Pursuing disaster risk reduction on fractured foundations
The case of Chad
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About this paper

This report is part of the project ‘When disasters and conflict collide: uncovering the truth’, a collaboration between the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). The lead researcher is Katie Peters, Senior Research Fellow, ODI (k.peters@odi.org.uk).

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  - Episode 3: A call to action

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# Contents

About this paper 3

Acknowledgements 4

List of boxes and figures 6

Acronyms 7

Executive summary 8

1 Introduction 11
   1.1 What do standardised approaches to DRR entail? 11
   1.2 Methodology 12

2 Complex risks in Chad: natural hazards, climate variability and conflict 14
   2.1 Chronic poverty and conflict 14
   2.2 Fractured governance 15
   2.3 Natural hazards and climate variability 15

3 DRR in Chad 17
   3.1 The national DRR architecture: progress to date 17
   3.2 Challenges and limitations to DRR 19

4 Dominant framings of risk 25
   4.1 Tackling droughts and improving food security: the dominant discourse 25
   4.2 Tackling climate change impacts 27
   4.3 The ‘resilience’ agenda: a help or a hindrance? 29
   4.4 Climate security 31

5 Alternatives to normative approaches to DRR 33
   5.1 Using DRR outcomes to strengthen the social contract 33
   5.2 Towards a networked approach to DRR in conflict contexts 34
   5.3 Recommendations 35

Bibliography 39
# List of boxes and figures

**Boxes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Box 1</td>
<td>Sectoral contributions to DRR</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 2</td>
<td>Priority actions in Chad's NAPA (2010)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 3</td>
<td>The RESILAC project</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>Map of Chad</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>The evolution of DRR in Chad</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFD</td>
<td>Agence Française de Développement</td>
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<td>AGIR</td>
<td>Global Alliance for Resilience</td>
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<td>ARC</td>
<td>African Risk Capacity</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CADRI</td>
<td>Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative</td>
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<td>CASAGC</td>
<td>Action Committee for Food Security and Crises Management</td>
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<td>CILSS</td>
<td>Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel</td>
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<td>CNARR</td>
<td>National Committee in charge of reintegrating refugees</td>
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<td>CNCAPD</td>
<td>National Committee in charge of displaced persons</td>
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<td>CONASI</td>
<td>National Committee for people affected by floods</td>
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<td>CPD</td>
<td>Civil Protection Directorate</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>disaster risk reduction</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EWS</td>
<td>early warning system</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<td>GCCA</td>
<td>Global Climate Change Alliance</td>
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<td>GEF</td>
<td>Global Environment Fund</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GmbH</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
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<td>LDCF</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries Fund</td>
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<td>NAPA</td>
<td>National Adaptation Plan of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFSP</td>
<td>National Food Security Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA</td>
<td>National Meteorology Agency</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONASA</td>
<td>National Agency to Support Food Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORSEC</td>
<td>Plan d’Organisation des Secours du Tchad (Relief and Rescue Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN-LCD</td>
<td>National Action Plan to Prevent Desertification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN-RRC</td>
<td>National Action Plan to Strengthen Disaster Risk Reduction, Preparedness and Response to Disasters</td>
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<tr>
<td>SISAAP</td>
<td>Information System on Food Security and Early Warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United National Development Assistance Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDRR</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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**Executive summary**

Conventional disaster risk reduction (DRR) efforts tend to focus on mitigating risk related to short-term, extreme events associated with high-visibility catastrophes such as earthquakes, floods and landslides. However, some of the most neglected and unreported humanitarian crises around the world are caused by long-term conditions such as drought. The effects of slow-onset disasters are particularly devastating when compounded by conflict, fragility and violence, but this aspect of DRR has generally been neglected in mainstream thinking and practice.

Known for its vulnerability to drought and food insecurity, Chad illustrates how conflict can undermine the foundations of development and economic growth. This case study challenges conventional thinking on how to promote DRR in a situation of conflict and poor governance. Instead of pushing forward with recommendations for more financial resources and technical capacity, the research questions whether an alternative, more politically astute approach could be taken to ensure systematic integration of risk into development decisions. Simply put, this framing would employ a ‘networking’ strategy applied through a conflict lens. Starting with what already exists, it would recognise where political traction could provide a viable entry point to advance progress on DRR and disaster risk governance as part of overall efforts to adapt to climate change and promote sustainable development.

**DRR in Chad: is it ‘destined to fail’?**

Chad presents a complex mix of intersecting risks and vulnerabilities. In addition to climate change, chronic poverty and lack of development, the country has experienced recurrent civil conflict, ethnic tensions and displacement. Over the past 30 years, the country has faced more than 40 natural hazard-related disasters affecting the lives and livelihoods of more than 5 million people.

Fractured risk governance structures do little to address the chronic vulnerabilities that increase citizens’ susceptibility to disasters. Years of civil war and the co-option of armed groups and rebel leaders into government institutions have led to inadequate governance characterised by clientelism, corruption and high staff turnover. The absence of a social contract and lack of trust between citizens and government adds an additional layer of difficulty in implementing normative approaches to DRR. With inadequate technical and financial resources, poor data and ineffective coordination mechanisms to support disaster risk assessment and management, it is perhaps not surprising that interviewees described DRR in Chad as ‘destined to fail’.

This apparent failure of conventional DRR approaches creates an impetus for policy-makers and practitioners to rethink their tactics. There is a need to reconnect people with institutions, rebuild the social contract and reinforce the role of the state regarding the welfare of the individual. DRR may only be effective where there is some level of basic governance functioning and political will. Improving understanding of the links between peace, development and DRR could help devise ways to strengthen the social contract and build trust between citizens and government, setting the stage for a more networked approach to DRR.

**Could a ‘system of strategies’ be more effective?**

Standard approaches to DRR typically refer to state-centric entry points, with national governments establishing the policy, implementation and financing architecture. Assessments tend to start at the top, examining
national disaster management laws and how policies are implemented. While Chad currently lacks effective policy and institutional arrangements for DRR in the conventional sense, it does have a relatively strong institutional and operational framework to address drought and food insecurity, partly because these areas attract external donor support.

More recently, climate change adaptation has featured high on the list of priority challenges included in the government’s national development planning process. Climate change funding could provide an as-yet unexplored opportunity to advance DRR since both approaches aim to protect and secure well-being. At present, this opportunity is limited by Chad’s lack of institutional commitment and stability, but there is potential to exploit donors’ desire to use climate funds as part of a broader effort to foster institution-building, and climate funds would in theory flow to activities of relevance to DRR.

Within the international community, climate security is being used increasingly as a discourse through which to understand intersecting risks. This could represent an alternative policy entry point for DRR as part of a broad range of response options. However, practitioners must also take care not to demonise those vulnerable to climate-related disasters as a security threat. More work is required to understand and define the role that DRR could play in this field. The concept of ‘building resilience’ continues to enjoy popularity among development, humanitarian and climate agencies. While there is some evidence that efforts to build resilience would also advance DRR outcomes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, the concept is still ill-defined, and resilience-building actions have yet to significantly improve disaster risk governance at the scale required.

A networked approach, described as a ‘system of strategies’ by the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), would take a broader view of DRR, and aim to strengthen collaboration among different sectors. This idea turns the concept of DRR on its head. Instead of starting with a blueprint for DRR, it suggests treating DRR as an outcome, where multiple actors and interventions contribute to a system in which DRR ambitions are adapted to the institutional and political economy of the context. Drought risk management, food security and climate change and resilience initiatives contribute to many aspects of sustainable development, including DRR; what is required is a comprehensive analysis of how they can come together to build synergy and improve DRR outcomes.

**Recommendations**

While it is not disputed that more investment is required to promote DRR in Chad, a ‘system of strategies’ may offer a more appropriate framework than more conventional approaches. This new narrative would also take the conflict context as the starting point, and consider how fostering disaster resilience could form part of a broader agenda to rebuild the social contract. Where aspects of effective DRR action are being implemented at the local level by non-state actors, effort should be put into understanding how they can move from discrete projects to form an effective entry point for new risk governance mechanisms and institutions as part of a long-term agenda to build capacity from the grassroots up. This approach could be channelled through several routes, as follows.

**Support Chad’s commitment to the Sendai Framework**

This includes providing technical support to the Chad government for reporting against its commitments in a way that is inclusive of current initiatives relevant to DRR. Employing such a ‘system of strategies’ approach would test new ideas and establish a more positive baseline. Any new investment in data collection and analysis should ensure interoperability and be streamlined with existing national information systems. Capacity-building efforts should focus on ensuring continuity in government efforts and building cross-sector collaboration.

**Move from crisis response to more proactive risk management**

Build on the UN disaster prevention agenda to strengthen capacity for risk management and adopt more flexible approaches, such as crisis modifiers, shock-responsive programming and forecast-based finance.
View alternative framings of risk management as an opportunity
This includes finding new ways to promote the mainstreaming of DRR through traditional sectors such as health, education, water and agriculture, as well as adopting risk-informed approaches to sustainable development. At the same time, harnessing opportunities offered by international climate funds could yield additional resources.
1 Introduction

This study explores how DRR has progressed in Chad, a country prone to a myriad of risks, from recurring droughts to communal and transboundary conflicts. In light of the government’s commitments under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (UNISDR, 2015a), this paper looks at current strategies and mechanisms by which the state is protecting its citizens against disasters and the adverse impacts of climate change. Specific emphasis is placed on the way in which history has shaped the state’s current governance arrangements, capacities and functioning. This is set in the context of the challenges that conflict presents to disaster risk governance, to contribute to the growing body of work that seeks to bring issues of politics and conflict to the fore in mainstream DRR discourse (see Peters, 2018; Siddiqi, 2018).

Unsatisfied with the conclusion that ‘more’ is needed in Chad – more technical capacity, more resources, more systematic integration of risk into development decisions (see Le Masson et al., 2018; OCHA, 2018b) – the paper takes a closer look at how other sectors and paradigms (outside the DRR space) dominate risk management in Chad to ask whether, somewhat paradoxically, advancing DRR within Chad requires making better use of these alternative framings of risk management. The analysis offers a critical reflection on dominant approaches for tackling disaster risks, particularly in a neglected field of study: DRR in conflict and post-conflict contexts. Taking a broader approach to risk reduction and actions that contribute to reducing the impacts of natural hazards and climate variability widens our frame of reference to allow for consideration of the wealth of development, humanitarian, climate and peace actors, actions and initiatives collectively seeking to improve the lives of Chadians – albeit through different framings, entry points and policies. Much more needs to be done to promote progress on DRR and disaster risk governance, but doing more of the same may not be the best way forward.

1.1 What do standardised approaches to DRR entail?

Whether explicit or implicit, standardised approaches to advancing DRR are frequently employed to make judgements about DRR progress within a country. This is characterised by the idea of ‘normative’ approaches to DRR, which refers to approaches employed under the Sendai Framework and its associated terminology guide and monitoring framework. Here, DRR is ‘aimed at preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk and managing residual risk, all of which contribute to strengthening resilience and therefore to the achievement of sustainable development’ (UNISDR, 2017). Normative approaches to DRR typically refer to state-centric entry points and approaches, with national governments establishing the policy, implementation and financing architecture (Peters, 2017). This is based on an arguably technocentric approach involving the establishment of a legal framework for disaster response, which often matures into a more holistic approach to DRR; the establishment of a national coordination body.

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1 ‘The system of institutions, mechanisms, policy and legal frameworks and other arrangements to guide, coordinate and oversee disaster risk reduction and related areas of policy’ (UNISDR, 2017).

2 Risk reduction encapsulates ‘preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk and managing residual risk, all of which contribute to strengthening resilience and therefore to the achievement of sustainable development’ (UNISDR, 2017).
overseeing operations and in time supporting the integration of DRR considerations into sectoral policies and plans; and a general move towards decentralised modes of operation. With few exceptions, securing financing for ex-ante risk reduction measures is an uphill political battle, as is avoiding risk creation through development processes.

Reports critically assessing the state of DRR in a particular country typically start from the top – looking at national disaster management laws, strategies, cross-ministerial working groups and the like – and then turn their attention to whether and how policy turns into practice. Impetus can also come from high-impact, high-profile disaster events, where in the aftermath of a humanitarian response questions are asked about the extent to which disaster impacts could have been reduced, how to ‘Build Back Better’ and ensuring accountability for the mitigation of disaster risk in the future. Policy advice and disaster research typically recommend that greater financial investment is required to bolster technical and institutional capacities, outline how funds are required to implement risk reduction measures and argue for more research to address critical gaps in knowledge. All such investments – be they financial, technical or political – are based on preconceived ideas of what exemplary DRR and disaster risk governance look like. This often includes assumptions about the types of government structures desired or in place and policy ambitions, without accounting for the fact that such expected outcomes may not hold true in conflict-affected areas, where national governments typically fall short in upholding basic disaster risk governance.

Articulating what exemplary DRR and disaster risk governance look like has become increasingly unified around the Sendai Framework. International articulations have many advantages: they help motivate and orient governments towards greater action, provide a standard to aspire to and offer a means to track progress across diverse contexts (see Wilkinson et al., 2017). But there are disadvantages to homogenous approaches to pre-prescribed development trajectories in order to achieve international targets (see Peters et al, 2019a). In countries where technical capacity is lacking, governments may opt to bring in consultants to help draft important policy documents – including DRR strategies – bypassing critical processes required to ensure buy-in across government ministries. Blanket approaches to strategy design drawing on ‘best case’ templates may help states learn from the experience of others, but also may inadvertently hinder deeper consideration of context specificity. Specifically, the absence of a deeper consideration of issues of violence, conflict and fragility in DRR programming approaches and strategies has been a notable criticism (Peters, 2018). This can trickle down to the subnational level in contexts where national strategies provide the template for subnational DRR strategies and action plans. In places where people experience violent conflict and where institutional capacities for disaster risk governance are limited, neglect of conflict dynamics can lead to DRR strategies that are unattainable and/or conflict-insensitive.

1.2 Methodology

The analysis reviewed academic and grey literature on Chad covering disasters, climate change, conflict, development and food and livelihood security, as well as strategies, policies and plans on DRR at the regional, national and subnational level (where they exist). A total of 48 qualitative interviews were conducted between November 2018 and January 2019 with government departments at the national level, regional organisations, donors, UN agencies, civil society organisations and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). Many official and policy documents were translated into English; where necessary, terms have been adjusted to ensure clarity for the reader.

The data collection process faced a number of limitations and challenges. As described throughout the paper, the terminology of DRR is seldom used in Chad or the Lake Chad region by policy-makers or development partners, and

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3 Disaster risk governance is defined as: ‘[t]he system of institutions, mechanisms, policy and legal frameworks and other arrangements to guide, coordinate and oversee disaster risk reduction and related areas of policy’ (UNISDR, 2017).
it was difficult to conduct interviews with an explicit focus on DRR. The analysis thus evolved to reflect on the limitations of a normative approach to DRR and the reasons why DRR was not widely used as a framing. By starting with what exists, rather than a predetermined blueprint for DRR, we find other avenues which may offer opportunities to advance DRR that currently have more political traction. The paper thus reflects on whether a networked approach (see Section 5.2), meaning pursuing DRR outcomes through a ‘system of strategies’, would achieve the same outcomes for disaster resilience, or whether gaps in disaster risk governance coverage, quality and effectiveness would remain and standardised approaches to pursuing DRR are still warranted.
2 Complex risks in Chad: natural hazards, climate variability and conflict

Chad is affected by different layers of intersecting conflict, the effects of climate variability and change and natural hazards including droughts and floods (République du Tchad, 2010a). Its geographical position in the Sahelian belt exposes it to a number of climate-related hazards, such as multi-decadal droughts, whose frequency, intensity and nature are changing due to climate change and high climate variability (Shanahan et al., 2009; Sylla et al., 2016). Pervasive development challenges include lack of access to basic services including clean water and sanitation, healthcare and education. The country has faced recurrent humanitarian crises stemming from cholera outbreaks in 2011, 2012 and 2018 – resulting in more than 38,000 cases and 845 deaths – and famine across the Sahel in 2012–17. Population movement coupled with recurrent displacement, and refugees from neighbouring countries, place additional stress on ill-equipped services. Population growth stands at 3.7% a year (AFD, 2018).

2.1 Chronic poverty and conflict

While the Boko Haram conflict (see below) has received significant attention across the region and in international foreign policy discussions, understanding how disasters and conflict collide in Chad requires a broader consideration of the country’s recent experiences of crisis. Underlying and chronic vulnerabilities have produced fractured risk governance structures which do little to address people’s susceptibility to disaster.

Chad has suffered recurrent civil conflicts, with the most recent coming to a close in 2010, alongside ethnic and communal conflict and competition over natural resources (ICG, 2014). The legacy of years of civil war and the systematic co-option of armed groups and opposition leaders into government institutions have led to inadequate governance, the absence of a social contract, a chronic mistrust of government structures by citizens and a clientelist civil service, affecting all aspects of governance, including DRR (ICG, 2016; ICG, 2008). Ranking 186 out of 189 countries on the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2018a), Chad’s fragility also stems from chronic under-development and high levels of poverty, with 85.9% of the population considered poor, 66.2% severely (UNDP, 2018b).

2.1.1 The conflict with Boko Haram

The conflict with Boko Haram has resulted in 300,000 refugees, with almost 2.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) – either as a result of Boko Haram’s activities or stemming from the government’s military response. More than 17 million people are living in areas affected by the conflict (OCHA, 2018a). The conflict has created a large-scale humanitarian crisis, with 10.7 million people in need of assistance, 2.43 million displaced and 5.04 million food-insecure (OCHA, n.d.). The majority of IDPs have been absorbed by host communities that are already lacking basic service provision, livelihood security and access to land (UNDP and OCHA, 2018). The resulting concentration of people has increased pressure on natural resources, exacerbated environmental degradation and deforestation (as a source of energy and income...
for IDPs) and raised tensions between IDPs and host communities (Nagarajan et al., 2018; ICG, 2017).

A state of emergency and movement restrictions imposed in response to the Boko Haram threat have had significant impacts on the livelihoods of groups who rely on mobility for cross-border trade (ICG, 2017); specific economic activities, such as fishing, have been banned and large areas of agricultural land are inaccessible. Some types of crops have also been banned; fields have been burnt by the military to reduce vegetation cover or simply harvested by armed groups (Adelphi, 2018a). Dusk to dawn curfews further restrict freedom of movement (AFD, 2018). Military checkpoints have proliferated, creating problems for the large number of people in the region without identity documents, and the border between Nigeria and Chad is officially closed, affecting trade and forcing herders to take longer routes, at the expense of their herds’ health, or stay in one area, leading to high concentrations of livestock, increasing pressure on already depleted resources and fuelling conflict among herders and between herders and farmers (FAO, 2017). The conflict has also intensified ethnic tensions and undermined community-level conflict management as chiefs have been sidelined by the national authorities, accused of complicity with Boko Haram or targeted by the group (ICG, 2017).

2.2 Fractured governance

Governance in Chad is characterised by patronage, corruption and impunity, undermining the credibility of the government in the eyes of the population and eroding an already weak social contract (ICG, 2008; ICG, 2016). Opposition leaders and leaders of armed groups have been co-opted into government and allowed to ‘benefit from state resources and find jobs in the administration for party members, giving them the opportunity to develop their own clientelistic networks’ (ICG, 2008). Many Chadians do not trust the government and instead ‘still violently refuse to accept the state’s authority and see its administration as foreign’ (ICG, 2008). Government officials are not selected on the basis of their capacity to govern, leading to sub-standard institutions and governance, including ineffective disaster risk governance. More concretely, it also means that the state lacks a presence outside of large urban centres, and basic services normally provided by governments are lacking. For example, ‘school enrolment in the Chadian lake area is below 30 per cent and “community teachers” – in other words, the parents of pupils – generally have to stand in, in place of trained teachers. There is only one doctor for every 140,000 inhabitants, which is only a quarter of the national average’ (ICG, 2017: 7–8).

2.3 Natural hazards and climate variability

Chad is often referred to as one of the world’s most climate-vulnerable countries, a reflection of its general political and socioeconomic vulnerability and geographical location. In the last 30 years, the country has reportedly faced more than 40 natural hazard-related disasters affecting more than 5 million people (République du Tchad, 2017b). In 2014, over a third of Chadian households faced at least one natural hazard-related disaster, primarily droughts and floods (UNDAF, 2017). A lack of sanitation infrastructure and waste management and insufficient health systems means that flooding can lead to epidemics. Cholera, measles and meningitis are common and deadly, with more than 30,000 cases combined in 2011 (République du Tchad, 2017b). Malaria is the most prevalent disease, with a million cases reported in 2016 (ibid.) Relative to epidemics, floods and drought have a lower mortality rate, but affect larger numbers of people and cause more damage.

The Lake Chad Basin is situated within the Sahel ecosystem, which is characterised by arid and semi-arid regions where the highly variable West Africa monsoon brings the majority of annual precipitation in just four months, roughly June to September (Giannini et al., 2008; Shanahan et al., 2009). Although prolonged droughts have been a feature of the region for thousands of years, recent periods of rainfall deficit due to variability of the West Africa monsoon have had significant impacts. A severe drought across the region from the late 1960s to the early 1990s contributed to significant loss of life and damaged livelihoods and economies.
Another severe drought in 2012 affected 1.6 million people in Chad alone (République du Tchad, 2017b). Droughts, combined with human-induced environmental degradation, have contributed to a reduction in arable lands and vegetation loss and exacerbated conflict over land.

There are some indications that the recent multi-decadal drought might have been partially influenced by climate change, through some climate change-related warming of the Atlantic Ocean (Biasutti, 2013; Giannini, 2016). However, regardless of the degree to which precipitation extremes can be attributed to climate change, the fact that so many households and communities are so heavily and negatively impacted by current climate variability and extremes points to high levels of vulnerability and low capacities for managing climate-related risks. With climate change increasing temperatures across West Africa – with a 1.6–5.4°C mean annual temperature increase projected by 2100 (World Bank, 2019; Pereira, 2017) – and precipitation variability likely to continue to grow (Biasutti, 2013), finding ways to bring DRR strategies and linked climate change adaptation into this volatile region is critical.
3 DRR in Chad

3.1 The national DRR architecture: progress to date

DRR lacks a strong foothold in the national political priorities, budget allocations and institutional capacities and responsibilities, and there is little support for DRR at the national level. Aspects of DRR are currently shared among three ministries: the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Local Governance, the Ministry of Economy and Development and the Ministry of Women, Child Protection and National Solidarity. Coordination between them is essential but has been absent. A full chronology of the evolution of DRR in Chad is provided in Figure 2.

A 2002 Decree (no.529/PR/PM/MCD/2011) established the Civil Protection Directorate (CPD) under the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Local Governance. The primary body for disaster preparedness and response, the CPD is organised around three units: protection, prevention and planning. In 2011, the CPD was extended to cover civil protection services, which also encompass disaster prevention. The CPD’s remit includes coordinating and implementing emergency management plans, working with the Ministry of Women, Child Protection and National Solidarity in response operations (République du Tchad, 2002). It was also the national focal point for the Hyogo Framework (UNISDR, 2005), and plays the same role in relation to the Sendai Framework (UNISDR, 2015a).

Disaster risk policy-making is largely reactive in Chad. In a number of post-disaster situations, ad hoc committees have been created to propose action plans and mobilise external support, such as the National Committee for people affected by floods (CONASI), the National Committee in charge of displaced persons (CNCAPD), the National Committee in charge of reintegrating refugees (CNARR) and the National Committee in charge of fighting epidemics. The financial health and sustainability of these committees is limited (see below), and the overall policy architecture is largely confined to decrees establishing bodies involved in emergency response. For example, decree 02/PR/2013 created the Firefighters’ Corps, a civil protection paramilitary unit under the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Local Governance.

Aspects of DRR do feature in sectoral policies and ministerial responsibilities (see Box 1), though the dominant approach focuses on forecasting and responding to hazards, rather than tackling vulnerabilities to risk. For example, the National Environmental Policy (République du Tchad, 2017a), aims to address a range of environmental and climate-related risks, including improving the climate monitoring mechanism, strengthening the national early warning system (EWS) and emergency response to disasters, including building community capacity for risk management. Activities set out in the policy include managing and tracking the negative impacts of drought, desertification, climate variability and natural hazard-related disaster risks (République du Tchad, 2017a).

National and international NGOs have called for the policy to be validated and actioned.

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4 The policy outlines the key environmental issues in Chad, including natural resource degradation, climate change, pollution, access to resources and weak environment governance (République du Tchad, 2017a). It then articulates three main priorities: combating desertification, adapting to climate change and biodiversity conservation; global warming attenuation, combating pollution, preventing and managing ecological and natural disaster risks; and access to natural resources, improvement of people’s life quality in link with environmental protection (République du Tchad, 2017a).
There have been various attempts to create a more complete architecture for disaster risk. External financial and technical support has been instrumental in creating national plans of action on DRR. For example, following a national DRR capacity assessment by the UN Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI) in 2014, a National Action Plan to Strengthen Disaster Risk Reduction, Preparedness and Response to Disasters was created, alongside a government roadmap for implementation (PAN-RRC 2015–2020). The Plan is organised around the four priorities set by the Sendai Framework and details, for each pillar, the strengths and weaknesses of the disaster risk governance architecture, along with recommendations for improvements.

Although Chad does not have a national DRR platform, a DRR Working Group was officially enacted by the government in 2016. It is coordinated by the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Local Governance and the Ministry of Economy and Development Planning, with technical support from the UN Development Programme (UNDP) (République du Tchad, 2015). A multi-stakeholder group also

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**Box 1  Sectoral contributions to DRR**

Various ministries have responsibilities for various threat-specific aspects of prevention and response. Outlined below are some examples (this is illustrative rather than comprehensive):

- The Public Health Ministry plays a key role in preventing and responding to epidemics and water and health emergencies.
- The Ministry of Farming and Animal Production is responsible for organising and securing pastoral areas, addressing desertification and preventing and managing epizootic diseases.
- The Ministry of Production, Irrigation and Agricultural Equipment is responsible for preventing and fighting locust infestations, assessing food security and managing public stocks and participating in various aspects of risk management through its supervision of (UNDP, 2016):
  - the National Agency to Support Food Security (ONASA), responsible for the management of a national food emergency stock, emergency distributions and stabilising food prices;
  - the National Agency to Fight Locust Infestation (ANLA), which oversees the delivery of the National Framework to Manage Locust Infestation, spanning prevention, preparedness and response;
  - the Information System on Food Security (SISAAP), regarded as the most active operational mechanism in the country. Unlike most of the other risk management mechanisms, which are externally funded, the SISAAP is (partly) funded by the Chadian government.
- The Ministry of Environment, Water and Fisheries oversees the implementation of:
  - the National Environment Policy, which articulates priorities related to combating desertification, climate change adaptation and biodiversity conservation, among others, and includes attention to ‘preventing and managing ecological and natural disaster risks’ (République du Tchad, 2017a);
  - the National Action Plan to Prevent Desertification (PAN-LCD), which includes a pillar on risk management specifically regarding bush fires;
  - the National Strategy ‘Big Green Wall’ (Grande Muraille Verte), a multifaceted international programme to create an 8,000km stretch of vegetation to combat desertification, food insecurity and biodiversity loss, and support political stability, economic activity and resilience to climate change (UNCCD, n.d.).
supports the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the PAN-RRC 2015–2020, and acts as a forum for sharing best practice, training and advocacy on aspects of DRR integration.

Various threat-specific contingency plans exist, including a locust infestation plan (see below), a food security crisis plan (Chadian Red Cross, 2015, in UNDP, 2016), a flooding contingency plan for N’djamena (République du Tchad in UNDP, 2016) and a cholera contingency plan (ACF, 2014). Most notably, in 2014, the ORSEC Plan (Plan d’Organisation des Secours du Tchad or Relief and Rescue Plan) was developed, with support from UNDP, to articulate the responsibilities and coordination mechanisms for responses which exceed existing threat-specific contingency plans (République du Tchad, 2014c). The ORSEC articulates a response protocol, outlines the chain of command from township to national level and stipulates that a post-disaster needs assessment is required, using a common evaluation tool to inform early recovery activities (République du Tchad, 2014c). In 2017, with support from the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the government created a multi-risk contingency plan, beginning with pilots in Salamat and Hadjer Lamis provinces. Focused on emergency response capacity, coordination and activation thresholds, simulation exercises have concentrated on responses to food insecurity, flooding, population displacement, health crises and epidemics including cholera.

For some threats a transboundary approach has been adopted. Locust infestation, for example, is a recurrent threat across the four countries of the Lake Chad region, leading the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) to support the creation of national centres to combat it. In 2004, 80,000 hectares of six regions including the Lake region in Chad were affected by locusts and the response used 12,983 litres of chemical pesticides, with disastrous impacts on the environment, livestock and human health (République du Tchad, 2014a).

Recent sustainable development plans also include aspects of DRR. Priority 4 of the National Development Plan 2017–2021 contributes to DRR, including, for example, ‘to ensure sustainable natural resources management and to implement climate change adaptation policies’, ‘to implement climate resilient farming practices’, ‘to operationalise an efficient mechanism to prevent and manage risks and natural disasters’ and ‘to ensure the protection of Lake Chad’ (République du Tchad, 2017d: 48). Pillar 2 of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2017–2021 on ‘social protection, crisis management and sustainability’ calls for strengthening the institutional and legal framework for DRR, early warning mechanisms and disaster preparedness, alongside building household resilience to shocks (République du Tchad and United Nations, 2017).

### 3.2 Challenges and limitations to DRR

There is a significant lack of legal, technical and operational foundations underpinning DRR in Chad. While the country has been less affected by the Boko Haram conflict than its neighbours, governance is fragile, discouraging donor investment in risk reduction through or in conjunction with the national budget. High rates of chronic poverty and a popular perception of the state as distant and uncaring discourage people from paying the taxes required for state-funded risk reduction projects. This section explores a number of impediments to DRR, including limited finances, capacity and coordination, before moving on to consider issues around risk information, accountability and enforcement.

#### 3.2.1 Lack of funding

Operationalising DRR in Chad is stymied by a chronic lack of financial resources, particularly a centrally allocated budget. These budgetary constraints must be set in the broader context of Chad’s economic problems and government reform. In 2017, only 48% of the National Development Plan’s requirements for Priority 4 (under which DRR sits) were funded (République du Tchad and United Nations, 2017).
The UNDAF pillar addressing DRR was 6.4% funded in 2017 (République du Tchad and UN, 2017). The limited resources spent on DRR reflects a lack of political prioritisation and ultimately a lack of national funds overall. This challenge is not confined to Chad, prompting the African Union (AU) to call for governments to allocate at least 1% of their national budgets to delivering their commitments under the Sendai Framework and strengthening national capacities for DRR.

Chad’s CPD lacks basic requirements for effective functioning, including human and financial resources, transportation and communication and emergency response capabilities (République du Tchad, 2014c). One interviewee felt that the ‘CPD was in a situation of total destitution’. Most preparedness and response activities identified in various plans – simulation exercises, population sensitisation, first aid training – have not taken place, and a planned Special Emergency Fund is still at the proposal stage. The fund is intended to be financed through a combination of central budget allocations and the existing emergency budget, alongside private and external funds. In other examples, the Firefighters Corps, established in 2013, has only one operational brigade, in N’djamena, and there is one firefighter per 10,500 inhabitants (République du Tchad, 2014c).

Many respondents stressed that local-level action only materialises when implemented by NGOs. More generally, the lack of local CPD presence and subnational DRR capacity mean that DRR and disaster risk governance are not well understood at the local level. Various national committees established in the wake of disasters largely fail to secure the financial resources required for response, recovery or rehabilitation. For example, CONASI has not received government funds for a number of years, while CNARR is currently being funded by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). For organisations such as the Chadian Red Cross, funding from external partners is one of the few sources of income – including the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) – while the significant humanitarian presence has repeatedly drawn on emergency funds, such as Flash Appeals.

Lack of financial support also affects information management and EWS. According to interviews, the government has included a small contribution in the 2019 budget for the SISAAP, but this does not match requirements. The Ministry of Health’s EWS lacks resources, leading to challenges in data collection, poor geographic coverage and lack of maintenance of weather stations, leaving some high-risk areas without monitoring systems. There is also a lack of incentives for individuals to collect and disseminate information. These challenges have been documented in the Climate Services National Framework of 2016, but little has been done to address them. The lack of communication infrastructure means that when data is collected, it can take more than a month to be received at the national level for integration and analysis, which significantly limits its utility, particularly for early warning (République du Tchad, 2016a).

Sectoral policies, strategies and programmes contributing to DRR face similar financial difficulties. As an example, the National Environment Policy will only have a budget allocated once the policy has been validated by the National Assembly. Meanwhile, the emergency fund under the Ministry of Women, Child Protection and National Solidarity is limited to €3 million annually. The health sector, which will receive almost 7% of the government budget in 2019 (Ezechiel, 2018), struggles to meet healthcare needs. In Dar Sila in eastern Chad, only 27% of the 47 health centres are functional, a single ambulance covers the entire province and there is only one physician for 102,300 inhabitants (OCHA, 2017; Le Masson et al., 2018). People living in remote areas usually travel to clinics on foot or by donkey. Unmet everyday health needs exacerbate people’s vulnerabilities and reinforce reliance on humanitarian interventions and NGO services.

### 3.2.2 Capacity constraints, limited incentives and gaps in coordination

Interviewees reported that important coordination mechanisms, such as the DRR Working Group, are ineffective. The group last met in July 2016, and has been hampered by the fact that the decree formalising the group identified 50 specific individuals, rather than
civil servant and organisational staff positions, meaning that when members change jobs, their participation in the group ceases and they are not automatically replaced by their successor in post. The high turnover of personnel in government has destabilised the group, and there is little incentive or institutional accountability for nominating replacements. UNDP’s withdrawal of financial support and technical leadership has further hindered the group’s functioning, and the CPD confirmed that no government budget had been allocated to it.

The DRR Working Group should act as an essential coordination, knowledge-sharing and advocacy mechanism to bolster DRR in Chad, including providing support for coordination between government ministries and with external partners. As outlined earlier, sectoral policies and strategies do contribute to DRR, including the National Development Plan, the Environment Policy and the national strategy on climate change. However, lack of capacity and understanding of the concept of DRR, combined with its position in a relatively low-profile government department, limits the incentives for working across sectoral lines to pool effort. The Ministry of Environment, Water and Fisheries supervises the Environment Policy, the National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) and the National Strategy to Combat Climate Change, while the national DRR focal point (the Director of the CPD) sits under the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Local Governance. The focal point faces difficulties mainstreaming DRR within sectoral policies and coordinating government strategies across all international policies: meetings on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Humanitarian Response Plan, the Paris Agreement and the Sendai Framework are often attended by different ministerial representatives each time. Without an effective information-sharing mechanism, people in different ministries might not be aware of or involved in what other government entities are doing. For example, the Ministry of Public Health, through the entomological and epidemiological services, requires basic climate information and rainfall seasonal trends forecasts to address climate-affected disease (malaria), but collaboration on this has yet to be routinely established (République du Tchad, 2016a).

3.2.3 Lack of systematic risk information
Making the political case for investing in DRR is challenging as risk information is piecemeal; there is no multi-hazard risk assessment with national coverage, and no systematic disaster loss data. The government has no data collection or database system to record or analyse disaster losses and is currently not reporting on DesInventar, preventing analysis of investments versus losses at the national level that could help prioritise investment in DRR. UN agencies have tried to collect and analyse risk trends, but this is not systematic or holistic, and Chad does not have a single or standardised methodology for post-disaster needs assessment – those that are conducted are agency-specific, disparate and ad hoc. That said, there have been attempts to record disaster impacts. The Chadian Red Cross, NGOs and UN agencies, including through the REACH initiative, are conducting vulnerability and capacity assessments, on a project- or area-specific basis, with a short-term focus on crisis response. Systematic, nationwide and institutionalised assessments are required to develop a full picture of risks and capabilities across the country.

The lack of systematic risk information reflects a lack of commitment to compiling data and coordinating assessments to improve understanding of risks and support DRR. The main strategic documents, such as the National Development Plan and the National Climate Change Strategy, do outline the main hazards and

6 See www.desinventar.org.

7 REACH is a joint initiative of IMPACT, its sister organisation ACTED and the UN Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT). REACH was established in 2010 to facilitate the development of information tools and products that enhance the humanitarian community’s decision-making and planning capacity (www.reach-initiative.org/reach/about-reach).
**The evolution of disaster risk reduction in Chad**

**Selected key policy moments, events and legislation**

1975

1989

1992
Ministry of Environment and Fisheries signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

2000
Creation of National Action Plan to Prevent Desertification (PAN-LCD).

2002
Creation of Civil Protection Directorate (CPD) (decree n°384/PR/MAI/2002), tasked to develop, implement and coordinate emergency plans, and raise awareness of risks and disaster prevention.

2005
Creation of the Information System on Food Security and Early Warning (SISAAP), Chad’s main food security early warning system (EWS), operational with support from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

2007
Decree n°035/PR/PM/MA/99 created the Action Committee for Food Security and Crises Management (CASAGC) to track national food security indicators.

2009
Creation of National Framework to combat locust infestation, with FAO support including a regional EWS. A National Environment Policy developed, including aims to improve the climate monitoring mechanism, strengthen the national EWS and emergency support in case of natural disaster, along with communities’ capacity to face disasters. The policy has not been politically validated.

2012
Major drought in June (1,600,000 people affected) and floods in September (466,000 affected) caused serious damage in more than 12 regions, prompting uncontrolled urbanisation in N’Djamena (République du Tchad, 2014c, 2017b).

2013
Decree n°02/PR/2013 created the Fire Brigade with decentralised provincial units. Roles included disaster response and preparedness.

2014
Chad received support from the Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI), including a DRR capacity assessment based on Hyogo Framework priorities. Plan d’Organisation des Secours du Tchad (ORSEC) relief plan created with support from UNDP, defining intervention and coordination mechanisms in the event of disaster. It is considered part of a strategic framework for national security, and inventories current risks and capacities. Chain of command from township to national level is described and it also stipulates the need for post-disaster needs assessments (République du Tchad, 2014c). The plan has not been validated politically.

2015
Chad endorsed the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, with the CPD as focal point for implementation. National Action Plan to Strengthen Disaster Risk Reduction, Preparedness and Response to Disasters (PAN-RRC) elaborated with support from CADRI. It has not been politically validated.

2016
Decree 622/PR/PM/2016 officialised CPD’s responsibility to ‘coordinate operations in the events of natural-related disasters, to implement policies and programs aiming at assisting and protecting refugees, returnees, repatriated and displaced persons’.

Decree n°007/PR/PM/MPCI/SG/2016 officialised the DRR Working Group. However, October 2016 was the group’s last meeting as UNDP withdrew financial support.

Action Plan for the Implementation of the Climate Services National Framework developed to target four sectors: agriculture and food security, water resources, health, and natural-related disaster risk management. Much of the plan has not been implemented for lack of financial resources.

2017
A national multi-risks contingency plan created with support from UNICEF. It has been developed into two pilot regional plans (Salamat and Hadjer Lamis provinces), with simulation exercises organised in August 2016. National Development Plan (2017–2021) outlined how humanitarian crises stemming from the security context and disasters have hindered development and diverted state resources from development to security and humanitarian needs.

UNDAF (2017–2021) plan called for strengthening the DRR institutional and legal framework, EWS and disaster preparedness, but also household resilience to shocks. National Strategy to Combat Climate Change (2017–2030) created, identifying preservation of Lake Chad as a capital condition for peace, security and development. Chad participated in the Global Platform for DRR in Cancun.

2019
Chad took part in the Global Platform for DRR in Geneva.
threats and the vulnerability context, but focus on disaster prevention and response rather than DRR, and a chronic lack of budget means that planned activities have not been implemented. This research also found little in the way of a robust monitoring mechanism, and little understanding of what had been achieved to date.

3.2.4 Lack of accountability and enforcement

Over the past 30 years, numerous well-intentioned decrees and national policy frameworks have been devised with the intention of kick-starting action and strengthening capacities on various aspects of risk management. But all too often these fall short, with lack of enforcement, capacity, funding or political support. Sectoral laws that would contribute to risk reduction are routinely not enforced. Unregulated urban development was rife following the 2012 drought in N’djamen, and riverbeds, where the poorest populations now reside, are exposed to flooding. Limited enforcement of building codes and land use planning regulations (UNDP, 2016) has resulted in unplanned urban settlements in the capital that experience repeated annual flooding.

Overall, there is a chronic lack of funding, limited technical capacity and an absence of any strong institutional foothold for DRR, resulting in inadequate disaster risk governance. This was certainly the finding of CADRI in 2014, and while some progress has been made over the past five years, this has not gone far enough. Meanwhile, disasters are having devastating impacts on Chadians. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2018b: 47), more than 7.5 million people (half of the population) are characterised by chronic or severe vulnerability due to food insecurity, malnutrition, displacement and public health emergencies. This situation is compounded by risks associated with climate change, economic crises and the general low level of development, with 4.3 million Chadians in need of humanitarian assistance and support to secure their livelihoods (OCHA, 2018b: 16).
4 Dominant framings of risk

The way a risk is defined shapes the responses proposed. The dominant framing of risks, threats and hazards in Chad has traditionally been around food insecurity, humanitarian crises, human and hard security, displacement (related to conflict, livelihoods and food insecurity) and, more recently, climate security. Although issues of drought, flooding and climate variability feature heavily as barriers to stability and socioeconomic progress, means of addressing these are rarely situated under an umbrella framing of DRR.

As the previous section has shown, DRR is not a political priority for the government or international donors (with the possible exception of UNDP). Instead, risks are framed in other, sectoral or threat-specific, ways. For example, the government is focused on tackling food insecurity, the EU has made substantial investments in climate change adaptation (AMCC+, n.d.) and Agence Française de Développement (AFD) in maternal health, among other developmental challenges (AFD, 2016).

4.1 Tackling droughts and improving food security: the dominant discourse

The populations of drylands and semi-arid areas have traditionally developed their own pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihood systems to adapt to low and sporadic rainfall (Anderson et al., 2009; UNDP, 2011). Both governmental and non-governmental organisations supporting the inhabitants of drylands have over the years advanced understanding, technical capacity and action with drought-specific mechanisms, policies and institutions (e.g. the Food Security and Nutrition Network). In Chad, too, a strong institutional and operational framework exists to address food insecurity: the Action Committee for Food Security and Crises Management (CASAGC) and the National Food Security Programme (NFSP 2014–2021). The CASAGC coordination platform, funded through a state budget allocation and operational since 1999, convenes monthly technical gatherings – including agro-economists, statisticians, nutritionists and database experts – and biannual committee meetings, and supports decentralised services through provincial focal points. Commitment to these two frameworks is evident as responsibility has been given to two powerful government ministries: the Ministry of Production, Irrigation and Agricultural Equipment (for the CASAGC); and the Ministry of Economy and Development Planning (for the NFSP). Even so, delivering on these frameworks is not without challenges; the emergency stock has a limited geographical spread, with one interviewee flagging that there are no warehouses in the poorest and most isolated areas.

The government is also an active participant in a number of programmes and initiatives on drought and food security. Chad is the only central African member of the Global Alliance for Resilience (AGIR) within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Chad is also part of the regional Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), which provides climate services for the agricultural and livestock sectors and a regional food security EWS and database. The CILSS supports processes of coordination and consultation with governments, donors and NGOs, and regional initiatives such as FEWS-NET. Stakeholders meet twice a year to review the agro-sylvo-pastoral, food and nutrition situation and identify and agree on those populations most at risk of food insecurity.
The CILLS is supported at the national level in Chad by the FAO-supported and EU-funded SISAAP. Created in 2007, this is the country’s main EWS. Through the SISAAP, the National Meteorological Agency (NMA) and the Ministry of Production, Irrigation and Agricultural Equipment collate data from rainfall stations to provide information to agro-pastoral communities. The strength of the system lies in the deployment of SISAAP focal points at the provincial level, with responsibility for gathering information and sending it to the national database, and its links to regional systems such as the CILSS. The SISAAP is regarded as the strongest EWS in Chad, and the budget allocated to it is testament to the government’s prioritisation of food security.

Taken together, the institutional and operational framework surrounding drought and food security is relatively strong compared to other risk management structures at the national and regional level. In part, this reflects the severity of the consequences of widespread famine; as such, financial resources and political capital continue (arguably rightly so) to be focused on food security over other risks. Despite these efforts, however, pervasive food insecurity affects almost 3.7 million of people in Chad (OCHA, 2018b), demonstrating the limits of institutional mechanisms to reduce vulnerability to food crises. In 2019, the national rate of acute malnutrition reached 13.5%, and more than 350,000 children were at risk of severe acute malnutrition (OCHA, 2018b).

There are weaknesses in the institutional framework for drought management (UNDP, 2016). The CILSS is primarily financed internationally, rather than by national governments. According to interviews the government has included a small contribution in the 2019 budget for the SISAAP but sustainability of funding remains an issue, and the EU has requested a resource mobilisation study. Other mechanisms, such as the AU’s African Risk Capacity (ARC), are yet to come into effect in Chad.

4.1.1 Situating drought and food security within the DRR agenda
What does this mean for DRR? Since the International Decade for Disaster Reduction in the 1990s (UNISDR, 1999), DRR has advanced substantially, but arguably in a way that largely neglects, or at least has remained distinct from, actors, institutions and policy and legal frameworks on drought and food security. DRR policy and institutions tend to focus on rapid-onset events, and in many contexts the idea of shifting from risk management to risk reduction still has a long way to go (Wilkinson et al., 2017).

Yet drought risk management offers many contributions and opportunities for mainstreaming disaster risk governance. The institutional and operational mechanisms for drought and food security have clear links to and alignments with more conventional disaster risk management, including tracking indicators for early warning, coordinating crisis prevention, the management of emergency stocks, capacity strengthening and resilience-building (République du Tchad, 2014d; 2014e). Drought and food security mechanisms – like conventional principles for DRR – also require cross-ministerial expertise, as well as decentralised services and multi-stakeholder participation. It is often argued that advancing DRR is challenging as it requires multidisciplinary expertise and action across line ministries and departments. Dealing with food security is no different, though this seems to be better understood in Chad – in ways that DRR is not.

Respondents often referred to DRR as a new concept in Chad, and one that is poorly understood within government. Yet numerous government departments have long-established mechanisms to anticipate and mitigate drought risks and associated food insecurity (albeit with varied success). With farming and

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8 The CILSS is funded by a range of donors, including the EU, USAID, the AFD, the African Development Bank, the World Bank and the Islamic Development Bank.

9 The ARC is a risk pooling and risk transfer mechanism covering up to $30 million per country per season for drought events that occur with a frequency of one in five years or less.
livestock-rearing as the main source of food and revenue for Chadians, and a driver of rural economic growth (Lead Chad et al., 2018), this strong institutional framework is intended to anticipate major risks in order to tackle food insecurity and malnutrition, but these efforts are not regarded as part of a broader DRR agenda, and have developed independently from the policy and institutional architecture of DRR. Could a ‘system of strategies’ be a better way to frame current risk management efforts in Chad – to put a positive spin on what already exists, as a foundation for further action?

4.2 Tackling climate change impacts

The links between action on climate change, particularly climate change adaptation, and DRR are well-established (Schipper, 2009). Both understand risk to be inherent in society and in development trajectories, and both seek to take a holistic approach to risk reduction through socioeconomic and political processes (Schipper, 2009; Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2019). The urgent need globally to reduce emissions through climate change mitigation, and the resulting legally binding Paris Agreement on climate change (UNFCCC, 2015), has led to an upsurge in political and financial backing for climate change action. The legal weight behind the Paris Agreement, and the international desire to halt global temperature rise before irreversible limits result in catastrophic outcomes, has fast-tracked the development of national action plans for climate change adaptation – far more rapidly than action on the non-legally binding Sendai Framework (UNISDR, 2015a).

In Chad, managing the adverse impacts of climate variability and change features high on the list of priority challenges to be addressed by the government in the National Development Plan 2017–2021 (République du Tchad, 2017d). On the one hand, climate models tend to converge around a noticeable increase in temperatures, especially in summer (June, July, August, September), between 3–4°C by the end of the century, compared with the last 20 years of the twentieth century (Heinrigs, 2010). On the other hand, climate model projections of precipitation in the Sahel are in significant disagreement, and there is no scientific consensus on whether extremely dry or extremely wet seasons are likely to become more common (ibid.). Certain regions in south-eastern Chad have experienced changing patterns of rainfall and recurrent floods, destroying hundreds of thousands of hectares of arable land (PNUE, 2011). Chad’s NAPA (PANA-TCHAD, 2010) acknowledges that climate extremes contribute to a decrease in river flows and in groundwater recharge, the recession of Lake Chad shorelines, the degradation of soil and vegetation cover and decreased rain-fed agricultural production. All of these impacts undermine people’s access to natural resources (water and land) and are known to aggravate conflicts between different users.

Chad’s NAPA (PNAN-TCHAD, 2010) – a precursor to the National Adaptation Plan,

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Box 2 Priority actions in Chad’s NAPA (2010)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Water management.</td>
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<td>2. Development of intensive and diversified crops.</td>
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<td>3. Development and dissemination of cropping calendars.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Information, education and communication on adaptation to climate change.</td>
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<td>5. Building of protection infrastructure and soil restoration for the development of agricultural activities.</td>
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<td>6. Improvement of intercommunity pasture areas.</td>
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<td>7. Improvement of seasonal forecast of precipitation and runoff of surface water.</td>
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<td>9. Creation and extension of fodder banks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Climate risk management.</td>
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which is still being developed – articulates a set of priority action areas, many of which will contribute to improved risk management (see Box 2). The NAPA complements the PAN-LCD, which includes a pillar on risk management, particularly regarding bush fires, and the National Strategy ‘Big Green Wall’. Climate change adaptation thus provides a vehicle for pursuing DRR outcomes. The priorities correspond to initiatives that can contribute to strengthening people’s capacities to anticipate shocks, protect their assets and cope with stresses, ultimately reducing their vulnerability to extreme weather events and climate change.

The implementation of the NAPA is supported by a $36.2 million project funded by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the Global Environment Fund (GEF) and the Chadian government (16.8% of total cost) over seven years. The Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), funded by the EU, also supports the country’s efforts in climate change adaptation. The GCCA aims to reinforce environmental and natural resource management, in particular developing a database to track adaptation activities and measure progress in reinforcing the resilience of communities and local ecosystems in the face of climate shocks (AMCC+, 2017). In 2017, Chad also equipped itself with a National Strategy to Combat Climate Change with five priorities. Three directly contribute to DRR:

- To strengthen the resilience of agro-sylvo-pastoral activities and fisheries resources.
- To prevent risks and manage extreme climate phenomena, including (1) to reinforce the meteorological network and weather and climate forecasting tools; (2) to create an observatory for risks and natural disaster prevention and management; (3) to reinforce operational capacities for crisis prevention and management; and (4) to strengthen mechanisms for preventing and managing epidemics and climate-sensitive human and animal diseases.
- To reinforce institutions’ and actors’ capacities to deal with climate change impacts and to access and use climate funds. (République du Tchad, 2017c).

The strategy articulates clear links with other DRR-related mechanisms, and affirms that Chad supports ‘panafrican risks and natural disaster prevention and management mechanisms’ alongside accelerating the finalisation of the National ORSEC Plan and the National Contingency Plan, and reinforcing SISAAP’s operational capacities (République du Tchad, 2017c: 40). In practice and at community level, adaptation efforts are supported by projects such as Résilience et Emploi au lac Tchad (RESTE). RESTE activities include support to develop smart agriculture, advancing understanding of the cropping calendar and convening regional and local weather and climate workshops in collaboration with the NMA.10 Each year, an exchange programme sees two technicians from the NMA visit the CILSS to work on seasonal trends. Such initiatives combine local knowledge with CILSS scientific information, allowing plans to be developed for a range of possible scenarios – rains at normal levels, in excess or in deficit. Communities then develop adaptation strategies based on those scenarios.

4.2.1 Utilising politically and financially backed entry points: climate change adaptation

Given the conceptual and programmatic links between climate change adaptation and DRR, could climate change funding provide an opportunity for advancing DRR ambitions? In theory yes, because both climate change adaptation and DRR aim to protect, secure and sustain people’s well-being. In practice, implementation of existing climate-related plans is undertaken through projects that receive timebound external funding, as opposed to an overarching governmental budget dedicated to supporting the implementation of climate change adaptation efforts. This results in poor implementation of most of the NAPA’s priority actions. The lack of institutional commitment

is aggravated by the rapid turnover of civil servants, which requires continuous sensitisation, training and capacity-building of ministerial staff on mainstreaming climate change and DRR.

More broadly, states with weak institutional performance find it extremely difficult to identify and access climate change funding. Chad is no exception. As an example, in 2013 only 16% of public adaptation finance was disbursed to sub-Saharan African countries, more than half of which are characterised as fragile by the OECD (Climate Diplomacy, 2016). States – particularly states with lower technical knowledge and administrative capacity – find it hard to navigate the plethora of bilateral and multilateral funds. One key informant from a government agency explained the challenge of developing financial proposals that comply with the GEF’s Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) requirements. Obtaining accreditation to major funding schemes can take several years. State corruption does not help demonstrate fiscal credibility. In 2013, Chad was ranked 166th of the 177 countries assessed by Transparency International, with a score of 19 on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (highly clean) (Chêne, 2014). Understandably, donors are keen to minimise the risk of financial misappropriation.

One interviewee from a UN agency felt that the GEF’s Adaptation Fund would be less likely to fund initiatives framed as DRR. Any proposals geared towards building a national DRR strategy or a national DRR platform are seen as attracting little interest given the limited support for DRR within the government. Many respondents suggested that actions contributing to climate adaptation and ‘resilience’ are more likely to be supported, including activities such as EWS and weather index insurance.

Climate funds are designed to support the delivery of NAPA and National Adaption Plans, in which DRR outcomes are articulated, albeit not necessarily explicitly using ‘disaster’ terminology. By extension, therefore, any allocated climate funds will flow to DRR-relevant activities. Ultimately, the LDCF under the GEF is prioritising actions to reduce the vulnerability of sectors important for national development (agriculture, health, water) and disaster risk management (though arguably with less emphasis on longer-term risk reduction). While some progress has been made on the policy links between climate change adaptation and DRR, more concerted effort is required to support governments of fragile and conflict-affected contexts, including on how climate change adaptation and DRR could contribute to conflict prevention (Peters et al., 2019b).

4.3 The ‘resilience’ agenda: a help or a hindrance?

Since the concept of ‘resilience’ took hold in development, humanitarian and climate spheres, a multitude of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) programmes have framed their interventions around ‘building’ it. What this means in practice varies considerably according to the individual stakeholders concerned, and as such the utility of ‘resilience’ as an umbrella concept has been both championed and criticised (Levine et al., 2012). There is some evidence to suggest that resilience could be useful for advancing DRR outcomes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, where it manifests as efforts to bridge humanitarian and development action, encouraging responses that lead to longer-term risk reduction, and where a more holistic approach to risk links climate and disaster resilience with aspects of conflict prevention, for example through specialised approaches to natural resource management. FAO’s regional response strategy (‘Mitigating the impact of the crisis and strengthening the resilience and food security of conflict-affected communities’) combines emergency support during the lean period, to avoid decapitalisation, with help to build and diversify livelihoods and create value chains. The RESILAC project (see Box 3) includes reinforcing hazards and climate shock EWS. AGIR, established in 2012, aimed to strengthen social protection for more sustainable livelihoods, but it is no longer funded and the resilience priorities identified by the Chad government were never implemented.

Recent studies in Chad have shown strong government interest in the concept of resilience, and in linking ‘emergency’ and ‘development’ interventions (Watson et al., 2015). Providing cash transfers, for example, strengthens the resilience of vulnerable people against a range of
shocks, allowing individuals to acquire assets that can be disposed of during a crisis, or enabling them to diversify their livelihoods to spread risk. Such interventions, which can respond to both immediate survival and longer-term development needs, are attracting increasing interest because social protection-focused projects using cash transfers constitute a means to achieve a balance between humanitarian and development action (Watson et al., 2016). Donors in Chad, including the World Bank, are providing financial backing for cash programming for social protection.

Overall, resilience-framed projects implement a range of activities, often focused on improving access to basic services including sexual, reproductive and maternal health (AFD-funded project PASFASS 2019–2022), strengthening livelihoods (such as through the Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) programme) and food security (CARE International, 2015). The language of ‘resilience’ looks set to remain a dominant frame of understanding over the next few years. In August 2018, UNDP and OCHA published a background paper on Resilience for Sustainable Development in the Lake Chad Basin, calling for the urgent scale-up of development interventions in the region to ‘prevent the further erosion of local capacities’ (UNDP and OCHA, 2018:3).

The paper stresses the underlying causes of the humanitarian crises that need to be addressed to achieve sustainable peace and stability, which a military victory alone could not bring. Proposed responses include actions to build the resilience of individuals and households. DRR components include the provision of social safety nets, weather and climate services and recovery of the lake ecosystem.

Our research finds that the local scale is a much-used entry point for resilience interventions by civil society organisations and international agencies alike. This is in part because NGOs seek to work directly with poor communities, and in part because the state’s institutional and technical capacities are low, and so for many donors and agencies geographically specific, projectised approaches appear to offer greater opportunities to deliver results within discrete, predetermined timeframes. Interviewees for this study frequently said that bottom-up approaches have more impact.

The local level may be a viable entry point for interventions, but even people living in remote communities are affected by national economic and political structures that can alleviate or maintain conditions of poverty. Moreover, community-based interventions can only be effective where local governance mechanisms do

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**Box 3 The RESILAC project**

The RESILAC (Inclusive social and economic recovery of Lake Chad) project operates across the four riparian countries in the Lake Chad region. Funded by the AFD and EU to a value of €35 million over four years (2018–2021), RESILAC is regarded as an innovative pilot project on recovery, development in conflict contexts and change processes. Implementation in Chad is in the hands of a consortium of INGOs comprising Action contre la faim (ACF) (as the lead), CARE and Groupe URD (as the knowledge manager).

Groupe URD is implementing an Iterative Evaluation and Small Seminary (EIMS), a dynamic evaluation and monitoring method based on ideas of apprenticeship and accountability towards local communities. According to interviews, the process will enable the project to adapt to changing conflict dynamics, for example by supporting returnees if some areas previously occupied by armed groups become accessible again. Donors have provided the consortium with more flexibility than usual in terms of budget (allowing a variation of 25%) and on project deliverables: activities have not been predefined and will vary from one country to another. Adaptive programming is central to the project, from design to implementation. RESILAC also includes activities contributing to DRR, and as such presents an opportunity for DRR (and development) practitioners, along with donors, to learn how to implement programmes effectively in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.
not discriminate against the most marginalised members of communities. For example, granaries can help villagers access food during the lean period, but women’s access is constrained by social norms which dictate they need permission from their husband before using them (Le Masson et al., 2019). To address this, many projects set up granary management committees that include women, but the scale of these initiatives is extremely limited.

For some agencies, resilience denotes a systems approach, which necessitates a deeper understanding of how actions interact across scales. Including national, regional and local authorities in strategic and operational steering committees is believed to help strengthen authorities’ ownership and capacity to replicate similar processes in other areas. In this way, the local level can be an avenue for leveraging change at the national level. Similarly, it is often the case that NGOs see part of their role as helping build an evidence base of good practice to support advocacy with the government on the costs and benefits of interventions.

Finally, critics of the resilience paradigm have questioned whether it has genuinely delivered a substantive change in approaches or outcomes. In particular, to what extent are project outcomes sustainable in the absence of adequate links to national funding mechanisms or social services? For a number of agencies, the ‘solution’ lies in working to enhance local governance, particularly where ‘resilience’ includes building governance legitimacy and accountability. For example, many operational agencies felt that processes such as Vulnerability Risk Assessments (VRAs) and Vulnerability and Capacity Assessments (VCAs) help enable communities to determine the priorities within development strategies and ensure actions respond to locally identified risks and vulnerabilities. Local Development Plans can also support communities to drive social change in ways that support their resilience capacities, even in conflict contexts This is in line with broader academic literature, which finds that people rebuilding for themselves from the bottom up enjoy far greater success in terms of sustainable development and increased resilience, as opposed to top-down planning processes from centralised government institutions (Klein, 2008; Lowenstein, 2015). Lowenstein (2015) suggests that resilience programmes which centre on the local level provide a means of challenging the orthodox view that resilience should focus on the state and on bolstering centralised infrastructure, which often fails to improve the lives of the people these programmes are seeking to help.

4.4 Climate security

Competing discourses of risk governance can prevail in the same location at the same time, and the way risks are framed affects the way development and humanitarian challenges are presented, as well as the solutions proposed. The climate security discourse is not one that comes from within Chad, but derives from external actors in the academic and international foreign policy space. Even so, it is becoming increasingly relevant in shaping funding priorities and action in the Lake Chad region.

Climate change has increasingly been framed as a security issue, with numerous discussions of the potential security implications of climate change on the UN Security Council agenda since the mid-2000s (Peters and Mayhew, 2016). Chad, as part of the Lake Chad region, has featured heavily in these debates as an illustration of the climate–security nexus. Specifically, UN Security Council Resolution 2349 on the Lake Chad region included ‘an entire, unprecedented paragraph on the role of climate change on the crisis’ (Vivekananda, 2017: 2). The Resolution called for a UN Secretary-General report to identify ‘durable solutions’ alongside ‘preventative and stabilisation’ measures (ibid.). Many proponents of the climate security agenda felt strongly that the subsequent report failed to deliver because it omitted climate change. The report also focused on humanitarian response, rather than proposing response coupled with ex-ante measures including DRR, which could have offered longer-term and sustainable routes to reducing the humanitarian burden.

In response to the neglect of climate in the UN Secretary-General’s report, significant investment has been made by the Netherlands, France and Germany in ‘climate fragility’ and ‘climate-related security risk assessments’ (Nagarajan et al., 2018; Vivekananda and Born, 2018). Such assessments
make scant reference to DRR, though there is
opportunity to advocate for greater consideration
of DRR as a potentially under-utilised solution to
the climate security challenge, as part of a broader
suite of response options. Indeed, extreme weather
events and disasters are identified as one of seven
compound climate fragility risks, to which DRR is
one of a range of solutions (Ruttinger et al., 2015;
Smith et al., 2019).

There has been a notable backlash at the
international level against the securitisation of
climate change (Warner and Boas, 2017; Peters
and Mayhew, 2016), with concerns that a climate
security discourse is demonising those vulnerable
to climate-related disasters as a security threat
– with racist undertones, especially in reference
to African states (Hartman, 2014). Few attempts
have been made to understand how disasters
are ‘utilised’ in a securitised climate discourse
(one exception being Peters, 2018), but attention
is turning to ‘doable’ actions and, with this,
consideration of the role that DRR could play.
5 Alternatives to normative approaches to DRR

A colleague told me yesterday about the goldfish he owned when he was a child. The goldfish used to swim in precise circles in its small bowl. When the water in the bowl needed changing, the goldfish was temporarily moved to the much bigger bathtub. And yes, despite its more spacious surroundings, the fish continued to swim in the same small circle (Schomerus, 2017).

This anecdote formed part of an opinion piece on the UN Secretary-General’s drive to refocus the UN system on sustaining peace. It is in part the drive towards conflict resolution and prevention which prompted increased international attention on the Lake Chad region – together with European preoccupations with a securitised narrative on migration (European Commission, 2015). The anecdote hints at the confinement – self-prescribed and enforced – of individual and institutional approaches to humanitarian, development and peace challenges. Do those concerned with advancing DRR outcomes need to start swimming in larger circles, including, but not limited to, those linked to drought and food security, climate change, resilience and climate security? Could a networked approach help to advance the DRR agenda in a context where DRR has limited political traction? Or would a stronger and more explicit framing of DRR as a means to enhance the social contract offer a way to move disaster resilience beyond natural hazards and into the realm of post-conflict governance strengthening? This paper explores these ideas next, and concludes with recommendations.

5.1 Using DRR outcomes to strengthen the social contract

Institutional arrangements based on the legacy of the civil war and a heavily clientelist system challenge standardised approaches to DRR in significant ways. Such governance structures challenge the feasibility of collectively pursuing the goals of the Sendai Framework (and other sustainable development ambitions) since – as one interviewee remarked – the system is geared towards keeping a balance to avoid overt and violent conflict. In such a system, disaster risk governance based on principles of fair and equitable distribution of resources and inclusive whole-of-society approaches are put into question. Without the foundations of a strong social contract, positive experience of effective disaster risk governance or trust between the state and citizens, the incentive for and sense of state obligation to invest in DRR is undermined and may not come to fruition in any meaningful way.

It may be unsurprising therefore that all interviewees mentioned in some shape or form that DRR is ‘destined to fail’ in Chad because it relies on a certain level of governance functioning and political will – arguably prerequisites for any sectoral development and state-building activity. There is an inherent logic to this assumption
based on the way DRR is currently conceived, principally as a dogmatic approach orchestrated around the state’s responsibility for protecting citizens, requiring technical capabilities, government budget allocation and political will. Indeed, DRR mechanisms suffer from the same governance limitations as development projects – lack of enforcement of policies, inadequate planning regulations and codes, limited financial resources – and so it may be easy to conclude that the historical legacy of conflict in Chad undermines the basic developmental and governance foundations necessary for conventional approaches to DRR. But there is another way to interpret this – that perhaps the way the DRR community conceives of DRR is misguided in conflict contexts.

The nexus of DRR and conflict has for some time challenged the DRR community, with questions about whether peace is required before DRR can be pursued (Peters, 2017). In Chad, what level of peace and development, or, more acutely, the state–citizen contract and governance functioning, is required if normative DRR approaches can act as a logical channel for progress remains unclear. Greater understanding of and insight into how DRR adapts to different levels of peace and development is required to even begin to map out a viable pathway for DRR in Chad.

Alternatives to state-level entry points do exist, including community-based DRR, which can support individuals and communities at specific points in time to enhance their disaster resilience. But to what extent can the local level be considered an alternative or sufficiently alternative pathway to achieving disaster resilience? How can such approaches scale up or out, or be genuinely sustainable without government ownership, commitment and accountability? What are the implications for the social contract? In what ways does circumventing the state undermine or reduce the pressure put on the state by citizens to provide basic service provision?

The limited social contract and trust between citizens and government add an additional layer of difficulty in the implementation of normative approaches to DRR, which rely heavily on a state-centric approach. While there is no clear evidence to suggest that service delivery by UN and NGOs necessarily impacts citizens’ perceptions of the state (Nixon and Mallett, 2017), such insights need to be tested specifically in relation to disaster risk governance, and whether externally delivered interventions may further undermine state–citizen relations. For some interviewees, any DRR intervention in Chad should strengthen the social contract via its implementation. While a normative approach to DRR may not be feasible in Chad, any non-state interventions should contribute towards building an environment that may eventually lead to a more government-led and institutionalised DRR system. A networked approach that builds on established institutions and successful partnerships which (aim to) respond to drought and food insecurity offers an alternative DRR pathway for Chad. This is especially the case in instances where there is strong government buy-in.

5.2 Towards a networked approach to DRR in conflict contexts

DRR strategies ‘may be one comprehensive strategy document or a system of strategies across sectors and stakeholders with one overarching document linking them’ (UNISDR, 2017a). DRR is not prominent in risk management in Chad. In fact, the way risks in Chad are framed nationally and internationally differ. Policies and mechanisms have been developed around issues of food security and drought as well as military and security framings linked to geopolitics and the Boko Haram crisis. Within the international community, climate security is increasingly being used as a discourse through which to understand intersecting risks. The language of DRR does not speak to the dominant national discourses in Chad, and as such is more of a ‘hard sell’ politically, especially when unaccompanied by funding (unlike the climate change agenda). This presents challenges when trying to promote and advocate for action under the Sendai Framework (UNISDR, 2017).

DRR in Chad is sometimes regarded as a top-down agenda driven by international organisations and donors – albeit to respond to the realities of disaster impacts. Through a normative lens, the state of DRR in Chad
suggests that there is a lack of institutional support and adequate capacity to align with and deliver on the Sendai Framework. However, Chad has established institutions both nationally and regionally to address drought, food insecurity, conflict over natural resources and the impacts of climate variability and change. In parallel, many initiatives supported by international donors have generated programmes that do contribute to reducing natural hazard-related vulnerabilities even if they are not labelled as DRR. This includes the myriad humanitarian and development projects framed as sustainable livelihoods projects, resilience-building or climate change adaptation.

We know the financial resources spent on DRR (or at least activities explicitly labelled as DRR) are limited, but when taking a broader view of DRR, any resources allocated to support water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) interventions, reduce maternal mortality or improve food security, both during and after emergencies, support aspects of disaster resilience where they contribute to addressing people’s vulnerabilities or build capacities to cope with natural hazards. These interventions might not be labelled as such but they do contribute to DRR outcomes. Moreover, reducing vulnerability to disasters requires intersectoral initiatives to strengthen people’s livelihoods, including their health and income, access to information and social support and overall well-being. A networked approach that strengthens collaboration between sectors, and considers contributions towards disaster resilience as originating beyond formalised DRR action, would arguably be a more viable entry point for advancing DRR. The idea of networked approaches has been used to describe the need to take a systems approach to risk management, recognising how risks are interconnected and require holistic responses. Here we take a different interpretation to consider how actions by multiple actors could collectively contribute to achieving DRR outcomes. This aligns with UNDRR’s conceptualisation of a DRR strategy comprising a ‘system of strategies’ – but which could require an overarching frame to enable them to become more than the sum of their parts.

The pursuit of DRR in Chad thus challenges normative approaches to achieving disaster resilience outcomes. Instead of starting with a blueprint for DRR, starting with DRR as an outcome where multiple actors and interventions can contribute might lead to a ‘networked’ way of thinking and acting, allowing DRR ambitions to be achieved in ways that are adapted to the institutional arrangements and political economy of the context. Of course, there are limitations. In Chad, critical ministries such as the Ministry of Women, Child Protection and National Solidarity have seen their budgets plummet. Institutions that could contribute to reducing disaster impacts routinely suffer from insufficient funding – a reminder that there will be no quick wins simply by looking elsewhere.

The traditional DRR approach in Chad is not well-developed, but our analysis suggests that food security, drought and resilience initiatives are contributing to many of the same outcomes of disaster resilience and sustainable development – in other words, DRR outcomes. What is not happening is a comprehensive analysis of how those multiple initiatives come together to achieve impacts greater than the sum of their parts. Such an analysis could build on existing humanitarian coordination mechanisms and be extended to include development and climate partners and interventions, where they exist. Such an analysis may help to identify the amounts of ODA spent on response and recovery. The predominantly humanitarian context, with constraints on funding and intervention timeframes, and interventions not geared towards structural or institutional change, limits the scope for achieving enhanced disaster risk governance at the scale required. Interventions more developmental in nature, including those that work with local government entities, are required. The chronic vulnerability of the majority of the population to multiple risks shows that, despite efforts to date, a sea-change is still required.

5.3 **Recommendations**

The government of Chad has committed to reduce disaster risks under the Sendai Framework (UNISDR, 2015a), and to report against those commitments as part of its contribution to Agenda 2030. The conclusions identified early in this research process hold true – more needs to
be done to support citizens and the government to bolster disaster risk governance and DRR capacities to reduce disaster impacts. ‘More’ is required – investment through government budget allocations and external donor support, enhanced DRR knowledge and skills and high-level political support. Evidence and analysis are required on what types of DRR actions are viable and appropriate under different conditions of conflict.

Trialling a networked approach to DRR in Chad and interpreting a DRR strategy as a ‘system of strategies’ in order to report against the four priority areas of the Sendai Framework could offer a more appropriate starting point from which to pursue DRR. In addition to ‘more’, perhaps a new narrative can also be trialled, one that seeks to take the conflict context as the starting point and consider the ways in which advancing disaster resilience can be part of a broader agenda to rebuild the social contract between the state and citizens. Starting at the local level, where action on DRR is viable and visible through NGO projects and having real impacts on people’s lives, a concerted effort is required to devise new means of partnering with formal risk governance mechanisms and institutions as part of a longer-term agenda to build capacity from the ground up.

5.3.1 Chad’s commitment and contribution to the Sendai Framework

- Technical support is required to help the government report against its commitments under the Sendai Framework in ways that harness the breadth of risk reduction work happening under other terms and labels – trialling a networked approach could help test the ideas emerging from this research and establish a more positive starting point from which to prioritise further action on DRR outcomes.

- Subnational DRR strategies are required across Chad to support attainment of Sendai Framework Target E. Such strategies should be designed on the basis of the known vulnerabilities of local populations – including explicit recognition of the relationship between conflict dynamics and hazard vulnerabilities, and the challenges this presents with regard to limited access and operational space.

5.3.2 From crisis response to strengthening disaster risk governance

- Concerted attention is required on the part of the government, donors and international agencies to strategise around how to shift from a predominantly response-oriented
arrangement to more proactive risk management. The UN’s prevention agenda offers space to challenge the extent to which humanitarian response and transitions out of crisis could contribute to building local capacities for risk management.

- There is currently no multi-hazard risk assessment with national coverage, and no systematic disaster loss data across development, humanitarian and peace actors. Effective DRR requires a nuanced understanding of all constituent components of disaster risk – including natural hazards, environmental shocks, climate change and conflicts. Any new investments in data collection and analysis (including through climate-related funds) should ensure interoperability with existing national information systems.

5.3.3 Viewing alternative framings of risk management as an opportunity

- In the context of a conflict-affected and least developed country, the government’s limited financial resources are dedicated to key sectors contributing to resilience: health, education, agriculture and pastoralist livelihoods and water and sanitation infrastructure. Finding more politically astute ways to promote mainstreaming of DRR through these traditional sectors may need to come first, rather than dogmatically pursuing standardised approaches to DRR and then mainstreaming through other sectors. Risk-informed approaches to sustainable development in support of the SDGs more broadly can also contribute to reducing disaster risks, and in turn achieving the objectives of the Sendai Framework (Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2019; UNDRR, 2019).

- With limited political appetite among donors to invest in DRR in conflict-affected contexts, opportunities presented by international climate funds must be harnessed. First, the argument still needs to be effectively made that contexts affected by conflict require additional and tailored support to access climate funds – this should be championed by financial partners such as the NAP Global Network and GCCA+ – and where support is provided to improve monetary and fiscal management, such processes should be used to accelerate the pace of accreditation.

- Accreditation provides opportunities to access climate funds – which in turn can help bolster capacities for managing and preventing climate-related disaster impacts. Accreditation may also serve the broader goal of improving financial transparency at the national level and addressing corruption, which is paramount in supporting improvements in fiscal management and resource governance. The Green Climate Fund accreditation system, for instance, requires entities to comply with fiduciary principles of accountability, financial reporting and transparent administration. Over the longer term, such improvements may help encourage donors to channel resources to Chad for DRR.

- One limitation of interventions contributing to DRR outcomes, but which use other framings of risk – such as livelihood support, climate change adaptation or food security – is that data, knowledge and lessons are not documented in ways that are readily transferable to the DRR community of practice. This may be because of the different terminology used, circulation among different audiences and/or different tags allocated to the outputs. Further work is needed to source, collate and analyse lessons from interventions on what works and what doesn’t, with a specific view to understanding what types of DRR actions are viable and appropriate under what types of conflict conditions, and how to strengthen capacity and ownership at the national and subnational level through time-bound interventions. Learning from previous experience, including BRACED and ongoing programmes such as RESILAC, offers one avenue for exchanging of insights, knowledge and experience specifically on risk management and governance strengthening.

This case highlights a number of new avenues of enquiry. It leads us to ask: what does DRR contribute above and beyond the current framings? Put another way, could current approaches to risk management address
hazard-related risks? And if not, would DRR fare any better? Is DRR an unnecessary complication, or does it offer a useful transition to sustainable national disaster risk management systems? There will be no one answer to these questions, but asking them nonetheless can generate new ideas for advancing DRR outcomes, given that current efforts that adopt relatively technocentric approaches have to date failed to live up to expectations.


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