What drives reform?

A political economy analysis of migration policy in Morocco

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This case study is part of a larger set of research commissioned by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) exploring the linkages between migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, however the views expressed are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect the official policies of the Federal Council of Switzerland.

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Cover photo: A group of sub-Saharan African immigrants walk through the G5 neighbourhood of Rabat. © Alfredo Caliz/Panos Pictures.
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# Acronyms

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAPEC</td>
<td>Agence Nationale de Promotion de l’Emploi et des Compétences (National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Skills)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCME</td>
<td>Conseil de la Communauté Marocaine à l’Etranger (Council for the Moroccan Community Abroad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDH</td>
<td>Conseil National des Droits de l’Homme (National Council for Human Rights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRO</td>
<td>Conseil Régional de l’Oriental (Regional Council of Oriental)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>foreign direct investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Corporation for International Cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>gross national product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTP</td>
<td>Groupe de Travail de Protection (Protection Working Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDCMREAM</td>
<td>Ministère Délégué Chargé des Marocains Résidant à l’Etranger et des Affaires de la Migration (Ministry responsible for Moroccans Residing Abroad and Migration Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRE</td>
<td>Marocains résident à l’étranger (Moroccans living abroad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS2</td>
<td>Maroc Solidarité Médico-Sociale (Moroccan Medical-Social Solidarity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>official development assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFPPPT</td>
<td>Office de Formation Professionelle et de la Promotion du Travail (Office for Professional Training and Employment Promotion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDR</td>
<td>Plan de Développement Régional (Regional Development Plan) 2016–2021</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEA</td>
<td>political economy analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNPM</td>
<td>Plateforme Nationale Protection Migrants (National Platform for Migrants’ Protection)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNIA</td>
<td>Stratégie Nationale d’Immigration et d’Asile (National Immigration and Asylum Strategy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNMRE</td>
<td>Stratégie Nationale en faveur des Marocains Résidant à l’Etranger (National Strategy for Moroccans Residing Abroad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN DESA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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Executive summary

This study analyses the political economy factors affecting migration policies in Morocco, and their implications for the country’s development policies and outcomes. Morocco is an interesting case for several reasons: first, its diverse migration profile with a prominent history of emigration and transit migration, alongside rising levels of immigration; second, its location and position as a key player in migration between Africa and Europe; and third, its recent pursuit of a leadership role on migration affairs, both within the region and globally.

After gaining independence from France in 1956, for many decades Morocco’s migration policy focused almost exclusively on supporting and maximising the benefits of the now five million-strong Moroccan diaspora, whose remittances account for around seven percent of the country’s Gross National Product. In 2003, its migration agenda expanded to include a new emphasis on border controls and the prevention of irregular migration flows, through strict, security-focused legislation. But in 2013, King Mohammed VI announced a major shift in Morocco’s migration policy, leading to the launch of a new National Immigration and Asylum Strategy (SNIA). This new framework affirmed the need for a humane and rights-based approach to migration management and highlighted the opportunities and benefits that migration could bring, with a particular emphasis on welcoming and integrating increasing numbers of sub-Saharan African migrants. The introduction of the SNIA saw concrete achievements across some important dimensions of Moroccan migration policy, including the regularisation of tens of thousands of formerly irregular migrants. Other reforms outlined in the SNIA, however, have yet to be adopted, including key commitments to introduce immigration and asylum laws that reflect and legally underpin the strategy.

What drove the adoption and implementation of the post-2013 migration policy, and how does it relate to the country’s development strategy and outcomes? It is important to understand this reform in the broader context of Morocco’s recent migration agenda. In many other countries, migration and border management are primarily matters for domestic policy, shaped by domestic priorities and politics. In Morocco, civil society movements have undoubtedly played a major role in promoting migrant rights and opportunities that were adopted in the SNIA. Yet more so than in many other countries, the primary purpose of Morocco’s migration agenda appears to be oriented towards achieving specific foreign policy objectives, as represented by its positioning under the ministry responsible for foreign affairs. These foreign policy objectives promote Morocco’s development through wide-ranging economic and political gains, and span – and require mediation between – multiple diplomatic arenas, including the country’s relations with Africa, Europe, and on the global stage.

In Morocco’s engagement with Africa, migration policy has contributed to a broader strategy to improve the country’s status and influence on the continent, by helping to project an image of hospitality, fraternity and shared identity with fellow African states, as well as regional leadership (for example, as the African Union’s migration lead since 2017). This wider strategy in Africa has pursued – and in many cases successfully achieved – valuable political and economic objectives. These include regaining entry and influence in the African Union from 2017, reducing opposition to its contested claim to Western Sahara, and promoting trade and a (still pending) bid to join the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These stronger ties with the rest of the continent all help Morocco to position itself as a gateway to Africa for global trade and investment.

Looking northwards, migration policy has also been a long-standing component of
Morocco’s diplomatic relations with the EU and with EU member states. The economic benefits of this relationship are substantial for Morocco. For example, the EU accounted for two-thirds of its trade exports in 2017, and provided almost three-quarters of foreign direct investment in 2018, as well as billions of euros in annual remittances from the EU-based Moroccan diaspora. Given Europe’s pressing need to improve migration management at its borders, migration cooperation has certainly been significant in helping Morocco to cultivate a privileged relationship with the EU and with individual member states. These bilateral and multilateral partnerships with EU states have in turn been important for Morocco’s development by facilitating further trade links, investment and access to EU visas for Moroccan citizens.

While collaboration on border enforcement has been a component of Morocco’s migration cooperation with the EU since the turn of the century, the introduction of the SNIA in 2013 presented a new dimension of Moroccan migration management that also held strong appeal for European member states. With its emphasis on integrating migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and other neighbouring countries, the Moroccan policy had the potential to serve Europe’s objective of reducing irregular onward migration to its borders, by providing opportunities and incentives for migrants to stay in Morocco. For this reason, European partners supported and provided significant funding for the SNIA. However, in the last two years, European funding for Moroccan migration management has increasingly reverted to prioritising traditional border security and immigration controls, due to the stark rise in irregular migration to Europe along the Western Mediterranean route (for which Morocco was the main departure point). This rise in irregular crossings partly reflects the implementation of heightened controls on other routes, but also indicates the perceived limitations of the opportunities afforded in Morocco; not just for migrants but also for many Moroccan citizens, who accounted for one-fifth of the Western Mediterranean irregular crossings in 2018.

Beyond specific regional relationships, Morocco’s migration policy has also been employed in the service of diplomatic objectives on the global stage. Its post-2013 migration policy has been heavily publicised in global fora. This has helped build Morocco’s reputation as a progressive leader on migration issues and improve its global status, including its credentials to host major migration events such as the Marrakech Intergovernmental Conference to endorse the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) in December 2018. This global influence, combined with the perception of Morocco as a trusted partner and ally of both African and European states, is a significant achievement, and one that is based on the use of migration as a key entry-point and platform for external engagement.

In the main, Morocco has been successful in achieving many of its foreign policy objectives leveraging its migration agenda. Yet domestically, progress on the implementation of the SNIA has been slow. There is frustration among civil society actors, as well as increasingly within the international community, about the Moroccan government’s pending commitments to pass legislation and allocate resources for the SNIA’s various components. There has been little in the way of concrete budget commitments, a normative framework or accountability for delivery. Without clear resource allocation, local governments have had limited incentives to implement the SNIA, particularly as migration is not considered a key electoral issue.

Our analysis therefore points to a stark difference between the refined, political narrative and internationally publicised endorsement of the SNIA at the top level of government, and its incomplete domestic implementation in practice. If left unaddressed, this gap between policy ambition and implementation may well undermine the image of stability and credibility that Morocco has established with Africa, with Europe and globally.

There is thus a clear and pressing need for Morocco to deliver more roundly on its commitments. Yet the goals it has achieved at the international and regional level thus far should not be underestimated. Migration is not often seen or understood as a key component of foreign policy. Through its strategic use of migration policies to build alliances, attract financial resources, and develop credibility as a trusted regional and
global player, Morocco offers some useful (and relatively rare) insights into the political economy of migration as a foreign policy strategy.

Ultimately, Morocco provides a concrete example of how migration can be a strategic component of diplomatic efforts to help achieve significant foreign policy objectives. But unless the country follows through on its migration policy implementation, there is a risk that Morocco’s commitment to the GCM and beyond will remain limited at best, and that the efforts made to date to establish Morocco as a credible and stable regional and global player in the migration space will be undermined.

Based on this analysis, this study presents several recommendations for the Government of Morocco and the international community.

The government should:

- Strengthen institutional infrastructure to ensure a credible and tangible commitment to implement the SNIA.
- Align legislation and normative frameworks with the SNIA’s ambition and design.
- Re-engage with civil society to rebuild trust in the Moroccan government’s intention to promote migrant rights, and to ensure that civil society organisations are treated as respected, independent partners.
- Continue to decentralise decision-making powers and financial resources to the local level to promote migrants’ integration into Morocco’s economy and society.

The international community should:

- Ensure consistency between diplomatic engagement and development cooperation, providing transparent information on the rationale for financial support to the SNIA, and how this relates to other forms of support.
- Develop realistic milestones to engage with the Moroccan government on key areas of implementation, in particular to align national legislative frameworks with the policy objectives of the SNIA.
- Engage in a dialogue with Morocco, the AU and other key actors in the region to improve coherence between multilateral cooperation and bilateral relationships on migration and other related policies.
1 Introduction

This case study analyses the political economy factors affecting the evolution and implementation of migration policies in Morocco, and the implications for domestic and external aspects of Morocco’s development policies and outcomes.

Morocco offers an interesting case study of the role migration can (and does) play in a country’s development, for three reasons. First, it has a diverse migration profile, with a long and prominent history of emigration and rising levels of immigration. Second, by virtue of its geography Morocco is a key player in migration between Africa and Europe. The country is a springboard for sub-Saharan African migrants looking to make the journey across the Mediterranean, and is one of only a handful of countries that are at once origin, transit and destination hubs for migration. Third, in recent years Morocco has successfully sought a leadership role on migration affairs within the region, and increasingly globally.

The paper is structured as follows. The rest of this chapter outlines the methodology, with further detail in the Annexes. Chapter 2 describes Morocco’s migration profile and the key geopolitical dynamics influencing policy development. Chapter 3 analyses the political economy of migration reform. Chapter 4 looks at sectoral implementation (in health, education and employment), and local implementation in the case of Oujda. Finally, chapter 5 shares key findings and recommendations for the Moroccan government and the international community.

1.1 Methodology

This case study draws on an in-depth review of published and grey literature and datasets, as well as 26 interviews with key stakeholders from the Moroccan government, donor governments and civil society. The literature review informed the selection of interviewees, alongside consultation with SDC’s Morocco country office.

The datasets used include those published by the United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA)’s Population Division, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Bank, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), as well as the Determinants of International Migration database (DEMIG C2C) from the International Migration Institute at the University of Oxford. We also drew on data from various branches of the Moroccan government, principally the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry responsible for Moroccans Residing Abroad and Migration Affairs, as well as the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of National Education, Vocational Training, Higher Education and Scientific Research; and the Ministry of Employment and Professional Integration (see the References for the full list of sources).

When using this data, we faced a number of limitations. As with any migration research, it is difficult to estimate precise changes in the total migrant population since population datasets typically only report migrants who are known to the authorities and are therefore regular. Furthermore, one component of our analysis of development outcomes aimed to consider the impact of migration policy on migrants’ health, education, employment and other outcomes. However, it was very difficult to assess this impact because population-wide data on these variables could not be disaggregated to look at only the migrant population, and even basic data on the numbers of migrants using government services was imprecise. These limitations in the quantitative data meant that the case study...
took a more qualitative approach, using key informant interviews from the fieldwork to complement analysis by other researchers and civil society organisations.

Key informant interviews were conducted in late 2019, both remotely via Skype and in person in Rabat and Oujda. Fieldwork was conducted over two weeks in October and November.

The case study uses a political economy approach, exploring how ‘systemic’ factors, such as structures, institutions and dynamics of power, incentives and the behaviour of different actors shape the effects of migration on development outcomes. Our analytical framework (see Annex 1) explored two specific characteristics of migration policy and dynamics: the benefits and costs of migration for Morocco; and the effects of costs and benefits on the country’s domestic and externally oriented development policies, outcomes and relationships.

1.1.1 Local case study site selection
Oujda in Morocco’s Oriental region was selected as a case study site due to the significant migration flows in the city and the wider Oriental region. Oujda and the Oriental region is a key migration hub (CRO, 2016). Oujda lies on the border with Algeria and is one of the most important entry points for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and/or refugees (mainly from Syria) crossing into Morocco. From Oujda, migrants can travel to the sea to continue their journey towards Europe – typically moving to Nador or Melilla and onwards to Spain.

A wide range of actors work on migration issues in the Oriental region, including international development partners and local NGOs backed by international funding. Civil society actors have established a protection working group (GTP) to facilitate coordination and referrals across sectors. This structure has been emulated in other regions of the country.
2 The context for Morocco’s migration policy

2.1 Morocco’s migration profile

2.1.1 Emigration

Morocco has historically been one of the world’s leading emigration countries (Berriane et al., 2015); see Figure 1. Today, the number of Moroccan emigrants stands at more than 3 million (UN DESA, 2019), while the Moroccan diaspora as a whole (including second- and third-generation Moroccans residing abroad) totals 5 million (or 15% of the country’s population) (Kingdom of Morocco, 2018).

Most Moroccans abroad are in Europe (predominantly France, followed by Spain and Italy) (UN DESA, 2019). The first major emigration wave occurred in the 1960s, when Western European countries actively recruited Moroccans en masse for low-skilled labour (de Haas, 2005). Subsequent decades saw increasingly restrictive visa regulations in Western and Southern Europe, but Moroccan emigration to Europe continued to increase through both regular and irregular channels, rising from around 300,000 in 1973 to more than 2 million in the early twenty-first century (de Haas, 2005; 2014). Following the 2008 recession, Moroccan emigration to Europe notably declined (OECD, 2017), before picking up again since 2014 (OECD, 2019). In public opinion surveys almost half of respondents (44%) would consider relocating (Arab Barometer, 2019). The most common reasons given are economic considerations (50%), followed by educational opportunities (15%), to reunite with family (14%) and frustration with corruption (6%). Emigration aspirations are particularly high among youth, who have faced record-high unemployment levels of 22% over the last three years (World Bank, 2019). Combined with low wages, the lack of job prospects means that emigration rates are likely to remain high (de Haas, 2014).

While many Moroccans emigrate through regular channels for education, employment or family reunification, some use irregular migration to reach Europe, particularly in the face of diminishing opportunities for regular migration from the 1990s onwards (Gazzotti, 2018). In 2018, Moroccans accounted for one-fifth of the
57,034 irregular migrants detected on the Western Mediterranean route to Europe (travelling by sea and land from Morocco or Algeria to Spain) (Frontex, 2019); see Figure 2. That same year, Moroccans constituted the majority of the 1,500 irregular migrants detected on the Western African route (from the north-western coast of Africa to the Canary Islands) (ibid.). This is in addition to irregular migrants intercepted by the Moroccan authorities in-country, of whom there were consistently more than 6,000 a year between 2009 and 2015, reaching a high of 12,000 in 2014 (Gazzotti, 2018). In the Arab Barometer survey cited above, 38% of Moroccans thinking about emigrating said that they would consider doing so without the necessary visas, while 56% said they would do so only on a regular basis (Arab Barometer, 2019).

2.1.2 Transit migration

As well as being a prominent source of emigrants to Europe, Morocco is also a transit country for sub-Saharan African migrants looking to make the journey to Europe. With the tightening of European visa policies, Morocco’s position as the closest African country to Europe has made it a popular springboard for onward migration (Lahlou, 2015). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, around 10,000–15,000 sub-Saharan migrants entered Morocco annually, and 15,000–20,000 (both Moroccans and foreigners) irregularly migrated to Spain each year, via land and sea routes (Natter, 2014).

After 2003, Morocco’s policy towards irregular immigration and emigration became far stricter. According to the Moroccan government, this led to a significant decline in transit migrants’ irregular migration to Europe, with annual flows of irregular onward migration by foreigners reportedly falling from 24,000 in 2003 to 7,500 in 2009 (Lahlou, 2015). Morocco claims to have prevented 500,000 irregular attempts to cross into Europe since 2004 (by both Moroccans and foreign migrants) (Ghani, 2018). However, while Frontex data shows low levels of irregular crossings on the Western Mediterranean route from Morocco and Algeria to Spain in the late 2000s and early 2010s, the last three years have seen a pronounced increase in land and sea interceptions on this route (for both Moroccan and other nationals). Crossing from Morocco to Spain has now become the main irregular route to Europe (Frontex, 2019).

2.1.3 Immigrant population

While transit migration has by no means disappeared, tighter monitoring by the Moroccan authorities and stricter border patrols on European shores over the last decade mean that many sub-Saharan Africans who originally saw Europe as their final destination are instead staying in Morocco (de Haas, 2014). While Morocco is now framed as a destination country for immigrants (Kingdom of Morocco, 2018), this is only partly borne out by the data (Natter, 2018).

The national census (conducted every 10 years) shows a notable rise in immigrant numbers, from 51,000 in 2004 to 84,000 in 2014 (Kingdom of Morocco, n.d.). Government estimates reported to the UN at more frequent intervals show a similar rise, from 54,400 in 2005 to 98,600 in 2019 (UN DESA, 2019). These official figures are certainly an underestimate of the total migrant population since they only show regular migrants; furthermore, they appear not to include migrants newly regularised in registration exercises in
2014 (23,096 applications accepted, primarily from Syria, Senegal, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Nigeria) and 2017 (20,000-plus applications accepted, country breakdown unknown). However, it is worth noting that, of the official international migrant population reported in the UN data, more than one-third are French, and these French migrants accounted for over 70% of the jump in official migrant numbers from 2005–2010, and over a third (37%) of the rise in migrant numbers in 2010–2015 and 2015–2019 (ibid.). These European migrants have generally been overlooked.

A much greater part of the narrative on migration in Morocco focuses on sub-Saharan African migrants. As described in chapter 3, the mass registrations in 2014 and 2017 regularised tens of thousands of previously irregular migrants, many of them from sub-Saharan Africa. But since some migrants did not regularise their status, and others arrived irregularly in subsequent years, the total number of sub-Saharan African migrants in Morocco is unknown. According to Jacobs (2019a), recent estimates suggest that the combined regular and irregular population may amount to around 70,000.

According to a 2015–16 survey by the International University of Rabat and the Hassan II University of Casablanca (Mourji et al., 2016), the large majority of sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco are male (74%), single (74%) and highly educated, with an average age of 28 years. The largest migrant populations are Ivorian (22%), Senegalese (21%), Cameroonian (14%) and Guinean (13%). Almost all were urban residents in their countries of origin (91%), and most (70%) travelled to Morocco by air, entering legally (citizens of many African countries either do not require a visa for short-term stays in Morocco or can obtain one relatively easily). Around a quarter had arrived in the last year (23%), while 28% had spent more than four years in Morocco. The main reason given for their migration was to improve their living standards (64%), with a minority migrating for their studies (18%) or to escape conflict (10%). Two-thirds of migrants reportedly came to Morocco for long-term residence, compared to only one-third reporting Morocco as a transit route to another destination. This differs substantially from a 2007 migrant survey, in which only 2% of sub-Saharan African migrants described Morocco as a long-term destination country (Mghari, 2008, cited in Mourji et al., 2016).

2.1.4 Refugees and asylum-seekers

One relatively minor but noteworthy sub-component of the international migrant population in Morocco consists of refugees and asylum-seekers. This group is processed by UNHCR in the absence of an approved national asylum framework (UNHCR, 2019a). Largely as a result of the Syrian conflict, the population seeking asylum has grown substantially in recent years, from 1,072 in 2010 (792 refugees and 280 asylum-seekers) to more than 8,000 in 2019 (6,200 refugees and 1,900 asylum-seekers – predominantly from Syria) (UNHCR, 2019b).

2.1.5 A destination country?

While Morocco has seen some increase in migrant numbers, classifying it as a destination country seems premature (Natter, 2018). International migrants constitute a very small percentage of Morocco’s total population (officially 0.3%, against the global average of 3.5%) (UN DESA, 2019). While these official estimates under-report the total number of immigrants since they only report those with regular status, even a conservative estimate of 200,000 immigrants in Morocco remains miniscule compared to the millions of Moroccan emigrants (Natter, 2018). Furthermore, of the sub-Saharan African migrants who reside in Morocco, many entered with and often still maintain the intention of continuing on to Europe, as demonstrated by the large and growing rate of irregular transit migration on the Western Mediterranean route since 2016. Many Moroccans also remain determined to leave, undermining the depiction of Morocco as an attractive destination country for immigrants from across the continent.

2.2 Key geopolitical influences

Geopolitical dynamics are an important backdrop to the formulation of Morocco’s migration policy. Two aspects in particular shape the policy context: Morocco’s relationship with the EU, and its relationship with other African states.
2.2.1 Relationship with the EU
Morocco has long sought a strong relationship with Europe, having originally (and unsuccessfully) applied to be part of the EU’s predecessor in 1987 (Natter, 2014). Over the years, Morocco’s relationship with the EU has become one of the most developed of all the EU’s Southern Partners (European Parliament, 2019); it includes the establishment of a Free Trade Area (in 2000), the first attainment of ‘advanced status’ among Southern Partners in the European Neighbourhood Policy (in 2008) and ongoing negotiations to establish a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (which stalled shortly after they began in 2013, but have since been reinvigorated).

The economic benefits of the EU relationship are significant for Morocco (Teevan, 2019). The EU is Morocco’s most important economic partner by a hefty margin, accounting for 59% of its trade in 2017 and 65% of its exports. EU countries provided Morocco with 70% of its foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2018, and the EU-based Moroccan diaspora provides billions of euros in remittances (ibid.). Since 2014, the EU has also allocated more than €1 billion in assistance to Morocco through its European Neighbourhood Instrument, to support access to social services, democratic governance, the rule of law and mobility, as well as employability and sustainable and inclusive growth (European Commission, 2018).

Yet, while the EU continues to hold substantial economic importance to Morocco, a notable change in the relationship between the two parties has emerged over the last decade. Sceptics note that, year on year, the EU has enjoyed a substantial trade surplus with Morocco, while the concrete policy changes that would most benefit Morocco or Moroccan citizens in the EU have failed to materialise (Martin, 2014; Teevan, 2019). Conscious of this imbalance, Morocco has adopted a bolder tone in negotiations and called for more equal treatment. It has also assumed a more defiant tone in relation to political criticism, for example in response to European Court of Justice rulings regarding Moroccan rights to resources on Western Saharan territory (Garcia Valdivia, 2018).

Morocco’s enhanced leverage in negotiations is to a large extent derived from Europe’s pressing political need to improve (and often outsource) migration management at its borders. As the closest African country to Europe, Morocco’s location on the border between the two continents has given it significant geopolitical leverage with the EU and enabled it to cultivate a privileged relationship with the EU as a whole, and with specific member states (notably Spain) (Lahlou, 2015; Teevan, 2019). Morocco’s negotiating position with the EU is also strengthened by the increasing diversification of its trade partnerships, including with China, Russia and – critically – with its sub-Saharan neighbours (Teevan, 2019).

2.2.2 Relations with African states
Morocco has a deep but complex relationship with its North African and sub-Saharan African neighbours (Messari, 2018). It was a founding member of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the African Union’s (AU) predecessor, and has had long-standing religious and commercial ties with many states in the sub-Saharan region. However, Morocco withdrew from the OAU in 1984 due to the territorial dispute over Western Sahara. A former Spanish colony with rich phosphate and fishing reserves, Western Sahara was annexed by Morocco in 1975 and became the site of a 16-year conflict with the indigenous Sahrawi people, led by the Polisario Front. A UN-brokered truce came into effect in 1991 and is still in place, though subsequent attempts to organise an independence referendum have been blocked. Over the last three decades Morocco has lobbied for support for its position, including campaigning vigorously against recent international rulings in favour of the Polisario Front (Garcia Valdivia, 2018; Norman, 2014).

The Western Sahara dispute has been a scourge on Moroccan diplomatic relations, leading not only to the country’s isolation from the AU, but also impeding progress on the development of an Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). Established in Rabat in 1989, the AMU aimed to strengthen economic, political, cultural and security coordination between its five members (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) and to become a regional trading bloc, in line with the seven other AU-recognised regional economic communities (Ait Hamza, 2017; Abderrahim and Aggad, 2018).
But members’ polarised views on Western Sahara and various other contentious issues quickly led to a stalemate within the institution. A functional regional framework for cooperation has yet to be produced, and it has now been 25 years since the last meeting of the AMU Presidency Council (Abderrahim and Aggad, 2018).

Observing the lack of progress in regional cooperation and the heavy economic toll of the Arab Spring events on the Maghreb, a number of North African countries including Morocco have pivoted towards the south in pursuit of geostrategic influence and engagement with sub-Saharan Africa’s rapidly growing emerging markets (ibid.). Morocco’s desire to pursue close ties with sub-Saharan Africa is not a new goal; even after its departure from the AU, the country worked hard to maintain bilateral relations with many sub-Saharan African states (Messari, 2018). But the focus on South–South relations has undoubtedly intensified under King Mohammed VI and has become a top foreign policy priority in recent years (Messari, 2018; Bassist, 2019).

Most significantly, a concerted diplomatic campaign to re-join the AU was successful in enabling Morocco’s readmission in January 2017. Since then, the country has sought to show regional leadership on a number of issues, of which migration is arguably the most prominent. Morocco has also been assertively strengthening its economic relationships with its southern neighbours. According to the African Development Bank, 85% of Morocco’s outward FDI now goes to sub-Saharan Africa, and trade is also growing, with exports of Moroccan goods to West Africa tripling between 2006 and 2016 (The Economist, 2018). Morocco has been actively lobbying to solidify its economic partnership with West Africa; it applied to join the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2017, but has faced significant resistance from current members (particularly Nigeria and Ghana) and its membership status remains uncertain (Bassist, 2019).
3 Migration policy reform

3.1 Policies, normative frameworks and legal frameworks

3.1.1 Emigration policy
Since it became an independent state in 1956, Morocco’s migration policy has focused heavily – and, for many decades, exclusively – on promoting and channelling emigration, and maximising the benefits of a large and growing Moroccan diaspora (Natter, 2018). In 1990, Morocco became one of the first countries to establish a ministry for its overseas citizens (the Ministry for Moroccans Residing Abroad), as well as a state-financed foundation focused on deepening ties with the diaspora. The Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad aims to promote emigrant investment in Morocco, and runs activities for the diaspora both in Morocco and in their new countries of residence (de Haas, 2014). In 2007, King Mohammed VI set up a Council for the Moroccan Community Abroad (CCME), whose members advise the government on protecting the interests of Moroccan emigrants and enhancing the development potential of migration (ibid.).

Engaging effectively with the diaspora is seen as critically important for Morocco because of emigrants’ immense value to the country’s economy. Migrant remittances (see Figure 3), mostly from Europe, are a vital contributor to the national balance of payments, representing

**Figure 3** Migrant remittance inflows to Morocco

![Figure 3 Migrant remittance inflows to Morocco](source: World Bank, 2019)
around 7% of gross national product (GNP) and amounting annually over the 2000s to roughly six times the annual amount of official development assistance (ODA) and three times the annual FDI received by Morocco (de Haas, 2014). The diaspora is also an important driver of tourism in Morocco and, to some extent, of direct investment (Alioua et al., 2017). However, emigrants’ concerns about corruption and bureaucracy appear to have limited government efforts to increase diaspora business and infrastructure investments (de Haas, 2014), and the government fears that remittances may also diminish over time, given weaker third- and fourth-generation diaspora ties to the country (Kingdom of Morocco, 2018).

Cognisant of the need to reinforce and reshape diaspora engagement, in 2015 the government released a new National Strategy for Moroccans Residing Abroad (SNMRE) (Kingdom of Morocco, 2018). Building on provisions enshrined in the 2011 constitution, the SNMRE has three main objectives: preserving the national identity of Moroccans living abroad; protecting their rights and interests, including their right to participate in Moroccan elections; and promoting their contribution to the country’s development.

The SNMRE consists of eight programmes spanning six sectors and two cross-cutting areas. However, despite its wide thematic range, it does not have strong cross-government engagement and is primarily seen as an internal strategy for the Ministry responsible for Moroccans Residing Abroad and Migration Affairs (MDCMREAM). While the government has championed several of the initiatives coming out of the strategy (ibid.), concrete assessments of progress are difficult given the lack of published targets, budgets and other information on programme operations (European Commission, 2016).

### 3.1.2 Immigration and asylum policy

While Moroccan migration policy has historically been most concerned with diaspora management, the policy agenda has also expanded to address a broader range of migration issues. As irregular migration routes from Morocco to Europe became more heavily used, not only by Moroccans but also by increasing numbers of transit migrants, the authorities initially turned a blind eye (Natter, 2014). However, in 2003 this lax approach was reversed, with the adoption of Morocco’s first migration law since independence: Law 02-03 relating to the entry and stay of foreigners in Morocco and to irregular emigration and immigration.

Characterised by a strict, security-driven tone, Law 02-03 introduced new regulations for foreigners’ entry and stay in Morocco and criminalised both the act and facilitation of irregular immigration and emigration, introducing swingeing fines and jail sentences for irregular migrants and smugglers (ibid.). It also established a Directorate of Migration and Border Surveillance within the Ministry of the Interior and doubled the number of permanent border guards.

The sudden enactment of this restrictive legislation is frequently interpreted as an example of Morocco ceding to EU demands to reduce irregular migration to Europe and to take on the role of ‘Europe’s gendarme in Africa’ (Lahlou, 2015). But this framing understates Morocco’s autonomy as a political actor and overlooks the significant geopolitical advantages that the policy offered in providing Morocco with a source of ‘geographical rent’ and a powerful bargaining tool to leverage in diplomatic relations with Europe (Natter, 2014).

The decade following the enactment of Law 02-03 was characterised by an ‘arbitrary, violent and security-driven state approach to immigration’, trapping irregular sub-Saharan migrants in harsh living conditions and in constant fear of crackdowns and expulsion (Natter, 2018). But this period also featured a growing movement of civil society organisations and academics critical of the government’s repressive approach and calling for more humane and progressive migration policies (Alioua et al., 2017). In 2011, Morocco experienced Arab Spring-inspired public protests for economic, political and social reform, which were quickly followed by the development of the new constitution (Üstübici, 2016). This constitution embraced more democratic principles and called for greater respect for human rights, including specifically guaranteeing foreigners the same fundamental rights as Moroccan citizens.
It also gave new powers to the National Human Rights Council (CNDH), which advocated strongly for migrant rights, including in a 2013 report calling for a radically new immigration and asylum policy (CNDH, 2013).

In late 2013, seemingly in response to this civil society pressure, King Mohammed VI announced a major shift to a ‘new migration policy’ (MDCMREAM, 2014). Subsequently outlined in more detail in the National Immigration and Asylum Strategy (SNIA), the new policy affirmed the need for a coherent, humane and rights-based approach to migration management, and emphasised the opportunities and benefits that migration could bring. It also explicitly reframed Morocco’s migration profile: formerly a country of emigration and transit, Morocco had now become a host country that welcomed immigrants. Overseen by MDCMREAM, the SNIA aimed to facilitate the integration of regular migrants, establish new legal and institutional frameworks for immigration and asylum and uphold a human rights-based approach to the management of migration flows.

The first major reform initiative was a mass regularisation exercise launched in January 2014 targeting 45,000 irregular migrants. Eighty-three offices were opened around the country, and 3,000 officials were assigned to undertake the exercise (Lahlou, 2015; Alioua et al., 2017). Over the course of 2014, 27,649 applications for regularisation were submitted (of which 80% were reportedly from non-Arab African countries). Around 18,000 applications were initially approved (ibid.), rising to 23,096 following the broadening of the eligibility criteria (Kingdom of Morocco, 2018). This was followed in December 2016 by the launch of a second, year-long regularisation wave (now framed as an ‘integration’ exercise), which received 28,400 applications (Alioua et al., 2017). More than 20,000 of this second wave of applications had reportedly been accepted as of October 2018 (MDCMREAM, 2018). There were also two exercises to regularise UNHCR-recognised refugees, who were not previously recognised by the Moroccan government in the absence of a functional asylum system (Alioua et al., 2017).

Beyond this high-profile regularisation exercise, much of the proposed new migration policy has yet to be implemented (GADEM, 2018a). There has been a lack of institutional ownership, with civil society organisations left to drive forward much of the policy vision (ibid.). As discussed in chapter 4, regular and irregular migrants’ access to health, education, employment and other rights remains uneven in practice. Progress on legal reforms envisaged in the SNIA has repeatedly stalled, with only one of the three planned laws being adopted to date (the law on human trafficking, which was approved in 2016) (Alioua et al., 2017). As long as the new immigration and asylum laws remain in draft form, the restrictive terms of Law 02-03 continue to apply. Migrants have therefore continued to be exposed to arbitrary arrest, deportation and other rights violations; civil society organisations report a particular deterioration in the government’s treatment of sub-Saharan African migrants since mid-2018 (GADEM, 2018a; Amnesty International, 2018). Through a ‘cruel and unlawful’ large-scale crackdown, thousands of migrants and refugees have been arrested and deported to remote areas close to the Algerian border or in the south of the country, including several with legal residence permits (Alami, 2018).

These reports of mistreatment within Morocco’s borders have not prevented the country from presenting a global image as a progressive leader on migration affairs – a position which it has actively sought to establish since the King’s 2013 speech announcing the new migration policy. This growing international influence helped secure Marrakech as the host city for the Intergovernmental Conference on the Global Compact for Migration in December 2018. It also helped bolster Morocco’s position within the Global Forum on Migration and Development, which it co-led during 2018 with Germany (MDCMREAM, 2018; Baida, 2019).

### 3.2 Drivers of migration reform: balancing domestic and foreign policy priorities

How and why has migration evolved into such a visible and salient policy area in Morocco? The answer lies in a combination of factors linking Morocco’s foreign policy to its position as an emerging economy. While migration has always been central to Morocco’s development
and identity, it has become a much more central feature of the political landscape since the launch of the ‘new migration policy’ in 2013.

A key feature of the post-2013 approach to migration is that it explicitly links it to key policy areas and political priorities in Morocco and the region. Several respondents highlighted how, in the new policy framework, migration is a key pillar of an evolving narrative of economic growth in a broad sense, as well as being part of an ambition to play an increasingly strategic role as a trusted partner and interlocutor in the region. In the SNIA, Morocco is presented as a destination country that attracts, welcomes and integrates migrants from across the African continent. This is explicitly framed as benefiting both African migrants and Morocco’s economy and society, although the major implicit beneficiary is undoubtedly Europe, based on expectations of reduced irregular flows of newly integrated sub-Saharan immigrants.

How has this narrative been delivered in practice, and in what ways has the implementation of the SNIA contributed to achieving its objective? In contrast to many other countries, where migration is first and foremost a domestic policy issue, respondents agreed that Morocco has primarily employed migration policy as a diplomatic tool in the service of broad foreign policy objectives. Organisationallly this is evidenced in the location of migration affairs within the remit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The foreign affairs agendas to which migration policy has contributed in Morocco are remarkably diverse, including engagement strategies with Africa, the EU and global institutions.

In Morocco’s engagement with Africa, migration policy has constituted an important component of a broad strategy to improve the country’s status and influence on the African continent. Specifically, interviewees pointed to the centrality of an immigration-friendly policy to secure Morocco’s re-entry into the AU in 2017. This also finds support in the literature, which highlights the importance of projecting an image of hospitality, fraternity and shared identity to build trust and authority on the continent (Alioua et al., 2017). Morocco is today the AU’s migration lead and is spurring the development of an ‘African Agenda on Migration’ (Baida, 2019). Several respondents referred to the recent decision to host the headquarters of a new African Observatory for Migration and Development (OAMD) in Rabat as the most tangible outcome of Morocco’s efforts to show leadership within the region.

Yet Morocco’s objectives in Africa go far beyond leading regional migration affairs. Both our interviews and the literature review for this study emphasised the role of Morocco’s migration agenda in furthering its ambition to gain ECOWAS membership, position itself as a gateway to Africa for global trade and investment and win support for its claims to Western Sahara (Norman, 2016; Alioua et al., 2017; Jacobs, 2019a). Opinions among respondents differed as to the extent to which these objectives have been achieved, but commentators on Moroccan affairs agree that migration policy has undoubtedly played some role in advancing the country’s economic and political goals in the region (ibid.). However, the long-term sustainability of this strategy is questionable if the value of Morocco’s hospitable migration policy on paper is undermined as migrants continue to encounter state hostility and restricted integration opportunities in practice (Baida, 2019).

While migration constitutes a more recent tool in Morocco’s diplomacy in Africa, it has been a much longer-term component of the country’s diplomatic relations with the EU and with several EU member states (most notably Spain, but also France, Belgium and Italy, among others) (Lahlou, 2015; GADEM, 2018a; Teevan, 2019). Morocco is well-known for using migration policy as leverage in its negotiations with the EU, and migration cooperation has undoubtedly played a role in strengthening Morocco’s bilateral and multilateral partnerships with EU states (ibid.). These partnerships go beyond the simple allocation of aid for the country’s migration and broader development projects, to also include improved trade links and access to EU visas for Moroccan citizens.

Major developments in the partnership often appear closely correlated with peaks in irregular migration flows from Morocco to Europe. This was the case in 2019 with the emergence of the wide-ranging Euro-Moroccan Partnership for
Shared Prosperity, not long after the Western Mediterranean route became the main concern for the EU’s management of irregular migration flows. However, even before this spike in Western Mediterranean migration numbers, Morocco was able to obtain extensive financial and diplomatic support from the EU for the implementation of the integration-focused SNIA agenda (Statewatch, 2019). Supporting that agenda held major appeal for EU partners since improving the rights and opportunities available to migrants in Morocco was assumed to be a means of discouraging their onward irregular migration to Europe (Baida, 2019). Indeed, several interviewees referred to the SNIA as a document paid for by international donors and written by consultants. While this could not be confirmed, interviews did attest that a number of European development agencies, as well as the EU, are increasingly funding migration-related initiatives as part of their development cooperation portfolio, using the SNIA as the main framework for action and as an anchor for targeting funding.

Alongside its application to specific regional agendas, Morocco’s migration policy has also been employed in the service of diplomatic objectives on the global stage. The post-2013 migration policy has been heavily publicised in global fora, helping to build Morocco’s reputation as an emerging leader on migration issues and improve its global status, including its credentials as a host or chair of major migration events (Abderrahim, 2019). Some interviewees considered this global staging too akin to a PR exercise, making it impossible until recently to have an open and honest conversation about migration policy in Morocco. However, it is also certainly the case that Morocco gained visibility and credibility throughout the Global Compact process, culminating in the Marrakech Summit in 2018. This global influence, combined with the perception of Morocco as a trusted partner and ally of both African and European states, is a significant achievement in no small part based on the use of migration as a key entry point and platform for external engagement.

Clearly, Morocco’s migration agenda has served as an important foreign policy instrument to gain power and influence, regionally and globally. But the extent to which migration policy is – or was ever – intended to promote concrete changes domestically is far less certain. On paper, the SNIA has wide-ranging domestic impacts. It covers a range of domestic policy areas, from health to education and security, and promises the economic and social integration of thousands of marginalised migrants. The 2014 and 2017 regularisation waves also had substantial domestic impacts in principle, since they granted new legal status to nearly 50,000 previously irregular migrants.

Yet many interviewees asserted that the SNIA and associated regularisation exercises never genuinely aspired to deliver on their promises of migrant integration. The reforms to immigration and asylum legislation set out in the SNIA have yet to be adopted: in fact, several respondents not only expressed frustration at the delays in adopting the new legislation, but also questioned whether it was ever the intention of the Moroccan government to reform the legal framework, and felt that the SNIA was always intended as a ‘woolly’ strategy/declaration of intent, rather than a genuine reform process.

The lack of coherence between the SNIA and broader migration legislation has resulted in the Moroccan authorities adopting approaches to migrants that are not coherent with – and often directly violate – the spirit of the new policy. Many interviewees noted that delays in changing the actual laws are a clear sign of a lack of willingness to do anything concrete with the SNIA, signalling a preference for maintaining the security-focused status quo in practice, while reaping the rewards for a progressive integration policy on paper. Civil society reports of increased violations of migrant rights since mid-2018 by the police and security forces reinforce doubts as to whether the SNIA was only ever intended as hollow rhetoric aimed at gaining global prestige, EU funding and diplomatic support and improved relations within the AU (GADEM, 2018b; Baida, 2019; Statewatch, 2019). Interviewees from civil society as well as representatives of the international community expressed clear concerns regarding the actions of the police, rumours of arrests of migrants and even deportations over the Algerian border. In the main, our respondents were very sceptical regarding the implementation of the SNIA.
The belief that the SNIA and associated regularisation waves were little more than a publicity stunt to serve diplomatic objectives is reinforced by an analysis of the power structures and related incentives (or, rather, lack thereof) associated with the policy’s implementation. Although the launch of the SNIA was accompanied by high-level endorsement calling for its implementation across many policy areas, in practice the government has established limited mechanisms to ensure the engagement of different line ministries. Even within the ministry responsible for migration, the structure of and authority for SNIA implementation is weak and ambiguous. While the launch of the new migration policy officially expanded the remit of the Ministry for Moroccans Residing Abroad to cover migration affairs more broadly, the profile of the latter component has been visibly eroded over time. The migration ministry has now been subsumed into the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccans Residing Abroad, with the title of the delegate for both Moroccans residing abroad and migration affairs sometimes mentioning only the former (Kingdom of Morocco, 2019).

In terms of incentives and resources to support the implementation of the SNIA, on the financial side very little information is available to assess how it was meant to be funded and by whom. In practice, there does not appear to be an explicit or accountable process to allocate resources to the SNIA as part of the annual budget process. Interviewees could not point to examples of clear budget allocations made by government departments, even though in principle all ministries are supposed to take concrete actions to implement the policy. Conversely, it is clear that the international community, and European donors in particular, are finding the SNIA a useful mechanism for allocating ODA to migration-related development actions, in part (and at times explicitly) to compensate for or balance their security-focused investments in supporting the government to contain irregular migration to Europe.

Beyond financial resources, some respondents referred to the Ministry responsible for Moroccans Residing Abroad and Migration Affairs as a weak and ‘hollow’ institution, with very limited power or agency to influence government action or take any meaningful initiatives in relation to policy enforcement and implementation. The movement of key staff between departments, at times away from the ministry and into regional/local roles with limited or no power, are signals that, while good on paper, very little has been put in place to enforce policy implementation.

Overall, the SNIA – and Morocco’s new migration policy more broadly – appears to have served a very specific purpose: to position Morocco as a credible and influential player in the Europe–Africa region. Indeed, some interviewees argued that, with the reintegration of Morocco into the AU, the main purpose of migration policy has been fulfilled and the SNIA ‘is now dead’. In relations with the EU, the SNIA appears to have provided a useful framework for engagement, both in diplomatic and funding terms. This is not to be underestimated; given how misleading attempts to use aid to ‘deter’ migration can be, the SNIA is in many ways valuable in providing an alternative example of a ‘non-securitised’ framework for engagement with the EU.

However, as the deficiencies in SNIA implementation become more apparent, discontent among domestic and international actors will only grow. According to our interviewees and much of the recent literature (GADEM, 2018a; 2018b; Baida, 2019), there is a sense that, now that PR efforts have succeeded internationally and regionally, culminating with the 2018 summit, the ‘mask is off’ and there is a real risk of a domestic backlash against the current incoherent approach to migrant integration. There is also a clear limit to the extent to which international relations can be advanced solely through commitments, without adequate follow-up actions.

### 3.3 The benefits and costs of migration policy

Migration is often framed in terms of the costs and benefits to migrants and host communities. Yet this does not take into account the range of broader domestic and external costs and benefits associated with migration. Here we assess the broader costs and benefits that have emerged in the context of migration policy in Morocco.
- **Benefits** considers the extent to which migrants and migration policies contribute to national development outcomes, whether internally focused (e.g. the development of human capital) or externally oriented (e.g. economic development through regional and global trade or aid partnerships).
- **Costs** considers the economic, political or social costs of migration or migration policies. It can also include the wider costs that migration and migration policy may have on regional or global relationships.

Reflecting the outward-facing orientation of the government’s use of migration as a political tool, the benefits gained by Morocco mainly come from external sources, including the diaspora and regional and global partnerships. These benefits have been substantial in both economic and geopolitical terms, bringing Morocco remittances, aid, trade and diplomatic gains.

Meanwhile, the economic costs to the Moroccan government have been minimal due to extensive donor financing of migrant integration initiatives. The costs to the government therefore relate more to social tensions, and to the domestic and international political repercussions that may arise from the repeated failure to follow through with major policy declarations and commitments. These costs and benefits are outlined in Table 1.
Examples of benefits | Examples of costs
--- | ---
Returns from diaspora (primarily remittances) — On average over the 2000s, remittances amounted to roughly six times the annual amount of ODA and three times the annual FDI received by Morocco each year (de Haas, 2014). Alongside remittances, the diaspora is also a key driver of tourism and investment (Alioua et al., 2017). | Risk of domestic strain due to incoherent government policy — Domestic discontent is likely to increase if local officials are faced with growing migrant numbers but lack national support to implement integration policies.

Increased EU aid for migration management — For border security: 78% of the €276 million of migration-related EU funding to Morocco since 2001 has focused on border management and security (Statewatch, 2019). For migrant integration: €61.6 million given for ‘integration’ between 2015 and 2018, including €35 million in budget support for migration policy (ibid.). | Risk of international backlash due to growing frustration — Frustration at the limited impact of the SNIA to date could damage Morocco’s relations with its African neighbours and with the EU. There are real limits to how much diplomatic goodwill Morocco can continue to generate if the SNIA isn’t properly implemented (Baida, 2019).

Increased EU aid for broader development — Since 2014 the EU has allocated more than €1 billion in assistance to Morocco (via the European Neighbourhood Instrument), focusing mainly on equitable access to social services, governance, the rule of law, mobility, employability and sustainable and inclusive growth (European Commission, 2018). | Increased social tensions — Recent increases in arrests and deportations of migrants are resulting in growing public fear of and racism towards migrants (Alami, 2018). Persistently high youth unemployment and limited formal job prospects are fuelling social tensions more broadly, including towards migrants (El Ghazouani, 2019).

‘Integration’ into Europe via trade deals and visa access — Morocco’s relations with the EU are one of the most developed of all the EU’s southern neighbours. For example, the 2019 Euro-Moroccan Partnership for Shared Prosperity revived discussions on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement and offers potential integration into various EU programmes and agencies/improved visa access for Moroccan citizens (Fox, 2019; Teevan, 2019). | Minimal economic costs due to donor financing — The Moroccan government has incurred relatively few economic costs stemming from migration reform, since the SNIA is ‘mainly implemented by cooperation agencies or international organisations, benefitting from funding essentially coming from Europe’ (GADEM, 2018a; Statewatch, 2019).

Global recognition for migration leadership — Morocco has achieved widespread acclaim and a growing reputation as a leader on migration issues (Baida, 2019). The country hosted the Global Compact for Migration Summit in December 2018 and co-led the Global Forum on Migration and Development (MDCMREAM, 2018). | Regional influence from migration leadership — King Mohammed VI was appointed as the AU ‘Champion’ of Migration in 2017, and proposed an ‘African Agenda for Migration’ in 2018 (Baida, 2019). Rabat has been chosen by the AU to host the new African Observatory on Migration headquarters (Lormeus, 2019a).

Regional influence from migration leadership — King Mohammed VI was appointed as the AU ‘Champion’ of Migration in 2017, and proposed an ‘African Agenda for Migration’ in 2018 (Baida, 2019). Rabat has been chosen by the AU to host the new African Observatory on Migration headquarters (Lormeus, 2019a). | Progress on broader ‘Africapolicy’ — Morocco re-entered the AU in 2017. The country has seen improved trade links, e.g. bilateral trade deals; creation of a new African Continental Free Trade Area in 2019; potential (but contested) pathway to ECOWAS membership (Messari, 2018; The Economist, 2018; Lormeus, 2019b; Jacobs, 2019a). There has been a partial softening of opposition to claims to Western Sahara (Bassist, 2019).

Restricted benefits from migrant contributions — Though migrants have directly contributed to the Moroccan economy, their labour contribution has been limited by restrictions on their ability to practise their past professions and access formal jobs (El Ghazouani, 2019).
4 Implementation of migration policy at the local and sectoral levels

As noted in the previous chapter, the drivers behind a policy’s design may have little to do with its implementation. Understanding how a policy is being delivered and what is influencing this process therefore requires additional consideration beyond an assessment of the original motives for reform. This chapter considers the implementation of Morocco’s migration reform at the sectoral level – within the areas of health, education and employment – before looking at local-level implementation in Oujda and the Oriental region.

4.1 Decentralisation in Morocco: how does migration feature?

Morocco is currently implementing a process of decentralisation, set in motion with the adoption of the new constitution in 2011. Known as ‘advanced regionalisation’, decentralisation aims to delegate more powers and autonomy to Morocco’s 12 regions and expand representative democracy at the regional level (Markria, 2018).1 Regions have their own budgets and budget allocations transferred from the central level to implement their regional development plans.2

As with other key policy areas such as health and education, migration is not decentralised to regional or local structures. Instead, the MDCMREAM – through a number of committees – is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the SNIA. ‘Houses’ (public-facing offices) for Moroccans living abroad and migrants living in Morocco have been created to represent the MDCMREAM at local and regional levels, but these only currently exist in four regions (Markria, 2018).

Instead, the question of migration must be addressed in regional and local economic development plans. While migration itself does not explicitly fall within the jurisdiction of regional structures, they nevertheless must address migrants’ socioeconomic integration in their plans and activities. Some have argued that regional and local economic development plans are an entry point for the operationalisation of the SNIA that is better able to take account of local contexts and realities (ibid.). However, in practice interviewees noted limited consideration or articulation of migration issues in regional and local development plans across the country. In most regions, the contribution that migration can make to regional development is not considered, let alone exploited.

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1 ‘Regionalisation avancée’ (advanced regionalisation) is the term used by the Government of Morocco to outline the decentralisation process in the 2011 constitution.

2 Regional councils undertake strategic planning using regional development plans. These plans identify development priorities in their region and outline a strategy, their guiding principles, and the various activities that the councils will undertake to promote economic, social and environmental development in the region.
4.2 Healthcare

The SNIA calls for migrants and refugees to access healthcare under the same conditions as Moroccans, and for coordination of the activities of civil society actors in the field of health. It is however important to note that some of the key policy reforms relating to migrants’ access to healthcare services predate the SNIA, from a circular issued in 2007 enabling migrants regardless of status to access primary healthcare services, to a 2011 reform of internal regulations for hospitals to ensure that all foreign patients (regardless of status) are admitted to hospitals (secondary and tertiary services) under the same conditions as nationals (MoH, 2018).

Building on this, the Ministry of Health has made strong commitments to ensure universal access to healthcare for migrants (PNPM, 2017). Yet the difference between rhetoric and reality is often stark, for example:

- A national strategy on the health of migrants was developed in consultation with civil society. However, this has not been adopted due to a lack of consensus at the national level between the various ministries involved in the strategy – the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance – regarding how to operationalise the SNIA.

- A convention enabling regular migrants to access basic medical coverage for secondary and tertiary healthcare for poor households (from which they were previously excluded) was signed in 2015 between the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Economy and Finances, the MDCMREAM, the Ministry of Health and the CNDH. However, no official instructions have been issued on the practical implementation of the convention. As a result, there are significant disparities in access to secondary and tertiary healthcare services for migrants across the country. The Ministry of Health has also conducted training for staff on supporting migrant cases, awareness-raising activities and the prevention of communicable diseases (PNPM, 2017; MoH, 2018). The degree to which national-level conventions are implemented locally seems to differ from one region to the next. The 2017 National Platform for Migrants’ Protection (PNPM) review notes that universal access to primary healthcare is not necessarily adhered to in all regions (PNPM, 2017). At times migrants are unable to access secondary or tertiary services in the absence of dedicated insurance schemes or civil society organisations to cover the costs (PNPM, 2017; 2019). As a result of language barriers there is a lack of awareness among migrants of services, and how to access them, meaning that many migrants rely on civil society organisations for health provision (PNPM, 2017; 2019).

4.3 Education

The SNIA aims to integrate migrants and refugees into both formal and informal education systems, and outlines several initiatives to facilitate school enrolment and attendance and reduce barriers to access (MDCMREAM, 2014; 2018).

The Ministry of Education has issued various legal documents over the last few decades aiming to ensure access to education for migrant and refugee children, including a circular issued in 1996 and another in October 2013 requesting that school directors and administrators admit students from the Sahel and sub-Saharan African countries to private and public schools and non-formal education (Benjelloun, 2017). These circulars entitle migrant children from sub-Saharan Africa to access schools across the territory, although a 2017 review by the PNPM on migrants’ access to services in Morocco noted that this circular had not been received or applied by all schools in the country (PNPM, 2017).

The SNIA builds on these circulars in the following ways:

- For enrolment, migrant children intending to register at school must have an authorisation from the Regional Direction of Education. They must then present this form to individual school directors in order to enrol. While this process typically requires several documents, a circular was issued
in 2019 to facilitate the process, allowing students to register in school even in the absence of documentation (including proof of educational attainment) by relying on a sworn statement instead. However, the PNPM review of 2018 highlighted that this circular was implemented to different degrees across the country (PNPM, 2019).

- Several programmes focus on ensuring adequate attendance, including the roll-out of special classes for migrant and refugee children who may have missed years of school to bring them up to their appropriate grade levels, French- and Arabic-language classes, non-formal education (MDCMREAM, 2018), and the distribution of school bags and cash transfers (Benjelloun, 2017).

As with healthcare, civil society organisations and international development partners play a key role in implementing and financing most (if not all) of these activities (MDCMREAM, 2018).

4.4 Employment and professional training

The SNIA outlines three specific objectives relating to employment for migrants:

- Facilitate access to employment for regular migrants and refugees.
- Promote enterprise creation by regular migrants and refugees.
- Fill gaps in the labour force.

While progress has been made in terms of migrants’ access to employment, restrictions remain. Formal employment, self-employment and many employment-related services are only accessible to regular migrants and refugees if their residence permit entitles them to work. Irregular migrants typically work in the informal sector because they are excluded from the formal labour market and employment services.

While access to work visas has been facilitated through recent initiatives implemented by the Ministry of Labour (ibid; PNPM, 2019), regular migrants still face limitations on the professions in which they are allowed to work:

- Migrants are not able to work in certain public sector professions, and cannot, for example, work as lawyers, doctors or university teachers in public institutions (ILO, 2014).
- Employers seeking to hire foreign workers have to apply to the ANAPEC (the national employment agency) for authorisation, which requires a range of paperwork.
- For certain professions, employers must also demonstrate that the position they are hiring for cannot be filled by a national. Following the SNIA, a communication from the ANAPEC lifted the rule for migrants who had been regularised during the 2014 and 2017 waves, but the PNPM (2017) notes that this has not been supported by appropriate legislation. In Oujda, for example, key informants noted that employers are reluctant to hire migrants for fear of acting illegally.

4.4.1 Access to employment services for migrants

The MDCMREAM signed a convention with the Office of Professional Training and Employment Promotion (OFPPT) and several NGOs to recognise foreign qualifications which are typically required to access certain programmes by the ANAPEC (Benjelloun, 2017). Some of these have now become available to migrants regularised during the 2014 and 2017 waves, including TAEHIL (aiming to improve employability) and IDMAJ (aiming to enhance employers’ ability to hire recent graduates) (PNPM, 2019). A number of employment (and self-employment) programmes are also being financed by international partners (including the Belgian development agency and UNHCR), but overall coverage remains limited.

4.4.2 Professional training programmes

The SNIA aims to promote access for regular migrants to professional training programmes and promote their professional integration. Some national institutions have begun to accept migrants into their programmes. For example, the MDCMREAM signed a convention with the OFPPT in June 2014 to secure access to its professional training programmes for
Box 1  In focus: the case of Oujda

Oujda is the capital city of the Oriental region of north-eastern Morocco, with a population of around half a million people. Located on the border with Algeria and just to the south of the Mediterranean, the region is a key migration hub. The region is an exception to the rule that migration rarely features in regional development plans in Morocco, with migration integrated as a cross-cutting issue in Oriental’s Regional Development Plan 2016–2021 (PDR).

The PDR highlights the need for the social integration of regularised migrants, and outlines initiatives to address the needs (and promote their contribution to regional development) of Moroccans living abroad. The plan outlines various programmes and projects to integrate migrants, including:

• the roll-out of a strategy for Moroccans living abroad;
• strengthening the capacity of decentralised structures to manage migration;
• the commission of a study on the region’s migration profile; and
• the establishment of relevant governance mechanisms.

However, the PDR places greater emphasis on Moroccans living abroad than it does on integrating migrants in the region, and the plan gives little to no consideration to how immigration can be galvanised as a resource to contribute to economic and social development.

Our research found limited evidence that commitments on paper are translating into tangible practice, with very few projects or programmes initiated by the Regional Council of Oriental (CRO) to facilitate the integration of migrants. While a number of studies have been commissioned by international partners (including GIZ and IOM) to identify specific initiatives that could promote the integration of migrants in Oujda, interviewees noted that none of the recommendations from these studies had been adopted by the CRO, and that the budget for migration affairs remains largely unused.

The reasons for the limited engagement in migration issues at the regional level are similar to those more generally in Morocco. One vice-president of the regional council noted that the CRO would only address immigration questions once a clear vision has been elaborated at the national level. Key informants also noted that many CRO members are not familiar with migration issues despite training initiatives by development partners (Markria, 2018).
regular migrants. However, participation remains limited, with only 54 migrants and refugees enrolled in 2017–2018 nationwide (MDCMREAM, 2018). In Oujda, civil society organisations (with financing from international actors) have been promoting access by covering registration fees and providing participants with food baskets and other items to help them meet their basic needs during the training programme. In turn, the Entraide Nationale (a government institution responsible for providing social support to vulnerable sectors of society) has launched professional training programmes for migrants. These typically have limited reach, with very low numbers of participants, and programmes do not lead to a qualification (PNPM, 2017).

4.5 Policy implementation in Oujda and beyond

How migration policy plays out at the regional and local level is fundamentally tied to the broader process of decentralisation that began in 2011. The SNIA is a national policy, but has yet to galvanise more than limited action at the regional and local level.

In our interviews the following key themes came through when discussing regional and local dynamics in the Oriental region (see Box 1), and across Morocco more broadly.

Unclear responsibility for policy implementation at the regional and local level. It became clear in interviews that, in the ongoing decentralisation process, there is a lack of clarity...
over who is expected to take migration questions forward and drive policies to effectively integrate migrants, both economically and socially. Many interviewees saw decentralisation as a key opportunity for the effective implementation of the SNIA, with policies and activities to integrate migrants becoming better rooted in local contexts.

Yet in practice, without rules delegating responsibility for integrating migration in development activities – at the regional, provincial or local levels – different levels of governance have tended to either offload the issue onto one another or wait passively for directions from more centralised structures (a stance termed attentisme or ‘wait and see’). This creates a political vacuum where decentralised governance structures lack the initiative to address the needs of migrants or promote their integration.

In this vacuum, civil society has often come to play a prominent role on migration at the regional and local level, as highlighted in Oujda. The PNPM review and key informants in Oujda noted that differences across regions can be explained by the presence or absence of civil society actors advocating on behalf of migrants (PNPM, 2017).

Lack of incentives at the regional and local levels. Migration is not considered an electoral issue for the political parties driving policy in regional and local governance structures. They therefore have limited incentives to develop strategies – or even political positions – on the issue. In turn, interviewees noted that politicians still do not recognise the phenomenon of immigration, as migrants to Morocco are still considered to be in transit – and therefore have a limited role to play in local or regional development. Related to this, interviewees noted that migration itself is rarely conceptualised as a regional development issue, but rather a question to be dealt with centrally by the Ministry of the Interior. This confirms the literature’s characterisation of the SNIA as a highly centralised policy. Weak downwards communications structures are exacerbated by a lack of buy-in at the level of regional and local government, with diverging perceptions of the role of migration in Morocco – while Morocco increasingly presents itself externally as a destination country, this has yet to be matched by internal perceptions.

Uneven progress by sector. There seem to be greater achievements in extending services to migrants (which in the framework represents a cost of migration) compared to strengthening migrants’ participation in the labour market (a benefit of migration). Indeed, more progress seems to have been made in extending access to healthcare and education to migrant and refugee children, while participation in the labour market continues to be limited by the principle of preference nationale. As migrants are considered competitors in the labour market, their integration may not be regarded as a benefit to locals. Instead, the benefits of migration seem to be conceptualised only in terms of the contribution that emigrants can make in the form of remittances to and investments in their home communities.
5 Conclusion

The main objective of this study was not to evaluate the effectiveness or impact of migration policy in Morocco, but rather to analyse the political economy factors affecting the evolution and implementation of migration policies, and the implications for domestic and external aspects of Morocco’s development policies and outcomes. The study found that, across several important dimensions of Moroccan migration policy, there is more than one side to the story.

First and foremost, there is a divergence and lack of coherence between Morocco’s domestic and external agendas on migration. In many other countries, migration and border management are primarily matters for domestic policy. Yet in Morocco, the purpose of migration policy is primarily to achieve specific foreign policy objectives: to regain entry and influence in the AU, gain support for joining ECOWAS, reduce opposition to its contested claim to Western Sahara and position itself as a trusted and reliable player in the region, mediating between the interests and priorities of countries in North and sub-Saharan Africa with European and other MENA neighbours.

In the main, these foreign policy objectives have been achieved. As a result, in the words of one respondent some fear that the SNIA ‘is now finished’, if ever it was intended to play a major role domestically. There is certainly frustration and a certain dose of cynicism among civil society actors, as well as within the international community, about the willingness and commitment of the Moroccan government to take concrete steps to pass legislation and allocate resources to implement the SNIA. It will be important for the government to address these concerns and develop a credible plan to put reform into practice, especially to speed up legislative change. In the absence of such signals and actions there is a risk of a domestic backlash that may undermine the image of stability and credibility that Morocco has established in the region, and as a trusted partner of Europe.

The second area of divergence is the role of Morocco as a pivotal actor in two related but very distinct foreign policy landscapes: Europe and Africa. Morocco is a key partner of the EU and migration is clearly a key component of that relationship. In principle, a policy aiming to integrate migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and other neighbouring countries into Morocco could serve Europe’s wider policy objectives to better manage and reduce irregular migration at its borders by providing opportunities and incentives for migrants to stay in Morocco. For this reason, European partners have provided significant funding to implement the SNIA. However, uneven implementation of the SNIA to date, the mixed results of regularisation initiatives, demographic trends and high rates of youth unemployment all point to continued emigration from Morocco to Europe. This is likely to be at least in part irregular due to the lack of legal pathways. While the SNIA has served the purpose of signalling Morocco’s commitment to integrate migrants and reduce onward migration, unless it delivers better integration and economic opportunities for those in transit it risks undermining commitments to better manage and reduce irregular migration to Europe. It also risks damaging relations with African neighbours, with exclusion and hostility in practice contradicting repeated assertions of continental solidarity and friendly, open borders.

A third area of divergence relates to the narrative of Morocco as an emerging power, and increasingly as a country of immigration rather than emigration. In practice this appears to be undermined by two factors: first, high levels of unemployment and lack of opportunities for young people, whose intent to emigrate remains high; and second, the limited capacity of national systems to offer concrete opportunities to
migrants to induce them to stay and contribute to economic and social life. The fact that the country continues to rely heavily on the vast remittances of the Moroccan diaspora, and the high visibility of the policy to attract investment from Moroccans abroad, contradicts the image of Morocco as increasingly a destination country.

In principle, the government offers a coherent narrative between the SNMRE’s efforts to maximise the benefits derived from emigration with the SNIA’s commitment to welcome and integrate new migrants. Yet in practice the two policies and strategies are not being developed or implemented coherently, and there are tensions and contradictions between them. The fact that the newly elected government has separated the two portfolios and renamed the Ministry as ‘Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccans Residing Abroad’ – with a visible ‘delegated’ portfolio on expatriates but not on immigration – has increased concerns that the commitment to immigration is languishing.

The final area of divergence relates to the gap between policy ambition, evolution and implementation. Our analysis points to a stark contrast between the refined political narrative and high-level commitment regarding the SNIA at the top level of government, and its limited implementation, either through national-level actions and initiatives (for example, the lack of concrete budget commitments, a normative framework or accountability for delivery) or through decentralised delivery at the local level. To date, this contrast has not prevented Morocco from gaining significant influence and visibility, especially at the international and regional level, but it will be harmful in the long term.

Despite these areas of divergence, the significant achievements made, especially at international and regional level, should not be underestimated. Migration is rarely seen or understood as a key component of foreign policy or as a diplomatic tool. During the negotiations ahead of the adoption of the Global Compact for Migration in 2018, a number of countries challenged the very notion of international cooperation on migration. We also saw countries suffering a significant domestic backlash for underestimating the tensions between a progressive foreign policy agenda and perceived national priorities.

Against this background, Morocco’s strategic use of migration policies to build alliances, attract financial resources and develop credibility as a trusted regional and global player offers some useful (and rare) insights into the political economy of migration as a foreign policy strategy.

Ultimately, Morocco offers a concrete example of how migration can be a strategic component of diplomatic efforts in helping to achieve significant foreign policy objectives. But unless the country embraces the necessary follow-through, there is a risk that Morocco’s commitment to the Global Compact and beyond will remain hollow at best, undermining the efforts made to date to establish Morocco as a credible and stable regional power and global player in the migration space.

Based on our analysis, we recommend the following.

The government of Morocco should:

- **Strengthen institutional infrastructure** to ensure a credible and tangible commitment to implement the SNIA and SNMRE, as part of a broader strategy on both immigration and emigration. This will require concrete incentives to meaningfully embed the SNIA into sectoral plans and budgets, for example on health, education, welfare and jobs.

- **Better align legislation and normative frameworks with policy ambition and design**: this will require fast-tracking new legislation on matters of asylum and immigration, to address the lack of coherence between the SNIA and existing legislation and remove the blockages to implementation and delivery.

- **Re-engage with civil society** in a sincere and concerted manner, to rebuild trust in the Moroccan government’s intention to promote migrant rights, and to ensure that civil society organisations are treated as respected, independent partners in the design, implementation and monitoring of migrant integration processes.

- **Drive forward progress in decentralising decision-making powers and financial resources** at the regional and local level, to facilitate the implementation of the SNIA, ensuring that migrants can integrate into Morocco’s economy and society.
The international community should:

- **Ensure consistency between diplomatic engagement and development cooperation**, providing transparent information on the rationale for financial support to the SNIA, and how this relates to other forms of support.
- **Develop realistic milestones to engage with the Moroccan government on key areas of implementation**, in particular to promote a major push to align national legislative frameworks with the policy objectives of the SNIA.
- **Engage in a dialogue with Morocco, the AU and other key actors in the region**, ensuring better coherence between multilateral cooperation and bilateral relationships on migration and other related policies, from trade to development cooperation.

If taken, these actions will go some way to restoring trust between the government of Morocco and its people. Giving confidence to the international community, including Morocco’s African neighbours, is essential to show that Morocco is taking serious action, not just to position itself as a regional and global leader on international migration, but also to implement in practice the commitments made by the SNIA. In the words of a respondent to this study, ‘the charm offensive is over’ – it is now time to demonstrate what Morocco can achieve in practice.


Ait Hamza, W. (2017) ‘The Maghreb Union is one of the world’s worst-performing trading blocs. Here are five ways to change that’. Blog, 1 June. World Economic Forum (www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/five-ways-to-make-maghreb-work/).


Annex 1 A political economy framework

This framework offers a new way of examining how ‘systemic’ political economy analysis (PEA) factors, such as structures, institutions and ‘rules of the game’ shape the effects of migration on development outcomes.

The framework proposes two key areas for analysis:

- The **benefits and costs of migration**, i.e. the extent to which immigrants realise their potential and contribute to development outcomes, and the extent to which migration, migration policies and contexts affects socioeconomic and political structures within and outside of a country.
- The effects of these costs and benefits on **development outcomes**.

The framework identifies the variables that need to be included in the analysis. These include:

- **Structural factors**: features that are relatively slow to change or are essentially fixed, and institutional features that may be more susceptible to change over the short to medium term.
- **Institutional factors**: individuals and organisations, their motivations and the relationships and/or balance of power between them.

Figure A1 sketches out the key features of the framework. The main area of focus of analysis is shaded within the diagram at the point where PEA factors interact with migration. Table A1 provides definitions and examples of key terms used in the framework.

*Figure A1 The PEA framework*
Table A1  Key terms used in the framework: definitions and examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Examples and application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agency, power, incentives and behaviour</td>
<td>Incentives are the motivations (financial, political, personal, ideational etc.) of individuals and organisations that shape their behaviour.</td>
<td>For example, migrants’ ability to use their skills – and gain new ones – in formal labour markets to improve their incomes and generate tax revenues. Benefits might also include the social implications of new skilled migrants, the cultural benefits that migrants bring to communities, or the impact of remittances and skilled returnees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>Benefits reflect the extent to which migrants can fulfil their potential and contribute to development outcomes. The term might also refer to the wider benefits that migration and migration policy might have on regional or global state relationships, or the benefits derived from migrants abroad.</td>
<td>For example, class sizes may expand rapidly due to the enrolment of immigrant children, and teaching may become more complex due to differences in school readiness and language. Alternatively, costs could refer to the political cost of migration to a government in terms of public support for, or opposition to, migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
<td>Costs relate to whether migrants place additional demands on host country resources and systems. They also include non-economic costs, such as the political or social costs of migration or migration policies. The term might also refer to wider costs that migration and migration policy might have on regional or global state relationships.</td>
<td>Examples of development outcomes include poverty reduction, improved trading partnerships, increased political participation, greater investment from diasporas, improved education and skills development and improved mobility rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development outcomes</td>
<td>Development outcomes denotes the economic, social and political development of a country due to the impact of migration. It relates to a broad scope of outcomes according to indicators identified in national strategies, goals and objectives. Development outcomes are categorised as either domestic or external impacts.</td>
<td>The domestic impact of migration might relate to the direct economic boost from migration. It can also include the impact of migration policy on the integration of migrants into society, or the political and social impact of enabling migrants’ access to services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic impact of migration</td>
<td>The domestic impact of migration relates to the development outcomes derived from migrants and migration policy. Domestic impacts of migration might be influenced or impacted by relations between states which might change migration flows.</td>
<td>The external impact of migration might include trade agreements that refer to migration, conditional aid based on migration policy or mobility agreements between states and trading blocs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External impact of migration</td>
<td>The external impact of migration is understood as the development outcomes and impacts of migration and migration policy on relationships and agreements between states and blocs. These agreements with regional or global partners can in turn affect domestic development outcomes.</td>
<td>Examples include the location of a country along a migration route, agreements on mobility with other states and the wealth, poverty or stability of neighbouring countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitical dynamics: regional and global</td>
<td>Geopolitical dynamics: regional and global reflect the broader geopolitical contexts influencing migration to and from states.</td>
<td>Examples of migration barriers include resource constraints, lack of legal pathways and restrictive social norms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Migrants vary in terms of age, gender, family structure, skill status, specific professional or technical expertise and personal characteristics and aspirations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A1 (continued)  Key terms used in the framework: definitions and examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Examples and application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migration drivers</td>
<td><em>Migration drivers</em> are factors determining whether people migrate.</td>
<td>‘Macro factors’ include socioeconomic, political, environmental, economic and demographic drivers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘Meso factors’ include social networks and technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘Micro factors’ include personal circumstance, including religion, ethnicity and gender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale</td>
<td><em>Scale</em> reflects the number of immigrants coming to the host country (or specific areas within it) during the study.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures, institutions and ‘rules of the game’</td>
<td><em>Structural factors</em> relate to the underlying structures of the host (and to an extent the origin) country that shape how immigrants live their lives and their impact on development outcomes.</td>
<td>Examples include demography, geography (e.g. natural resource endowment), geopolitics, culture and social structure, history, climate and climate change and level of technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Institutions</em> consist of the policies and institutions in host countries that shape access to services, jobs and other markets.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The ‘rules of the game’ relate to the institutions, including formal laws and regulations and informal social, political and cultural norms, that shape power relations and economic and political outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td><em>Type</em> covers both types of migration and types of immigrant.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex 2  List of interviewees and informants

### Table A2  List of interviewees and informants: Rabat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camille Denis</td>
<td>General Coordinator</td>
<td>Groupe antiraciste d’accompagnement et de défense des étrangers et migrants (GADEM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouloud El Kamel</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eulalia Figueras Civit</td>
<td>Project Officer</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration (IOM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathalie Houlou</td>
<td>Programme Officer – Governance and Migration</td>
<td>Delegation of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mounia Marzak</td>
<td>Directrice de la Communication et de la Mobilisation des compétences des MDM</td>
<td>Ministry of Moroccans Abroad and International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie Paindavoine</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>Agence Française de Développement (AFD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hannes Stegemann</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Caritas Rabat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table A3  List of interviewees and informants: remote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdeslam Amakhtari</td>
<td>Asticude</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abderrazak El Harji</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Migration et Developpement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erika Ramanzini</td>
<td>Legal Representative</td>
<td>CEFA Maroc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alessandra Varesco &amp; Oualid Chourak</td>
<td>Responsible d’intervention</td>
<td>Enabel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table A4  List of interviewees and informants: Oujda**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abderrahman</td>
<td></td>
<td>Association Marocaine d’Appui à la Promotion de la Petite Entreprise (AMAPPE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omar Akemmour</td>
<td>Regional Director</td>
<td>Office de la Formation Professionnelle et de la Promotion du Travail (OFPPT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Allioua</td>
<td></td>
<td>Associative actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amarti</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Regional Commission of the Conseil National des Droits de l’Homme (CNDH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Said Baaziz</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
<td>Regional Council of Oriental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mina Benissa</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
<td>ANAPEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdelmalek Kouala</td>
<td>Regional Director</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesbah</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
<td>Regional Council of Oriental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moubtil</td>
<td>Head of Service</td>
<td>Regional Delegation for National Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Tarik Oufkir</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>MS2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan Outmani</td>
<td>Regional Director</td>
<td>L’Entraide Nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanae Salmi</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>Organisation Marocaine des Droits de l’Homme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Wahed</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>Fondation Orient Occident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Zerouali</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>Regional Council of Oriental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benyouness Znasni</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Alvafae Association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 3  Key policy documents reviewed

- 2011 Constitution
- 2013 Ministry of Education circular
- Décret No. 2-57-1256 du 2 safar 1377 (29 août 1957) fixant les modalités d’application de la convention relative au statut des réfugiés signée à Genève le 28 juillet 1951
- The decentralisation laws:
  - Loi 111.14 relative aux régions
  - Loi 112.14 relative aux préfectures et provinces
  - Loi 113.14 relative aux communes
- Loi 02-03 relative à l’entrée et au séjour des étrangers au Royaume du Maroc, à l’émigration et l’immigration irrégulière
- Morocco’s Migration Policies and Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
- Politique National d’Immigration et d’Asile: Rapport 2017
- Politique Nationale d’Immigration et d’Asile: Rapport 2018
- Stratégie Nationale de Développement Durable: 2017–2018 Rapport Final
- Stratégie Nationale d’Immigration et d’Asile
- Stratégie Nationale En Faveur Des Marocains Du Monde