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Introduction

Intimate partner violence (IPV) is a major public health and human rights issue in Pakistan, and is rooted in a wider context of stark gender inequality. Indeed, Pakistan’s ranking on the Gender Inequality Index has been declining over time – from 112th in 2006, to 135th in 2013 and 143rd in 2015. The country ranks 86th of the 108 countries on the Social Institutions and Gender Index – a measure of discriminatory gender norms. While there is no global index for IPV, Pakistan’s reported rate of physical IPV experienced by women during their lives is 32%. This is marginally above the global average of 30%, and masks individual reports that have shown figures as high as 77% for sexual violence, 90% for psychological violence and 50% for physical violence (Ali et al., 2015).

There are few detailed studies on IPV in Pakistan, but figures from a study by the Aurat Foundation (2012) suggest that most of those who perpetrate any form of violence against women are intimate partners or relatives, such as husbands, brothers, cousins, fathers, uncles, fathers- and mothers-in-law, brothers-in-law, sons or step sons.

Despite such findings, few studies on IPV in Pakistan have engaged with men or boys: only 2 of the 23 papers that informed a cross-country review of IPV in Pakistan (Ali et al., 2015), for example. This gap is echoed at the global level: while there is plenty of evidence of the negative impact on women of their exposure to IPV, including health and socio-economic effects for women and their children, little is known about what drives the attitudes of men and boys towards, or their perpetration of, IPV – a major stumbling block to appropriate programme and policy responses.

This report aims to fill that knowledge gap, drawing on primary research in 2016 that provides unique insights into the multi-level influences – including household-level power imbalances and community level norms that devalue women and girls – that shape the attitudes and behaviour of boys and men around IPV. The findings discussed in this short report are part of a broader regional study of the perpetration of IPV by men and boys across South Asia, with a primary focus on Bangladesh and Nepal, in addition to Pakistan.

Objectives of the research

Given the knowledge gaps on the dynamics of IPV as they relate to male perpetrators, including attitudinal, programmatic and policy dynamics, this briefing has three objectives.

1. To understand the multi-level drivers of male perpetration of IPV in Pakistan, including the relative importance of conservative gender norms.
2. To investigate how broader political-economy dynamics shape attitudes, behaviours and service provision related to IPV.
3. To determine the types of policy and programming that exist to tackle male perpetration of IPV, and the associated implications for policy and practice to strengthen responses to IPV.

To address these objectives, this report first provides an overview of the conceptual framework we applied across all three focus countries in South Asia, followed by a methodology section setting out the study sites, the programmes reviewed and the tools and instruments used. Following an overview of existing evidence on the patterning and prevalence of IPV in Pakistan, the briefing discusses the individual, household and community level influences that shape experiences of IPV among both perpetrators and survivors. The report then discusses formal and informal responses. We use a political economy lens to better understand the interplay of ideas, interests and institutions that perpetuate or mitigate IPV at the national and sub-national levels of governance in Pakistan. The report concludes with a discussion of the policy and programming implications of our findings.
The starting point of our conceptual framework builds on an integrated ecological model (see e.g. Heise, 1998, 2011; Fulu and Miedema, 2015) that emphasises the interaction of factors at the individual, family/relationship, community and society/culture levels and the ways in which they help to perpetuate IPV (see Figure 1). Our framework positions individual adolescent boys and young men at the centre, together with factors that shape their well-being, such as substance abuse, childhood experiences of abuse, social relationships and the extent to which they are gendered, their current psychosocial status, and their ability to resist dominant social norms around gender. The focus on boys and young men represents an important departure from other studies on violence against women, which have placed women at the centre of study, and situates the findings in much-needed addition to this field.

These individuals are then located in the households that shape the behaviours, attitudes and trajectories of young men. The key characteristics of a household include its economic status and education levels, as well as its gendered and generational intra-household dynamics. Next, we emphasise the role of community social and cultural norms in shaping individual male experiences (including norms around marriage, sexuality, education, the gendered division of labour, the type of behaviour that should be punished or rewarded, and income-generation opportunities for men and women) (e.g. Marcus, 2014; Mackie et al., 2012; Bicchieri, 2015).

Less well conceptualised in the literature, and where this project aims to make a significant contribution, is the role of meso-level institutions – vital intermediaries for the channelling of national-level resources and standards to address IPV (True, 2012; Denney and Domingo, 2013). Our framework is informed by political economist Rosendorff (2005) who emphasises the importance of considering the role of formal and informal institutional rules of the game and the interests of actors within those institutions, as well as the ideas or discourses that shape their behaviours. Accordingly, we explore institutions from the formal spectrum, including legal provisions around divorce; child custody; property inheritance; sanctions around IPV and gender-based violence (GBV); and service provision, such as shelters and counselling. We also include the justice sector, including the application of legal provisions by the courts; police stations and legal aid; and legal protection and family mediation. At the customary end of the spectrum we emphasise that it is also important to consider the role of religious and customary norms as well as religious and traditional leaders who are often the first port of call for the resolution of local conflicts.

All of these domains are situated within broader macro-level contexts. Variables at national level include weak rule of law, poor governance, under-investment in the social sector, and under-resourced responses to demographic pressures (Hickey et al., 2015). At the global level, international rights conventions and women’s and human rights movements that champion action against GBV and IPV can be influential (True, 2012; Roberts and Waylen, 1998).

Our conceptual framework envisages that important changes could be achieved by effectively tackling the multi-level risk factors that underpin IPV (presented above), including imposing broader sanctions against IPV, fostering progressive masculinities and, ultimately, creating a society where there are gender equitable norms and behaviours.
Figure 1. Conceptual framework – seeing IPV through an ecological and institutional lens in fragile-state contexts

2. Methodology

The primary qualitative research data underpinning this report were collected from four main sites in and around Karachi (see Figure 2), three of which were urban and one peri-urban. Three had various NGO programmes related to IPV, while the fourth site had no interventions.

A range of qualitative tools was used to collect data on IPV during two phases of fieldwork in 2016. Purposive sampling guided the selection of participants for the interviews. The team worked closely with NGOs to identify research respondents, given the sensitivity of this topic.

In-depth interviews (IDIs) were the major tool for interaction with men and boys and with survivors of violence. The tool had three components: self, family and programming influences. Focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted with adult women, men, adolescent girls and young married men to explore the broader gender norms that underpin practices and sanctions around IPV.

Inter-generational trio interviews (with three family members of different generations, e.g. grandfather, father, son) were also undertaken to explore how attitudes to, and the prevalence of, IPV and GBV had changed over time in the project sites. Finally, key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted with national programme implementers on how existing policy and legal frameworks shape prevention and treatment responses to IPV. District- and community-level key informants involved in health, education, the judiciary, police and social affairs were also included to discuss the adequacy of IPV prevention and response services, as well as programme implementers. The total number of interviews conducted in Phase I is shown in Table 1A in the Annexes.

Figure 2. Location of sites in Karachi
Phase II was based on Rosendorff’s (2005) political economy framework, which focuses on the interplay of the ‘three I’s’ (institutions, ideas, and interests) discussed in section 8. For institutions, the police and academia were interviewed. For ideas, interviews were conducted with officers at the Sindh Development Society (SDS) and AMAL (meaning ‘action’ in Urdu). For interests, interviews were conducted with members of Tehrik-e-Niswan – a women’s activist group that consists of theatre and dance performers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of site</th>
<th>On-going programmes</th>
<th>Study phase</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lyari</td>
<td>Women Development Foundation</td>
<td>Phase I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan, Rose Academy, Noble Academy, and Institute for Basic Rights (IBR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shah Faisal</td>
<td>Ra’ana Liaquat Craftsmen’s Colony (RLCC)</td>
<td>Phase I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyderabad</td>
<td>Sindh Development Society (SDS)</td>
<td>Phase II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deh Chohar</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Phase I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Study sites
Despite recognition that IPV and GBV are both commonplace in Pakistan, research on IPV is scarce. There are limited population-based surveys (the exceptions are Ali et al., 2013; Andersson et al., 2009; Karmaliani et al., 2008) and only cross-sectional data, with most based on convenience samples (one exception is Qayum et al., 2012). The majority of the research focuses on women as participants, although a few studies also include male perpetrators (e.g., Shaikh, 2000). Few studies attempt to disentangle risk factors for men and women for IPV (one exception being P4P et al., n.d.) or attempt to understand the attitudes of male perpetrators (with one exception being Zakar et al., 2013).

Nevertheless, available evidence indicates that IPV is widespread, as it is in other countries in South Asia. A systematic review of literature on IPV found that the prevalence of physical violence ranges from 16% to 76% (Ali et al., 2015). According to the 2012 Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), 33% of women aged 15 to 49 had experienced spousal violence in the past year (NIPS and ICF International, 2013). Statistics from the Aurat Foundation show a rise in the number of cases of domestic violence – although this is likely to represent a rise in reported cases and shows that women are increasingly seeking help (a rise from 281 cases in 2008 to 989 cases in 2010; cited in Ali et al., 2015, p.300).

Focusing on male respondents, Fikree et al. (2005) drew on reports from 183 men to find that the life-time prevalence of marital physical abuse was 49.4%, with slapping, hitting or punching being most often reported (47.7%). Shaikh (2000) found a much higher percentage in a sample of 70 men: 77.1% admitted to ever engaging in non-consensual sex with their wives, while 58.7% said that any confirmation of a suspicion that a wife was having illicit relations would prompt them to kill her. Psychological violence is also common, although women’s reports are the only ones available. Rabbani et al. (2008) found that 100% of women in their sample of 108 women reported such violence, while 58% reported other forms of psychological abuse such as suspected or actual infidelity by the husband, emotional blackmail (most likely by the spouse), character assassination, social isolation, or a perceived neglect of their basic needs by their husband.

Our qualitative findings both complemented and added further nuances to the secondary literature findings. IPV was understood as violence occurring in relation to one’s "spouse or people who are living with each other in spousal relations; whether it be legal or not, formal or informal. It could be a boyfriend, a husband or simply a partner" (KII 12). Several participants noted that violence against women was ‘extremely common’, with one key informant stating that she has heard of ‘countless’ incidence of both IPV and GBV.

Most of the participants agreed that women are the victims of IPV at the hands of their husbands. However, GBV in dating relationships emerged as a rising and common phenomenon. Rooted in patriarchal norms around controlling women’s movement and freedom, several examples of boyfriends ‘slapping’ their girlfriends emerged from our sample. Jealousy and suspicion were cited as possible reasons for such violence. In rare but extreme cases, it was reported that girls who refused to engage in premarital sexual relations were ‘raped and abandoned’ (19-year-old boy, Lyari). The notion of a girl’s honour and reputation was evoked several times in relation to dating relationships, suggesting that girls who date were not viewed favourably by society, making them less likely to seek help if they experience violence.

Key informants and in-depth interviews confirmed that ‘slapping, punching and kicking’ or ‘beating with a stick or shoe’ were often observed at home, in the neighbourhood and by service providers. In an extreme case, a 26-year-old man in Lyari saw another man using ‘tools to beat his wife’, while several women survivors said that their husbands had routinely attempted to strangle them when they were married.

Key informants added that while, physical violence was the most visible form of violence, subtle forms of psychological violence were probably more common. Several participants referred to husbands using ‘verbally abusive’ language as a form of violence. Others stated that ‘criticising’ one’s wife for her cooking, her care of the house, children and in-laws, and her looks also constitute IPV. Several women reported that their husbands would
threaten to ‘burn them’ or ‘throw acid’ on them. As service providers in Shah Faisal Colony explained, ‘violence is not just beating, words are more painful’ – a sentiment repeated by several women survivors.

While these forms of violence were reported to be widespread, views on the existence and prevalence of sexual violence differed according to the gender of the participants. Male participants, on average, denied the existence of marital rape: ‘woman says no to sex after marriage? Never heard of that’ (adolescent boy from Deh Chohar). Tellingly, several male participants were surprised to hear that marital rape (zinna) is illegal, although a small number of male participants stated that forceful sex is ‘wrong’.

Women survivors of IPV, on the other hand, reported that husbands not only forced their wives to have sex, but would also withhold money from women, verbally abuse them, and even beat them for refusing sex. This suggests that sexual violence occurs in conjunction with economic, psychological, and physical violence (see also Box 1).

One disturbing trend noted by many participants, particularly key informants, was that not only was IPV increasing, but also its severity. One key informant explained that in the past, domestic violence would lead to physical injuries, but that was as far as it would go:

‘But now it is different. People will even kill as part of this violence. Killing is not what happened in the past. And now the killing is not just part of honour killing, it’s part of the usual violence as well. Women can be killed because of very petty issues’

(KII 19)
4. Multi-level influences that shape IPV risks

IPV emerges from the ‘interplay of multiple interacting factors at different levels of the social “ecology”’ (Fulu and Heise, 2014: 2). We follow this ecological framing in presenting our findings below (see also Box 2).

4.1. Individual-level risk factors

Our analysis emphasised that lack of education at the individual level or a lack of ‘intelligence (aqal), manners (tameez), and awareness (shaoor)’ were root causes for IPV. This is in keeping with the literature on Pakistan, which found that low or no formal education increases the risk of IPV (Ali and Khan, 2007; Fikree et al., 2005). These three qualities were expected to be instilled by education, but as one key informant explained:

‘I think it goes back to our education system, to what extent students are taught and made aware. Co-education is not available in the majority of schools, so boys and girls are taught separately. It’s also how and what they are taught that makes a lot of difference. If you look at the curriculums, violence is never a topic that is discussed.’

(KII 13)

While lack of education was seen as a risk factor for men, having an education was found to be a risk factor for women, as educated women are often seen as wanting equal rights and freedom from traditional expectations of womanhood. Men may feel threatened by an educated wife, as revealed by a woman survivor in Lyari:

‘I believe men also have this insecurity that their wives might get more successful than them, like I am looking for a job these days so he always had a problem and asked me why I want to work.’

Box 2. Multi-level factors underpinning IPV, as highlighted in the 2012 Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey

Findings from the 2012-2013 Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) show that both younger and older men were equally likely to justify the use physical intimate partner violence (IPV) against a wife. Slightly more than one third in both groups justified IPV in any of the six situations listed (i.e., wife goes out without telling husband, wife neglects children, wife argues with husband, wife burns the food, wife neglects in-laws, and wife refuses to have sex with husband), and between 6% and just over 20% justified physical IPV in any single situation. However, a far lower percentage of younger men than senior men reported that they alone made decisions about major household purchases (19% versus 32%). At the individual level, a younger man’s schooling has a marginally negative association (p = .06) with his justification for inflicting IPV, while being older and having any living children are associated positively with dominance in decisions about major family purchases, and household wealth is associated marginally negatively with his dominance in decisions about major family purchases (p = .06).

In an adjusted model, a composite measure found that masculine dominance at community level among older men was closely associated with both the justification of physical IPV against a wife and dominance in family decisions about major household purchases. When a composite measure was disaggregated into norms about IPV and dominance in decisions, some interesting associations emerged. Both ‘injunctive’ norms about IPV (what people think others think is acceptable) and ‘descriptive’ behaviours related to the dominance of older men in family decisions were associated with their dominance in family decisions when they were younger; while, only norms about IPV among older men were associated with a younger man’s justification of IPV.

Intriguing differences in associations were also apparent across outcomes. A young man living amidst more prevalent norms of male dominance and violence was 4.74 times more likely to justify IPV and 2.92 times more likely to exhibit dominance in major family decision-making. The findings suggest some internalization of ‘male-dominance’ norms, whereby young men living in communities with more prevalent norms of male dominance were more likely both to justify IPV, and in turn, to treat their wives accordingly.

Source: Yount et al. (forthcoming).
Key informants noted that women who have an education were aware that they are in a cycle of violence, but were fearful of reporting or leaving the abusive relationship. Such women were described as both ‘powerful and fearful’ (KII 13) (see also discussion hereafter).

A strong link was made by the participants between lack of education and poverty. Unemployment (and, by extension, poverty) was considered a risk factor, given the ‘stresses’ (KII 10) and ‘feelings of depression’ (focus group discussion with women, Shah Faisal colony), that came along with ‘economic problems at home’ (KII 9). Violence was often triggered when a wife requested money from her husband to meet household expenses but resources were scarce because of poverty and unemployment.

Poverty was also seen as a driver for early marriage, a factor that has been shown to be a risk factor for IPV globally. Perhaps this was best summarised by one key informant who noted that ‘poverty and lack of education are a lethal combination [for violence], Very lethal’ (KII 3).

Unemployment and poverty were also found to be underlying factors for inter-generational violence in the project sites, as parents supported unemployed sons financially and sons tended to live in the same household as mothers who had faced violence themselves, yet now supported violent sons. As one professor noted:

‘The mother supports her unemployed son after marriage, even though the father scolds him and asks him to earn his own living. The son should be ashamed of himself if he is being physically abusive to his wife but now mother, the same woman who was facing violence, is now supporting her son who is being violent towards his wife’

(KII 9)

Another risk factor that tallies with the literature was that of drug and alcohol use (see Farid et al., 2008; Zareen et al., 2009). Many participants reported that when they witnessed violence either at home or in the community, the husband was most likely ‘drunk’ (19-year-old boy, Deh Chohar) or ‘high on weed (charas)’ (woman survivor 8, Lyari). There were also a few references to men becoming drug addicts because they were idle, and this leading to violence towards their wives:

‘I have seen drug addicts and when they come home and ask for food from wives, they beat their wives. There is no reason. First of all, he does not earn, he is sitting useless whole day. When he returns home after drug abuse and demands for food then wife says “I don’t have flour to make bread”. That person who doesn’t earn and whatever he gets from begging, he spends all that money on gambling and drugs’

(16-year-old boy, Deh Chohar)

Another risk factor identified by a small number of participants was that of witnessing violence in the family or in the neighbourhood and as a result, normalising violence against one’s wife: ‘If the dad beats the mother than the son will also be violent’ (KII 4). The impact of witnessing violence on the inter-generational cycle of violence has been studied globally (Fulu et al., 2013) and in Pakistan (Farid et al., 2008; Fikree et al., 2005). In line with their findings, respondents in our sample also acknowledged that ‘when a child sees violence at home, he will also beat his wife when he grows up’ (19-year-old, Lyari).

### 4.2. Household-level risk factors

At family level, risk factors stemmed from one underlying factor: conflict in relationships. This included not only conflict within a marriage, but also conflict in relationships with in-laws. For example, there was consensus that women face violence from husbands and in-laws at home, given the tradition of extended families living together in Pakistan. Domestic violence in South Asia encompasses broader family violence (violence from members of the marital family, such as the father-, mother-, brother- or sister-in-law) and has been shown to be commonplace (Jejeebhoy et al., 2013).

An interview with an advocate at the Legal Rights Forum underscored the severity of family violence:

‘We have a case in Hyderabad court against a family where seven people tortured their daughter-in-law. According to the medical report there are sign of violence on whole body. Another case is about woman being burned with a cigarette.’

(KII 1)

Not only is there frequent physical violence from in-laws, but there is also evidence that mothers- and sisters-in-law may instigate IPV between the husband and wife. One woman survivor felt that her good relationship with her husband was ruined by her mother- and sister-in-law (see Box 3).

Indeed, co-residence with in-laws seemed to be a driving factor for violence according to our interviews with all survivors. Women survivors indicated that none of them had the power to make decisions in their homes, and they felt that their opinions were neglected and seen as irrelevant.

‘My mother-in-law used to accuse me of having an affair with his [husband’s] father. I told my husband that when our children will grow up and will listen to all this, what effect will this have on them? Your mother is blaming your father and your wife, but my husband did not listen or care.’

(Woman survivor 4, Lyari)
The triggers for violence and marital problems cited by male respondents included: their wife did not take care of the house, children and/or in-laws; wore clothes considered inappropriate; did not cover her head; bothered the husband after he came home from work; and went outside the home and was suspected of talking to other men. For almost all men in the sample the consensus was that if a wife made a mistake, disobeys her husband, or was wrong, then a husband had the justification to ‘beat her’.

Polygamy, a common practice in Pakistan, was seen as another driver of marital problems, especially ‘in Balochi culture and usually the consent of the wife is not considered important for other marriages’ (KII 9). Key informants described how the economic constraints of poor households, combined with the stress of being the head of more than one household, contributes to violence against wives.2

4.3. Community and social levels

At the community level, social norms and beliefs have been researched and documented extensively as a risk factor for IPV (Fleming et al., 2015; Flood and Pease, 2009; Fulu et al., 2013; Heise, 1998; Santana et al., 2006).

Our interviews suggested that deep-rooted patriarchal norms around femininity and masculinity were the strongest drivers of IPV in all three project sites. One father from an inter-generational trio, for example, described the differences between men and women:

‘If you read the ‘Qur’an’ (holy book) or hear it read from a scholar you will learn that man is a level higher than woman. Man is like a tree which provides shadow to others. While a woman is like an ivy, she needs some support to rise but she can’t be a shadow to others’

(IGT 1, father, Shah Faisal)

As can be seen from Table 4, which compiles youths’ perceptions of femininity and masculinity, their notions of femininity remain strongly traditional. Their notions of masculinity, however, mix traditional gender norms (e.g. a man meets the needs of his family) and modern constructions of manhood (e.g. men should act to stop violence against women and encourage women to do well).

Overwhelmingly, the evidence in the interviews shows that women’s freedom and movement were restricted as a result of social norms. In most households, even women who had good relationships with their husbands were not ‘allowed’ to have a job, ‘go outside anywhere, meet anyone.’ In fact, women were expected to ‘stay at home’ as soon as they reached puberty. This was found to be true across all Phase 1 sites.

These gender norms resulted in rigid expectations of behaviour from a wife. Interviews with survivors revealed that married women felt that they have no voice or agency in their marital relationship, often feeling more like a carer than a partner:

‘He wants a wife to be at his service all the time. No matter if she is sick, or she just came after spending time with children and working hard with them. There was no sense of recognition that my wife can also get sick. As if I am not human but a machine, all the time at his service’

(Woman survivor 4, Lyari)

Women’s rights were further curbed as a result of norms around early marriage. Many key informants explained that the concept of arranged marriage, especially early marriage, puts women at risk of IPV in the future. In arranged marriages ‘the boy and girl haven’t seen each other before marriage, they start fighting within 8-15 days of their marriage because they haven’t met, talked, or understood each other’ (KII 5). One woman survivor noted that to decrease IPV ‘when girls get married, they are

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1 2.5% of the women in Punjab and 4.5% of women in Sindh aged 15-49 years are in a polygynous marriage (data from the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey [MICS] 2014).

2 While there was no evidence of different types of marriages in our sample, evidence in Pakistan has indicated that in non-traditional marriages, i.e., exchange marriage (watta-satta) (Jacoby and Mansuri, 2009), there is a lower likelihood of IPV. However, Fikree et al., (2005) found that consanguineous marriages (marriage between cousins) was not protective against IPV. This suggests that it is necessary to disentangle the effects of type of marriage to understand IPV.
Table 4. Norms around femininity and masculinity, according to Pakistani youth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notions of femininity</th>
<th>Women and girls</th>
<th>Boys and men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsible for home and for respecting and taking care of parents, brothers, in-laws, husband and children.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educated.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically savvy (i.e. runs home within budget).</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beautiful, religious, ethical.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not fight or misbehave, is respectful.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerates violence to maintain harmony in family.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brings up children to be well-mannered.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is happy in good times and bad times with marital family.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observes purdah and dresses modestly.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confident.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knows how to balance work and family if employed.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not talk to men who are not relatives, does not get into relationships with boys before marriage.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has the same rights as men and should be able to leave home without permission.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should be able to work but maintain their dignity and reputation. Can do the same work as men.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should have a say in who they choose to marry.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notions of masculinity</th>
<th>Women and girls</th>
<th>Boys and men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fulfils responsibility to family (financial) and takes care of parents, wife, siblings.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gives time to children.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respects women, elders.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not inflict VAW, is open minded.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not use drugs or alcohol.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not get angry, manages temper.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusts wife, gives her freedom.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is sexually virile. Is able to make wife agree to have sex.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulfils wife’s needs, treats her well.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stops and discourages others from committing VAW.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
very young so others in family should help them to adjust’ (woman survivor 5, Lyari).

While arranged and early marriages were common across all project sites and ethnicities, focus group discussions with service providers in Lyari indicated that giving dowry was not a norm in Balochi communities. In fact, they stated:

‘When a daughter is born in Baloch community she is considered a blessing. We do not have a custom of giving dowry to a girl. On top of it she gets half of the property of her father, so she is not a burden the family’

(FGD 8, service providers, Lyari)

These positive norms may explain, in part, why young men in Lyari were less likely to endorse violence against women.

As discussed above, violence in relationships between girlfriends and boyfriends is common, but is less likely to be reported as such relationships are seen as less acceptable according to conservative gender norms. This is highlighted by the following example from a better-off family, where social class and education proved to be no protection:

‘I went to a friend’s place and she told me that her daughter has a boyfriend who is beating her up. And a boyfriend, not even her husband. Why is she taking this? And then willing to go back to him. The girl’s mother was explaining to her that you are consenting to this and becoming one of those women who allow this, this becomes a cycle and goes on. So this happens in the educated families also. And these men think that it’s no big deal. They think what will happen if I slapped her once?’

(KII 18)

Acceptability of gender-based violence was another driving factor for IPV, although there is considerable regional variation. Data from Pakistan’s 2012 DHS indicate that among men, those in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are most likely to justify wife-beating (73.5%), followed by men in Balochistan (51.3%), men in Sindh (37%) and Punjab (36.3%) (NIPS and ICF International, 2013). Other studies in Pakistan have shown that men and women justify violent behaviours by evoking religious and cultural expectations of men and women (P4P et al., n.d.; Fikree et al., 2005). Our study revealed similar trends, with both younger and older men justifying violence as a necessary tool to teach women to ‘obey’ and ‘behave’:

‘When I ask her for prayers, she won’t offer prayers. When we ask her to cover her body, she doesn’t obey. When Nikah3 is done then husband has rights over her. So, she shall obey. I think that the husband should not beat her on small matters but when it is legitimate, he is justified and then he can beat. We learn this from sermons delivered on TV’

(16-year-old boy, Deh Chohar)

As noted above, one interesting risk factor to emerge from our data was the role of the media in shaping the acceptability of particular gender norms. There was concern among a number of male respondents that exposure to media was challenging traditional gender norms. Men, especially in Deh Chohar, felt that the media teach women to become ‘free’. Men repeatedly noted that Indian soap operas were misleading women:

‘In the beginning, it was good, women were treated well with strictness, and they were not left alone in marriage ceremonies and outings. Man used to order his wife. But now, woman order her husband. Our women have seen those Indian dramas and they have learned back biting from these dramas, and they see their dresses and shoes and wish to wear them in marriages, so in this way our women are getting free now’

(21-year-old boy, Deh Chohar)

The influence of media on norms for both men and women was validated by a key informant who stressed:

‘I don’t think that the television media is playing a good role. Not at all. Our television media is playing a very negative role as they perpetuate that image. They say that the man should be like this and the women don’t need to work or go out. They still say that women who go out are bad’

(KII 18)

Key informants and other women suggested that new technologies were giving young boys easy access to pornography, leading to ‘sexual frustration’. Young boys in Lyari explained that having mobile phones led to dating relationships while providing easy access to porn (which was once only available in cinemas or by buying CDs).

Religion also plays a role in perpetuating IPV at the society level. Some studies in Pakistan have found that religion is often cited to justify violence. Shaikh et al. (2008), for example, found that 24 men (i.e., 4.9% of

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3 Marriage or ‘Nikah’ can be defined as a contract that has for its object the procreation and the legitimising of children. A legal marriage in Islam can be defined as ‘a marriage contracted and solemnised in accordance with Sharia with all its constituents and conditions and without any legal impediment’.

16 ODI Report
the sample) believed that religion allowed a husband to beat his wife, even if she has been faithful to him, while 21.3% believed that religion allowed a husband to have sex forcibly with his wife even if she does not want to have sex. In our sample, both younger and older men referred to Islam’s teachings to justify their actions. Several respondents, however, explained that although Islam prohibits wife beating, somewhat ambiguous religious messages allow ‘strict’ disciplining of wives:

‘Islam has not allowed violence on your wife, sister, mother or daughter. A little strict behaviour is asked to be used in Surah-An-Nisa’ but not beating of any woman. No Prophet said any such thing’

(KII 1)

The underlying message received was that ‘women are the property of man’. Indeed, all participants agreed that religion dictated how to control a woman: ‘see religion like ordering women to wear abaya, not letting her go outside the house. … I think its role is to increase violence’ (KII 5).

4 The fourth chapter of the Qur’an, commonly referred to as ‘The Women’.
In keeping with the literature both globally and in Pakistan, our findings suggested that IPV had a severe impact on the physical and mental health of its victims. Interviews with women survivors indicated that women experience different forms of mental illness after suffering abuse in their marriages. In Lyari, for example, a young boy explained that his sister, who had married early and then divorced her husband after enduring IPV, had experienced a ‘psychiatric condition’. Several other women reported that they had been ‘so mentally stressed’ that they ‘couldn’t sleep and would cry all night’.

Our interviews with women survivors revealed several examples of physical injuries as a result of IPV, including head injuries, broken arms, and broken teeth. Others reported ‘low blood pressure’, ‘heart problems’, and instances of ‘fainting’, even after they had left their abusive marriages (see Box 4). Women survivors explained that their illnesses only started after marriage, and presumably after the abuse. As a doctor explained:

‘Women usually come to us with physical ailments of various sorts and those physical ailments basically are manifestations of underlying depression and anxiety’

(KII 4)

Several survivor interviews revealed that women were denied healthcare by their husbands and their in-laws:

‘Once I told him that I have pain in my foot I need to see a doctor, I had this pain for weeks and he replied that your pain is psychological’

(Woman survivor 4, Lyari)

This applied whether the injury was the result of physical violence or when a woman felt ill, regardless of the cause: ‘I was not feeling well and my father-in-law refused to take me to the doctor but my auntie took me instead’ (woman survivor 3, Shah Faisal).

Women’s sexual and reproductive health was at risk as a result of both IPV and family violence. Several survivors described being forced to abort pregnancies and had no say in decisions on family planning. All forms of violence (physical, psychological, and sexual) were common during pregnancy and post-partum. One woman lost her baby after her husband attempted to ‘strangle her and the baby went into foetal distress’ (woman survivor 3, Shah Faisal).

Another consequence of IPV was the impact on children, whether directly or indirectly. Our secondary evidence review found no existing research on how IPV affects children in Pakistan. Yet findings from our qualitative research indicated that children were suffering in various ways as a result of witnessing tensions and violence. The testimony from a former male perpetrator highlights these negative spill-over effects on children:

‘One day I was very angry and I slapped her so strongly that she fainted. She was pregnant as well. I slapped her but then I regretted it a lot because she was much weaker than me. If we quarrel then it affects the children. They get harassed. Even if we shout at each other they start shouting and crying, so we do not do it’

(24-year-old man, Hyderabad)

Box 4. The physical consequences of intimate partner violence

Fiza (a pseudonym) is a victim of severe IPV and of family violence. While she has faced psychological violence from the first day of her marriage, she shares several instances of having been physically abused by everyone in her in-laws’ home.

‘One day, three months after my wedding my sister came to meet me. My sister thought I looked weak, so asked if everything was okay. My mother-in-law said ‘if you are so worried about her then take her with you’. When my husband came home in the evening, his mother and sister started crying and said that I had verbally abused them. My husband pulled me and I hit the door and my tooth broke and started bleeding. Then he took a thick stick and started beating me. He was pulling my hair. His brother and sister were also beating me. I fell as my blood pressure was low. They left me upstairs and did not even check if I was alive or dead. Just three months after my wedding… I was beaten up so badly.’
Interviews with survivors found that one of their main concerns was that their children were witnessing and learning about violence in the home environment. One woman explained that her son gets very ‘disturbed’ by everything he sees. In cases of divorce, women survivors could not continue to provide adequate care to their children – sometimes as a result of their own poor health and sometimes because of economic constraints. Finally, key informants reported that children were also subjected to beatings by their father, with lasting effects: ‘My children have been abused. My daughter remembers all that. She is still scared’ (woman survivor 2, Shah Faisal).
6. Responses to IPV

Our findings revealed highly fragmented and limited service options to protect women and girls from IPV in Pakistan. Here we discuss the informal and formal response options available to women and girls.

6.1. Informal responses to IPV

There was consensus that when IPV did occur, a woman should, first and foremost, turn to family members for help, although respondents had varied opinions on which family member might be most appropriate. Some believed that a woman should turn first to her marital family – either the husband or parents-in-law – while most felt that a woman should turn to her own parents. As noted in the survivor interviews, however, women were hesitant to reveal their situations to their parents for fear of giving them ‘tension’, a ‘bad reputation’ or ‘dishonour’. In the rare case of love marriages, women would remain in their marriage:

‘I have been beat up almost 20 times but because it was my love marriage and against my family’s wish, I was tolerating it. I thought “what will my family say?” I was also tolerating it for my son and daughter’

(Woman survivor 4, Lyari)

When women told their own families what had happened, reactions were often mixed. Some relatives would tell them to tolerate the violence, and/or attempt to reconcile husband and wife. Some family members did not understand the seriousness of the violence. One survivor in Shah Faisal who had been kissed on the lips by her father-in-law said that her sister saw it as a ‘misunderstanding’. Other families, however, encouraged their daughters to divorce their husbands.

Given that IPV is seen as a ‘private’ matter, it is not surprising that the norms around any first response aim to keep it internal, within the family. As one key informant at Aga Khan University explained, in a joint-family system, the desire to keep IPV out of the public sphere is so strong that ‘all religious leaders also stand against complaining outside. They all say that it’s a personal matter, why should the police come and break the sanctity of a house?’ (KII 4).

Nevertheless, several participants explained that communities became involved when parents were unable to reconcile a couple. In Balochi communities, people of the same tribe or caste would try to help couples of their own group. When asked whether family members would object to outside intervention, a key informant at Karachi University explained:

‘A Baloch is first and foremost a Baloch. If someone from the Bughti caste interferes in someone from the Hoat caste’s problems, then they will get angry. However, if someone from the same caste, even if he isn’t a relative, intervenes the family will feel proud that they wanted to help them’

(KII 9)

In non-Balochi communities, elders or village community councils (panchayats) were the next level of response. However, this may not be a viable option for many girls and women. One 16-year-old girl explained that if she was stuck in a cycle of violence, she would: ‘not go to the community head, because he will send me back to my husband and then it will bring a bad name for my family. My husband will also not take care of me like before.’

The role of the village council or community elders was to reconcile the couple, but all participants agreed that if the village elders were ‘unable to solve the problems, the couple would get a divorce’. It was stressed, particularly in Deh Chohar, that no outside courts would be involved in getting a divorce. One grandfather at this site added: ‘if a husband gives a divorce then it’s an easy process, but if a husband does not want to give a divorce then the court will decide’ (grandfather, IGT 5, Deh Chohar). The norms around divorce also ensure that men are free to marry again while women tend to be marginalised and unable to re-marry.

Informal religious courts are another form of response management. Known as jamatts (which translates as ‘group of people’ in Urdu), these religious courts were seen as ‘beneficial’ in handling any cases of GBV, according to a mother in Lyari. In jammat:

‘...usually the girls’ side approaches the jammat first. The members of the jammat listen to both sides before finalising their decision. They talk to the woman, man and their families before giving their verdict’

(20-year-old boy, Lyari)

One underlying reason for choosing informal religious courts rather than formal courts was that the community saw religious courts as effective in solving the problem.
In one case, village elders were deemed more successful than formal courts because they persuaded the ex-husband to let his ex-wife keep their daughter, even though she had not won custody of the child.

Key informants described several weaknesses of these informal mechanisms, including the strong cultural drive to keep violence private, with women only seeking help when ‘they are injured to such an extent that they need to be taken to the hospital, in which case the incident comes into notice’ (KII 4).

Discussions with women in Lyari suggested that they were not satisfied with the local village council because ‘the jammat at times does not take any justified decisions. They [jammat] also don’t keep issues confidential and this ruins the image of the family’ (FGD 12).

### 6.2. Formal responses to IPV

While there are several formal response systems (police, courts and NGOs), the overwhelming consensus in our sample was that these services were not accessed until ‘women’s lives are in danger’ (KII 13). Nevertheless, survivors do have avenues that direct them to the appropriate authorities, counsel them, and help them should they seek justice.

The government-run crisis centres are a first option, connecting victims to the police and shelters. Crisis centres provide ‘health services and connect women to a lawyer in the community’ (KII 3). While these centres provide immediate and vital services, women can only stay at the centres for three days. There are government-run shelters that let women stay longer, and where women tend to go after filing a court case. Private shelters run by NGOs (such as Dastak and Panah) are also available and attempt to ‘mediate at household level as well’. In addition, survivors who seek justice can turn to lawyers who provide counselling and legal services, aiming to provide holistic care.

Helplines were operational in Shah Faisal and Lyari to provide ‘help on mental health, child abuse, medical and medical outreach.’ In Lyari, a 24-hour helpline was launched in January 2017 by the Citizens-Police Liaison Committee (CPLC). The helpline supports survivors to register complaints as a First Information Report (FIR) with the police (KII 23). The CPLC helps them connect to police stations, while the Public Complaints Authority (PCA) helps to deal with complaints after they have been reported (see Box 5).

### 6.3. Under-reporting of IPV

Various factors contribute to the chronic under-reporting of IPV. One is the major barrier to accessing services caused by a lack of awareness that services are available. The onus is on survivors to find services (such as NGOs and shelters) almost all of those interviewed for our research said that they were unaware of any NGOs that dealt with violence against women and girls (VAWG). Any under-age girls (i.e. minors) who did go to a shelter or NGO were asked to identify their legal guardian and then sent back to them, which placed them back into the cycle of violence (KII 12). There are also questions about the effectiveness of services, given that networks for safe spaces created in the Sindh villages were led by perpetrators of IPV – an issue that had to be addressed before the safe space could become functional (KII 3).

Cultural norms also prohibit women from seeking formal support. In all four project sites, inter-generational trios with grandparents and parents indicated that going to courts is ‘not acceptable’. Women who seek formal justice are considered too ‘independent’. Victims of IPV may be unwilling to go to courts because they fear being ‘exposed to males’. To resolve such issues, the courts have attempted to appoint female justices in ten districts in Sindh, but could only find female judges in two of these districts. In other districts: ‘either there were no female judges or females did not have the capacity to become a judge’ (KII 1).

Cultural norms may explain why members of a theatre group faced extreme hostility from the community:

> ‘Our work is at constant risk. Recently, a few months back, we were performing in a park in Sultanabad. And they came with thick sticks (laathis) and said that we will show you. They went to bring more people but we left in a hurry. It’s a constant challenge in that sense.’

**Box 5. Challenges in IPV reporting processes**

A ‘women’s cell’ in the office of the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP), is staffed by women and handles women’s complaints about violence. One challenge, however, is that the women’s cell comes under the Public Complaints Authority (PCA), which cannot take cases to court.

The male-dominated working culture of police stations presents additional challenges for the women who work in them.

> ‘When a difficult question (related to matters of violence) comes in via post, the officers give it to her. All the police stations are male-dominated. How can she do it? She is just a moderator, so she can talk to the women. The rest is not her job. The branch has to do the work. So the officers harass her. They ask her to go to court if the trial involves women. She didn’t even have a place to sit until recently. I got a new cell made for her.’

Nevertheless, key informants shared examples of cases where they had helped the survivor successfully and emphasised that the ‘Police is the key for human rights’ (KII 21 and KII 22).
We have had people throw stones at us as well. We cannot go to anyone for help. We are on our own. Police will never support us. We have never sought it. The establishment doesn’t support theatre’

(KII 18)

Financial constraints create more barriers to justice. Respondents stressed repeatedly that hiring a lawyer was too expensive, far beyond the economic capacity of most families, and ‘a waste of money’. As a result, ‘they prefer to solve their matters in the village.’

One key informant also noted that a lack of sensitivity among service providers makes women more hesitant to seek formal justice:

‘There is a lack of sensitivity in the police service, medical-legal staff, and the staff working at the shelter. A lot of women have told us that the women in the police service are the most verbally abusive. The person in-charge of the shelter home has said to a woman that you have had a second marriage, so now we can’t do anything for you except tell you to have a third marriage or die in the current marriage’

(KII 14)

This was corroborated by service providers in Shah Faisal Colony who reported that the police were more likely to question the ‘character’ of a woman than to help her. While sensitivity training is underway, it is not changing attitudes ‘fast enough to keep up with the demand.’

An equally challenging barrier in the formal response system was a perceived dearth of accountability and transparency. This was summarised by a key informant who explained that an increase in incidence of violence may be a result of ‘the formal state structures being too loose’ (KII 19). She believed that a lack of accountability and transparency was to blame:

‘Even if an incident happens, the perpetrators know that they can go to the political people such as the Members of the National Assembly and they will be saved from the consequences. So people do realise that even if we ask the authorities for help, there are some influential people who will not even be taken to the police station’

(KII 19)

This suggested that the legal and justice system were unable to perform their functions and protect victims effectively, given that the ‘control of these structures’ lies with powerful people in the Government who are not necessarily champions of IPV prevention and prosecution: ‘the courts are disappointing... because of a lot of corruption’ (KII 14).

6.4. Prevention programmes

Programming efforts on GBV in Lyari, Shah Faisal colony, and Hyderabad (the three sites with interventions) had only started in 2010-2011, but had proved effective for beneficiaries. However, their scope was limited, and large-scale change was hindered by the small number of people reached.

Recognition of the need to include men and boys in programming was also fairly new. As a key informant at Sindh Development Society (SDS) noted, SDS started in 1994 but it did not, at first, focus on GBV. Similarly, AMAL began its work with a focus on HIV/AIDS. The extent of GBV in Pakistan, however, propelled violence to the top of their agendas. For AMAL, the realisation that HIV/AIDs interventions and treatment were most successful when men and boys were included reinforced the need to engage them in GBV programming. At SDS, a key informant explained:

‘We realised that if the women become aware but the men don’t, then the awareness of the woman is useless. If the men aren’t sensitised, then all this is of no use’

(KII 15)

As a result, at the time of our study, both SDS and AMAL ‘integrated engagement of men in all their work around women’s empowerment, violence against women, and girl’s education’ (KII 15).

One key component of the inclusion of men and boys in programming was the need to understand and raise awareness about the role played by norms of masculinity in perpetuating violence. The training by SDS, for example:

‘... talked about masculinities with the participants. It focused on the attitude and behaviours of men and women. It taught power balancing, i.e. who should have the power in families. It explained that if there is an imbalance of power, then there can be violence. If extra power goes to either of the spouses, the other spouse can become deprived of their rights’

(KII 16)

Training activities have included awareness raising, the creation of student unions and father, brother, mother and youth advocacy groups, the organisation of conferences for youth, protests against violation of women’s rights, radio programmes, income generation for girls and women, and capacity building of programme staff (see Annex 1). Community activists who raise awareness are sought out on a voluntary basis, rooted in the idea that those who volunteer would be most willing to put in the effort needed to raise awareness at community level.

Evidence for ‘training sessions on violence against women, qualities of a good father and husband, and
generally on women’s rights’ was found in Lyari. Half of the male participants (20 out of 40) said that they had attended awareness-raising sessions as part of programming efforts. Men and boys were ‘encouraged to come and attend the session by SDS’ where they learned:

‘... not to inflict violence on women or any weak person. So, we are more careful about it. Another thing that we learned is that we must not force our own decisions on our wives. If we see violence we try to stop it and if we can’t, at least we feel bad about it in our heart.’

(50-year-old man, Karachi)

This beneficiary reported taking his sons for sessions because he found them so beneficial.

Student advocacy groups supported by SDS in Shah Faisal give members ‘medical and teaching’ support. SDS has formed ‘vigilance committees at district level’, which gives them both legitimacy and community influence. The father, brother, mother and youth advocacy groups aim to create ‘community activists out of anyone’ so that messages can be spread across the community. In Jamshoro district, there are now as many as 140 community activists (KII 16).

University students are also playing an increasingly important role in IPV prevention activities. One 26-year-old man from the Institute for Basic Rights (IBR) mobilised the Baloch Student Union to involve local people. He reported that young men gather to protest about ‘how women’s rights are being violated [...]’ they ‘protested a lot against the chief minister of Balochistan, Sardar Sanaullah Zaidi. This happened in the area of Naal, near Khuzdaar and Bolan.’ He further explained that helping women gain an education was part of their activities. Not only did they help ‘collect funds for girls who could not afford to study’, but they also lobbied a government representative to construct a building so that girls could attend college.

Other important institutional efforts to shift discourse around VAWG and women’s rights are led by activist academics. Key informants indicated that several courses at the University of Karachi, including ‘women in Islam, economics, religion, sociology, women in politics’ were introduced in the mid- to late-1990s to strengthen understanding about women’s roles and rights. While most students on these courses are women, there were ‘boys also’ (KII 11). Courses were offered at undergraduate, post-graduate, and doctorate levels. Such courses often have a positive spill-over effect as one key informant explained:

‘Most of my students of women’s studies are working with non-governmental organisations and everywhere else. So, they are spread everywhere, in Northern Areas, in the Interior also, in Baluchistan’

(KII 11)

IPV prevention efforts by NGOs also draw on creative approaches, including workshops and theatre plays on topics related to violence against women, such as honour killing, domestic abuse, equal rights, etc. Both men and women act in these plays and, according to a key informant from the well-known theatre group Tehreek-e-Niswa, there had been more than ‘500-700 performances in one year all over Sindh’ (KII 18). These theatre groups also harnessed the power of social media to spread awareness by posting video clips of their plays on Facebook.

There was, in general, optimism among key informants about the effectiveness of prevention activities, with a number emphasising that there has been a ‘significant impact ful change’ (KII 7) on attitudes towards violence against women in the communities where programmes are being rolled out. Young men who attended training sessions reported that they started to control their anger during arguments with their wives as a result of what they had learned (see Box 6). They no longer ‘question(ed) the food made at home’ (27-year-old in Karachi). One young boy ‘cried in the mosque for forgiveness’ after learning about violence and regretting hitting his mother (16-year-old-boy, Lyari). Others attempted to change the attitudes of their peers:

‘When I see that my friends talk about hitting their wives, I tell them to talk to them. I question why they hit them. Do they not realise that it is physically painful? So, I make them understand that it is also the right of women to take decisions, to have their own opinions’

(27-year-old-man who participated in the SDS youth group programme in Karachi)

There was general consensus among those who attended these awareness-raising sessions that even months later, people ‘did not see anyone who attended them beat their wife now. They try to give money to their wives so there are no more quarrels in the families’ (young man in Karachi). This was also noted in the case of beneficiaries who were not married when they attended the training sessions:

‘... but when I got married, I followed what they had told us. That is the reason we never had fights. If I had not been part of this programme, there would have been a lot of fights’

(25-year-old man, Karachi)

Community theatre was also seen as a powerful tool to raise awareness about the effects of discriminatory gender norms on IPV. In a FGD with performers, participants shared many instances of their plays giving ‘courage’ to victims to reach out to them for help or to speak out when someone in the audience dismissed the importance of the play:
‘We can empower people by these workshops so they can take a stand about it. One girl who was ready to leave the workshop stayed the whole time and even danced on the last day. She was a nurse and said that “in our office, we always have to look down when we talk to men. But this workshop has given me the courage to talk to men directly, eye-to-eye”’. There was a boy who kept staring at her and she stood up and slapped him and said “my face is up here, this is where you should look”. So, she got this courage after the training

(���� ����)

Challenges for programming. Despite these positive examples, programmes face challenges linked to community norms around violence against women. Almost all key informants noted that there was strong ‘denial’ that IPV occurs in the community. In some cases, girls would be denied permission to see the plays and would have to escape from ‘locked rooms’ to do so, given the strict rules that do not allow boys and girls to be in the same space.

Such community rules and a general acceptance of violence against women explains a sense of frustration among programme implementers, who struggled to change deep-set beliefs:

‘We are putting continuous efforts through meeting, counselling and dialogue to change their mind set, but changing the mind set of people who are grown up is a bit difficult’

(KII 8)

Programme implementers also face challenges within and outside their own organisations: they often lack trained personnel who can understand and effectively implement modules that include changing norms around masculinity. As the key informant at AMAL explained: ‘the issue that we had was that our staff did not have capacity to handle such a subject.’ The organisation, therefore, invested in their staff by sending them to international conferences and training them on ‘mainstreaming masculinities, engaging men and boys, fathers and youth in their training modules’ (KII 17).

Outside the organisation, the sustainability of the programmes came into question when international donors could not be convinced of the need to engage men and boys:

‘At first, there was hardly any donor that was prepared to work on this subject. They think that the funding that is being used for issues related to men is the funding that ought to be used for gender-based issues or women’s empowerment. It should not be used for men’s empowerment. Even today, many donors are against that unless they have someone with them who has any idea or understanding of this concept’

(KII 17)
The right to live a life free of violence, with dignity and equality in a just and equitable society, is established under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and its international obligations. Table 5 provides an overview of current legal provisions that aim to protect women from GBV. However, the complexity of the struggle for legal protection of women is evident in the nationwide protests in early 2016 against the Women’s Protection Bill of Punjab by religious parties, who called it un-Islamic, and demanded its withdrawal.

Our interviews suggested that there are still major gaps in the current policy framework that undermine the protection of women’s rights. A member of the National Commission on Human Rights noted:

‘There was a national plan of action before, but after the 18th amendment, every ministry made their own plans of action. They have signed over one document and there are provincial policies for women’s empowerment. Laws against domestic violence are also there but there is no implementation of those laws. There is a lot of inertia in setting it all up’

(KII 14)

Table 5. Policy and legal provisions to tackle gender-based violence in Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of national laws against gender violence</th>
<th>Effort undertaken to address gender-based violence over the years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional provisions</td>
<td>• The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal provisions</td>
<td>• Pakistan Penal Code, 1860: Addresses several forms of violence against women including assault, rape (section 375), the criminal detention or intimidation of women (section 496A and 506), and insulting a woman’s modesty (section 509).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Family Laws Ordinance, 1996: Requires marriage to be registered and a woman to be aware of her rights on divorce and in situations where the husband marries a second time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2004: Recognises that killings committed in the name of honour are murders and must be booked and prosecuted as murder, and that they will not receive any exemptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006: This law allowed for rape to be prosecuted under criminal law, rather than Sharia law, and reverses many of the harsh punishments introduced by the brutal hudood ordinances relating to adultery (laws in Pakistan enacted in 1977 as part of the ‘Sharisation’ or ‘Islamisation’ process of military ruler Zia-ul-Haq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 2011: Deals specifically with the offence of using acid to cause injury.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Laws</td>
<td>• Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act, 1976: Places restrictions on the number of gifts to be given to a bride and groom, mandates all dowry items to be vested property of the bride and requires all dowry gifts to be itemised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Acid Control and Acid Crimes Prevention Act, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Prevention of Anti-Women Practices (Criminal Law Amendment) Act, 2011: Prohibits depriving women from inheriting their property; creates the offence of forced marriages of women; and marriage of a woman to the Holy Qur’an (if she is considered unholy and/or evil).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Bill, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Women’s Protection Act (passed in Punjab), 2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/countries/pakistan/evaw-pakistan/legislation-on-vaw

5 The 18th Amendment of the Constitution of Pakistan was passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan in 2010, removing the power of the President of Pakistan to dissolve the Parliament unilaterally, turning Pakistan from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary republic.
As explained in our overview of the conceptual framework that underpins this study, patterns of material power and relationships have a profound impact on the prevalence of violence and insecurity and hamper efforts to eliminate them (True, 2015). By adopting a political economy lens we can explore Rosendorff’s ‘three Is’ – institutions, interests and ideas – in which gender identities and status are constructed, including those related to IPV.

In terms of institutions, diverse legal frameworks across Pakistan present a real challenge to the implementation of a clear and unified response to IPV. An in-depth interview with one survivor indicated that even if there are laws, they differ across regions, which makes it hard for someone in Sindh, for example, to be protected under Punjab policies (woman survivor 4, Lyari).

What makes this process even more complicated is the lack of clarity or accountability on who is responsible for enforcing the laws. This was noted by one key informant:

‘Now the state, which has a legitimised power, such as beating up people under martial law, etc., due to pressure, has franchised its power. It gave it to some people. Some tasks have been given to some people, some tasks to others’

(KII 19)

In terms of the interests of key actors, the challenge for comprehensive action against IPV is the absence of a government champion to tackle this issue at state and national levels. A lawyer noted that state-level actors are not considered champions of women’s rights:

‘Where there isn’t any government political will, then there isn’t any priority or accountability or budget. Accountability is very important. It is also imperative for a commission to be active and to facilitate the Government’s response to IPV’

(KII 14)

On the other hand, academic activists want to promote deeper discourses around rights and social justice. A wide range of academic courses on social justice are being offered and are now being taken up by both male and female students.

For the past two years, there hasn't been a woman minister in Sindh. There is a provincial commission that oversees and monitors everything. A law was passed last year that a commission had to be formed within three months but it has been a year and a half and no such commission has been formed. The Government created the Women’s Ministry and Women’s Development Departments but in comparison to other ministries it doesn't have any say'

(KII 14)

In terms of ideas, IPV in Pakistan generates sharply divergent ideas on the appropriate framing. On the one hand, conservative religious actors want a reduction in efforts to criminalise IPV and a reinforcement of notions of male authority in line with religious scriptures. More specifically, fatwas, which are informal laws but driven by religious beliefs, are sometimes proposed in direct contradiction to the protection of women. One key informant revealed:

‘Recently a Fatwa from Ulemas was presented to the Parliament of Punjab, which stated that light beating of a woman is alright. It further stated that a husband is allowed to beat his wife as long as he doesn’t break her bones. There was a lot of debate on this topic’

(KII 13)
8. Conclusions and recommendations

This report highlights the changing yet persistent ways in which IPV remains a reality for girls and women in Pakistan. Our findings suggest that all forms of violence (physical, sexual, psychological) are prevalent and increasing in severity. As a result of IPV, women have suffered physical injuries ranging from broken bones to heart problems; mental health problems ranging from anxiety and depression to an inability to sleep; and lack of access to proper healthcare. Their sexual and reproductive health has been at risk, with women denied any voice in family planning, being forced to have abortions, and facing violence during pregnancy. Children in households where IPV occurs have been affected directly by being subjected to physical and emotional violence, and indirectly by witnessing violence that normalises the brutalisation of women.

Our findings are in line with our conceptual framework, which emphasises the inter-linkages between different levels of drivers of IPV in Pakistan.

At the individual level, lack of education, poverty, unemployment, drug and alcohol abuse, and witnessing violence in childhood were identified as increasing the likelihood of men perpetrating IPV. At household/family level, conflict in family relationships gave rise to violence from male partners, often exacerbated by the actions of in-laws, especially in extended households. In some cases, marital problems stemmed from polygamy, a practice more prevalent in the Balochi culture and one that increases the likelihood of IPV.

At community level, the major driving factor for IPV was social norms that defined and constrained the behaviour of both men and women. While notions of femininity remain traditional, notions of masculinity mix traditional gender norms (e.g. meet the needs of the family) and modern constructions of manhood (e.g. act to stop violence against women and encourage women to do well). Social norms around femininity restrict women’s freedom and movement, entrench rigid expectations of the kind of behaviour expected from a wife, and reinforce the traditions of arranged and early marriage. Social norms are also used to justify violence against women, mainly by men who cite religious teachings and expectations. Finally, traditional and social media, while helpful in providing information on existing services, also emerged as contributors to a context where violence against women is both justified and expected.

Based on these findings about the dynamic multi-level drivers of IPV, we propose the following recommendations for each level.

8.1. Individual level

Ensure that men are included as agents of change as a priority, while simultaneously working on longer-term responses to structural triggers, such as lack of education, unemployment and backgrounds shaped by violence, all of which interact and compound the likelihood of committing IPV.

More specifically, engage with men and especially younger adolescent boys to tailor programme interventions by identifying entry points where different groups of men and boys are most likely to be receptive to messaging. These include religious institutions (e.g. mosques), schools, youth groups, cafes, and sports centres.

Identify specific entry points to reach young adolescents. Given that social norms become more rigidly enforced and personally salient in adolescence, it is critical to reach boys as early as possible, ideally in their pre-adolescent or very young adolescent stage, and inside the family. This can be done by working through educational establishments and influencing curriculum development, through youth clubs and by working with role models for positive and progressive masculinities, including celebrities or progressive religious leaders. However, more effort is needed to embed robust systems of monitoring, evaluation and lesson-sharing to strengthen programmes, many of which are still very small scale and limited in their reach and duration.

8.2. Household level

Engage husbands, fathers-in-law and brothers-in-law to reflect on their own attitudes and behaviours towards violence in general and IPV specifically. This includes educating adolescents and youth about alternative and more progressive forms of masculinity and the economic and social costs of IPV through schools, youth groups, religious institutions, and engagement with parents.
8.3. Community level
Mobilise communities to both combat and deal with violence against women, including community activists, health clinics, and schools, as well as scholars and women’s networks to generate new discourses around this issue.

8.4. Systems and services level
Promote culturally-resonant definitions of IPV as a starting point. This can be done by building on standardised measurements for IPV as well as identifying indicators that are culturally resonant, (e.g. including those related to dowry violence), together with academics, educationalists, regional bodies such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the World Health Organization Regional Office. One challenge will be to ensure that the definition captures the regional variations within Pakistan on IPV attitudes and behaviours. It is necessary, therefore, to engage academia, civil society, analysts, writers and poets, and youth to develop an understanding of violence against women and girls within this particular context through ethnographic and other social scientific methods.

Ensure continuous dialogue and awareness raising by institutions (academia, police, the state, judiciary, rangers, civil society and NGOs) to combat the deep-set social norms that underpin violence against women and girl and engage youth to generate debate on the role of families, religion and communities in perpetrating and mitigating IPV.

Map and engage strategically with key institutions by investing in information, as well as the skills and knowledge of service providers to prevent, screen for and respond to IPV, including making referrals on IPV within and across the justice, legal, protection, health, and education sectors. At a systems level, efforts are also needed to institutionalise gender budget monitoring to track investments to tackle violence against women and girls, and to enhance the transparency and accountability of service providers across sectors. There is also a need to integrate efforts to tackle such violence into multi-sectoral policies, such as those on health and education.

Advocate for legal reforms and implementation of legal frameworks in line with international conventions against gender-based violence. Advocacy is needed with the Government’s human-rights bodies for legal reforms to criminalise certain IPV behaviours (e.g. marital rape and dowry related violence), in line with recommendations by the Committee on the Convention to End All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) to better align provision for the prosecution and sentencing of IPV perpetrators.

It is also vital to ensure that more women are employed in formal service institutions (particularly police forces and courts of justice) and to embed widespread sensitivity training for police officers to remove an important barrier to justice for survivors.

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6 Rangers are the paramilitary of the Sindh and Punjab provinces of Pakistan.
References


P4P, Rozan and ICRW (n.d.) ‘Understanding Masculinities: A Formative Research on Masculinities and Gender based Violence in a peri-urban area in Rawalpindi, Pakistan’.
## Annexes

### Table A1. Total number of interviews (Phase I) by study site

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Lyari</th>
<th>Shah Faisal</th>
<th>Deh Chohar</th>
<th>Aku / other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key informant interviews (KIIs)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus group discussions (FGDs)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-depth interviews (IDIs) (adolescent boys)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-depth interviews (IDIs) (IPV survivors)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergenerational trios (IGTs)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table A2. Total number of interviews (Phase II) by the ‘three I’s’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>SDS/AMAL</th>
<th>Tehrik-e-Niswan</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Academia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key informant interviews (KIIs)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus group discussions (FGDs)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-depth interviews (IDIs) (adolescent boys)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
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