• Low- and semi-skilled labour migrants face significant difficulties accessing ‘decent work’ in host countries.
• Globally, 40% of workers are in vulnerable or precarious forms of work – migrants are disproportionately represented in this share.
• Low quality work at destination limits the potential economic returns of migration and can impede migrants’ integration into host communities.
• Providing employment alone in areas of origin is unlikely to stop migration. Many people move abroad even when opportunities ‘at home’ are available.
1 Introduction

International labour migrants are disproportionately concentrated in vulnerable forms of employment. Migrants in search of better work and wages often find themselves battling for jobs on the lowest rungs of the labour market. The work is often insecure, arbitrarily remunerated and thinly regulated (if at all), representing a continuation of the conditions many faced ‘back home’. As has recently been argued, ‘with local employment in countries of origin often characterised by informal employment, poor working conditions and unsustainable livelihoods, migrant workers are caught within a protracted precarity that spans life at home and abroad’ (Piper et al., 2017: 1089).

This briefing explores the causes and consequences of this phenomenon against the backdrop of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It uses a ‘decent work’ lens to look at international labour migration, exploring how employment (in relation to its quality, terms and regulation) relates to migration (including the decision to migrate, integration, return and remittance-sending).

The briefing addresses two key questions. The first (Section 3) asks to what extent aspects of the migration experience are driven or affected by the nature and quality of work that people are able to access. It also provides an overview of why precarious labour is so pronounced among migrants.

The second question (Section 4) explores how migration shapes the nature and quality of work that people are able to access. We consider the way in which this plays out for migrants themselves, native-born workers and ‘stayers’ (i.e. household and community members who have remained in their country of origin).

The final two sections relate the preceding analysis to the 2030 Agenda, drawing on the literature’s key findings to offer practical and policy-relevant ways of approaching the intersections between decent work and migration – an area that has received relatively little attention to date.

2 Precarious labour and the ‘decent work’ agenda

Unemployment is presented as one of the key development challenges, but this perspective risks obscuring the difficulties faced by those locked into precarious labour (where labour rights violations are more likely to occur), underemployment and ‘working poverty’ – a disproportionate share of whom are migrants (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2014; 2016).

Latest figures from the ILO show that, globally, the number of unemployed individuals is dwarfed by the number of those working in what it terms ‘vulnerable employment’ (ILO, 2018a). This category includes people who are subject to high levels of precariousness, more likely to be employed on informal terms and less likely to benefit from job security, regular incomes and access to social protection than their waged and salaried counterparts (ILO, 2017).

The challenges around labour cannot be solved just by getting people into work. As the numbers – and this ILO (2018a) report – demonstrate, even those in employment can face poverty, precariousness and vulnerability.

Policy debates within the international development community have circled around job creation for some time, but it is no longer enough to talk about increasing the number of jobs. The concept of ‘decent work’ has been gaining considerable traction in recent years. While a variety of definitions now exist, the term generally refers to work that provides (ILO, 2018b):

1 One recently adopted marker for precarity in the labour market is migrant status (Piper et al., 2017).
• a fair income,
• security in the workplace,
• good prospects for personal development and social integration,
• freedom for people to express their concerns, organise and participate in the decisions that affect their lives,
• and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men.

In other words, it’s not just the quantity of work that we need to be thinking about. Its quality matters too.

Within the 2030 Agenda, Goal 8 calls for ‘sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all’. Goals 4 (on educational and learning opportunities), 5 (on gender equality and women’s empowerment) and 16 (on peaceful and inclusive societies) also feature relevant aspects. We return to these goals in Section 5, where we examine the links between migration and targets related to decent work.

3 How the ‘decency’ of work shapes migration

This section explores how different dimensions of migration are affected by the labour market.

3.1 Emigration

Most migration research on this theme has focused on the role of wage differences and un/employment levels in a person’s decision to migrate, yet evidence suggests that the terms of employment in countries-of-origin can also contribute.

One such example concerns the emigration of nurses from developing countries. In a recent systematic review, Moyce et al. (2015: 3) find ‘Many push factors…centred on working conditions or lack of job opportunities in nurses’ home countries’, with burn-out, emotional exhaustion and general dissatisfaction with conditions commonly cited.

But negative conditions at origin are only one element in deciding to emigrate: the perception of more positive, supportive environments abroad also appears important – in particular the ‘pull’ of greater educational opportunities (for both the migrant and their children), increased autonomy in the workplace, and more flexible working hours. Issues relating to stress, leisure, independence and personal development, which can be affected by the nature of employment and drive people to search for new opportunities, are therefore relevant to the debate.

The body of studies on nursing illustrates how the stigmatisation of certain types of work can also contribute to the decision to emigrate (see Box 1). Image and status are important dimensions in what people gain from work, and can be key to both an individual’s wellbeing and the way they are treated by others in the wider community. When these dimensions are negatively affected by the context in which that work is taking place, emigration may seem a better option than staying ‘at home’ and switching sectors.

This resonates with findings on economic crises and austerity in more ‘developed’ countries such as Greece. Following the onset of Greece’s financial crisis in the late 2000s, there was a growth in emigration: some estimates suggest that as many as 350,000 Greeks may have left between 2010 and 2015, and in 2014 it was reported that one in three citizens claimed to be willing to move overseas in search of work (this share was most pronounced among educated young adults) (Labrianidis and Pratsinakis, 2016).

Box 1 The role of stigma in the emigration of Indian nurses to Italy

Recent research with Indian nurses in Italy demonstrates how their decision to emigrate was driven not only by ‘unsatisfactory working conditions at home’ and ‘low salaries’, but also by the ‘poor image of nursing [in India], linked to a masculine and patriarchal society’ (Stievano et al., 2017: 7). Female nurses experience this stigma most acutely. It has also been suggested that the perception of nursing in India as an occupation of comparatively low worth ‘plays out in the issues of salaries, rights and working conditions’ (World Health Organization (WHO), 2017: 34). For these women, moving to Italy was at least partly about escaping occupational stigma (and the occupational injustices that can accompany this) and finding opportunities to build a more positive self-identity.
In examining these migration patterns, analysis points to the changes in the types and conditions of employment available in the Greek labour market, and an overriding sense of disillusionment regarding the country’s political and economic future (ibid.; see also Themelis, 2017) driving decisions to leave. This is not so much about a lack of jobs per se – around half of all respondents in the Labrianidis and Pratsinakis (2016) study were in employment at the time of their emigration – as it is about shifts in the quality, status and nature of the work available. Where people are highly educated and have prior experience of ‘decent work’, as many of the Greek post-2010 migrants would have had, a decline in the quality of labour opportunities can prompt emigration in search of work that (hopefully) meets expectations better.

Box 2  What explains the disproportionate concentration of migrants in precarious labour?

Migrants are disproportionately concentrated in vulnerable or precarious forms of employment. Recent estimates suggest that 16% of employed migrants in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries are in low-skilled jobs, compared with 7% of nationals – something which cannot be explained by lower levels of education and training as evidence also shows high levels of overqualification among migrant workers (ILO, 2014). So what is the explanation?

Market flexibility and ‘unfree labour’

Although the deregulation of labour markets has created new kinds of job opportunities for mobile workers, it has also resulted in an erosion of employment standards (Mosley and Singer, 2015) and an increase in labour casualisation, as formal enterprises outsource production to informal workers (Chen et al., 2006; Chant and Pedwell, 2008). Research shows how greater labour market flexibility has helped create conditions that maximise the potential for the exploitation of migrants, predominantly in the most disadvantaged segments of the market (LeBaron and Phillips, 2018). There is also a growing body of work revealing ‘unfree labour’, where some migrants (for example day labourers and domestic workers) get trapped in exploitative labour relations. Methods of control include disciplining by employers, debt bondage and the use/threat of violence (Anderson, 2010; LeBaron and Phillips, 2018; Yea, 2017).

National legislation and regulatory frameworks

Government legislation tends to be structured around fixed populations, so migrants can be invisible in terms of national regulation (Mosse et al., 2005). Where more targeted frameworks do exist, they often prove ineffective in practice. This is partly due to the complexity and incoherence of the overarching regulatory regime, which makes it difficult to establish which authorities or organisations are responsible for securing migrants’ rights. This problem is particularly pronounced where migrants are sub-contracted through cross-border arrangements (Axelsson and Hedberg, 2018). National legislation and policies determining migrant status play an active role in producing precarity for migrant workers, regulating not just the flow of migrants into a country but also the types of migrant labour available to employers (i.e. that which can be paid minimal amounts and offered on highly flexible, insecure terms) (Anderson, 2010; Lewis et al., 2015).

The creation of ‘hostile environments’

Migrants often respond to national migration policies designed to aggravate the experience of irregular/illegal migrants by working in further under-the-radar clandestine labour. Recent analysis by Lewis et al. (2017) demonstrates that the UK government’s ‘hostile environment’ policy, pursued through the implementation of major immigration acts in 2014 and 2016, has helped generate a ‘super-exploitable’ and ‘hyper-precarious’ (Lewis et al., 2015) workforce. The authors show that by excluding irregular migrants (and in particular asylum-seekers) from formal banking and housing, and restricting their access to public services, this policy regime’s primary outcome has been a deterioration in wellbeing for people either unable or unwilling to return home. This is consistent with research from other contexts showing that tighter migration controls at destination often simply disrupt ‘natural’ patterns of return and circular migration (Czaika and de Haas, 2014)

Individual-level pressures of the migration experience

On arrival at their destination, labour migrants often have to lower the threshold of what they consider ‘decent work’ in order to start remitting. As a result, people can ‘opt into’ low- or under-skilled forms of work, competing against others (including natives) for precarious opportunities on the lowest rungs of the labour market – in some cases with an awareness prior to departure that this is likely to happen (Malla and Rosenbaum, 2017; McDowell et al., 2009). Choosing to take up ‘indecent work’ can also be understood as an individual-level response to the constraints that visas often place on people’s employment, as has recently been observed in Australia (Li and Whitworth, 2016).
3.2 Return migration
The Labrianidis and Pratsinakis (2016) study also shows how poorly perceived labour markets ‘back home’ keep emigrants in work overseas, even when that work may not be ‘decent’. As the authors explain, many people in this study chose low-skilled jobs abroad over Greek employment that doesn’t meet expectations. A key element in this decision is the perception that employment abroad offers opportunities such as the development of language skills and the construction of wider social networks – pathways that they perceive will ‘help them to eventually find better jobs’, whenever and wherever that might be (ibid.: 25).

Other recent studies lend support to this ‘aversion’ effect. For example, research with Polish and Spanish migrants living in Norway shows how concerns about working conditions and the deregulation of labour markets in countries of origin are often experienced as reasons not to return (Bygnes and Erdal, 2017). Other analysis of return aspirations among young, educated Turkish emigrants highlights the role of gender discrimination within the domestic labour market, showing how the existing and evolving nature of economic and public life in Turkey proves a greater ‘push’ for women relative to men (Elveren and Toksoz, 2017).

Even when workers experience badly paid, precarious forms of work abroad – see Box 2 for an overview of why this happens – return is not inevitable (Castles, 2011). Looking at the experiences of Bolivian migrants in Spain, Bastia (2011) points to the restrictive nature of migration policy in many host countries, which can cause labour migrants to ‘hang on’ in times of adversity or crisis. Box 3 examines this case in more detail.

3.3 Integration
The extensive literature on precarious migrant labour highlights how the nature of work taken up at destination can have a profound impact on people’s capacity to integrate into their new settings. Exploring the lives of ‘working poor’ immigrants in Israel, Sigad et al.’s (2018) analysis establishes the world of work as both a ‘primary route of integration into the new culture as well as a means of coping with…the uprootedness caused by immigration’. Their findings speak to the role that work can play in helping people achieve a sense of belonging, even when faced with difficult financial situations.

The authors also argue that the fundamental and far-reaching importance of work to the immigrant experience leaves individuals particularly vulnerable to discriminatory workplace practices (see Box 1). Newly arrived migrants are under pressure to find work quickly, especially when the journey has been financed by others back home, and to start providing remittances.

When decent work opportunities are scarce, integration into host societies can be challenging. We see this in research with refugee communities in sub-Saharan Africa, where difficulties in accessing employment (Danso, 2002; Kamwimbi et al., 2010) or establishing financial security through regular income generation (Smit and Rugunanan, 2014) give way to difficulties in settling in. Some have argued that this is because successful integration is perceived to be related to refugees’ and other migrants’ ability to establish an adequate personal income in their new environment (Pittaway et al., 2009, in Smit and Rugunanan, 2014). Having to pursue self-employed informal work or insecure, low-wage jobs creates obstacles to successful integration (see Long et al., 2017 in this series). Studies of migrant experiences in the service sectors of European and northern American countries endorse this finding. Zuberi and Prashnick (2012), for example, interviewed migrants in Vancouver doing hotel and hospital work; they found that the conditions migrants face after arrival – such as low pay or long hours – limit the time available for participation in community life.

3.4 Remittance-sending
Drawing on data from more than 2,500 regular migrants along seven major migration corridors – including
Nepal-Qatar, Vietnam-Malaysia and Ethiopia-Saudi Arabia – Aleksynka et al. (2017) look at the extent to which ‘deficiencies in conditions of work’ overseas constitute a ‘cost to labour migration’: an area that has received extremely limited attention to date. They find that losses due to ‘decent work deficits’ are equivalent to 27% of migrants’ total wages, and are double the recruitment and travel costs of the migration itself. In many destination countries, the bulk of these losses come from excessively long working hours, which are often unfairly remunerated and associated with higher levels of stress, fatigue, work-related injury and poor work-life balance (Figure 2).

Such losses vary from group to group: some of the worst affected include female domestic workers (whose comparatively higher costs stem from ‘prohibitively excessive hours’) and male construction workers (who are often subject to unexpected wage deductions, long hours and work-related physical injury).

‘Decent work deficits’ have a direct monetary impact on migrants, including on remittance flows: the authors report a significant correlation between higher losses incurred through bad working conditions and the amount of remittances sent back.

4 How migration shapes ‘decent work’ outcomes

In this section we look at how migration shapes both the nature of work for individuals – including migrants themselves, native-born workers and ‘stayers’ – and the functioning of labour markets more broadly.

4.1 At destination

A recent study by OECD/ILO (2018a) asks how international labour migration shapes the nature of destination economies, looking not only at the impact on native employment and wage levels but also at how migration impacts the types of jobs held by native-born workers. It finds that immigration has a ‘negligible’ impact on their labour market outcomes, which is ‘in line with the majority of research on OECD countries’ (ibid.: 15).

When we move below the aggregate or national level, however, a more mixed and complicated picture emerges. Gender is one element in how migration impacts the labour market. Native-born women appear to be most negatively affected by the presence of female labour migrants (there are exceptions in Costa Rica, Nepal and South Africa). The report suggests this is probably due to women’s over-representation in temporary and vulnerable forms of employment, which are particularly sensitive to increases in competition from new workers (see Box 4).

**Figure 2** Excessive working hours are responsible for substantial losses in migrant incomes across countries

![Excessive working hours are responsible for substantial losses in migrant incomes across countries](chart)

Source: Aleksynka et al., 2017.

**Box 4** The labour market impacts of immigration are gendered – and vary between countries

Although the OECD/ILO (2018a) synthesis report suggests that native-born women risk losing the most from immigration, the case studies show how this can vary from country to country.

In Ghana, for example, immigration appears to have a negative impact on the paid employment rate of native-born women, even though the aggregate impact at the national level (women and men combined) is negligible. While there is no detectable impact on women’s wages, the report suggests that the reduction in paid employment is likely to be associated with increased informality and a decline in the quality of work for native-born women. It proposes that ‘immigrant women are strong substitutes for native-born women, and that the latter might therefore be pushed into vulnerable employment’ (OECD/ILO, 2018b: 102).

By contrast, the evidence from Argentina suggests that immigration may have allowed native-born women with relatively low levels of education to enter the labour market in greater numbers (OECD/ILO, 2018c). The study suggests that women in this category were able to hire migrants to perform domestic duties, freeing themselves up for other work.
Geography and scale also have an impact: some countries with insignificant effects at the aggregate level contain several sub-national regions where the effects are much more positive (Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Thailand), while others with an overall positive effect are also home to regions where that impact runs in the opposite direction (South Africa). The reasons for such variations are diverse and complex, but include regional differences in the rate of native out-migration.

There is some evidence that immigration can shape the structures of destination labour markets, to the extent that it can lead to changes in the type of work that native-born workers subsequently take up. One example of how this happens is the creation of new jobs. Recent research in the United States (US) finds that while immigrants constitute 15% of the labour force, they account for around a quarter of the country’s entrepreneurs (Kerr and Kerr, 2016). What’s more, new firms established by immigrants employ an average of 4.4 workers – a powerful counter-narrative to the misplaced idea that economies have a fixed number of jobs to go around (sometimes referred to as the ‘lump of labour fallacy’).  

Returning to the OECD/ILO report, we also see that in certain contexts ‘immigrants provide native-born workers the opportunity of finding better employment’ (ibid.: 29). In Thailand, for example, immigration has helped to reduce the share of native-born workers in vulnerable employment and increase their presence in paid employment. The idea that migrant workers, particularly low-skilled ones, can free up natives to specialise and upgrade their occupations is supported by evidence from a number of European countries (Constant, 2014).

This is not the case everywhere of course. The impact of migration depends on the skill structure of immigrants relative to the skill structure of native-born workers (Dustmann et al., 2008), so it matters which parts of the labour market we look at. If, for example, we take what some call the ‘secondary sector’ – where there is a concentration of low-skilled, low-waged jobs and unemployment is the norm (Wachter, 1974, in Fields, 2010: 6) – we find that immigration can generate comparatively worse effects for native-born workers relative to those in higher segments of the market. This can apply both to wages – as research by the Bank of England demonstrates in relation to the UK’s semi- and unskilled service sectors (Nickell and Saleheen, 2015) – and occupational status/change. Studies suggest that natives working in jobs with the worst conditions and/or those with some of the lowest levels of educational attainment are most likely to be affected negatively (or potentially even displaced) by new immigration flows (Edo, 2015; Ozden and Wagner, 2014).

This ‘crowding out’ effect arises because many migrants find work in the secondary sector (see Box 2), which can subsequently increase competition for jobs in that sector – even those that are badly paid and without protection. Prominent examples include increasingly deregulated sectors such as construction, agriculture and the service industry (particularly in relation to janitorial work, catering and hospitality) (Benach et al., 2011; Bloch, 2006; Castles, 2011; McDowell et al., 2009; Pajnik, 2016). Part of what drives this dynamic is the combination of pressure and vulnerability that often surrounds migrants as they enter new economic environments. This is most likely to happen when people arrive through irregular means, including asylum channels – research shows that those arriving without documentation tend to find themselves in some of the most exploitable situations within the destination labour market (ILO, 2014; Katiri, 2007; Waite, 2017).

As a result, alongside increased competition and possible displacement within the secondary sector, we sometimes see skills/status downgrading among migrant workers. Bloch (2006) has observed such an effect among highly educated and experienced Zimbabwean immigrants to the UK, describing a ‘pattern of under-employment and downward occupational mobility’ that is linked to a subsequent process of ‘de-skilling’ (Bloch, 2006: 83; see also Marsden, 2014 for similar evidence from Canada). The incorporation of migrants into these precarious sectors of the labour market can thus prove problematic for both native workers and migrants themselves.

The impact of migration on more skilled sectors of the labour market is often very different. There is some evidence, for example, that the insertion of new workers can increase the quality of the labour supply within some sectors. Looking at the impact of the distribution of foreign nurses across US states, Cortes and Pan (2015) find that while fewer native nurses sit the licensing exams, an increase in foreign nurses also increases the pass rate of natives who do sit the exams (the authors’ proxy for nursing quality).

So, while an increase in competition as a result of labour immigration can certainly undermine the

---

2 When new firms are co-founded by immigrants and natives, they employ on average nearly 17 workers.

3 It should be noted that, while there is evidence of wage-lowering and ‘crowding out’ among unskilled native-worker populations, the magnitude of these effects is said to be far lower than popular opinion would suggest (ILO, 2014). One recent review of the effects of low-skilled migration into ‘advanced’ countries found that ‘fears of an adverse impact on the wages, unemployment and living standards of native low-skilled workers are largely misplaced’ (Dadush, 2014).

4 The briefing on gender, migration and the 2030 Agenda highlights how de-skilling can be particularly pronounced among female migrants (O’Neil et al., 2016).
nature and quality of labour market outcomes for both natives and migrants, this is sector-specific—and must be considered alongside the generally neutral national-level impacts. Moreover, in certain scenarios we see the opposite effect: under certain conditions, migration can help enhance employment outcomes for all, both in terms of quantity and quality. In this regard labour migration constitutes both an opportunity for, and barrier to, meeting SDG 8, and must be managed accordingly.

4.2 In transit

Although there is very little literature looking directly at how migration shapes the nature of labour markets in transit, the recent political prioritisation of Europe’s ‘migration crisis’ has prompted interest in certain hotspots along key migration corridors.

The case of Agadez, a city in central Niger, illustrates what substantial migration flows can do to the economies of major transit sites. In their 2015 report for the Wall Street Journal, Hinshaw and Parkinson describe how recent increases in the number of African migrants passing through the city—many heading to north Africa (and beyond)—have helped revitalise the local economy, primarily through the creation of new migration-related jobs (in the transportation and smuggling industries, for example) but also through increases in local demand and consumption. This new commercial activity has helped inhabitants to start up or expand self-run enterprises, with the potential of further job creation down the line.

The case of Agadez also highlights the role that international migration/development policy can play in shaping the labour markets and economies of transit spaces. 2016 saw the implementation, funded by the European Union (EU), of a law designed to prevent the ‘illicit smuggling of migrants’. This crushed migration-related livelihood opportunities (for members of the host community) and generated a huge shock to the Agadez economy. In assessing the economic fallout of this policy, Hoffmann et al. (2017) observe multiple impacts, including the loss of 6,000 migration-related jobs, adverse economic effects among businesses previously benefiting from increases in consumption, and a reduction in regional imports.

Yet, at the same time as trying to flatten the migration industries of places like Agadez, international policy is also attempting to create alternative jobs (partly based on a logic of migration deterrence). As part of the Valletta Action Plan to address the root causes of irregular migration, Agadez is the target of a €30-million initiative to ‘improve the production conditions and economic value of agricultural products in the region’ (European Commission (EC), 2016), while other key transit countries such as Jordan and Ethiopia—both resident to significant numbers of regional refugees and other migrants—have become the testing grounds for a new kind of idea: compacts (see Box 5).

Box 5 Compacts: a new way of creating jobs in transit countries

Refugee compacts are agreements between host government and donors that combine grants, concessional loans and other ‘beyond aid’ incentives, with the aim to create new labour opportunities and economic development in migration hotspots. They often include industrial parks, with a split allocation of jobs between refugee and host communities. Compacts constitute an important and forward-looking step in international migration policy. But while the focus tends to be on the number of jobs created by these initiatives, evidence shows that the type and quality of the work are equally important.

Looking at the Jordan Compact, research by Barbelet et al. (2018) highlights how work permits provided through the scheme ‘are restricted to sectors that do not align with the typical skills profile of Syrian refugees’; neither do they reflect the fact that many refugees rely on ‘a portfolio of jobs to make a decent living’, designed as they are to tie permit-holders to a single employer (Barbelet et al., 2018: 5; see also International Rescue Committee (IRC), 2017). The geographical dimension of work has also been identified as an important mediating factor, with low take-up of industrial jobs by Syrians ascribed in part to the location of factories and people’s reluctance to take on long journey times for family reasons (Lenner, 2016).

One key lesson from Jordan is that, for refugee compacts to work, there must be wide and inclusive consultation during the initial design phase. It is crucial that the skillsets, experiences and aspirations of both refugee and host populations are taken into account and balanced against the limits and structures of the economy. Inputs from a range of actors are needed to get this right, building partnerships across the economic, political, humanitarian, diplomatic and trade sectors.

---

5 One recent analysis suggests that the impacts of transit migration are negligible and potentially negative, stating that ‘migrants in transit’ generally lack the means to remit home and may end up competing for jobs in transit countries (World Bank Group, 2018). However, the evidence from Agadez counteracts the point regarding competition for jobs in transit. Research by Samuel Hall (2016) suggests that the ‘crowding out’ effect outlined earlier is unlikely to be a problem for the inhabitants of Agadez: of the 400-plus migrants interviewed, 70% planned on staying in town for less than one month.
4.3 Back ‘home’
Beyond their positive if negligible effect on GDP growth (Mitra et al., 2015; OECD/ ILO, 2018a), remittances can drive more localised processes of economic change, including creating jobs at origin by stimulating demand for labour.

In Zimbabwe, research shows that although remittances have been responsible for creating a significant number of jobs locally (within the specific study sites), these are predominantly insecure and low-waged (Ncube and Gomez, 2011), primarily involving domestic and agricultural activities. They were created largely in response to a new demand for labour following the emigration of household members (which freed up positions within the local market) and the financial accumulation of recipient households (which gave them the capital to employ workers). Elsewhere in Zimbabwe, remittances have encouraged entrepreneurial activity among non-recipient households by increasing consumption levels within the local economy (Nzima et al., 2017). And in India, there have been increases in the demand for local construction and service industries (Kapuur, 2010).

Remittances can also help improve labour-market outcomes through indirect means – education, for example, which increases human capital and impacts the quality of a country’s (future) labour supply. Evidence shows that remittance receipt is often associated with positive outcomes in this respect, not just in relation to better secondary-level attainment, but also at the university level (Gorlich et al., 2007; Kugler, 2006; Ngoma and Ismail, 2013; Mansour et al., 2011). Recent analysis additionally demonstrates that remittances tend to remain relatively stable during times of economic slump or crisis, suggesting they can keep recipients in education even when times are tough (De et al., 2016).

Remittances can fund collectively the provision of local goods, from roads and electricity to health services and hygiene infrastructure (Adida and Girod, 2011; Chaudhry, 1989; Chauvet et al., 2015; Kapuur, 2010). Theoretically, both the formation of human capital and functioning public services are important preconditions for ‘decent work’ creation and attainment.

Another way in which emigration shapes labour markets ‘back home’ is through changes to the domestic labour supply. Evidence from Nepal suggests that the combination of out-migration and remittance receipt has contributed to a shift in labour relations between ‘employees’ and ‘employers’ (Adhikari and Hobley, 2015). Households that are historically marginalised as a result of their caste have achieved greater economic dependence, moving from wage labour into more independent forms of income generation; and land tenants have gained (relatively) greater control over landlords, taking advantage of labour shortages within the community to secure more favourable tenancy terms. At the same time, however, ‘left behind’ women find themselves having to take on additional work on top of reproductive duties.

While out-migration is sometimes associated with shifts in the employment trajectories of ‘stayers’, the literature on this question is highly mixed (Bossavie and Denisova, 2018). In some cases ‘stayers’ move into different types of work (for example, from formal paid employment into informal work), resulting in a re-allocation, rather than reduction, of the labour supply (see Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006 on Mexico); in other cases, the impacts are either insignificant or non-existent.

Finally, there is the question of how migration – or rather the prospect of migration – can cause a ‘brain gain’ for countries of origin. Analysis shows that prior to the physical act of crossing borders, individuals go through a process of ‘cognitive migration’ whereby they imagine their future abroad (Koikkalainen and Kyle, 2016). As part of this process, people’s behaviour prior to departure is geared towards enhancing their chances of a ‘successful migration’ – for example, by investing in more education – which benefits the country of origin.

The prospect of future migration can generate significant improvements in the quality of the domestic labour supply, with research from Cape Verde showing that an increase in the ‘probability of own [future] migration’ by 1 percentage point increases the ‘probability of completing intermediate secondary schooling’ by 1.9 percentage points (Batista et al., 2007: 24). And in contrast to the ‘brain drain’ narrative, most people do not leave as soon as they finish their course. Studies show that African medical graduates wait on average several years – often more than five – before emigrating (Clemens, 2009; Dowlo and Nyonator, 2001; Tankwanchi et al., 2013).

5 Relevance to the 2030 Agenda
The concept of ‘decent work’ has a prominent position within the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This is an important and positive move forward, steering policy debates beyond their focus on the quantitative aspects of job creation towards a consideration of how the quality of new and existing work opportunities might also be enhanced.

It features most centrally in Goal 8, which encourages action to ‘promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all’. Within Goal 8 are five more specific targets (8.1, 8.2, 8.5, 8.6 and 8.8), which draw attention to the nature, quality and regulation of available economic opportunity. Goals 4 (‘Ensure inclusive and equitable education and promote life-long learning opportunities for all’), 5 (‘Achieve gender equality and empower all women

6 This is an important counterpoint to the ‘brain drain’ narrative, which although having received substantial attention within the economic literature, remains a contested and perhaps over-hyped phenomenon (Gibson and McKenzie, 2011).
Table 1  Decent work, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevant SDG target</th>
<th>Link to migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal 8</strong> Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1 Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per cent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries</td>
<td>Migration can contribute to economic growth across different migration spaces. At destination – and, to a lesser extent, in transit – it can do so by supporting the transition of native workers into comparatively higher-skilled jobs, and by creating work opportunities through enterprise. In many countries of origin, remittances form a substantial element of the economy. However, evidence suggests that in both instances their role is limited and likely incapable of sustaining 7% annual growth rates (OECD/ ILO, 2018).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2 Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, including through a focus on high-value added and labour-intensive sectors</td>
<td>At destination, migration has been shown to support diversifications in export portfolios (although this is a gradual process), and its association with economic innovation is generally positive. Migration also impacts the country of origin economy positively, as new ideas and knowledge are remitted and individuals invest in their own human capital prior to the act of migration. These effects tend to be linked more to processes of high-skilled migration than other categories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value</td>
<td>Migration can help create new employment opportunities for ‘stayers’ through remittances, which recipient households can use to hire labour, and alterations in the domestic labour supply. However, such work tends to be informal, low-skilled and insecure. Remittances can also support the economic mobility of recipient households, encouraging internal migration to places promising greater labour opportunity (especially non-farm-related). At destination, high-skilled migration can create new jobs for natives through enterprise and business start-up. At the lower-skilled end of the labour market, immigration sometimes brings a ‘crowding out’ effect. This can either result in ‘job upgrading’ or push those who depend on insecure and hyper-flexible work out of the labour market altogether. The current treatment of many low- and semi-skilled labour migrants overseas (e.g. in domestic, service or construction work) means the attainment of ‘full and productive… decent work for all’ remains some way off. In some of the worst-case scenarios, underemployed migrants can be de-skilled through mismatched, low-skilled employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal 4</strong> Ensure inclusive and equitable education and promote life-long learning opportunities for all</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes</td>
<td>Generally speaking, a pre-condition for accessing ‘decent work’ is a good standard of human capital, attained through (among other things) quality education. Primary and secondary attainment, rather than attendance alone, is central to this. Additionally, labour migration can help children back home complete primary and secondary education through remittances, which are often used for this purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university</td>
<td>Higher education is also important for the attainment of ‘decent work’ later in life, particularly that which demands highly skilled individuals. As per Target 4.1, remittances secured through labour migration can be used to put family members back home through higher education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship</td>
<td>Technical and vocational skills are often pre-conditions for the attainment of ‘decent work’. Labour migration can contribute to the acquisition of new skills, as jobs overseas may provide better opportunities for further learning and skills development relative to those in countries with weaker economies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal 5</strong> Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation</td>
<td>Foreign domestic work is a key area of employment for female labour migrants, but it also one of the least protected in terms of exploitation and violation of rights. National legislation, if appropriately designed and properly administered, has a role to play in addressing this; around 30% of the world’s domestic workers are currently excluded from national labour laws (ILO, 2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate</td>
<td>Emigration can potentially empower ‘left behind’ women by facilitating their entrance into previously restricted spaces of the labour market. In many cases, however, it places additional work burdens on female household members while leaving reproductive labour relations and responsibilities unchanged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal 16</strong> Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere</td>
<td>For many migrants, the world of work is the primary determinant of their migration experience. Low- and semi-skilled migrants often find themselves in precarious labour positions where they are exposed to violence and rights violations. By contrast, quality jobs that offer security and protection can help migrants integrate into their new surroundings, thus contributing to more inclusive societies at the local level (see also the ODI briefing on citizenship, migration and the 2030 Agenda (Long et al., 2017)).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and girls’) and 16 (‘Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies’) also include ideas about ‘decent work’.

Migration plays into these goals and targets in a number of ways. Table 1 highlights the relevant points policy-makers should consider, and underlines migration’s potential contribution towards ‘decent work’ for all.

6 Conclusions and policy recommendations

SDG 8 calls for ‘full and productive employment and decent work for all’ by 2030. Unfortunately, there is still some way to go to meet this target. While the number of unemployed people has been falling in recent years (190 million or 6% of the global labour force in 2017), the number of people in vulnerable or precarious forms of work remains substantial (1.4 billion or 40% in the same year) – and it looks set to rise. Labour migrants are disproportionately represented in this latter category and, as this briefing has shown, face overwhelming challenges in the pursuit of ‘decent work’.

In the policy context, the relationship between migration and employment tends to be discussed in terms of how job availability influences migration movements, and vice versa. Recent mass displacements have lent further weight to this focus on the numbers. In countries such as Jordan and Ethiopia, new jobs are being created in order to counter the pressures that can accompany large influxes of refugees and other migrants, helping to support people’s livelihoods and – it is hoped – discourage onward migration.

We need to move beyond this one-dimensional approach. The evidence discussed in this brief clearly demonstrates the fact that badly conditioned, poorly protected or paid work can influence the initial decision to migrate. We have also seen how the experiences of migrants can be vastly undermined by exploitative practices and regulatory black holes in overseas labour markets. In short, having a job is no guarantee that wellbeing, stability and security will follow: the substance or quality of the work involved is just as important.

The evidence has several implications for progress towards the 2030 Agenda, with particular reference to Goals 4, 5, 8 and 16. The following recommendations set out actions for governments, donors and international agencies aiming to maximise ‘decent work’ outcomes in a migration context.
Conclusion 1 The ‘decency’ of work affects the decision to migrate, migrants’ experiences of overseas labour markets, and the economic returns of migration

While it may not always be the single most important determinant of migration processes and outcomes, the nature of work plays a significant role. Evidence suggests that ‘indecent’ or precarious work can shape emigration flows, stifle the ability of migrants to integrate into their host communities, and limit the potential returns of labour migration. Policy-makers should take ‘decent work’ issues into consideration in order to address the root causes of migration effectively and maximise its potential benefits.

Recommendation: use a ‘decent work’ lens to better understand, and respond to, the policy challenges of international migration

Policy-makers should:

- think less in terms of numbers, more in terms of wellbeing. Go beyond job numbers and wages to consider the regulation and treatment of workers. Consider broader wellbeing factors, such as autonomy in the workplace, opportunities for learning and self-development, voice and accountability, and personal safety.

Donors and international agencies should:

- incorporate ideas about decent work and wellbeing into the design of new employment initiatives. Refugee compacts need to go beyond the initial creation and allocation of work permits. They should include labour inspections on a regular basis and more active attempts to link permit holders to social-security systems. Donors and agencies can draw on lessons learnt from existing compacts (see examples from the Jordan experience: Barbelet et al., 2018; Kattaa and Byrne, 2018; Lenner, 2016).
- generate and use data that captures ‘decent work’ outcomes. Data collection methods and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) approaches concerned with employment numbers and productivity levels alone are not sufficient. Consider alternative metrics. Kim et al. (2017), for example, suggest that the ‘inclusiveness’ of processes of economic change can be evaluated by focusing on shifts in the availability and distribution of ‘decent work’ opportunities.

Relevant SDG targets

4.3 Ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university

4.4 Increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship

5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation

5.4 Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate

8.1 Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per cent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries

8.2 Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, including through a focus on high-value added and labour-intensive sectors

8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value

8.6 By 2020, substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training

8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment

16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere
Conclusion 2  Low- and semi-skilled labour migrants face significant difficulties accessing ‘decent work’ in host countries

Given that international labour migrants shoulder a disproportionate share of ‘indecent’ work, we will not achieve Goal 8 without relevant action in host countries. Hostile policy environments and increasingly restrictive immigration laws intensify competition for precarious jobs, affecting the livelihoods of both migrants and natives (who can be ‘crowded out’ of low- and semi-skilled jobs). Transaction fees and ‘decent work’ deficiencies also reduce the size of remittances, which undermines the potential economic ‘success’ of migration.

Recommendation: protect migrants’ labour rights through innovative and politically pragmatic solutions

Donors and international agencies should:

- support local initiatives and movements that are facilitating migrants’ integration and promoting labour rights. Such support may need to be at arm’s length in order to minimise political sensitivities. Lend backing and finance to campaigns designed to secure decent pay and conditions for labour migrants in certain sectors, such as domestic work and the service industries, rather than the labour market as a whole. Take advantage of opportunities for wholesale reform, such as that offered by the recent Windrush scandal in the UK (see Foresti, 2018).
- go sub-national. The best opportunities for reform are often at municipal or regional level. Consider providing support to sub-national authorities who are willing to protect migrants’ employment rights, offer legal advice and provide support into the labour market – as has been observed in Barcelona (see Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017).

Civil-society organisations should:

- challenge the ‘hostile environment’. Policies designed to create an unwelcome situation for migrants are often counter-productive. Advocate for reform on this basis. Rights-based campaigns should draw on the evidence demonstrating that exclusionary practices help create ‘super-exploitable’ migrant workforces and act as a deterrent to return migration.
- be aware of trade-offs and unintended consequences. Better rights and protections can result in a reduction in the demand for migrant labour, meaning fewer people get the opportunity to migrate through formal pathways (Naidu et al., 2016; Ruhs and Martin, 2008; Weyl, 2018). Promote the creation of alternative migration pathways and/or make the case that greater rights and higher numbers of jobs are not necessarily mutually exclusive goals.

Conclusion 3  It’s not just the lack of work in origin countries that drives migration, but the nature of their labour markets too

People’s experiences with labour markets at home can drive the decision to migrate. Even those in employment aspire for and actively pursue opportunities abroad. Thinking about how domestic labour markets work (e.g. in relation to terms of employment or opportunities for legal redress and accountability) opens up new options for reform beyond the mantra of job creation alone.

Recommendation: improve the quality of labour opportunities before migration occurs

Policy-makers in origin countries should:

- implement policies that lead to higher wages where possible. Evidence from the health sector suggests that wage-increase programmes can help to reduce emigration levels (Antwi and Phillips, 2013; Okeke, 2014). Expanding this kind of programming to other sectors could help governments retain skilled workers.
- test new ways to enhance the quality of the labour market, beyond wage increases alone and in partnership with donors. Michael Clemens (2015: 21) has pointed out that the ‘creative design and evaluation of incentives for skilled workers to remain in poor countries has received extremely little attention’. Experiment with new kinds of reforms and
interventions designed to target workers’ conditions, rights and representation; and examine how these could reshape people’s plans for the future.

Policy-makers, donors and international agencies should:

- **safeguard the experience of labour migration before it happens.** People will continue to migrate, even in the presence of a ‘better’ domestic labour market. For those attempting to do so through legal pathways, the quality of recruitment systems is key to a successful migration. As Hagen-Zanker et al. (2017) highlight in their ODI briefing on poverty, migration and the 2030 Agenda, there are several steps that can be taken to ensure exploitative agencies and employers are more accountable. In addition, donors should continue to support and expand existing initiatives such as the ILO-managed Integrated Programme on Fair Recruitment (FAIR) and Regional Fair Migration Project in the Middle East (FAIRWAY), as well as the International Organization for Migration’s International Recruitment Integrity System (IRIS) – all of which are designed to promote fair and ethical recruitment practices.

### Relevant SDG targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDG target</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per cent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, including through a focus on high-value added and labour-intensive sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For very helpful and constructive feedback on an earlier version of this paper, thanks go to Emma Samman, Manolo Abella, and several staff at the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). For continued support, advice and feedback throughout the whole process, many thanks also go to Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Helen Dempster and Sarah Cahoon. Finally, during the editing and production processes, thanks go to Chris Little, Caelin Robinson and Sophy Kershaw.


ODI is an independent, global think tank, working for a sustainable and peaceful world in which every person thrives.

We harness the power of evidence and ideas through research and partnership to confront challenges, develop solutions, and create change.

Readers are encouraged to reproduce material for their own publications, as long as they are not being sold commercially. As copyright holder, ODI requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. For online use, we ask readers to link to the original resource on the ODI website. The views presented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of ODI or our partners.

© Overseas Development Institute 2018. This work is licensed under CC BY-NC 4.0.