<tr>
<td>Obliges the international community to reduce forced displacement, share responsibility for refugees, prevent gender-based violence, eliminate gaps in education, include people with disabilities, and enable young people to ‘be agents of positive transformation’.</td>
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<td>E.g. Deutsche Post DHL Group aligns to the core commitments by extending its partnership and joint initiatives with UNDP and UNOCHA for a minimum of another three years (until 2019).</td>
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<th>IV. Change People’s Lives: From Delivering Aid to Ending Need</th>
<th>Commitments: 1308</th>
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<td>Pledges a move toward demand-driven responses that reduce vulnerability and ‘development’ and ‘humanitarian’ distinctions, and common results and accountability frameworks.</td>
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<td>E.g. The IL0 will by 2020 finance the start-up cost for the implementation of at least two social protection schemes that mitigate risks and provide a basic income security to populations affected by crises.</td>
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<th>V. Invest in Humanity</th>
<th>Commitments: 545</th>
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<td>This responsibility proposes greater investment, particularly directed toward local actors, national systems and disaster risk reduction and resilience activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>E.g. The Dhaka Community Hospital Trust commits to adopt the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) and International Aid Transparency Initiative Standard, with clear benchmarks for achieving them.</td>
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Unlike the other global summits reviewed in this paper, the WHS was informal by design. Conceived as a two-track process that would combine grassroots, multi-stakeholder consultations with high-level political championship around the summit’s key themes, it was designed to reflect a power shift toward non-traditional and non-state actors across the sector by capturing a wider range of views. Prior to Istanbul, a global consultation process convened 23,000 global stakeholders, incorporating their views into a summary report by the Secretary-General. This outlined the five core responsibilities against which the summit’s commitments were made (see Table 2).

Yet while this inclusive, multi-stakeholder process was able to mobilise a diverse group, it was never able to engage with the governments of major states in ways governments recognised and understood, or to rally the necessary political support required for implementing the ambitious change agenda. As a result, the commitments remain ‘ unofficial’ in the landscape of intergovernmental politics. This lack of ownership and acceptance by some member states is still evident in post-WHS discussions, where mention of the WHS was left out of the annual humanitarian resolution in ECOSOC.

The lack of official status for the WHS also makes the implementation and monitoring of its commitments difficult, and the comparison with other global agendas speculative. Proposals for moving forward include an annual stock-taking exercise and a higher-level event ‘within the next five years’ to evaluate progress, based on the Platform for Action, Commitments and Transparency (PACT), an online database of commitments against which progress will be monitored. While there is an aspiration to link progress on WHS commitments to the targets established as part of the SDGs, this is yet to be implemented.

The summit’s outcomes – over 3,500 commitments by 300 stakeholders – included pledges to uphold international humanitarian law (IHL), broaden operating models and partnerships to include a more devolved way of working, encourage more diversity and transparency in the way crises are funded and bring more coherence to humanitarian and development aid. While it is too early to tell whether these commitments will result in actionable progress, the summit did manage to catalyse a global conversation on the need for change. Major outcomes and initiatives included:

- The Grand Bargain, a compact between the sector’s largest donors and the organisations they fund, including pledges to channel 25% of funding to local and national responders by 2020 and increase the use of cash in place of material assistance. The compact also includes new pledges to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), increasing the pool to over $1 billion by 2018, partly funded through efficiency savings from reducing management costs.
- The ‘Commitment to Action on Collaborating in a New Way of Working’, a pledge by humanitarian and development agencies to work more closely and coherently based on comparative advantage in each context (Centre on International Cooperation, 2016).
- A shift toward recognising the role of local responders was demonstrated through the signing of the Charter4 Change, commitments to localise aid signed by over 100 NGOs from 37 countries, and the launch of both the Network for Empowered Aid Response (NEAR), a group of NGOs based in the global South, and the Regional Organisations Humanitarian Action Network (ROHAN).
- The Education Cannot Wait fund, bringing together government donors and private partners with the aim of closing the $8.5 billion funding gap needed to provide basic education for the 75 million children affected by crises.
- The Global Preparedness Partnership, an initiative involving the Vulnerable 20 Group of Finance Ministers, the UN and World Bank, to help the most vulnerable countries achieve a minimum level of resilience to shocks by 2020.
- Over 30 governments pledged to ‘uphold international responsibilities’ around migration and to aim to reduce forced displacement by half in 2030, with pledges from several to host more refugees, including a target by Canada to resettle 44,800 people, which is triple its current intake.

Unfinished business

Resolving the tensions around humanitarian-development coherence

The direct and deliberate linking of the WHS to the SDGs has rekindled long-standing tensions about the scope of humanitarian action and its relationship to the broader development agenda. While this linking seems a rational way to ensure that emergency response helps reduce the root causes of suffering and prevents recurrent crises, aligning these agendas presents a risk to upholding humanitarian principles, particularly the imperative to be neutral and independent (see Box 1).

In addition, broadening the purpose of humanitarian action from ‘delivering aid’ to ‘ending need’, without adequate resources and little power to influence what are essentially political agendas puts undue pressure and expectations on the humanitarian sector beyond its ability to deliver. Implementing the WHS’ core responsibilities and the Grand Bargain will require resolving such tensions across the sector.

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**Box 1. Humanitarian action operates on the basis of four core principles**

- **Humanity:** saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found
- **Impartiality:** acting solely on the basis of need, without discriminating affected populations
- **Neutrality:** acting without favouring any side in an armed conflict or other dispute
- **Independence:** the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented
Ending conflict and fragility

One of the strengths of the SDGs and where they differ from their MDG predecessors is the specific focus on fragile and conflict-affected states as one of the agenda’s key ambitions, as set out in Goal 16. This theme was also picked up by the Secretary-General’s report, which highlighted preventing and ending conflict and upholding IHL as core areas of WHS responsibility. However, while 48 governments signed a declaration supporting these goals, backed up by support to the development of a global IHL compliance mechanism led by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Government of Switzerland, some basic issues were not addressed directly. Omitted from the discussion were initiatives around ending arms sales to belligerents, UN Security Council veto suspensions in situations of mass atrocities, restricting the use of explosive weapons and basic protection of medical facilities during hostilities.

The frustration of this lack of progress was evident in the Report of the Secretary-General on the WHS, noting that ‘it was the weakest in terms of concrete commitments’ and citing the small share of pledges made related to Core Responsibility 1. The low number of commitments is a stark reminder that delivering political solutions is outside both the control of humanitarian organisations and the national interest of many states. This was emphasised by the public withdrawal from the WHS by the government of the Russian Federation and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) just two weeks before it began. While Russia pointed to a deliberate side-lining of member states in deciding the summit programme and outcomes, MSF dismissed the proceedings as a ‘fig-leaf of good intentions, allowing systemic violations, by states above all, to be ignored.’

System reform

With a business model designed more than 75 years ago but operating largely unchanged today, there was broad recognition that the implementation of WHS core commitments would require unpopular shifts for the sector’s major players in order to address some of the structural blockages that prevent effective working. Indeed, at one of the summit’s preparatory conferences held in New York in June 2015, 71% of participants identified UN mandate review as a WHS priority (Stoddard et al., 2015). In the lead up to the WHS, reports by leading think-tanks and NGOs highlighted the ‘structural pathologies’, ‘skills atrophy’ and ‘intolerance to risk’ that were endemic across the humanitarian sector, emphasising the need to ‘Let go of the perverse incentives that hold the system back’ (Stoddard et al., 2015; Bennett et al., 2016; Feinstein Centre, Kings College London, ODI, 2016; Oxfam, 2015; MSF, 2014).

Ultimately, the summit itself failed to take up these causes, missing an important opportunity to call for the types of reforms critical for change. The WHS was a forum to establish future parameters and directions of humanitarian action, leaving the determination of any systemic or structural change to a time when such new directions had been set. Discussing matters of internal reform also risked the summit disintegrating into unhelpful disagreements between agencies, detracting from the important political, financial and strategic issues the WHS sought to elevate.

2.3 The Paris Climate Agreement

The Paris Agreement on climate change of 2015 was widely hailed as a ‘historic agreement’ that created a new universally relevant and forward-looking framework for action on climate change. The pillars of the Paris Agreement have their substantive foundations in the Copenhagen Accord of 2009, which was widely regarded as a disappointment. In many ways the Paris ‘success’ is the result of strategic learning from the Copenhagen ‘failure’ (see Box 2). Key elements of the Paris discussions included strong leadership at multiple levels from the UN system including the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the governments of France and Peru which hosted the Conference of the Parties leading up to the agreement. The process involved deliberate engagement of key stakeholders from business, civil society, financial institutions as well as governments to build the case for action, and secure their commitment to a successful outcome, while managing expectations around what a multilateral process could reasonably deliver (Jacobs, 2016).

In the months before the Paris summit, countries put in place their own processes to establish intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) of action on climate change. More than 180 countries submitted their INDCs by October 2015, setting out the range of actions that they were prepared to take to mitigate and respond to climate change. The reality of the process meant that countries were unlikely to commit to goals on a global stage if they were not confident they could meet them.

The UNFCCC Secretariat made all INDCs public through a web-based portal, encouraging independent scrutiny of proposed actions. A vibrant network of experts engaged on climate policy to complete independent assessments of likely implications. Their inputs confirmed that while the INDCs represented increased efforts, emission reductions would fall substantially short of what was needed to avoid dangerous climate change. A key success of the agreement was therefore to create a system that allowed countries to ‘ratchet up’ the ambition of their action over time. The relatively formal process of review every five years based on technical assessment of achievements creates an important political window to encourage continued progress and acceleration.

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3 Core Responsibility 1 - Political Leadership to Prevent and End Conflict represented only 8% of the summit’s total commitments. Since this figure does not assess the content of each commitment, measuring their relative numbers is an imperfect proxy for assessing the level of importance placed on each Core Responsibility by WHS participants.

4 For more, see, for example, the UNEP Emissions Gap report, and IEA analysis of the INDCs.
Box 2. The Paris Agreement — an exercise in policy learning, leadership and facilitation

The failures of Copenhagen drove senior leadership in key institutions to take an early strategic approach to secure a successful outcome of the 2015 UNFCCC negotiations. When she took over as Secretary-General of the UNFCCC, Christiana Figueres focused her secretariat on fostering a positive narrative around the case for action through inclusive engagement of states, business and civil society organisations. She started by working with the Mexican hosts of COP 16 to legitimise the core tenets of the Copenhagen Accord through the Cancun Agreements, which were reached through a patient and transparent consultative process with all parties. In July 2014, more than 18 months before COP 21, the UN Secretary-General convened a High Level Summit that brought together more than 100 heads of state to focus on the case for ambitious action, and reiterate their commitment to a legally binding agreement on climate change.

The mechanics of the negotiations themselves also made a big difference. Heads of state came to Copenhagen during the final days of negotiations that had essentially reached an impasse. The core of the Copenhagen Accord was, in effect, agreed by the heads of the US, India, Brazil, China and South Africa in a closed room leaving almost no time to build wider ownership or reflect other parties’ views. By contrast, in Paris, more than 150 heads of state came at the beginning of the negotiations to signal their commitment to a strong outcome, thereby creating the political space for negotiators to reach an agreement. The Paris summit is reportedly the largest gathering of heads of state to ever attend a UN event.

At the beginning of the second week of negotiations a new ‘High Ambition Coalition’ of more than 100 countries including Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and LDCs as well as the US and EU expressed their commitment to a legally binding agreement that would keep global warming below 1.5°C. This included a ratchet mechanism to review nationally determined contributions (NDCs) every five years, and a unified system for tracking progress on implementation. This helped secure the political will to allow these provisions to manifest in the ultimate agreement.

A separate side-summit hosted by the Mayor of Paris convening 1,000 mayors from cities across the world to commit to action on climate change, alongside commitments from financial institutions and statements affirming climate risk from the Chair of the Financial Stability Board. This all contributed to reinforcing a broad-based commitment to a positive outcome.

Unfinished business

The Paris Agreement is a welcome outcome. Yet the compromises struck are delicate, and there are many hurdles to overcome if its promise is to be realised.

Where’s the money? Delivering on finance

One of the most contentious issues going into the Paris negotiations was the provision of finance to help developing countries respond to climate change. This was due, in part, to the Copenhagen Accord, which includes concrete commitments by developed countries to mobilise $100 billion a year in public and private funds by 2020. Ambiguties in the framing allowed countries to agree to the commitment, but have frustrated efforts to monitor progress in achieving the goal (Bodnar, Brown and Nakhooda, 2015). While the global context is that many developed countries confront increasing fiscal austerity and resistance to increased international spending.

In fact, that developed countries would have a hard time mobilising large volumes of public finance, may actually have prompted greater focus on how to leverage the much larger flows of private finance that will affect climate outcomes in larger economies. The focus on finance has also prompted attention on the need to consider climate impacts of all financial flows in all countries, including policy options that will increase consideration of climate risk in the mainstream financial sector, and correct actions that encourage high carbon investment (such as fossil fuel subsidies). These measures are crucial, but are no substitution for the need to follow through on commitments to support developing countries, and ensure funding is spent effectively.

Without meaningful progress in scaling up support to developing countries, efforts to seek more ambitious pledges of action from developing countries in 2020 may be compromised. There is a significant tension at the heart of this effort, between the need to support vulnerable countries including SIDS and LDCs who have been champions for ambitious climate policy and the need to support mitigation in fast growing emerging economies who are the largest emitters.

Operationalising the transparency framework: data and information

The Agreement includes a commitment to an enhanced framework for transparency of implementation and support, in which all countries enhance data and reporting, common rules for reporting (including for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions) are agreed, and a common framework for verification is established. It also created a committee to facilitate implementation and promote compliance, the modalities of which are being developed.

The Paris review and ratchet mechanism hinges on robust information about GHG emissions, developed using reasonably consistent rules and guidelines, and capacity to maintain high-quality systems (particularly in developing countries). This is a substantial task that is closely linked to having much better information on activities in key economic sectors and their emissions implications. It also creates provisions for monitoring progress on adaptation and resilience, through
an adaptation communication to be ‘submitted and updated periodically’, potentially as part of future NDCs. The need to support developing country capacity for implementation is recognised, particularly its monitoring and reporting requirements, and a Paris Committee on Capacity Building has been established that will seek to identify and address gaps in capacity needs, and strengthen the coherence of capacity building support. There could be significant synergies between the climate agenda and the data and reporting requirements of delivering on the SDGs.

Sustaining commitment to action within countries
The Paris Agreement creates political windows of opportunity in which countries can commit to more ambitious actions. Yet these remain only windows: the will to seize them must be maintained. This will require empowering domestic constituencies for change, and ensuring the resonance of climate actions with national and sub-national priorities (given that cities have also pledged ambitious climate commitments). The paths that developing countries take to resuscitate economic growth, recover from fiscal crises, or restore security within their societies will be vital to delivering more ambitious future pledges on climate change. The early entry into force of the Agreement sends a positive signal.

Yet there is great uncertainty in the months ahead, particularly in light of the outcome of the 2016 US election of a candidate who has questioned action on climate change. Realising the potential of the agreement will rest on resolving questions such as who will host the 2018 COP in which the initial facilitative dialogue to take stock of progress made will take place, and how well those presiding over the COP are able to work with UN leadership to enable a new round of more ambitious pledges. Independent expert technical expertise and input will be essential to make the system work.

2.4 Summary
Table 3 summarises the key features of the SDG, WHS and Paris global agendas discussed above. The arrangements to follow up on each of these processes differ, but it is striking that new windows of opportunity to take stock of progress on all three are poised to open. In 2018, the HLPF meeting will focus on reviews of environmental goals and the COP will include a dialogue to take stock of progress made. Furthermore, in 2019 the first Heads of State Dialogue on the SDGs will take place, and in 2020 countries will be invited to submit new climate pledges, and a follow up humanitarian summit is anticipated.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Sustainable Development Goals</strong></th>
<th><strong>World Humanitarian Summit</strong></th>
<th><strong>Paris Agreement on climate change</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Governance</strong></td>
<td>The Agenda for Humanity serves as a policy platform to bring together diverse actors in the humanitarian system including governments, regional organisations, private sector and national and international NGOs. More than 3,500 current commitments to be self-monitored and reviewed in annual global stock-taking exercises.</td>
<td>• NDCs reviewed every five years on the basis of a technical review of implementation progress.</td>
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<td>HLPF – voluntary annual reporting on progress. It will meet every year under the auspices of the ECOSOC and every four years at the level of heads of states and government under the auspices of the General Assembly. This year’s HLPF meeting, which took place in July in New York, was the first one after the adoption of the SDGs. National reviews of SDG progress are a key input to the HLPF.</td>
<td>• A 2018 facilitative dialogue on early progress in order to inform the next round of pledges, which are to be submitted by 2020.</td>
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<td><strong>Finance</strong></td>
<td>The WHS was not a pledging conference and did not result in general pledges to finance its implementation. The WHS did result in promising funding initiatives, including:</td>
<td>• A global stocktake – comprehensive assessment of progress – in 2023, informed by technical expert review of reporting on implementation.</td>
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<td>• A doubling of the level of the Central Emergency Response Fund to $1 billion.</td>
<td>• Future pledges to build on 2015 and reflect highest possible ambitions.</td>
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<td>• A $500 million fund for Education in Emergencies.</td>
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<td>• The launch of an Islamic finance platform.</td>
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<td>• Commitment to 25% of funding to be channelled to local and national responders.</td>
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<td>• Commitments to an increase in the use of cash against material assistance.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Commitments to save $1 billion by increasing efficiency of management and overhead costs in five years.</td>
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<td><strong>Data and information</strong></td>
<td>The WHS attempted to group together increasingly prominent and fragmented data of humanitarian actors through a number of individual and collective data initiatives, including the launch of the Humanitarian Data Centre in The Hague.</td>
<td>Extensive reporting on climate change mitigation actions (including GHG emissions), adaptation, and support received by developing countries.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Expert Group identified 230 indicators (81 with established methodology and standards available and data regularly produced by countries) to be produced in partnership with national statistical offices. Supported by the multi-stakeholder Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Key challenge to reconcile</strong></td>
<td>• Seeking political resolutions to current conflicts and crises.</td>
<td>• Maintaining a focus on low carbon development opportunities and climate risk in development planning and implementation, and financial planning and investment systems.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Reforming the international humanitarian system to be able to deliver on the WHS outcomes.</td>
<td>• Fostering technology improvement and uptake, and fiscal signals that internalise climate risk (globally and nationally).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• The informal and non-binding nature of the commitments and lack of clarity as to where the responsibility lies for upholding and enforcing commitments.</td>
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<td>• Tensions between broad and narrow conceptions of humanitarianism and how to reach a middle ground in upholding humanitarian principles while bringing more coherence to humanitarian, development and peacebuilding initiatives where it is needed.</td>
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<td>• 2018: HLPF meeting hosted by ECOSOC focused on ‘Transformation towards sustainable and resilient societies’.</td>
<td>• 2018: Facilitative Dialogue to take stock of progress</td>
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<td>• Annual meetings of ECOSOC and the General Assembly on humanitarian issues.</td>
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<td>• A high-level stock-taking event before 2021 to evaluate progress.</td>
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<td>• The adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in September 2016 commits signatories to a global compact on refugees in 2018.</td>
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3. Delivering on the post-2015 policy agenda: the road ahead

The three global agendas considered in this paper have the potential to be highly complementary. The holistic SDG agenda presents a docking station for some aspects of the climate agreement, and can serve as a basis for those aspects of the WHS commitments related to protracted crises. Goal 13 refers explicitly to the global climate change policy process, while other goals are framed to capture linkages with the environmental and climate change agenda, including Goal 7 on clean energy, Goal 11 on sustainable cities, Goal 12 on responsible consumption and production, and Goals 14 and 15 on life below water and on land. Furthermore, several of the targets apply to both the climate and humanitarian agendas: for example, Target 1.1 on building the resilience of the poor to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters. While Goal 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions makes critical linkages between state fragility and conflict and may compel development actors to engage in specific crisis settings.

Despite these interlinkages, there are tensions between the three sets of agreements and within them that may yet prove problematic as implementation proceeds. In the case of the WHS, there is a tension around the importance of operating on the basis of humanitarian principles and the distinct ways of working they envision, while also operating more coherently with development and peacebuilding actors, particularly in fragile states and in contexts of high levels of displacement. While in the case of the SDGs and the climate agenda, there are tensions between the ambitious economic and infrastructure SDG targets (e.g. 7% average annual growth for low-income countries) and the overarching goals of the Paris Agreement. Different countries and stakeholders will need to own and prioritise different aspects of these agendas, depending on how invested they were in the negotiations and taking into account their individual country’s national interest. The challenge for the international community will be to monitor overarching progress, highlighting gaps where they manifest, and signalling opportunities to maximise complementarity, where appropriate, while managing the tensions and trade-offs that such complementarity will entail. This will also mean managing the politics and financing of the transition to the envisaged new approaches to development. The new leadership of the UN system, including the new Secretary-General and his appointees, will also need to contend with the realities of politics in key member states that are reinforcing nationalist policies, and growing geopolitical tensions.

The challenge of implementing these global agreements will require shifts in the way the international system operates, the way it is resourced and in assessment of its own progress. This will create significant implications for governance structures, the sources and uses of funds, and the nature and level of data required and generated. We present some initial insights on these three interrelated issues below. Each of these themes will be explored further in a series of three forthcoming ODI working papers to be released in December 2016.

3.1 Governance and structural transformation

The outcomes across each of these global summits imply significant changes in how the international aid system is structured, how it functions and how it delivers. The SDGs and the Paris Agreement both take as their starting point the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development and the integration of economic, environmental and social action as the basis of their implementation. The WHS, and its resulting Agenda for Humanity, aims to address the causes of crises as well as the consequences by bringing more coherence to humanitarian and development action, and a tighter focus on crisis prevention – resilience, disaster preparedness and disaster risk management – alongside crisis response. Taken as a whole, the summits – and the new global aid agenda they envisage – will offer significant opportunities to address the multiple dimensions of conflict, fragility, inequality and long-term poverty. However, realising the full ambition of their commitments requires looking outside traditional systems of global governance and programming to new players, new partners and different ways of working.

Implementation beyond states

The new global frameworks cannot be achieved by states alone. Government structures and incentives are not set up to realise the universality and comprehensiveness of coverage these agendas require – including the promise to leave no one behind. Many governments are also not equipped to gather and analyse data and assess progress that the new monitoring frameworks will require. Existing models
will need to eschew state-centric or multilateral forms of governance, potentially in favour of more networked approaches that promote flexibility in decision-making and policy change and more diverse sources of domestic or international resources to fund the public goods that these agendas envision. Consideration should be given to the role and added value of regional organisations and the multilateral system in setting and legitimising norms, standards and the promotion of collective action, coordination and information-sharing.

Devolution of decision-making and action

All three agendas prioritise working at sub-national and local levels and envision investing significant time and resources in enhancing local capacity and partnerships in order to do so. All three agendas also recognise the untapped infrastructure, know-how and human and financial resources within those sectors of society not traditionally or formally part of the international aid system. These include businesses, insurance companies, diaspora groups and faith-based organisations – all of whom have a role to play. Creating the right structures and modalities to make use of the significant capacities and resources that exist within these organisations, while simultaneously financing local action where needed will be important. It will also mean creating the right incentives for devolving leadership, responsibility and decision-making to sub-national and local entities, and addressing the deep-seated power imbalances that have prevented these shifts in the past.

Reducing fragmentation and improving coherence

The UN Development System (UNDS) is heavily fragmented and poorly coordinated. According to data from the Chief Executive Boards of the UNDS, 24 UNDS entities in 2014 or 95% of UN Official Assistance for Development (OAD) expenditure, maintained 1,432 UNDS offices in 180 countries across the globe. This figure excludes multiple UNDS field offices within a single country (ECOSOC, 2016). On the humanitarian side, existing governance structures are, at once, highly centralised while being geographically and functionally dispersed; distinct by design from development and peacebuilding agendas, and profoundly distanced in social, cultural, political and economic terms from the countries and communities they serve (Collinson, 2016).

All three global agendas acknowledge the need to reduce this fragmentation to work towards a more coherent, efficient and effective international system. From the perspective of humanitarian sector, this requires consideration of how to bridge humanitarian, development and peacebuilding initiatives where longer-term approaches to crisis response are needed. This does not mean the integration of humanitarian approaches and activities with these other agendas, particularly in sensitive conflict situations (for example, where the government is a party to conflict) where humanitarian action must remain distinct from other forms of assistance. However, in situations of chronic and protracted crisis, aligning humanitarian structures and approaches more closely with national development plans and eliminating the bifurcated structures within donor aid organisations and institutions may be required. From development perspectives, better coherence across agendas involves ‘leaving institutional divides behind’, and using regional mechanisms and platforms to integrate their programmes and actions. The findings of the International Team of Advisers, tasked by ECOSOC with repositioning the UNDS in the wake of the SDGs, is a positive starting point.

Managing interests and values

While the national interest has always been a significant driver of humanitarian and development aid, the distinction between poverty reduction, life-saving assistance and strategic interest is becoming less clear-cut (Gavas and Gulrajani, 2015). The growing ‘bilateralisation’ of aid, coupled with growing isolationist rhetoric, has refocused humanitarian and development priority-setting and decision-making on strategic objectives and calculations (Ibid.). This sits uneasily with the humanitarian ethos of saving lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found, and with the values of universality and collective outcomes that underpin the SDGs and the Paris Agreement. The implementation of these global agendas will require a governance system that understands and manages the political impulses and motivations behind aid. While stronger multilateral models of leadership and cooperation are needed to balance interests and values.

Realising the rhetorical ambitions of these three agendas is a political, not a technical, challenge – and past efforts at reform within the humanitarian sector demonstrate how difficult overcoming that challenge to achieve meaningful change can be. Thus, while devolution to national and local levels will help in strengthening national and local governance and accountability in some countries, the outcome may still prove lacking. There may be some local progress in some areas, but lack of progress is just as likely. Political will is also crucial to the Paris process and to succeeding in ratcheting up national commitments. However, the US election win by Donald Trump exposes just how politically vulnerable the agreement still is.

Meanwhile, the SDGs do not contain enough on detailed goals and indicators for fragile and conflict-affected states. In particular, Goal 16 relating to peace, justice and strong institutions is too general and could be perceived as potentially naive in dealing with the hard political issues it will need to cover. There are also significant tensions between the priorities of Paris and the SDGs, and between the SDGs and core humanitarian principles. On their own, the WHS commitments do not fully address the ongoing tension between humanitarian and development action.

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3.2 Finance: finding the cash and spending it effectively

Spending the money well

Where the money for implementing the post-2015 agendas will come from has been a particularly politically contentious
 issue. Equally important is ensuring that available finance is appropriately targeting interventions that can make a real difference – and spent well. The SDGs and Paris Agreements seek transformations to the global economic and developmental paradigm, and to direct all relevant flows of finance (public, private and hybrid) towards activities that are consistent with efforts to achieve low carbon and climate resilient development – rather than undermining these efforts. For the humanitarian sector, despite the exponential growth in financial terms for the last 20 years, the $28 billion that currently fuels it is not yet being used effectively to meet the demands of multiple, large-scale crisis response.

The nature and sources of finance differ across agendas. UN agencies have played a central role in channelling humanitarian finance, and there is an urgent need to strengthen the efficiency of spending. On the development and climate agendas, there is a vital role for domestic public finance in all countries, and better systems of domestic revenue raising and management to deliver on integrated climate and development goals.

Navigating the role of the private sector

Private finance and private businesses play important roles in many of the sectors that are at the heart of the climate, humanitarian and developmental challenge, and need to be part of the solution. The SDGs (and accompanying Addis Ababa Agenda for Action on Finance for Development), the Paris Agreement and the WHS recognise this need, focusing on opportunities to attract private finance, and to widen the finance toolbox to target barriers to profit-seeking investment. In addition, there is a combined focus on non-grant finance, and efforts to encourage a wider range of actors to contribute (including through voluntary South-South cooperation). On climate change, there has been unprecedented engagement on questions of climate change risk and opportunity by key actors in the mainstream private financing community. While in the implementation of the WHS commitments and the SDGs, there has been interest in getting private companies involved in making more concrete contributions to the humanitarian and development agendas, recognising the investment opportunities of these responses.

The scale and concessionality of public finance

The question of how much international concessional finance will be available to support some of these efforts have also created heated debate, as have questions over how to channel and spend the available funds. None of the agendas delivered explicit commitments for international support from developed countries. In the case of the Paris Agreement, existing collective financing goals were confirmed and extended, and discussions on a new larger goal for the finance flowing from developed to developing countries, has been pushed down to the line to 2025. The Financing for Development Outcome Document reiterated the goal of delivering 0.7% of GNI as development assistance, yet only a small number of countries have stepped up to this commitment. The WHS secured pledges for CERF and the Education Cannot Wait fund, but no longer-term commitments at a country level.

The reality is that economic and political conditions in the richest countries in the world have not been conducive to these countries taking on international development assistance-related spending commitments. These developments have some profound implications for the UN system in particular, which has historically relied on developed countries as sources of funding for its activities. Furthermore, it has been a slow and difficult task reforming key institutions in the international development finance landscape so they can better channel funding to key institutions on the frontlines of the development, climate and humanitarian challenges. There has been some encouraging progress in making climate change a more mainstream consideration in development spending, but there is a continued need to increase risk tolerance and innovation in this context.

Encouraging signs that major developing country economies are beginning to scale up their investments and support for global development, climate change and humanitarian action include actions taken by China, the Gulf states, as well as national development banks based in developing countries with international operations (such as the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES), the Islamic Development Bank, and others). Their means of operation are, of course, quite different, with an emphasis on mutual benefits. The emergence of new development banks such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank to also deliver on the development agenda (particularly infrastructure finance needs) should be noted.

The prioritisation and allocation of concessional resources

Available concessional resources for these intertwined developmental goals are constrained and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. This forces key actors in the international community to confront difficult questions about where and how to spend this potentially shrinking pot of concessional resources. On the one hand, the leave no one behind agenda makes a compelling case for concessional resources to be focused on the needs of the poorest (or the poorest within major emerging economies), the displaced and the host communities in which they reside. There is likely to be complementarity between these priorities and efforts to scale up adaptation finance for vulnerable countries (and communities within countries). On the other hand, there is a rich body of research and practice that affirms the importance of support for institutional and domestic capacity strengthening efforts to deliver climate change mitigation outcomes, including in middle income countries. These efforts work alongside efforts to drive non-grant and return-seeking finance into revenue generating mitigation and adaptation activities.

Major opportunities to increase the efficiency spending to generate ‘efficiency savings’ are likely. These include opportunities to find creative ways to channel a larger share of financial resources to institutions including NGOs, research institutes and community organisations that are based in developing countries alongside developing country governments and local private actors. The growing engagement and interest of developing country-based financial institutions and their growing capacity to demonstrate adherence with accepted fiduciary management practices, is encouraged.

Central to future efforts is confronting questions over how to maximise the impact and influence of existing development
3.3 Data: following up on commitments

Data has been neglected by the international community. The SDGs highlighted the importance of investing in good information along with the capacity to generate and use it within countries. The SDGs called for a ‘data revolution’, which will include a comprehensive indicator framework with Goal 17 outlining specific targets to improve data capacity, monitoring and accountability. Transparency and reporting systems are also at the heart of the Paris Agreement, with an emphasis on reporting on emissions, climate action taken, and support received.

The case of the WHS is somewhat different. As a multi-stakeholder process rather than an intergovernmental negotiation leading to agreed outcomes, there was less work dedicated from the outset to issues of monitoring and progress tracking of the commitments. Important questions remain around the data that will be collected – by whom, and how? – to provide learning and accountability to the humanitarian system for implementing the WHS reforms.

Below we reflect on some of the issues that need to be tackled to deliver the data needed to monitor progress across these three major agendas. It is clear that data gaps cut across all three agendas. While issues of governance and finance will play a fundamental role in putting these agendas in practice, only through the ability to follow up on the commitments made can we learn how much progress is made in practice, only through the ability to follow up on the commitments made can we learn how much progress is made to inform interventions and hold actors with implementation responsibilities to account.

Filling major data gaps

The vast agenda set out by the SDGs and the accompanying focus on monitoring progress through better data represents an opportunity to create practical synergies across this aspect of the three agendas. The UN Statistics Commission working with the Inter-agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators (IAEG-SDGs) developed a set of 230 global indicators to monitor goals and targets of the SDGs (IAEG-SDGs, 2016). The group proposed a tiered system of indicators. Only 35% of these indicators (81 out of 230) are fully defined with available data (classified as Tier I). This presents a clear indication of the huge data gaps that will need to be filled. The remaining indicators will require more frequent data collection (Tier II) and/or further refinement and methodological development (Tier III). The group will implement a work plan to further develop indicators and continue to work on the implementation of the global indicator framework.

There are a number of SDG targets and indicators that are clearly linked to the climate agenda. Efforts to monitor progress on goals related to extending access to clean energy (Goal 7); decent work and economic growth (Goal 8); industry, innovation and infrastructure (Goal 9); sustainable cities and communities (Goal 11); and responsible consumption and production (Goal 12); as well as Goal 13 on climate change itself, could support efforts to track progress in delivering NDCs. The existence and efforts of these goals help underpin future pledges of climate action to be submitted in 2020 and beyond. Some of these goals – for example, the goal on responsible consumption and production and Goal 13 on climate change – face large data gaps since many indicators fall under Tier III, which means that for these indicators there are no established methodology/standards yet.

There is less overlap between the SDGs and humanitarian action in emergency situations. However, some intersections may prove useful given the advances the SDGs have made in terms of indicators compared to the WHS, while some parts of the WHS agenda should fall to development and political actors to carry through, particularly in terms of delivering political and development solutions to the problems facing fragile states (Stoddard et al., 2015). Here, the clearest area for alignment/overlap lies in SDG 16, which addresses peace and conflict prevention, and the first WHS commitment area: political leadership to prevent and end conflicts. Yet some key indicators under Goal 16, such as the number of conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population for target 16.1 (‘Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere’) also fall under Tier III with currently no available data. Other relevant targets, such as those related to reducing exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events (e.g. the indicator for Target 1.5 is the number of deaths, missing persons and persons affected by disaster per 100,000 people) fall under Tier II, which means that relevant information is not regularly collected. The need to fill data gaps cuts across all three agendas.

While there may be some aspects of the SDGs that overlap with the climate agenda, and to a lesser extent with the WHS, there are also particular data needs for each of the agendas. For example, monitoring GHG emissions to deliver on reporting requirements under the Paris Agreement will require particular expertise.

For implementation of the WHS, first-mile data collection applications may be necessary, which allows for faster access to data about affected people. The nature of humanitarian emergencies – often involving high levels of mortality and significant population movements – means that data can very quickly be out-of-date (Knox-Clark and Darcy, 2013). Furthermore, humanitarian actors have to deal with the challenges of collecting data in difficult situations where state institutions are fairly weak. Not only are secondary sources often missing, but in situations where physical access is severely restricted, data collection is often not possible. At the same time, humanitarian interventions involving the distribution of large quantities of goods and services will,
In sector-specific data, improvements to financial flows will be required for these three major agendas. This will be important, both from a political perspective (to shine light on whether international support is reaching local institutions and beneficiaries as committed), and from a practical one (to increase understanding of what types of activities are being targeted and how these are supporting progress on each agenda). In the case of climate change, how to account for climate finance and progress towards the goal of $100 billion a year by 2020 from developed countries remains a highly contested area (Roberts and Weikman, 2016). Data on humanitarian financial flows are provided primarily through OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS). However, reporting to the FTS is voluntary so the picture offered for humanitarian financing is incomplete and often features inconsistencies across different donors. The Grand Bargain’s aim to improve the transparency of humanitarian financing - through its commitment to publishing financing data to the International Aid Transparency Initiative within two years - could be a starting point to address some of these issues.

Leaving no one behind: the need for disaggregated and perceptions data

Investment in disaggregation of data for different social groups and detailed geographical breakdowns is needed to track progress on the SDG principle of ‘Leaving no one behind’, while also targeting policies towards marginalised groups. Currently, household surveys samples often do not allow for detailed disaggregation, which means that many SDG indicators cannot be disaggregated by location, age, ethnicity or particularly vulnerable groups of interest under WHS, such as Internally Displaced People (IDPs), refugees and migrants (UN, 2016). This granular information, combined with data on disaster risks, could support a better understanding of the socio-economic characteristics of those vulnerable to a variety of impacts including climate change, which links up both the climate and humanitarian agendas.

In addition, perceptions data can also help to better understand the priorities and needs of vulnerable groups. For example, in the context of the WHS, the Grand Bargain has commissioned a monitoring project that seeks the views of affected people on the degree to which Grand Bargain reforms are being implemented and how these are perceived as contributing to better humanitarian assistance.7

Tapping into new technologies

New technologies present opportunities across these agendas, as they can help to fill data gaps and complement traditional data collection methods. For example, spatial mapping technologies can be used to provide more granular locational data, including on vulnerabilities to climate change. Big data and mobile phone surveys can help to generate more frequent data needed to inform development and humanitarian responses. Of course, these new technologies also present challenges, such as guaranteeing privacy, being aware of particular sample biases, and securing quality standards when third party information is used (e.g. community generated data or private sector data). Over the coming years, setting principles to deal with these challenges will be critical to exploiting these alternative sources of information – initiatives like the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data can help to spearhead these efforts. New technologies will also offer opportunities to make data more accessible through open data portals, benefiting all three global agendas.

Dealing with a fragmented data ecosystem

Avoiding fragmentation of data sources produced by different actors and setting standards to aggregate information and improve capacity to do so is a common challenge for these three major agendas. In the case of the SDGs, the global indicator framework provides guidance on common methodologies and standards, but there is room for improvement on the standardisation of some indicators in order to provide an aggregate picture of development progress.

WHS recognises that the fragmentation of data sources and formats and an uneven capacity by humanitarians to use data can impede informed, coherent and accountable responses (OCHA, 2016). Humanitarian agencies use different sets of indicators to monitor their programming and effectiveness, thus inhibiting the ability to draw comparisons from country-to-country or to monitor progress on a single issue across multiple organisations. This inconsistency undermines the ability to make meaningful comparisons across crises, or to reach an accurate global picture of the humanitarian caseload. Looking to the Paris Agreement, differences in how NDCs are reported can make it challenging to assess the expected aggregate impacts of NDCs on future trends of global GHG emissions.

There are a number of initiatives being launched to coordinate efforts to improve data and data capacity. The UN Statistics Commission and the Global Partnership for Sustainable Data are the key actors seeking to strengthen the data for Agenda 2030 – with some commentators highlighting the need for ongoing communication between these two initiatives to avoid duplication (Steven and Kashambuzi, 2016). The UNFCCC also has provisions to improve data capacities. This includes on GHG emissions as well as a renewed emphasis on an increased understanding of vulnerabilities to the impacts of climate change so as to support reporting on adaptation efforts. In the case of WHS, the UN and several governments announced their support for and launch of a Global Humanitarian Data Centre to increase data literacy and use in humanitarian response (OCHA, 2016). While many of the issues covered will be sector specific, it is important that these initiatives, together with other ongoing efforts from key international actors involved in data collection and dissemination (e.g. World Bank, PARIS21, OECD DAC, UN agencies, etc.), do not lose sight of areas where there could be synergies to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts that increases fragmentation.
4. Conclusions and recommendations

Taken together, the commitments made by the SDGs, the Paris Agreement and the WHS have the potential to significantly remake and modernise the way conflict, climate resilience, fragility and poverty are addressed on a global scale. However, maintaining political commitment, mobilising adequate financial resources and applying them to good effect to bring the full weight of international, regional, national and local capacity to efforts will be critical to success.

As the steward of these global agendas, it will be the responsibility of the new UN Secretary-General in particular to provide strong, unwavering leadership and a sharp focus in achieving the commitments outlined in this paper. The successful implementation of these agendas will require bringing to bear the full weight and support of the departments of the UN Secretariat as well as the UN agencies, funds and programmes to exploit the points of convergence across them. Where crucial political and financial support of major powers is lacking, it will be up to Mr. Guterres to rally the UN membership and look beyond the UN’s traditional power-holders, to business, finance and civil society leaders in promoting these agendas in political and practical terms.

As this paper highlights, there are three areas of implementation that will be critical factors in success: the right governance systems, finance – raising it and spending it effectively – and data management. Each of these themes will be explored further in a series of three forthcoming ODI working papers to be released in December 2016. On these three important areas, this paper offers the following considerations:

4.1 Governance

Governance and structural transformation: improving the governance mechanisms for implementation of the agreements themselves

- The United Nations should undertake a forensic analysis across and within all three agreements to identify and address the gaps and inconsistencies within and between the three agendas, while also identifying the potential trade-offs. This is especially true of the SDGs, where the breadth and scope of the agreement involves tensions between competing SDGs and associated targets.
- The mechanisms set up to monitor and implement these agreements should be reinforced by governments, humanitarian and development organisations and by the United Nations. Critical to this is aligning international, regional and national targets and review mechanisms, as well as strengthening the ability of civil society actors to hold governments and corporations to account. Non-state actors, including regional organisations, civil society groups and the business sector should become integral partners in the implementation of the SDG and climate change agendas.

Reducing institutional fragmentation and improving coherence

- The UNDS is heavily fragmented and poorly coordinated. All three agendas acknowledge the need to reduce this fragmentation and work towards a more coherent, efficient and effective international system.
- International humanitarian actors – humanitarian donors, UN agencies and NGOs - need to consider how to bridge humanitarian, development and peacebuilding initiatives in protracted crisis situations, while maintaining distinctions between humanitarian and development work where a neutral and impartial profile is necessary.
- For the development sector, 'leaving institutional divides behind' and prioritising a more horizontal way of working is important. Integrating programme implementation based on the requirements of the context and a division of labour will make the best use of the comparative strengths of individual development organisations.
- The findings of the International Team of Advisers, tasked by ECOSOC with repositioning the UNDS in the wake of the SDGs should inform further efforts to build institutional capacities at international and national levels, and reduce fragmentation.

Implementation beyond states – devolving decision-making and action

- The ambitions of these new global frameworks cannot be achieved by states alone. Governments, regional organisations as well as the UN and its sister agencies should look at networked approaches that promote flexibility in decision-making and policy change, and more diverse sources of domestic or international resources for funding.
- Untapped infrastructure, know-how, and human and financial resources, such as within non-traditional sectors, businesses, insurance companies, diaspora groups and faith-based organisations, should be better utilised.
- The new Secretary-General and his appointees will need to contend with the realities of politics in key member states that may reinforce nationalist policies, and growing
Strengthen global governance

- The responsibility of implementing these agendas rests with national governments, but the drivers and implications of many challenges that comprise the sustainable development, climate change and humanitarian agendas are transnational and global in nature.
- Support for national efforts by the international community and by governments themselves must also be matched with efforts to address those aspects of globalisation and global governance that currently work to undermine or jeopardise achievement of the SDGs, the mitigation of dangerous climate change, and the prevention and appropriate and effective responses to humanitarian crises.
- In the area of global governance, the UN Secretary-General must play a critical leadership role in managing the increasing interdependence among countries on the interlinked issues.

4.2 Finance
Meeting financial commitments and providing guidance for scaling up

- Developed countries must follow through on their existing commitments to provide concessional finance. This is particularly important for those countries most vulnerable to a range of shocks and stresses that span the humanitarian, development and climate agenda such as LICs, fragile states and some SIDS. The continued engagement of all country leaders will be necessary to achieve the required scale of funding to meet the ambition of the three agendas.
- New and emerging funding actors will be key. The existing standards and guidance factored into country programming, future capital mobilisation and portfolio development financing strategies would better allow multilateral development banks to meet the commitments they are making, but should be expanded to new actors, such as development finance institutions in emerging economies with growing capacity and interest in investing in the development and global public goods agenda. IFIs themselves will play an important role in developing new collective guidance drawn from the Paris Agreement and SDGs.
- Building and maintaining strategic alliances and expertise with the private business and finance community on questions of risk and resilience will be critical to achieving the objectives of the three agendas.

Navigating the role of the private sector

- Private finance and private businesses play important roles in many of the sectors that are at the heart of the climate, humanitarian and developmental challenge, and need to be part of the solution. The SDGs (and accompanying Addis Ababa Agenda for Action on Finance for Development), the Paris Agreement and the WHS recognise this need, focusing on opportunities to attract private finance, and to widen the finance toolbox to target barriers to profit seeking investment.
- There is unprecedented engagement by key actors in the mainstream private financing community on climate change risk and opportunity. This momentum and already active engagement should be built upon and encouraged.

Spend the money well: developing consistent, transparent methods and approaches to deploy and track finance

- Development banks, in particular, need to include approaches that enable climate change risk to be accounted for, as well as NDC and SDG implementation factored into country programming, future capital mobilisation and portfolio development financing strategies. A reinforcement of efforts to strengthen tax systems and public financial management in partnership with development banks can also be supported by creating neutral fora where options can be considered and debated. Such development must be coordinated to prevent a proliferation of finance tracking methods that become cumbersome for contributors and recipients.
- Actors across the three agendas must adopt a collective and overriding priority to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of available finance. The requirement is two-fold. First, development of monitoring and evaluation approaches must be aligned to ensure the direction of resources delivers impact – and value for money. Second, financial mechanisms, policies and programmes should be designed to deliver on more than one agenda. This is particularly true in the infrastructure sector, or in relation to, for example, the tools and solutions in insurance and social protection where there is potential for synergies as well as a need to reduce tensions between the objectives of the agendas. This comes with the associated challenge of ensuring priorities and success in one agenda will not undermine progress in another.

4.3 Data
Fill in the data gap: investing in data in countries with weak statistical capacity

- Data gaps cut across all three agendas. Better data collection and disaggregation by national statistics offices, international organisations carrying out international households surveys and with capacities to support national data collection efforts will be needed to monitor progress on the principle of ‘Leave no one behind’ which applies to all three agendas, for instance by including data on vulnerable groups, such as refugees, IDPs.
- Transparency is a key accountability mechanism, and investing in good data and open data portals allows an informed debate and clearer picture on where progress is being made, and how progress can be accelerated.
- In developing countries where spending needs are more acute and fiscal constraints higher, spending is often prioritised over gathering and analysis of data. In these cases, IFIs could make the core starting investment in creating the data gathering and management capacities and systems, with national governments only
incurring future operational expenses (Chattopadhyay and Quattri, 2016).

• Investments should also consider the potential of new technologies to gather more frequent data on hard-to-reach groups, for example, through initiatives like the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data. Spatial mapping technologies can be used to provide more granular locational data, including on vulnerabilities to climate change. New technologies will offer opportunities to make data more accessible through open data portals, benefiting all three global agendas.

Avoid fragmentation of the data ecosystem and encourage coordination between relevant actors (for example, IFIs and UN agencies that are ‘custodians’ of particular datasets) and data capacity building initiatives across the three agendas

• In addressing a fragmented data ecosystem, the UN Secretary-General’s office has an important role in coordinating data efforts across UN agencies and other relevant actors, such as IFIs to achieve a more coherent data framework.

• The SDG indicator framework can act as a docking station, where appropriate, to avoid duplication. It may even be useful to involve the same key actors or UN agencies involved in the development of the SDG framework, in developing the monitoring framework for the WHS.

• There are a number of initiatives being launched to coordinate efforts to improve data and data capacity. Support should be given to the UN Statistics Commission and the Global Partnership for Sustainable Data, key actors seeking to strengthen the data for Agenda 2030; the UNFCCC’s provisions on improving data capacities on GHG emissions and understanding vulnerabilities to the impacts of climate change to support adaptation efforts; the Global Humanitarian Data Centre; and ongoing efforts from key international actors including World Bank, PARIS21, OECD DAC and UN agencies.

Take advantage of specific opportunities for synergies between monitoring frameworks

• In 2018 there will be a specific opportunity to take advantage of synergies between the climate and SDGs agendas. The former will hold a facilitative dialogue to take stock of progress on the Paris Agreement, whilst the SDGs’ HLPF meeting will focus on ‘Transformation towards sustainable and resilient societies’ and will track progress on a number of climate-related goals. The meeting of head of states in 2019 on SDGs provides another important milestone in filling data gaps and setting credible baseline indicators for the SDGs and the ‘Leave no one behind’ agenda. By then all goals, including climate related goals and Goal 16 on peace and security, will have undergone a first review.
References


