Set against a global context of rising violent conflict and the changing nature of conflict driven by a broad range of factors, including a wider spectrum of involved parties, this report considers lessons drawn from key literature on recent peace processes and multilateral settlements, and international donor support to such mechanisms.

Key lessons:

- **Multipolarity matters**: Process design should acknowledge multiple vested interests across the full range of locally, regionally and internationally involved actors. Without doing so, it risks fomenting resurgent instability and undermining the legitimacy of post-accord states. International mediators must cooperate to prevent ‘forum shopping’.

- **Processes must consider sequencing, flexibility and inclusivity**: Trade-offs are necessary in establishing which issues will be brought to the negotiating table, the order in which key issues are considered during negotiations and the extent to which donors are willing to support effective compromise. Whilst ensuring that armed groups are represented in dispute resolution mechanisms, criteria for invitation must be sensitive to the need for outcomes to bear legitimacy.

- **Continued support in implementation**: Donor support is crucial in the time following the agreement of a peace accord. The first five years post-accord are definitive; a lack of international support to weaker states can strip away state capacity to uphold an accord, and policy positions agreed through compromise risk being weakened and non-productive. Whilst donors and international financial institutions are shifting to more conflict-sensitive approaches, finance flows in support of peace-building remain proportionally small worldwide.
Acknowledgements

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The Lessons for Peace project aims to help development, security, political and humanitarian practitioners embed practical, evidence-based insights into current planning and policy-making processes in Afghanistan and in international capitals.
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Acronyms

AU  African Union
IMF  International Monetary Fund
INGO  international non-governmental organisation
MDTF  multi-donor trust fund
NGO  non-governmental organisation
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ODA  official development assistance
OSCE  Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
PIU  project implementation unit
UN  United Nations
UNOCHA  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Executive summary

The international peace support landscape is undergoing necessary adjustment. The consensus of multilateral peace-building is that peace needs inclusive political and economic settlements, broad popular legitimacy, reduced incentives to engage in violent conflict and effective response to new challenges. However, emerging frameworks have made unsatisfactory progress beyond rhetorical commitments to cooperation and coordination. Peacemaking is today more multipolar involving a range of international or state actors who have complex and sometimes irreconcilable interests over regional hegemony, security, border definition, market access and score-settling. The growing multipolarity of peace-building has opened up avenues for factions within conflicts to find rival international patrons; this is particularly significant since some of the bloodiest recent conflicts have been highly internationalised.

The mediation environment is increasingly competitive, leading at times to incoherence, which the UN system continues to address with internal reform. Overall, liberal, democratic peace continues to drive most international engagement by institutions such as the UN, regional organisations, the International Financial Institutions (primarily the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Other peace-building actors have added complexity but have also played constructive roles in conflicts ignored by major powers, often due to a more acute national interest, better understanding of the conflict and stronger relationships with the parties involved.

Peace process support generally envisions ideal sequencing – and the following of a negotiation agenda – that can oversimplify the iterative and cyclical nature of most peace processes. Early ceasefires, while halting suffering and building confidence, may introduce a negative dynamic to negotiations by freezing conflicts or giving space to regroup. Putting the most difficult items first on the negotiation agenda might bring trust in the seriousness of the negotiations or it might hinder early progress. The principle of sufficient consensus means parties can object to already negotiated agenda points in a final agreement. This allows for productive possibilities of ambiguity and deferment, particularly on the issues that are most often postponed to a post-agreement constitution drafting process such as budget and revenue, customs and borders, fiscal reform, territory, autonomy/self-determination, governance structures and environment. However, questions about the form and goals of post-agreement donor assistance may need to be answered during the negotiation phase.

During the implementation period, sequencing can affect the balance of power: if demobilisation or weak opposition means a government is not held to account, powerholders may simply coopt a deferred constitution process. Transitional power-sharing governments, amnesties and prisoner releases are provisions that can be implemented quickly and verifiably, facilitate elections, signal commitment and are difficult to reverse. However, elections prior to such accommodation measures may contribute to a recurrence of violence.

Peace processes can combine dialogue, negotiation, mediation/facilitation, voting-based formats and adjudication/arbitration. Partly in recognition of the weaknesses of power-sharing models emerging from elite negotiations, more inclusive approaches (such as broad-based multi-stakeholder forums, a subset of which is called National Dialogues) have become increasingly common. Who is included in negotiations is a crucial question, with exclusion of armed groups associated with a greater likelihood that peace processes will fail; however, a principled approach to including all armed actors can lead to fragmentation. What exactly inclusion and participation in a peace process looks like is
contested (although the right to participate is enshrined in various international instruments). Meaningful inclusion of civil society and women is likely dependent on how inclusion is managed and who is able to decide who is included or represented, with what mandate and with what decision-making power. Crucially, inclusion needs to expand beyond the process of negotiations towards broad-based engagement in peace processes, for example through dialogue and reconciliation processes or collaborative resource management.

Post-peace accord states face the triple challenge of implementing an agreement, reconstructing and working against poverty or fragility. International support can compensate for state weakness; however, international presence can also hinder implementation of accords. Donors have struggled with how to support legitimate states (meaning the governing authority’s right to exercise that authority is popularly accepted; state legitimacy is commonly identified as having the components security, political, socio-economic and justice) after conflict. In recent years this has meant increased recognition of the need for human/citizen security, justice and inclusive economic development. However, international engagement in these processes has also created perverse incentives through privatisation of development and a lack of consensus on how to transcend the binary between state-centric development cooperation models and a ‘bottom-up’ perspective. The practice of donor engagement in statebuilding has lagged behind commitments made in forums such as the G7+ group of fragile states and donors. Further, a narrow focus on security provision as fundamental to state legitimacy can fortify security organisations that might be predatory or ineffectual.

Peace-building is funded from grants, loans and other types of financing (concessional loans, development impact bonds, etc.), national tax revenues and private philanthropy; donors are also increasingly using pooled funding mechanisms. Financial needs for humanitarian assistance have skyrocketed during a funding shortfall of the UN system.

Peace processes are funded via country-level aid (or direct budget support) and project-level aid (humanitarian and development projects). In fragile states with exclusive governance orders, country-level aid might exacerbate conflict while project aid might contribute to the hollowing out of the state. More recent research emphasises the need to channel funds through accountable systems, improve the quality of services delivered and provide predictable aid. International financial institutions are seeking to adopt conflict-sensitive approaches and are revising their engagement in fragile states; however, the support for free markets may continue to sit at odds with the need for social justice to prevent future conflict.
1 Introduction

The international peace support landscape is undergoing a period of adjustment, driven by disenchantment with the record of previous models of engagement in conflict-affected states; by increasing multipolarity internationally; and by the development of new critical approaches in the academic and policy communities. At the core of multilateral peace-building is a consensus that inclusive political and economic settlements, resting on broad popular legitimacy, can ensure peace by reducing the incentives to engage in violent conflict (making for resilient societies) and responding effectively to new challenges (through inclusive prevention strategies; Box 1). However, while the United Nations (UN) system, the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), UN member states and the G7+ are all nominally committed to this agenda, activity and funding in support of these commitments has been inadequate. Meanwhile, around this core of multilateralism a wider range of states and regional organisations are seeking a greater role, with divergent interests and priorities.

This literature review covers lessons from reviews of recent peace processes and multilateral studies and policy reviews, with a particular focus on donor support (Table 1). Key lessons include the importance of accommodating multipolarity; sequencing, flexibility and inclusivity; and support for implementation and donor coordination.

---

Box 1 Main findings from Pathways for peace (2018)

1. Violent conflict is increasing after decades of relative decline – conflicts are more international, protracted, cross-border and are fought by more non-state actors than in recent decades.
2. Increasing population movements, transnational organised crime and climate change have amplified risk.
3. Prevention requires identifying solutions to imminent or ongoing violence and addressing the underlying risks of conflict through incentives, institutional reforms addressing economic and social grievances and building social cohesion.
4. Grievances related to real or perceived exclusion and inequalities among groups are fuelling many conflicts.
5. Preventive strategies are most effective and can only be sustained when they come from within affected societies themselves.
6. Effective preventive action must be grounded in national processes, must be implemented early and must support multi-level initiatives to prevent the escalation of violence.
7. The Pathways for peace study is a self-assessment of progress in relation to a number of multilateral frameworks including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Sustaining Peace Agenda and the World Bank’s own ongoing reviews of its policy-making. Unlike some of these agendas, there is no direct translation of the recommendations into any major policy reforms.


---

1 Third-party states can engage in peace processes in their own right (through foreign, development, trade ministries etc.), as part of international/regional organisations (e.g. the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union) or international financial organisations (e.g. the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank), and as part of purpose-specific coalitions of states (often called ‘groups of friends’, ‘contact groups’, ‘core groups’, ‘troikas’ etc.).
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<td>World Development Report: Conflict, security and development</td>
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<td>Group of 7+</td>
<td>New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States</td>
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2 Accommodating multipolarity

Peace-building is more multipolar now than at any time since the end of the Cold War. In countries undergoing fundamental political change, a range of state actors are invariably present, with complex and sometimes irreconcilable interests related to contests over regional hegemony, security, border definition, market access and sometimes score-settling (Brown, 2016).

The growing multipolarity of peace-building has opened up avenues for factions within conflicts to find rival international patrons. Carothers and Samet-Marram term this configuration the ‘new global marketplace of political change’ (Carothers and Samet-Marram, 2015; Box 2). Multipolarity may also have revealed peace-building for what it has always been: a locus of competing actors and interests, in which support for the stated goal of peace is invariably contingent on the terms on which that peace is to be decided.

Some of the bloodiest recent conflicts have been highly internationalised, with international support propping up weaker factions. Such competitive interventions (adversarial state support to multiple parties in a conflict) are associated with significantly longer conflicts (Anderson, 2016: 74–81). The sponsorship of non-state armed groups as proxies by third-party states has also been associated with higher levels of violence against civilians (Wood, 2013; Kalyvas, 2012).

Not all competitive intervention involves support to armed actors. The mediation

---

Box 2 Lessons from the ‘new global marketplace of political change’

1. Transitions are unpredictable
   a. The era in which transitions aimed at democracy either succeeded or failed is over. Multiple normative visions are available.

2. Multipolarity is pervasive
   a. The marketplace is not only in high-profile hotspots such as Syria and Ukraine.

3. The marketplace is here to stay
   a. Multipolarity will remain a feature of the international order.

4. State motivations are complex and non-ideological
   a. Binary notions of democracy versus autocracy are misleading.

5. Methods of intervention are becoming more direct and forceful
   a. The marketplace is characterised by the growing use of intrusive methods, especially sanctions, military force and cash.

6. Pushback from fragile and conflict-affected states is increasing

Source: Carothers and Samet-Marram (2015)

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2 Partly because international support makes armed groups less dependent on civilian populations.
environment is also increasingly competitive, leading at times to incoherence and ‘forum shopping’ (Lanz and Gasser, 2013). Reform processes since 2005 have attempted to consolidate the tangle of UN agencies under several coordination offices (Box 3); however, the 2015 Sustaining peace report noted that these new agencies had merely added to the ‘fragmentation’ of UN peace-building (United Nations, 2015: 7–8). The Pathways for peace report appears to recognise these limitations and reflect a renewed commitment to coordination by the UN and the World Bank.

2.1 Liberal (democratic) peace remains fundamentally embedded in the international order

While the role of competitive interventions in a small number of prolonged, extremely violent conflicts that have proven resistant to settlement (the conflicts in Yemen post-2014, Syria post-2011, Iraq post-2014, Afghanistan post-2001; see Semple (2018) for a case study of competitive international intervention in Afghanistan) may suggest that the liberal peace project is teetering, liberalism remains deeply embedded in the international order through international law, and institutions such as the UN, regional organisations, the international financial institutions (primarily the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) and NGOs. Even dissenters to the liberal international order have not advanced an alternative programme beyond self-interest and respect for sovereignty.3

Moreover, peace-building by regional actors is not always a challenge to liberal (democratic) peace; nor are these interventions guaranteed to lead to competitive interventions driving intractable and brutal conflict. Regional actors have played important, constructive roles in conflicts otherwise ignored by major powers (as for example in the series of interventions led by Australia and New Zealand in Papua New Guinea/Bougainville, the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste in the late 1990s and early 2000s).

2.2 The interests of regional actors must be acknowledged

Regional states exercise influence over their near neighbours asymmetric to their power. They often have deeper wells of political will, fuelled by a more acute national interest, better understanding of the conflict and stronger relationships with the parties involved. This has allowed regional actors in several recent peace processes to exert greater influence than far more powerful states or coalitions of states (Carothers and Samet-Marram, 2015: 27). If regional actors cannot be ignored, they must be acknowledged. Innovative process design can facilitate the co-participation of multiple states or international organisations (Box 4).

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3 Arguably, self-interest and respect for sovereignty are at the core of realism, the alternative to liberal internationalism in mainstream international relations theory. But the point here is that even rival forums of international cooperation or intervention have largely paid lip service to liberal norms. See also section 4.5 Financing for conflict recovery and peace-building.
Box 4 Forms of cooperation in competitive intervention environments

Competition for mediation roles in conflict situations can be mitigated by cooperation amongst actors. This cooperation can take various forms:

1. Hierarchical cooperation (e.g. the UN, regional organisations)
   a. If one party has enough legitimacy (perhaps by including most competitive state actors among its members, e.g. the UN or a regional organisation), it may take a leadership role.

2. Networked cooperation (e.g. regional organisations, contact groups, groups of friends, troikas)
   a. Parties agree on an overall strategy for the mediation process and a rough division of labour.
   b. If a division of labour cannot be agreed, continued dialogue is still worthwhile.

Source: Lanz and Gasser (2013: 13–15)

i The UN Secretary General (2009) in his report on mediation lamented a situation in which ‘multiple actors competing for a mediation role create an opportunity for forum shopping as intermediaries are played off against one another. Such a fragmented international response reinforces fragmentation in the conflict and complicates resolution’. Furthermore, the 2012 Guidance for Effective Mediation (UN Secretary General, 2012) recommends that mediators should ‘work together to agree on the degree of transparency and coordination mechanisms for information sharing’ and ‘cooperate based on a common mediation strategy, ensure consistent messaging to the parties and avoid duplication or overloading the parties with multiple competing processes’.
Support for peace processes generally envisions an ideal sequence of (usually secret) pre-negotiations, leading to ceasefires, comprehensive peace agreements and their subsequent implementation, including the revision or replacement of constitutions (Bell and Zulueta-Fülscher, 2016). However, this sequence rarely obtains in the real world (ibid: 20–21), and oversimplifies the iterative and cyclical nature of most peace processes (which can be dangerous, e.g. if they lead to an assumption that, once an agreement is signed, no further negotiations are needed).

### 3.1 Ceasefires before, during or after agreements

Mediators and other parties supporting peace processes generally advocate early ceasefires, either prior to negotiations or before the core issues under dispute have been addressed (Chouzet-Cambas, 2011). The most important virtue of early ceasefires is that they pause the conflict, preventing deaths and allowing for humanitarian access or safe passage for civilians. They may also build confidence in the peace process, or avert new incidents of violence that risk reigniting hostility among the parties. However, some have suggested that early ceasefires introduce a negative dynamic to negotiations. The continuation or escalation of insurgent violence is the main ‘card’ armed groups have in hand, and playing it at the beginning of negotiations deprives these groups of leverage. In turn, this reduces the incentives for the state party to negotiate in good faith: as long as negotiations under a truce continue, the state enjoys a simulacrum of its core objective of re-establishing a monopoly on violence (Zartman, 1995: 336). In theory, this leads to the breakdown of the peace process or so-called ‘frozen conflicts’. The conflict parties may also use the ceasefire to recruit and rearm, meaning that the conflict, once resumed, is deadlier than before (Mahieu, 2007: 214–215).

This has led some to stress the importance of the format and detail of ceasefires, whereby mechanisms that increase information and transparency, such as monitoring and verification, or increase costs, such as peacekeeping missions, make ceasefires during negotiations more likely to succeed (Page Fortna, 2004). Åkebo has argued that ceasefires are likely to establish a status quo in terms of the distribution of territory among the parties in any eventual settlement. Hence, they should not be concluded when the parties are unable to accept their current borders (Akebo, 2016: 6).

### 3.2 Sequencing negotiation agendas

Negotiation processes conventionally proceed according to an agenda, setting out the topics to be discussed (and their order). This is not obligatory, and some processes are more freeform in their approach. This adds flexibility, but may be exploited by parties to present challenging proposals at the last minute, when there is not sufficient time to discuss them (Pendergast, 1990: 136).
The negotiation agenda sets out the topics to be discussed, which can be addressed in sequence, or concurrently by different working groups. In an analysis of 34 comprehensive peace agreements, the Peace Accords Matrix at Kroc identified six categories (A–F) and 50 types of peace agreement provision (Box 5).

The fundamental question in relation to a negotiation agenda is whether to begin with more contentious issues, or attempt to build momentum by tackling easier issues first. Chigas and Woodrow argue that progress on issues ‘tightly connected to a fundamental grievance’ (some of which will be less contentious than others) can serve as symbolic progress that builds confidence in the process as a whole (Chigas and Woodrow, 2018). The principle of sufficient consensus allows parties to register their disagreement with a specific proposal while negotiations continue. At the end of the negotiations, when all items in the agenda have been addressed, the parties can decide whether to adopt the entire agreement, including any provisions with which they may have disagreed.4

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4 The principle of sufficient consensus is most famously associated with the South African peace negotiations and the Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement negotiations (Friedman, 1994).
3.3 Sequencing and implementation

Sequencing can affect the balance of power during the implementation period. If the implementation of some provisions – such as the demobilisation of armed groups (and a disorganised or weak opposition in the legislature/civil society) – has meant there is no group capable of holding the government to account, powerholders may simply coopt a deferred constitution process to re-establish the status quo ante (see Box 6; Bell and Zulueta-Fülscher, 2016).

Joshi, Melander and Quinn argue that elections are more likely to contribute to sustained peace agreements when they take place after accommodation measures have been implemented (Joshi et al., 2015a: 4–28). Transitional power-sharing government, amnesties and prisoner releases are all provisions that can be implemented quickly and verifiably, facilitate elections and are costly to the parties (in the sense that they signal commitment and are difficult to reverse) without disempowering them. If elections are held before such accommodation measures are implemented, elections are more likely to contribute to the recurrence of conflict.

3.4 Dispute resolution approaches

Peace processes can combine dialogue, negotiation, mediation/facilitation, voting-based formats and adjudication/arbitration. Multiple approaches can co-exist in one process, simultaneously or in different phases. Dispute resolution approaches/institutions are almost always supplemented by other functions (see Table 2). Partly in recognition of the weaknesses of power-sharing models emerging from elite negotiations, more inclusive approaches (such as broad-based multi-stakeholder forums, a subset of which is called National Dialogues) have become increasingly common.

Box 6 Recommendations from Sequencing peace agreements and constitutions in the political settlement process

The timing and sequence of agreements must follow elite buy-in. Where buy-in is absent, staged processes focused on achieving it are essential.

All parties must focus on achieving negative peace (the abatement of organised violence) before beginning a constitution revision/replacement process.

International sponsors must be patient; pressure to meet deadlines leads to insufficient consensus, and can foreclose proper consultation.

Timelines that are too short to allow for new elections can truncate the constitution revision process prematurely.

Source: Bell and Zulueta-Fülscher (2016)

The productive possibilities of ambiguity and deferment have also been recognized (Pospisil, 2019). The issues most commonly postponed or excluded from agreements are: budget and revenue issues, customs and border issues, fiscal reform, territorial issues, autonomy/self-determination, governance structures and environmental issues (Ross, 2018). Issues can be postponed to a post-peace agreement constitution-drafting process, to arbitration, to be settled by the judiciary or clarified by post-agreement legislation.

International actors have provided technical support to thematic areas, which may contribute comparative experience on complex issues (Berghof Foundation, 2017: 166). This coordination also prefigures post-agreement donor assistance and programming (e.g. can an extensive, expensive monitoring and verification regime be incorporated into the agreement?). Questions about the form and goals of post-agreement donor assistance may need to be answered during this phase.

5 For a discussion of the perverse spill-over effects of power-sharing, see Tull and Mehler, 2005; for a detailed discussion of the weaknesses of power-sharing, see Mehler, 2008; Spears, 2000; for the argument that what matters are the details of power-sharing, see Cheeseman, 2011.
3.5 Should all armed actors be included?

There is some evidence that the exclusion of armed groups from the peace table is associated with increased violence during negotiations and a greater likelihood that peace processes will fail. However, under some conditions partial or ‘rump’ peace agreements are possible. The political programmes of armed groups are relevant to their inclusion: studies of spoilers have converged around the principle that groups totally opposed to peace should be excluded (although aims and priorities may be difficult to determine in practice, especially if they are excluded from negotiations) (Lanz, 2011; Stedman, 1997). Related to this, the principle that all armed groups should be included can create incentives for them to fracture internally, as factions or individual commanders seek to increase their share of rents distributed in an anticipated power-sharing agreement by striking out on their own (Verweijen, 2018; Tull and Mehler, 2005).

6 Reiter finds that violence during peace negotiations is committed by parties excluded from the process almost twice as often as by included parties (Reiter, 2011: 89). Blaydes and De Maio (2010) also find that more inclusive agreements (of armed groups) were associated with less spoiler violence.

7 Cunningham finds that conflicts with multiple actors who must approve a settlement (veto players) last longer, and argues that therefore all veto players should be included at the table (Cunningham, 2006; 2013).

8 Nilsson, in a 2008 quantitative study, found that ‘partial peace agreements’ that leave out armed parties to the conflict are no less likely to result in violence between the signatory parties to the agreement (even if the excluded groups continue to fight). Additionally, in several post-Cold War peace processes (e.g. the Ohrid peace process in Macedonia, the Arusha peace process in Burundi and the Good Friday Agreement negotiations in Northern Ireland), armed actors have been represented at track 1 by an acceptable political party (or parties), and peace agreements have been concluded and generally implemented. These arrangements did not always depend on prior relationships between the armed groups and parties. The role of international pressure on the parties and support for disarmament, ceasefire monitoring etc. was decisive in these cases (Ross, 2019).
3.6 How should unarmed actors be included?

The central importance of inclusion has been affirmed in all recent multilateral reviews of peace support. However, the term itself, and what exactly a commitment to inclusion implies in terms of process design, remain a matter of some dispute. Inclusion has been understood as inclusion ‘at the table’, inclusion in participatory forums that provide an opportunity (e.g. for women) to influence the process or be heard, inclusion of issues (e.g. gender issues) in the agenda of peace negotiations and any resulting agreement or processes that lead to more inclusive outcomes (e.g. more equality between men and women). Not all inclusion is offered by powerholders: civil society and other actors have ‘claimed’ participation in processes through unofficial advocacy or other peace-building initiatives (Aulin, 2018: 40).

While the conflict-inhibiting effect of more inclusive political and economic orders is reasonably well supported, the benefits of inclusive negotiation processes and agreements are less well established (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Lindemann, 2008).9 Inclusion of civil society10 and women (UN Women, 2000; Paffenholz et al., 2016; Krause et al., 2018) during negotiations may have positive effects on peace processes.11 However, these effects are likely to be highly contingent on how inclusion is specified in the design of these projects,12 or the specifics of how inclusion is practiced. Nor has the most obvious causal chain (from inclusive negotiations to inclusive peace agreements to inclusive societies by way of inclusive implementation) been substantiated. Hence, the debate over whether inclusion in processes has any general effect is a diversion from the detailed questions of how inclusion or participation takes place.

3.7 The form of inclusion follows from the rationale of inclusion

The Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative has found that inclusion of unarmed actors is not exclusively an international agenda: it is pursued by all national actors, to gain the support and buy-in of constituencies that were (or were thought to be) relevant to reach and/or sustain an agreement, to change the distribution of power in a negotiation process or sometimes to ‘outsource’ politically contentious decisions. Nevertheless, the normative inclusion agenda has been the source of some divergence between local and international actors, particularly in relation to the right of women to participate. International support for inclusion has been criticised as favouring English-speaking elites from urban civil society, and ignoring other forms of civil society and public participation (Vogel, 2016).

3.7.1 Who is included and why?

This encompasses which organisations (e.g. non-state armed groups, but also parts of government, third-party states and opposition political parties), population groups (e.g. women, ethnic minorities) or sectors (e.g. civil society, the business community) will participate. Just

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9 There is abundant evidence for the role of exclusion in fomenting conflict (Mancini, 2005; Østby, 2008; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

10 Wanis-St John and Kew (2008) studied several cases of peace agreements and observed that there appears to be a correlation between civil society participation and longer lasting peace agreements. Nilsson (2012) conducted a quantitative study of the durability of peace agreements where at least one signatory party was a civil society actor. She found that such peace agreements were approximately 54% less likely to result in renewed violence among the signatory parties during the observation period.

11 There is also comparable evidence for the effect of broader public participation in the study by Eisenstadt et al. (2015) of constitution design processes. Although, it is easy to imagine that transitions in violent conflict impose different conditions and requirements.

12 Most of the evidence for the positive effect of inclusion has been based on bivariate correlation, and inclusivity might easily be a proxy for other factors, including greater international involvement, more amenable conditions for negotiations and/or political will, and this effect has not been disentangled in the studies cited.
as important is who, specifically, will represent these groups. Inadequate attention to selection criteria and procedures has led to accusations of illegitimacy. Legitimacy of representation is not only relevant for unarmed groups: negotiations whose process design did not accommodate internal factionalism within armed groups have occasionally provoked the escalation of violence or the fragmentation of these groups (Ross, 2019; Verweijen, 2018).

3.7.2 Where and when are they included?
Negotiation process architecture can be divided into functions and institutions (see Table 2), which play different roles in different phases. Broader participation can take place in all of the institutions described in Table 2. In general, a movement from less to more participatory approaches is prudent (Bell and Zulueta-Fülscher, 2016). Research from the Political Settlements Research Program has argued that peace agreements which bring about negative peace (the absence of major armed conflict) can provide conducive conditions for a transition to more inclusive orders, through careful attention to sequencing. Technical roles and peace infrastructures provide opportunities for influential/meaningful inclusion (Pospisil, 2019: 111–120).

Donors have supported all the institutions of peace processes with funding and technical assistance. Inclusion in dispute resolution bodies (including observers to these bodies) is expensive (especially when negotiations take place in third states) (Berghof Foundation, 2017: 163–169).

Additionally, many countries have struggled to implement ambitious peace infrastructures due to a lack of funding (van Tongeren, 2011). The World Bank’s institutional prohibition on interfering in member states means it cannot usually issue loans to fund political dialogue/reconciliation processes (Viterbo, 2018: 119; Cissé, 2012: 59). Trust funds which pool donor commitments up-front, and are administered by a secretariat, provide a degree of coordination and flexibility that is lacking when different actors fund components of a process on an ad hoc basis (Berghof Foundation, 2017: 164).

3.7.3 The ‘so what’ of inclusion?
The Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative has found that the benefits of inclusion are only available if inclusion is meaningful: i.e. not merely cosmetic. This can relate to the specifics of process design. Will included groups have decision-making power? How will the results of any consultations be transferred to negotiation bodies? What powers will monitoring bodies have? How will the process deal with negative referendum results? The interrelationships between the various institutions and actors shape the influence they have over the process (although there is scope for coalition-building and for other dynamics to emerge) (Paffenholz et al., 2017: 72–74). Whether process outcomes are inclusive is also relevant here. There is some evidence that inclusion of groups is correlated with inclusive outcomes (e.g. inclusion of women contributing to gender-sensitive agreements); however,

---

13 The nature of trying to include demographic groups, such as women or young people, or disorganized sectors, such as civil society, makes legitimate representation difficult (and some have argued impossible; Lederach, 2018). Nevertheless, truly egregious examples of nepotism or cronyism in selection have detracted from the purpose of attempting to broaden inclusion in the first place (Ross, 2018). See also the description of the ‘Arusha Quarter’ in McClintock and Nahimana (2008: 73–91).

14 For a description of modalities of broader participation, see Paffenholz (2014; 2015) and Paffenholz et al. (2016).

15 The Political Settlements Research Program calls peace agreements that bring about negative peace ‘formalized political unsettlements’, and Bell and Pospisil (2017), as well as Pospisil (2019), have argued these are both probable and viable as end states of peace negotiations. A formalised political unsettlement translates a formerly violent conflict into new political and legal institutions that manage and contain, rather than resolving, the conflict. Power sharing arrangements are typical examples of formalized political unsettlement.

16 The label ‘technical’, commonly applied to these bodies, is often an implicit attempt to strip the political valence out of some issues. This can be productive space for civil society (including women’s civil society) and opposition political parties to participate.

17 For a discussion of transfer from track 2, see Çuhadar and Dayton (2012); Çuhadar and Paffenholz (2019).
this relationship has not been conclusively established (Bell and O’Rourke, 2010).

3.8 Peace-building away from the table

Some have pointed out the limitations of a focus on inclusion in high-level peace negotiations and supportive architecture, and instead advocated for longer-lasting, broader-based approaches to inclusion (Aulin, 2018). Civil society peace-building of this kind can be supported by governments, funded by donors and international NGOs or claimed by national civil society and through other forms of political mobilisation. Broad-based engagement in peace processes can involve dialogue and reconciliation processes, collaborative projects to manage common resources, direct protection activities such as accompaniment, civilian involvement in the negotiation and monitoring of ceasefires, media monitoring and the production of pro-peace media, among many other activities (see, for example, Paffenholz, 2010).

3.9 Inclusion obligations

Whether or not inclusion in peace negotiations is effective, the principle is so deeply embedded in the structure of international peace support that it cannot easily be ignored. The right of various groups to participate in political processes is enshrined in multilateral treaties and mandated by UN Security Council Resolutions (see Box 7). Moreover, many organisations engaged in mediation now feature inclusion/inclusivity as part of their guidelines. As evidence of how this can be binding on organisations, women seeking inclusion in the 2011–2014 peace process in Yemen were able to pressure the UN mediation team for greater representation by citing UN system-wide obligations under Resolution 1325 (Ross, 2017: 5). The question therefore becomes how to manage inclusion constructively.

Box 7 ‘Rights to participate’ of various population groups in international instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights (1969)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Article 13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Women</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Article 7 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1997)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• UN Security Council Resolution 2250 (2015)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Post-peace accord states are faced with the triple challenge of implementing the agreement, reconstructing after conflict and confronting ongoing issues of poverty or fragility. Achieving these three allied programmes is a vital contributor to avoiding relapse into conflict, especially in the crucial window of five years after the signing of a peace accord (the period in which most transitions fail) (von Einsiedel, 2017). Official development assistance (ODA) plays an essential, but not sufficient, role in supporting states through this period and beyond. While understanding how and why agreements are implemented has improved, a narrow focus on strict implementation may be dangerously rigid and foreclose the possibility of ongoing negotiation (Lyons, 2016).

4.1 Implementing agreements

Stronger (wealthier) states are much more likely to implement peace agreements than weaker ones; however, international support can compensate for state weakness by augmenting state capacity, or where international organisations/actors implement parts of the agreement themselves (DeRouen et al., 2010). Data from the Peace Accords Matrix project suggests that provisions related to economic development and governance and justice sector reform are among the least likely to be implemented (Joshi et al., 2015b). The same project found that the implementation of typically liberal provisions (related to democracy, rule of law, human rights, security sector reform, governance reforms) is correlated with more durable peace agreements (MacGinty et al., 2019). The presence of peacekeeping and observer missions seems to make peace agreements more likely to endure, although it may also reduce the perceived urgency (and likelihood) of actually implementing accords (Joshi et al., 2017: 1009).

4.2 How is state legitimacy (re)built?

The most challenging questions in relation to donor support concern the building of (legitimate) states after conflict. Broadly, the last two decades have seen a move away from ‘off the shelf’ statebuilding programmes focused on supporting top-level institutions in centralised states towards an increased recognition of the need for human/citizen security, justice and inclusive economic development. Legitimacy can be conceptualised as the popular acceptance of a governing authority’s right to exercise that authority. Legitimacy is context-dependent, both in the sense that it is

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19 Hulman et al. (2016) found that the presence of unarmed observers was not significantly correlated with peace duration; whereas, the relationship between armed peacekeepers and peace duration was both positive and statistically significant.

20 These are the three cornerstones of the 2011 ‘World Development Report’ (World Bank, 2011).

21 This definition is used in the Building Legitimacy in Conflict-Affected and Fragile States project (Babbitt et al., 2019).
influenced by culture and history, and in the sense that the performance of institutions is measured against a shifting baseline (Clements, 2014: 13). For example, populations confronting rampant violence or criminality may award a governance actor (state or non-state) significant legitimacy for the provision of basic security. However, once security is consolidated, expectations of legitimate governance are likely to increase (Menkhaus, 2014: 74–77).

It should also be noted that states are not the only actors staking a claim to legitimacy. Alternative governance actors, including non-state armed groups, civil society and traditional institutions, engage with these same issues. Alternative governance actors may compete directly with the state, or may support state legitimacy. This depends partly on the ambitions of these alternative governance actors, and partly on the state’s approach.

States (and donors supporting statebuilding) have attempted to engage alternative governance actors by repressing them, encouraging them or incorporating them (the typology in Table 3 describes this for non-state justice systems, but could be applied to non-state governance actors in other domains). This is closely related to the issue of ‘grounded legitimacy’: in recognition of the failures of ‘off the shelf’ interventions to rebuild state legitimacy, many scholars and practitioners have advocated for context-sensitive approaches that recognise and harness the expectations and agency of national actors (Clements, 2014: 13–16).

Attempts to incorporate local actors and agendas into hybrid programmes have been plagued by long-standing issues with the structure of international engagement, perverse incentives created by the privatisation of development (Lockhart, 2018), including high levels of staff turnover and a privileging of generalist expertise over local knowledge (Baker, 2013). There is, moreover, no consensus on how to transcend the binary between state-centric development cooperation models and the ‘bottom-up’ perspective seemingly required to execute a ‘local turn’ (MacGinty and Richmond, 2013). The practice of donor engagement in statebuilding has, unsurprisingly therefore, lagged behind commitments made in forums such as the G7+ group of fragile states and donors (Chandy et al., 2016: 22).

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Table 3 Components of legitimacy in terms of process or performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Process aspects</th>
<th>Performance aspects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Political decision-making | • Elections  
                       | • Constitutional reviews  
                       | • Legitimacy of decision-making                          | • Political settlements  
                       | • Stable governments and transitions  
                       | • Constitutions                                                |
| Socio-economic     | • Process of tax collection  
                       | • Corruption                                               | • Tax revenues gathered  
                       | • Infrastructure built/maintained  
                       | • Services delivered                                        | • State security (external defence, internal order)  
                       | • Humanitarian relief/development assistance  
                       | • Fiscal governance                                        |
| Security           | • (Inclusive) peace processes  
                       | • Security governance/SSR                                  | • Effective peace agreements  
                       | • State security (external defence, internal order)  
                       | • Human security                                            | • Humanitarian relief/development assistance  
                       | • Law enforcement                                           |
| Justice            | • Law and justice policy                     | • Policing                                                | • Rule of law  
                       | • Access to justice (expense of procedures, wait times, etc.) | • Justice outcomes  
                       | • Law as followed                                          | • Law enforcement                                        |

‘This refers to the implementation of justice on the ground, rather than the development of justice policies. According to the OECD, ‘whether the state’s rules trump those of rivals cannot be assessed purely on the basis of the adoption of a new constitution or set of legal reforms, but needs to be seen in the implementation of the law’.

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22 For example, we might consider whether a non-state armed group is ignored, tolerated, incorporated into state security objectives in combination with limited support from the state, or fully integrated into the state armed forces.
4.3 Four components of state legitimacy

Four components of state legitimacy are commonly identified: security, political, socio-economic and justice (Ottaway, 2002; Goodhand and Sedra, 2007; Porter et al., 2013). These categories are highly interdependent and somewhat overlapping. One can also distinguish between process legitimacy and legitimate (state) performance. Process legitimacy refers to how decisions are taken, responsibilities discharged or services accessed, and often emphasises various forms of political inclusion. Performance-based legitimacy refers to whether a state is capable of delivering goods (and preventing harm), and hence is more associated with socio-economic, security and justice-based legitimacy (Zanker, 2017; Whaites, 2008). The terminology of performance legitimacy in statebuilding debates derives from a critique of a donor-driven model that advocated for an early emphasis on establishing democratic mechanisms/institutions in very fragile states.23

The provision of basic security (in terms of territorial control, monopolisation of violence and the exclusion of rival claimants) is thought to be fundamental to state legitimacy (according to Putzel, 2007; see also, Dobbins, 2006), and is the first terrain on which non-state armed groups attempt to undermine the state (Kalyvas, 2006: 12–13, 146–172). A narrow focus on supporting state security can fortify security organisations that are disconnected from the population, and are in consequence either predatory or ineffectual. An emphasis on human security – the protection of civilians from criminal and gender-based violence and disease, hunger and natural hazard-related disasters – may be a more effective path to legitimacy.

Legitimate justice includes dispute resolution and the implementation of the law, as well as transitional justice. The procedural component of justice includes access (in terms of expense of procedures and wait times), as well as the legitimacy of the law as written, whereas the performance component refers to the rules actually followed by most people (Crook et al., 2010: 3).24 Justice is one area where grounded legitimacy is particularly relevant. In fragile and conflict-affected states, non-state actors are especially likely to be involved in the provision of justice, through traditional justice institutions or tribunals run by armed groups. As the OECD argues: ‘For a state to survive in a territory it must ensure that its own rules trump rival rules’ (OECD, 2010); however, this need not inevitably lead to a repressive approach. States have attempted to contest the territory of justice provision by repressing, regulating or incorporating non-state justice actors (see Table 4). Some states have had considerable success harmonising justice provision between state and non-state institutions (see, for example, Tholens, 2012; Nolan-Haley, 2016; Bavinck, 1998; Crook et al., 2007: 24).

### Table 4 Relationships between state and non-state justice systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Repression of non-state justice system by the state system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No formal recognition but tacit acceptance by the state of the non-state justice system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No formal recognition but active encouragement of the non-state justice system by the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Limited formal recognition of the exercise of jurisdiction by a non-state system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Formal recognition of exclusive jurisdiction in a defined area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>The state recognises the right of the non-state justice system to exercise jurisdiction and lends its coercive powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Complete incorporation of the non-state justice system by the state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Forsyth (2007)

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23 The OECD cites the example of Rwanda, where the international community pushed for multiparty politics, without understanding the continued association of party political competition with the genocide and civil war (OECD, 2010).

24 Although this paper uses a different typology of ‘legitimacy, accessibility and effectiveness’.
Political legitimacy refers to the legitimacy of government/governance. This can encompass inclusion in decision-making, as well as the legitimacy of political settlements. Inclusion in decision-making has been interpreted as primarily applying to institutions of representative democracy: political parties, elections and plebiscites. As described above, elections can come too early in a process. Papagianni, therefore, advocates for ‘extended transitional periods, which provide avenues for political representation beyond the signatories of peace agreements before elections are held’ (Papagianni, 2009).

The political settlement refers to the dynamic, consensus-based understanding which regulates access to power and resources in a society. It is codified in formal institutions (such as constitutions), but importantly also includes unofficial ones (Whaites, 2008: 4). The legitimacy of political settlements is influenced by their inclusiveness (of elites and non-elites, generally defined along the lines of the former conflict), as well as the process by which they were negotiated. Grounded political legitimacy can encompass a role for traditional leaders and the role of religion in government.

Socio-economic legitimacy encompasses the development and maintenance of infrastructure, the provision of social services and the collection of revenues. The provision of services by the state may be less important than whether quality of services is (perceived to be) improving (Guerrero, 2011; Sacks, 2011) whether services are delivered equitably (Dix et al., 2012; Ndaruhurste, 2012) and whether citizens can exercise accountability for service provision (McLoughlin, 2015). (For more on the role of services in state legitimacy, see section 4.5.) The collection of tax revenue is one of the most important components of socio-economic legitimacy, and the procedure by which tax is collected may be even more important than total revenue; according to Di John (2010) ‘High levels of coercion or even predation in tax collection are often signs of the illegitimacy of the state’.

4.4 Corruption

Corruption is defined as the abuse of institutional power for personal gain; however, not all such behaviour attracts stigma in all contexts: corruption structured around familial, patrimonial or other social obligations often fits into a society’s moral economy (Smith, 2007: 12, 61).

Corruption is often entrenched in every interaction citizens have with a fragile state recently emerged from violent conflict (Scharbatke-Church and Chigas, 2019). Anti-corruption efforts are more likely to be effective when they situate corruption in relation to social norms and expectations (rather than looking at it as individual wrongdoing) and are tailored to the challenges of a specific ministry. Policy reforms should be operationalised as a small package of changes that address the core problem, rather than a laundry list of best practices, as these can overwhelm reformers within ministries. Pyman cites an example from Afghanistan where a change in the form used to document tolls paid at border crossings helped to reduce corruption in the Transport Ministry (Pyman, 2019).

4.5 Financing for conflict recovery and peace-building

Funding for peace-building can come from grants, loans and other types of financing (concessional loans, development impact bonds, etc.), as well as national tax revenues and private philanthropy (see Table 5). Peace-building represents a relatively small share of total aid expenditure. A 2017 review by the Institute for Economics and Peace found that approximately 16% of ODA received by conflict-affected countries went towards

25 For the legitimating effects of inclusion of social groups, see Call (2012).

26 Boege et al. (2008) list ‘Namibia, South Africa, Ghana, Mozambique, Uganda, Zambia and Cameroon’ as African states that have created a role for traditional leaders in state hierarchies.

27 Although, see Brinkerhoff et al. (2012) for a case where the redistribution of services to previously excluded groups in Iraq diminished the state’s overall legitimacy.
peace-building. Fragile and conflict-affected states suffer more from aid volatility and aid shocks, and ODA is more unevenly distributed among them than among other recipients (Giordano and Ruiters, 2016).

The international financial landscape is increasingly diverse, with fragile and conflict-affected states borrowing from regional development banks and other ‘South–South’ lenders (among them China, India, Brazil, Malaysia and Gulf states). Alternative sources of financing may come with fewer normative strings attached, and some of these lenders have affirmed non-intervention and respect for sovereignty.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimates that financing requirements for humanitarian assistance have more than quadrupled between 2005 ($5 billion) and 2017 ($22.6 billion) (Massing, 2017: 106). At the same time, the UN system is facing what are likely to be sustained shortfalls in funding.

Two broad approaches are available to donors during peace processes: country-level aid (or direct budget support) and project-level aid (which is further divided into humanitarian and development projects). Development assistance of both types is often highly variable and unpredictable, flooding into countries following large crises (though often too slowly for acute crises), then rapidly tapering off as the crisis recedes or competing crises emerge elsewhere (World Bank and UN, 2018). This has been argued to increase conflict risks (Chandy et al., 2016). In fragile states with exclusive governance orders, country-level aid is likely to exacerbate conflict by sharpening inequality as benefits accrue to favoured groups (World Bank and UN, 2018: 249; Chandy et al., 2016: 6). It has been argued that project aid can contribute to the delegitimisation and hollowing out of the state, whose ability to set policy priorities is greatly diminished as budgets are fragmented across multiple projects and directed by NGOs and development cooperation agencies, and donors poach capable national staff (see, for example, World Bank and UN, 2018: 250; Institute for State Effectiveness, 2018; Duffield, 2007: 170; Box 8).

Recent findings partly challenge this assumption, indicating instead that the quality of services delivered, whether they are perceived as equitable and the existence of functioning measures for citizens to exercise accountability and participate in the delivery of services matter far more than whether it is the state that delivers them (Denney et al., 2015; McLoughlin,

Table 5  Types of financing flows for peace-building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finance flow</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External</strong></td>
<td>ODA grants and concessional loans</td>
<td>Private borrowing from capital markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South–South and Triangular cooperation</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INGO donations (on-budget)</td>
<td>INGO donations (off-budget)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public borrowing from capital markets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic</strong></td>
<td>Tax revenues</td>
<td>Private borrowing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-tax revenues</td>
<td>Inclusive Business Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mineral-related taxation</td>
<td>Domestic philanthropy and NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public–private partnerships</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public domestic borrowing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sovereign wealth funds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bailey (2017: 49)

28 ODA is the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s terminology for resource flows to developing countries that are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; and (c) at concessional financial terms. In addition to financial flows, technical cooperation is included in aid (http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm). For the 16% figure, see Institute for Economics and Peace, ‘Measuring Peacebuilding Cost-Effectiveness’ (http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Measuring-Peacebuilding_WEB.pdf).

29 Humanitarian projects are particularly likely to bypass the state, legitimated by the urgency of the need they purport to address (OECD, 2012; Bennett et al., 2016: 49).
If project aid is not conflict-sensitive, it can also exacerbate inequalities by concentrating in more accessible areas, or otherwise failing to reach those most in need (World Bank and UN, 2018: 250). The substitution of service delivery by NGOs and other humanitarian/development third parties can weaken accountability relationships between citizens and their governments, reducing popular expectations of the state as service provider and papering over states’ failure or unwillingness to perform this fundamental task (Winters, 2010).

Control of humanitarian aid flows has become an important tool of non-state armed groups, both in securing the support of civilian populations and perpetuating insurgency (by selling aid to fund salaries, purchase arms etc.). NGOs and other humanitarian actors can facilitate non-state armed groups’ claims to legitimacy through their neutral stance towards the parties to the armed conflict, in effect becoming providers of social services in rebel-controlled areas (Mampilly, 2011: 87).

Donors have increasingly preferred pooled financing mechanisms/funds or joint funding mechanisms/arrangements in fragile or crisis contexts, and pooled financing has grown as a share of total ODA since the mid-2000s, although it remains low at around 6% (Jenks and Topping, 2017). Joint funding mechanisms can be through UN-administered pooled funds (targeted at specific issue areas or countries), or multi-donor arrangements administered by a secretariat (see also the description of trust funds for negotiation processes under sub-section 3.7.2).

Pooled financing mechanisms (or multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs)) have been argued to reduce administration costs, increase available expertise, facilitate greater coordination of activities, distribute risk, increase the predictability of aid amounts, professionalise administration, apply greater leverage to problems and harness donor attention in the window after a crisis (UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, 2017; Molloy, 2019). However, trust funds may operate on too-short timeframes and exclude national governments (Molloy, 2019: 30–32). In the case of donor coordination bodies, where international NGOs are preferred as implementing partners, these arrangements may exclude and weaken local civil society (Wiseman, 2006).

### 4.6 International financial institutions

Having been widely criticised as exacerbating conflict and undermining peace settlements in the window after their signing (MacGinty, 2006: 143; DeRouen et al., 2010: 335), international financial institutions have begun to adopt more conflict-sensitive approaches. As noted in the Challenge of sustaining peace report, while improvements have...

---

**Box 8 Recommendations from Aid effectiveness in fragile states**

1. Donors should channel their aid through recipient governments’ public financial management systems in order to strengthen the systems themselves and to raise accountability for their performance.
2. Project implementation units (PIUs) should be avoided wherever possible.
3. Donors lacking expertise should prefer cooperative arrangements for engaging in fragile states, rather than acting alone.
4. Predictable aid is better than volatile aid. Donors should make firm commitments and inform recipient governments of their future spending plans.

Source: Chandy et al. (2016)

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30 Although the authors of Aiding the peace (Bennett et al., 2010) seem to think unequal distribution of international aid is unlikely to be significant as a cause of violent conflict.
been made in the short term, the medium-term post-peace accord phase remains neglected and ‘the usual phase of brisk post-conflict economic rebound proves difficult to sustain’ (United Nations, 2015; McKechnie et al., 2018).

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has recently begun to revise its engagement in fragile states, including acknowledging the role volatile ‘stop and go’ funding and ‘a large fall in public sector employment’ can play in stressing the social and political fabric, and setting up new bridging financing instruments to cover fragile states (IMF, 2012). Nevertheless, new fragility-sensitive interventions from the IMF still envisage a rapid trajectory towards a universalised standard of best practices (Manuel, 2017), which seems insensitive to the ‘tendency of free markets to contradict social justice’ and exacerbate conflict risks (MacGinty, 2006: 46).

The World Bank has a more elaborated policy in relation to fragile and conflict-affected states, and has undertaken major research projects into donor-supported peace-building in the last decade, most importantly the 2011 *World development report* and the 2018 *Pathways for peace* study.31 There are however some weaknesses in the World Bank’s operations. Demand for lending at concessional rates far exceeds supply, which is a result of underfunding by wealthier member states. The Bank’s policy of non-interference in member states has led it to operate in partnership with the UN in states undergoing transitions. While this approach has some strengths, it has led the Bank to under-serve countries that do not have UN missions (Viterbo, 2018: 117–119). The non-interference provision has also been interpreted as preventing the Bank from imposing ‘peace conditionality’, whereby further loans are conditional on progress towards peace (Viterbo, 2018: 117–118).

Regional financial institutions (e.g. the Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank and Inter-American Development Bank) have not developed standards for or approaches to lending to conflict-affected states, and (insofar as they have developed standards for lending to conflict-affected states at all) have largely followed the lead of the World Bank and IMF (Giordano and Ruiters, 2016).

### 4.7 Conclusion

While the growing consensus around the importance of inclusion and local ownership reflects hard lessons from the recent history of peace-building, emerging frameworks have made unsatisfactory progress beyond rhetorical commitments to cooperation and coordination. Even as the prospect of consensus and coordination among donors, international organisations and states around issues such as local ownership and inclusion is promising, the assumption that all goals are mutually reinforcing relies on assumed links between inclusive processes and outcomes, and seems to sidestep the question of prioritisation among goals and strategies. Moreover, the question remains whether the Sustaining Peace Agenda and other frameworks amount to making a virtue of necessity, stripping the political valence out of peace support by equating it to economic development, and placing it in the hands of national governments.

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31 World Bank concessional loans for fragile and conflict-affected states are disbursed through the International Development Association, and the Bank’s engagement is guided by Operational Policy 8.00 on Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies (OP 8.00), last revised in 2014; Viterbo (2018).
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