Against the odds: refugee integration in Kenya

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Contents

Acronyms v

1 Background and objectives of the case study 1

2 Context 3
  2.1 Opportunities for durable solutions 4

3 Legal and policy frameworks 5
  3.1 Kenyan refugee law, institutions and protection 5
  3.2 Freedom of movement 6
  3.3 Right to work 6

4 The impact of forced displacement on Kenya 7
  4.1 The impact of Kenya’s camps 7
  4.2 The impact of Kenya’s urban refugees 10

5 Public attitudes, politics and security 15
  5.1 Attitudes towards refugees 15

6 Integration in Kenya 19
  6.1 Integration of refugees in Kenya’s camps 19
  6.2 Integration of Kenya’s urban refugees 21

7 Conclusion 25

Bibliography 27

Maps and boxes

Maps
  Map 1: Kenya and neighbouring countries iv

Boxes
  Box 1: Profile 1
Map 1: Kenya and neighbouring countries

Source: UN Horn of Africa map, No 4188, Rev. 2, May 2007.
# Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Alien Refugee Certificate (issued by the DRA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRA</td>
<td>Department of Refugee Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Union</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>KISEDP</td>
<td>Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>Mandated Refugee Certificate (issued by UNHCR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEP</td>
<td>North Eastern Province</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCK</td>
<td>Refugee Consortium of Kenya</td>
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<td>RSD</td>
<td>Refugee status determination</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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1 Background and objectives of the case study

Kenya was chosen as a case study for the World Commission initiative due to its long history of hosting refugees and the large numbers of refugees in the country. While there is a rich body of literature on refugee management in Kenya, the predominance of an encampment approach since the early 1990s means there is limited literature on integration per se. The case study therefore considers the following questions:

1. What steps towards integration have been possible in Kenya despite the long-term policy of encampment?
2. What have been the key economic, demographic and social impacts of refugees in camps, and in Nairobi on host communities?
3. Which populations or groups have been able to make the greatest progress towards integration, and why?

In determining the impact or effects of refugees in Kenya, the literature focuses primarily on the impact of refugees on host populations in different locations, rather than analysing the impact of specific population flows. This case study therefore analysed the impact or effects of refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma camps, Kenya’s two largest, rather than analysing the implications of different refugee groups. The literature on refugees in Nairobi focuses predominantly on Somalis, but there is a limited body of literature on other groups. As the impact and experiences of refugees from Somalia and DRC have been quite distinct, the case study focuses on their experiences in particular.

The complexity of extracting information relevant to integration from such a vast body of literature, coupled with the limited time-scale, meant that it was not possible to conduct extensive primary research for this case study, although several experts on Kenyan refugee issues were consulted.

Box 1: Profile

2. As of May 2017, Kenya was host to some 490,656 refugees and asylum-seekers (UNHCR, 2017b). This is equivalent to 1% of Kenya’s total estimated population of 48 million (World Bank, 2018).
3. Refugees from Somalia number 304,892, and form the largest refugee group. There are currently 101,713 South Sudanese refugees and 29,894 refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
4. The majority of refugees, an estimated 423,389, reside in the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps. An additional 67,267 refugees are living in Nairobi and other urban areas.
5. Kenya was ranked 146 in the UN Human Development Index (HDI) in 2017, with an HDI value of 0.555.
6. With an annual growth rate of 5.8% in 2016, and a per capita GDP of $1,455.4, Kenya is classified as a lower middle-income country. According to the UN HDI, Kenya’s 2017 unemployment rate is 39.1%.
Kenya’s relative stability, economic resilience and porous borders in a region dominated by protracted crises means that the country has been hosting refugees since the 1960s (Abuya, 2007). Until the 1990s, refugee policy favoured local integration. Refugees – many of whom were African and Asian Ugandans fleeing political turmoil in the 1970s – were able to work, move and settle across Kenya; and to access education (Abuya, 2007; Campbell, 2006). As many Ugandan refugees were relatively well-off professionals, intellectuals and business people, this policy supported Kenya’s interest in attracting skilled workers and investment to the country (Kagwanja, 2000). The Kenyan government provided limited support, and responsibility for the integration of refugees largely lay with churches and aid organisations (Abuya, 2007). No large-scale camps were in operation, although the government’s Thika Reception Centre outside Nairobi provided reception and accommodation for a few hundred refugees and asylum-seekers. It also housed the government’s registration and refugee status determination (RSD) activities (Campbell et al., 2011). Kenyan experts suggest that camps were also used at other points in Kenya’s past.

This integration policy was reversed in the early 1990s, when hundreds of thousands of refugees arrived in Kenya fleeing conflict and insecurity in Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda and DRC. By the end of 1992 Kenya was hosting almost 300,000 Somali refugees, the first mass influx of refugees in the country’s history (Abuya, 2007). Somalis have dominated ever since, both in terms of refugee numbers and refugee policies. Conflict in Ethiopia resulted in a parallel influx of Ethiopian refugees, who numbered almost 70,000 in 1992, alongside 22,000 Sudanese, half of whom were thought to be unaccompanied minors. Refugees from DRC also started arriving in large numbers in the 1990s. Overall, refugee numbers, estimated at between 12,000 and 15,000 before 1990, rose to 120,000 in 1991, and over 400,000 in 1992 (Abuya, 2007).

The scale and profile of the new arrivals prompted a major shift in Kenyan refugee policy away from integration and towards encampment. While much of the literature chronicling this change in policy points to the escalation in numbers overwhelming Kenya’s refugee management system (Campbell et al., 2011; Lindley, 2011; Omata, 2016), there were also important political and ethnic dimensions. The large numbers of Somali refugee arrivals in the 1990s lacked the socio-economic credentials of their Ugandan predecessors, and arrived in a context of long-standing discrimination against Kenyan Somalis following a secessionist conflict in Kenya’s North-Eastern Province (NEP) between 1963 and 1967, when Somali and Muslim populations fought to join a greater Somalia. The province was under emergency rule until 1991, and Kenyan Somalis there were subject to collective punishment, security screenings and forced repatriation (Lind et al., 2015). Other factors reinforcing the policy change included a downturn in the Kenyan economy; broader concerns that regional conflicts would spill over into Kenya; increases in small arms and more general social unrest; and a chronic shortage of arable land (Kagwanja, 1999; Abuya, 2007).

The new strategy was predicated on the offer of temporary protection; the delegation of responsibility for refugee affairs to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and the containment of refugees in camps in remote areas of the country close to the borders of Somalia and southern Sudan. The camp option was deemed the most appropriate by both the Kenyan government and UNHCR because it allowed for the provision of assistance to the large numbers of arriving refugees, while also protecting Kenya’s national security interests and facilitating the eventual repatriation of refugees. Individual RSD was replaced by the granting of præmatura facie refugee status (Campbell et al., 2011). Somali refugees were transferred from areas where they had initially settled in Mombasa and along the coast to the Dadaab camps of Ifo, Hagadera and Dheyadera in the north of NEP, close to the border with Somalia. Meanwhile, refugees from Ethiopia, Sudan and the Great Lakes were hosted primarily in Kakuma camp, in the north-west of the country close to the border with southern Sudan.

By early 1999 the number of refugees had fallen to under 200,000 as a result of the repatriation of many Somali refugees and resettlement (Kagwanja, 2000). Between 2006 and 2012, however, numbers rose sharply again in response to fighting between internationally-backed Ethiopian troops and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the emergence of
Al-Shabaab and the effects of Somalia’s worst famine for 25 years. By September 2011, more than 500,000 Somali refugees were in Kenya, mostly in Dadaab camp. Numbers of South Sudanese fleeing to Kenya have also risen again, although flows to Kenya have been lower than to Ethiopia and Uganda. Today, Kenya is home to the tenth-largest refugee population in the world, and hosts the highest number of Somali refugees globally (UNHCR, 2016). Its refugee and asylum-seeker population of 490,656 is third only to Uganda and Ethiopia in Africa.

There were an estimated 138,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kenya at the end of 2016, the majority of them the result of evictions, communal violence, terrorism and development-induced displacement. These figures do not include the estimated 300,000 people who fled post-election violence in 2007–2008 and ‘integrated’ into host communities (World Bank and UNHCR, 2015). Kenya is reportedly a transit hub for migrants smuggled and trafficked on the so-called ‘Southern route’ to South Africa. In 2009, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated that up to 20,000 Somali and Ethiopian male migrants were being smuggled to South Africa annually, although numbers are thought to be much higher today (Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, 2013).

2.1 Opportunities for durable solutions

Despite an early emphasis on the temporary nature of the camps established along Kenya’s borders, once the emergency phase had stabilised refugee management shifted to care and maintenance of the large refugee population, with few options for a durable solution to their long-term exile. Only 29,000 refugees were resettled to a third country over the five years between 2011 and 2016, and resettlement is mainly provided as a protection intervention for refugees who arrived in Kenya in 1991–92 (UNHCR, 2017a). Formal local integration through citizenship is virtually impossible through legal means, although arguably some refugees outside of camps have obtained a form of de facto integration as many are self-reliant thanks to employment in Nairobi’s thriving informal sector, and are able to access some health and educational services (Jacobsen, 2001; Crisp, 2004; Campbell et al., 2011). Official figures estimate Nairobi’s urban refugee population at 67,267 (UNHCR, 2017a), although unofficial numbers put the figure as high as 100,000. Abdulsamed (2011) and Carrier (2016) highlight that large numbers of Somali refugees were granted Kenyan citizenship, including in return for political favours, while many others have acquired Kenyan identification cards and citizenship through illicit means.

Repatriation remains the main durable solution for Somali refugees, despite the absence of conditions conducive for return. Over 66,000 Somali refugees returned between 2015 and the first half of 2017 under a voluntary repatriation agreement signed between the governments of Kenya and Somalia and UNHCR in 2013 (UNHCR, 2017a). In 2016, the Kenyan government announced the closure of Dadaab camp, although delays and legal challenges have meant that the likelihood and timing of its closure, and the possible forcible repatriation of its residents, remain unclear. Overall, official numbers of Somali refugees in Kenya have fallen from an estimated 475,000 in 2013, to just over 300,000 in 2017 (UNHCR, 2017a). Today, Somalis account for approximately 62% of Kenya’s refugee population, down from 81% in 2013, as a result of repatriation, reverification exercises and, to a lesser extent, resettlement.
3 Legal and policy frameworks

3.1 Kenyan refugee law, institutions and protection

Kenya became a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter the 1951 Convention) in 1966, and the 1967 Protocol in 1981. It has also ratified the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problem in Africa (hereafter the 1969 Organisation of the African Union (OAU) Convention), which expands upon the 1951 Convention definition of refugee to include people compelled to leave their country owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order (as discussed in related policy research for the World Commission). The 1969 OAU Convention also does not require a refugee to demonstrate a direct and personal link to future danger. Kenya did not enter any reservations in regard to these Conventions. However, it was not until 2007, when the Refugees Act 2006 came into force, that Kenya had national legislation that affirmed its commitment to international refugee conventions, and set out the rights and treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers in Kenya (Abuya, 2007).

The Act established the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA), whose responsibilities include receiving and processing applications for refugee status, which had been delegated to UNHCR since the early 1990s. The DRA took on responsibility for registering refugees in 2011, but only assumed some RSD functions in 2014. Due to resource and capacity limitations, the transfer of RSD functions has not been completed (Garlick et al., 2015). The RSD process takes approximately two years rather than an intended maximum of six months, and it currently lacks an appeal system (UNHCR and DRC, 2012). In November 2016, the DRA was disbanded abruptly and subsequently replaced by a Refugee Affairs Secretariat, largely tasked with the same functions. Reports indicate that the staff of the new Secretariat are largely drawn from government security and intelligence departments.

The Refugees Act recognises two classes of refugees: statutory and prima facie refugees. Prima facie refugees are defined in accordance with the expanded OAU Convention (RCK, 2012). The Minister of Interior and Coordination of National Government is empowered to declare a class of persons prima facie refugees and to amend or revoke such declarations. The most recent examples are the designation in 2014 of South Sudanese as prima facie refugees, and the revocation of this status for Somali refugees in 2016.

The Act stipulates that refugees are protected from arbitrary arrest, detention or expulsion, and that refugees should be provided with a ‘refugee identity card’. These take the form of either a UNHCR Mandated Refugee Certificate (MRC) that is valid for two years, or the DRA-issued Alien Refugee Certificate (ARC), valid for five years. One of the important implications of the documentation is that it affords refugees some small measure of protection from harassment, extortion and violence at the hands of security officials in urban centres. Avenues to transition from refugee status to citizenship are limited. The 2010 Kenyan Constitution provides that a person who has resided lawfully in Kenya for a continuous period of at least seven years may be naturalised if they meet additional conditions. These conditions include legal entry into Kenya, the ability to speak Kiswahili or a local language and the capacity to make a substantive contribution to Kenya’s development. In practice these conditions mean that refugees rarely meet the criteria and are seldom granted citizenship (Lindley, 2011), although as mentioned above, an unknown number have been granted or have acquired this illicitly.

A new Refugee Bill passed through parliament in 2017. Its development was supported by a taskforce co-chaired by the government and civil society representatives. Accounts indicate that there may be greater provision for refugee self-reliance, including the potential for refugees to access land and work permits. During debates in parliament, it was, however, agreed to remove reference to integration as a possible

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4 For a list of forms of identification, please see https://archive.org/details/perma_cc_4UDM-BJGB.
durable solution for refugees, linked to concerns that Somali refugees in particular might gain Kenyan citizenship. While the Bill passed through all stages of parliamentary approval during early 2017, at the time of writing it is not yet clear if it will be signed into law, and even if it is, the degree to which some of its more progressive elements will be implemented in practice is uncertain.

3.2 Freedom of movement

Although Kenya’s 2010 Constitution guarantees freedom to all refugees to enter, remain and reside anywhere in the country, Kenya’s policy of encampment effectively prohibits refugees from leaving the camps. Refugees’ lack of freedom of movement fundamentally curtails their ability to access employment and higher education. Access to justice is also affected, as refugees have to wait for the monthly mobile court sittings in the camp (RCK, 2012). Kenya’s policy of encampment was recognised legally in March 2014.5 A High Court ruling in January 2015 upheld as constitutional the provisions on encampment, arguing that the policy did not violate freedom of movement as envisaged under the Constitution (World Bank and UNHCR, 2015).

Only camp residents in possession of a movement pass can travel to other parts of Kenya. Passes are issued for a limited set of reasons, such as medical or higher educational requirements or due to protection concerns in camps. The limited opportunities for legal travel have resulted in many refugees travelling either without permits, or gaining permits through false documentation or bribery (RCK, 2012). Despite the policy of encampment, many urban refugees remain outside camps, with their presence implicitly endorsed by the Kenyan authorities, which have registered some of them in urban areas. In early 2012, the Refugee Consortium of Kenya reported more welcoming procedures for refugees in urban centres than in camps (RCK, 2012).

The freedom of movement enjoyed by refugees in urban centres was significantly restricted by a relocation directive in December 2012, as well as a subsequent encampment directive issued in March 2014, both of which resulted in urban refugees being relocated to camps. In July 2013 the High Court ruled that the directive was unconstitutional. In April 2014, following a number of serious security incidents, the government launched ‘Operation Usalama Watch’. Originally targeted at Somalis, the operation led to arrests, detentions and the relocation of refugees living in urban areas to camps, as well as deportations to Somalia (IRC and ReDSS, 2016).

3.3 Right to work

The 2006 Refugee Act provides refugees the same rights to employment as other non-nationals.6 Employment of non-nationals is governed by the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act 2011,7 under which work permits, called ‘Class M’ permits, are granted, usually for two years. Applications for permits also need a recommendation from a prospective employer, and must be accompanied by a letter from the DRA confirming refugee status (Zetter and Rudel, 2017). While refugees may therefore theoretically work, in practice this is reportedly much more difficult, perhaps due in part to Kenya’s high unemployment rate of over 39%, and high dependence on the informal economy. The Refugee Consortium of Kenya stated in 2012 that the government only issues work permits to asylum-seekers or refugees in a few isolated cases (RCK, 2012). For those who manage to obtain them, work permits last for five years (Zetter and Rudel, 2017). As a result, refugees, both skilled and unskilled, seek employment in the informal sector. A thriving informal economy has emerged in camps, and the majority of refugees in urban centres rely on Kenya’s extensive informal economy.

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6 Refugees Act § 16.

4 The impact of forced displacement on Kenya

Perceived negative impacts of refugees on Kenya’s security bear heavily on decision-making. In terms of their economic impact, refugees are, on the one hand, perceived as a burden, and on the other as competitors for Kenyan jobs. However, despite strong political and public perceptions and concerns, no studies have been undertaken to quantify the impacts of refugees on the Kenyan economy at a national level. Urban refugees are more integrated, and are likely to have greater impacts, but as many are unregistered, under the radar and operating in the informal sector, the extent of their impact is difficult to discern.

This section draws on the available evidence to document the impact of Kenya’s camp-based refugees, before reviewing the impact of refugees in Nairobi. As the available literature seldom distinguishes between the different countries of origin of camp-based refugees, it has not been possible to provide a detailed assessment of the impact of different population flows, although Somali refugees form the majority of refugees in Dadaab, and South Sudanese the majority in the more ethnically diverse Kakuma camp, analysis of the impact of each of these camps corresponds, to a certain degree, to the impact of these populations. The sub-section on Nairobi profiles refugees from Somalia and the DRC, offering interesting comparisons because of their numbers, different settlement patterns and very different impacts.

4.1 The impact of Kenya’s camps

Much of the literature on Kenya’s camps focuses on the experience of refugees and the impact of encampment on their rights and freedoms, livelihoods and access to services. Indeed, refugees’ experiences in Kenya’s camps have been the inspiration for a body of literature critical of camps for depriving refugees of their civil and political rights, rendering them dependent on relief, robbing them of access to socio-economic networks and problematising refugees and depicting them in dehumanising ways (Harrell-Bond et al., 1992; Crisp, 2002; Verdirame et al., 2005). This literature has in turn been criticised for downplaying the agency and productivity of refugees (Jacobsen, 2001; Horst, 2004).

The literature on refugees’ impact on host populations is mostly qualitative, but a recent World Bank impact assessment of Kakuma camp (Sanghi et al., 2016; Alix-Garcia et al., 2017) uses quantitative methods to assess the economic and social impacts on local populations. Two earlier studies of Dadaab, although less comprehensive and robust in terms of methodology, analyse its socio-economic, cultural and environmental impacts. These studies form the basis of the findings provided below, supplemented by analysis from the qualitative work. The evidence is therefore limited, and in some instances dated. What it does show is that the picture is much more nuanced than narratives about the negative impact of refugees in Kenya would suggest. The evidence shows significant, although localised, economic benefits of camps for host populations, negative, but geographically limited, environmental impacts and mixed social impacts.

4.1.1 Demographic impacts

Of the 17 original refugee camps established by UNHCR in the early 1990s, only four remain: Kakuma camp in the Turkana District of north-western Kenya and the three camps at Dadaab in Garissa District (Ifo, Dagahaley and Hagadera, commonly referred to as the Dadaab complex). Both camp complexes are situated in remote, impoverished, politically marginalised and semi-arid locations, with low population densities, close to the borders of South Sudan and Somalia, respectively (Ikanda, 2008). Although demographic impacts are restricted in scale and scope by the geographic segregation of the refugee population, there are some indications of impact on population size, mobility and access to services and resources.

The prolonged presence of refugees, their high concentration as well as the cultural and economic characteristics of the camps have led a number of academics to conclude that they resemble cities or ‘refugee camp towns’ (de Montclos and Kagwanja, 2000; Agier, 2011; Okra, 2011). Certainly, their scale and the concentration of refugees relative to host populations is clear. Kakuma camp is currently home to 176,872 refugees and asylum-seekers (UNHCR, 2017a). At its opening in 1991, the camp held
35,000 Sudanese refugees, some 10km from Kakuma town, an ‘inconsequential village’ at the time with a population variously estimated at 2,000 (Ohta, n.d.), 8,000 (de Montclos and Kagwanja, 2000) and 15,000 (UNHCR, 2004). The camp appears to be having some effect on Kakuma’s local population, at least in terms of size and density, as by 2004 the population had risen to 50,000, with some evidence of high levels of in-migration (Alix-Garcia et al., 2017). While the exact causal relationship between this population growth and the camp is not set out in the literature, aside from the camp there are few other explanations.

The impact on Dadaab’s demography appears to be more clearly demonstrated. Unlike Kakuma, the predominantly Somali Kenyan host population in Dadaab shared a common ethnic ancestry, language, culture and religion, and in some cases clan affiliation, with the Somalis who arrived in 1991. Although the Dadaab complex was designed to accommodate a maximum of 90,000 people, by 2009 its population had exceeded its initial capacity by 270% (Sanghi et al., 2016). Today, it is home to 426,517 people (UNHCR, 2017a). Two studies describe the difficulty of distinguishing between refugee and local populations due to locals’ easy access to refugee ration cards (one study estimates that 27% of non-refugee households within a 50km radius has one), the recent arrival of host populations to the area and the ethnic and clan ties between the two groups (Ikanda, 2008; Enghoff et al., 2010). To our knowledge, there has been no impact analysis of population growth around Dadaab as a result of the camp, although the area’s population growth rate of 11.7% since 1999 is much higher than the overall rate in NEP of 3.7%, which has resulted in a population increase from 15,000 in 1989 to 148,000 in 2010. However, it is unclear whether these rises suggest increased urbanisation of the local population. Agier (2011) highlights how the transient nature of camps means that urbanisation is ‘incomplete and unfinished’. This appears to be the case with Dadaab, given its uncertain future.

Although no quantitative assessment of the availability of services in areas surrounding the camps has been undertaken, there is no evidence of a drain on social services and some indication that services have improved for local people. A simple comparison between levels of service provision in the Dadaab area and other arid areas of Kenya shows above-average access to potable water, education and health facilities among the local population, and surveys find that 83% of respondents in a host community sample reported improved access to water and 85% improved access to education (Enghoff et al., 2010). In Kakuma, the local population report that entitlement to free medical facilities at the camp’s main hospital has been beneficial, and in 2000 it was reported that around 10% of schoolchildren in Kakuma camp were Kenyan (Vemuru et al., 2016).

Services may have improved, but negative environmental impacts have been recorded, which is significant given the semi-arid locations of the camps. According to two qualitative studies, Kakuma camp has contributed to a shortage of resources, particularly firewood, and the extra demand for water has, at times, caused insufficient supply, and over the long term lowered the ground water level (Aukot, 2003; RMMS, 2013). A study by Braun et al. (2015) indicates an 11.8% decrease in natural resources, such as water and foliage, in the five kilometres around the Dadaab complex. Enghoff et al. (2010) report depletion of firewood and building materials, as well as grazing competition in the immediate environment. The report also provided more nuanced arguments in relation to the environmental impact than the accepted, more alarmist narratives of the Kenyan government and international actors. It suggested that environmental degradation is largely restricted to the immediate vicinity of the camp and is an inevitable consequence of concentrating large numbers of refugees in large camps at a level much above the 20,000 refugees advised by UNHCR. Numerous programmes have been implemented in recent years to reduce dependence on firewood, introduce solar energy and address the detrimental environmental impact of the camps.

4.1.2 Economic impacts
Confounding assumed narratives that refugee camps are a burden, the evidence from Kenya shows that they are in fact considerable economic assets for local economies, especially given that they are largely financed externally. However, the benefits are not felt equally, and the limited strategic engagement with camp economies means that there are no efforts to redistribute the benefits more equally amongst host populations. The informality of camp economies also means that potential revenue benefits for the Kenyan authorities are not realised.

The economies of camp-based refugees hinge on the transfers they receive, which in turn determine their purchasing power. The main sources of transfers are foreign aid and remittances. We found no studies quantifying the amount of investment, but the total budget received for refugees in Kenya by international

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8 This data is from a recall question; the period of recall is not specified in the study.
agencies for 2011–13 was $940 million, amounting to $1.42 per refugee per day, including food. Similarly, no study was found quantifying the amount of remittances received by refugees in camps. Alix-Garcia et al. (2017) found that, in Kakuma, 61% of those surveyed had received a remittance payment in the past year. Horst (2004) estimates that 10–15% of refugees in Dadaab receive remittances, with some receiving regular payments of $150–200 per month. These resources have contributed to improved living conditions at the household level, as well as services in the camps, especially housing, water provision and telephone services. De Montclos and Kagwanja (2000) showed that telecommunications in both Kakuma and Dadaab were upgraded in order to support the high number of international calls being made to relay international remittances.

A recent study of the economic impact of Kakuma camp on the host Turkana population shows that it is both significant and localised. The camp has boosted Gross Regional Product by an estimated 3.4%; employment has increased by 2.9%, and there has been a small increase in individual incomes of some 0.5% per person. The macroeconomic impact on Kenya is, however, negligible (Sanghi et al., 2016). A study of Dadaab also indicates economic benefits for the host population, although these are not quantified in percentage terms (Enghoff et al., 2010). The study estimated the total economic benefits of the camps and related operations for the host community at $14 million in 2010, with a further $4.9 million in food aid if it was traded. Relevant impacts include sales of livestock and milk to the camps and a 20% reduction in the price of basic commodities, resulting in savings on food purchases for the local population.

Other studies highlight the range of economic interactions between hosts and camp residents, including the sale of livestock, firewood and charcoal to refugees in Kakuma; the supply of goods and services by merchants in Kakuma; and the importance of refugees from the camps as customers for local shops. The cost is approximately KES 3,500 per year per business. The study of Dadaab also indicates economic benefits for the host population, although these are not quantified in percentage terms (Enghoff et al., 2010). The study estimated the total economic benefits of the camps and related operations for the host community at $14 million in 2010, with a further $4.9 million in food aid if it was traded. Relevant impacts include sales of livestock and milk to the camps and a 20% reduction in the price of basic commodities, resulting in savings on food purchases for the local population.

Alix-Garcia et al. (2017) show that the economic benefits of Kakuma camp are not felt equally, and hosts who face direct competition from refugees are worse off. Lack of sufficient competition in markets in the vicinity of the camp, such as retail, land, housing and livestock (due in part to the areas’ relative poverty, political and economic marginalisation, low population density and limited economic investment) means that benefits are felt disproportionately by those who control these businesses. Alix-Garcia et al. (2017) indicate that the camps do not affect the housing market directly as refugees and aid workers are not housed outside them, but they may influence the market indirectly through increased in-migration of other Kenyans to Kakuma, and through increasing titling and commercialisation of land.

Few locals have benefitted from formal employment with aid organisations, with jobs instead taken up either by refugee incentive workers (refugees paid a stipend for their work) or non-local Kenyans. This is an issue that local populations have protested publicly about (de Montclos and Kagwanja, 2000). Major markets in Dadaab town were transferred into the camps, causing tensions with the local community (Ikanda, 2008). One study in 2008 indicated perceptions of considerable wealth disparities between refugees and host populations in Dadaab (Ikanda, 2008), and wealthy refugees in Kakuma camp in the early 2000s employed indigenous Turkana as casual labour, including children as domestic servants (de Montclos and Kagwanja, 2000; Aukot, 2003). Although local populations protested against the proposed closure of Kakuma camp (Alix-Garcia et al., 2017), a survey of host populations in Dadaab indicated support for the repatriation of Dadaab’s refugees, whom they blamed for the area’s economic hardships (Ikanda, 2008).

The informality of refugee economies results in lost revenue for the Kenyan government, although the amounts are unknown. De Montclos and Kagwanja (2000) refer to past efforts by the government to collect tax in Dadaab following demands by the host community. At that time, the authorities estimated that taxation in the camp would yield up to KES 8 million (approximately $75,000) per annum. Omata (2016) notes that, since 2014, the district municipality of Turkana has requested that refugee enterprises inside Kakuma camp pay for a business licence and register their shops. The cost is approximately KES 3,500 (approximately $33) per year per business.

4.1.3 Social and political impacts
Numerous studies show the implications of the segregation and containment of refugees in terms of security, community tensions and relations between refugees and host communities. However, most do not quantify these impacts, and it is difficult to discern the degree to which negative perceptions are accurate. Where refugees and hosts have been able to interact – mostly in relation to trade and other economic activities – this reduces concerns and tensions.
Ethnographic studies by Ohta (n.d.; 2005) indicate that over-riding narratives of conflict and violence between refugees and host populations in Kakuma in the early days of the camp conceal more complex and nuanced relations, especially as the economic impact of the camp has brought benefits for the Turkana. This has been more recently evidenced by a 2016 World Bank social impact study in four locations near Kakuma camp that showed mostly positive attitudes among host populations, which increased with proximity and regularity of interaction. Distrust and violence are reduced by cooperation, collaboration and the exchange of labour, goods and services between the two groups, but compounded by external factors such as the marginalisation of the Turkana from the Kenyan political system and perceptions of bias by aid actors against local populations and towards refugees (Vemuru et al., 2016).

Studies of similar depth have not been undertaken in Dadaab, but the available evidence points to tense relations between host and camp populations due to conflict over the availability and utilisation of resources, as well as perceived disparities in wealth between the two communities (Kamau and Fox, 2013; World Bank, 2017). Ikanda highlights how the privileging of refugees for humanitarian assistance by aid organisations gives rise to tensions, rather than a dislike of the refugees themselves (Ikanda, 2008).

No comprehensive study was found quantifying the impact of refugees on insecurity. As in Kakuma, Enghoff et al. (2010) note a tendency among hosts to emphasise problems with the camp in a quest for compensation, though overall the study found that residents rate the security situation as good, and that refugees did not have a major effect on crime. However, a number of other studies highlight insecurity within camps, including high levels of domestic and community violence; recruitment of camp residents into armed forces in the country of origin; high levels of sexual and gender-based violence; arbitrary and violent administration of customary justice; and violence between national refugee groups. This tends to focus more on Dadaab, rather than Kakuma, though this may be a reflection of under-reporting of violence in Kakuma (Kagwanja, 2000; Crisp, 2003). The perceived violence in Dadaab has led the Kenyan authorities to claim that the camp has lost its humanitarian character (DPPS, 2016). The degree to which violence is affecting host communities is unclear, but Ikanda’s survey of 150 local residents indicates that 92% attributed insecurity in the region to the increase in trafficking of small arms across the border from Somalia that coincided with the arrival of the refugees. Key issues including rape, cattle theft, conflict and violence were highlighted (Ikanda, 2008).

Qualitative studies point to friendship and social interaction between refugees and host populations in Kakuma, drawing on customary practices of the Turkana (Ohta, 2005; Vemuru et al., 2016). Vemuru points to host–refugee relations being strengthened through inter-marriage, usually involving Turkana women marrying male refugees (Vemuru et al., 2016), although previous qualitative work also indicated tensions associated with refugees undermining customary marital practices (Aukot, 2003). Ikanda (2008) also points to a significant level of interaction between hosts and refugees in Dadaab, including social relations, inter-marriage and sharing of cultural practices. Aukot (2003) indicates political implications in Turkana resulting from the presence of refugees. The perceived privileging of refugee populations over their local hosts has been a factor in the host Turkana population becoming more attuned to their marginalisation. Some consequences have included increased requests to central government for recognition of their rights and investment in local development. In 1997, an MP from the ruling party was ousted due to perceptions of insufficient support.

### 4.2 The impact of Kenya’s urban refugees

This section documents the impact of refugees living in Nairobi, focusing in particular on refugees from Somalia and the DRC. Much less is known about the situation of these refugees than their counterparts in camps: they are less visible, do not rely on assistance and the encampment policy encouraged politicians to play down their existence (Campbell, 2006; Lindley, 2007). A number of factors drive people to leave or avoid Kenya’s camps: insecurity; the urban background of refugees; limited livelihood opportunities in camps; and lack of adequate education and medical services (Pavanello et al., 2010). Campbell and Crisp (2012) also highlight opportunities for onward migration to other countries. Banki (2004) highlights that only those refugees with resources live outside camps as, in effect, most who do so lose access to assistance. Many refugees retain links with the camps and travel there during verification exercises, or return there if urban life becomes too difficult (Campbell, 2006).

Urban refugees in Nairobi live in an expanding city of some 3.5 million people. Around 40% of the city’s Kenyan population is unemployed, 50% live below the poverty line and 60% live in slums (Campbell et al., 2011). As of 2006, nearly 70% of Nairobi’s population was estimated to be working in the informal sector (UNHCR and DRC, 2012).
Demographic impacts

Officially, 14% of Kenya’s registered refugees – just over 47,000 – reside in Nairobi (UNHCR, 2017a), but unofficial estimates put the figure at between 80,000 and 100,000 in 2011 (Campbell et al., 2011). The government conducted a census in 2009, but it has not published a breakdown of Nairobi’s suburbs by citizenship or ethnicity. This lack of accurate data on numbers poses a major problem for those attempting to measure the impact of the presence of refugees in Nairobi.

4.2.1 Population composition

The largest urban refugee group by citizenship is Somali, and has been for many years. Officially there are approximately 30,000 Somali refugees in Nairobi (UNHCR, 2017a), though the actual number is almost certainly substantially higher (estimates put the figure at 60,000 in 2005) (Lindley, 2007). Other major refugee groups include Ethiopians, who currently make up around 15% of Nairobi’s registered refugees. The proportion of registered refugees from the DRC has grown substantially, from 18% in 2009 to over 25% in 2017 (UNHCR, 2017a). Unofficial numbers suggest this group has grown from 6,500 in 2012 to approximately 18,000 in 2016 (Omata, 2016), although, again, official figures are much lower. Other nationalities include South Sudanese and small numbers from the Great Lakes region, notably Burundi and Rwanda (UNHCR, 2017a). As with other demographic indicators, these figures should be taken as part of the picture, as it cannot be assumed that the unregistered refugee population has the same composition as registered refugees.

A third of registered refugees are children (below 18 years of age), 65% are of working age and 3% are aged 60 or over (UNHCR, 2014). This contrasts with overall refugee figures in Kenya from 2017, which show that 56% of refugees are children, 42% working age and 2% over 60 (UNHCR, 2017a). This would suggest that the urban refugee population is older on average than those in camps, with fewer children. Furthermore, while 56% of refugees in Kenya are under 18, the figure is only 48% for the Kenyan population as a whole (UNICEF, 2017), which implies that the presence of refugees has increased the proportion of children in Kenya’s population.

As is often the case with migrants to cities in general, different refugee groups are clustered by citizenship and ethnicity in different parts of the city. The suburb of Eastleigh, once known for having a comparatively high concentration of ethnic Asians, is now predominantly populated by Somalis and Ethiopian Oromo, many of whom are refugees with ties of religion and kinship to the Kenyan population residing there (UNHCR and DRC, 2012). In the 1999 census, Eastleigh had a population of 100,000, which by 2005 had grown to an estimated 500,000 (Lindley, 2007): a surge in numbers in which refugees have no doubt played a part. Refugees in the suburb of Kayole are almost all from the DRC and the Great Lakes region, and settled there through social networks (ibid.). Security and social networks are two important reasons for the dispersal patterns of different ethnic groups.

Gender

In terms of gender, a study by Aseyo and Ochieng (2013), which sampled refugees in Nairobi, found that their respondents were 36 years old on average, majority male and unmarried, which they take as confirming other reports that ‘younger and more productive refugees are attracted to the cities’.

Language

Few refugees arrive proficient in one of Kenya’s official languages, Swahili and English. One study of a school in Nairobi suggests that the presence of refugees has increased the range of languages being spoken, with one anecdote reporting seven languages spoken by children in one class (Mendenhall et al., 2015).

Public services

As in the case of Kenya’s refugee camps, to our knowledge no quantitative study has been conducted to assess the impact of refugees on public services. Several studies, however, do describe changes in service provision, which can be attributed to the presence of refugees and differences between refugees and host populations’ use of services, which provide some information about changing patterns over time.

In the education sector, the presence of refugees in Nairobi has been linked to the opening of new private or community-led schools by refugees themselves, and the initiation of efforts by international NGOs (and UNHCR) to improve the capacity of government-run schools (Campbell et al., 2011; Kronick, 2013). UNHCR also funds a small number of scholarships to tertiary-level institutions for refugees (Campbell et al., 2011). The literature also provides some evidence of changing patterns of school-going among the Kenyan population as a whole, albeit small and context-specific. One study reports a case of Kenyan parents withdrawing their children from government schools in response to overcrowding and deteriorating quality, which the parents attributed to the arrival of refugees (Campbell et al., 2011). There is reported to be a high rate of absenteeism among urban refugee children (Campbell et al., 2011), and although government schools are statutorily free of charge, various studies report that the extra costs and fees...
for school attendance drive some refugees to instead enrol their children in low-cost private or religious schools (Campbell et al., 2011; UNHCR and DRC, 2012; Kronick, 2013; Mendenheall et al., 2015). Other studies indicate that religious schools are chosen out of preference (Carrier, 2016). The establishment of religious schools by refugees also has implications for teaching quality, since such schools are unregulated.

In the health sector, available studies report a low rate of usage of primary facilities among urban refugees, both for palliative and preventative care (Mohamed et al., 2016; UNCHR and DRC, 2012), due to the costs associated with health provision, and different cultural and health practices. One study found that refugees in Nairobi were much less likely to have used health services associated with pregnancy and birth than Kenyan citizens (Carter, 2011).

Another study touching on urban transport reported several instances of refugees relying heavily on taxis because of concerns about security and harassment on public transport (Anderson, 2012). Another study noted that the supply of piped water to certain parts of Nairobi with a large refugee population is particularly inadequate, with water being sold in jerry cans as a result (UNHCR and DRC, 2012).

A number of studies reported a deterioration in the quality and availability of services as a result of population growth in Nairobi and the introduction in 2003 of free education for all children. In a context where refugees and migrants are sometimes identified as the cause of overburdened public services, it is important to recognise that no data is publicly available on the number of refugees (or migrants) in Nairobi, or the extent to which migration has contributed to population growth.

4.2.2 Economic impacts

We found no studies assessing the impact of refugees on Nairobi’s formal or informal economy. Indeed, much of the economic literature focuses on the impact of Somalis, and does not disaggregate between Kenyan nationals of Somali ethnicity (Somali Kenyans) and refugees from Somalia. The development of Eastleigh district has resulted in increased investment and growth, but accurate figures are not available. One estimate suggests that Somali investment in Kenya and the remittances Somalis receive amount to $780 million a year (Carrier, 2016: 217), but it is not clear the degree to which this can be attributed to refugees. Carrier’s research also indicates that, in the early 1990s and from 2006 onwards – periods of high numbers of Somali refugee arrivals to Kenya – were also periods of intense economic growth and transformation in Eastleigh, but the exact relationship is not explored further.

Carrier’s ethnographic study of Eastleigh presents it as a ‘dramatic example of a displacement economy’: that is, an economy made possible because of displacement. Somalis in Kenya have taken advantage of a transnational diaspora; the absence of state regulation in Somalia as well as Kenya which has facilitated cheap international trade; the availability and transfer of financing through the hawala system; and the absence of price controls in Kenya to generate what he terms ‘low end globalisation’ – the importation and sale of consumer products at low cost, which has resulted in an economic boom in Eastleigh.

In the 1990s, Somalis were instrumental in the development of a thriving retail industry in Eastleigh, as well as the trade and export of khat, although no studies were found quantifying the scale. Carrier describes how cheap consumer goods sourced through diaspora links in the Middle East were routed through Somalia and smuggled into Kenya, while khat – which had been made illegal in Somalia in 1983 – was smuggled the other way, back into Somalia. Goods were sold from small retail units in Eastleigh frequently operated by refugees who relied on Kenyan Somalis to obtain permits from the city council (Carrier, 2016). The scale of the retail trade is indicated by the development of shopping malls in Eastleigh: Carrier highlights that seven large malls were built in the early 1990s containing a total of 660 shops and 463 stalls. Abdulsamed (2011) reports that the success of Somali businesses has resulted in property prices tripling in areas of Nairobi where Somalis predominate, and Carrier (2016) indicates that property prices in Eastleigh are now among the highest in Nairobi.

Construction and real estate are also important sectors of Eastleigh’s economy, alongside industries revolving around the mobility of people and goods. Kagwanja (1999) shows that Somali refugees with strong transnational links were able to mobilise funds to purchase and operate matatus (private buses) during the 1990s. The constant flow of refugees between Nairobi and the camps means that Somalis have also operated permanent transport routes to these peripheral areas (Campbell, 2006). Abdulsamed’s research shows how Somalis now own at least ten trucking companies, each with annual profits of about $20m in 2011, although the level of refugee involvement is not detailed (Abdulsamed, 2011). Freight companies and travel agencies are also key sectors. Little (2003) described how Somalis adapted the mobility patterns of nomadic pastoralism to

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12 Against the odds: refugee integration in Kenya
transnational trade, with 16% of all cattle consumed in Nairobi coming from Somalia (Little, 2003).

The influx of refugees into Eastleigh in the 1990s is reported to have also affected housing and property prices. Reports suggest that the price of accommodation in Eastleigh rocketed to five or more times previous levels, pushing Kenyan tenants out into other areas, whilst Somali refugees often lived in over-crowded conditions, sharing and sub-letting (Campbell, 2006). Abdullahsamed (2011) reports that the success of Somali businesses has resulted in property prices tripling in areas of Nairobi where Somalis predominate, and Carrier (2016) indicates that property prices in Eastleigh are now amongst the highest in Nairobi.

Although many non-Somali refugees, and in particular Ethiopian Oromo, depend on Eastleigh for their livelihoods, Campbell’s research on Congolese refugees shows that many established their businesses in Nairobi’s city centre in order to take advantage of wealthier Kenyan customers. Congolese refugees are active in the service and entertainment sectors as musicians, tailors, barbers or hairstylists. Like their Somali counterparts, Congolese rely on Kenyan spouses, friends and business partners to obtain the necessary business permits, although Campbell reported that only 50% of those operating in the city centre, and none of those in Eastleigh, had the required licences (Campbell, 2006).

Competition and employment

The economic success of some of Kenya’s urban refugees has both positive and negative implications. Abdullahsamed (2011) highlights how informal trading in Eastleigh has been detrimental to mid-sized formal businesses, particularly Kenyan-Asian ones. It is understood that Kenya’s long-term Asian business community was influential in the government’s decision in 1995 to close the coastal refugee camps and move refugees inland to Kakuma and Dadaab. Asian business owners argued that the activities of Somali traders were harming the profits of long-established Asian businesses in Mombasa (Abdullahsamed, 2011: 13). Congolese hairstylists have had to relocate their businesses to people’s homes as Kenyan competitors drove them out of the market by repeatedly calling the police (Campbell, 2006). Meru elders, concerned about Somali refugees’ takeover of the khat industry, lobbied the government in 2003 for greater regulation. Campbell also notes negative reports in the media about the impact of refugees on competition in Kenya’s labour market (Campbell, 2006).

Numerous reports describe Kenyan workers being employed by refugee businesses, but again the scale and overall impact on Nairobi’s labour market is unknown. Many refugee businesses are either established in partnership with Kenyan nationals, or Kenyans enable them by obtaining permits and licences. Congolese refugees deliberately employ Kenyan staff as they understand the local market better, can facilitate business with Kenyan customers and can represent the business with officials (Campbell, 2006). Carrier (2016) shows how Somali-owned businesses have created jobs for Kenyans and frequently pay higher rates for casual labour. Kenyans have adapted their business practices to Somali practices, including changing their opening hours. In Pavanello et al.’s research in 2010, every business and shop owner interviewed employed at least one Kenyan, in part to deal with the police; research by the Refugee Consortium of Kenya shows that 49% of those working in refugee-owned enterprises are Kenyan nationals (RCK, 2015).

Fiscal effects, informality and illegality

While the non-registration of businesses means that the government is collecting less revenue than it potentially could, it is also likely that these businesses are paying other indirect taxes, such as VAT and import duties. Given that informal workers and informal migrants are also not likely to be receiving any kind of social protection, i.e. state pensions, they could very well be net tax contributors overall. Carrier and others also note that Somali businesses in particular have become increasingly formalised as they have grown in scale. There is no separate tax band for Eastleigh, so accurate accounts of tax revenues are not available, but estimates include a figure of $22.8m annually. It has also been claimed in parliament that, of Nairobi’s districts, Eastleigh is the third-largest contributor of tax revenue. Again, the degree to which this is revenue from Kenyan Somalis or Somali refugees is not clear (Carrier, 2016).

Eastleigh is on the one hand praised for its development and entrepreneurship, and on the other condemned as an economy built on dubious goods and illegal activities (Carrier, 2016). It is partly through corruption that Somalis in Kenya have managed to convert Eastleigh into a commercial area, despite the fact that it was legally zoned as residential (Abdullahsamed, 2011). Despite these perceptions – which are reinforced by the government, which has linked Eastleigh with piracy and terrorism – investigations by the World Bank, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Interpol show that the main drivers of Eastleigh’s property transformation are bank credit, diaspora remittances and a strong market (Lind et al., 2015). Refugees claim that 60% of refugee businesses in Nairobi were established with capital from remittances (RCK, 2015).
However, there appears to be no doubt that tax and duty evasion occurs on a grand scale, involving property development and shipping contracts, as well as in everyday business life. There are also numerous reports of Eastleigh operating as a market for contraband goods, drugs, illegal documents and weapons (Lind et al., 2015; Carrier, 2016).

### 4.2.3 Social and cultural impacts

The presence of a relatively large population of Somali Kenyans mean that many Somali refugees adapt and integrate into this community, rather than Kenyan society more broadly. The lack of policies facilitating integration means that there is little opportunity or incentive to do others. Carrier’s ethnographic study of Eastleigh highlights how many Somali refugees confine much of their social, economic and religious life to the suburb. He indicates that there are examples of inter-ethnic marriage, but that these are rare, and non-marital relationships are frowned upon. Some Somali refugees learn Kiswahili, both in order to facilitate business relations, as well as to navigate difficulties faced at the hands of Kenyan police and bureaucracy (Pavanello et al., 2010). Carrier highlights the numerous Kiswahili language schools in Eastleigh and how Kenyans also adapt in order to support their business relations with Somalis, including some learning the Somali language and others adopting the trust- or credit-based system of Somali trade.

Congolese refugees take a very different approach. They disperse across different suburbs of Nairobi, learn Kiswahili and try to blend in as much as they can as part of a deliberate strategy aimed at minimising the intolerance they face from their Kenyan hosts, as well as the persistent harassment meted out by the police. Although the literature points mainly to the challenges faced by Congolese refugees in terms of their acceptance into Kenyan society, there is also some evidence of positive relations, including friendship with some Kenyans and assistance in accessing legal documents (Campbell, 2006; Pavanello et al., 2010). Aseyo and Ochieng (2013) emphasise how belonging to different social, religious and ethnic groups is a key factor in refugee livelihoods, indicating that a majority of refugees they interviewed belonged to a religious group, and that this was one of the few places where refugees felt accepted.
5 Public attitudes, politics and security

Despite a thread of African hospitality running through Kenyan public and political discourse on refugees (Campbell, 2006; Lindley, 2011), attitudes towards refugees have been largely negative. Abuya (2007) recalls parliamentary debates in the 1970s demanding the repatriation of Ugandan refugees, as well as the events of 1993, when Kenya faced its first large-scale influx of refugees, and the government asked the UN to repatriate all refugees due to concerns about banditry and pressure on resources (the call was not acted on at the time).

If anything, these attitudes have hardened with time. A global survey of public attitudes undertaken by Amnesty International ranked Kenya 23 out of 27 countries polled in terms of people’s willingness to host refugees. Interestingly, and in line with the encampment policy, there was majority support (55%) for accepting refugees in the country, but the number of people prepared to accept people into their homes, neighbourhoods or villages was, at 22%, dramatically lower than the global average of 47% (Amnesty, 2016). An IPSOS public attitudes poll conducted in Kenya in 2016 found very high public awareness of refugee issues, and overwhelming support (69%) for the closure of Dadaab camp.

5.1 Attitudes towards refugees

Perceptions of refugees in Kenya are linked to crime, illegality and insecurity. In 2004, then Kenyan Vice-President Moody Awori blamed the increased proliferation of light arms and small weapons on refugees (Campbell et al., 2006). Such attitudes have persisted and are reinforced by the media. An article in Kenya’s Daily Nation in 2006 claimed that ‘it is conceivable that if the Government continues to pursue its open-door policy, rival Somali gangs will soon be settling their differences on Kenyatta Avenue’ (quoted in Jaji, 2014), while more recent articles highlight how Somali gangs have pushed the police out of Eastleigh.9

More recently, concerns about general insecurity and criminality have been overtaken by the stereotyping of Somalis as terrorists (Kagwanja, 2009; Jaji, 2014). Jaji highlights how the regional and global discourse on terrorism has allowed for the depiction of Somalis in Kenya as threatening, aggressive and violent. She points to media stories blaming Somali refugees for a measles outbreak, environmental degradation and illegal weaponry, as well as interviews with Kenyans saying that they fear Somalis in their neighbourhoods due to their ‘extremism’ (Jaji, 2014). Somalis caught up in the wave of police violence that followed the encampment directive in 2014 have said that police officials accused many of them of being terrorists (HRW, 2013).

Prevailing attitudes are both represented and reinforced by politicians. The Kenyan Ministry of State for Immigration and Registration of Persons, for instance, claimed that the influx of Somali refugees into Kenya created ‘a major terrorism threat and [put] tremendous pressure on social services and amenities’; ‘extremist groups’ and ‘Muslim radicals may use refugee flow to smuggle weapons and people into Kenya to engage in terrorist attacks’ (MIRP, 2009: 15). The Assistant Minister of Internal Security described Al-Shabaab as ‘like a big animal with the tail in Somalia and the head of the animal is here in Eastleigh’ (Mureithi, 2011). This government-sanctioned discourse against Somali refugees has created an atmosphere in which abuse is normalised and possibly even perceived as merited (HRW, 2013). While there appears to be little doubt that Al-Shabaab is active in Dadaab camp in particular, a number of commentators have raised questions regarding the level of refugee involvement in terrorism and criminality more broadly. They point to a scapegoating of a vulnerable group by a government keen to demonstrate strength in the face of major terrorist attacks such as the one by Al-Shabaab at the Westgate shopping mall, continuing insecurity and accusations of incompetence (Campbell et al., 2011; Carrier, 2016). Lind argues that growing insecurity stems from long-standing ethnic and geographical tensions, and that heavy-handed security responses targeting Somalis and Muslims play directly to Al-Shabaab’s aim to deepen insurgency in Kenya’s peripheral regions (Lind et al., 2015).

The conflation of refugees with insecurity and terrorism has led to a series of measures and legislative changes. This includes a series of efforts on the part of the Kenyan government to stem the flow of Somali refugees into Kenya and reduce their numbers in Kenya, including closing the border with Somalia in 2011 and halting refugee registration. In 2014, parliament passed the Security Amendment Act, which limited the number of refugees and asylum-seekers in Kenya to 150,000. A High Court ruling in January 2015 suspended elements of the Act, including the limitation on refugee numbers. Later that year, the Kenyan government started building a fence along the Somali border. The government has also sought to tighten control of refugees through relocation and encampment. Following a series of security incidents in Eastleigh, in 2012 the DRA issued a directive stating that all urban refugee operations had stopped with immediate effect, and that Somali refugees were to relocate to the Dadaab camps immediately. The directive was stopped by the High Court following civil society intervention, but in 2014 the Kenyan government restated that all refugees should relocate to camps, and launched ‘Operation Usalama Watch’, a campaign aimed at relocating refugees to the camps by force. Human Rights Watch documented a wave of police abuse, violence and extortion (HRW, 2013). Efforts to repatriate refugees have also been stepped up since the announcement in 2016 of the closure of Dadaab camp. The measure has met with civil society and international opposition, and in February 2017 was declared unconstitutional by the Kenyan High Court, which ruled that it amounted to an illegal and discriminatory act of group persecution (Amnesty International, 2017). The negative security environment and uncertainty about the future has prompted Somalis (the proportion of refugees is unclear) to move to other urban centres (Abdulsamed, 2011), to reduce trading in camps (Omata, 2016) and to move to Uganda (Lind et al., 2015; Carrier, 2016).

Of note here is the important role that Kenyan and international civil society has played in helping to hold the government to account for its obligations towards refugees under national and international law. Through assistance, advocacy, public condemnation and legal action, civil society has been involved in a number of important actions that have halted or delayed some of the most egregious efforts to undermine refugees’ freedoms in Kenya. Different approaches have been successful at different times. Civil society actors point to a willingness on the part of governmental representatives to take account of civil society input on the development of policy and legislation, only for this to be over-ridden by political and security interests. That it has fallen to the Kenyan courts to provide some measure of protection to refugees as a last resort can only be viewed as an indication of the limited opportunities to influence public and political opinion in favour of refugees.

5.1.1 Factors driving attitudes in Kenya

The extent to which there is a correlation in Kenya between hostile public attitudes towards refugees and current restrictive, securitised policies is unclear. It appears that public attitudes are reinforced by political and media narratives, although which constituency is driving which is difficult to discern. With 2017 an election year in Kenya, it is likely that the increasingly politicised debates and high-profile decisions regarding refugees had a strong domestic political agenda. As in other countries, scapegoating of refugees in a context characterised by popular hostility towards them was likely to be politically popular, and commentators have noted that the closure of Dadaab camp was announced just a week before President Uhuru Kenyatta began campaigning (Allison, 2016). The Kenyan government’s rationale for closing Dadaab camp was linked to security and financing. In its initial statement, the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government cited ‘a pervasive and persistent terrorist threat’ in the country, while later statements highlighted government concerns that the costs of managing the camps, in terms of environmental impact, the provision of services to refugees and the economic fallout of terrorism allegedly stemming from the camps, had become unmanageable.

International factors also play a role – not just in terms of international funding, but also arguments that diminishing international respect for refugees has meant that Kenya could no longer bear the brunt of hosting such a large population (Kibicho, 2016). Some believe that the deal signed between Turkey and the European Union (EU) – where Turkey was provided with $2bn for stopping refugee flows to Europe – is having a ‘ripple effect’ in refugee-hosting countries such as Kenya, which are demanding increased international funds (Dempster and Hargrave, 2017).

More local issues are also important. Reports suggest widespread lack of knowledge among the public and police about the rights of refugees (RCK, 2015). Studies also indicate that threats against refugees from police declined following efforts to increase their understanding of refugees and refugee documentation. Finally, the policy against integration has an important bearing on public attitudes towards refugees, in that it reduces opportunities for contact that is deemed so integral to positive attitudes (Dempster and Hargrave,
Pavanello et al. (2010) highlighted concerns amongst those in Nairobi that Somalis did not want to integrate and were not interested in joining cultural events or learning Kenyan languages. Vemuru et al.’s social impact study in Kakuma highlighted more positive attitudes in locations nearer to Kakuma due to the relatively higher opportunities for interaction and engagement.
6 Integration in Kenya

This project has adopted the United Nation Development Plan’s (UNDP) definition of social cohesion as the basis for its understanding of integration: ‘A general condition of stable coexistence within communities, when IDPs, refugees, and host community members accept socio-ethnic differences, have equitable access to livelihoods and other community resources, and feel safe and secure in their homes’. Zetter and Rudel (2017) describe ‘domains’ or key aspects of integration. Legal, governance, functional and social ‘domains’ form the main elements of the multi-faceted process of integration, with the first two central to the interests of the receiving country, and the second two giving more emphasis to the refugee experience. The legal domain refers to the different models of membership enabled by legal entitlements, ultimately leading to citizenship. The governance domain comprises the institutional structures and processes that facilitate integration. The functional domain describes the levels of social and economic participation of refugees in their host country. The social domain focuses on the degree of social inclusion of refugees with the majority receiving community, and relates to ethnicity, cultural identity, social networks and social capital (ibid.).

6.1 Integration of refugees in Kenya’s camps

It is something of an oxymoron to describe the level of integration amongst refugees in camps given that they are designed as a temporary measure to limit integration and facilitate the early return of camp residents. Integration is fundamentally circumscribed by the remote location of the camps and physical curtailment, and refugees’ socio-economic opportunities are further constrained by their lack of mobility and right to work.

6.1.1 The impact of the legal and policy environment on integration in camps

The encampment framework determines the overall level of integration of refugees in camps; however, the actions and policies of local authorities and aid actors also affect outcomes for camp-based refugees. No literature was found directly analysing the interaction of local and regional authorities with camp residents, although as mentioned there is some indication that the Turkana authorities may impose licences on refugee businesses. Several analysts suggest that UNHCR, which controls large tracts of territory, social services and budgets, has taken on a quasi-state role in camps (Gilbert 1998; Verdirame et al., 2005; Slaughter and Crisp, 2009). In providing critical assistance to large numbers of refugees in camps, aid actors reinforce the legal, social, economic and spatial isolation of refugees from surrounding society. This compounds negative perceptions of refugees among host populations, as the large majority of assistance is targeted towards refugees rather than to the communities hosting them. Aid actors have recognised the need to invest more in livelihoods strategies for the camps (JAM, 2014; UNHCR, 2016), but this is undermined by a consistent reduction in funding for camp-based refugees. Only 6% of funding is allocated to supporting the livelihoods of refugees in Kenya (UNHCR, 2016). Efforts also rub up against the barrier of the encampment policy: due to the limited job market and that fact that even trained refugees are highly unlikely to obtain a work permit, it is difficult to avoid a saturation of skills, and apparently take-up of these opportunities are affected (Kamau and Fox, 2013; IRC and ReDSS, 2016).

6.1.2 Economic integration – the functional domain

It is a testament to the agency of refugees that only 2% of refugees in Dadaab in 2013 relied entirely on humanitarian assistance (Kamau and Fox, 2013). In 2010 there were an estimated 5,000 businesses in Dadaab, ranging from petty traders to large concerns with an annual turnover of millions of dollars. The refugee economy in Kakuma is similarly dynamic: the majority of refugees engaged in economic activities in the camp work for humanitarian agencies, in shops or in construction, with activities ranging from pharmacies to money transfer companies and breweries. Of those reporting a cash income, the largest source was from employment (36%), followed by remittances (29%) and business (20%). In 2016, Kakuma camp had more than 2,150 shops, including 14 wholesalers, and businesses produced approximately $350,000–400,000 in monthly sales (Vemuru et al., 2016). Although it is clear that the majority of refugees are economically active, encampment curtails the nature, location and scale of work by refugees. The
vast majority of livelihood opportunities are derived from the microcosm of the camp, made possible through external aid and remittance investments – few refugees are employed outside the camp and in both areas agricultural and charcoal production and livestock holding are limited – with the recent exception of Kalobeyei (see below) (Kamau and Fox, 2013; Omata, 2016). On the other hand, Lindley (2011) highlights that, while ‘incentive’ work for aid organisations helps in terms of boosting income, skills development and interaction with Kenyan colleagues, the fact that refugee workers receive a benefit, rather than a salary in line with Kenyan pay scales, reinforces the separateness of refugees.

Despite the diversity of livelihood activities, the segregation of refugees and curtailment of their economic activities severely affects their economic independence. It is thought that only 4% of refugees in Kakuma could sustain themselves independently of humanitarian aid (Kimetrica, 2016). Despite the protracted nature of the camps, needs remain high. In 2014, 70–80% of people in both camps lacked sufficient food assistance to meet their monthly requirements; rates of malnutrition in Dadaab and Kakuma remained ‘serious’ and ‘poor’ respectively; and educational enrollment – at only 59% and 81% in primary education in Dadaab and Kakuma – faced significant gaps (JAM, 2014).

6.1.3 Cultural and socio-political integration of camp-based refugees – the social domain

Refugees who achieve a certain level of economic self-sufficiency in such a constrained environment do so as a result of their own agency, identity and capacity. Ethnicity, social capital and social networks – all elements of Zetter’s social domain – are reported to be the primary determinants of success. Somali and Ethiopian refugees are perceived to be doing best; refugees from DRC are thought to be middling and South Sudanese are at the bottom in terms of livelihoods outcomes. This is attributed to access to networks and remittances. The length of stay in the camp is another factor in improved livelihoods. Refugees in the camp for ten years or longer are more involved in small and medium-sized income-generating activities, whereas new arrivals are more dependent on humanitarian assistance (Kamau and Fox, 2013).

In the absence of opportunities to integrate into Kenyan society, refugee networks serve as alternative systems of governance, into which refugees integrate in various ways. Okra (2011) reports that those with greater means and higher socio-economic status tend to do better, using their networks of influence. Refugees use social networks as support mechanisms, including sharing homes and meals; relying on and providing debt and credit; supporting those in need and the newly displaced; paying zakat; and engaging in community-based rotating savings and credit schemes (Lindley, 2011; JAM, 2014). Another set of camp strategies relates to interactions with the humanitarian system: refugees use different methods to maximise the food aid they receive or make efforts to establish good relationships with aid providers to secure assistance, preference or incentive work. However, such strategies occur largely within the camp microcosm, cut off from interactions with wider Kenyan society (Lindley, 2011).

Horst (2004) describes a third important network for both camp and urban refugees. She estimates that 15% of camp refugees receive remittances of up to $150 a month, which are important for supplementing incomes, dealing with crises and investing in business and education. However, despite common perceptions that remittances are a form of social security for all Somalis, evidence shows that these remittances tend to benefit those with greater socio-economic status and influence, as it is often better-connected and wealthier refugees who have relatives in the diaspora. While the benefits of remittances are often felt beyond the recipient family through increased spending power and the use of remittances to support others, Horst highlights how remittances can result in tensions between those who receive them and those who do not.

6.1.4 A shift in refugee policy towards greater self-reliance?

The World Bank study of Kakuma assessed various policy scenarios on refugee integration and their impact on economic welfare (Alix-Garcia et al., 2017). The three scenarios were: (1) limited integration of skilled refugees only; (2) full integration of all refugees currently in camps; and (3) decampment – closure of camps and repatriation of refugees. The study found that integration reduces the burden of aid, reduces market imperfections and incentivises skills acquisition. This is true if current transfers (of aid and remittances) are maintained, but also true if aid is gradually phased out after their integration, and that the differences between the two impacts are marginal if aid is phased out in five years. Encampment, the status quo, concentrates both gains and losses in the vicinity of the camp, which reduces potential aggregate gains for the rest of the economy.

A scenario involving partial or full integration of Kenya’s camp-based refugees appears remote, but there are some indications of a shift in refugee management towards greater self-reliance of refugees from South Sudan (UNHCR, 2016). Kolobeyei, a new refugee...
Many commentators argue that urban refugees in Nairobi have achieved a form of de facto integration due to their level of self-sufficiency, access to services and social interaction with the host community (Jacobsen, 2001; Campbell, 2006; Beversluis et al., 2016). Analysis commonly draws on Jacobsen’s description of de facto integration, which has a number of elements including: refugees are no longer in physical danger or at risk of refoulement; not confined to camps or settlements, and have the right of return to their home country; can sustain a livelihood, are self-sufficient and have similar standards of living to their hosts; and have access to public services and are socially networked into the host community (Jacobsen, 2001).

It is evident that refugees in Nairobi enjoy much higher levels of integration than their camp compatriots due to their ability to draw on their own skills, adaptability and networks to navigate Nairobi’s informal economy and wider socio-political environment. However, much of this analysis is derived from the level of economic integration achieved by Somali refugees in particular, and downplays the significant social, political and cultural barriers that they face in integrating into majority Kenyan society.

As their status and security in Nairobi becomes increasingly fragile in the face of growing hostility, encampment and security crackdowns, it will be important not to privilege economic integration at the cost of social, political and cultural achievements. Indeed, despite the obvious economic successes of some within the Somali community, a recent study charting levels of integration of refugees in Nairobi concluded that Congolese refugees were more integrated than Somalis as they had adapted to a greater degree to the fabric of Kenyan society (Beversluis et al., 2016), highlighting the fact that economic success and interaction does not necessarily equate to broader integration. Indeed, as we will see below, at least some of the economic success Somali refugees have enjoyed can be attributed to their lack of integration – their ability to benefit from a co-ethnic enclave in Nairobi on the one hand, and from their diaspora network on the other.

### 6.2 Integration of Kenya’s urban refugees

Many commentators argue that urban refugees in Nairobi have achieved a form of de facto integration due to their level of self-sufficiency, access to services and social interaction with the host community (Jacobsen, 2001; Campbell, 2006; Beversluis et al., 2016). Analysis commonly draws on Jacobsen’s description of de facto integration, which has a number of elements including: refugees are no longer in physical danger or at risk of refoulement; not confined to camps or settlements, and have the right of return to their home country; can sustain a livelihood, are self-sufficient and have similar standards of living to their hosts; and have access to public services and are socially networked into the host community (Jacobsen, 2001).

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#### 6.2.1 Economic integration – resilience in the face of significant odds

Nairobi’s refugees – a self-selecting group who have opted to avoid camps for reasons of protection or opportunity – are generally self-reliant and tend to be in a better economic position than those in camps. Their skills, determination and resilience have, as we have seen, resulted in economic benefits for the host community. However, this does not mean that all urban refugees are wealthy and have achieved full integration into Nairobi’s economy; in fact, the majority join the ranks of Nairobi’s urban poor.

A very low number, estimated at only 2%, have a Class M permit, which allows them to work in the formal economy (RCK, 2015). The few refugees in this position can own their own businesses and make significant profits (UNHCR and DRC, 2012). The great majority, however, engage in activities below and different to their professional training and competency (Zetter and Rudel, 2017), and rely on their own means or that of relatives to survive. Educational status is more nuanced. Aseyo and Ochieng (2013) indicate that tertiary education is an impediment to, rather than a facilitator of, economic integration amongst refugees from the Great Lakes, presumably as they find it more difficult to adapt to Nairobi’s informal economy. Refugees tend to be self-employed and engaged in the informal economy, selling a range of consumer goods or khat, or running businesses such as restaurants, taxis, hairdressing shops or tailoring
A recent study showed that refugee incomes were almost equally split between business (29%), employment (28%) and remittances (30%), with only 3% relying on NGO assistance (RCK, 2015). Overall, almost 70% of refugees in Nairobi earn below the Kenyan national income average of KES 30,000 per month ($290), and only 12% earn above KES 50,000 ($480) (RCK, 2015). While no study provided a breakdown of wealth status on the basis of countries of origin, a livelihoods study analysing the livelihoods of refugees in three districts in Nairobi indicated that those who reside in Eastleigh – Somalis and Ethiopians to a greater extent – tend to have higher incomes than those in other areas. Less than 20% of those in Eastleigh were classed as ‘very poor’ and earning less than KES 9,500 per month. However, the rate of ‘very poor’ households in the two other locations in the study – which were dominated by refugees and asylum-seekers from the Great Lakes, and to a lesser degree South Sudan – was between 55% and 65%. Very poor households fall below the ‘survival threshold’ and do not have the means to meet their minimum food and non-food requirements. These households are more prone to negative coping strategies such as prostitution to make up their financial shortfalls (UNHCR and DRC, 2012).

Apart from difficulties in accessing formal employment, refugees face a number of other economic barriers. Refugees face poor access to financial services, for example, to obtain credit to expand their businesses (Beversluis et al., 2016). As a result, and similar to the experience in camps, there is a high level of dependence on transnational networks and remittances, with 60% of refugees indicating that they secured their start-up capital for their businesses from remittances. Perceptions on the part of the local population that refugees are relatively wealthy due to different factors, including Somalis reputation as successful entrepreneurs and the flamboyant dress of some Congolese refugees, results in refugees being charged more, for instance for renting property (Campbell, 2006; Pavanello et al., 2010).

### 6.2.2 Police harassment and extortion: a major impediment to integration

Numerous reports highlight routine and extreme harassment, extortion and violence against refugees on the part of the police, linked to their precarious legal status as refugees; lack of training of police on refugee rights and documentation; the large number of fake documents in circulation in Nairobi; and the widespread violence that is a characteristic of Kenyan life more generally (RCK, 2015). This affects refugees’ ability to move about, take up employment and start businesses. It also affects refugees’ perceptions of Kenyan authorities; for many, their only interaction with the Kenyan state is negative, extractive or violent. Even though many refugees are registered and have the right to be in Nairobi, Pavanello et al. (2010) highlight how language barriers, fear of exposure and lack of familiarity with the system mean that refugees are likely to try to resolve police interactions through bribery. The patterns of police targeting of refugees vary, with men approached more during the day as they are perceived to carry money and women after dark, as police believe (rightly) that the woman’s family and wider network will pay quickly to avoid possible sexual assault.

Refugees pursue a number of strategies to minimise abuse, including obtaining illegal documents, avoiding leaving their homes, especially after dark, and women pretending to be pregnant, which apparently reduces harassment. Many refugee households pay a monthly protection fee to the authorities to safeguard against abuse; a strategy also employed by some Congolese refugee businesses (Campbell, 2006). A livelihoods assessment of urban refugees in 2012 indicated that refugees spend approximately 1% of their income on bribes, with the amounts paid rising with their level of wealth (DRC and UNHCR, 2012). Beversluis et al. (2016) highlight how the lack of legal protection exacerbates vulnerabilities leading to discrimination, such as unfair rents, exploitative business partnerships or, more seriously, gender-based violence; and how this situation has implications for refugee trust and civic engagement, as intimidation is the only consistent interaction refugees have with the authorities.

### 6.2.3 Socio-political and cultural adaptation of Somali refugees: ‘segmented assimilation’

The presence of Somali Kenyans is a key determinant of the level of integration of Somali refugees in Kenya. On the one hand, they afford refugees material assistance, social networks and orientation into Kenyan life. On the other, the availability of an ethnic enclave reduces opportunities for trust-building and integration with the wider community beyond Somali Kenyans, and leads to what Lindley (2011) terms ‘segmented assimilation’.

Stigmatisation means that Somalis choose physical isolation to protect themselves from it, as well as from threats and extortion at the hands of the police and the security services. Some limit themselves geographically to Eastleigh as much as possible. The
seclusion of Somalis in their ethnic enclaves generates hostility from local communities, and highlights Somalis' reluctance to participate in Kenyan social and customary events and to learn the country's languages (Pavanello et al., 2010). For their part, Somalis engage in ‘retaliatory criticism’ of Kenyans and self-segregate socially and physically in order to guard against perceived cultural, moral or religious corruption (Jaji, 2014). Other cultural factors also play a role in orienting Somalis away from local integration. Some have highlighted how traditional Somali nomadism and information from transnational networks concerning opportunities in the West have stimulated ‘buufis’ – an extreme desire to relocate to the West – amongst some Somalis, which again reduces interest in local integration.

The government guarantees the right to free primary education for all children in Kenya. Up to 70% of children in some schools in Eastleigh may be refugees (Pavanello et al., 2010). However, the strength of Somali identity is such that children's adaptation to Kenyan life is perceived by some as detrimental to Somali cultural and religious values and an obstacle to eventual return. Many Somali refugee children attend faith-based schools (Carrier, 2016). Cultural norms that exclude women from public life mean that Somali women are the least integrated (Beversluis et al., 2016). As in the camps, however, the length of time people are displaced has a bearing on the degree to which they integrate, and there is now a generation of Somalis born and brought up in Kenya who speak the local languages and are very integrated into Kenyan life.

Beversluis et al. (2016) also found that legal status and access to documentation is a key determinant of integration in Nairobi. The blurring of Somali refugees into their co-ethnic group also occurs in official and legal matters. Carrier highlights how the term ‘refugee’ is seen as pejorative, and shunned by Somalis, particularly those who are economically successful, and many refugees instead self-identify as Kenyan Somalis to outsiders. Others seek to establish this more officially, by procuring Kenyan ID papers or passports through the black market (Carrier, 2016). Lindley (2011) highlights how official treatment of Somali Kenyans and Somali refugees is also blurred, with refugees facing an environment where Somali Kenyans are subject to high levels of official suspicion, and where the plight of Somali Kenyans' is undermined further by the arrival of large numbers of Somali refugees. The Kenyan government has also played a role in assigning Kenyan citizenship to thousands of Somalis in return for electoral support (Carrier, 2016).

6.2.4 Cultural adaptation by Congolese refugees

Congolese refugees adapt to life in Nairobi very differently to Somali refugees. Without a large population of co-nationals, they disperse into different districts across the city and attempt to assimilate socially and physically by adopting Kenyan dress and language. This is easier for Congolese than for other nationalities due to their physical and religious similarities to many Kenyans (Campbell, 2006). Congolese Bantu refugees are more integrated in Nairobi than Somalis because they share the Kinyamulenge language, spoken by ethnic Kenyan Bantus (Beversluis et al., 2016). Many report having positive relations with their Kenyan hosts, but many also hide their refugee status in the belief that it will prejudice their social inclusion. Those refugees whose status is known report facing hostility and abuse from locals, who believe that they benefit unfairly from aid that should be provided to Nairobi's poor. The fact that many have to hide their identity and status means that they do not feel integrated (Pavanello et al., 2010). Although they downplay their national identity to outsiders in many ways, Congolese refugees still found solidarity, support and assistance through their fellow ethnic refugees (Beversluis et al., 2016).
7 Conclusion

Three decades of mass refugee influxes to Kenya have resulted in policies designed explicitly to reduce opportunities for integration. Focused on containment, camps and repatriation, these policies have allowed the Kenyan government to claim control over a refugee population that is perceived as posing an inherent security threat; reduced opportunities for the refugee population to blend into the local population, thus preserving the possibility of eventual repatriation; and offered visibility, which assists with external funding. A largely hostile environment, continued spikes in arrivals and a chronic emergency refugee response has left little room for changes in this approach.

1. The over-riding and unsurprising conclusion is that camps are highly effective barriers to integration. Segregating people’s social, political and economic lives from the host population fundamentally undermines opportunities for interaction, cooperation and co-existence. It is largely only those refugees who have managed to circumvent the controls resulting from the encampment policy who have made progress, however limited, towards integration.

2. The vastly different experiences, outcomes and impacts of refugees in Kenya’s camps and urban settings demonstrate the extent to which the policy framework is the principal determinant in outcomes for refugees and the host community. This, more than the timing, numbers and profiles of arrivals, matters most.

3. Kenya’s experience highlights the profound difficulty of transitioning from an encampment policy once this has been established as the preferred option, particularly in a country receiving continuous refugee arrivals. This is an important consideration for policy responses that aim to take account of the protracted nature of most refugee crises. Success in convincing local, rather than central, government to soften the encampment approach and adopt greater refugee integration and self-sufficiency in Kalobeyei points to the different priorities of different arms of government in terms of refugee management, and the potential to positively influence those authorities directly affected, particularly as the perceived effects may be more positive at the level where the economic benefits are likely to be felt.

4. Early decisions about the size, location and composition of camps are likely to have negative implications should a shift in policy towards self-reliance be pursued. Lessons from Uganda, where a policy of refugee self-reliance has been in place for some time, indicate that the allocation of land for refugee settlement should be based on careful site selection, with particular consideration given to access to markets, transport, security and quality of land (Kaiser, 2006). This appears not to have been possible with the Kalobeyei initiative, where the site’s location was determined largely by the pre-existing camp, and negotiations with the authorities.

5. Contrary to claims that camps are an economic burden, Dadaab and Kakuma have increased trading and business opportunities, widened access to employment, services and education and improved markets and infrastructure. It is an indication of refugees’ resilience, proactivity and capacity that, even in the most constrained circumstances, only a tiny percentage of refugees are thought to rely fully on humanitarian assistance in camps, and those in urban settings are thought to be almost entirely self-sufficient. However, the fact that refugees are still being born into a protracted camp setting designed decades ago constitutes a tremendous waste of human potential and an affront to refugees’ rights and dignity. The civil, political and economic rights and opportunities of camp-based refugees are fundamentally curtailed, their futures remain largely on hold and even their basic survival is precarious.

6. Many of the negative implications of the refugee presence in Kenya appear to hinge on specific policy choices – how refugees are managed, rather than their existence per se. The environmental degradation linked to the camps is a direct consequence of confining large numbers of people in limited geographical areas. Community tensions in areas surrounding camps appear to have some correlation to the limited opportunities for interaction resulting from segregation. In urban areas, Kenyan hosts complain about the limited interaction of Somalis. The benefits refugees bring are highly localised in both camp and urban settings and are unevenly distributed, but in a context weighted against integration, the policy space to harness the development opportunities associated with refugees and to reduce...
distributional imbalances is extremely restricted. International aid appears to be compounding tensions by reinforcing perceptions of inequality and discrimination amongst host populations.

7. That some refugees in Nairobi have been successful indicates what could be achieved if the camp policy is relaxed. Somalis have transformed Eastleigh into one of Nairobi’s most economically successful districts; Kenyans appear to have benefited from increased employment and higher wages, as well as from the improved supply and lower cost of goods and services provided by refugees. Larger refugee businesses are integrated into the formal economy.

8. Refugees will adapt to whichever economic system is most available. If the receiving society is unwilling to integrate, refugees will adapt elsewhere. Integration is a two-way process between refugees and the host population. With limited opportunities to integrate into the host population in Kenya, there are signs that a natural propensity of refugees towards integration means that they adapt to different economic systems, including the aid community, ethnic enclaves and transnational networks.

9. The presence of a national ethnic group may improve economic opportunities for co-ethnic refugees, but may also hinder integration. Somalis have apparently exceeded the economic performance of other refugee groups in both camp and urban settings. They benefit from the presence, protection and assistance of a co-ethnic national minority; their pre-existing entrepreneurial knowledge in an informal environment; and strong financial and trading links to diaspora networks. However, while some Somali refugees are achieving economic success, this appears to be based largely on ties to a co-ethnic population, rather than through integrating into society more broadly. One recent study found that female Somalis were the least integrated of all refugees.

10. Refugees with the human and social capital to navigate and do business in Kenya’s informal economy have had the most success. With formal work effectively outlawed, and land and livestock holding impossible, it is those refugees able to adapt to the informal economy that succeed, in both camp and urban settings. Those with higher socio-economic status appear more successful in securing diaspora remittances and access to jobs and opportunities within the aid sector. Gender, age and educational levels also appear to be significant, with young men forming a large proportion of the urban refugee cohort, and tertiary education appearing to make it more difficult for some refugees to adapt and integrate. Time plays an important role, as it allows refugees in both camp and urban settings to build up the social capital required to succeed.

11. Policies aimed at improving the economic situation of refugees risk downplaying the overriding political barriers that refugees face. These are largely political rather than economic. Some refugees have proved adept at circumventing these barriers by operating in the margins of Kenyan society, physically, socially and economically. This has come with major costs to their rights and security. Much of the literature on refugees in both urban and camp contexts has focused on their economic achievements in the context of considerable legal and policy constraints. There is a danger that focusing primarily on the productive capacities of refugees, without also addressing the political and legal barriers they face, risks excluding rights and protection from policy discussions. The Kalobeyei initiative is an important first step in providing routes out of encampment, but it must be part of a comprehensive discussion about refugees’ rights and protection over the long term. With a focus primarily on South Sudanese refugees, the initiative also risks compounding, rather than addressing, the vulnerabilities faced by Somali refugees in particular by promoting different solutions for refugees of different nationalities, on the basis of ethnicity rather than need. Placing the responsibility for self-reliance on refugees themselves may also increase the challenges refugees face.

12. Policies that build on the current activities of refugees will assist most in their integration. The informal sector has proved instrumental in promoting the livelihoods of refugees in urban and camp settings alike. The Kalobeyei project is in some ways the antithesis of the ‘bottom up’ approach of refugees, as it predetermines the location and focus of refugee livelihoods. Supporting refugees’ access to information, networks and finance will be an important corollary of this approach to ensure that it links with and builds upon, rather than supplants, the current activities of refugees.


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Cover photo: Kenya. Striving for higher education in Dadaab refugee camp. “When I grow up, I want to be a doctor.” Five-year-old Somali refugee Filsan looks out from her home in Dadaab, Kenya, with her three-year-old sister Sundus.

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